People v.

Tuvera

An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact that he
had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for
the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his
declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence

Facts:

On September 14, 1972, a search party composed of policemen of Bacnotan, La Union,

proceeded to the mountains of Bo. Ubbog to look for Amadeo Orejudos, barrio captain of
said barrio, who has been reported missing. In the course of their search, they found the
lifeless body of Orejudos lying near a shallow creek.

Upon receiving information that the persons last seen in the company of the victim were
Lorenzo Tuvera and Cornelio dela Cruz, Pat. Espejo summoned them to the police station. In
the ensuing investigation, Tuvera pointed to dela Cruz as the killer of Orejudos. At first, dela
Cruz denied the accusation and, instead, countered by charging that Tuvera was the author
of the crime. However, after Tuvera narrated the details of how dela Cruz perpetrated the
crime, the latter readily admitted responsibility for the killing of Orejudos. He also informed
the police that he took the gun of the victim. Asked as to the place where he had kept the
gun, dela Cruz directed the police to a small hut in the mountains of Bo. Ubbog, where they
recovered a 'Hi-standard' Cal. 22 revolver with ammunitions, licensed in the name of the
deceased Amadeo Orejudos. Dela Cruz executed two written statements which he signed in
the presence of the Chief of Police, the Fiscal, and Judge Nemesio Molina of the Municipal
Court of Bacnotan.

During the investigation, Tuvera also informed the police investigators that one Matias
GULENG had offered dela Cruz the amount of P4,000.00 to kill Orejudos. Cornelio dela Cruz,
Lorenzo Tuvera and Matias Guleng were subsequently indicted for murder qualified by
treachery, and in a separate information, dela Cruz and Tuvera were accused of the crime of
robbery for having taken and carried away a 'Hi-standard' revolver, Cal. 22 with
ammunitions, belonging to the deceased Orejudos, valued at P300.00.

At the trial, accused Tuvera, on motion of the prosecution, was discharged from the
information and utilized as state witness.

Appellant imputes as error the action of the trial court "in accepting and giving weight to the
testimony of co-accused Lorenzo Tuvera who turned state witness.

Issue:

WON the trial court should accept and give weight to the testimony of Tuvera?

Held:

Yes. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact
that he had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his
testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded
his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this connection, it
has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and
convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. 1
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the defense, and it assessed the testimony of Tuvera
to be convincing and credible. What is more, the declarations of this witness find solid
corroboration in the statements contained in the appellant's affidavits. The latter not only
admitted having killed the deceased Orejudos, he also informed the police authorities of the
place where he hid the gun which he took from the victim. In fact, the police officers did
recover the said gun at the same hut pointed to by him.

Chan v. Chan

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who
gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation.

Facts:

Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny
Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of
custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support
his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse. Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request
was accompanied by a motion to be allowed to submit in evidence the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.2

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielenes motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a
special civil action of certiorari ibefore the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

Held:

No. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate
to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to
make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had
transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his
own health at great risk.

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could
be made part of the physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he had made
entries in those records that concern the patients health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature.

It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecumcovering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order
any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and
manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe
such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents
to be disclosed are not privileged.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.

This privilege is not absolute. The request of petitioner for a copy of the medical records has
not been properly laid.

Instead of a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, Josielene Lara Chan should
avail of the mode of discovery under Rule 28 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 28 pertains to the physical or mental examination of persons. This may be ordered by
the court, in its discretion, upon motion and showing of good cause by the requesting party,
in cases when the mental and/or physical condition of a party is in controversy. 4 Aside from
showing good cause, the requesting party needs only to notify the party to be examined
(and all other parties) and specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination, including the name of the physician who will conduct the examination. 5

The examined party may obtain a copy of the examining physician's report concerning
his/her mental or physical examination.6 The requesting party shall deliver this report to
him/her.7 After such delivery, however, the requesting party becomes entitled to any past or
future medical report involving the same mental or physical condition. 8Upon motion and
notice, the court may order the examined party to deliver those medical reports to the
requesting party if the examined party refuses to do so.

Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan

The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation
to cases pending before it.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena
duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.

Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified
copies of manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan
granted the same.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and
may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their extremely
detailed character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel
through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the
extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials
concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his
bank accounts would itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the
production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court

HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the
exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the
ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must
be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction.

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he
concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it
may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.
Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.

The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank
accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before
the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because
the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four
months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of
statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is
not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of
Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is
a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.