WRITTEN REPORT

[G.R. No. 159507. April 19, 2006.]

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS

INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS,
respondents.

FACTS:

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his
daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her
supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in
April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal
credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there
with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in
honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted
from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his
failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo
denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was
allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit
card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint.

Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper
venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed
on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern
Leyte.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative
defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo
likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid.

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the
same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion.

The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition
for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against
respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be
commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court,
because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it
declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court
pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue was improper.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

VENUE

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff
but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of
every action and proceeding.

RESIDENCE

The term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with
the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention
of returning.

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the
Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. and Fule v.
Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al., decided on November 29, 1976.

OPINION:
In this case, it discussed that residence in Rule 4 of rules of court is not synonymous
with domicile. Also, it stated that the residence for the purpose of election law is
more stringent.
 [G.R. No. 161220. July 30, 2008.]

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and
ROSIE M. BENATIRO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely:
Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and
Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos,
respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Gloria represented by Atty. Lepiten, filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, a petition for Letters of
Administration. The petition was opposed by Gloria's brother, Francisco, who was
represented by Atty. Yray.

In the hearing, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case.
The trial court on even date issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of
the estate.

Subsequently, in the Order, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing
was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco,
together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray manifested that
the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both
counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo, be appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30
days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.

In his Commissioner's Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae

supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February
28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located,
for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs,
only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of
the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given
addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of
Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.

On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation of the other heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique, filed with the
CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of
Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged
that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the
same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their
share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as
well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place
for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that
they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the
inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir
Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation,
should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a
falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the
certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity,
since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished
a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the
remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been
terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope
as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in
the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with
administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due
process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be
deprived of their property.

Nothing in the records showed that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the
Report. The CFi adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs attended the conference.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is notice.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

NO CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THROUGH PUBLICATION FOR HEIRS

Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice
after the fact of execution.

The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was
never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.

Opinion:

In this case, it is stated that the notice through publication is not a notice to the
heirs.
 [G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000.]

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA

AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO,
PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late
Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.

She filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate
and asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.

Angelina and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition, which petitioner duly opposed.

The judge issued the assailed order which converted the petition for the issuance of
letters of administration into a judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio
Avelino, Sr.

The parties were directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and
personal properties left by the deceased. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The respondent appellate court issued the assailed decision which affirmed the
order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper in
this case.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

COMPETENT COURT SHALL APPOINT A QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATOR IN CASES WHERE

DECEDENT'S ESTATE SHALL BE JUDICIALLY ADMINISTERED; EXCEPTIONS
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.

The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 which provide:

"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the

decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition.

SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the gross value
of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or
administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts
of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office."

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at
the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of
being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs
are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.

WHEN ORDINARY ACTION FOR PARTITION MAY BE RESORTED TO; CASE AT BAR
The basis for the trial court's order converting an action for letters of administration
to one for judicial partition is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides
that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no
extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be
resorted to, as in this case. This Court has held that where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them
may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. The trial court
appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit
for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents.

OPINION:

In this case the Court discussed that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of
being dissipated.

When a person dies without any pending obligations, his heirs are neither required
to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court.