Beruflich Dokumente
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China Relations
With Chinas rapid ascendance to great power status, the U.S.China rela-
tionship has become one of the most important international relationships in
the world today. This book explores relations between the U.S. and China,
focusing in particular on China policy-making in the U.S. Congress, which
has been unusually active in the development of this relationship. Based on
detailed analysis of China bills introduced in Congress over the past three
decades, it provides detailed analysis of how Congressional policy-making
works in practice, and explores the most controversial issues in U.S.China
relations: Taiwan, trade and human rights. It considers the voting patterns
and party divisions on these issues, showing that liberals and conservatives
often form an alliance concerning China because Chinas authoritarian
regime, human rights problems, soaring trade surplus with the U.S and rising
military power attract criticism from both camps. It also argues that congres-
sional committees, bicameralism and presidential veto make it virtually
impossible for Congress to legislate on China, despite its intense preferences,
and therefore Congress often turns to informalbut no less eectivemeans
to exert inuence on China policy, such as framing public opinion and gener-
ating situations that result in anticipated reactions by the executive branch
or Beijing.
Tao Xie is Assistant Professor at the American Studies Centre, Beijing For-
eign Studies University, China. He holds a Ph.D. in political science. His
primary research interests are U.S. Congress and American electoral
behavior.
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U.S.China Relations
China policy on Capitol Hill
Tao Xie
U.S.China Relations
China Policy on Capitol Hill
Tao Xie
First published 2009 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
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2009 Tao Xie
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
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invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Tao, Xie, 1973
U.S.China relations : China policy on Capitol Hill / Tao Xie.
p. cm(Routledge contemporary China series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. United StatesForeign relationsChina. 2. ChinaForeign
relationsUnited States. 3. United StatesForeign relations1945
1989. 4. United StatesForeign relations1989-. 5. United States.
CongressDecision making. 6. TaiwanStrategic aspects.
7. United StatesCommerceChina. 8. ChinaCommerce
United States. 9. Human rightsChina. I. Title. II. Title: United
StatesChina relations.
E183.8.C5T36 2008
327.73051dc22
2008014023
List of gures xi
List of tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction 1
Congress and foreign policy 2
Why China? 5
Contributions of the book 9
Structure of the book 10
8 Conclusion 142
Legislative institutions and their impact on China policy 142
The international environment and Congresss China
policy 144
Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy 145
Policy implications 149
A look into the future 154
Notes 161
Bibliography 177
Index 199
List of gures
Only in the case of Communist China has the Congress played a major role
over a long period of time to conne narrowly the presidents means of
maneuver.
(Herbert Carroll 1965: 161)
The United States and our allies must recognize that in the upcoming Pacic
Century no country will play a larger role in shaping the future of Asia
than China, and no single bilateral relationship in the region will be more
important to the US than the SinoAmerican one.
(Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 1996)
An active Congress
It is not too much exaggeration to say that of all the bilateral relationships the
U.S. has with other countries, Congress has been most active in the relation-
ship with China. One of Congresss earliest actions was the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, which excluded all Chinese laborers from immigrating to the U.S.
for ten years.10 Half a century later, under pressure from American silver pro-
ducers Congress enacted the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 that had a devastat-
ing impact on Chinas economy by driving up the value of the silver-based
Chinese currency (e.g., Ho et al. 2005; Roberts 1936).11 When China was
engulfed in a civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists in the late
1940s, Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948 in order to salvage the
Nationalist regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. After the Chinese Communists
victory, Congress vehemently opposed U.S. recognition of China and Chinas
admission to the United Nations, delaying the former until 1979 and the latter
until 1971.12 Meanwhile, Congress remained steadfast in its support for Chi-
ang and the regime he established on Taiwan, passing the U.S.Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the Taiwan Relations Act.
Congress was conspicuously inactive in China policy in the decade after
normalization. American euphoria about China that had been building
since Nixons 1972 trip, which reached its zenith in the aftermath of Deng
Xiaopings successful visit to the U.S. in 1979, plus the election of Ronald
Reagan, who was a staunch supporter of Taiwan, probably diminished
Congresss interest in China policy.13 Yet this interlude of congressional reti-
cence was cut short by the Tiananmen Incident. Since then, Congress has been
extremely active in nearly every aspect of China policy. As Mann wrote:
Moreover, from the Chinese perspective, Congresss China policy has almost
always been one of antagonism and punitive actions. The above review of
Congresss involvement in U.S.Taiwan policy amply illuminates this point.
It is primarily because of staunch congressional support for Taiwan that
Beijing has not been able to regain control of the island. Another example of
congressional antagonism involves MFN renewal. Congress rst granted
China MFN status in 1980 and had not objected to presidential renewal of it
until 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Incident. Each year between 1990 and
2001, Congress attempted to revoke MFN or to add various conditions to its
6 Introduction
renewal (Pregelj 2001). Twice (both in 1992), Congress was just one step away
from enacting legislation attaching human rights and other conditions to the
renewal of Chinas MFN.
More recently, Congress initiated a series of punitive actions against China:
Scholarly neglect
Yet despite congressional activism and antagonism, only a few scholars have
paid close attention to Congresss role in China policy. This scholarly neglect
appears to have something to do with the American constitutional structure.
Though Congress, particularly the Senate, does have a number of foreign
policy powers such as treaty ratication and approval of ambassadorial
appointments, it is the executive branch that is constitutionally charged with
the management of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of China policy, it is
President Nixon who initiated the normalization process; it is President Carter
who negotiated the terms of normalization; and it is President George H. W.
Bush who almost single-handedly salvaged the relationship from a total break-
down in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. As a result,
some scholars of U.S.China relations may have underestimated Congresss
inuence in China policy. What Chang (1993) concluded about Congresss role
in U.S.China relations seems to be representative of the general impression
among them:
For the most part, Congress and other non-administration sources are
excluded from the dialogue and discourse in the making of China policy.
When their voices are heard sporadically over the course of Sino-
American relations, they usually come out supporting the actions and
decisions taken by the White House.
(Chang 1993: 244)
8 Introduction
Thus most students of U.S.China relations tend to focus on the executive
branch (e.g., Harding 1992; Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Ross 1986; Ross
1995; Suettinger 2003; Tucker 1983; Tucker 1994). Those who do pay particu-
lar attention to Congress usually focus on the late 1940 up until the late 1950s,
a period when Congress was unusually active and inuential in China policy
(e.g., Dulles 1972; Finkelstein 1993; Grasso 1987; Purifoy 1976; Tsou 1963;
Tucker 1983). Some scholars also highlight Congresss role in the normaliza-
tion process, particularly the enactment of the TRA (Kraft 1991; Sutter 1983;
Tan 1992). Only a handful of scholars have conducted exclusive analysis of
Congresss China policy (Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Sutter 2001; Xie 1993;
Yang 2000; Zhang 1995).
Nor have students of American politics showed strong interest in Con-
gresss role in China policy, notwithstanding the voluminous literature on
Congresss role in U.S. foreign policy generally (e.g., Corwin 1948; Crabb and
Holt 1984; Dahl 1950; Franck and Weisband 1979; Lindsay 1994; Ripley and
Lindsay 1993; Robinson 1967; Spanier and Uslaner 1974) and roll call voting
on foreign policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cronin and Fordham 1999;
Fordham 1998; Lindsay and Ripley 1992; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990;
McCormick and Wittkopf 1992). The disciplines emphasis on rigorous
theorizing is partly responsible for the lack of interest. China is merely one
case, it is said, and no matter how important it is, you cannot build a good
theory with one case. As a result, only a few students of American politics have
paid detailed attention to Congresss involvement in China policy (Crabb and
Holt 1984; Nokken 2003; Rourke 1983: 7476, 130145; Westereld 1955:
Chapter 12, Chapter 16).
However, it is not just scholars who have largely neglected Congress.
Policy-makers in Beijing, after many years of frustration with and criticism
of Congresss China policy, have yet to make earnest and concerted eorts to
understand the mysterious beast called Congress and to inuence its behavior
(see Harney and Roberts 2005; Ma 2006; Mufson 1998; Weisskopf 1993).
Some of the older [members of the Chinese] leadership dont understand
that simply because a senator gets up on the oor of the Senate and says
some uncomplimentary things about China that [sic] thats not necessarily
government policy, said James Sasser, former U.S. ambassador to China
(quoted in Mufson 1998). When the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister sug-
gested in a meeting that Congress not bring up something about China, an
impatient Senator John Glenn (D-OH) snapped back: You just dont
understand our form of government if you think anybody can tell a particu-
lar Congressman or Senator not to bring up something about China
(quoted in Sciolino 1996). Says a public aairs director at a large U.S.
manufacturer with considerable investment in China, The Chinese might
have got the hang of capitalism, but they dont understand democracy and
the free press yet and that shows up in the way they misread the political
mood here (quoted in Harney and Roberts 2005). The former Chinese
President Jiang Zemin himself candidly admitted in 1995 that the Chinese
Introduction 9
havent done enough lobbying of U.S. Congress (quoted in Sciolino
1996).
Second, the very notion of China policy, as Oksenberg (1986: 208) cau-
tioned, is an intellectual abstraction that, upon close examination, can lose
its purported analytical clarity. China policy is the sum of ocial actions
proposed or implemented regarding U.S. relations with China. It encompasses
many issues: arms sales to Taiwan, textile quotas, military relations, cultural
and educational exchanges, export control, IPR protection, and so on. China
policy also includes issues that primarily concern other countries but in
which China is a signicant, perhaps silent partner (ibid.). U.S. policy toward
North Korea stands out as a key example, since China is the single most
important ally of that country. U.S. policies toward Pakistan and some Middle
East countries are also complicated by Chinas involvement in those regions,
mainly through its actual or alleged sales of weapons. Furthermore, all these
issues are not only part of China policy, but also part of broad U.S. foreign
policy as wellnon-proliferation, trade, human rights, etc. Thus there are
some problems related with the term China policy, though it continues to
be an analytically useful concept.
1 The new institutionalism and
legislative behavior
By the mode of its election and the greater length of the term by which its
seats are held, the Senate is almost altogether removed from that temptation
to servile obedience to the whims of popular constituencies to which the
House is constantly subject, without as much courage as the Senate has to
guard its virtue.
(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 153)
Just as the standing committees control legislative action, so the chairmen are
masters of their committees . . . In short, committee chairmen exercise crucial
powers over the legislative process.
(George Galloway 1953: 289)
Congressional committees
To understand Congress, one must understand its committees. For most
members of Congress, political life on Capitol Hill begins and ends with
committees. Moreover, it is committees to which bills are referred; it is com-
mittees that hold hearings on bills; and it is in committees where bills are
marked up. In a word, committees are where the bulk of legislative work gets
done. Woodrow Wilson (2006: 69) famously wrote, Congress in session is
Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-room is
Congress at work. Because of the central role of committees in the legis-
lative process, they have life-or-death control over legislative proposals
(Johnson et al. 1994: 450451). As Bryce (1911: 157) vividly put it, A bill
comes before its committee with no presumption in its favor but rather as a
shivering ghost stands before Minos in the nether world.
Committees and rules of procedures lie at the heart of the theoretical
literature on Congress (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast
1981, 1987, 1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988). While conceptually distinct,
committees and rules of procedures are actually inseparable. For rules of pro-
cedures give shape to the committee structure and constitute the major source
of committee power. Wrote Woodrow Wilson (2006: 62), The privileges of
the Standing Committees are the beginning and the end of the rules.
Under the committee structure, each committee can be viewed as respon-
sible for one policy dimension. Each and every billwith rare exceptions
must be referred to the committee(s) with proper jurisdiction over the policy
content of the bill. The chamber ordinarily may not vote on a bill unless it is
approved by the referred committee. Moreover, committees have ex post veto
power, i.e., the power to kill a piece of legislation at the conference stage
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987).3 Last but not least, the germaneness rule, closed
rule, and other special rules in the House impose severe restrictions on
amendments oered by non-committee members on the oor. These special
rules empower committee to be monopoly supplier of policy alternatives to
the status quo (Denzau and Mackay 1983; Krehbiel 1991: Chapter 5). To put
it a dierent way, they give committees gatekeeping rights.4
As a result of gatekeeping rights, majority cycling can be avoided and
equilibrium induced because the chamber needs to consider only one issue at
a time, instead of voting on a multitude of policy issues at the same time. And
in single-dimension politics, the median voter is where the equilibrium lies. In
a word, the committee structure transforms multi-dimensional politics into
single-dimension politics and induces equilibrium.
In so far as substantive policy is concerned, gatekeeping rights enable
16 New institutionalism, legislative behavior
committee members to keep controversial or undesirable policy proposals
from reaching the oor, while at the same time proposing policy alternatives
that they prefer. To be sure, the full chamber does have certain toolse.g., the
discharge ruleto force a committee to report a bill to the oor, but these
tools are rarely used and, even if they are used, almost always fail (Krehbiel
et al. 1987).5 Maltzman (1997: 65) thus asserted, Undoubtedly, the most
important tool possessed by committee is their gatekeeping power. Woodrow
Wilson, that astute student of American government and politics, described
in vivid language the power of committees over bills:
Presidential veto
Presidential veto and the supermajority requirement for congressional over-
ride clearly reect the founding fathers deep suspicion of accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
18 New institutionalism, legislative behavior
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective
(Madison 1982a: 244). Two means were adopted to prevent the concentration
of powers. As Madison (1982c: 262) wrote, A dependence on the people is
no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. For Madison, the
auxiliary precautions consist of a constitutional structure under which
the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their limits, without
being eectually checked and restrained by the others (Madison 1982b: 252).
In Federalist Papers No. 51, he most forcefully and eloquently spelled out the
rationale behind such a constitutional structure:
Party
[P]olitical parties created democracy, and . . . modern democracy is unthink-
able save in terms of parties, declared E.E. Schattschneider (1942: 1). Political
parties can be viewed as endogenous institutions created by politicians to
achieve certain goals (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957). Wrote Aldrich (1995: 28):
A series of problems that necessarily arise in elections and in governance
make it possible for politicians to win more of what they seek to win, more
often, and over a longer period by creating political parties. The Democratic
Party and the Republican Party have dominated American electoral politics
since their emergence in the early nineteenth century. Because of the two-
party system, party politics (or partisanship) has become an integral part of
American politics.
Partisanship manifests itself in two fundamental ways in the halls of Con-
gress. On the one hand, it means loyalty to the president of ones own party,
because the president is the leader of his party and his leadership extends to
the legislative arena. In behavioral terms, party loyalty entails, among other
things, voting for the presidents policy agenda in spite of ones own prefer-
ences or constituent preferences. Indeed, Bond and Fleisher (1990) adduced
evidence that the most important determinant of a presidents legislative
success is party loyalty. The demand for loyalty is particularly high when the
opposition party has a majority in Congress, since the majority party has
strong electoral incentives to embarrass the president, with a view toward
winning the presidency in the next election.
On the other hand, partisanship also means electorally-induced inter-party
dierences. Because of electoral competition and historical circumstances,
the two parties have developed relatively stable and usually distinct positions
on a number of issues that generally reect the preferences of their respective
electoral bases. For example, since the 1940s, the Republican Party has tended
to be the party of free trade, whereas the Democratic Party has been the party
of protectionism (see Bailey and Brady 1998; Gibson 2000; OHalloran
New institutionalism, legislative behavior 21
1994). When members take distinct positions along electoral lines, it can be
viewed as partisanship. As Davidson and Oleszek (1990: 130) aptly put it,
partisanship means constituency dierences translated into issues.
However, it is sometimes dicult to empirically distinguish between the
two aspects of partisanship. Again, take foreign trade as an example. When
Republicans vote for a free trade bill supported by a Republican president, it
is likely that they do so not only because of their loyalty to the president, but
also because of their traditional support for free trade, and the latter may be
more important a factor than the former. However, it is hard to distinguish
the one from the other in this particular case. On the other hand, it is easier to
distinguish the two aspects when a Democratic president sends to Congress a
free trade bill. Given the Democrat Partys traditional alliance with labor
unions, a vote in support of the president can be a vote against labor unions
in light of the latters long-standing opposition to free trade.
In general, when a foreign policy issue has apparent and immediate impli-
cations for the electoral bases of the two parties, the likelihood of inter-party
conict signicantly increases. Crabb thus wrote:
Nonetheless, when an issue in the foreign policy area has an evident and
substantial bearing upon domestic policyas with the issue of tari ver-
sus reciprocal trade, foreign aid spending, and the size and composition
of the armed forcesthen the diculty of arriving at bipartisan under-
standings is greatly increased. Not only is the diculty increased, but the
desirability of bipartisan co-operation may be greatly reduced, if not
altogether eliminated.
(1957: 174)
Ideology
Ideology is a conguration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are
bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence
(Converse 1964: 207). Hinich and Munger (1994: 11) dened it as an intern-
ally consistent set of propositions that make both prescriptive and proscrip-
tive demands on human behavior. According to Hunt (1987: 12), ideology is
integrated and coherent systems of symbols, values, and beliefs. What these
various denitions have in common is the coherence and consistency of ones
beliefs. Translated into plain language, the ideological hat one wears enables
others to predictwith reasonable accuracywhere one would stand on a
particular issue. For example, being a liberal generally means support for
abortion and gun control, while being a conservative often means opposition
to abortion and gun control.
The other important attribute of ideology is stability. Once formed, ideo-
logy tends to remain remarkably stable over time and across issues.10 As
Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 8) vividly noted, Members of Congress come to
Washington with a staked-out position on the [ideological] continuum, and
22 New institutionalism, legislative behavior
then, largely die with their ideological boots on. In a word, coherence and
stability are the dening characteristics of ideology. It is precisely because of
these two attributes that a members roll call votes on a wide variety of issues
across a long period of time can be arranged on a simple liberal-conservative
continuum (ibid.). And empirical research has produced an impressive
amount of evidence that ideology usually has the biggest impact on members
votes on foreign and defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb
1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Usually members from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum are
expected to take opposite positions on a particular issue. For example, a
liberal is expected to oppose the war in Iraq while a conservative is supposed
to support it. However, on certain occasions ideological foes may form
a temporary alliance out of strategic considerations or genuine policy
concerns. For instance, a piece of legislation may be too conservative for
liberals but too liberal for conservatives. Liberals may cast sincere votes to kill
it, while conservatives may vote strategically by joining the liberals, knowing
that they can introduce a more conservative alternative once the proposal at
hand is defeated (see Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Nokken 2003). As will be
shown shortly, such a coalition of liberals and conservatives is frequently
found on China policy because of the peculiarities of U.S.China relations.
Constituency inuence
Constituency inuence stems from the electoral connection (Fiorina 1974,
1977; Mayhew 1974). If members of Congress are assumed to be single-
minded seekers of reelection (ibid.: 5), they should be responsive to consti-
tuency interests in order to get reelected. The electoral connection is relatively
strong for House members whose two-year term puts them on a short leash
with their constituents. The much longer tenure of Senators enables them to
have relatively more autonomy from constituency inuence (see Fenno 1982).
While not every member is single-mindedly in pursuit of reelection, other
goals such as power within Congress and good public policy are impossible to
achieve without being elected (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).
Regardless, reelection generally requires responsiveness to constituency
interests, particularly but not exclusively economic interests. And a long line
of research has produced ample evidence that constituency economic inter-
ests have signicant impact on legislative behavior, particularly roll call vot-
ing (e.g., Bailey 2001; Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke and
Wrighton 1998). Indeed, even during the height of the Cold War when secur-
ity issues seemed paramount, economic interests inuenced Senators voting
on foreign policy (Fordham 1998).
However, it is possible that constituency inuence on foreign policy may
not be strong, or at least not as strong as it is on domestic policy. First and
foremost, the American public is notorious for its poor knowledge of foreign
policy issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and is widely believed to have
New institutionalism, legislative behavior 23
no stable, meaningful, or coherent foreign policy preferences (see Page and
Shapiro 1992: chapter 1).11 As a result, they are not expected to pay much
attention to how their representatives in Congress vote on foreign policy
issues. Moreover, most foreign policy decisionswith foreign trade being the
single most important exceptiondo not have clear, immediate impact on
domestic constituents. Even on defense spending (e.g., weapons purchase and
military bases), an issue that presumably has huge constituency implications,
responsiveness may be weak because the costs are diuse and benets are
highly concentrated.
Lindsay and Ripley aptly explained why constituency inuence in foreign
policy may be weak and it is worth quoting them in length:
[M]ost members of the House and Senate have great freedom in taking
substantive positions on foreign policy issues. One reason is that most
constituents are uninformed or unconcerned about specic issues. Voters
care mostly about pocket-book issues, and many foreign policy issues
have no heavy economic components . . . Even when voters do have opin-
ions on a foreign policy issue, they often do not hold their opinions very
strongly, at least not strongly enough to punish errant legislators at the
polls. And the publics memory of foreign policy developments typically
fades quickly: witness the speed with which public anger over U.S. policy
toward China after the 1989 crackdown dissipated.
(1992: 422)
To conclude, with the probable exception of foreign trade, most foreign pol-
icy decisions do not have direct impact on domestic constituents. As a result,
voters at home may not pay much attention to them. This enables members to
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in foreign policy-making. Instead
of following constituency preferences, they are likely to follow their own
foreign policy preferences, the presidents plea for loyalty, or the dictates of
party leadership. This may help explain why most previous studies have pro-
duced little or no evidence of a signicant relationship between defense
spending and roll call voting (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969;
Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Methodology
Having laid out the theoretical foundation of my analysis of congressional
policy-making toward China, I will briey discuss methodology. This study
combines both qualitative (i.e., historical-comparative analysis) and quanti-
tative (i.e., statistical analysis) methods. Many scholarly works in American
politics today employ only the latter, while most students of U.S.China
relations choose the former. Such methodological pluralism is necessary for
three reasons. First, dry statistics will do little justice to the intense passions
this controversial relationship evokes among many members of Congress. It
24 New institutionalism, legislative behavior
is one thing to tell readers how many China bills a member introduced in one
session or how he or she voted on a China bill, and it is quite another to
describe his or her feelings and attitudes toward China. Thus whenever
possible and appropriate, I will let members speak for themselves through
extensive use of quotes.
Second, historical-comparative analysis provides important contextual
background for quantitative analysis. Moreover, in some instances where
quantication is impossible or extremely dicult, historical-comparative
analysis is perhaps the only tool available. For example, I rely on historical-
comparative analysis to support my argument that the Cold War had a sig-
nicant impact on Congresss human rights policy toward China and that
democratization has been the primary source of congressional support for
Taiwan since the 1990s.
Third, quantitative methods are useful in identifying general patterns of
congressional behavior toward China. They can be very precise about the
eects of a particular factor, whereas qualitative analysis oers only impres-
sionistic observations. More specically, negative binomial regression is
used to examine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced in
each chamber, and logit regression is utilized to analyze the eects of party,
ideology, and constituency interests on roll call behavior.
In so far as roll call analyses are concerned, three methodological issues
deserve special notice. First, since this study examines not only roll call votes
on three China policy issues but also roll call votes on U.S. relations with
other countries, it is imperative that the same set of independent variables
be used across issues and countries. Otherwise, cross-issue or cross-country
comparison becomes problematic.
Second, because constituency variables are usually highly correlated with
party and ideology due to the electoral connection, including all of them
in the same equation can potentially dampen the eects of the former.
Consequently, each regression has two models, the rst with only consti-
tuency variables and the second with party and ideology added. This
method allows me to ascertain the independent eects of constituency vari-
ables and to identify instances where their eects are dampened by party and
ideology.
The third methodological issue concerns constituency opinion. Given the
theoretical and empirical signicance of public opinion, it is desirable that I
examine its eects on legislative behavior. Normative democratic theory pos-
tulates that elected ocials should be responsive to public opinion (Dahl
1956, 1998), and rational choice models of democracy predict that self-
interested politicians will respond to public opinion in order to be elected
(Downs 1957). Empirically, research in American politics has produced ample
evidence that public opinion has some eects on public policy (e.g., Erikson
et al. 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Russett 1970;
Sobel 2001). Moreover, numerous studies have produced evidence that con-
stituency opinion has varying impact on roll call behavior (e.g., Bartels 1991;
New institutionalism, legislative behavior 25
Erikson 1981; Herrera et al. 1992; Holian et al. 1997; McDonagh 1993; Miller
and Stokes 1963; Page et al. 1984).
Thus, it appears imperative that I include constituency opinion in my
analysis. And I do have an aggregate measure of public opinion when I
examine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced in each
chamber. However, I do not include any direct measure of constituency opin-
ion in roll call analyses because there simply is no district or state-level public
opinion data about China policy.12 It is beyond the scope of this study to oer
an in-depth analysis of the eects of public opinion on Congresss China
policy at both the individual and the aggregate level. Such a research topic
would develop into a major project in and of itself.
2 Congressional eorts to
punish China1
The thing, [sic] that angers me the most is I hear people saying let us not use
MFN. There must be some other approach we can take. What other device is
there for Congress? This is the only game in town.
(Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL), U.S. Congress 1997c: 97)
For four years the President has pursued a policy best described as aggressive
appeasement, rolling over on issue after issue like an obedient puppy deter-
mined to receive the approval of a demanding master . . . [I]t amounts to the
continuation and intensication of a tragic 25-year unrequited love aair with
Beijing.
(Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) 1997)
During his six-day state visit to the U.S. in 1997, the former Chinese President
Jiang Zemin dropped by the Capitol Hill and had breakfast with 55 members
of Congress, including all the members of the leadership except for House
Republican Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), who stayed away to protest Chinas
alleged suppression of religious liberties. The lawmakers peppered Jiang with
pointed questions on everything from religious persecution to forced abor-
tion, from organ harvesting to Chinese transfer of nuclear technology to Iran
(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 39). Republicans listened in stony silence as Jiang
ercely defended Chinas human rights practices (Campbell 1997). It
reminded me of the old days of the Soviet Union, Congressman Chris Smith
(R-NJ) said after the breakfast. He denied everything (quoted in ibid.). On
the Democratic side, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)
said he told Jiang that we could not have a normal relationship with a
country that trampled on the rights of its people (quoted in Slavin and
Nichols 1997). Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) remained highly crit-
ical after the exchange with Jiang. In my view, the responses were evasive,
she said (quoted in Mitchell 1997).
In retrospect, Jiangs meeting with the lawmakersand his summit with
Clinton for that matterwould probably not have happened, had it not
been for Republican restraint on China bashing. In late September, despite
Congressional eorts to punish China 27
strong reservations from several Democrats and Republicans, the House
International Relations Committee marked up ve bills critical of China.
These bills were ready for oor action in early October, but under intense
pressure from President Clinton, House Republican leadership agreed to
postpone oor consideration until after the summit (CQ Almanac 1997:
8: 38). Immediately after Jiangs departure, the House launched a legislative
blitzkrieg on China (Campbell 1997). Within ve days, that is, November 59,
the Republican-controlled House passed nine bills, including the ve bills
already approved by International Relations. Among other things, these bills
aimed to do the following:
Increase funding for human rights monitoring in China and extend con-
gressional review of nuclear technology transfer to China (HR 2358).
Deny U.S. visas to Chinese ocials involved in religious persecution
(HR 967).
Require the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of constructing
a theater missile defense for Taiwan (HR 2386).
Impose sanctions on China for transferring cruise missiles to Iran
(H.Res. 188).
Appropriate funds to enforce the ban on Chinese prison labor products
(HR 2195).
Condemn forced abortion in China and propose a visa ban on Chinese
ocials involved in forced abortion (HR 2570).
Oppose international loans to China (HR 2605).
Authorize the president to monitor, restrict, and seize the assets of and
ban companies in U.S. associated with the Chinese army (HR 2647).
Increase broadcasting by Radio Free Asia to China (HR 2232).
(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 3940; CQWR 1997: 153637, 261820)
Though none of the nine bills was enacted into law, the sheer number never-
theless attests to congressional activism in China policy. Some readers may
wonder whether this ood of China bills was unique due to Jiangs visit. As
will be demonstrated shortly, this is not an isolated episode, but reects a
general pattern of congressional activism and antagonism in China policy.
Taiwan 27 21 4 10 18 80
Generic 9 16 2 8 25 60
human rights
MFN 1 7 18 5 31
Tiananmen 1 3 9 10 23
Tibet 6 10 3 3 22
Generic trade 2 6 2 4 3 17
Export control 2 1 4 2 8 17
WTO 6 3 9
UNPF 1 1
Other 9 17 1 18 27 72
Total 57 74 20 78 103 332
up slightly more than 30 percent of the Taiwan bills introduced in the Senate,
which is about half of the corresponding percentage in the House. However,
Senators were more likely than their House counterparts to use simple resolu-
tions to convey their opinions about Taiwan policy, as 21 out of 80 Senate
Taiwan bills were simple resolutions, compared with 21 out of 167 in the
House.
As in the House, the largest number of Senate joint resolutionsseven to
be exactwas related to MFN renewal. However, they account for only
slightly more than 30 percent of all the Senate joint resolutions, as opposed to
57 percent in the House. Thus in both absolute numbers and percentages,
Senators were less likely to sponsor joint resolutions disapproving of presi-
dential renewal of Chinas MFN status.
The most striking dierence between the two chambers lies in the number
of amendments. Even though the Senate is less than one fourth the size
of the House, it has nearly twice the number of amendments. Except for
export control, there were more amendments in the Senate for each policy
issue than in the House. Anyone who is familiar with the internal operations
of Congress knows that this inter-chamber dierence in amendments results
from dierent rules governing oor debate in each chamber.6
Having discussed the frequency of each type of bills, I will examine con-
gressional activism in each policy issue. Excluding the Other category, three
policy issues have the same ranking in each chamber. In descending order,
they are Taiwan policy, generic human rights, and MFN renewal. There were
167 Taiwan bills in the House and 80 in the Senate. When combined, this
means that on average seven Taiwan bills were introduced in Congress annu-
ally during the 34-year period, or more than one out of four China bills
introduced in Congress during this period pertained to Taiwan policy.
The number of generic human rights bills is 75 and 60 in the House and the
32 Congressional eorts to punish China
Senate respectively. These bills pertain to such issues as religious freedom,
political dissent, and labor rights. One can argue that bills respecting the
Tiananmen Incident, funding to the UNPF, and Tibet should also be counted
as human rights bills. For many members of Congress, the Tiananmen Inci-
dent exemplies Chinese violation of human rights. The controversy over
funding to the UNPF arose amidst allegations of forced abortion in China,
which was viewed by many members of Congress as violations of human
rights. Tibet attracted congressional attention due to alleged Chinese repres-
sion of Tibetans. If these bills were counted, then the total number of human
rights bills would jump to 245. In addition, there were 79 bills related to MFN
renewal. Since the MFN debate was primarily about how to use trade to
leverage human rights progress in China, these bills can also be viewed as
human rights bills. If so, the number of human rights bills would be 324,
surpassing that of Taiwan policy.
Export control does not attract as many headlines as Chinas human rights
or the soaring U.S. trade decit with China, but it is clearly an important part
of Congresss China policy, particularly in the House. As was briey men-
tioned in the Introduction, Congress not only makes sure that the U.S. main-
tains a tight export control regime regarding China, but also successfully
pressured the European Union to delay its lifting of arms embargo against
China.
Bilateral trade seems to be another issue of major concern to members of
Congress, as 52 bills concerning issues like taris, textile quotas, and intel-
lectual property rights (IPR) were introduced. Also, 19 bills specically
addressed issues concerning Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization.
With only six bills, foreign assistance (e.g., international loans to China) does
not seem to be an issue of particular concern to Congress.
Figure 2.1 classies China bills according to several general categories
Far more China bills (665) were introduced in the 17 years after 1989
(including 1989) than those introduced in the 17 years before it (210).
This huge disparity strongly suggests that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident
has been a major source of congressional activism in China policy.
The total number of China bills introduced in the rst session of each
Congress (578) is nearly twice that in the second session (297). This is
strikingly similar to the aggregate ratio for all bills introduced in Con-
gress during the same period.7 One reason for inter-session dierence
may be that members introduce bills in the rst session so as to allow
more attention and time for committee and oor consideration of their
bills, knowing that the legislative agenda is crowded but time is limited.8
Republicans sponsored 475 China bills and Democrats 394 bills, with
Independents contributing 6 bills (which are not presented in Figure 2.1).
This inter-party dierence is quite noteworthy because more Democrats
held oce during this period than Republicans.
Congress took oor actionvoice vote or roll call voteon 259 bills, or
less than one-third of all China bills introduced. Since the full chamber
normally may not debate and vote on a bill unless it is reported out of a
committee, it appears that committees failed to report the vast majority
of China bills to the oor.
The time trend of China bills is depicted in Figure 2.2. A tentative impression
The two political parties have frequently used China policy to attack each
other, particularly in times of divided government, that is, the presidency and
Congress are controlled by dierent parties. When Republicans regained
majority control of Congress in 1947the rst time since 1933congres-
sional debate about what the U.S. should do respecting the Chinese civil war
became much more partisan (e.g., Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westereld
1955). Republicans intended to use the China issue to embarrass President
Truman, with an eye toward defeating him in the coming 1948 election.
Rourke (1983: 6) wrote, In control of Congress for the rst time in almost
two decades and condently looking forward to capturing the White House
in 1948, Republican foreign policy activity became increasingly motivated by
partisan considerations.
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, the Democratic majority in
Congress launched harsh criticism of President Bushs China policy and
their criticism seemed to be largely motivated by partisanship. Ross (1992:
290) claimed that the Democratic-controlled Congress used China policy
as a vehicle for both pursuing its foreign policy agenda and weakening
the presidents domestic popularity. Harding (1992: 244) asserted that
the deep division between the White House and Congress on China
policy . . . reect[s] simple partisan politics, with the Democrats seeing in
China one of the few foreign policy issues on which a popular new
Republican president might prove vulnerable. Richard Bush (1995: 149150)
agreed: China became subject to the dynamics of divided government. A
Democratic Congress, with support from some conservative Republicans,
sought to use the China issue to embarrass a Republican administration for
political gain.
Similarly, when Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, they
became immediately active in China policy. They put enormous pressure on
Clinton and forced the latter to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the former
Taiwanese president. Then the Republican-controlled House passed the
U.S.Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act in 1997 and the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in 2000 (e.g., Bush 2004: Chapter 7; Mann
2001; Yang 2000: Chapter 6). In the meantime, Republicans launched high-
prole investigations of allegedly illegal Chinese campaign donations in the
1996 presidential election (e.g., CQWR 1997: 1140, 1568, 1601, 1861). In
1998, the Republican majority formed a Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the Peoples Republic of
China, chaired by Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA). In early 1999, the
committee released the highly controversial Cox Report (CQWR 1998: 1375,
14001402, 18861889).
36 Congressional eorts to punish China
Hypothesis 2: The number of China bills introduced should be positively
associated with the strength of anti-Communism in Congress, other
things being equal.
Methodology
Because there are two major political parties and three branchesthe White
House, the House, and the Senateparty control of government can come in
any of the following four forms: unied Republican control of White House
and House (Senate), unied Democratic control of White House and House
(Senate), Democratic PresidentRepublican House (Senate), and Republican
PresidentDemocratic House (Senate). The rst three forms are included in
regression analysis, with the last form being treated as the baseline.
Favorable public opinion about China is measured as the percentage of
Americans who reported having a favorable opinion of China in various
surveys. Notwithstanding slight variations in question wording and response
categories, these survey responses are generally good indicators of Americans
overall opinion of China (see the Appendix). For a year in which no such
question was asked, the average of the previous and following years is used.
For years in which there were multiple surveys, the average is taken.
It is hard to construct an aggregate measure of anti-Communism in
Congress. Instead, I use a rather crude measure, namely, the percentage of
Republican membership in each chamber. Republicans in general have tradi-
tionally been more vocal in anti-Communism than Democrats.9 To be sure,
not every Republican adopts a hard-line approach to China. Furthermore,
hard-liners often had to compromise with moderate Republicans like
Doug Bereuter (R-NE) (see CQWR 2000: 263). But, in general, the more
Republicans there were in each chamber, the more punitive China bills would
be introduced due to their antipathy toward Communism.
The rst session of each Congress is coded as 1 and the second session 0.
Tiananmen is coded 0 for years before 1989 and 1 for years thereafter (includ-
ing 1989). I include a time trend variable Year, which is expected to capture
any autonomous change in the number of China bills that is independent of
Congressional eorts to punish China 39
other variables. Last but not least, since House rules make it much more
dicult to amend a bill on the oor than in the Senate, I exclude amendments
in the following analysis.
Findings
I run two negative binomial regressions, one for each chamber.10 Results for
the House are presented in Table 2.3. Since the average number of China bills
introduced in the House between 1973 and 2006 is 14, this means that con-
trolling for other factors, a Democratic president facing a Republican major-
ity in the House witnessed an estimated 22.68 (1.62 14) more China bills, as
compared with a Republican president facing a Democratic-controlled
House. This is clear indication of the important impact of divided govern-
ment on China policy.
Notice that between 1973 and 2006, there was only one Democratic
president who faced a Republican majority in the House, and that president
was Bill Clinton. As discussed shortly before, House Republicans were par-
ticularly active in China policy after they regained House majority in 1995.
Table 2.3 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) intro-
duced in the House, 19732006
Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coecients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
** Signicant at .01
40 Congressional eorts to punish China
Clintons situation was strikingly similar to that of President Harry
Truman, whose China policy was subject to bitter attacks by the newly
inaugurated Republican majority. This statistical nding plus Trumans
experience with the Republican-controlled Congress strongly suggests that a
House Republican majority tends to use China policy as a partisan issue to
attack Democratic presidents.
Unied Republican control of the House actually led to 20.72 more China
bills than a Republican president facing a Democratic majority, controlling
for other factors. During the 34-year period, the House was under unied
Republican control only for six years (20016). Among other things, George
W. Bushs tough stance in dealing with the collision of a U.S. reconnaissance
plane with a Chinese ghter jet in early 2001, congressional frustration with
the astronomical trade decit with China, and congressional opposition to
the European Unions proposed lifting of arms embargo against Beijing may
be responsible for the increase of China bills under unied Republican
control of the House.
Consistent with my expectation, the rst session of each Congress pro-
duced 8.68 more China bills than the second session, when other factors are
controlled for. Also, a post-Tiananmen House session had 18.76 more China
bills than a pre-Tiananmen session, holding other factors constant. This pro-
vides strong evidence that the Tiananmen Incident was primarily responsible
for congressional activism and antagonism in China policy since 1989.
Republican membership appears to have signicant impact, but it has a
wrong sign. That is, when other factors are held constant, increase in
House Republican membership actually led to fewer China bills. One
possible explanation is that during the studied period, signicant increase in
Republican membership in the House occurred after two major events in
U.S.China relations, namely, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Tiananmen
Incident. And these two major events brought about a sharp increase in
China bills introduced in the House. Finally, contrary to my expectation,
favorable public opinion does not appear to have any signicant impact.
Table 2.4 reports regression results for the Senate. Now only three factors
have signicant eects: session, Tiananmen, and favorability rating. Since the
average number of China bills introduced in the Senate was 6.7, this means a
rst session in the Senate witnessed on average 6.2 more punitive bills than a
second session. A post-Tiananmen Senate session produced 9.2 additional
China bills, compared with a pre-Tiananmen one, controlling for other fac-
tors. Thus in both chambers, signicantly more China bills were introduced
in the post-Tiananmen years. Suettinger thus wrote of the impact of the
Tiananmen Incident on U.S.China relations:
Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coecients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
** Signicant at .01; * signicant at .05.
one that is far more contentious and hostile than at any time since the
late 1950s.
(2003: 85)
In both the American and Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much
authority as the second; it could produce the maximum of impedimenta
dead-lock, if it liked.
(Walter Bagehot, quoted in Wilson 2006: 151)
In the previous chapter, I adduced evidence that Congress has been extremely
active in China policy. The next logical question is: What is the impact of
congressional activism on U.S.China policy? In answering this question, one
should consider the institutional structure under which Congress makes
China policy. After all, Congress and its members do not make China policy
(or any policy for that matter) in an institutional vacuum. If the institutional
structure makes it extremely dicult for Congress to transform its collective
preferences into policy outcomes, then Congress cannot have much impact
on China policy, regardless of how active it is or how strong its policy
preferences are. As will be shown in this chapter, bicameralism, the com-
mittee structure, and presidential veto have combined to severely constrain
Congresss ability to assert itself in China policy.
Bicameralism
The founding fathers created a second and distinct chamber in the hope that
it would serve as a cooling saucer to the rst and presumably more activist
chamber. Thus, the rst and most crucial step in assessing the policy impact
of bicameralism is to nd out whether the House is indeed more active than
the Senate.
Figure 2.1 already shows that the number of China bills introduced in the
House is larger than that of the Senate. However, this nding does not
44 Eects of congressional activism
necessarily constitute conclusive evidence of House activism in China policy.
First, the House is more than four times larger than the Senate, which makes
any inter-chamber comparison based on absolute numbers potentially prob-
lematic. Second, one can argue that the inclusion of amendments can skew
the results because it is much easier to sponsor amendments in the Senate
than in the House. The rst problem can be dealt with by examining inter-
chamber ratios instead of absolute numbers and the second by excluding
amendments.1
I rst calculate the ratio of House China bills to Senate China bills for each
Congress, and then compare it with the ratio for bills in general (i.e., all bills
introduced in each Congress). The purpose of this exercise is to nd out: (1)
whether there is any inter-chamber dierence in China policy; (2) whether
that dierenceif any at allis consistent across each Congress; and (3)
whether that dierence is unique to China policy or exemplies a general
pattern.
The HouseSenate ratios for China bills and bills in general are depicted in
Figure 3.1. With the exception of the 95th Congress (which has a ratio of 14),
the inter-chamber ratio of China bills stabilizes around 2 (the mean is 2.2).
The ratio for China bills is nearly identical to that for bills in general (the
mean is 2.3), and the correlation between the two ratios is 0.565 and signi-
cant at 0.05. All these statistics indicate that the House has indeed been
Figure 3.1 HouseSenate ratios for China bills and bills in general (excluding
amendments), 93rd109th Congresses.
Eects of congressional activism 45
Figure 3.2 Number of China bills (excluding amendments) by policy type and cham-
ber, 19732006.
signicantly and consistently more active in China policy than the Senate.
More importantly, this pattern of inter-chamber dierence is not unique to
China policy, but exemplies House activism in congressional policy-making
in general.
Figure 3.2 depicts inter-chamber dierence in the number of China bills in
each policy area. The most striking nding is that in each policy area the
number of China bills in the House is consistently larger than that in the
Senate. In terms of ratio, which is not reported here, the HouseSenate ratio
for each policy area uctuates closely around 2 (the mean is 1.97 if foreign
assistance is excluded). This ratio is nearly identical to the average aggregate
HouseSenate ratio of China bills reported above (2.2). Thus, in the par-
ticular case of China policy, what is true for aggregate level inter-chamber
dierence also appears to be true when it comes to specic policies.
Table 3.1 provides additional evidence of House activism. It depicts the
frequency of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) by chief
sponsor in each chamber. Of the hundreds of members who served in Congress
during the 34-year period, only 174 representatives and 79 Senators ever
introduced any China bill. Of those who did, 92 representatives and 37
Senators introduced only one China bill. That is, more than half of represen-
tatives and close to half of Senators who introduced any China bill at all
46 Eects of congressional activism
Table 3.1 Frequency of the number of China bills
(excluding amendments) by chief sponsor and chamber,
19732006
1 92 37 129
2 38 9 47
3 13 9 22
4 8 10 18
5 5 3 8
6 4 5 9
7 0 3 3
8 2 1 3
9 3 0 3
10 3 0 3
11 0 1 1
13 1 0 1
16 1 0 1
17 2 0 2
18 1 0 1
22 0 1 1
37 1 0 1
Total 174 79 253
introduced only one bill. The average is 2.7 (449 divided by 174) for each
representative and 2.9 (229 divided by 79) for each Senator.
While the average number of bills introduced by representatives and
Senators is strikingly similar, they mask the important fact that a handful of
House members were particularly active in China policy. Nine representatives
introduced ten or more China bills; together they introduced 148 China bills
out of a total of 449. By contrast, only two Senators introduced ten or more
China bills; together they introduced 33 out of a total of 229. It seems that
inter-chamber dierence in China policy arises primarily because the House
has more members with more intense China policy preferences. Table 3.2 lists
the nine representatives and two Senators as well as the policy issues that were
addressed in their bills.2
Up to this point, I have adduced strong evidence of House activism in
China policy. The next step is to establish that the Senate has checked House
activism in China policy. Two concrete examples will help illustrate the func-
tion of the Senate. In response to the Tiananmen Incident, Congress pro-
posed a number of sanctions against China, but these sanctions were never
enacted into law (Oberdorfer 1989; Phillips 1989). The House put the sanc-
tions in a foreign aid authorization bill (HR 2655) that died in the Senate. The
Senate attached its own version of sanctions to the routine State Department
authorization bill (HR 1487) that President Bush vetoed for other reasons. A
Table 3.2 Members of Congress who introduced ten or more China bills (excluding amendments), 19732006
House
Gerald Solomon (R-NY) 6 4 4 11 1 1 10 37
Tom Lantos (D-CA) 6 4 3 2 3 18
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) 1 4 1 6 1 2 1 1 17
Stephen Solarz (D-NY) 1 1 1 2 12 17
Chris Smith (R-NJ) 10 1 2 1 1 1 16
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) 2 4 7 13
Christopher Cox (R-CA) 1 4 1 4 10
Trent Lott (R-MO) 10 10
Dawson Mathis (D-GA) 1 9 10
Senate
Jesse Helms (R-NC) 3 10 3 4 2 22
Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 1 7 3 11
48 Eects of congressional activism
substitute bill (HR 3792) was never reported out of the Senate due to juris-
dictional dispute (CQ Almanac 1989: 1642, 3261).
The second example concerns Congresss failed attempt to strip China of
its MFN status. Between 1990 and 2001, the House voted each year on a joint
resolution to disapprove of presidential renewal of Chinas MFN status. The
Senate, by contrast, voted only once on such a resolution. Meanwhile, the
House twice passed bills conditioning MFN renewal on Chinas human
rights progress, and twice it garnered enough votes to override presidential
vetoes. But because the Senate on both occasions sustained the vetoes, the
two bills never became law.
In a word, bicameralism has had profound impact on Congresss China
policy. No matter how active the lower chamber was, its legislative initiatives
regarding China would have had little chance of being enacted into binding
legislation unless the upper chamber had been equally active and agreed with
these initiatives. Moreover, my ndings about inter-chamber dierences are
not unique to China policy, but reect a general pattern of House activism in
congressional policy-making. To the extent that the founding fathers were
wary of an active House churning out one piece of legislation after another,
my ndings seem to justify their concerns and to vindicate their decision to
set up a second chamber as a restraining force.
Congressional committees
To what extent has the committee structure aected Congresss China policy?
Part of the answer is shown in Figure 2.1, which shows that only 259 out of a
total of 875 China bills were reported out of committees to the oor. It
should be noted that the numbers in Figure 2.1 include amendments, but
House rules severely limit amendment opportunities.
Therefore, I retabulate the oor status of bills excluding amendments, and
nd that 119 (or 16.8 percent) of the 708 China bills were reported out of
committees. It is worth noting that my estimate is not unique to China bills,
but seems to be representative of bills in general. For example, Ripley (1983:
145146) found that only a nearly identical 16 percent of the 26,566 bills
introduced in the 89th Congress were ever reported out of committees. My
nding plus Ripleys illuminate the enormous power of committees as gate-
keepers: on average, about 84 percent of bills introduced in Congress die in
committee rooms. It is no wonder that Woodrow Wilson (2006: 63) called
committees the dim dungeons of silence from which few bills will ever
return alive.
What about the nal status of those 119 China bills reported out of com-
mittees? According to the new institutionalism, committee-approved bills will
almost always prevail on the oor (e.g., Crombez et al. 2006; Denzau and
Mackay 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
Consistent with this perspective, it turns out that 105 China bills were passed
and only 14 were rejected on the oor. That means the probability of a
Eects of congressional activism 49
committee-approved China bill being passed on the oor is close to 0.88
(105 divided by 119). Ripley (1983: 200) reported that an average of 70 per-
cent of committee-reported bills were passed unamended on the oor.3
Of the 14 rejected bills 13 (12 in the House and one in the Senate) were joint
resolutions to disapprove of presidential renewal of Chinas MFN status,
and the remaining one was a House bill. The oor majority approved all the
concurrent resolutions and simple resolutions reported out of committees.
Of the 64 House amendments, 51 were passed and 7 rejected; of the 103
Senate amendments, 63 were approved and 19 voted down.
My analysis so far provides strong support for theoretical claims about
committee power, that is, the power to block policy alternatives and the
power to prevail on the oor. In what follows, I will give a few concrete
examples of how committee members used gatekeeping rights to inuence
China policy.
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), former chairman of the full Senate Finance
Committee (20012003) and its Subcommittee on International Trade (1991
1994), has been a staunch supporter of free trade in general and U.S.China
trade in particular (Baucus 1994a, 1994b, 1996; Gugliotta 1991). He played
an instrumental role in maintaining Chinas unconditional MFN status.
Since MFN legislation falls within the jurisdiction of International Trade,
Baucus used the prerogative of his chairmanship to successfully block any
joint resolution to disapprove of unconditional MFN from being reported to
the Senate oor. In addition to trade, Baucus was also actively involved in
Taiwan policy. When the House passed HR 1838 to shore up U.S.Taiwan
military relations, Baucus promised to put a hold on the bill. Since a hold is
the equivalent of a libuster threat, the bill was doomed.4
Senator Craig Thomas (R-WY), former chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacic Aairs (19952001), has
also been a strong advocate of friendly U.S.China relations (U.S. Congress
1999, 2001d). Since 1995 he has played a role similar to that of Baucus,
fending o eorts by religious conservatives in the Senate to attach human
rights conditions to MFN renewal. In 1998, he prevented the passage of
several anti-China resolutions in the Foreign Relations Committee before
Clintons state visit to China (CQWR 1998: 3206). Partly because of the two
Senators inuence, the Senate never directly voted on a joint resolution to
disapprove of MFN renewal. The Senate voted only once on the issue and
that was in 1999. By a vote of 1287, it overwhelmingly rejected a motion to
discharge from the Finance Committee S.J.Res.27 that would revoke Chinas
MFN for one year.
While these two Senators epitomize the power of committee chairmen to
block certain policies, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) exemplies the power of
committee chairmen to propose new policies. Being the chairman of the
House International Relations Committee from 1995 to 2000 and a staunch
supporter of Taiwan, Gilman had profound impact on U.S.Taiwan policy.
Under his chairmanship, six resolutions rearming U.S. commitment to
50 Eects of congressional activism
Taiwan were reported out of the committee, and he managed to have them all
approved on the House oor under suspension of rules.5 In addition, the
committee marked up six bills in 1997 that aimed to deny visas to Chinese
ocials who are involved in religious persecution, increase the number of
human rights monitors stationed in China, authorize more funding for Radio
Free Asia, punish China for alleged missile sales to Iran and push develop-
ment of a missile defense system to protect Taiwan (CQ Almanac 1997:
838). All six bills were passed in the House. Had Gilman refused to schedule
hearings or committee votes on these bills, they probably would not have been
reported out of the committee and passed on the oor.
To conclude, the congressional committee structure has had profound
impact on Congresss China policy. From the perspective of Beijing, however,
this impact has been mostly positive, as the vast majority of anti-China
bills died in committees. Had it not been for committees serving as gate-
keepers, many more China bills would undoubtedly have been passed (in one
chamber or both chambers), and Congresss China policyand U.S.China
relations for that matterwould probably have been quite dierent. Also, it
should be noted that my ndings are not specic to congressional policy-
making toward China, but conform to the general pattern of committee
power in congressional policy-making.
Presidential veto
There have been three presidential vetoes and three unsuccessful congres-
sional overrides respecting China policy.6 The rst took place in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Congress attempted to provide
protection for Chinese students who were then studying in the U.S., hence the
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act (HR 2712). The bill, sponsored
by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), would waive for four years the
requirement that they rst return to China before applying for new visas or
permanent residency. The bill passed the House by a unanimous vote and the
Senate by a voice vote. President Bush vetoed the Act on November 30 1989,
on the grounds that the Chinese had threatened to cut o all educational
exchanges if the bill were enacted into law. In its stead, the president issued an
executive order granting Chinese students similar protections. The House
voted overwhelmingly (39025) to override Bushs veto, but the Senate failed
by four votes (6237) (see Yang 2000: 7680; Mann 1999).
The other two vetoes took place in 1992. The rst concerns HR 2212, or
the U.S.China Act of 1991. Sponsored by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi
(D-CA), the bill attached strict human rights conditions for the extension of
MFN in 1992. It would bar the president from extending MFN in 1992 unless
Beijing accounted for and released all political prisoners arrested during the
Tiananmen Incident. It also required China to make signicant progress in
other human rights areas before it could be granted MFN. The bill passed the
House 313112 on July 10 and the Senate 5544 on July 23 1991. The Senate
Eects of congressional activism 51
did not pass the conference report until February 1992, and Bush promptly
vetoed it on March 2. The House quickly voted 35761 to override Bushs
veto on March 11, but the Senate failed by a vote of 6038 (Yang 2000:
90107).
Several months later, Donald Pease (D-OH) and Nancy Pelosi introduced
HR 5318, or the U.S.China Act of 1992. It is similar to HR 2212 in that it
requires presidential certication of overall Chinese progress in human rights
before the granting of MFN. However, it is signicantly dierent from HR
2212 in one aspect: instead of imposing non-MFN taris on all Chinese
goods, it would target only goods made by Chinas state-run enterprises. On
July 21 1992, the House passed HR 5318 by a vote of 33962, and the
Senate passed it by voice vote on September 14. Two weeks later, President
Bush vetoed the bill. While the House voted 34574 to override the veto on
September 30, the Senate upheld Bushs veto the next day by a vote of 5940
(Yang 2000: 107111).
Regardless of why the three vetoes were sustained, which will be discussed
later on, the three unsuccessful overriding attempts convey two important
points. First, the two-thirds majority requirement essentially guarantees that
the president will prevail most of the time in his battles against Congress.
Second, bicameralism further enhances presidential dominance. If there were
only one chamber, then Bushs three vetoes almost certainly would have been
overridden. Yet the Senate consistently sustained Bushs vetoes, nullifying
whatever victory the House scored vis--vis the president.
The three veto ghts also raise an important question: Why did President
Bushs China policy preferences dier sharply from those of many members
of Congress? Bushs background as the former U.S. liaison ocer in Beijing
in 19741976 is often cited as a key factor behind his determination to pre-
vent Congressat almost any political costfrom inicting irrevocable
damage to a relationship that had been carefully nurtured since 1972 (e.g.,
CQ Almanac 1989: 14111414). That is, since Bush was personally and
intimately involved in the normalization process, he is supposed to have
strong incentives to maintain and promote friendly U.S.China relations
regardless of the policy preferences of Congress.
However, a close look at executive-legislative interactions in China policy
reveals that Bush is merely one of the many presidents whose policy prefer-
ences diverged from those of Congress. In the late 1940s, Congress insisted on
providing military and economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek despite Trumans
objection (Tsou 1963; Westereld 1955: Chapter 12, Chapter 16; Grasso 1987;
Purifoy 1976; Rourke 1983: 130145); Carter established diplomatic relations
with China despite strong congressional opposition (Sutter 1983; Tierney
1979); and Clintons engagement policy was widely criticized on Capitol Hill
(Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Suettinger 2003). Thus a general question arises:
Why does the president often disagree with Congress in China policy?
Party politics appears to be the major factor that induces executive-
legislative disagreements in China policy. Inter-party electoral competition
52 Eects of congressional activism
often motivates members of the opposition party to attack the presidents
China policy for political gains, particularly when the presidents party has a
minority in Congress. The new Republican majority in 1947 and 1995
launched incessant criticism of Truman and Clintons China policy, and the
Democratic majority mercilessly attacked Bushs China policy between 1990
and 1992.
Another reason probably has something to do with institutional dier-
ences. By constitutional design, members of Congress are expected to be
responsive to parochial interests within their districts, while the president
follows national interests. Moreover, the two institutions are electorally
independent of each other. That is, the president does not owe his oce to
Congress, nor does he have the authority to appoint or remove a member of
Congress. Thus members of Congress frequently advocate foreign policies
that are dierent from or contrary to those of the presidents. Take human
rights, for example. Congress initiated the human rights campaign in the
early 1970s, but the targets of the campaign were mostly U.S. allies. Out of
national security or other strategic concerns, however, the executive branch
was unwilling to jump on the congressional bandwagon and criticize its
allies for human rights violations (e.g., Cohen 1979; Forsythe 1988; Hehir
1992). In the case of China policy, Congress was most outspoken in its
condemnation of the Tiananmen Incident, but President Bush was deter-
mined to maintain normal relations with China, a country in which the
U.S. has a wide range of vital interests: cultural, economic, strategic, and
political.
In a word, because of partisan politics and institutional dierences,
Congress and the president often disagree with each other in China policy
in particular and foreign policy in general.
The rule of anticipated reactions predicts that rational actors will behave
strategically, adjusting their actions in anticipation of reactions from other
actors (Friedrich 1941). Because of strategic behavior, it is misleading to
judge the relative inuence of the president or Congress by merely what meets
the eye. The president may deter Congress from taking certain actions by
making known his policy preferences (e.g., his intention to use the veto).
Conversely, Congress can deter the president from taking certain actions by
signaling its collective preferences through actual or promised passage of
legislation. Thus, Lindsay and Ripley (ibid.: 25) wrote, The existence of such
strategic behavior has important implications for the study of defense and
foreign policy: the relative power of Congress and the president cannot be
judged solely on the basis of observed behavior.
Examples of anticipated reactions abound in Congresss China policy.
Lee Tenghuis visit to the U.S., which was discussed shortly before, is a
good example of anticipated reactions. Another example comes from U.S.
sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan. In 1999, the Clinton administration
seemed reluctant to approve sales of long-range early warning radars to
Taiwan. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), then chairman of the House International
Relations Committee, wrote to President Clinton to urge his approval. He
also wrote to Secretary of State Madeline Albright, threatening to introduce
legislation approving such sales. In the end, the administration agreed in
principle to sell early warning radars to Taiwan (Kan 2002: 5). Meanwhile,
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) co-sponsored S 693 (the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act), a bill that was two months later introduced in the House
as HR1838 and which eventually passed the House in 2000. Though the
bill never became public law because of sti opposition from a number of
Senators, it created an environment in which it became hard for Clinton to
reject Taiwans arms purchase requests (CQWR 1999: 26052607; CQWR
2000: 262, 953; Lampton 2001: 333334).
It is worthwhile saying a few more words about Senator Jesse Helms, who
exercised enormous inuence on China policy during his tenure as chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 19952000 (see Berke and
Myers 1997). His preferences on China policy and his toughness were so well
known on Capitol Hill that he often exercised inuence by doing nothing
(e.g., U.S. Congress 1997b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000c).7 As Lampton (2001: 339,
italics original) pointed out, In politics as well as in life, fear can be a
powerful force; simply being tough and dedicated deters both the executive
branch and other legislators from even attempting to pursue certain courses
Eects of congressional activism 57
of action. In the 1999 search for a U.S. ambassador to China, for example,
several candidates were ruled out simply because they were presumably
unacceptable to Helms. In a word, because of strategic behavior resulting
from anticipated reactions, [t]he inuence of legislators like Helms . . . often
is measured as much by what did not happen as by the legislation they eventu-
ally shepherd into law (ibid.: 339, italics original).
Instead of prescribing (or proscribing) policy actions for the executive
branch, as substantive legislation does, procedural legislation establishes the
processes by which policy decisions are made within the executive branch
(Lindsay and Ripley 1993). Through procedural legislation like reporting
requirements or the creation of new agencies, Congress has rmly put its
imprint on many aspects of China policy. The annual State Department
report on Chinas human rights, which was rst mandated by Congress in
1980, forces the administration to include human rights as an important
aspect of U.S. China policy. Because the report always oers unattering
assessments of the overall human rights situation in China, the Chinese
government has never failed to rebut the report (e.g., BBC Chinese 2004,
2005, 2006). In fact, starting from 1999 Beijing began to issue an annual
report on U.S. human rights. As a result of Congresss procedural legisla-
tion, the annual State Department report and the Chinese report have
become the symbol and a major source of U.S.China confrontations on
human rights.
Another example of procedural legislation is the creation of the Oce of
the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Aairs within the State Department
under Public Law 107228. A number of legislators, including some of the
heavyweights on Capitol Hill like Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, have been strong supporters of human rights in Tibet.8 Congress
has also held a number of hearings on alleged Chinese human rights viola-
tions in Tibet (e.g., U.S. Congress 1988, 1997a, 2001b, 2002). The executive
branch, by contrast, has been largely quiescent on the issue, except when the
State Department issues its annual report on human rights China, which
includes human rights in Tibet. To ensure that the executive branch includes
Tibet in its overall China policy and to provide access to human rights groups
and Tibetans, Congress created the Oce in 1997. Since Beijing has claimed
sovereignty over Tibet since 1949, it condemns the creation of the Oce as
another instance of U.S. interference in Chinese domestic aairs (e.g., BBC
Chinese 2001; Peoples Daily 1997).
Probably the best example of procedural legislation is the JacksonVanik
Amendment that prohibits the president from granting MFN to Communist
countries unless he waives the requirement. Originally enacted to punish
the former Soviet Union for its restrictions on Jewish emigration, the
Amendment became the statutory tool with which a frustrated Congress tried
to shape China policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Because
of this procedural requirement, the president and Congress locked horns
over China policy each year between 1990 and 2000, and twice the president
58 Eects of congressional activism
had to use his veto power to save unconditional MFN for China. While the
president always managed to renew unconditional MFN for China, the
annual debate nonetheless caused many uncertainties in and considerable
damage to U.S.China relations. Moreover, the annual debates on MFN
renewal forced the administration to treat human rights as a top priority in
China policy.
By holding public hearings in which legislators as well as outside groups
and experts testify on relevant policy issues, members of Congress can greatly
shape public preferences, which in turn can inuence the presidents policy
options. As Lampton (2001: 336) aptly pointed out, Often televised, hear-
ings can cumulatively help shape media, congressional, and ultimately popu-
lar discourse and create boundaries that the executive branch will itself
decide not to transgress. In a series of high-prole hearings held in 1966,
Congress discussed the state of U.S.China relations and came to the conclu-
sion that the U.S. should readjust its foreign policy by reaching out to China
(CQ Almanac 1966: 424429). These hearings laid the critical foundation of
public support for a normalized relationship with China, which in turn
encouraged and facilitated the KissingerNixon initiatives to form a strategic
alliance with China.
One reason that human rights has remained a top priority in U.S. China
policy since 1989 is frequent congressional hearings. Christopher Smith
(R-NJ), former chairman of the House International Relations Subcommit-
tee on International Operations and currently chairman of the Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, is one of
the most vocal critics of Chinese human rights on Capitol Hill. He has
held the largest number of hearings on human rights in China (e.g., U.S.
Congress 1998a, 1998b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b). According to
Lampton (2001: 336), Smith held at least ve sets of hearings on Chinas
human rights in 1995, the rst year of his chairmanship. In a February 2006
hearing, Smith blasted the top executives of U.S. internet companies for
allegedly aiding the Chinese government in cracking down on political dis-
sent (U.S. Congress 2006b) He even invited Chinese ocials to testify
before his hearings. Each time the Chinese would refuse, and Smith would
view it as Chinese unwillingness to cooperate on human rights issues, hence
more hearings on Chinese human rights (Lampton 2001: 336337). These
hearings undoubtedly have contributed to the salience of the issue among
American people and their support for a strong human rights policy toward
China.
In a word, it is misleading to judge Congresss impact on China policy by
simply counting the number of bills enacted into law. Congress has signi-
cantly inuenced China policy through procedural legislation, creating situ-
ations that generate desired reactions by the executive branch, and by framing
public opinion. On balance, then, Congresss inuence lies not so much in
telling the executive branch what to do as in setting up road blocks in U.S.
China relations. Sutter thus wrote:
Eects of congressional activism 59
The overall eect of such strong congressional criticism has been to act
as a drag on forward movements in U.S.China relations. The constant
critiques divert administration policy-makers from other tasks, forcing
them to defend and justify their China policies before skeptical and
sometimes hostile Congress.
(2001: 108)
4 Congress and U.S.China
trade relations1
When we trade with other countries, we export more than farm equipment,
soybeans, or computer chips. We export part of our society. Part of our Amer-
ican values and ideals [sic]. This is good for the WTO. It is good for China.
It is good for the United States. And I believe it will help keep the peace.
(Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Congressional Record 2000: S791)
Do my colleagues know that . . . China has still not accounted for those
missing or detained in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square demon-
strators? Eleven years . . . And this administration and this Congress wants
[sic] to grant China permanent trade status? Shame.
(Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), Congressional Record 2000: H514)
Source: 19731984, Harding (1992: Table A-2); 19852004, U.S. Census Bureau.
U.S. alone absorbs about one-third of all Chinese exports to the world. For
example, China has been the top supplier of footwear and toys to American
consumers since 1991; in 2005, Chinese imports alone accounted for 71 per-
cent of total U.S. footwear imports and 78 percent of total U.S. toys imports.
Since 2003, China has been the leading source of American apparel
importsboth knit and not-knit (see Table 4.2).
As a result, the U.S. has been running an enormous trade decit with
China. In fact, the last time the U.S. had trade surplus was back in 1982.
Between 1983 and 2006, U.S. trade decit with China increased from an
insignicant $68 million to $232.5 billion (see Table 4.1). The inux of
Table 4.2 U.S. imports of selected commodities from China in 19892005 (billions of dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: Oce of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 63
Chinese products arguably have had tremendous negative impact on American
jobs and wages. Unable to compete with cheap Chinese imports, many
American manufacturing businesses were forced to close, resulting in the loss
of thousands of jobs. According to one estimate, U.S. trade with China
eliminated a net 1,460,000 jobs in 19892003 (Scott 2005: 4).
The astronomical trade decit with China has put both the White House
and Congress under political heat, but for two reasons the political heat has
been particularly intense for Congress.2 First, of the three branches of gov-
ernment, only Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate foreign
trade. Second, because of the electoral connection, constituents adversely
aected by Chinese importsmostly blue-collar workers and labor unions
have put increasing pressure on members of Congress to address skyrocket-
ing trade decit (see Sostek 2006; Trumka and Hughes 2006). And Congress
has indeed been actively pursuing various legislative measures aimed
at reducing trade decit. In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) co-sponsored a bill that would impose a 27.5 percent
tari on Chinese imports unless Beijing appreciates its allegedly undervalued
currency, which is believed to be partly responsible for the huge trade decit
(see MacLeod 2006; Marquand 2006). In the House, representatives from the
manufacturing belt like Tim Ryan (D-OH), Mike Rogers (R-MI), and Phil
English (R-PA) also introduced similar bills.
Hypotheses
After the two countries signed the trade agreement on Chinas accession to
the WTO in late 1999, the Clinton White House immediately started a well-
organized and high prole campaign for its approval by Congress (CQWR
2000: 1121; Smith 2000). China is not simply agreeing to import more of our
products. It is agreeing to import one of democracys most cherished values,
economic freedom, said the president (quoted in CQWR 2000: 552). He
appointed Commerce Secretary William M. Daley and Deputy White House
Chief of Sta Steve Ricchetti to launch an all-out campaign. Clintons cam-
paign on Capitol Hill focused on House Democrats who appeared to be
reluctant to support a trade deal opposed by labor unions. In order to woo
wavering members, Clinton also arranged trips to China so that these
members could see with their own eyes the positive changes that had occurred
in that country since 1989 (Smith 2000). Two weeks before the scheduled
House vote, Clinton arranged a star-studded ceremony to tout the benets of
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 67
U.S.China trade. The guests included former presidents Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Minnesotas
Independent governor Jesse Ventura (CQWR 2000: 1121).
Since constituency interests are arguably most clearly dened on trade issues,
I expect signicant constituency inuence on the PNTR vote. In particular,
the interests of farmers, big retailers and wholesalers, and labor unions are
expected to have signicant impact on the vote.
The U.S. has been the worlds leading exporter of agricultural products.
In the early 1980s, it alone accounted for nearly one-third (32 percent to be
exact) of the worlds agricultural export market, and its share in 1999 was
18 percent (Economic Research Service 2001b: 1). In the same year, the over-
all export share of U.S. agricultural production was 15 percent (Economic
Research Service 2000: 1). In 2000, the U.S. exported $51.6 billion worth of
agricultural products, which generated 740,000 full-time civilian jobs (includ-
ing 444,000 jobs in non-farm sectors), and a third of U.S. cropland went into
export channels (Economic Research Service 2001a).
China has been a leading market for American farmers since the two
countries established diplomatic relations in 1979. It was the seventh largest
foreign market for U.S. farm products between 1997 and 2001; if Hong Kong
is included, then China became the fourth largest (Becker and Hanrahan
2002: 1). The U.S. is the largest supplier of agricultural products to China,
accounting for an average of 24 percent of Chinas agricultural import
market between 1997 and 1999. In 1999, U.S. share of Chinas imports of
soybean, soy oil, hides, and poultry meat was 58 percent, 39 percent, 44
percent, and 64 percent respectively (Foreign Agricultural Service 2001: 14).
With signicantly reduced tarishence more market access for American
farmersonce it was admitted into the WTO, China was expected to import
more U.S. agricultural products, raising average U.S. farm prices from
0.5 percent to 3 percent over the 20022009 baseline. And U.S. exports and
net farm income could increase by US$900 million and US$800 million,
respectively, by 2009 (Becker and Hanrahan 2002: 2).
Given the high stakes American farmers have in U.S.China trade, it is not
surprising that members from farm districts seemed to be particularly sup-
portive of PNTR. For example, Greg Walden (R-OR) supported PNTR
because the Oregon Potato Commission estimated that Chinese imports of
frozen French fries would increase from 15,000 metric tons in 1997 to 250,000
metric tons in 2005 (U.S. Congress 2001c: 13). Fully aware of the importance
of Chinese consumers for Iowa soybean growers, Senator Chuck Grassley
(R-IA) also championed Chinas WTO membership (Congressional Record
2000: S791).
68 Congress and U.S.China trade relations
Hypothesis 2: Support for PNTR will be positively associated with farm
employment in a congressional district.
Also, it should be noted that both parties had a hard time forming a unied
front on PNTR. On the Democratic side, opponents of PNTR were mostly
human rights activists and environmentalists from the liberal wing of the
party, and on the Republican side, social conservatives and defense hawks
from the conservative wing of the GOP (CQWR 2000: 89; CQ Almanac 1998:
23: 3). As a result, pro-trade Republicans and Democrats found themselves
in opposition to the ideological wings of both parties on the PNTR debate.
A CQ Weekly Report sta writer vividly captured the political scene:
Finally, it is worth noting that many members opposed PNTR because they
believed that the annual review of MFN gave Congress crucial leverage on
human rights in China. Chris Smith (R-NJ), a strong critic of Chinas human
rights, argued that the annual debate and the possibility of MFN revocation
are arguably the most important leverage the U.S. still has to inuence human
rights situation in China and that the permanent surrender of our MFN
leverage ought to be unthinkable at this point (U.S. Congress 2000b: 3,
2001c: 24). Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) also felt uncomfort-
able with just taking away a process that is in place, that does provide some
pressure on China, and leaving nothing to replace it (CQWR 2000: 850).
David Bonior (D-MI) said, If you reward China with permanent trade status,
you lose all leverage (quoted in Shesgreen 2000).
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 71
Data and methodology
Due to the lack of district-level data, I use state-level data for two variables:
Union Strength and Exports to China. Union Strength is the percentage
of unionized workers, and Exports to China is the proportion of exports to
China out of a states total exports. Data for the other two constituency
variables are district-level and come from the 2000 census. Farm Employment
is the total number of farmers and farmer managers divided by civilian labor
force. Similarly, Retail/Wholesale Employment is the percentage of retail and
wholesale workers in civilian labor force. Presidents Party is coded 1 if a
member belongs to the presidents party and 0 otherwise.
To test the hypothesis that the ideological wings of both parties are more
likely to vote against PNTR than pro-trade moderates, I use the absolute
value of the commonly used DW-NOMINATE score (hereafter referred
to as DW score) (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Since the original value of DW
score almost always ranges from 1 to 1, its absolute value ranges from 0 to 1.
Because both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) are
expected to vote against pro-trade moderates, high absolute DW scores
should be positively associated with nay votes. In other words, the absolute
value of DW score is expected to have a negative sign.
Given the usually high correlation between party and ideology, on the one
hand, and constituency variables, on the other hand, including both in the
same regression may dampen the eects of one or the other.12 Thus I rst
run a regression with only Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/
Wholesale Employment. Then I add party and ideology, the interaction term,
and Exports to China sequentially. I treat Exports to China dierently from
the other three constituency variables because data on state exports are avail-
able only after 1999, which means that when I analyze roll call votes on U.S.
Japan trade in the 1980s in Chapter 7, I will not be able to include state
exports to Japan. Yet it is essential to have the same set of variables if I want
to compare congressional roll voting on trade across dierent countries. On
the other hand, it is also important that I use the best available data to explain
roll call behavior. As a result, I include Exports to China here, but only after
I have run regressions with the other three constituency variables that will be
included in regression analyses in later chapters. Data sources are contained
in the Appendix.
Since the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on only
binary values (1 or 0), I use logit regression. The coecients of a logit regres-
sion represent logarithm of odds, not probabilities. To convert them into
probabilities, I use the SPost module in STATA developed by Long and
Freese (2003). More specically, I use the post-estimation command
prchange to arrive at the changes in probabilities when the value of
an independent variable increases by one standard deviation, holding other
variables at their means. This is the method that will be used in later
chapters too.
72 Congress and U.S.China trade relations
Statistical ndings
Table 4.3 reports the coecients of logit regression and Table 4.4 reports
probabilities converted from these coecients. Model 1 is the basic model
with three constituency variables. Members from farm districts seemed to be
aware of the potential benets of an even more open China market for their
constituents, as the probability of voting for PNTR increases by 0.122 if a
districts farming employment increases by one standard deviation, holding
other variables at their means.
However, neither Union Strength nor Retail/Wholesale Employment is
statistically signicant, even though both of them are in the hypothesized
direction. This is a rather surprising nding, particularly in light of strong
labor pressure on members of Congress. State-level data might be responsible
for the poor performance of Union Strength. More important, perhaps, is the
possibility that many Democratsthose who believed that China did not
deserve PNTR due to its human rights and environmental problems and that
free trade would do more harm than good to Americawould have voted
against PNTR without pressure from labor unions. Also notice that the
explanatory power of Model 1 is rather weak, as indicated by the low pseudo
R2 (0.043). This suggests that constituency interests as measured by the three
variables did not have much impact on the PNTR vote.
Party and ideology are added to Model 2. The rst thing to notice is that
with the addition of these two variables, pseudo R2 increases considerably to
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at 0.01; * Signicant at 0.05.
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 73
Table 4.4 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in
independent variables (HR 4444)
Union strength
Retail/wholesale employment
Farm employment .122 .083 .081 .078
Presidents party (Democrat) .440
Absolute DW score .126 .110 .114
Democrat union strength
Exports to China .067
0.179, as opposed to 0.043 in Model 1. It appears that party and ideology, not
constituency interests, exerted the primary inuence on members votes.
Contrary to my expectation, the presidents party has a negative sign. This
means that being a Democrat actually decreases the probability of voting
for PNTR by a hefty 0.44, when other variables are held at their means. The
enormous pressure from labor unions might have caused the defection of
nearly two-thirds of Democrats despite an all-out campaign by their presi-
dent. Yet this explanation is problematic because Union Strength is con-
trolled for and is not statistically signicant in either Model 1 or Model 2.
Also, the correlation between Union Strength and Presidents Party is merely
0.172 (signicant at 0.01), which rules out the possibility that high correlation
between the two variables washed out the eects of Union Strength.
Furthermore, Bailey and Brady (1998) reported evidence that controlling
for ideology and other variables, Senate Democrats were more likely than
Republicans to vote for NAFTA and GATT under the Clinton presidency.
They argued that this nding might reect eorts by President Clinton to
either persuade or move Democrats on trade votes (ibid.: 534). Gartzke and
Wrighton also found that House Democrats were more likely to vote for
GATT than Republicans, controlling for ideology and constituency interests.
They thus wrote:
So why did House Democrats support Clinton on GATT but abandon him
on PNTR? Two factors appear to be responsible for the Democrats dierent
positions on the two votes. First, the House voted on GATT in the immediate
aftermath of Democratic loss to Republicans in the 1994 mid-term election.
74 Congress and U.S.China trade relations
Foreseeing Republican challenges to their president, who was just two years
into his rst term, many Democrats may have decided to rally around Clinton
by voting for GATT. By contrast, the PNTR vote took place in 2000, the last
year of Clintons presidency. Thus there was less urgency for Democrats to
rally around their president. Second, the GATT deals with international
trade in general, whereas the PNTR bill addresses U.S. trade with one parti-
cular country. By 2000, U.S. trade decit with China had grown to US$83.8
billion from US$29.5 billion in 1994 and China had replaced Japan as the
largest decit-trading partner of the U.S. The high salience of Chinathe
astronomical U.S. trade decit plus human rights, weapons proliferation,
etc.may have induced many House Democrats to vote against a bill cham-
pioned by Clinton.
Absolute DW score is highly signicant and has the correct sign. If it
increases by one standard deviation, that is, as a member becomes more
liberal or conservative, the probability of voting for PNTR decreases by
about 0.13, holding other variables at their means. This evidence suggests that
the ideological wings of both parties were indeed united in their opposition
to PNTR, while the pro-trade moderates of each party joined hands in their
support for the trade deal. As in Model 1, Farm Employment is statistically
signicant. One standard deviation increase in farm employment is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.08 in the probability of voting for PNTR, holding
other variables at their means.
Model 3 tests the hypothesis of inter-party heterogeneity in electoral strat-
egies. The interaction term Democrat Union Strength is not statistically
signicant, nor is party. On the one hand, this should not be a surprising
nding, given that interaction terms are usually highly correlated with the
original variables. In my case, the correlation between party and the inter-
action term is 0.864 and signicant at 0.01. On the other hand, this is a
surprising nding because it is inconsistent with evidence produced by Bailey
and Brady (1998).
One explanation for this discrepancy, which was discussed above, is that
many Democrats would have voted against PNTR without labor pressure.
This explanation has two further implications. First, inter-party hetero-
geneity in electoral strategies may exist, but only on general trade policy, not
on country-specic trade legislation, as Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzed
votes on GATT and NAFTA. Alternatively, such electoral heterogeneity may
exist on trade policy toward some countries, but not on trade policy toward
Chinaa country against which many Democrats seemed to have a number
of grievances: human rights, forced labor, environmental problems, etc.
Another explanation is simply that Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzed Senate
votes. In other words, it is possible that inter-party electoral heterogeneity
exists in the Senate, but not in the House, which suggests inter-chamber
dierence in foreign trade voting.
With the addition of the interaction term, only Farm Employment and
Absolute DW Score are statistically signicant, and they both have the
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 75
hypothesized sign. More specically, one standard deviation increase in the
former increases the probability of voting for PNTR by 0.08, but a similar
increase in the latter decreases the probability by 0.11, holding other variables
at their means.
Model 4 includes an additional constituency variable, namely, Exports to
China, which turns out to be statistically signicant and in the hypothesized
direction. One standard deviation increase in Exports to China leads to an
increase of 0.067 in the probability of voting for PNTR. Again, Farming
employment and Absolute DW are both statistically signicant and have the
correct sign.
Discussion
My analysis adduced evidence that party was the most important determin-
ant of the PNTR vote. Republicans tended to be much more supportive of
PNTR than Democrats. On the one hand, this nding is consistent with many
previous studies that have examined the relationship between party aliation
and support for free trade (e.g., Baldwin 1985; Coughlin 1985; McArthur and
Marks 1988; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink et al. 1996). On the other hand, it
is inconsistent with my expectation that Democratsout of loyalty to and
pressure from Clintonwould be more likely to vote for PNTR than Repub-
licans (or more likely to vote for it than if they faced a Republican president).
Moreover, a few scholars have adduced evidence that Democrats were more
likely to support free trade agreements during the Clinton years (Bailey and
Brady 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998). These seemingly conicting nd-
ings suggest that the relationship between party aliation and support for
free trade is not xed but varies according to the political and electoral
context as well as the particular country that is involved in a trade bill.
As far as ideology is concerned, the absolute value of DW score is consist-
ently signicant andexcept in Model 2has the largest impact. Thus lib-
erals and conservatives, instead of voting against each other as they normally
do, were closely united in opposition against pro-trade moderates on the
PNTR vote. My ndings thus provide further support for Nokkens (2003)
thesis of EATM voting.
My study does not provide support for Bailey and Bradys (1998) theory of
inter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies, as the interaction term
Democrat Union Strength is not statistically signicant in any of the
models. This is a rather surprising nding in light of the electoral ties between
labor unions and the Democratic Party in general and intense lobbying of
Democrats by labor groups before the vote. The high correlation between
party and the interaction term may be partly responsible for this nding. It
is also possible that inter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies exists in
the Senate, but not in the House, as all the ve votes (two on NAFTA and
three on GATT) analyzed by Bailey and Brady were Senate votes.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that many Democrats would
76 Congress and U.S.China trade relations
have voted against PNTR because of other considerations, regardless of
whether labor unions launched massive campaign against it. These Demo-
crats may have subscribed to the view that China does not deserve PNTR
because of its poor human rights record and environmental problems, that
trade with China was responsible for the loss of American jobs, or that free
trade in general has done more harm than good to America. That Union
Strength does not have any signicant impact in any of the regressions seems
to support this explanation. To be sure, state-level data could have resulted
in the poor performance of this variable, but scholars have usually relied on
state-level data due to the lack of district-level data and they have reported
evidence that Union Strength had signicant negative impact on support for
free trade (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke and Wrighton
1998). In a word, that neither Union Strength nor the interaction term
is statistically signicant strongly suggests that many Democrats opposed
PNTR because of their own preferences.
Of the three basic constituency variables, Farm Employment is the only
one that is statistically signicant in all four regressions. This is strong
evidence that members of Congress were especially responsive to the eco-
nomic interests of American farmers. Since the U.S. is the largest supplier
of agricultural products to China and since Chinas WTO membership prom-
ises an even bigger and more lucrative China market, it is no wonder that
the electoral connection appears to be particularly strong in the vote. The
fourth constituency variable, that is, Exports to China, also has signicant
impact on members votes. Together these ndings suggest that members of
Congress were particularly responsive to export interests.
Also notice that Retail/Wholesale Employment does not reach statistical
signicance in any of the four models. Moreover, except in Model 1, it has a
negative sign. What this suggests is that controlling for party and ideology,
retail and wholesale workers are actually more likely to oppose PNTR. In
other words, Retail/Wholesale Employment should probably be viewed as a
measure of constituency opposition tonot support fortrade with China.
Though I did not analyze the Senate vote on PNTR, its lopsided nature
indicates that there was a strong consensus among Senators on the desir-
ability of free trade with China. In fact, passage [of PNTR] by the more
internationalist Senate was never in doubt, and both sides expected an exped-
itious vote there (CQ Almanac 2000: 20). That the Senate passed PNTR by
landslide margins, compared with the narrow margin of victory in the House,
illustrates sharp inter-chamber dierence on trade policy toward China.
Moreover, recall that a few years before the PNTR vote, the Senate also
easily passed two important trade bills: NAFTA (6138) and GATT (7624).
The relative ease with which the three important trade bills sailed through
the Senate and the intense opposition they encountered in the House strongly
suggest that the upper chamber is in general more pro-trade than the
lower chamber. Just as the House has become increasingly opposed to free
trade agreements and renewal of fast track authority (Bailey 2001; Conley
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 77
1999; Gibson 2000), the Senate has transformed itself into a bastion of free
trade.14
The Senates distinct pro-trade stance can be attributed to several factors.
First, Senators usually come from much larger and hence more hetero-
geneous districts than House members. The need to serve a greater number
and variety of constituency interests makes them less likely to be swayed by
narrow interests. In other words, a House member may be more responsive to
the immediate concerns of his/her constituents adversely aected by free
trade and vote against it, but a Senator may decide that his/her constituency
in the wholeexporters, importers, labor unions, and blue-collar workers,
etc.will in the long run benet from free trade and hence vote for it.
Second, the longer tenure of Senators enables them to be somewhat tem-
porarily insulated from constituent pressure, whereas House members are
perennially on a short leash because of their two-year term. Third, Senators
may be more acquiescent to presidential initiatives in foreign trade than
House members. This is so because, with multiple committee assignments,
larger number of constituents, and sometimes the pursuit of the presidency,
Senators have much less time to acquire policy expertise than House members
and hence are more dependent on executive guidance (Kernell 1973: 341,
see also Pressman 1966). Last but not least, the Senate may have been more
pro-trade than the House simply because there were more Republicans than
Democrats.15 Republicans have been strong supporters of free trade and they
have been the majority in the Senate since 1994.
Finally, the passage of PNTR merely means that Congress cleared a major
hurdle to unfettered trade between the two countries. It does not mean that
Congress henceforth would wash its hands of matters relating to bilateral
trade. Since 2003, some members have been pressuring Beijing to appreciate
its currency in the hope of slowing down the growth of U.S. trade decit with
China. The SchumerGraham iniative in 2005 is a case in point. Because of
the enormous stakes of constituency interests in U.S.China trade, on the one
hand, and the strength of the electoral connection on trade issues, on the
other, more congressional initiatives on U.S.China trade should be expected.
Moreover, even without the astronomical trade decit, many members of
Congress still have a variety of reasons to oppose trade with China: human
rights, weapons proliferation, environmental issues, Taiwan, religious free-
dom, abortion, etc. In a word, due to a number of factors, trade with China
will remain a highly controversial topic on Capitol Hill. The good news for
those promoting U.S.China trade is that they can almost always count on
the White House andto a lesser extentthe Senate to neutralize attempts
to set roadblocks in the development of one of the worlds most bilateral
trade relationships.
5 Congress and Taiwan
I ask that the President take every measure necessary to ensure that the pur-
suit of democracy and democratic practices [in Taiwan] are not fettered by
Chinese intimidation and aggression.
(Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID), Congressional Record 1996: S2626)
The upper chamber, with its tradition of careful deliberation more insulated
from the winds of populist enthusiasm, should conclude that, yes, Americans
love Taiwan, but this legislation [HR 1838] needlessly stirs up trouble. The
House has had its fun, but to continue this dangerous game would be
counterproductive.
(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2000)
The U.S.Taiwan relationship is not only a unique relationship, but also one
of the most controversial relationships in the world today. It is unique
because
perhaps for the rst time in the history of modern foreign aairs, a state
had broken relations with another, only to create a new legal arrange-
ment [the Taiwan Relations Act] so as to maintain virtually all the rela-
tionships that had existed before.
(Myers 1989: 13)
Chiang is the one man who can make Chinese unity and independence a
reality. His faults can be understood when the complexities of the Chinese
puzzle are studied and they are no more uncommon than the faults of
other leaders of the United Nations. We are committed to Chiang and we
will help him to the best of our ability. He alone can untangle the present
situation because in spite of the things he has done, he is China.
(quoted in Purifoy 1976: 13)
Figure 5.1 Time trend of Taiwan bills introduced in each chamber, 19732006.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, a Republican is more likely than
a Democrat to support strong U.S.Taiwan relations.
Scholars who studied U.S.China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s
usually single out partisanship as the most important factor behind congres-
sional support for China (and Taiwan after Chiang Kai-sheks defeat in 1949)
and criticism of Trumans China policy.10 Exiled from the White House since
1932, the Republicans desperately needed a campaign issue to beat the seem-
ingly unbeatable Democrats. Moreover, the 1946 mid-term election put
Republicans in control of Congress, greatly boosting their condence in
defeating Truman in the upcoming 1948 election. Tucker (1983: 162163)
wrote, The largest number in Congress participated in the China contro-
versy for partisan reasons. These Republicans lacked genuine interest in
China but needed a campaign issue to defeat the seemingly unbeatable
Democrats who had monopolized the White House since 1932, added
Tucker (1994: 31).
However, Truman scored a surprise win at the polls. Trumans reelection
coincided with the beginning of Chiangs debacle and congressional
84 Congress and Taiwan
Republicans increasingly saw the deteriorating China situation as a poten-
tial issue and arena of attack of Trumans foreign policy (Rourke 1983: 74).
By 1949, the China bloc consisted largely of Republicans for whom the
China question was primarily a matter of party politics [and who adopted a]
gloves-o approach and promoted the Nationalist cause for their own polit-
ical purposes (Borg 1980: 174).11
Nearly three decades later, partisan passions ared up again, and this time
the center of contention was the TRA.12 The Republicans in general were
more vociferous than Democrats in their criticism of Carters decision to
abrogate the U.S.Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (see CQ Almanac 1979:
112113; Sutter 1983).13 Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) (1979: 20) called it con-
stitutionally and morally objectionable to abandon a staunch and faithful
ally, denouncing Carters decision as an ignominious act. Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ) (1979: 23) condemned Carters normalization announce-
ment as a short speech . . . which history may well record as ten minutes that
lived in infamy. Goldwater even led a case in a federal court, claiming that
Carters unilateral decision to abrogate the defense treaty was unconsti-
tutional (CQ Almanac 1979: 100).
Just have a glance at party line-up on the 22 roll call votes, and one can tell
the extent to which the two parties were divided on the details, if not the
fundamentals, of the TRA (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Eleven of the thirteen
votes in the House and six of the nine votes in the Senate were party votes,
that is, votes in which the majority of the two parties voted against each
other. Furthermore, the intensity of party division was extraordinary. In the
House, seven of the eleven party votes witnessed at least 75 percent of one
party voting against at least 75 percent of the other party; in the Senate, four
of the six party votes were so divided. Notice that all but one partisan vote
were on amendments or motions that were sponsored mainly by Republicans
and which contained language that would have restored U.S.Taiwan military
alliance under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Such language would almost cer-
tainly have delayed normalization because of Beijings objection. In a word,
despite the broad bipartisan consensus on the desirability of continuing
U.S.Taiwan relations, as reected in the smooth passage of the TRA in both
chambers, the two parties disagreed sharply over the exact nature of future
U.S. relations with Taiwan.
In the decade after normalization, Republicans largely deferred to the
White House on Taiwan policy. For President Reagan did not need to be
prodded by Congress to be a staunch supporter of Taiwan (see Buttereld
1980; MacDonald and Kaiser 1980).14 President George H. W. Bush also
encountered little pressure from Congress on Taiwan.15 However, Republicans
became much more active in Taiwan policy during the Clinton years. In July
1993, Senator Frank MurKowski (R-AK) introduced an amendment to
the annual Foreign Relations Authorization Act, declaring that the TRA
should supersede the 1982 Shanghai Communiqu on U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan (Congressional Record 1994: S 29432944, S 5024). Despite the
Table 5.1 House roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act
149221 107 27 42 194 Nay Rejected Kramer amendment to retain language from the 1955 mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan regarding U.S. response to hostile
action toward Taiwan.
169197 120 14 49 183 Nay Rejected Lagomarsino amendment to state that the U.S. would consider
withdrawing recognition of China if it were to attack Taiwan.
172181 113 13 59 168 Nay Rejected Quayle amendment to conduct relations with Taiwan through a
government liaison oce, rather than through the unocial
American Institute on Taiwan.
171239 135 14 36 225 Nay Rejected Ashbrook amendment to make employees of the American
Institute on Taiwan employees of the U.S. government.
146256 100 44 46 212 Nay Rejected Edwards amendment to add the islands of Quemoy and Matsu to
the denition of Taiwan.
179225 124 21 55 204 Nay Rejected Solomon amendment to establish relations with Taiwan on a
consular basis.
204193 14 132 190 61 Agreed Zablocki motion to end all debate on the bill at 5 p.m. in an
attempt to cut o further amendments.
110295 98 51 12 244 Nay Rejected Bauman motion to strike the enacting clause (thus killing the bill)
182221 134 16 48 205 Nay Rejected Dannemeyer amendment to conduct relations with Taiwan
through a quasi-governmental agency entitled U.S. Commission
in Taiwan.
141264 118 32 23 232 Nay Rejected Edwards amendment to require approval by both houses before
the president could notify Taiwan that a treaty or agreement with
Taiwan would be terminated.
226174 144 4 82 170 Adopted Ashbrook amendment to require the authorization and
appropriation by Congress of any U.S. government funds for the
American Institute on Taiwan.
34555 104 41 241 14 Yea Passed Passage of the bill.
33950 105 37 234 13 Yea Adopted Adoption of the conference report.
3362 28 12 5 50 Nay Rejected Dole amendment to provide for unocial United States
relations with Taiwan rather than with the people of
Taiwan, which was the phrasing sought by President
Carter.
5738 10 30 47 8 Yea Agreed Glenn motion to table the Humphrey amendment to
conduct U.S. relations with Taiwan through a
governmental liaison oce.
4549 1 39 44 10 Yea Rejected Bryd motion to table the Percy amendment to declare
that hostile action against Taiwan would be a threat to
the security interests of the United States.
4250 35 5 7 45 Nay Rejected Percy amendment to declare that hostile action against
Taiwan would be a threat to the security interests of the
United States.
4936 30 7 19 29 Nay Agreed Morgan motion to table the Church amendment to
Boren amendment allowing Taiwan to have embassy
(Churchs amendment would have allowed the courts to
resolve the issue).
5438 7 32 47 6 Yea Agreed Biden motion to table the Dole amendment to require
Senate conrmation of the director of the American
Institute on Taiwan.
7421 22 18 52 3 Yea Agreed Church motion to table the Humphrey amendment to
make the eective date of the bill contingent on written
assurances from China that it would not attack Taiwan.
906 34 5 56 1 Yea Passed Passage of the TRA
854 33 2 52 2 Yea Adopted Adoption of the conference report of TRA.
Past research on foreign policy voting almost exclusively focuses on the inu-
ence of a particular constituency, namely, the military-industrial complex. As
Patrick Morgan (quoted in Ray 1981: 439) pointed out, a huge military estab-
lishment inevitably breeds . . . civilian institutions and numerous citizens
[who] prosper on the manna of massive defense expenditures, which in turn
produces a political componenta corps of local, regional, and national
politicians whose political self-interests now dictate promotion of or at least
acquiesce in such spending on behalf of constituents. In a word, the military-
industrial complex model leads to the expectation that a positive relationship
exists between constituency dependence on the military-industrial complex
and support for military spending (or hawkish foreign policy for that matter).
The military-industrial complex has important economic stakes in U.S.
Taiwan relations because Taiwan has been a leading market for U.S. weap-
ons manufactures (see Table 5.3). Moreover, defense contractors and their
19501990 4,939 7
1990 455 4
1991 549 4
1992 711 5
1993 816 4
1994 845 4
1995 1,347 3
1996 834 3
1997 2,555 2
1998 1,487 2
1999 2,526 2
2000 923 4
Last but not least, though U.S.Taiwan relations are primarily strategic and
political in nature, there are also signicant constituency economic interests
at stake. To begin with, Taiwan is the eighth largest trading partner of the
U.S. and the latter is the top trading partner of Taiwan. Though U.S.Taiwan
trade is only about one-fth of U.S.China trade today, back in the 1980s the
former was much larger than the latter.18 Only after 1994 did U.S.China
trade surpass U.S.Taiwan trade. Moreover, Taiwan has been an important
export market for U.S. companies, and American exports to Taiwan were
larger than its exports to China until 2001. Even after 2001, American
exports to China have been only slightly bigger. Thus many members may
have incentives to support U.S.Taiwan relations out of pure constituency
economic interests.19
Congress and Taiwan 91
Data and methodology
I use voting scores compiled by the Center for Security Policy (CSP) to
operationalize hawkishness.20 The CSPs mission is to promote international
peace through American strength. As such, it selects votes on critical defense
and foreign policy issues. The higher the score, the more pro-national security
and hence more hawkish a member is. Because the CSP combines the votes
for 19982000, I use this aggregate voting score for the 2000 vote.21 CSP
compiles a separate voting index for 1997 and that is used for the 1997 vote.
To test the hypothesis that both liberals and conservatives tend to vote
for strong U.S.Taiwan relations, I use the absolute value of the DW-
NOMINATE score, as I did in Chapter 4. Also, I expect the coecient for the
absolute value of DW score to be statistically signicant and positive. That is,
high absolute value of DW score will be associated with pro-Taiwan votes,
since both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) are
expected to cast such votes.
Constituency dependence on the military-industrial complex is oper-
ationalized as the amount of military awards for supplies, services, and con-
struction with a net value of over US $25,000 within each state in a scal
year.22 I use state-level data because there is no district-level breakdown of
military awards. Granted that oftentimes a state in which a prime contractor
is located is not the same state where subcontract work is done, this measure
is still a good indicator of the economic importance of defense contracts to a
particular state. For without such awards, the prime contractors would prob-
ably shut down. Constituency interests in U.S.China (Taiwan) trade are the
percentages of exports to China (Taiwan) out of total state exports. I use the
1999 data for the 1997 vote because that it is the earliest year for which state
export data is available. In addition to these constituency variables, I also
include three basic constituency variables, namely, Union Strength, Farm
Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment.
For the two votes, a yea vote is treated as a pro-Taiwan vote and coded 1,
and a nay vote is coded 0. For each vote, I rst run a regression with the three
basic constituency variables, and then add party and absolute DW score.
Subsequently, I add exports to China, exports to Taiwan, and military awards,
followed by hawkishness.
Statistical ndings
Logit regression results for the vote on HR 2386 are presented in Table 5.4,
and the probabilities calculated from logit coecients are presented in Table
5.5. Surprisingly, none of the three variables in Model 1 is statistically signi-
cant, suggesting that constituency interests measured by these variables did
not have any impact on the vote. In Model 2, the three constituency variables
still fail to reach statistical signicance, but the two added variables are highly
signicant. Consistent with my expectation, being a Republican increases the
92 Congress and Taiwan
Table 5.4 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 2386
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at 0.01; * signicant at 0.05.
Table 5.5 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in
independent variables (HR 2386)
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at 0.01; * signicant at 0.05.
Congress and Taiwan 95
Table 5.7 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in
independent variables (HR 1838)
I did everything I could to delay this legislation [because] I did not want
to give the Chinese an excuse for not reviving an agreement with the U.S.
on WTO accession, or give Clinton a reason for striking a WTO deal.
As a result of sti opposition from pro-trade members, the bill was stripped
of its most controversial language, including authorization to sell Taiwan
advanced weapons such as missile defense systems, air-to-air missiles, and
diesel-powered submarines. Thus members from states with large exports to
China may have hoped that the passage of a largely innocuous bill would
appease Taiwan supporters and induce them to vote for the trade deal with
China. In other words, for these members a vote for HR 1838 was actually a
strategic vote for PNTR.
By the same token, the vote could be an empty gesture, designed to protect
Republicans from attacks by party conservatives who see China as a military
threat (CQWR 2000: 262). That is, many Republicans may have treated the
vote as one on which to stake out their pro-Taiwan position. Weve had our
vote here, said House Rules Committee Chairman David Dreier (R-CA).
Now lets get on to dealing with permanent [normal trade relations], which
is the important thing (ibid.). Furthermore, strong opposition from the
Senate to the original bill and its watered-down version, plus Clintons threat
of veto, doomed the bill from the outset. This provides further incentives for
members to view the vote as a position-taking vote. In a word, the various
factors could have induced many membersincluding those whose constitu-
ents were heavily dependent on the China marketto vote for HR 1838,
hence the positive sign of Exports to China.
Finally, the high correlation between party and hawkishness (r = 0.748 and
signicant at 0.01) must have dampened the estimated eects of party, which
is no longer statistically signicant in Model 4. Farm Employment remains
signicant. With the inclusion of hawkishness, pseudo R2 increases consider-
ably from 0.212 to 0.284.
Discussion
Since no Senate votes on U.S.Taiwan relations could be analyzed, I cannot
explore inter-chamber similarities and dierences in roll call voting on Taiwan.
Moreover, the lack of data for many variables prior to the 1990s makes it
impossible to nd out whether there has been any change over time in Taiwan
policy voting. Finally, since both votes took place under divided government,
it is hard to know whether members would have voted dierently under
unied government. These shortcomings aside, my analysis still sheds some
important light on roll call voting on U.S. Taiwan policy in particular, and
foreign policy voting in general.
Congress and Taiwan 97
The military-industrial complex has no impact at all. Previous studies have
similarly reported little or no relationship between constituency dependence
on military spending and members votes on foreign/defense policy (e.g.,
Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman
1985).26 Thus it seems that constituency constraint [on foreign policy] is
quite loose (Lindsay 1990: 956). Several reasons may be responsible for the
minimal impact of constituency interests on roll call voting. Since many
foreign policy issues are not salient to most Americans (e.g., Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996), legislators enjoy a signicant degree of freedom in roll call
voting. Also, people tend to be more deferential to politicians when national
interests are invoked than when parochial, domestic interests are involved.
Moreover, When members agree with their constituents on most issues but
disagree with them on some, wrote Lindsay (1990: 951), a vote contrary to
constituent opinion often does not pose great costs. Last but not least, since
a legislators reelection constituency can be dierent from the geographic
constituency (see Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1973; Wright 1989), he/she may more
actively shape and reect the preferences of the former but not the preferences
of the latter. This can lead to non-signicant ndings about the inuence of
geographic constituency.
Meanwhile, two constituency variables perform relatively better. Exports
to China and Farm Employment are negatively associated with support for
HR 2386 and HR 1838 respectively. Thus some members of Congress
appeared to be mindful of the possible negative repercussions of a pro-Taiwan
policy for U.S.China relations, in particular U.S.China trade. If so, as eco-
nomic ties between the U.S. and China continue to grow, more members will
perhaps be more cautious in their approach to U.S.Taiwan relations. How-
ever, this electoral connection should not be blown out of proportion. It does
not mean that members will sacrice Taiwans security on the altar of
U.S.China economic ties. Moreover the potential threat to Taiwan from
Chinas growing military power will in all likelihood reinforce lawmakers
determination to safeguard Taiwans security.
Above all, Taiwans democratic transition has changed its bond with
Congress, from one based on anti-Communism in the Cold War to one
underpinned by shared democratic values and institutions. A China hand at
the State Department observed,
The former director of the American Institute on Taiwan, Nat Bellocchi, also
said, [They] are a democracy, and they have turned their human rights thing
98 Congress and Taiwan
around so completely, so they have a very broad spectrum of support up on
the Hill (quoted in Bush 2004: 479). As Bush (2004: 223) predicted, This
new consensus in favor of Taiwan as a fellow democracy would become a
signicant factor in future policy debate. In a word, regardless of growing
economic interdependence between Beijing and Washington, there will
probably be strong, bipartisan support for Taiwan in the foreseeable future.
I will conclude this chapter by saying a few words about the legendary
China lobby and its successor, the Taiwan lobby. Scholarly studies of U.S.
China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s generally agree that the China
lobby, which included the powerful China bloc in Congress, signicantly
shaped U.S.China policy, as evidenced by the China Aid Act of 1948 and
vehement congressional opposition to the recognition of China and its
admission to the United Nations (Bachrack 1976; Koen 1974; Tsou 1963;
Tucker 1980, 1983, 1994).27 As Tucker (1994: 3) wrote, The Nationalists
might not have practiced democracy at home but found it expedient and
rewarding to exploit Washingtons division of powers and sensitivity to
public opinion.
Since Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971 and particularly after the
dust had settled over normalization and the TRA, the China lobby gradually
faded from public attention. In the 1990s, the Taiwan lobby, as opposed to
the old China lobby, attracted extensive attention, as it was widely believed to
be the driving force behind the sudden surge of congressional support for
Taiwan on a wide range of issues, notably Lees visit to Cornell in 1995
(Pomfret 2002; Sciolino 1996; Shenon 2000). According to one former Foreign
Service ocial involved in China policy, They [Taiwan] have by far the most
professional and skilled congressional-relations sta of any foreign regime
represented here (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338). Manns (2001) study also
revealed the sophistication, strong message, and long history of the Taiwan
lobby. Thus a critical question arises: To what extent has the Taiwan lobby
inuenced congressional support for Taiwan since the 1990s?
It appears that the inuence of the Taiwan lobby on Capitol Hill derives
primarily from Taiwans democratic transition, and only secondarily from
Congresss historical ties with China and Chiang Kai-shek (i.e., the old China
lobby). To put it in a dierent way, being a democracy itself is the necessary
condition for the Taiwan lobbys political clout. Nancy Tucker (quoted in
Landay 1997) made this point crystal clear: What [mainland Chinese] dont
understand about the success that Taiwan has had with lobbying is that
Taiwans lobbying became much more successful as Taiwans political system
changed.
Remarks by ocials involved in the executive-legislative skirmish over
Lees 1995 visit appear to corroborate Tuckers claim. I dont think they
[Taiwan lobbyists] would be making a dent if Taiwan were not such a success
story, one senior administration ocial observed (quoted in Mann 2001:
209). Stanley Roth, who was then on the National Security Council, rejected
the argument that Cassidy, a Washington lobby rm hired by Taiwan, played
Congress and Taiwan 99
a major role in drumming up congressional support for Lees visit. Taiwan
had enormous support in the U.S. Congress to begin with, he asserted. The
nature of the event, combined with the perception of Taiwan as good, as a
role model, I think was more than enough to shore up congressional support,
and I would say Cassidys role in the Congress was marginal (quoted in
ibid.). In a word, an undemocratic Taiwan would probably not have enjoyed
so much support on Capitol Hill since the 1990s regardless of how powerful
its lobbies were.
Nevertheless, the Taiwan lobby should not be dismissed as politically
insignicant. It helps Taiwans cause by bringing Taiwan-related issues to the
attention of members of Congress. There are myriad issues crying for a
members attention. In most cases, it is incumbent upon alert interest groups
to bring a particular issuesuch as arms sales to Taiwan or Lees visitto
his attention. In some cases a member may keep a close eye on an issue due to
strong personal or policy interest (see Sutter 2001).28 Moreover, a members
attention often shifts to another issue once certain legislative actionhearing,
resolution, or billhas been taken. In order to make the issue constantly
salient to the member, he/she has to be reminded of the issue from time to
time. The Taiwan lobby has performed the two tasks extremely well through
institutionalized lobbying, as embodied in endowed professorships, donations
to universities, Taiwan-related research institutes, and sister-city networks.
These institutions ensure that Taiwan policy will remain a topic in American
academic and political discourse and a salient one if circumstances require.
6 Congress and Chinas
human rights
If the United States refusal to recognize the PRC after 1949 was one of the
great blunders of our time, so too must be the exemption of China from the
international human rights standards applicable to other nations.
(Roberta Cohen 1987: 451)
Had it not been for Congress, the advancement of human rights would not
have become a top priority in U.S. foreign policy. The human rights move-
ment originated in the early 1970s, when Congress was frustrated by an
imperial president in the Vietnam War and a deant Secretary of State prac-
ticing realpolitik in Chile (Cohen 1979; Fraser 1979; Hehir 1992). Since the
power of the purse is the surest way for Congress to gain a point of leverage
in the foreign policy process (Hehir 1992: 237), Congresss central strategy
was to pass legislation that linked human rights to the provision of U.S.
economic and/or military assistance (Fraser 1979: 248250; Forsythe 1988:
Chapters 4 and 5). President Jimmy Carter took the human rights mantle
from Congress and made it a central tenet of his foreign policy. Since then,
human rights has remained an integral and important element of U.S. foreign
policy. In a word, Congress fundamentally transformed U.S. foreign policy by
incorporating the promotion of human rights.
In so far as China is concerned, two aspects of Congresss human rights
policy stand out. First, the Tiananmen Incident is the dividing line. Before
Tiananmen, Chinas human rights record was largely exempt from congres-
sional scrutiny (Cohen 1987; Shirk 1977). Tiananmen abruptly ended con-
gressional silence and since then Congress has become the most outspoken
critic of Chinas human rights practices. Second, while Congress enacted some
general and country-specic human rights laws in the 1970s (see Forsythe
Congress and Chinas human rights 101
1988: Chapters 35), it has not been able to pass any similar laws respecting
China. Thus Congresss human rights policy toward China appears to be
more bark than bite.
In this chapter, I analyze Congresss human rights policy toward China. In
the process I attempt to answer three questions. First, why had Congress,
in its worldwide campaign for human rights, largely neglected China up until
1989? Second, why has Congress been extremely active in promoting human
rights in China since 1989? Third, what factors have inuenced roll call votes
on legislation targeting Chinas human rights?
I argue that the international environment holds the key to the rst ques-
tion. U.S. weakness vis--vis the former Soviet Union and hence the need to
form a strategic alliance with China necessarily constrained Congress from
scrutinizing Chinas human rights prior to 1989. As to the second question,
the Tiananmen Incident certainly spurred Congress into action, but it alone
was insucient to explain sustained congressional activism in Chinas human
rights since 1989. The other two important factors are the international
environment and partisan politics. The end of the Cold War reduced Chinas
strategic importance and enabled members of Congress to criticize its human
rights practices without fearing strategic consequences. The Democratic
majority in Congress used Chinas human rights to club a Republican presi-
dent who was determined to salvage U.S.China relations from the deadly
blow of Tiananmen. To answer the third question, I analyze roll call votes
on a set of bills that aimed to punish Chinas human rights violations by
revoking its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status.
China and the Soviet Union are two very dierent countries at dierent
stages of development, with dierent interests and ambitions, dierent
associates and allies, and dierent relations with this country. They
should be treated on separate tracks and, in our own national interest,
they cannot be treated alike.4
(quoted in ibid.: 126)
Nonetheless, not every member of Congress was ready to buy the strategic
argument and to turn a blind eye to Chinas human rights. Why is there this
tolerant attitude toward the obvious defects of the PRC? Why is it that they
seem to enjoy tolerance from academics as well as diplomatic and journalistic
sources on their many defects? asked an exasperated congressman Edward
Derwinski (R-IL) (U.S. Congress 1981: 149). If we dont apply some human
rights standards to China, even if . . . it will perhaps have a marginal, neg-
ligible eect, or no eect at allit makes us hypocritical when we apply
pressure to any place else in the world, warned Robert Dornan (R-CA) (U.S.
Congress 1983a: 360). Some members denounced the unwarranted sensitiv-
ities to Chinese culture and traditions. We are so much more careful and
thoughtful and sensitive when we deal with the subject of human rights in
China than we are with other countries in Asia who also have traditions
and customs, said Representative Joel Pritchard (R-WA) (U.S. Congress
1983a: 344).5
These few dissenting voices aside, most members of Congress remained
silent on Chinese human rights. A more specic indicator of congressional
reticence is the number of bills respecting human rights in China that were
introduced in Congress prior to 1989. By my count, in the 16 years between
1973 and 1988, a total of only 35 such bills were introduced. Of these bills,
19 were about generic human rights topics such as political dissent and
religious freedom, 8 about human rights in Tibet, 8 about Chinas family
planning policy and U.S. funding to the UNPF. This number is only a small
fraction of the 289 human rights bills (including generic human rights,
UNPF, MFN, Tiananmen, and human rights in Tibet) introduced in the
16 years between 1989 and 2006.
Perhaps nowhere was the impact of Tiananmen more keenly felt than in the
halls of Congress. The Tiananmen Incident destroyed the reservoir of good
feelings toward China that had been accumulating among members of
Congress, particularly since the beginning of Chinas economic reform in
1978 and after Dengs popular visit to the Capitol Hill in 1979. Congresss
reaction was swift and emotional. The American honeymoon and love fest
with China started in 1971 by Richard Nixon is over, declared Congressman
Bill Richardson (D-NM) (Congressional Record 1989: 10787). No dangling
of strategic advantage, or eort to invoke geopolitical calculations will deter
the Government of this country from expressing its revulsion at their [Chi-
nese] actions, said an outraged Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) (ibid.).
A deeply disappointed Les AuCoin (D-OR), who was proud of having taken
a constructive approach to China, was on the rst trade delegation to
China, and was opposed to two-China policy, said that China has disgraced
itself (Congressional Record 1989: 10804). Congressman Dave McCurdy
(D-OK) denounced the violence against students as an act of desperation by
tyrants out of touch with reality, and Leon Panetta (D-CA) called it an
oense against humanity (ibid.: 10805).
Congressional outrage naturally found its outlet in legislative actions. On
June 6 1989, each chamber unanimously adopted a resolutionH.Con-
.Res.136 and S.Res.142 respectivelyto condemn the crackdown. Frustrated
by Bushs slow and cautious approach, the House unanimously voted on
June 29 for sanctions against China that were more stringent than those
already announced by the president (CQWR 1989: 1642, 1800). Someone
in this governmentand today its the Housemust take a more forceful
action, said House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) after the
vote (quoted in Phillips 1989). The Tiananmen Incident also spurred congres-
sional scrutiny of a plethora of human rights problems in China that other-
wise had been ignored or downplayed in the past, such as forced abortion
106 Congress and Chinas human rights
(e.g., U.S. Congress 1995, 2005b) and prison labor (e.g., U.S. Congress 1992,
1994, 1998a).
Figure 6.1 illustrates legislative activism in human rights policy in the
aftermath of Tiananmen. As I mentioned above, only 35 human rights bills
were introduced between 1973 and 1988. In 1989 alone, 33 bills directly
related to Tiananmen (e.g., condemning the crackdown or proposing sanc-
tions) were introduced in Congress. But after 1989, Tiananmen disappeared
from the radar screen of Congress, as only 11 bills relating to the Incident
were introduced between 1990 and 2006. Meanwhile, generic human rights,
human rights in Tibet, and funding to the UNPF became the prime targets of
legislative actions, and the total number of bills for each issue is 118, 41, and
11 respectively.
Moreover, the various NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, which had been quiescent about Chinas human rights prior to
1989, now became extremely active. They began to keep close track of human
rights violations in China, publish regular reports, and testify frequently at
congressional hearings (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty Inter-
national USA 1990). Joining these NGOs were Chinese human rights lobbies
in the U.S. that were formed after Tiananmen. They became immensely
China was an issue where the Democrats in Congress could oppose the
Republican administration and know, with certainty, that they had
public opinion on their side . . . If George Bush wasnt going to convey
the countrys outrage over Chinese repression, then the Democrats in
Congress would happily volunteer.
(1999: 199)
Figure 6.2 Time trend of bills relating to Chinas MFN status, 19732006.
110 Congress and Chinas human rights
Table 6.1 House roll call votes on joint resolutions to disapprove of Chinas MFN,
19902001
Notes: a: Totals included Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Virgil Goode (I-VA in 2000).
b: A yea vote is a vote in support of MFN renewal.
Source: CQ Almanac.
Congress and Chinas human rights 111
in advancing our goals, but instead would severely damage the Western-
oriented, modernizing elements in China, weaken Hong Kong, and
strengthen opposition to democratic and economic reform (quoted in
ibid.: 158).
Notwithstanding his campaign rhetoric accusing Bush of kowtowing
to Beijing and his 1993 executive order linking MFN renewal to human
rights progress, President Clinton largely continued his predecessors policy.
Revoking MFN and, in eect, severing our economic ties to China, would
drive us back into a period of mutual isolation and recrimination that would
harm Americas interests, not advance them, he said. MFN renewal is not a
referendum on all Chinas policies, it is a vote for Americas interests (Public
Papers of the Presidents 1996: 778). For both Bush and Clinton, then, trade
is the primary vehicle of engagement, a force for change in China, exposing
China to our ideas and our ideals and integrating China into the global
economy (Public Papers of the Presidents 1998: 871).
Many members of Congress from both parties were strongly opposed
to unconditional MFN because they wanted to punish Beijing for its human
rights violations. Representative Richard Schulze (R-PA) best characterized
the prevailing mood in Congress: I want the outrage that is ringing through-
out the world to ring through the halls of Congress (CQWR 1990: 2570).
Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) denounced Bushs decision to renew
MFN as a hideously wrong message to send to the world (ibid.: 1686).
Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) characterized unconditional MFN
as a base hunger for cheap electronics and inexpensive consumer goods at
the price of Americas historic thirst for liberty and justice (U.S. Congress
1997c: 22).
For some members, antipathy toward Communism reinforced their moral
outrage against Beijing and their determination to oppose unconditional
MFN. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) regarded the policy of unlinked granting of
MFN as tantamount to appeasement to Communist China (CQWR
1990: 9). Frank Wolf (R-VA) opposed MFN renewal because They [China]
are the evil empire (CQ Almanac 1999: 23: 7). Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC)
characterized Clintons China policy as painstaking eorts . . . to cater to
Red Chinas every whim and wish (CQWR 1999: 2605).
From the opponents perspective, revoking or putting conditions on
Chinas MFN status seemed to be the easiest and most eective unilateral
punishment of China. Without MFN, Chinese exports to the U.S. would be
subject to much higher taris and hence would decrease precipitously. The
average tari on Chinese products would rise from 3.5 percent to an average
of nearly 40 percent. The 6 percent tari on apparel and footwear would
jump to 60 percent and 35 percent respectively (CQWR 1990: 1775; CQWR
1994: 1055). Considering that the U.S. is the destination of nearly one-third
of Chinese exports, revocation of MFN would have had a disastrous impact
on the Chinese economy.
Other members supported MFN for a variety of reasons. First, some of
112 Congress and Chinas human rights
them shared the opponents concerns about Chinas human rights, but
believed that engagement through trade was the best way to inuence Chinese
behavior and to help the democratic forces in China. The more trade, the
more democratization, asserted Congressman Robert T. Matsui (D-CA), a
leading pro-trade Democrat (CQWR 1990: 2571). To these members, the
alternative would be an isolated China with ill will toward the U.S. The
choice is clear, said Representative Tim Roemer (D-IN). Are we going to
have a constructive engagement policy with China or a new evil empire?
(CQWR 1999: 1898).
Second, many members were worried that revocation of MFN would hurt
American businesses, particularly the big exporters and importers. Senator
Bob Dole (R-KS) made it crystal clear in 1990: The Chinese consume about
20% of wheat exportsa commodity in which I and many other senators
have a special interest (CQWR 1996: 1232).8 In 1991, Senator Max Baucus
(D-MT), along with ve Democratic senators from farm states, signed a letter
to President Bush urging him to take actions in other areas so as to lessen
congressional pressure on MFN (CQWR 1991: 1737; Gugliotta 1991). If
MFN were cut o, China would probably retaliate by stopping its purchase
of wheatthe major export of these statesand the price of wheat would
collapse. Finally, some members simply didnt believe that the various condi-
tions attached to MFN were attainable. We will end up with a bill that will
be popular in the U.S. Congress but will harden the Chinese governments
resolve, warned Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL)
(CQWR 1991: 1739).
Each year since 1990, the president and Congress locked horns over
Chinas MFN. Initially, Congress attempted outright revocation, which
requires approval by both chambers of a joint resolution denying presidential
renewal. The threat of presidential veto and Senate reluctance to take action
forced House advocates of outright revocation to change their tactics and
adopted conditional MFN. As Nancy Pelosi (1994) put it, Conditioning
MFN for China provides the US with the best leverage to improve human
rights because preferential access to the US market is critical to Chinas
authoritarian regime. Besides, conditional MFN could win support from
those in Congress who might be afraid of the consequences of outright revo-
cation, but who wanted to do something about repression in China (Mann
1999: 232).
However, the unintended but inevitable consequence of such an approach
is that almost every group and organization with an interest in China policy
wanted to be part of the action in drafting the specic MFN conditions
(Mann 1999: 232). In addition to human rights, which was initially the pri-
mary concern of MFN opponents, other issues such as weapons prolifer-
ation, Taiwan, Tibet, intellectual property rights (IPR), and unfair trade
practices were also added, making MFN renewal the institutionalized
vehicle by which China policy, in all of its dimensions, was discussed each
year (Lampton 1994: 15). As Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL), then
Congress and Chinas human rights 113
chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, said of the
Pelosi bill (HR 2212), I guess Pelosi is just becoming a garbage truck.
Everybody throws in everything they can think of (CQWR 1991: 1739).
Allied with the White House were big exporters and importers such as
Boeing and Wal-Mart that had reaped huge prots from the China market
(Zakaria 2005; Zeng 2004: 96114). Joining congressional critics of China
were labor unions, religious groups, human rights groups, and environmental-
ists (CQWR 1997: 1390; CQWR 2000: 90). Labor unions opposed MFN
because of the thousands of jobs allegedly displaced by Chinese imports
(Shorrock 1994, 1996; U.S. Congress 1997c: 186189; Behr 1994). Religious
groups had grievances against Chinas family planning policy and the lack of
religious freedom (CQWR 1997: 1206, 1390; Devroy 1997). The MFN debate,
Gilbert (1997) wrote, created a peculiar political stew of labor unions, pro-
tectionists, religious activists, some liberals, some conservatives . . . ghting
an uphill battle against a coalition of exporters, retailers, pro-trade members
of Congress, and the White House.9
Statistical ndings
Since the ten votes took place under two presidents, I present the results
separately for the three votes under President Bush and the seven votes under
President Clinton. For each vote I rst run a model with Union Strength,
Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. After that, I add
party and Absolute DW Score. Table 6.2 presents logit coecients for the
three votes under President Bush, and the probabilities calculated from these
coecients are presented in Table 6.3.
Despite intense campaigns by labor unions against MFN renewal,
Union Strength is not statistically signicant in any of the regressions. The
other two constituency variables are consistently signicant and have the
correct sign in all models. If Farm Employment increases by one standard
deviation, the probability of voting for MFN revocation decreases con-
siderably by about 0.12 across the six models, holding other variables at
their means. Similarly, such an increase in Retail/Wholesale Employment
leads to a decrease of roughly 0.09 in the probability of supporting MFN
revocation.
Being a Republican is consistently and negatively associated with support
for MFN revocation. To be exact, being a member of the presidents party
decreases the probability of casting a yea vote (i.e., a vote in support of
revoking MFN) by a solid 0.165 in 1990, a remarkable 0.333 in 1991, and an
impressive 0.252 in 1992. These numbers constitute strong evidence of party
loyalty. However, as I cautioned in Chapter 1, it is hard to clearly distinguish
loyalty to ones president from electorally-induced inter-party dierence on
Congress and Chinas human rights 115
Table 6.2 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of Chinas MFN under Presi-
dent Bush
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
** Signicant at 0.01; * signicant at 0.05.
Table 6.3 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in
independent variables (votes under Bush)
Union strength
Farm employment .102 .086 .163 .134 .120 .100
Retail/wholesale .082 .073 .094 .089 .104 .102
employment
Republican .165 .333 .252
Absolute DW score .114 .078
trade, because for many Republicans, a vote in support of Bush was also a
vote consistent with their traditional pro-trade stance.
Notice that the estimated impact of party was at its lowest in the 1990 vote.
The vote took place one year after the Tiananmen Incident, and many
Republicans (81 out of a total of 171) may have decided to vote for the bill
(hence against Bush) because their outrage against Beijing had not subsided.
The vote outcomes of two China bills in 1990 provide further indication
116 Congress and Chinas human rights
about the prevailing sentiment among Republicans. On January 24, the
House voted 39025 to override President Bushs veto of the Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act. Only 25 Republicans voted against the over-
ride. By a 38430 vote, the House passed HR 4939 on October 18, a bill that
set strict conditions for MFN renewal for 1991. Only 19 Republicans voted
again the bill.
Absolute DW Score is statistically signicant and has the hypothesized
sign in two votes. If it increases by one standard deviation, then the prob-
ability of voting for MFN revocation increases by 0.114 in 1991 and 0.078 in
1992. For these two votes at least, there was indeed a coalition of the ideo-
logical ends against the middle. However, Absolute DW Score appears to
have no impact on the 1990 vote. My explanation is similar to the one I
oered above about the reduced impact of party. That is, because passions
about the Tiananmen Incident were probably still running high when mem-
bers cast their votes in 1990, many moderates also decided to support the bill
in spite of their general inclination to oppose such bills.
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present results for the seven votes under President
Clinton. As in the case of the three votes under Bush, Union Strength is not
statistically signicant in any of the regression. Of the other two constituency
variables, Farm Employment consistently has the correct sign, but it is not
statistically signicant in the two votes in 1997 and 1998. Also, when party
and ideology are controlled for, it loses statistical signicance in the 1995 vote
and the 1999 vote. Even though Farm Employment does not perform as well
as it did in the three votes under Bush, the ndings nonetheless indicate that
members of Congress were generally opposed to any bill that would aect
access to China, a leading market for American agricultural products. To be
exact, on average, one standard deviation increase in Farm Employment is
associated with a decrease of about 0.07 in the probability of voting for MFN
revocation. Retail/Wholesale Employment performs rather poorly, as it
reaches statistical signicance only in Model 2 of the 1998 vote.
Party is statistically signicant in the 1993 vote and has the correct sign.
That is, being a member of the presidents party decreases the probability of
casting a yea note (hence a vote against Clintons position) by a solid 0.137.
Recall that under President Bush, being a Democratic actually increased the
likelihood of casting such a vote. That House Democrats voted dierently on
the same issue under Bush and Clinton is a strong indication that they used
MFN renewal as a political issue to beat Bush. Once Bush was out of oce
and a president of the same party was elected, Democrats immediately
changed their votes so as not to embarrass their own president who was
opposed to MFN revocation.
Nevertheless, Democratic loyalty to their president did not extend beyond
1993, as party does not have any signicant impact on the three votes in 1994,
1995, and 1996. Furthermore, in 1997 and 1999, House Democrats were actu-
ally more likely to vote against their president than Republicans, controlling
for other factors. To be exact, being a Democrat increases the probability of
Table 6.4 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of Chinas MFN under President Clinton
Union strength .008 .005 .009 .013 .026 .028 .000 .000 .011 .014 .010 .013 .010 .016
(.014) (.014) (.016) (.017) (.014) (.015) (.013) (.014) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.012) (.013)
Farm employment .185** .218** .180* .172* .133* .109 .143* .118* .080 .083 .085 .091 .098* .096
(.064) (.069) (.080) (.082) (.063) (.064) (.058) (.059) (.047) (.050) (.049) (.052) (.049) (.050)
Retail and .010 .040 .017 .026 .035 .023 .078 .057 .063 .083 .076 .010* .058 .077
wholesale (.041) (.045) (.049) (.051) (.044) (.043) (.044) (.043) (.041) (.044) (.043) (.046) (.042) (.045)
Democrat .681** .365 .352 .429 .503* .468* .836**
(.231) (.273) (.248) (.227) (.210) (.213) (.220)
Absolute DW score 1.322 1.994* 3.745** 3.364** 3.462** 3.640** 4.189**
(.704) (.838) (.775) (.720) (.713) (.722) (.732)
Log likelihood 247.78 240.641 .195.69 189.65 236.40 221.88 264.08 249.91 288.28 272.85 282.78 266.52 284.75 260.69
Pseudo R2 .002 .045 .018 .040 .018 .073 .025 .073 .011 .061 .014 .068 .013 .094
N 423 422 431 430 428 427 427 426 432 431 430 429 430 429
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at .01; * signicant at .05.
Table 6.5 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes under Clinton)
Union strength
Farm .087 .101 .059 .054 .058 .073 .059 .055
employment
Retail and .063
wholesale
Democrat .137 .120 .109 .195
Absolute DW .043 .106 .115 .126 .130 .154
score
Like a vast picture thronged with gures of equal prominence and crowded
with elaborate and obtrusive details, Congress is hard to see satisfactorily and
appreciatively at a single view and from a single stand-point.
(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 57)
Selection of cases
Which cases are selected partly depends on the specic issues that I intend to
examine. I have examined roll call voting on three issues: trade, Taiwan, and
human rights. Because of the highly unusual nature of U.S.Taiwan relation-
ship, I decide not to pursue any comparative analysis of it. First, even though
the U.S. and Taiwan do not have diplomatic relations, their relationship con-
stitutes a de facto diplomatic relationship. Second, since 1949, China has
regarded Taiwan as a renegade province over which it claims sovereignty, and
this claim of sovereignty is almost universally recognized. No country or
entity in the world today has such a relationship with the U.S.
In so far as U.S.China trade is concerned, two characteristics stand out as
forming the primary criteria for case selection. First, the two countries have
extremely extensive trade relations. Second, bilateral trade is extremely unbal-
anced, as U.S. imports from China are much larger than its exports to China
(see Table 4.1). Only Canada, Mexico, and Japan are somewhat similar to
China in terms of the two characteristics. Each of the three countries has
been a top trade partner of the U.S. and each of them has been running a
huge trade surplus with the U.S. (see Table 7.1).
My analysis of Congresss human rights policy toward China focused
exclusively on congressional attempts to revoke Chinas MFN trade status.
Consequently, it is most appropriate to focus on MFN in comparative analysis.
Because the JacksonVanik Amendment applies to all Communist countries,
Congress also voted on the MFN status of many other countries like Albania
and Mongolia. Frequently Congress inserted in a general trade bill provisions
respecting MFN status for some countries. For example, the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 (HR 434) contained provisions authorizing the
president to extend MFN to Albania and Kyrgyzstan, and the Miscellaneous
Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 (HR 435) authorized the
president to grant MFN to Mongolia by proclamation (Pregelj 2000). I
decided not to analyze votes on these general bills because it is hard to ascer-
tain whether a members vote on these bills was aected by MFN provisions
or non-MFN provisions. On a few occasions, Congress did consider
124 Beyond the case of China
Table 7.1 Total U.S. trade and decit with Japan, Canada, and Mexico, 19852006
(billions of dollars)
Trade
Japan
While the U.S. trade decit with China dominates headlines and political
debates these days (see Chapter 4), U.S. trade decit with Japan was on the
front burner from the late 1970s through the 1980s (e.g., Cohen 1985; U.S.
Congress 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983b) (Figure 7.1). Then as now, the largest
component of U.S. decit with Japan involves automotive products. Table 7.2
depicts total U.S. decit with Japan in automotive trade and its share of total
U.S.world decit and U.S.Japan trade decit between 1986 and 2006. The
numbers are quite astonishing. Total U.S. automotive decit with Japan
Beyond the case of China 125
Figure 7.1 U.S. trade decit with Japan, 19622006 (billions of dollars)
Source: 19621984, available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/; 19852006, U.S. Census Bureau,
available from www.census.gov.
averaged US$37.7 billion per year during the 21-year period, accounting for
on average 60.8 percent of total U.S. trade decit with Japan. Notice that
even though total U.S. automotive decit has increased from US$32.6 billion
in 1986 to US$56.8 billion in 2006, its share of total U.S.world decit
has undergone a sharp decline from the record-high of 47.6 percent in 1991 to
6.9 percent in 2006. The rise of China as a leading international exporter,
which replaced Japan as the largest decit-trading partner of the U.S. in 2000,
was almost certainly a major factor behind the precipitous decline of U.S.
Japan automotive decits share of total U.S.world trade decit because
Chinese automotive exports were largely negligible during this period.
Under increasing pressure from the Big Three and United Auto Workers
(UAW) union, Congress began to take a series of legislative actions to curb
auto imports from Japan. On December 15 1980, by a vote of 31757 the
House passed H.J.R. 598 authorizing the president to negotiate an agreement
limiting sales of foreign (chiey Japanese) cars and trucks in the U.S. But the
measure didnt go anywhere because the Senate did not take any action on it
(CQ Almanac 1980: 303304). Two years later, the House passed HR 5133 on
a 215188 vote. The bill would have set domestic content ratios for foreign
automakers based on their sales in the U.S. For example, Toyota and Nissan
would have been required to have 7075 percent domestic content in their
cars by 1985 (CQ Almanac 1982: 5556). The following year, the House
passed a similar bill (HR 1234) by a vote of 219199. The bill would have set
126 Beyond the case of China
Table 7.2 U.S.Japan trade and automotive decit, 19862006 (billions of dollars)
Canada
Canada has been the largest trading partner of the U.S. for at least two
decades. Yet unlike Japan, the U.S. trade decit with Canada has generally
been much smaller. The annual U.S. trade decit with Japan in 19852006
was on average 3.35 times larger than its decit with Canada. For the seven
years between 1987 and 1993, the average ratio was as high as 5.72. Because
of the much smaller decit, U.S.Canada trade has rarely generated as much
controversy as U.S. trade with China or Japan. When Congress voted on
U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988, for example, there was little
objection in either chamber. The bill passed 36640 in the House and 839 in
the Senate.
One of the rare occasions on which Congress debated U.S.Canada trade
Beyond the case of China 127
involved the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 (HR 9042) that was
designed to implement an agreement signed by President Lyndon Johnson
and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson on January 16 1965. The
agreement called for the removal of U.S. and Canadian tari duties on cars
and car parts. As a corollary of the agreement, U.S. car manufacturers promi-
sed to increase their production in Canada, which in turn promised to elimi-
nate its taris on U.S. cars. The bill had the support of U.S. automakers and
the UAW, but was opposed by many independent parts manufacturers who
argued that that the bill would encourage U.S. automakers to shift produc-
tionhence jobsto Canada. Despite a heated debate in both chambers,
particularly in the Senate, the bill won House approval on June 21 by a
vote of 280113, and it passed the Senate on September 27 by a 5418 vote
(CQ Almanac 1965: 509512).
Mexico
Before the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into eect
in 1994, U.S.Mexico trade was signicantly smaller than U.S. trade with
Canada or Japan. Between 1985 and 1993, total U.S.Mexico trade was on
average about one-third of U.S. trade with Canada and half of U.S.Japan
trade. The U.S. trade decit with Mexico was even smaller, averaging about
one-fourth of its decit with Canada and one-sixteenth of its decit with
Japan between 1985 and 1990. For the three years between 1991 and 1994, the
U.S. actually ran a small surplus with Mexico. Since 1995, the U.S. has been
running a growing decit with Mexico, which appears to be catching up with
its decit with Canada and Japan.
Because of the much smaller volume of U.S. trade and decit with Mexico
prior to NAFTA, Congress did not act on any trade measure concerning that
country. But the enactment of NAFTA put Mexico on the front burner.
Because the U.S. had already signed a free trade agreement with Canada in
1988, the whole controversy surrounding NAFTA focused primarily on U.S.
trade with Mexico and only secondarily on U.S.Canada trade. Labor groups
were most vocal and persistent in their opposition to NAFTA because they
feared the inux of cheap Mexican products, coupled with probable reloca-
tion of many American companies to Mexico to take advantage of cheap
Mexican labor, would displace thousands of American jobs. While it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the legislative battle about
NAFTA, suce it to say that it was one of the most controversial debates
about Americas trade policy in the twentieth century. In the end, Congress
narrowly approved the trade agreement (i.e., HR 3450) on November 18
1993. The vote was 234200 in the House and 6138 in the Senate.
128 Beyond the case of China
Human rights
Romania
MFN status was rst granted to Romania in 1975 and had been renewed by
the president without congressional objection until 1979. In that year, the
House voted on a resolution (H.Res.317) to disapprove of it. Representative
Richard Schulze (R-PA), sponsor of the resolution, accused Romania of
repeatedly violating the requirements of the JacksonVanik Amendment by
abusing the Hungarian minority within its borders, running labor camps for
political dissidents and religious activists, restricting emigration to Israel, and
erecting new barriers to emigration. Opponents of the resolution, on the
other hand, argued that MFN had brought about more emigration and that
continuing MFN would encourage Romania to be more independent from
the former Soviet Union. The full House rejected the resolution on July 25 by
a 126271 vote (CQ Almanac 1979: 161).
The House voted twice more on Romanias MFN status.2 In 1986, Philip
Crane (R-IL) introduced H.Res.475 opposing President Reagans decision to
continue MFN for Romania, but the resolution was not reported out of Ways
and Means. Crane led a motion to discharge it from Ways and Means, but a
motion by Sam Gibbons (D-FL) to table Cranes discharge motion passed on
a 216190 vote, thus killing Cranes attempt to overturn Reagans decision.
Crane and others opposed MFN renewal on the ground that Romania was
guilty of human rights violations, including restrictive emigration practices
(CQ Almanac 1986: 350351). In 1987, Frank Wolf (R-WV) introduced
an amendment to the Omnibus Trade Bill (HR 3) to deny MFN status to
Romania for six months and to require a review of Romanias compliance
with the JacksonVanik Amendment every six months. The amendment was
adopted 232183 (CQ Almanac 1987: 642).
Hungary
Congress voted twice on Hungarys MFN status in 1989. In response to
President George H.W. Bushs decision to extend MFN status to Hungary for
ve years, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) led a motion to approve the presidents
decision under suspension of rules. His motion was defeated on June 27 by a
242172 vote (a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required
for passage under suspension of rules). In the end, by a 221169 vote the
House passed HR 1594 granting three years of MFN to Hungary (CQ
Almanac 1989: 40-H, 74-H).
Vietnam
The U.S. did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until 1995. Three
years later, President Clinton issued an executive order extending MFN
Beyond the case of China 129
status to Vietnam (U.S. Congress 2001a). Congress rst acted on Vietnams
MFN status in 1999, when the House failed by a 130297 vote to pass
H.J.R.58 to disapprove of Clintons decision to renew it. In 2000, the lower
chamber again failed to pass a similar resolution (H.J.R.99) by a vote of
91331. In 2006, the House failed by a 228161 vote to passunder suspen-
sion of rulesHR 5602 to authorize one more year of MFN for Vietnam.
Theoretical expectations
Without theoretical guidance, comparing China with six countries on two
distinct issues could be a confusing process full of ad hoc explanations.
Instead, I seek a clearly dened analytical approach that can facilitate sys-
tematic explanations with broad applicability. In this section, I propose three
broad theoretical expectations that will guide my analysis.
Even though Japan, Canada, and Mexico are quite similar to China in terms
of their extensive economic ties with the U.S., they dier from China in two
key aspects, that is, they are all democratic countries as well as allies of the
U.S. As a result, congressional debates about trade with these countries are
expected to focus almost exclusively on the economic dimension, particularly
the potential gain or loss of American jobs resulting from trade with these
countries. China, by contrast, is an authoritarian regime under Communist
control. The Tiananmen Incident, which is arguably the single most import-
ant event in bilateral relations since Nixons 1972 visit, has reinforced
antipathy toward China among many members of Congress. Besides, China
is not an ally of the U.S. Rather, due to its rising economic and military
power, China is widely perceived to be a potential threat to the U.S. Con-
sequently, anti-Communism, human rights, and strategic concerns are all
likely to aect voting on trade with China, which in turn may dampen the
potential impact of constituency interests.
Like China, Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam used to be or still are under
Communist rule. Yet unlike China, none of them isor has ever beenan
economic power, nor does any one of them have as extensive economic
130 Beyond the case of China
relations with the U.S. as China does. This helps explain why MFN renewal
for these three countries never caused much stir on Capitol Hill. Table 7.3
shows total trade and decit between the three countries and the U.S. In 2006,
U.S. trade with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam totaled US$3.8 billion,
US$1.7 billion, and US$9.7 billion respectively, and the U.S. decit with them
was US$1.4 billion, US$.57 billion, and US$7.5 billion respectively. By con-
trast, the U.S. trade decit with China stood at US$232 billion in 2006. In
terms of trade relations with the U.S., these countries are dwarfs compared to
the China giant. Because constituency economic interests in U.S. relations
with these three countries are quite small, they are not expected to have much
impact on roll call voting.
Hypothesis 3: The ideological ends will not form a coalition against mod-
erates in votes involving the six countries. In other words, the absolute
value of DW score will not be a signicant predictor of roll call votes.
Japan, Canada, and Mexico are all democratic countries and U.S. allies. Thus
the ideological factors of human rights, anti-Communism, and strategic
Table 7.3 Total U.S. trade and decit with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam (millions
of dollars)
Findings
The rst thing to notice in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 is that Union Strength
performs quite well, as it is statistically signicant and in the correct direction
Table 7.4 House roll call votes on trade and MFN extension for selected countries
Trade
Japan 1982 HR 5133 215188 Require automakers to use set percentages of U.S. labor and parts in automobiles they sell in the
United States
1983 HR 1234 219199 Require xed levels of U.S. labor and parts in automobiles sold in the U.S.; phase in domestic
content levels beginning in 1985 and reaching maximum levels in 1987
Canada 1965 HR 9042 280113 Remove tari duties on Canadian automobiles and parts for original equipment
Mexico 1993 HR 3450 234200 Approve the North American Free Trade Agreement and make the necessary changes to U.S.
statutory law to implement it
MFN
Romania 1979 H.Res.317 126271 Disapprove the presidents request to extent for 12 months a waiver of the JackonVanik
Amendment with respect to Romania
1987 HR 3 232283 Frank Wolf amendment to deny to Romania MFN status for six months and to require review of its
compliance with JacksonVanik Amendment every six months
Hungary 1989 HR 1594 221169 Approve for three years most-favored-nation status to the products of Hungary
Vietnam 1999 H.J.R.58 130297 Disapprove presidential waiver of the JacksonVanik Amendment for Vietnam
2006 HR 5602 228161 Suspend the rules and pass the bill to authorize the extension of MFN to Vietnam.
Source: CQ Almanac.
Table 7.5 Logit analysis of House roll call votes on trade with Japan, Canada, and Mexico
Independent variables Japan 1982 Japan 1983 Canada 1965 Mexico 1993
Union strength .054** .095** 6.707** 10.508** .008 .008 3.841** 4.258**
(.011) (.015) (1.398) (1.802) (.011) (.013) (1.263) (1.367)
Farm employment 10.599** 7.978* 25.772** 20.800** 3.816 2.241 9.431* 8.346
(3.184) (3.701) (5.021) (5.638) (2.212) (2.331) (4.675) (4.879)
Retail/wholesale 8.233 8.616 18.747** 18.128** 3.966 6.360 7.515 2.207
employment (4.691) (5.461) (5.300) (6.331) (5.371) (5.596) (4.161) (4.099)
Presidents party 2.735** 2.796** 1.121** 1.613**
(.296) (.297) (.243) (.229)
Absolute DW .538 1.104 1.119 1.348*
(.751) (.797) (.779) (.666)
Log likelihood 251.318 191.959 249.103 189.482 232.071 220.810 287.073 257.694
Pseudo R2 .097 .309 .155 .357 .008 .056 .041 .137
N 403 402 426 426 393 393 434 433
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at .01; * signicant at .05.
Table 7.6 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on Japan, Canada, and
Mexico)
Even though only outside forces involved in the NAFTA debate are depicted
Beyond the case of China 137
in the paragraph, it is reasonable to surmise, on the basis of the electoral
connection, that similar alliances probably also existed within Congress,
which in turn helps explain why Absolute DW Score is statistically signicant
and has a negative sign.
It should be pointed out that the conguration of political forces in the
NAFTA battle is quite similar to that in the legislative battle over Chinas
PNTR. This similarity raises a question: Should Mexico be viewed dier-
ently from Japan and Canada and, if so, on what ground? One might argue
that Mexico has more in common with China than with Japan or Canada
because both Mexico and China are developing countries that have many
problems with environmental protection and labor standards. On the other
hand, one might argue, as I did, that Mexico is quite dierent from China
because it is a democratic country and a U.S. ally. Consequently, many issues
(e.g., human rights and strategic concerns) that can potentially aect con-
gressional policy-making toward China may not aect congressional policy-
making toward Mexico. One way to answer this question is to examine roll
call voting on U.S. trade with developing countries and compare it with roll
call voting on trade with industrialized countries. If the absolute value of
DW score has a statistically signicant impact and a negative sign in the
former but not in the latter, then Mexico should perhaps be viewed as similar
to China.
The results for the ve votes on MFN extension are presented in Table 7.7
and Table 7.8. Neither Farm Employment nor Retail/Wholesale Employment
is statistically signicant in any of the regressions. Yet in the case of Chinas
MFN status, Farm Employment reaches statistical signicance and has the
correct sign in eight out of ten votes, and Retail/Wholesale Employment in
four votes (see Table 6.2 through Table 6.5). Union Strength is not statistic-
ally signicant in any of the ten votes on Chinas MFN, but it is in the 1987
Romania vote and the 1989 Hungary vote. On balance, then, the ndings
provide some support for my prediction that constituency variables will gen-
erally have smaller impact on MFN votes involving these three countries.
Though I did not expect a coalition of ideological ends against the middle
(i.e., EATM) to emerge on any of these votes, it actually appeared on three of
them. If Absolute DW Score increases by one standard deviation, the prob-
ability of supporting temporary suspension of Romanias MFN status (i.e.,
the Wolf Amendment) actually decreases by 0.071. My explanation for this
puzzling nding is that the ideological ends might have voted strategically on
this vote. That is, they might have voted against the Wolf Amendment in
order to propose a bill or amendment that would either permanently suspend
Romanias MFN or attach conditions to its renewal. The other puzzling
nding concerns the two votes on Vietnams MFN status. While Absolute
DW Score does not have any signicant impact on the 1999 vote, it does on
the 2006 vote.
Increase in Absolute DW Score is actually positively associated with sup-
port for a three-year extension of MFN status to Hungary. Because the bill
Table 7.7 Logit analysis of House votes on extension of MFN to Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam
Independent variables Romania 1979 Romania 1987 Hungary 1989 Vietnam 1999 Vietnam 2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .576 .760 4.928** 6.239** 2.489 4.198* 1.149 .006 .008 .016
(1.163) (1.417) (1.295) (1.485) (1.311) (1.626) (1.321) (1.415) (.013) (.014)
Farm employment 4.916 1.778 4.826 2.387 6.310 1.463 3.646 8.130 .070 .064
(2.679) (3.262) (3.698) (4.038) (3.713) (4.365) (4.832) (5.529) (.052) (.054)
Retail/wholesale 8.436 6.222 4.511 2.196 5.589 4.946 2.777 2.117 .023 .032
employment (4.903) (5.853) (4.676) (5.248) (4.770) (5.876) (3.957) (4.274) (.039) (.040)
Presidents party 2.588** 1.943** 2.682** 1.415** 1.037**
(.265) (.251) (.273) (.249) (.234)
DW Absolute 1.286 1.763* 1.946* 1.324 2.078**
(.789) (.709) (.777) (.731) (.669)
Log likelihood 244.806 186.618 274.273 237.727 262.369 199.902 261.897 238.842 262.711 249.838
Pseudo R2 .013 .248 .039 .167 .020 .253 .003 .087 .004 .050
N 397 397 416 416 391 391 428 427 389 388
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at .01; * signicant at .05.
Table 7.8 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on MFN extension to
Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam)
Independent variables Romania 1979 Romania 1987 Hungary 1989 Vietnam 1999 Vietnam 2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Our separation of powers system, the powers that the Constitution confers on
Congress, the campaign nancing system, the existence of immigrant com-
munities, and a variety of other factors guarantee that the legislative branch
will play a role on any major foreign policy issue and a number of minor ones
as well.
(Richard Bush 2004: 220)
Partisanship
Partisanship in Congress has two dimensions. On the one hand, partisanship
means loyalty to the president of ones own party, for the president is by
default the leader of his party and his leadership extends to the legislative
arena. Party loyalty entails supporting the presidents policy agenda regardless
of ones own preferences. On the other hand, partisanship also means
electorally-induced inter-party dierences. Because of electoral competition
and historical circumstances, the two parties have developed relatively stable
and usually distinct positions on a number of issues, and these party positions
generally reect the preferences of their respective electoral bases. When
members take positions along party lines dened by electoral competition, it
can also be viewed as partisanship.
My analysis indicates that both dimensions of partisanship inuenced
Congresss China policy. The three failed attempts to override Bushs vetoes
vividly illustrate Republican loyalty to President Bush. While Democrats
overwhelmingly voted for the override, most Republicans voted against it
despite their serious misgivings about Bushs China policy (see CQWR 1990:
245; CQWR 1992: 1594; Friedman 1990; Yang 2000: 90111). In fact, many
Republicans rst voted for the three bills that Bush later vetoed. I also
reported evidence that Republicans were signicantly more likely to vote
against MFN revocation during the Bush years. Democrats rallied around
Clinton during his rst year in oce. After that, they showed little loyalty to
their president. Between 1997 and 1999, they were actually more likely to vote
against their president on the MFN issue. In 2000, they were again more
likely to vote against Clinton on the PNTR issue. On balance, then, party
loyalty appeared to be stronger among Republicans than among Democrats.
The ip side of rallying around ones president is that the majority party
has political incentives to embarrass the president of the minority party. I
146 Conclusion
reported evidence that Democrats were signicantly more likely to vote for
MFN revocation under Bush. I also found that more China bills were intro-
duced when a Republican majority in the House faced a Democratic Presi-
dent. Meanwhile, scholars who studied U.S.China relations in the late 1940s
adduced evidence that the Republican majority criticized President Trumans
China policy primarily because of partisan considerations (Grasso 1987;
Rourke 1983: 7476, 1345; Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westereld 1955:
Chapter 12, Chapter 16). Thus for both Republicans and Democrats, pure
partisanship appears to have inuenced their approaches to China policy.
When members voted in 2000 on the bill to grant China PNTR, inter-party
dierence in trade policy, not loyalty to ones president, seemed to be the
decisive factor, since Democrats were actually more likely to vote against the
bill (hence against their own president) than Republicans. Yet a few years
before the PNTR vote, Democrats in both chambers were more supportive of
GATT than their Republican counterparts (Bailey and Brady 1998; Gartzke
and Wrighton 1998). The context of the PNTR vote (i.e., the last year of the
Clinton presidency) and the soaring trade decit with China help explain why
many Democrats decided to abandon their president and instead vote accord-
ing to their partys traditional stance on trade.
It is hard to distinguish the two dimensions of partisanship in roll call votes
on the two bills that aimed to strengthen U.S.Taiwan relations. On the one
hand, since the late 1940s, Republicans in general have been steadfast in
their support for Taiwan. Democrats, by contrast, have generally been more
cautious in their approach to U.S.Taiwan relations. In fact, they were highly
critical of Taiwans authoritarian regime and played an important role in
bringing about political reform on the island in the 1980s. Even though
Taiwans appeal to Democrats has increased considerably since it trans-
formed itself into a edgling democracy in the 1990s, Republicans still appear
to be more supportive of the island. On the other hand, Republicans became
extremely active in Taiwan policy after they secured majority party status in
Congress in 1994. It seems likely that Republicans used the Taiwan issue as a
political weapon to beat President Clinton.
Ideology
Because the commonly used measures of ideology (e.g., hawkishness or DW-
NOMINATE score) usually have high correlation with party, I did not
include any of them in my analysis, except in the case of Taiwan policy where
I included hawkishness. Not surprisingly, hawkishness turned out to be highly
signicant while party had no impact at all. Since most previous studies
included both party and a similar measure of ideology, this may explain why
they reported ideology to be the best predictor of foreign policy voting (e.g.,
Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay
1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Instead, I used the absolute value of DW-NOMINATE score. My expectation
Conclusion 147
was that since both liberals and conservatives had good reasons to be critical
of China, they should be united on China policy. As expected, the ideological
ends were more likely to vote against PNTR and to support revocation of
Chinas MFN status. Whats more, the strength of this coalition steadily
increased over time on the MFN issue. I contended that Chinas growing
military and economic power, its potential threat to Taiwan, and the soaring
U.S. trade decit with China, among other factors, made both liberals and
conservatives increasingly uneasy about U.S.China relations, thence the
growing strength of the coalition.
My ndings provide further support for Nokkens (2003) thesis of EATM
voting (i.e., the ideological ends against the middle). However, Nokken
attributed EATM voting to the special rules governing MFN renewal, and he
reported decreasing EATM voting in the case of the PNTR vote where the
special rules were removed. By contrast, I argued that the peculiar nature of
U.S.China relations was responsible for the emergence of such a coalition,
and I reported evidence of increasing EATM voting between 1994 and 1999
on the MFN votes. But I did nd decreasing EATM voting between the 1999
MFN vote and the 2000 PNTR vote.
Constituency interests
Despite the strong economic ties between the U.S. and China, constituency
interests generally had only weak impact on members votes. Union Strength
had signicant impact in only one model, and Retail/Wholesale Employment
in only four of the ten MFN votes. Two constituency variables performed
rather well. Exports to China was negatively associated with support for
strong U.S.Taiwan relations but positively associated with support for
PNTR. Farm Employment was positively associated with support for PNTR
but negatively associated with support for strong U.S.Taiwan relations. In
eight out of the ten MFN votes, Farm Employment was negatively associated
with support for MFN revocation.
My ndings about Farm Employment illuminates a key challenge to
Congress in its campaign for human rights, namely, how to balance human
rights with competing interests. The record of Congresss human rights policy
clearly suggests that with few exceptions, human rights has been subordinated
to other interests (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Cohen 1987; Dittmer 2001;
Forsythe 1988; Neier 1996). Whereas during the Cold War strategic and
security concerns eectively killed most congressional initiatives in human
rights, since the end of the Cold War human rights has often been down-
played or sacriced by many members for the sake of economic benets
(Neier 1996).
Despite strong economic ties between the U.S. and Taiwan since the late
1970s and the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars worth of annual
weapons sales to the island, neither Exports to Taiwan nor Military Awards
had any impact on members votes. It seems probable that the dominance of
148 Conclusion
strategic and ideological considerations in U.S.Taiwan relations have over-
shadowed economic ties. On the other hand, this nding is entirely consistent
with previous studies, most of which reported little or no evidence of con-
stituency inuence on defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb
1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
In order to nd out whether these ndings are unique to China or represent
a general pattern of congressional roll call voting on foreign policy, I also
analyzed roll call votes on six countries that are similar to China in relevant
respects: trade for Japan, Canada, and Mexico, and MFN extension for
Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam. A comparison of ndings from these six
countries with those from China suggests a theory of roll call voting on
dierent countries.
One component of this theory is the political regime of a particular country.
Being a democracy itself, the U.S. usually has close diplomatic, political, and
military ties with democratic countries. Consequently, when members of
Congress vote on trade legislation involving democratic countries, they tend
to focus on a single dimensioni.e., the economic impactof the pend-
ing legislation. In one-dimensional politics, liberals and conservatives are
not expected to form a coalition. By contrast, when members consider trade
legislation involving non-democratic countries like China, they are likely to
consider not only economic issues, but also ideological and/or strategic
issues. As the number of issues increases, the opportunities for liberals and
conservatives to form a coalition also increase. For a liberal may oppose the
legislation from one perspective and a conservative from another perspective.
In other words, in a multi-dimensional world the conventional model of
spatial voting may not work. And statistical ndings provide support for this
expectation. Whereas the ideological ends were almost always united in
China policy, this coalition appeared far less frequently on votes involving the
six countries.
Second, the nature of political regime may also aect the impact of con-
stituency interests. When a trade bill targets a democratic country, members
are expected to focus on economic issues. As a result, constituency interests
should be particularly salient to them. When deciding on trade legislation
involving non-democratic countries, they will likely consider not only the
economic dimension, but also the ideological and/or strategic dimension of
that legislation, and the latter may well dampen the eects of the former. I
adduced evidence that Union Strength, which is a measure of constituency
interests in foreign trade, did not have any signicant impact on the vote on
Chinas PNTR, but it had signicant impact on the two votes on U.S.Japan
trade and the vote on U.S.Mexico trade.
Finally, the magnitude of constituency interests can also aect party loyalty.
Out of electoral considerations, the presidents fellow partisans generally
tend to be more supportive of his policy agenda than members of the oppo-
sition party, other things being equal. However, when a piece of legislation
involves signicant constituency interests and when a presidents preferences
Conclusion 149
dier signicantly from those of their constituents, members of Congress
may be tempted to defect from their own president, as many Democrats did
in the case of China. On the other hand, in the absence of clearly dened and
signicant constituency interests, as in the case of MFN extension to Hungary,
Romania, and Vietnam, members may be more likely to rally around their
own president. In fact, except for the 1987 vote on Romanias MFN status,
members of the presidents party were consistently more likely to support his
position than members of the opposition party, controlling for other factors.
Yet it should be pointed out that it is impossible to control for political
regime in roll call analysis. Besides, it is very dicult to measure the number
of issues involved in a piece of legislation or in U.S. relations with another
country. Even if this is plausible, the various measures may be so highly
correlated as to make statistical inference problematic. Historical-comparative
analysis based on qualitative evidence oers one potential solution to the two
problems. Regardless, my analysis makes a small but important step in building
a theory of congressional policy-making.
Policy implications
Now what are the implications of my study for policy-makers in Beijing and
Washington? More specically, what they should and should not do with
respect to Congress in order to successfully manage and promote this import-
ant but highly controversial relationship?
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with signicant powers in the trade
area (e.g., to set tari levels). In contrast, when security is the dominant
concern, as it was during the cold war, constitutional prerogatives and
the need for quick response favor presidential dominance. Thus, moving
from a security-centered to an economics-centered relationship with
Beijing put the relationship more substantially into the congressional
domain.
(Lampton 2001: 116)
Favorability rating
Favorability rating has probably the longest time series in surveys. The major
survey houses across the nation have elded such questions with slightly
158 Appendix: Sources
Table A.1 Examples of coding of China bills
dierent wording and response categories. The questions usually have either
four response categoriesvery favorable, mostly favorable, mostly
unfavorable, and very unfavorable, or a 10-point-scale running from +5
to 5. A third type of questions has three categoriesgenerally favorable,
generally unfavorable, and neutral. Hirshberg (1993) was among the rst
to collect and organize data on American publics favorability rating of
China. His data covered 19541991, and most of the questions in his data
have 10-point-scale response categories.
I selected the rst two types of questions, i.e., four-category and 10-point
scale questions. I collapsed very favorable and mostly favorable into
favorable, and very unfavorable and mostly unfavorable into
unfavorable. For those 10-point scale questions, I collapsed + 1 to +5 into
favorable and 1 to 5 into unfavorable. I used the percentage of Ameri-
cans having favorable opinion of China as the measure of favorability. For
years in which multiple survey houses asked the same questions, I take the
average of the percentages. For missing years, I take the average of the previ-
ous and following years percentages. I updated Hirshbergs data by including
more recent data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research avail-
able online at www.lexisnexis.com. For exact question wording, see T. Xie
(2004: Appendix 1) and Hirshberg (1993: 249250).
Ideology
DW-NOMINATE score: www.voteview.com.
Hawkishness: The Center for Security Policy.
Constituency variables
Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment
(before 1998): Adler, E. Scott. Congressional District Data File, [congres-
sional term]. University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
Farm Employment and Retail/Wholesale Employment (after 1999): I used
the 2000 Census CDs at the Government Section of Northwestern University
Library to arrive at the percentages.
160 Appendix: Sources
Union Strength (after 1999): Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson,
Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population
Survey: Note, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, January
2003, pp. 349354.
State Export to China: Oce of Trade and Industry Information, Manu-
facturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce.
Military Awards: U.S. Department of Defense, Atlas/Data Abstract for the
United States.
Notes
Introduction
1 Though Congress passed legislation (HR 2676) in 1998 changing MFN to
NTR, MFN is still commonly used in international trade negotiations. Besides,
MFN is the term used in most congressional documents, scholarly works, and
journalistic accounts. Thus MFN instead of NTR will be used throughout the
book.
2 Scholars sometimes draw a distinction between foreign policy and defense policy
(Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Ripley and Lindsay 1993). The former generally
includes diplomatic and strategic relations with other countries and trade policy,
whereas the latter refers exclusively to defense spending like military bases,
weapons purchase, and payment for military personnel. Thus dened, the three
policy issues in U.S.China relations that will be examined in this study belong to
foreign policy.
3 To be sure, there are many otherand perhaps equally importantquestions
about Congresss role in foreign and defense policy, such as who decides the con-
gressional agenda, the role of interest groups, the impact of constituency opinion,
and the consequences of congressional activism (for the most comprehensive
review of the literature, see Lindsay and Ripley 1992). Nonetheless, answers
to the three questions form the foundations on which other questions can be
pursued. For example, one cannot adequately address the question of who decides
Congresss foreign policy agenda without rst addressing executive-legislative
interactions in foreign policy or the decision-making process in Congress.
4 Many studies approach Congresss relative power vis--vis the president in
foreign policy from the legal-constitutional perspective. They focus on Congresss
constitutional prerogatives, particularly the war powers (e.g., Adler 1988; Crovitz
and Rabkin 1989; Deering 1991; Fisher 1985; Fisher 1988; Fisher 1991; Franklin
1987; Schlesinger 1989).
5 Since it was published, the two presidencies thesis has been at the center of
scholarly debate. For a review of the debate, see Fleisher and Bond (1988); Shull
and LeLoup (1981); Sigelman (1979); and Wildavsky (1975).
6 In the nal analysis, Schlesinger seems to be reluctant to completely reject presi-
dential dominance in foreign policy. To restore the constitutional balance, it is
necessary in this period to rebuke presidential pretensions, as it has been necessary
in other periods to rebuke congressional pretensions, he cautioned (1972: 108).
But in demythologizing the presidency we must take care not to remythologize
the Congress, he hastily added (ibid.: 109).
7 I borrowed the term contingency from public opinion research. Based on
interviews with a representative sample of House members, Cook (1992) con-
tended that congressional responsiveness to public preferences on welfare policy is
162 Notes
contingent upon the particular issue. See Manza and Cook (2002) for a review of
the literature on the contingency view.
8 According to Lindsay and Ripley (1993: 19), crisis policy is characterized by the
perception of an imminent threat to the U.S. national interests, usually one involv-
ing the use or potential use of force. Strategic policy species the goals and
tactics of defense and foreign policy. It includes what is commonly called foreign
policy plus those aspects of defense policy that specify the basic mix and mission
of military forces. Finally, structural policy governs how resources are used and
mostly clearly resemble decision making on domestic, distributive politics.
9 To my knowledge, Burgin (1991) is the only scholar who has systematically stud-
ied the extent of legislative participation in foreign policy. She constructed a scale
of participation and then divided members into four dierent categories based on
the participation scale: leaders, activists, position-takers, and voters. She examined
the impact of constituent interests on whether to participate in a foreign policy
issue and the extent of participation. Hall (1996) oers the most comprehensive
study of legislative participation in Congress, but his focus is participation in
general, not foreign policy issues in particular.
10 The Act was repealed in 1943 by the Magnuson Act, but large-scale Chinese
immigration didnt occur until after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965.
For the most recent account of the history of Chinese immigration, see Lee (2003).
11 Since almost all bank notes in China were backed by silver, large-scale purchase by
the U.S. depleted Chinas silver reserve and led to sharp appreciation of the cur-
rency. As the Chinese currency appreciated, exports became more expensive and
imports cheaper, resulting in more outow of silver. Meanwhile, banks began to
withdraw notes from circulation, which resulted in credit stringency and deation.
The Silver Purchase Act appeared to be the major cause of the nancial crisis in
China in the 1930s.
12 Three sentences from the 1971 CQ Almanac best summarize the intensity of
congressional opposition to Chinas admission to the UN. From 1950 to 1970,
Congress expressed its opposition to the seating of Communist China in the
United Nations at least 30 times. Every year, statements expressing this opposition
have been attached to appropriations bills and enacted into law. Every year, that is,
until 1971 (CQ Almanac 1971: 364).
13 When Deng visited Washington, 85 Senators and 70 House members met with
him, with another dozen accompanying him to Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle.
Many House members avidly sought invitation for a meeting with Deng and
members of both chambers stood in line to shake Tengs [sic] hand and even to
get his autograph. Senator Henry Jackson was so impressed by Deng that he
predicated that Deng would be kissing a lot of babies here (CQ Almanac 1979:
207208).
14 For example, Mann (2001) and Crabb (1985) examined congressional support for
Taiwan. Nokken (2003) analyzed roll call votes on MFN renewal. Yang (2000)
oered a detail account of MFN renewal and Taiwan policy in the Bush and
Clinton years. Xie (1993) conducted an in-depth analysis of roll call voting on the
Taiwan Relations Act and the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of
1989.
11 This appears to be true only at the individual level, however. There is convincing
evidence that aggregate or collective opinion is remarkably stable, coherent, and
meaningful (Page 2006; Page and Shapiro 1992).
12 Students of American politics have constructed various measures of constituency
opinion, including demographic variables, small-sample estimates, presidential
election results, and referenda voting (for a review, see Ardoin and Garand 2003;
McDonagh 1993; Stone 1979), but none of these directly concern China policy.
8 Conclusion
1 In retrospect, there appears to be more to it than merely partisan motivations in
Democratic criticism of Bushs China policy. Some Democrats, notably George
Mitchell, Nancy Pelosi, and Dick Gephart stuck to the same position on China
policy even after Clinton took oce. Take George Mitchell, for example. Mitchell
would later become nearly as much of a problem for a Democratic president, Bill
Clinton, as he had been for the Republicans, Mann observed (1999: 199). He
was genuinely outraged by the Chinese repression; he believed in what he was
doing. But for many others Democrats, the conclusion seems inescapable that
. . . the MFN disputes of the Bush years had been primarily an issue of partisan
politics.
2 The case of Taiwanese-Americans is one example of ethnic pressure. While the
number of Taiwanese-Americans is very small, they are well organized and have
easy access to Congress because of the historical ties between Taiwan and the U.S.
In the 1980s, a number of Taiwanese groups lobbied Congress to pay more atten-
tion to Taiwans human rights conditions and they were successful in bringing
Congress to bear on the political regime on the island (Bush 2004: Chapter 6).
3 There are some members who pursue human rights for personal or partisan
reasons. Steven Solarz and George Mitchell are examples of the former, while
176 Notes
Ron Brown and other Democrats in the Bush years are examples of the latter.
Moreover, Congresss human rights crusade in the 1970s was also partly motivated
by a desire to rein in the runaway executive branch in Vietnam and Latin America.
As Forsythe (1988: 26) wrote,
In short, what an observer may fairly and properly call a human rights vote
may not be seen as a purely human rights vote by any given member of
Congress. A member may view it as a test of power between Congress and the
president, or of national versus international jurisdiction, or of economic
versus idealistic considerations, or of security versus morality, and so on.
Nevertheless, these various motivations do not refute the observation that it is in
the interest of members to take a pro-human rights position.
4 Keller (1997a; 1997b) oered some journalistic accounts of Chinese lobbying by
organizing congressional delegations.
5 Commenting on the strength and sophistication of the Taiwan lobby, Charles
Freeman (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338) described how Taiwan skillfully played the
constituency card. Even if it was a Q-Tip cotton swab, according to Freeman, the
Taiwanese made sure that the congressman from the district where cotton was
grown knew Taiwan bought the cotton swab. By contrast, in 1980, the Chinese
were buying one out of seven bales of cotton produced in the U.S. but no one was
aware of this, except the Board of Trade at Chicago and the cotton traders.
6 For a good review of the arguments about the China threat, see Roy (1996). For a
more benign view of the rise of China, see Spence (2005) and Zakaria (2005). For
a critical view of how the China threat is played up by the neoconservatives, see
Klare (2005). Pei (2005) is much more pessimistic about the rise of China, arguing
instead that Chinas political system prevents it from becoming a real superpower.
Bibliography