POLITICAL LAW:

A REVIEW OF VELASCO DECISIONS

Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon

U.P. College of Law Class 1987

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

BAYAN MUNA, AS REPRESENTED BY REP. SATUR OCAMPO, REP. CRISPIN

BELTRAN, AND REP. LIZA L. MAZA v. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND BLAS F. OPLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011, J. Velasco, Jr.

Essential Facts

The Philippines signed the Rome Statute, a treaty which establishes the International
Criminal Court (ICC).

The ICC has the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern (considered grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression) and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.

However, no ratification was made at the time the Petition was filed.

The Republic of the Philippines (RP), represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed
with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note which
Petitioners allege would violate a treaty obligation.

Bayan Muna alleges that the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as
persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.

The Agreement prevents the state-parties from surrendering a national of the other to a
third party or to the international tribunal without the consent of the said other State

Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and

ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.

Bayan Muna also alleges that the Agreement was constituted solely for the purpose of
providing individuals or groups of individuals with immunity from the jurisdiction of the
ICC; and such grant of immunity through non-surrender agreements allegedly does not
legitimately fall within the scope of Art. 98 of the Rome Statute.

Nature of Executive Agreement

Question: Was the Non-Surrender Agreement validly contracted between the

Philippines and the United States of America considering that Philippines signed
the Rome Statute?

Answer: Yes, the agreement was validly contracted between the Philippines
and the United States of America. At the time the petition was filed the Senate
has not ratified the Rome Statute and the same is therefore considered an
executive agreement. The President, as head of state and government, is the
sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution
vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject,
in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate.

An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law, the courts
should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.

Customary Practice in Public International Law

Question: In Public International Law, will Exchange of Notes be a valid basis

to conclude an agreement between two independent states?

Answer: Yes. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental

agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement.

Hence, the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and

the U.S. in the exchange note is a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations. Under international
law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of
their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. On the domestic
sphere, an AGREEMENT cannot be held valid if it violates the Constitution.
 Question: Does the Philippines adhere to the doctrine of incorporation in its
dealings with other independent states?

Answer : Yes, the Doctrine of Incorporation is enshrined under Section 2,

Article II of the Constitution wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The country
also adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Question: Being a signatory to the Rome Statute, will the Philippines substantially
impair the value of the governments undertaking on jurisdictional conflict of the
domestic courts and the International Criminal Court under the Non-Surrender Bilateral
Agreement with the U.S. government ?

Answer: No. The Philippines will not violate its obligations under of the provisions of
the Rome Statute because the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions.

Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem under par. 3 of Art.
20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-
-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that no person who has
been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction]
shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.
(elements of double jeopardy)

Distinction between State Party and State Signatory

Question: At the inception of the case, the Philippine Senate has not ratified the Rome
Statute. Is there any distinction between the obligation of a state party and a state
signatory under the facts of the case?

Answer: Yes. There is a distinction. At the time of the filing of the case, the Philippines
is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by
the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any
provision in the treaty would be premature. (doctrine of transformation)

Question: With the ratification of the Rome Statute by the Senate, discuss the
obligation of the Philippines as a state party?

Answer: Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;
whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of
a treaty in good faith. Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90 are only legally binding upon State-Parties,
not signatories. (principle of pacta sund servanda)

DELEGATION OF POWERS

SM LAND, INC. (SMLI) v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.

Essential Facts:

Pursuant to R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA opened for disposition and development its
Bonifacio South Property.

SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the
development of the lot which was accepted by the BCDA.

Upon acceptance of SMLIs bid proposal, the BCDA clarified that its act should not be
construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture agreement with SMLI. At best
it can only constitute as an authorization to conduct detailed negotiations with SMLI and
iron out the terms and conditions of the agreement.

Afterwards, a Certification was issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties. BCDA
prepared for the conduct of a Competitive Challenge. In furtherance thereof, the agency
issued Terms of Reference. Consequently, SMLI was required to post a proposal
security in the amount of PhP 187 million, following the prescribed procedure outlined in
the TOR and the NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines.

Instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded with
SMLI stating that it will welcome from other parties any voluntary and unconditional
proposal to improve SMLIs original offer.

To protect its standing bid proposal, SMLI increased the total secured payments with an
upfront payment to BCDA.

Without any comment on SMLIs new proposal, SMLI found out that the BCDA sent a
memorandum to the Office of the President categorically recommending the termination
of the Competitive Challenge with SMLI.

Alarmed by this development, SMLI urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive
Challenge as agreed upon.

Without heeding SMLIs request, the BCDA terminated the Competitive Challenge
altogether.
Question: Can an administrative agency pursuant to its charter formulate rules to
implement the mandated objectives of the agency?

Answer: Yes, under the doctrine of delegation of powers, administrative agencies have
the authority to promulgate issuances provided they conform with the congressional act
vesting in them such power. To bind third parties, the promulgated rules must be
published. (Tanada v. Tuvera, factors to consider when one is a publication of general
circulation)

The administrative agency must likewise comply with the twin tests of valid delegation,
to wit:

1. Completeness Test; and

2. Sufficient Standard Test

Question: Can SMLI assail the decision of the BCDA to ignore its submitted proposal
under its Competitive Challenge despite compliance with the rules for the disposal of
the property in question?

Answer: Yes. SMLI has the right to a completed competitive challenge pursuant to the
NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines and the Certification issued by the BCDA.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in Executive Orders. The NEDA Joint Venture
Guidelines and the Competitive Challenge are incorporated in presidential issuances
and officers of NEDA and BCDA were likewise authorized by the President to undertake
steps to carry out the tasks.

Question: Can SMLI invoke the application of the alter ego doctrine when the BCDA
recommended to the Office of the President that the SMLI submitted bid proposal under
BCDAs Competitive Challenge be totally ignored?

Answer : Yes. In this particular case the executive power to issue rules and regulations
on procurement has been delegated to the Presidents alter egos, partcularly to NEDA
and BCDA. BCDA can no longer renege on submitted proposal of SMLI under its
Competitive Challenge. By allowing SMLI, to submit voluntary and unconditional
proposal to improve the original offer, BCDA is now precluded from changing the rules
it earlier promulgated. SMLI was led to believe that BCDA has been duly authorized to
act on behalf of the Office of the President.

DELEGATION OF POWERS AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the Department of Health,
Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEA, G.R. No. 159883, March 31, 2008, Velasco,
Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

The petitioner, Dr. Gobenciong, was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman after
an investigation conducted upon a complaint filed against him by respondent Dela
Pena.

Dr. Gobenciong filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
questioned the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate, prosecute and impose
disciplinary sanctions on public officers.

C.A. denied the petition.

Dr. Gobenciongs present petition contends that the Ombudsman does not have the
power to investigate, prosecute and discipline public officers. Hence, he prays that the
S.C. declare R.A. No. 6770 as unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue delegation of
power.

Question: Is the Ombudsman empowered to investigate, conduct the prosecution and

implement disciplinary actions against public officers?

Answer: Yes. The provisions of R.A.No. 6770 granting investigative, prosecutorial and
disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman are constitutional. The Office of the
Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it
to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and
corrupt public officers in the Government.

Question: Was there a valid delegation of power under R.A. No. 6770 provisos
granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman?

Answer: Yes. It is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant
by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the
Ombudsman. The framers of the Constitution, however, left it to Congress to invest the
office with more broad powers to enforce its own action.

Thus, R.A. No. 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15(1) thereof, the
Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government,
the investigation of cases of which the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction.
 N.B. The Ombudsman may delegate to DOJ the prosecution of cases
involving public officers.

Read Ombudsman v. C.A. and Mayor Binay

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED

RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008,
VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

Some concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC of
Imus against several government agencies, principally the MMDA, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

(Writ of Continuing Mandamus)

Petitioners also prayed that MMDA and the other respondent government
agencies be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to RTC-Imus a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC-Imus rendered a Decision in favor of the concerned residents of Manila.

Respondent MMDA et al. filed an appeal before CA arguing that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (P.D. No. 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

Aside from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, MMDA et al. also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the decision of RTC-Imus.

Question: Do the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (P.D. No. 1152) relate
only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning of pollution
(effluence) in general?

Answer: No. The policy statements and the provisions of P.D. No. 1152 do not in
any manner limit the states responsibility for incidents related to clean-up. In
 fact, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. (Relate to Oposa
v. Factoran and Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Straits v. DENR Sec.
Reyes)

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less
would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. (Refer to Article XI Public
Accountability: Public Office is a public trust.)

Question: Can the task of cleaning up of the Manila be compelled by

mandamus?

Answer: Yes. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus.

The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924
creating the MMDA which states that solid waste disposal and management
which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs
and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal.

It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and
related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid
waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code
(P.D. No. 1152) and R.A. No. 9003, but in its own charter as well (R.A. 7924).

The enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Sec.
3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 creating the MMDA charged it with the task of solid
waste disposal and management.

LEGISLATURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTION LAW

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA)

G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.

There are three petitions in this case challenging the constitutionality of the provisions
of R.A. 9165 insofar as the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.

Essential Facts:

SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and PDEA from enforcing
paragraph (g) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 on the ground that it is constitutionally infirm
because it imposes an additional qualification for a senator to undergo mandatory drug
testing. Pimentel Jr. and Atty. Laserna Jr. also seek the nullification of said law, including
the COMELEC Res. No. 6486 which implements drug testing for political candidates.

Question: Whether Sec. 36(g) of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Res. No. 6486 are
unconstitutional for imposing an additional qualification for candidates for senator?

Answer: Yes. The assailed provision of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 are unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. Sec.3 of Art.VI
of the Constitution provides that: No person shall be a senator unless he is natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election. Drug testing is not one of the
constitutional requirements to become a senator.

Thus, COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
Sec. 36(g) cannot be imposed by Congress and if it cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power.

The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec.
36(g) of R.A. No. 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in
the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.

LEGISLATURE AND THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURES
Question: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional on the grounds of violation of right against unreasonable searches and
right to privacy?

Answer: Paragraphs (c), (d), and (g) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 are constitutional .
Firstly, on the grounds of right against unreasonable searches , it should be highlighted
that what the Sec. 2 of Article II of the Constitution, requires a reasonable showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by the judge. The factor considered here is
the nature of privacy interest upon drug testing.

The factor considered in the assailed provisions is the nature of privacy interest upon
drug testing. There could be no unconstitutionality to the search (in this case the
random drug testing) because as it might be deemed mandatory, it is randomly done,
thus not specifying the people subjected to be tested, the place and the schedule. Plus,
the testing would be conducted by trained professionals in controlled locations of
Department of Health to ensure the trustworthiness of results and to safeguard against
tampering of the results and accurate chain of custody.

(Please take note of the purpose of chain of custody; requisites)

LEGISLATURE AND THE POWER TO TAX

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del

Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Vallares, Joselito A. Moraleda, et al. v.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177857-58 January 24, 2012, Velasco Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

Republic Act 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF) which imposes a levy on every sale of
copra.

The fund was placed under the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.

The Philippine Coconut Authority also had its share of the coco levy funds because with
the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued several presidential decrees to
improve the coconut industry through collection and use of the coco levy fund, which
included the following:

P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468 which both provide that the CCSF and CDIF shall not
be construed as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the
government. The intention is for the said funds to belong to coconut farmers in their
private capacities.

An earlier decree, P.D. No. 755 likewise empowered the Philippine Coconut Authority to
look after the welfare of coconut farmers.

Through the years, the Philippine Coconut Authority purchased shares of stocks of the
United Coconut Planters Bank with the funds it collected under P.D. 961 and P.D. 1468

It is a contention of the Petitioners that P.D. No. 755, P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No.1468
are unconstitutional because the funds collected by the Philippine Coconut Authority
under the two latter are in fact taxes which can only be spent for public purpose.

Question: Whether P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468 are unconstitutional for declaring
the funds which the Philippine Coconut Authority has been authorized to collect are
funds which can be used to purchase shares of stocks for private individuals?

Answer: Yes, both presidential decrees are unconstitutional. The mandate of the
assailed presidential decrees are unconstitutional. The coconut levy funds are in the
nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be
used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.

Take note of the purpose of imposing taxes and the constitutional provisions
related to enactment of laws on taxes:

The coco levy funds were exactions with the end goal of developing the entire coconut
industry, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition
of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale
behind the imposition of taxes or levies.

Furthermore, Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all money collected on any tax
levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in
fact mandated, by the assailed presidential issuances. Clearly therefore, the pertinent
provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Section 29
(3) of Article VI of the Constitution.

In this context, the distribution by Philippine Coconut Authority of the United Coconut
Planters Bank shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of
the government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed under the
pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468. These provisions are
unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution.

PARTY LIST SYSTEM

AND THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) v. COMELEC represented by

CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., G.R. No. 172103, 13 April 2007, J. Velasco,
Jr.

Essential Facts:

This is a joint Petition of CIBAC, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng
Manggagawa for Immediate Proclamation entreating the COMELEC en banc to
recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be
immediately proclaimed. They asked that the number of seats be designed by rounding
the results into the nearest integer.

They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC applying
the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC.

COMELEC, however, resolved to deny CIBACs motion following a more simplified

formula which eliminated the process of rounding off to the nearest integer.

Question: Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners
prayer for their additional seats in the House of Representatives under the party-list
system?

Answer: Yes, COMELECs application simplified formula or of Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna is incorrect. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, the
COMELEC should have used and adhered to the Veterans formula.

The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least 2% of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters number of
seats and so on.

The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. There should be no
rounding off to the nearest whole number.
Question: Is petitioner CIBAC after obtaining a result of 0.82304986 entitled to an
additional seat?

Answer: No. Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, the Court reached the
conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Since petitioner CIBAC got a
result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one, then it did not obtain or reach a whole
number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from the Courts ruling in Veterans
that in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.
Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.

PRESIDENCY AND IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO

CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. No. 183871
February 18, 2010, Velasco, J.

Essential Facts:

Lourdes Rubrico, Chairperson of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was
allegedly abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS). She was believed to be brought to and detained at, the air base
without charges.

But even after her release, the harassment continued. This led to the filing of criminal
complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross
abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

Petitioner did not achieve any success in the criminal case she filed against the officers
of the AISS.

Petitioner filed the present petition and prayed that a writ of amparo be issued ordering
the individual respondents including President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

The petition prayed that the President be ordered to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) be directed to immediately file an information for kidnapping
qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and dropped President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as party respondent.

Question: Did the Court of Appeals commit irreversible error when it dropped President
as respondent in the instant case?
Answer: No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under the countrys
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. The
President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions.

THE JUDICIARY AND ITS POWER

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, 178193, 180705
February 11, 2010, Velasco, J.

Essential Facts:

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) filed a motion for the
conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common shares of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of Coconut Industry Investment Fund
(CIIF) into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares. These subject SMC common
shares represent the sequestered shares of the government.

Oppositor-intervenors hinged their plea for reconsideration on the following issues:

1. the conversion of the shares is patently disadvantageous to the government; and

2. the coconut farmers, given that SMCs option to redeem, will not realize any
gains because the shares will be bought at less than their market value.

Question: Is the legal contention of the Oppositor-intervenors tenable?

Answer: NO. The conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve
and conserve the value of the governments interests in CIIF SMC shares. The choice to
convert the SMC common shares into Preferred Shares is a prerogative of the
executive branch which hold these sequestered shares.

Power of Judicial Review and the Residual Powers of the President

Question: May the court look into the prerogative of the executive branch in the
disposition of the SMC shares representing the interest of the government in San
Miguel Corporation?

Answer: It is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the
President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all
matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or, in this case,
sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG.

Surely, such control is neither legislative nor judicial. Well settled is the rule that the
courts cannot inquire into the wisdom of an executive act but must respect the decision
of the executive department, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

The conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve and conserve
the value of the governments interests in CIIF SMC shares.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE

OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE

HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COMMITTEE,

G.R. No. 171101 November 22, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

In 1957, the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) offered to sell

some 6,443 hectares of Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the
sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), then
owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group.

To facilitate the sale, the Central Bank of the Philippines assisted TADECO In obtaining
a dollar loan from a US bank.

The GSIS also extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of TADECO to pay the peso
price component of the sale, subject to the condition that the lots comprising the
Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the
tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such
action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.

The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

TADECO appealed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals.

On March 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the
Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the governments case against
TADECO, et al.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the case, subject to the PARCs approval of TADECOs
proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its farm workers.

Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, TADECO had the option of availing stock distribution
as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the farm workers.

On August 1988, TADECO organized a corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to

facilitate stock acquisition by the farm workers.

To effect the goal, TADECO conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75
hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI
shares of stock.

Parties agreed to have a Stock Distribution Option Plan which they actually executed a
Stock Distribution Agreement.

PARC initially approved HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) but which it later revoked.

Question: Will the action of the PARC over the Stock Distribution Plan covering the
shares of Hacienda Land, Inc. be covered the operative fact doctrine?

Answer: Yes. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this. The doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but
also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that
have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this
score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that
resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.

The implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI enjoys the full
respect accorded to a law. The farmer-tenants as members of a juridical entity were
allowed to retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

Question: Can beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program cover

juridical persons?

Answer: Yes. The farmers and regular farm workers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY
OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of
land distribution direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the
most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
agricultural land by individual farmers. Article XIII Sec. 4 expressly authorizes collective
ownership by farmers.

CONGRESS AND THE POWER OF

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M.

ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R.
CANLAS v. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, G.R. No.
174105, April 2, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

Pursuant to a resolution directing the Labor Committee to investigate, in aid of

legislation, the liability for plunder of the former President Ramos and others for the
illegal investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain Project, Reghis Romero II,
as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation to attend at a
public hearing to be conducted for the said purpose.

His request to be excused was denied by the Committee.

Petitioners then filed the instant petition which seeks to bar the Committee from
continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it.

In a manifestation with urgent plea for a Temporary Restraining Order, Romero raised,
among others, that when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as
resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in
Chavez v. National Housing Authority, none of which were related to the subject of the
inquiry but may affect the outcome of the inquiry. (The Chavez case has something to
do with beneficiaries of the NHA housing program which closely linked with the Smokey
Mountain case.)

Petitioners claim that the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the
pendency of the Chavez v. NHA petition.

Question: Can one invoke the sub judice rule to enjoin the conduct of a congressional
inquiry?

Answer: No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice. In this case, the subject matter of the senate inquiry is no
longer sub judice for the reason that the Court has denied with finality the motion for
reconsideration of its decision filed by Chavez.

Even assuming that Chavez v. NHA is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still,
such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation.
Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative
action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY AND JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS

Question: Is there a distinction between a congressional inquiry and a judicial

proceeding?

Answer: Yes. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has
different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative
procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights.

Upon the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and
effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact
new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation.

POWERS OF THE COMELEC

ROQUE VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456 September 10, 2009, Velasco, J.

Essential Facts:

The enactment of Republic Act No. 8436 in 1997 authorized the adoption of an
automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and
onwards.

In 2007, R.A. No. 9369 authorized anew the COMELEC to utilize the Automated
Election System.

Pursuant to law, COMELEC awarded to SMARTMATIC-TIM Corporation the contract to

allow it to implement the Automated Election System.

Petitioners claim that the conclusion of the automation contract constitutes an

abdication on the part of COMELEC of the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC
shall be responsible for the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.

Question: Did the award to Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract constitute

abandonment the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall be responsible for
election law enforcement?

Answer: No. The COMELEC did not violate its constitutional mandate when it
awarded the contract to Smartmatic.

Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and lessor of goods and
services to the COMELEC, which shall have exclusive supervision and control of the
electoral process.

There is a continuity and back-up plan that is in place and there is also an overall back
up strategy and options to address even the worst case scenario of all the machines
breaking down.

Source Code review can be conducted to ensure that the COMELECs constitutional
mandate to ensure the integrity and sanctity of the election is adequately protected.

FELICIANO LEGASPI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO D.

GERMAR, AND ROGELIO P. SANTOS JR., G.R. No. 216572, April 19, 2016,
Velasco, Jr., J .

Essential Facts:

Germar, Santos and Esquivel were among the candidates fielded by the Liberal Party
to vie for various elective positions in Norzagaray, Bulacan during the 2013 elections.
Legaspi on the other hand was the NUP bet for Mayor in the same town.

Germar and Santos were proclaimed the winning candidates. Legaspi moved for the
suspension of their proclamation with the COMELEC for their alleged vote buying but to
no avail. The First Division and Special Division of the COMELEC ruled to disqualify
Germar and Santos.

The COMELEC en banc had a 3-2 vote in the disqualification of the Liberal Party bets
which did not reach the 4 vote requirement. A rehearing was made in which the
COMELEC en banc took another vote but still failed to get a 4 vote thus dismissing
Legaspis complaint.

FINALITY OF DECISION OF COMELEC DECISIONS

Question: Can a decision of a Division of COMELEC reach its finality?

Answer: YES. A decision of the COMELEC division can attain finality. Sec. 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC divisions the authority to decide
election cases. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without need of any
affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc.

While the Constitution requires that the motions for reconsideration be resolved by the
COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires that four votes must be reached for it to render
a valid ruling to grant the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. Hence,
when the private respondents failed to get the four-vote requirement on their motion for
reconsideration, their motion is defeated.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar,

G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Guillermo

N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of
seven years ending on February 2, 2008.

On February 7, 2004, the President appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as a third

member of COA for a term of seven years starting from February 2, 2004, to February
2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as commissioner, the latter was designated Officer-in-Charge of the COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.

On April 18, 2008 Villar was appointed and nominated as Chairman of the COA.

The Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve

chairman for the unexpired portion of his term as commissioner or on February 2, 2011.

Petitioner opposes Villars appointment saying that such appointment is invalid under
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. He said that reappointment of any kind
within the COA be it for the same position (Commissioner to Commissioner) or for an
upgraded position (Commissioner to Chairman) is a prohibited appointment and
therefore a nullity.
Question: Was the appointment of Villar valid?

Answer: Yes. Villars appointment is valid. Villars appointment is not prohibited under
the Constitution. The Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and
Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.

Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor.

Question: Is promotional appointment in any of the Constitutional Commissions valid?

Answer: No. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment
from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full
term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D)
that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor.

Question: What rule will apply to promotional appointment in a constitutional

commission?

Answer: The promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the
aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he
will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

ELECTION LAW: THREE TERM RULE

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Virac, Catanduanes for four
consecutive election period.. In the 2004 electoral derby, the municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres, who, in due time,
performed the performed the functions of the office of mayor.

Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
 electoral contest.

In the 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost
no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run, predicated on the 3-
consecutive term limit rule.

COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto
action before the RTC to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised.

RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has

already served three consecutive terms. COMELECs 2nd division and en banc
affirmed.

Question: Was Abundo precluded to enjoy his seat as Mayor for having served for
three consecutive terms?

Answer: No. Abundos term was interrupted due to the earlier election contest
between him and Torres. The almost two-year period during which Abundos
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary
interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in
the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.

In Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term
limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.

After the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek
a fourth term, immediately following the third.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY and ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Ernesto Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, October 19,
2010,VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

PD 1112 created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), vesting it with the power to enter
into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant
authority to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate
(TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and adjust it from adjust it from time to time after due
notice and hearing.

PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation

(PNCC) for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North
Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further
granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded
delineated NLEX and SLEX.

In 1993, the Government Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a
joint venture agreement (JVA) with private entities without going into public bidding.

In 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the
door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC
entered into a financial and technical Joint Venture Agreements with entities for the
toll operation of its franchised areas.

Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the
South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway
Projects.

Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of
Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as
they vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes
while given the ability to collect tolls. It is alleged that TRB does not have to
power to issue franchise under the STOAs.

Question: Can Congress delegate the power to grant franchise to administrative

agencies?

Answer: Yes. The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or
entity with authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of
various laws, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll
facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution on the
grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in
context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises,
as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years.

Question: Were the Toll Regulatory Boards grant of concession to private parties
valid?

Answer: Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to
grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative
authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain
public utilities to authorized administrative agencies. TRB has been authorized by
Congress to exercise this power.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA), G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., .

Question: Will a provision of law imposing a mandatory drug test on the accused
violate his right to privacy and right to self-incrimination?

Answer: Yes, paragraph (f) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 is unconstitutional. SC finds
no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion
less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint.

REASON; Accused are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out
and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact
of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.

To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness

a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

DUE PROCESS

GONZALO S. GO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 172027 July 29, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:
Gonzalo Go Jr. was promoted to the position of Chief Hearing Officer (Chief, Legal
Division), with a salary rate of PhP 151,800 per annum.

The promotion was to the position of Attorney VI, Salary Grade (SG)-26.

However, Department of Budget and Management (DBM), informed the then DOTC
Secretary of the erroneous classification in the Position Allocation List of the DBM of
two positions in his department, one of which is in the LTFRB (formerly BOT).

Go questioned his summary demotion or downgrading of his salary grade from SG-
26 to SG-25. The DBM denied his request and reminded him that based on the
departments standards and criteria formulated, the division chief of bureau-level
agencies, like the LTFRB, is allocable to Attorney V, SG-25.

Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration , Go appealed to the Office of
the President .

The Office of the President dismissed Go's appeal.

His petition was also denied by the Court of Appeals..

Question: Was the downgrading of the salary grade of Go proper considering his
promotion which required a greater responsibility?

Answer: No. Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments
of his position as Attorney VI, SG-26. And being an incumbent to that position, he
has, at the very least, an equitable right to receive the corresponding salary and
emoluments attached thereto. The summary demotion to a lower salary grade, with
the corresponding decrease in salary and emoluments after he has occupied his
current rank and position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the benefits
accorded the position and which his predecessors must have been receiving. (Take
note that this matter was decided on equitable grounds.)

Go was denied due process. His right to a higher position and corresponding salary
pay grade has ripened into a vested right, of which he could be deprived only by due
process of law, but which we believe he was denied through the summary
reallocation.

Go was neither apprised nor given the opportunity to contest the reallocation before
the same was unjustly implemented.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056 December 21, 2009,
Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves the enactment of 16 cityhood bills.

The Petitioners opposed the passage of all bills and sought to enjoin COMELEC
from conducting respective plebiscites in each of the proposed upgraded local
government units.

There were twenty-four (24) cityhood bills that were not acted upon in the 11th
Congress. During the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was signed into law amending
Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) increasing the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20M average
annual income to P100M locally generated income. During the 13th Congress,
sixteen (16) out of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
their individual cityhood bills.

Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the

municipality covered from the P100M income requirement imposed by R.A .
No.9009. The cityhood bills were approved by Congress and eventually lapsed
into law. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to
determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.

Petitioners sought to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of

Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and contended that the grant of exemption
from the P100M income requirement to only the 16 municipalities is illegal since
there is now new law that has come into effect.

Petitioner also alleged the cityhood laws violated. the equal protection clause.

Question: Were all the 16 cityhood bills validly enacted without violating any
constitutional provision?

Answer: Yes, all the 16 city hood bills were validly enacted. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon
factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in
the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality
guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be

 germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory under the equal protection clause.

Question: Did the 16 cityhood bills violate the new requirement of P100M
income for a municipality to be upgraded into a city?

Answer: No. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of R.A. No.
9009 which amended the Local Government Code, it was the intention of
Congress that municipalities covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the
PhP100 million income criterion.

The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had
pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially
distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. To impose on
them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through
would appear to be indeed unfair.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPOUSES MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v.

ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN
DOES, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

This petition sought for issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data against the
respondent school.

Photographs of Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara , clad only in their undergarments,
were uploaded by Angela Tan on her Facebook profile.

Escudero, a computer teacher at STCs high school department, learned that some
students posted pictures online, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
reported the matter to Rose Tigol, STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action.

After an investigation, STC found Julia, Julienne and other identified students to
have violated the rules proscribed by the schools student handbook. These
identified students claimed that they were castigated and verbally abused by the
STC officials in the conference they attended. The students then were barred
from joining the commencement exercises as a penalty.
 Despite the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order, the respondent school still
barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites.

The petitioners then filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Wirt of Habeas Data.
However, the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy.

Question: Did the respondents violate the right to privacy of the concerned
students?

Answer: No. As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only
to the sanctioned students Facebook friends, STC did not violate the minors
right to privacy, as it was the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures
to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.

Question: Are petitioners entitled to issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data for
alleged violation of the right of informational privacy of the concerned students?

Answer: No. Respondent STC is not in the business of information gathering.

The right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information

about themselves. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot
invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive: A person

who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her

capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE
L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L.
LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL,
and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents. G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010, Velasco,
J.

Essential Facts:

Eliseo Soriano made very demeaning remarks in his program, Ang Dating Daa

Soriano specifically directed his remarks to Michael Sandoval, a minister of Iglesia ni

Cristo and a regular host of the TV program, Ang Tamang Daan.

The MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20
days.

Question: Was the action of respondent Laguardia issuing the 20-day

suspension on Petitioners program tantamount to abridgement of the freedom of
speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint?

Answer: No. The Court rules that the government's interest to protect and
promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the
reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as
program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.

Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast,

without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have
exposed children to language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as
parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in
regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

REASON: There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered
on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the
kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of
statutory disciplinary powers.

It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to
regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state
interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television
when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language and
vulgar language.

Question: Were the words uttered by Petitioner Soriano protected by the free exercise
of religious speech?

Answer: No. There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints

expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical
mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse.

Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of
religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he
was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.
His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul
language used in retaliation as religious speech.

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ,

and CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU;

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) v. RICARDO L.

INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of OLYMPIA E.
ESTEVES, et. al. , G.R. No. 168770 & G.R. No. 168812, February 9, 2011, Velasco,
Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

Petitioners pray for the reconveyance of their respective properties subjected to

expropriation in favor of the government for the expansion of Lahug Airport for public
use.

Petitioners claim for reconveyance is based on the alleged promise of the National
Airport Corporation (NAC), Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authoritys (MCIAA)
predecessor agency, that should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push
through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu
Airport, they are assured the right to repurchase their land.

When the Lahug Airport was closed and transferred its operations with MCIAA, the latter
refused to honor the said agreement.

Hence, Ouanos and Inocians filed their respective complaints against the latter.

MCIAA averred that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged
verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their
landholdings is already barred by the Statute of Frauds.

Questions: Was the claim of the Ouanos and Inocians barred by the Statute of
Frauds?

Answer: The claim of the Petitioners was not barred by Statute of Frauds..
Equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play
also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as
just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal
interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time
MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. (PLEASE TAKE NOTE
AGAIN THIS WAS DECIDED BASED ON EQUITY.)

Question: Do they have the right to repurchase their properties pursuant to the
verbal agreement with the governments negotiating team assuring them of its
reacquisition should the respondent agencies abandon the intended public
purpose?

Answer: MICAA is under obligation to reconvey the expropriated properties to

the Petitioners. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is
always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a
necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned,
then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course
to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

AND FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF LGUS

BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA represented by

BARANGAY CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA SINDAYAN, G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007, J.
Velasco, Jr.

Essential Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses Jose
Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 117674-R.

Barangay Sindalan claimed that respondents property was the most practical and
nearest way to the municipal road.
Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents land into Barangay Sindalans
feeder road.

Respondent-spouses, on the other hand, alleged that the expropriation was for a private
purpose, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision.

They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision
and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the residents of Sitio
Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who
would purchase the lots of said subdivision.

Question: Can a barangay exercise the power of eminent domain?

Answer: Yes. Being a political subdivision under Article X of the Constitution, it

can exercise the power of eminent. (The ruling in Moday v. Court of Appeals
will help you appreciate this principle.)

Question: Was public purpose met by the barangay when it sought to

expropriate the property of Spouses Sindalan?

Answer: No. The facts of the case reveal that the intended use of respondents
lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not for the
general public. Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the subdivisions
owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to
the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell
from the HLURB, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-
way. The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with
just compensation. Taking an individuals private property is a deprivation which
can only be justified by a higher good which is public use and can only be
counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of
property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would
also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals
basic right to property as well.

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK

CORPORATION AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM;
 ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE
GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, AND JULIO SUNIGA AND HIS SUPERVISORY GROUP
OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. AND WINDSOR ANDAYA ,G.R. No. 171101 April
24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

Question: When is just compensation pegged, is at the time of taking or at time

judgment is rendered?

Answer: Just compensation for the property should be based at the time it was taken
from the owner and appropriated by the government. The time of taking does not only
mean the time when the landowner was deprived of the use of his property, or when the
title was issued to the Republic or the beneficiaries.

Question: Is there taking under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program when
its beneficiaries are private individuals?

Answer: Yes. Taking in eminent domain cases also occurs when agricultural lands
voluntarily offered by a landowner are approved for CARP coverage. The power of
eminent domain has been broadened through the years as government implements
various programs to improve the living conditions of the people. Taking can now also
be done in meeting the housing needs of informal settlers under the Community
Mortgagage Program of the government.

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, G.R.

No. 171101, 05 July 2011, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J.

Question: Did PARC have the power to recall or revoke HLIs SDP without violating the
non-impairment of contract clause?

Answer: Yes, PARC has the power to revoke the Stock Distribution Option of the farm
workers of HLI. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to
approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, contrary to petitioner HLIs posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the
SDP which it previously approved. Such power or authority is deemed possessed by
PARC under the principle of necessary implication, to deny PARC such revocatory
power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency
tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would
be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.

A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations

between and among parties is deemed read into the contract and its
implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment
guarantee.

Question: What is the guarantee of the non-impairment clause under the

Constitution?

Answer: Impairment obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract

between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon
or withdraws existing remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in
effect at the time of the contract execution.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and ANTONIO P. GANA v.

OLONGAPO MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC. and TRIPLE CROWN SERVICES,
INC., G.R. Nos. 146184-85, G.R. No. 161117, G.R. No. 167827, January 31, 2008,
Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI)
were among the five contractors of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) which
had janitorial and maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA).

Before their service contracts expired, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P.
Gana, then General Manager of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their
contracts would no longer be renewed.

TCSI and OMSI suggested that a public bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of
its service contract be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.

MIAA did not heed the request of TCSI and OMSI. Instead, MIAA granted the
concession to a new service contractor and executed a contract with Goodline Staffers
& Allied Services, Inc.

OMSI and TCSI sought for injunctive writs before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against
MIAA and Goodline which were granted. The RTC declared null and void the negotiated
contract awarded and ordered the holding of a public bidding on the janitorial service
contract.

MIAA and Ganas appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of .Appeals held that E.O. No. 301 refers only to contracts for the purchase
of supplies, materials, and equipment, and do not refer to other contracts, such as lease
of equipment, and that in the same vein do not include service contracts.

MIAA and Gana appealed the C.A. decision.

Question: Was MIAA barred from entering into negotiated contracts after the
expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI within the context of the
public bidding requirements?

Answer: Yes. The contention of MIAA and Gana that the exceptions to the public
bidding rule in Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 301 cover both contracts for public services
and for supplies, material and equipment is not tenable. Their reliance on Sec.
1(e) of E.O. No. 301 for the award of a service contract for janitorial and
maintenance services without public bidding is misplaced.

The general rule is that all government contracts must be subject to bidding. The
matter of negotiated bidding is restricted only in specific cases. In this particular
case, the transaction should undergo public bidding.

The Court said: Executive Order No. 301 explicitly permits negotiated contracts in
particular identified instances. In its preamble, it adverted to the then existing set-up of a
centralized administrative system . . . for reviewing and approving negotiated
contracts . . ., and to the unsatisfactory character thereof in that such centralized
administrative system is not at all facilitative particularly in emergency situations,
characterized as it is by red tape and too much delay in the processing and final
approval of the required transaction or activity; hence, the need to decentralize the
processing and final approval of negotiated contracts . . . It then laid down, in its Section
1, guidelines for negotiated contracts thenceforth to be followed. While affirming the
general policy that contracts shall not be entered into or renewed without public
bidding.

CITIZENSHIP AND REPATRIATION

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R.

No. 125793 August 29, 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

When he was seven years old, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa acquired American citizenship
when his father became a naturalized American citizen.
When he arrived in the Philippines in 1995, he was admitted as a balikbayan.

During his stay in Manila , he was arrested and detained by the agents of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation.

The Consul General of the US Embassy requested the deportation of Tabasa on the
ground that a standing warrant for several charges has been issued against him and
that his American passport has been revoked.

Tabasa filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. As ordered, the
BID presented Tabasa before the Court of Appeals. A.

Tabasa filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship
by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171, and that because he is now a
Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation.

The Court denied Tabasas petition finding no legal basis to sustain his claims.

Question: Did Tabasa validly reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
thus cannot be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien?

Answer: No. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the
following:

a.) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

b.) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Tabasa does not fall in either category.

PUBLIC OFFICERS: DISCIPLINE OF JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ISABEL A. SIWA, STENOGRAPHER,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, MANILA, A.M. No. P-13-3156,
November 11, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

Question: What is the liability of a stenographer who engages in lending money during
office hours but fails to transcribe her stenographic notes within the prescribed period?

Answer: The stenographer is liable for gross neglect of duty.

Quoting Absin v. Montalla, the Court held: The failure to submit the TSNs within the
period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of
duty. Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal
even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

As a stenographer, he should realize that the performance of his duty is essential to the
prompt and proper administration of justice, and his inaction hampers the administration
of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary. Public office is a public trust, and he
has without a doubt violated this trust by his failure to execute his duty as a court
stenographer.

ELECTION LAW: NATURE OF ELECTORAL PROTEST

JAIME C. REGIO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO, G.R. No.

204828, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.

This is a Petitioner for Certiorari alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC when it proclaimed Co as winner in a barangay election.

Question: What standards must COMELEC observe in appreciating evidence in an

electoral protest?

Answer: The Court summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest

predicated on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of the
voters due to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots. These
guiding standards are:

(1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the
election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been
preserved with a care

(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such
a manner is on the protestant;

(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made
of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide
assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations
from the precise mode of achieving that end;

(4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the
provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual
tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and
 (5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the Court that the integrity of the ballots
has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as
reflected in the election returns. In the same case, the Court referred to various
provisions in the Omnibus Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and
preservation of the ballots, more specifically Sections 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the
Code.

ELECTION LAW:APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS

ERNESTO BATALLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TEODORO BATALLER,

G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves a barangay election protest.

Batalla garnered 113 votes while Bataller garnered 108 votes.

Consequently, Batalla was proclaimed the Punong Barangay winner.

Bataller filed an election protest and claimed misappreciation of seven ballots.

MCTC rendered its Decision finding that Batalla and Bataller had garnered an equal
number of votes.

Batalla disagreed with the findings of the trial court in appreciating the five protested
ballots in favor of Bataller.

(Please take note that: Section 240 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides for the drawing of lots in case
of a tie of two or more electoral candidates garnering the same or or equal highest
number of votes, with the proclamation as winner of the candidate favored by luck.)

Question: Did the MCTC correctly appreciate the five (5) protested ballots as votes for
Bataller, resulting into a tie between the contenders?

Answer: No. Only three ballots should have been credited to Bataller. After a scrutiny of
the five (5) contested ballots subject of Batallas instant position, the Court ruled that
three (3) ballots marked as Exhibits A, E, and G were properly appreciated and credited
in favor of Bataller under the neighborhood rule and intent rule. On the other hand, the
ballots marked as Exhibits B and C are stray ballots.

Question: What is the intent rule in appreciating ballots in an election contest?

Answer: The intent rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that in the appreciation of the
ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter,
if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. Hence, the intention of the voter to
vote for a particular candidate must be unequivocal from the face of a ballot. A ballot in
question should be liberally appreciated to effectuate the choice of the voters.

Question: What is the neighborhood rule in the appreciation of ballots in an

election contest?

Answer: The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a
candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of
the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said
candidate. Such rule is usually applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems
from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain
and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable
certainty.

ELECTION LAW: PERIOD TO FILE ELECTION PROTEST

MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE P.

PAYUMO III, G.R. No. 216691; July 21, 2015; VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves an election contest between two mayoralty candidates in

Dinalupihan, Bataan. Garcia was proclaimed winner. In his election protest, Payumo III
alleged irregularities during election day.

Garcia moved to dismiss the case since, the protest was filed out of time.

He argued that since he was proclaimed on May 14, 2013, Payumo IIIs protest was
filed out of time, when he reckoned the period on May 15, 2013, the date the printed
canvass was released.

Question: When is the reckoning date to ensure the timely filing of an election protest?

Answer: The reckoning date for the timely filing of an election protest is counted from
the date of the proclamation of the winner. Jurisprudence have established that the rule
prescribing the 10-day reglamentary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the
filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere
procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an
essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction
over the case.

ELECTION LAW:JURISDICTION OF A COMELEC DIVISION

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014, Velasco, J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves an election contest between Petitioner Villarosa and respondent
Festin who were rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro during the May 2013 elections.

Festin was initially declared winner.

Since the accuracy of the vote count was disputed, a physical recount of the ballots was
conducted in an election case filed by Villarosa

The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision declaring the proclamation of respondent
Festin void.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted by the trial
court acting on the election contest.

Aggrieved, Festin elevated the case to COMELEC through a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for injunctive relief.

The COMELEC, acting through its First Division, issued an Order requiring petitioner to
file his answer to the petition. COMELEC granted private respondents request for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the trial courts decision execution pending appeal.

Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of a newly-constituted Special First Division which

issued the injunction.

He assailed the creation of a First Special First Division.

COMELEC formed the questioned First Special First Division due to the absence of
several COMELEC commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to the
concerns of the overseas absentee voters abroad.

Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted was composed of only two
members, Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreo, with the
former presiding

Question: Is the injunction order of a specially-constituted COMELEC Division valid?

Answer: Yes. Contrary to petitioners claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and
the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent
transfers of the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a
separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its
Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates that the
commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via
substitution.

ELECTION LAW: NATURE OF COMELECS POWERS

HECTOR T. HIPE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MA. CRISTINA L.

VICENCIO, G.R. No. 181528; October 2, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves an election contest between Hipe and respondent Vicencio who
were candidates for the mayoralty post in Catubig, Northern Samar in the May 14, 2007
elections.

Vicencio petitioned for the exclusion of seven election returns on the grounds that they
were prepared under duress, threats, intimidation or coercion; and that the election was
marred by massive vote buying, widespread coercion, terrorism, threats, and
intimidation, preventing voters from voting.

The MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio.

COMELEC sustained the ruling of the MBOC.

COMELEC dismissed the appeal of Hipe since it was filed out of time.

Question: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion when it dismissed Hipes appeal
questioning the MBOC ruling?

Answer: No. Even if the Court would entertain petitioner Hipes appeal from the
decision of the MBOC on the questioned election returns, the Court still rules in favor of
respondent Vicencio. The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on
record, upheld the findings of the MBOC to exclude the subject election returns on the
basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of
justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created
and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs.

ELECTION LAW AND JURISDICTION OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SENERES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, Velasco, J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves an issue of entitlement to representation of a party list member. The
conflict arose from the right to a seat between two party list members of Buhay.

Petitioner filed his protest before the COMELEC.

Robles argued that COMELEC does not have any jurisdiction over the protest filed by
Seneres.

Robles alleged the proper remedy is to institute an action before the HRET.

Question: When does the HRET acquire jurisdiction over an election protest?

Answer: Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS:

POWER TO RECLASSIFY LANDS

HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), G.R.
No. 169913, June 08, 2011, J. Velasco, Jr.

Question: Does the local government unit have the power to classify agricultural land to
non-agricultural land?

Answer: Yes. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 2264, amending the
Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission. In this case, since the subject property had been reclassified as
residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it
can no longer be considered as an "agricultural land, and is therefore outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF A MAYOR

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN G.R. No. 211356,

September 29, 2014, Velasco Jr., J

Essential Facts:

Despite having been issued a special permit by the DENR, Aquino, a resort owner in
Boracay persisted in expanding his present hotel without awaiting the final decision of
the local government on his application for a building permit. The local government
passed an ordinance declaring the area where the hotel is situated as a No Build
Zone.

Mr. Aquino is aware of this because he was served a notice when he filed his
application for a building permit for his hotel expansion. Mr. Aquino also applied for a
Business Permit for the operation of his hotel which permit was never issued by the
LGU.

Question: Can the Mayor order the demolition of the hotel for operating without a
business permit?

Answer: Yes. In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government.

The LGC authorizes LGUs, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC empowers the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the
necessary permits.

Therefore, the Mayor can order the demolition.

(Please take time to review nuisance per se and when the court intervention is
necessary to remove the alleged nuisance.)

Question: Is the Mayor vested with quasi-judicial power when he ordered the
demolition of illegal structures without any court order?

Answer: Yes. While a city mayor is an executive official, the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders is not a ministerial one.

In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property

rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for
in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the
city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.

Therefore, he can order the demolition of the illegal structure of Aquino.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT: CONVERSION/ RECLASSIFICATION

AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.

VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, G.R. No. 203974,
April 22, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

J.V. BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , G.R. No. 204371, April 22, 2014,
Velasco Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves the conversion of Cabanatuan City into a highly-urbanized city by
way of a presidential proclamation.

The conversion is subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as

provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991." Pursuant to such
proclamation, COMELEC issued a minute resolution which provided that only those
registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

Governor Umali opposed the resolution of COMELEC praying that the plebiscite should
not be limited to the registered voters of Cabanatuan City only.

Question: In the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City should the same be
limited only to the registered voters of the city or should it include all the registered
voters of Nueva Ecija?

Answer: The qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija must
participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city into an Highly Urbanized City.
 GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS: POWER TO
REORGANIZE (LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS)

UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA v. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION

ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

Essential Facts:

This case involves the power of the Board of the National Electrification Administration
to organize or reorganize NEAs staffing structure.

The NEA Board approved Resolutions Nos. 46 and 59 where all the NEA employees
and officers are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant.

The affected personnel filed action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 otherwise known as the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA
Board of Administrators (NEA Board).

Question: Did the NEA Board have the power to reorganize NEA to a point of declaring
all its plantilla positions vacant?

Answer: Yes. Under of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all
NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a
reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress.

Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize
does not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEAs manpower
complement. Such contention is erroneous.