Barrioquinto v.

Fernandez
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which m
ust be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no noti
ce thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concur
rence of Congress, and itis a public actof which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after vonction; while amnesty is granted to cl
asses of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, general
ly before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes aft
er conviction. Pardon looks forward and relives the offender from the consequenc
es of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolsihed or forgiv
es the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the r
ights to hol public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expr
essly restored by the terms of pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit fro
m the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence under art.
36 of rpc.
Main holding: We are of the opinion and so hold that in order to entitle a perso
n to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of Septmenber 7, 1946, it is not n
eessary that he should, as a condition, precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act of offense with which he is charged and allege the am
nesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant
or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence it is not correct to say that invocation of the ben
efits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Althoug
h the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by
the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits.
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Cristobal v. Labrador (1940)
Subject: Petition for certiorari asking for reversal of trial court decision tha
t the pardon granted to respondent has had the effect of excluding the responden
t from the disqualification from the list of qualified voters.
Held:
Par. 6, Sec. 11 of Art. VII of Constitution provides that: The President shall h
ave the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment
, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem
pro to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
the National Assembly.
There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogrative by
the Chief Executive: 1.) the power be exercised after conviction; and b.) such
power do not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Consti, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or cotrolled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereig
n authority has placed it and must be exercised by the ighest authority to whom
it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all isabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the
disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left