The Russian

Provisional Government
1917

VOLUME I

HOOVER INSTITUTION

PUBLICATIONS
 H O O V E R IN S T IT U T IO N P U B L IC A T IO N S

The Russian
Provisional Government
1917

D O C U M E N T S

S e le c te d a n d e d ite d b y
ROBERT PAUL BROWDER
and
ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY

VOLUM E I

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

ST A N F O R D , C A L IFO R N IA

1961
 STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
1961 by the Board of Trustee of the Lcland Stanford Junior University
Ail rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-9052
Printed in the United Suites of America
I

To
the memory of

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

I
 Statement by Alexander F. Kerensky

The decision of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to

publish a three-volume documentary account of the 1917 revolution in Russia
is a great service not only to the history of my country but to world history as
well.
The year 1917, a year of stupendous changes in the fate of Russia, was but the
beginning of a great upheaval in world history which shattered the entire political
structure of the globe as it had existed up to 1914.
The importance of these volumes cannot be overemphasized. And their con
tent is much broader than the title would seem to imply. They offer not only a
full account of the legislative and administrative acts of the Provisional Govern
ment as recorded in the original minutes of the day-by-day sessions of this
government (this valuable source is available only in the archives of the Hoover
Institution) and in other official documents, but also an authentic record of the
military, political, and social accomplishments of the democratic revolution of
February 1917.
During my long years in exile I have read a great many historical accounts,
published in the U.S.S.R. as well as abroad, dealing with the period when I was
active in Russia. The truth of the matter is that all such accounts emanating from
Soviet Russia are falsifications. In the opinion of Communist leaders in the Krem
lin, historical events are weapons of propaganda; they do not hesitate to change
history to serve their purposes. Works on this period published in other countries,
by contrast, are not as a rule deliberate falsifications, but often have been the
result of over-reliance on the pseudo-scientific materials published in Moscow,
Naturally the historian must be entirely free to evaluate historical events and
draw his own conclusions, but only on one binding condition: that he base his
account on authentic facts, arranged in proper sequence. The present three vol
umes adhere to this condition. They consequently represent a touchstone against
which future historians may check the veracity of their facts.
This is why I accepted with enthusiasm and gratification the invitation of the
Hoover Institution to participate in this unique work.

Stanford, California
April 3,1961
 Foreword

More than forty years have passed since the overthrow of the last Romanov
emperor in Russia and the formation of the Provisional Government in Petrograd.
Based on a coalition of political parties which at that turning point in Russian
history enjoyed widespread public support, the Provisional Government under
took a gigantic task: to carry on the war to a victorious end and, simultaneously,
to build a democratic society in Russia.
The Russian Provisional Government had been in power for only eight months
when, by conspiracy and bloody revolt, it was overthrown by a small minority of
Bolsheviks under Lenins leadership.
No single, comprehensive and objective history of this period has appeared
in print so far. For the past four decades the archives and libraries in the Soviet
Union have been inaccessible to Western scholars. It was generally assumed that
the existing sources outside of Russia were too incomplete for the writing of a
comprehensive history of this eight-month period. This assumption was chal
lenged by the Assistant Director of the Hoover Institution, Witold S. Sworakow-
ski, who, in a survey of the Hoover Institutions collection on Russia published in
1954, stated:
The lack of a sizable number of books published on this period [of the Provisional
Government] and the general scarcity of pamphlets, periodicals, and newspapers from
Russia under the Lvov and Kerenskii governments have produced the general belief
that the source material on this period in American libraries is too poor and inadequate
to support larger research projects. A survey of the holdings of the Hoover Library
appears to suggest that a revision of the above belief is in order. The Library has an
exceptionally good body of official documentation on this period, a limited number of
books, a comparatively large number of pamphlets, and nearly complete sets of the
most important periodicals and newspapers. . . .
Although the scholar consulting these materials will often find gaps and deficiencies,
nevertheless the resources of the Library seem to be adequate for the undertaking of
studies on Russias democratic potential revealed during the short period of the Pro
visional Government.
This statement came to the attention of the former Prime Minister of the Rus
sian Provisional Government, Alexander F. Kerensky. In the summer of 1955
Mr. Kerensky came to Stanford to examine the documentation on this period at
the Hoover Institution. His findings confirmed Mr. Sworakowskis conclusions.
In fact, he was amazed to find such a wealth of material after having previously
searched in vain for documentary sources on the Provisional Government in other
American and European libraries.
Conversations between Mr. Kerensky and Mr. Sworakowski led late in 1955 to
a decision of the Hoover Institution to undertake the selection, translation, and
annotation of these rare materials in order to make them available to scholars
and students.
X FOREWORD

It was obvious that a project of this kind should have the cooperation of Mr.
Kerensky, whose firsthand experiences and recollections would be of great value.
An invitation was extended, and Mr. Kerensky graciously accepted. We are deeply
grateful to Mr. Kerensky for his unswerving interest in seeing the project through.
The Institution was fortunate to secure the services of Dr. Robert P. Browder,
a specialist on Russian history who is Chairman of the Department of History at
the University of Colorado, to share the burden of the work with Mr. Kerensky.
We are heavily indebted to Dr. Browder for his perseverance in this difficult
undertaking and his devotion to the project.
A work of such magnitude required the services of a team of translators and
assistants. Their contribution also merits the Institutions grateful acknowledg
ment and thanks.
Finally, we wish to express our gratitude to the many generous donors of funds
who made the undertaking and the completion of the project possible.
After more than four years of work, this basic collection of documents dealing
with the period of the Russian Provisional Governments efforts to establish dem
ocracy in Russia is being made available to the scholar and student. The docu
ments will, we hope, correct many misconceptions about the past as well as provide
new perspectives on this important phase of Russian history.
W. G l e n n Ca m p b e l l
Director, Hoover Institution
Stanford University
April 1961
 Preface

The purpose of these volumes is to provide in English an extensive collection

of documents and materials on the February revolution and the brief but momen
tous period of the Provisional Government in Russia during 1917. Of course,
specialists will wish to consult the sources directly, but we hope that our work will
also encourage and facilitate their further investigation of this exceedingly com
plex and important stage in the course of Russian history. Cognizant of the
dangers inherent in any selection of materials, our aim has been to present as
complete a picture as possible of events and reactions to them, utilizing public
documents, memoirs, correspondence, unpublished manuscripts, the contemporary
press, and certain recently available materials to show the activities of the Gov
ernment, the conditions of the time, and the views of the various parties and groups
and their leaders. The introductions and annotations are not interpretations, but
summaries of the subject matter covered in the following sections and aids to an
understanding of the documents.
Restrictions of space and other considerations were responsible for certain de
cisions taken at the beginning of the project which affected the content and format
of the work. The first two volumes are organized topically; the last, covering
political history, chronologically. Because of the paucity of information on the
legislative and administrative activity of the Provisional Government, relatively
more space was devoted to these aspects of the regime than to the strictly political
developments of the time, which have received so much attention and coverage in
the subsequent writings of participants and in later scholarly studies. Again, al
though we have included editorial comment from the full spectrum of significant
political, social, and economic opinion, we have purposely given Bolshevik pro
nouncements less representation in several places, because of their availability
elsewhere, as, for example, in the collected works of Lenin in English. In these
and other cases where materials of some importance have been omitted, we have
indicated where they may be found. Where documents have been cut, the omis
sions are clearly marked by ellipses. Footnotes which appeared in the sources are
distinguished by asterisks, as opposed to the numbered footnotes of the editors.
Wherever possible, citations have been made to sources in Western European
languages as well as in Russian.
It should also be noted that in the course of our work many more documents
were translated than could be included in the volumes. These translations, as well
as sometimes more complete versions than those in the volumes, are available for
consultation at the Hoover Institution. The Institutions holdings on this period,
which were, with very few exceptions, the basis for our selection, are without doubt
unrivaled outside the Soviet Union.
The Library of Congress system of transliteration from Russian has been used,
xii PREFACE

without ligatures and diacritical marks and with some other modifications. The
medial hard sign is not indicated. The final soft sign is not shown in the names
of certain administrative divisions that appear frequently. Initial fl, K), and e are
rendered as ya, yu, and ye. Finally, in some instances proper names are given
in the form most familiar to Western readers, and Russian words which are found
in Websters Unabridged Dictionary have been spelled as they appear there. All
1917 dates, except as otherwise noted, are in the Old Style, then used in Russia,
which was thirteen days behind the Western Gregorian calendar.
The Bibliography includes all works used or cited in the volumes, but does not
pretend to be a comprehensive list on the period. For additional bibliographical
aid, the reader is referred to William Henry Chamberlins The Russian Revolution,
and especially to the extremely valuable catalogues of the former Russian Histori
cal Archive abroad in Prague, Bibliografiia russkoi revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi
voiny (1917-1921), and of the Bibliotheque de la documentation internationale
contemporaine, edited by Alexandra Dumesnil, Catalogue methodique de fonds
russe de la Bibliotheque. The brief Chronology should be supplemented by refer
ence to N. Avdeev and others, Revoliutsiia 1917 goda (Khronika sobytii), 6 vols.
Short biographical notices of the principal figures of the period are given in the
Index,

The most pleasant task of the editors in this Preface is the opportunity to
acknowledge the invaluable assistance of their translators, without whose labors
these volumes would never have been presented to the public. Their careful work,
often with materials penned or spoken in the heat of political batde or under the
pressure of administrative or military exigency by men unaccustomed to verbal
niceties, was a constant source of satisfaction to us. To Mr. Robert Burton, Mrs.
Nucia Lodge, Dr. Jack Posin, Mrs. Helen Ivanov Powers, and Mr, Daniel Wol-
konsky we extend our deepest appreciation. Their contribution was incalculable.
It would be impossible to enumerate our obligations to all the other members
of the Hoover Institution staff for their encouragement and assistance throughout
the preparation of these volumes, but we would like to express our gratitude par
ticularly to Dr. C. Easton Rothwell, Director from 1952 to 1959, Professor Witold
Sworakowski, Assistant Director, and Dr. W. Glenn Campbell, the present Direc
tor, for their support and understanding. Mrs. Mary Hawkins Johnson, who
served with great efficiency as secretary to our project, deserves a special word
of thanks.
We are greatly obliged to the following publishers who have granted permis
sion to reprint passages: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., from the Memoirs of the
Russian Revolution by General Loukomsky; Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., from
Alexander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, and from Frank Golder, Documents of
Russian History; International Publishers, from the Collected Works of V. L
Lenin; Gerald Duckworth, Ltd., from Constantine Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a
Diplomat; Novyi Zhurnal, from the article by V. Zenzinov entitled Fevralskie
dni ; Dodd, Mead & Company, from A. F. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism;
 PREFACE xiii

Oxford University Press, from N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917,

ed. and trans. by Joel Carmichael, and from Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the
Revolution in Russia; Princeton University Press, from Klaus Epstein, Matthias
Erzberger; E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., from Elizabeth Narishkin-Kurakin, Under
Three Tsars; and Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., from C. E. Vulliamy and A. L. Hynes, From
the Red Archives.
We have made every effort to achieve accuracy in these volumes, but we do
not deceive ourselves that no errors remain. For these, we, of course, assume full
responsibility and, at the same time, invite users of the work to send any correc
tions to us addressed to the Hoover Institution.
R obert P a u l B row der
A lexander F. K erensk y

March 28,1961
 Contents
OF VOLUMES I, II, AND III

Volume I

INTRODUCTION: Harbingers of Revolution............................................... 3

PART I. T h e F e b r u a r y R e v o l u t i o n ................................................ 21
1. The Storm B reaks............................................................ 26
2 . The Collapse of the M onarchy........................................ 83
3 . The Formation of the Provisional Government.............. 117

PART II. T ow ard a D e m o c r a t ic O r d e r ............................................ 153

4. The Central Government.................................................. 157
5. Justice and Law Enforcement.......................................... 191
6. Local Government and Administration.......................... 243
7. The Nationalities P roblem .............................................. 317
8. The Constituent Assembly................................................ 434

Source Abbreviations................................................................................... 473

Glossary......................................................................................................... 475

Volume II

PART III. E c o n o m ic a n d S o c i a l R e o r g a n i z a t i o n ...................................... 479

I 9. Public Finance.................................................................. 484
10. The Agrarian Question.................................................. 523
11. Supply and Provisioning .............................................. 615
112. Industry, Transport, and Communications.................. 666
113. L a b o r ............................................................................. 709
14. Education and W elfare.................................................. 771
15. Religion .......................................................................... 803
xvi CONTENTS OF VOLUMES I, I I , AND III

PART IV. an d O p e r a t i o n s .....................................

M il it a r y A f f a ir s 841
16. The Revolution in the Army and N a v y ........................ 845
17. The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive.......... 921
18. Efforts toStrengthenthe Army After J u ly ..................... 977

PART V. F o r e ig n A f f a i r s ................................................................. 1039

19. The Period of the First Provisional Government.......... 1042
20. May to October............................................................. 1102

Source Abbreviations................................................................................... 1189

Glossary......................................................................................................... 1191

Volume III

PART VI. T h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t and P o l it ic a l F o r c es to

Ju ...............................................................................
l y 1195
21 . Political Parties and the S oviet...................................... 1199
22. The April Crisis and the Formation of a Coalition Gov
ernment ......................................................................... 1236
23. The First Coalition Government.................................. 1286

PART VII. T h e J u ly D ays and S u bseq ue nt E ffo r ts to S t a b il iz e

the ..................................................................
R e g im e 1331
24. The July Uprising........................................................ 1335
25. The Political C risis...................................................... 1383
26. The Moscow Conference.............................................. 1451

PART VIII. F r o m K o r n il o v to O c t o b e r ............................................. 1523

27. The Kornilov A ffa ir ..................................................... 1527
28. Military and Civil Demoralization................................ 1614
29. The Dissolution of the Democratic Coalition.............. 1653
30. October........................................................................... 1714

Source Abbreviations................................................................................... 1815

Glossary......................................................................................................... 1817
Chronology................................................................................................... 1821
Bibliography................................................................................................. 1831
I n d e x ............................................................................................................. 1841
 Documents in Volume I

PART I. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Chapter 1. The Storm Breaks

THE PETROGRAD UPRISING

1. V. Zenzinovs Description of the First Days.................................................... 26

2. The Announcement of General Khabalov on theBreadSupply in Petrograd 27
3. The Duma Session of February 2 4 ............................................................... 28
4. An Extraordinary Conference on the PetrogradFoodSupply.......................... 29
5. The Supply of Flour in Petrograd................................................................. 30
6. Editorial in RecK on the Petrograd Food Supply Crisis................................. 30
7. An Incident on Znamenskaia Square............................................................. 31
8. A Meeting of Left Representatives on the Night ofFebruary 2 6 ..................... 32
9. Documents of the Okhrana on the February Days.......................................... 33

THE STATE DUMA

10. At the Tauride Palace................................................................................... 39

11. The First Telegram of M. V. Rodzianko to the T sa r.................................... 40
12. The Mutiny of the Troops........................................................................... 40
13. The Seizure of the Arsenal and the Central Artillery Administration [Build
ing] .................................................................................................... 41
14. Forces Joining [the Side of] the People .................................................. 41
15. Ukase on the Prorogation of the State Duma............................................... 41
16. Telegram of February 27,1917, from Rodzianko to the T sar........................ 42
17. Rodzianko Asks the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich to Intervene in the
Crisis .................................................................................................. 42
18. The Meeting of the Sertoren konvent........................................................... 43
19. Resolution of the State Duma .................................................................... 44
20. A Delegation from the Revolutionary Troops [Arrives at]the State Duma 44
21. The Revolutionary Troops in the State Duma ........................................... 44
22. Unofficial Meeting of the Members of the State Duma,February 27, 1917 45
23. The Formation of the Temporary Committee of the StateDuma................... 47
24. The Arrest of Members of the Old Regime................................................... 47
25. Resolution of Representatives of Public Organizations ............................. 49
26. The Appeal of the Deacons ........................................................................ 49
27. Appeal of [the Duma] Deputies from the Clergy ...................................... 50
28. First Steps of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma ...................... 50
29. Speech of Rodzianko to the Preobrazhenskii Regiment ........................... 51
30. Speech of Miliukov to the Lifeguard Grenadiers ...................................... 51
31. The Fall of the Admiralty ...................................................................... 52
32. The Situation in Moscow............................................................................. 52
33. The Military Commission of the State Duma............................................... 53
34. The Organization of the City M ilitia.......................................................... 61
35. Order on the Procedure for Carrying Out Arrests andSearches................. 61
36. Order to Officers of the Petrograd Garrison and All Officersin Petrograd! 62
xviii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

37. Announcement of the Commander of the Petrograd Garrison .................. 62

38. The Resolution of the Officers in the Hall of the Army and Navy* ............. 63
39. Appeal of the Officers to the Soldiers ....................................................... 63
40. Cossack Regiments Join [the Revolutionary People] .............................. 64
41. Additional Military Units Join the Revolution........................................... 64
42. The Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich in the State Duma ......................... 64
43. The Kronstadt Fortress Joins [the Revolution] ....................................... 65
44. Order to the Military Schools [from the Temporary Committee of the State
Duma] .............................................................................................. 65
45. To the Troops [from the Military Commission] ....................................... 66
46. Continued Scattered Resistance by Supporters of the Old Regime.............. 66
47. The Appointment of Commissars to the Ministries and Other Government
Agencies.............................................................................................. 67
48. Appeal to the Railroad Workers [from the Transport Commissar Bublikov] 67
49. The Telegraph Agency Is in the Hands of the Executive Committee ......... 67
50. The Temporary Committee and Allied Diplomatic Representatives............... 68
51. Official Report of the Commissar of Transport on the Food Supply in Petro
grad .................................................................................................... 69
52. Appeal of the Temporary Committee of the Duma and the Executive Com
mittee of the Soviet for Cooperation in Supplying the Population and
the Army with Food............................................................................. 69

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF

WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES

53. The Soviet of Workers Deputies [Temporary Organization and the De

cision to Address an Appeal to the Population] ................................ 70
54. Proclamation Calling for the Election of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
to the Petrograd Soviet....................................................................... 70
55. Appeal of the Temporary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to Supply the
Insurgent Troops with Food................................................................ 71
56. Zenzinovs Account of the Organization of the PetrogradSoviet................... 71
57. Sukhanovs Account of the First Meeting of the PetrogradSoviet.................. 73
58. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet....................................... 76
59. Sukhanovs Account of the First Meeting of the Executive Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet.................................................................................. 77
60. The Reduction of the Number of Deputies in the Soviet............................. 78
61. To the People of Petrograd and Russia from the Soviet of Workers Dep
uties .................................................................................................. 78
62. Soviet Appeal to the Soldiers....................................................................... 78
63. Do Not Tolerate Looting [Appeal from the Soviet] ................................ 79
64. Resolution of the Soviet of Workers Deputies on FinancialQuestions.......... 80
65. Soviet Concern over the Relations Between the Temporary Committee of the
Duma and the Petrograd Garrison...................................................... 80
66. An Appeal [to the Soldiers] from the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies ....................................................... 82

Chapter 2 . The Collapse of the Monarchy

THE ABDICATION OF EMPEROR NICHOLAS II

67. Telegram from the Minister of War to Stavka............................................. 83

68. Telegram from the President of the State Duma to General a.d.c. Ruzskii,
Commander in Chief of the Northern F ront....................................... 83
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I xix

69. Telegram from General Ruzskii to the Emperor.......................................... 84

70. Conversation by Hughes Apparatus Between the Chief of Staff of the Supreme
Commander and the Chief of Staff of the Northern F ro n t.................... 84
71. Telegram of the Elected Members of the State Council to the T s a r............... 85
72. Conversation by Direct Wire Between General Alekseev and Grand Duke
Mikhail Aleksandrovich on February 27, 1917...................................... 86
73. Telegram from General Alekseev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander,
to All the Commanders in Chief, Sent on February 2 8 ......................... 87
74. Letter to Nicholas II from General John Hanbury-Williams, Chief of the
Allied Military Mission to Russia........................................................ 89
75. Telegram from the President of the State Duma to the Commander in Chief
of the Northern Front............................................................................ 90
76. Telegram from General Alekseev Sent to the Emperor in Pskov on March 1 91
77. Telegram from the Tsar to General Ivanov Dated March 2, 1917................ 91
78. Conversation by Direct Wire Between General Ruzskii and Rodzianko....... 92
79. Conversation by Telegraph Between the Quartermaster General of the Su
preme Commander and the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front......... 93
80. Telegram from General Alekseev to the Commanders in Chief of theFronts 94
81. The Reply of General Yanushkevich to General Alekseev........................... 95
82. Telegram from General Alekseev to the Emperor, Sent March 2, 1917, at
14 Hours 30 Minutes, Transmitting the Replies of the Commanders in
Chief.................................................................................................... 95
83. The Reply of General Sakharov.................................................................. 96
84. The Reply of Vice-Admiral Nepenin........................................................... 97
85. The Tsar Appoints Prince Lvov President of the Council of Ministers and
the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Supreme Commander................ 97
86. The Emperor Decides to Abdicate in Favor of His Son................................ 98
87. Rodzianko Requests the Appointment of General Kornilov as Commander
of the Petrograd Military District....................................................... 98
88. Shulgins Account of the Journey to Pskov and the Abdication of theTsar.. 99
89. General Ruzskii on the Events of March 2 at Pskov.................................... 102
90. The Abdication by the Sovereign Emperor Nicholas n of the Throne of the
Russian State and His Laying Down of the Supreme Power ............. 104
91. Telegram of Guchkov and ShuFgin to Rodzianko...................................... 105
92. Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front to General Alekseev
Announcing the Several Acts Signed by Nicholas at Pskov.................. 105
93. Last Address of Nicholas II to the Arm y.................................................... 105
THE REFUSAL OF THE GRAND DUKE MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH
TO ACCEPT THE THRONE

94. The Activities of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich During the Febru
ary Revolution...................................................................................... 106
95. Conversation by Telephone Between General Ruzskii and M. V. Rodzianko
and Prince Lvov.................................................................................. 109
96. Conversation Between General Alekseev and Rodzianko by Direct Wire . . . . I ll
97. Telegram from General Alekseev to the Commanders in Chief of the North
ern, Western, Southwestern, and Rumanian Fronts............................. 112
98. Telegram of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to General Alekseev............. 113
99. The Question of the Accession of M ikhail................................................... 114
100. The Decision of Mikhail to Refuse the Throne.......................................... 115
101. The Refusal of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich toAssume the
Supreme Power Pending the Determination in the Constituent Assembly
of the Form of Government and the New Fundamental Laws of the Rus
sian State ............................................................................................ 116
XX DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

Chapter 3. The Formation of the Provisional Government

102. The Conferences Between the Delegates of the Executive Committee of the
Soviet and the Temporary Committee of the State Duma.................... 117
103. The Selection of the Members of the First ProvisionalGovernment........... 124
104. Attitude of the Executive Committee of the Soviet on the Question of Par
ticipation in the Provisional Government............................................. 125
105. Kerenskys Dilemma Concerning His Acceptance of the Ministry of Justice 127
106. A. F. Kerenskys Statement in the Soviet of Workers* Deputies .............. 128
107. Speech of Miliukov in the Ekaterininskii Hall of the Tauride Palace......... 129
108. Statement of Miliukov Concerning His Reference to the Dynasty in His
Ekaterininskii Hall Speech.................................................................. 133
109. Speech of the Minister of Justice Delivered to Soldiers and Citizens ....... 133
110. The Speech of N. S. Chkheidze ............................................................. 134
111. Order of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, March 2, 1917 .. - 134
112. From the Provisional Government [Announcement of its Formation and
Membership] ..................................................................................... 135
113. From the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies [Appeal for Support of the Provisional Government]....... 136
114. The Rumored Revolution in Germany....................................................... 137
115. Telegram of the President of the Council of Ministers [Announcing the
Formation of the Provisional Government to Civil and Military Authori
ties] .................................................................................................. 137
116. The First Meeting of the Council of Ministers Away from the Tauride Pal
ace ...................................................................................................... 137
117. Soviet Protest Against the Acceptance of Nicholas Appointment of Prince
LVov and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.................................. 138
118. Rodzianko on the Role of the Duma After February.................................... 138
119. Shidlovskii on the Relationship of the Temporary Committee, the Provisional
Government, and the Soviet After February......................................... 139
120. The Victims of the Revolution in Petrograd ........................................... 140
121. The Fallen Government and the New [Editorial in Novoe Vremia] ....... 140
122. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti................................................................ 142
123. Editorial in Rech ..................................................................................... 143
124. The Revolution and Our Tasks [Editorial in Den] ................................ 143
125. Editorial in Delo Naroda........................................................................... 144
126. The Finish [Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta] ......................................... 145
127. Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta.................................................................. 146
128. The Funeral [Editorial in Izvestiia'] ...................................................... 146
129. The Dissemination Outside Petrograd of the News of the Revolution......... 147
130. The February Revolution in Siberian Exi]e.............................................. 149
131. Message of Lloyd George to Prince LVov.................................................. 150
132. The Ordeal of Russia [Editorial in The Times (London) ] .................... 151
133. Russian Unity [Editorial in Lhomme enchaine (Paris) ] ..................... 151

PART II. TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Chapter 4. The Central Government

THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

134. The First Declaration of the Provisional Government................................ 157

135. Prince LVov States the Aims and Hopes of the New Government.............. 158
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I xxi

136. The First Meetings of the Provisional Government................................... 160

137. Minutes of an Early Meeting of the Provisional Government.................... 161
138. The Organization and Procedures of the Provisional Government............... 164
139. The Establishment of the Juridical Council Attached to the Provisional Gov
ernment ............................................................................................... 170
140. The Visit of Kerensky to Moscow............................................................... 171
141. The Work of the Provisional Government [Editorial in Russkiia Vedo-
mosti] ................................................................................................... 175

THE FORMER TSAR AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

142. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet Demands the Arrest of
the Romanovs...................................................................................... 177
143. Telegram of General Alekseev to Prince Lvov Transmitting Nicholas9 Re
quests to the Provisional Government................................................... 178
144. Telegram of General Alekseev to Prince Lvov and Rodzianko.................... 178
145. Telegram of Prince Lvov to General Alekseev in Reply to Nicholas Requests 178
146. Measures for the Protection of the Imperial Family at Tsarskoe Selo......... 178
147. Declaration of the Members of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Sol
diers Deputies, March 7, 1917............................................................. 179
148. The Decision of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to Arrest
the Imperial Family............................................................................. 179
149. Report to the Temporary Committee of the State Duma by the Members of
the Duma Delegation to Escort Nicholas II from Mogilev to Tsarskoe
Selo .................................................................................................... 179
150. Minutes of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee Session of March 9
Concerning the Disposition of the Imperial Family............................. 181
151- The Attempt to Send the Imperial Family to England for Asylum............. 182
152. Resolutions Adopted at the Congress of Delegates from the Front, April 12,
1917 .................................................................................................... 184
153. How Nicholas Romanov and His Family Are Being Maintained in Tsar
skoe Selo ........................................................................................... 184
154. Calls for Revenge .................................................................................. 186
155. The Imperial Family at Tsarskoe Selo........................................................ 187
156. The Decision of the Provisional Government to Send the Imperial Family
to Tobolsk........................................................................................... 189
157. The Departure of the Imperial Family for Tobolsk.................................. 189

Chapter 5. Justice and Law Enforcement

INITIAL ACTS

158. In the Ministry of Justice ........................................................................ 191

159. On the Eve of Amnesty ........................................................................... 191
160. The First Orders of the New Minister of Justice ................................... 191
161. The Establishment of Temporary Courts in Petrograd............................... 192
162. The Abolition of Some Judicial and Police Establishments and Institutions 192
163. The Abolition of the Supreme Criminal Court and the Special Chambers of
the Ruling Senate, Appellate Courts, and Circuit Courts with Class
(Soslovie) Representatives................................................................... 193
164. The Establishment of a Special Commission to Investigate the Malfeasance
of Certain Senators.............................................................................. 193
165. The Establishment of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry................. 193
166. Civil Rights and the Stronghold of Democracy [Editorial in Izvestiia] . .. 194
xxii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

AMNESTY

167. Five Hundred Thousand Rubles for the Benefit of PoliticalPrisoners . . . 195
168. The Decision of the Provisional Government to Issue a Ukaseon Amnesty 196
169. The Release of All Political Prisoners..................................................... 196
170. Ukase of the Provisional Government on Amnesty................................. 196
171. Amnesty [Editorial in Izvestiia] .......................................................... 198
172. The Reduction or Cancellation of Punishment for Persons Who Had Com
mitted Criminal Offenses..................................................................... 198
173. Disorders in Tomsk Gubemiya .............................................................. 199

ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

174. The Abolition of the Death Penalty............................................................ 199

175. What Is a Revolution? [Editorial in Novoe Vremia'].............................. 200
176. Editorial in Rech9 ..................................................................................... 200
177. The Abolition of the Death Penalty [Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta] . . . 201
178. The Delay in Publishing the Law Abolishing the Death Penalty.............. 202
179. Editorial in Novoe Vremia......................................................................... 202
180. Vladimir Nabokov on the Abolition of the Death Penalty........................... 203
181. The Magnanimity of the Russian Revolution [Editorial in Delo Naroda] 203

PENAL REFORM

182. The Abolition of Brutal Prison Practices................................................... 204

183. The Organization of Societies of Patronage............................................ 204
184. The Replacement of Prison Administrators and W arders......................... 205
185. Changes in the Organization of the Central Administration of Places of
Detention............................................................................................ 206
186. The Abolition of Deportation to Siberia..................................................... 207
187. The Parole System..................................................................................... 208

THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS BASED UPON

NATIONALITY, RELIGION, AND CLASS

188. The Decision of the Government to Abolish All Restrictions Based upon
Nationality or Religion....................................................................... 210
189. The Abolition of Classes and Ranks [C/wn] [Editorial in Izvestiia] ....... 210
190. The Abolition of Restrictions Based on Religion and Nationality............. 211
191. Equal Rights [Editorial in Novoe Vremia] ........................................... 212
192. The Abolition of Religious and National Restrictions [Editorial in Russ-
kiia Vedomosti] ................................................................................. 214
193. The Great Victory of the Revolution [Editorial in Den9] ....................... 214
194. The Abolition of Estates............................................................................ 215

POLICE AGENCIES

195. The Seizure of the Okhrana and the Police Department........................... 215
196. The Abolition of the Department of Police andthe Establishment of a
Temporary Police Administration....................................................... 216
197. The Abolition of the Okhrana Agency in P a ris........................................ 217
198. The Abolition of the Gendarme Corps...................................................... 217
199. The Organization of a Temporary Militia................................................. 218
200. The Establishment of a M ilitia............................................................... 218
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I xxiii

THE COMMISSION FOR THE RESTORATION

OF THE JUDICIAL CHARTERS

201. The Formation of a Commission to Restore the Judicial Charters of 1864

and to Make Them Consistent with the New State Order, and the Estab
lishment of a Provisional Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal................... 222
202. The Opening of the Commission for the Restoration of the Basic Provisions
of the Judicial Charters...................................................................... 224
203. The Question of Women Ju ro rs................................................................. 225
204. An Amendment to the Statute on Judicial Institutions Concerning Jurors 225

THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY,

ASSOCIATION, AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCES

205. Meetings and Associations........................................................................ 226

206. The Supervision of Public Performances................................................... 227
207. The P ress.................................................................................................. 228
208. Institutions for Press Affairs...................................................................... 230
209. Regulations for the Special Commission for the Liquidation of the Central
Administration for Press Affairs, the Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel9stva,
the Book Chamber, and the Bureau for Reviews of the Periodical
Press in Russia and Abroad ............................................................... 231
210. The Ministry of the Interior Warns Against Infringements of the Freedom
of the Press ........................................................................................ 233

LOCAL COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

211. The Temporary Organization of Local Courts........................................... 234

212. Explanation and Comment on the Reform of Local Courts......................... 235
213. Administrative Courts................................................................................ 236
214. Comment on the Statute on Administrative Courts.................................... 237
THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE BAR AND THE CIVIL SERVICE

215. The Admission of Women to the B a r......................................................... 238

216. The Extension of the Rights Granted to Women to Enter the Civil Service . . . 239
THE DISPOSITION OF CASES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL ARREST

217. The Procedure for Considering Cases of Persons Subjected to Extrajudicial

Arrest.................................................................................................. 240
CODIFICATION AND COORDINATION OF THE LAWS

218. The Coordination of the Code of Laws (Svod Zakonov) with the Laws of the
Provisional Government ..................................................................... 241

Chapter 6. Local Government and Administration

THE COMMISSARS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF TEMPORARY LOCAL COMMITTEES

219. The Appointment of Gubemiya and Uezd Zemstvo Chairmenas Commissars 243
220. Instructions from the Provisional Government Concerning the Commissars
and the Local Public Committees.......................................................... 243
221. The Need to Inform the Population of the Acts and Activity of the Pro
visional Government........................................................................... .. 244
222. The Organization of Volost Committees...................................................... 244
xxiv DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

223. The Volost Committees............................................................................... 244

224. The Organization and Relationship of Gubemiya and Uezd Committees and
Municipal Committees in Guberniya and Uezd Capitals....................... 246
225. The Appointment of New Uezd Commissars.............................................. 246
226. Public Dissatisfaction with Appointed Commissars.................................. 247
227. The Decision to Reform Local Administration........................................... 247
228. The Government Urges Economy in Local Administration....................... 248
229. The Place of the Commissar in Local Administration.............................. 248
230. The Provisional Government Requests Complete and Continuous Informa
tion on Local Occurrences and Developments....................................... 249
231. The Provisional Government Orders the Release of Local Officials Placed in
Custody During the February Revolution........................................... 249
232. The Conference of Guberniya Commissars, Petrograd, April 22-24, 1917... 250
233. The Negligence of Guberniya Commissars in Answering Inquiries from the
Provisional Government...................................................................... 254
234. Gubemiya Commissars Ordered to Take Energetic Action Against Increas
ing Disorders and Arbitrary Actions.................................................... 255
235. Russkiia VedomostVs Comment on the Draft Statute on Gubemiya and
Uezd Commissars................................................................................ 255
236. The Temporary Statute on Gubemiya, Oblast, and Uezd Commissars....... 256

MUNICIPAL REFORM

237. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on the Reform of the Municipal Duma . . . . 259
238. Editorial in Den*on the Reorganization of Local Self-Government.............. 260
239. Izvestiia Editorial on Local Reform........................................................... 260
240. Temporary Rules on the Election of Municipal Duma Members and on the
Establishment of District Administrations in Municipalities................ 261
241. The Ministry of the Interior Warns Against Local Arbitrary Procedures for
Zemstvo and Municipal Duma Elections............................................... 263
242. The Situation in the Towns......................................................................... 264
243. Temporary Statute on Municipal Administration....................................... 265
244. Statute on Municipal Revenues, Expenditures, Estimates, and Reports . . . . 269
245. Adverse Comment by Russkiia Vedomosti on the Municipal Finances Statute 271

GUBERNIYA AND UEZD ZEMSTVO REFORM

246. Temporary Rules on the Election of Gubemiya and Uezd Zemstvo Members 272
247. Comment of Russkiia Vedomosti............................................................... 276
248. The Democratization of Municipal Dumas and of Zemstvos Pending New
Elections ............................................................................................. 277
249. Temporary Amendments to the Statute on Gubemiya and Uezd Zemstvo In
stitutions ............................................................................................. 277

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VOLOST ZEMSTVOS AND

SETTLEMENT (Poselok) ADMINISTRATIONS

250. The Volost Zemstvo [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti]........................... 282

251. Article in Izvestiia on Local Self-Government............................................. 283
252. Temporary Statute on Volost Zemstvo Administration.............................. 284
253. The Activities of Volost Public Committees Prior to the Election of Volost
Zemstvos ............................................................................................. 290
254. The Temporary Statute on Settlement {Poselok) Administration............. 291
255. Editorial on the Volost Zemstvos in Russkoe Slovo.................................... 292
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I XXV

256. How Were the Volost Elections Conducted? [Article in Russkiia Vedo-
mosti] ................................................................................................... 293

THE ALL-RUSSIAN UNION OF ZEMSTVOS AND THE EXTENSION

OF ZEMSTVO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

257. The Statute on the All-Russian Zemstvo Union.......................................... 294

258. The Charter of the Zemstvo Insurance Union............................................. 296
259. State Treasury Guarantees on Zemstvo and Municipal Loans...................... 297
260. The Foundation of the State Municipal and Zemstvo Credit B ank............... 297
261. Industrial Activity of the Zemstvos............................................................ 298

THE EXTENSION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

TO OTHER AREAS OF RUSSIA

262. The Temporary Organization of Administration and Local Self-Government

in the Guberniya of Estland (Estonia) ................................................. 300
263. The Organization of Local Administration in Siberia................................... 301
264. The Introduction of Zemstvo Institutions in the Guberniya of Arkhangelsk
and in the Guberniyas and Oblasts of Siberia...................................... 303
265. The Introduction of Zemstvo Institutions in the Oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semi-
palatinsk, Semirechensk, Turgaisk, and Uralsk.................................... 304
266. The Introduction of Zemstvo Institutions in Localities Reserved for the Use
of Nomadic Inorodtsy in the Guberniya of Stavropol*......................... 304
267. The Introduction of Zemstvo Institutions in the Oblasts of Transcaspia,
Samarkand, Syr Darya, and Ferghana............................................... 305
268. The Introduction of Zemstvo Institutions in the Kalmyk Steppe and the
Kirghiz Inner Horde of the Guberniya of Astrakhan............................. 306

THE PROGRESS OF THE REFORM IN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION

269. Summary of the Activity of the Provisional Government on Local Self-Gov

ernment to August 1,1917.................................................................... 306
270. The Second Conference of Guberniya Commissars...................................... 312
271. Commissars and Committees [Editorial in Novoe Vremia] ........ 315
272. Self-Government and Government [Editorial in RabochaiaGazeta]........ 315

Chapter 7. The Nationalities Problem

GENERAL

273. The Kadet Policy on the National Question............................................... 317

274. Soviet Resolution on the National Question............................................... 318
275. The Organization of a Special Council Under the Provisional Government
to Work Out a Regional Reform.......................................................... 319
276. A Draft Project for the Articles of the New Fundamental Laws Concerning
Autonomy and Federation.................................................................... 319

POLAND

277. A Dispatch from the Poles .................................................................... 320

278. The Petrograd Soviet Sends Greetings to the Polish People........................ 321
279. The Proclamation of the Provisional Government to the Poles, March 16,
1917 .................................................................................................... 321
280. Novoe Vremia on the Polish Proclamation................................................. 323
xxvi DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

281. Free Russia and the Polish Question [Editorial in RusskiiaVedomosti] 324
282. Polish Freedom [Editorial in Den] .................................................. 324
283. The Answer of the Temporary Council of State in Warsaw to the Pro
visional Governments Proclamation to the Poles, April 13, 1917(N.S.) 326
284. Editorial in Dziennik Polski on the Proclamation to the Poles............... 327
285. The Statutes of the Liquidation Commission on Matters Pertaining to the
Kingdom of Poland........................................................................ 327
286. The Work of the Liquidation Commission........................................... 328
287. Ukase Exempting from Trial and Punishment Russian Subjects of Polish
Nationality Captured Bearing Arms Before the Publication of the Proc
lamation Recognizing the Independence of Poland........................ 329
288. The Pardoning of Certain Condemned Poles.......................................... 329
289. The Polish Division............................................................................... 329
290. Kerensky on the Polish Army............................................................... 330
291. The Polish Congress in Moscow............................................................ 330
292. A. R. Lednickis Statement................................................................... 332
293. A New Declaration of the Allies on the Independence of United Poland 333

FINLAND

294. First Acts Concerning Finnish Affairs...................................................... 334

295. Manifesto Confirming the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland and
Its Full Implementation....................................................................... 334
296. The Transfer of Certain Judicial and Law Enforcement Functions to the
Finnish Authorities ............................................................................. 336
297. Interview with Governor General Stakhovich............................................. 336
298. Novoe Vremia on Finnish Claims................................................................ 337
299. Finland and Russia [Editorial in Den] .................................................. 338
300. Lenin on the Finnish Question.................................................................. 339
301. Comment of E. V. Tarle on the Finnish Situation and Kerenskys Speech in
Helsingfors ......................................................................................... 340
302. Kerenskys Explanation of His Finnish Policy to the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies................................................................................ 341
303. The Speech of the Finnish Social Democratic Party Representative Khut-
tunen at the Session of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies on June 20 ....................................................... 341
304. The Russian Request for a Finnish Loan.................................................... 343
305. The Law of the Sejm on the Supreme Power in Finland, July 5,1917......... 344
306. The Address of the Sejm to the Provisional Government Accompanying the
Transmission to It of the Law on the Supreme Power......................... 345
307. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Action of the Sejm ........................................... 347
308. Den9on the Finnish Enactment.................................................................. 348
309. The Act of the Finnish Sejm [Editorial in Volia Naroda] ....................... 349
310. Izvestiia on the Finnish Enactment........................................................... 350
311. Manifesto of July 18/31, 1917, on the Dissolution of the Sejm and on the
Holding of New Elections.................................................................... 351
312. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Dissolution of the Sejm .................................... 352
313. Vlasf Naroda on the Dissolution of the Finnish Sejm .................................. 352
314. Rabochaia Gazeta on the Dissolution of the Sejm ....................................... 353
315. Izvestiia on the Dissolution of the Finnish Sejm ........................................ 354
316. Novaia Zhizn* on the Dissolution of the Sejm.............................................. 355
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I xxvii

317. Resolution of the Helsingfors Organizations Dominated by Russian Military

and Naval Personnel............................................................................. 355
318. Statement by the Council of the Finnish Social Democratic Party and the
Social Democratic Faction in the Sejm ................................................. 356
319. Demands Submitted by the Helsingfors Strike Committee to Governor Gen
eral Stakhovich.................................................................................... 357
320. Decision of the Provisional Government Empowering the Governor General
to Take Forceful Measures if Necessary to Maintain Order.................. 357
321. Russian Press Reaction to the Finnish General Strike and the Attempt to
Reconvene the Sejm ............................................................................. 357
322. Resolution of the Conference of the Regional (Oblast) Committee of the
Army, Fleet, and Finnish Workers, the Executive Committee of the
Helsingfors Soviet of Deputies, All-Finnish Committee of the Soviet of
Peasants Deputies, and the Garrison Committee................................. 358
323. The Attempt to Reconvene the Sejm .......................................................... 359
324. A Rescript of the Provisional Government Extending the Jurisdiction of the
Finnish Senate.................................................................................... 359
325. An Interview with N. V. Nekrasov, Newly Appointed Governor General of
Finland ............................................................................................... 360
326. Another Attempt of the Sejm to Convene.................................................... 361
327. Ukase for the Convocation of the Sejm on November 1(October 1 9 ) ........... 361
328. A Summary of the Draft Law on the Form of Government in Finland Pro
posed by the Juridical Commission of the Finnish Senate.................... 362
329. Summary of the Draft Law on the Legal Relations Between Russia and
Finland, Submitted by the Juridical Commission of the Finnish Senate 363
330. Record of the Sessions of October 13 and 17, 1917, of the Juridical Council
of the Provisional Government............................................................. 364

THE UKRAINE

331. Telegrams from the Ukrainian Central Rada to Prince LVov and Kerensky,
March 6,1917...................................................................................... 370
332. The Provisional Government Authorizes the Use of Ukrainian in the Ukrain
ian Schools......................................................................................... 370
333. Resolution of the Ukrainian Demonstration in Kiev.................................... 370
334. Resolution on the National Question of the Congress of the Ukrainian So
cialist Revolutionary Party, April 4-5, 1917....................................... 371
335. From the Resolution on the National Question of the Conference of the
Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, April 1917.................................. 371
336. From the Resolutions of the Ukrainian National Congress, April5-8, 1917 372
337. From the Resolutions of the First Ukrainian Military Congress,May 5-8,
1917 .................................................................................................... 373
338. Memorandum of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Rada to the Provisional
Government and the Executive Committee of the Soviets..................... 374
339. Official Communique on the Rejection of the Ukrainian Demands............. 376
340. The Opinion of the Juridical Council on the Ukrainian Memorandum....... 377
341. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Ukrainian Memorandum................................. 377
342. Resolution of Public and Soviet Organizations in Kiev on the Answer of the
Provisional Government........................................................................ 378
343. From the Resolutions on Ukrainian Autonomy of the All-Ukrainian Peasant
Congress, May 29-June 2, 1917........................................................... 379
344. Kerenskys Prohibition of the Ukrainian Military Congress........................ 379
xxviii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

345. Resolution by the Second Ukrainian Military Congress (June 5-10) Con
cerning the Action of Kerensky.......................................................... 380
346. Speech by V. Vinnichenko at the Second Ukrainian Military Congress....... 380
347. Against the Unity of Forces of the Revolution [Editorial in Izvestiia] ---- 381
348. Lenin on the Ban Against the Ukrainian Military Congress....................... 382
349. The First Universal of the Central Rada, June 10, 1917............................ 383
350. Appeal of the Provisional Government to the Ukrainian People.................. 385
351. Reck9on the First Universal....................................................................... 386
352. Volia Naroda on the First Universal.......................................................... 387
353. Izvestiia on the First Universal................................................................. 388
354. The Agreement Reached Between the Central Rada and the Provisional
Government........................................................................................ 389
355. The Resignation of the Kadet Ministers in Protest Against the Ukrainian
Agreement.......................................................................................... 390
356. The Second Universal of the Central R ada................................................ 392
357. Den*on the Second Universal................................................................... 393
358. Draft Proposal of the Small Rada on the Administration of the Ukraine . . . . 394
359. The Temporary Instructions of the Provisional Government to the General
Secretariat.......................................................................................... 396
360. The Refusal of the Senate to Publish the Temporary Instructions.............. 397
361. Resolution of the Rada on the Instruction of August 4 .............................. 398
362. Report of the General Secretariat to the Rada, September 28, 1917 ........... 399
363. Vinnichenko and Other Members of the General Secretariat Ordered to
Petrograd............................................................................................ 401
364. Resolution of the Third Ukrainian Military Congress on the Appointments
of the Provisional Government, October 19, 1917.............................. 401

BELORUSSIA

365. The Declaration of the Belorussian National Conference........................... 402

366. Statement of the Belorussian National Committee..................................... 402
367. Resolution of the Conference of the Organizations of the Belorussian So
cialist Hromada (in Early April) ..................................................... 403
368. The Political Platform of the Belorussian Central R ada............................ 403

ESTONIA

369. The Resolution of the Estonian National Assembly on the Status of Estonia,
July 3,1917........................................................................................ 404

LATVIA

370. Resolution of the Land Assembly of the Latvian Part of Vidzeme (Livonia),
March 12-13, 1917............................................................................. 405
371. The Decisions of the Latvian National Political Conference, July 30,1917... 405

LITHUANIA

372. The Resolution of the Lithuanian National Council, March 13,1917........... 406
373. The Resolution of the General Lithuanian Conference (Sejm) in Petrograd,
June 1917............................................................................................ 406
374. A German View of the Future of Lithuania.............................................. 407
 DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I xxix

THE MOSLEM MOVEMENTS

375. The Call for an All-Russian Moslem Congress.......................................... 408

376. The Resolutions of the First All-Russian Moslem Congress, Moscow, May
1-11, 1917........................................................................................... 409
377. The Second All-Russian Moslem Congress, Kazan, July 21-31, 1917......... 411
378. Appeal of the National Central Council to the Provisional Government on
Moslem National and Cultural Autonomy............................................. 413
379. The Program of the Crimean Tartars.......................................................... 415
380. The Second Kazakh-Kirghiz Congress in Orenburg, July 1917.................... 416
381. The First Bashkir Congress in Orenburg, July 1917.................................. 416
382. The Caucasian Moslem Congress in Baku, April 1917................................. 417
383. The Provisional Government Discontinues the Drafting of Non-Russians
(InoTodtsy) and Decides to Introduce a New Administrative Order in
Turkestan ........................................................................................... 419
384. The Arrest of General Kuropatkin by the Tashkent Soviet........................ 419
385. The Establishment of the Turkestan Committee........................................ 419
386. The Turkestan Moslem Congress, April 1917............................................. 420
387. The Jurisdiction and Duties of the Commissar General of the Provisional
Government for the Administration of the Turkestan Krai and of the
Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government......................... 421
388. The Attempt of the Soviet and Other Revolutionary Forces in Tashkent to
Overthrow the Authority of the Provisional Government...................... 422
389. The Suppression of the Tashkent Uprising by General Korovnichenko....... 424

THE CAUCASUS

390. The Special Transcaucasian Committee (Ozakom) .................................. 424

391. Resolution on the National Question by the Caucasian Krai Congress of
Workers and Peasants9Deputies in Tiflis, May 1917........................... 425
392. Editorial on the National Question in the Armenian Dashnak Newspaper
Origon.................................................................................................. 426
393. The Second Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and the
Union of the Mountain Peoples........................................................... 426
394. The Terek Cossacks Unite with the Union of Mountain Peoples, Vladi
kavkaz, October 20, 1917 .................................................................... 427

THE JEWS

395. The Resolution of the Tenth Conference of the Bund, April 1917............... 428
396. The Resolution of the Zionist Congress in Petrograd, May 1917................ 429
397 The Blood-Stained Specter [Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta'].................. 430

SIBERIA

398. The Objectives of the Siberian Federalists................................................. 431

399. The Attitudes of Several Russian Leaders Toward Siberian Autonomy....... 432
400. The Buriat Conference............................................................................... 433

Chapter 8 . The Constituent Assembly

THE PREPARATION OF ELECTORAL LEGISLATION AND SCHEDULES

401. Concerning the Convocation of the Constituent Assembly ...................... 434

402. The Establishment of a Special Council for the Drafting of the Statute on
Elections to the Constituent Assembly.................................................. 434
XXX DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME I

403. The Difficulties Facing the Special Council.............................................. 435

404. The Delay in the Formation of the Special Council.................................. 436
405. Measures for Advancing the Date of the Convocation of the Constituent
Assembly ........................................................................................... 437
406. The Necessity for an Early Convocation of the Constituent Assembly....... 438
407. The Opening of the Special Council for the Drafting of the Statute onElec
tions to the Constituent Assembly..................................................... 438
408. The Decision of the Electoral Commission of the Special Council inFavor of
the System of Proportional Representation for the Elections to the Con
stituent Assembly.............................................................................. 441
409. Law of the Provisional Government Setting the Dates for Elections to the
Constituent Assembly and for the Convocation of the Assembly......... 445
410. An Opinion of a Member of the Special Council Protesting the Date Set
for Elections to the Constituent Assembly......................................... 445
411. The Provisional Government Orders the Hastening of Local Elections to
Facilitate Early Elections to the Constituent Assembly........................ 446
412. The Last Chance [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ............................... 447
413. Objection of RecK to the Dates Set for the Election and Convocation of the
Constituent Assembly ....................................................................... 448
414. Volia Naroda Considers the Early Convocation Justified............................. 448
415. Izvestiia Considers the Decision of the Government a Victory for the De
mocracy ............................................................................................... 449
416. The Impossibility of Holding the Elections on September 1 7 ...................... 450
417. Izvestiia Assesses the Blame for Delays in the Meeting of the Constituent
Assembly............................................................................................. 451
418. RecK Answers the Charges of Kadet Responsibility for the Delay in Calling
the Constituent Assembly.................................................................... 451
419. The Postponement of the Convocation of the Constituent Assembly............ 452
420. Izvestiia on the Postponement of Elections................................................ 453

THE ELECTORAL LAW

421. Suffrage, Election Commissions, Registration of Voters, and List of Candi

dates .................................................................................................... 454
422. The Conduct of Elections and the Determination of theCandidates Elected 461
423. Election Procedure in the Army and Navy.................................................. 463

THE PRELIMINARIES TO ELECTION AND CONVOCATION

424. The Delay in the Delivery of Ballots and Envelopes.................................. 465

425. Public Apathy Concerning the Elections.................................................. 465
426. The Proposals of the Juridical Council Concerning Procedure for the Con
stituent Assembly................................................................................ 466
427. Excerpts from the Records of the Special Commission of the Provisional
Government to Prepare a Draft of the Fundamental Laws (Constitu
tion) for the Consideration of the Constituent Assembly...................... 469
428. Kerensky Orders the Preparation of a Complete Report on the Work of the
Provisional Government for Submission to the Constituent Assembly... 471
I

The Russian
Provisional Government
1917

i
 INTRODUCTION

Harbingers o f Revolution1

On February 10, 1917, M. V. Rodzianko, President of the Fourth Imperial

State Duma, was received in audience by the Tsar. Alarmed by the accelerating
course of internal dissolution and public criticism of the vacillating and inept
government, he came armed with a strong written report on the current situation
and with personal words of warning. The Duma was to reconvene in four days.
The preceding session of November-December, 1916, had been marked by scath
ing speeches against the proved inability of the Government to cope with the
manifold problems facing the nation, then in the third year of the World War.
Rumors were abroad that the Duma would be dissolved soon after it met in order
to prevent a repetition of the previous attacks. Consequently, Rodzianko once
again attempted to alert the Emperor to the growing danger to the throne and to
the country.
The Government, he asserted, persists in widening the abyss between itself
and the representatives of the people. The ministers by every means prevent the
Emperor from learning the truth. Responsible critics had been accused of trea
son. Censorship, arrests, and even a show of force were employed to suppress
justified anxiety and questioning. The Duma was threatened with prorogation*
and the Government had urged the President of the Duma to take heroic meas
ures to silence its members. In view of prevailing circumstances such action was
patently impossible. Furthermore, Rodzianko continued, the President would
hardly be in the right both before the popular representatives and before the
country if he took any measures to such an end. The State Duma would lose the
confidence of the country, and then, in all probability, the country, exhausted
from the hardships of life and in view of the disorder existing in the administra
tion, might itself take a stand for the defense of its lawful rights. This should in
no case be permitted. This should be prevented at all costs and this is our basic
task.2
The Tsar, obviously annoyed at Rodziankos repeated importunities, urged

1 This resume of the years 1914-17 is in no sense a history or interpretation of the period,
but attempts only to highlight some of its major issues and developments which foreshadowed
thet February revolution and the ordeal of the Provisional Government. For extensive de
scriptive and analytical accounts, see Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, and
M. T. Florinsky, The End of the Russian Empire. Detailed coverage of various aspects of
the internal and military history of the time may be found in the several volumes of the
Russian Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War published by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Many documents on the era are translated in
Golder, Bk. I.
2 M. V. Rodzianko, Poslednii vsepoddaneishii doklad, ARR, VI (1922), 335-38.
4 INTRODUCTION

him to hasten with his report, assured him that the Duma would be allowed to
continue in session only if there were no further indecent rude outbursts against
the Government, and refused to comment on Rodziankos request that the most
objectionable ministers be removed. To the Presidents apprehensive allusion to
the state of public opinion and hint of violent action from below, Nicholas re
sponded that the information reaching him was directly contrary. Despairingly,
Rodzianko expressed his profound foreboding and . . . conviction that this
would be his last report, because the Duma will be dissolved, and the course the
Government is taking bodes no good. There is still time; it is still possible to
change everything and grant a responsible Ministry. That, apparently, is not to
be. You, your Majesty, disagree with me, and everything will remain as it is.
The consequence of this, in my opinion, will be revolution and a state of anarchy
which no one will be able to control.3 Rodziankos prophecy was soon to be
realized.

The Russian Declaration of War on July 19, 1914, had signaled a great up
surge of national feeling and loyalty to the throne. Turning from its preoccupa
tion with mounting internal grievances and disagreements, the nation united in
the struggle against the foreign enemy. Mobilization was completed in strict ac
cordance with the timetable and with a minimum of disorder. In St. Petersburg
the political strike in progress, involving more than one hundred thousand work
ers, was stopped, and great crowds of students, workers, and citizens gathered in
front of the Winter Palace to express their patriotism. On July 26, the Duma
met in a one-day session, and, although the parties of the left refused to vote
war credits for reasons of principle, they joined in a call for national defense.4
Throughout the country, the workers, who had engaged in an increasing number
of strikes during the preceding months to protest economic conditions, and public
leaders, whose voices had been raised against Imperial attempts to tighten the
reins of autocracy, committed their energies and efforts to the common cause.
The sources of unrest and even revolution remained, but the monarchy had been
vouchsafed a final chance at salvation by an armistice with the people and through
effective leadership. It did not meet the challenge.
To be sure, many of the difficulties that beset Russia during the war years
were not the fault of the regime but the result of her general backwardness and
unfortunate geographical position. Of all the major belligerents, she was the
least prepared for the demands of modern warfare. Despite her economic and
industrial advance in the past quarter-century, she still lagged far behind the
nations of Western Europe, upon which she continued to rely for many manu
factured goods. The outbreak of the war, with the entrance of Turkey on the
side of the Central Powers and the closing of the Straits, left her virtually iso
lated. Only Archangel in the north, ice-bound much of the year and at the end
of a treacherous and enemy-harassed sea route, and Vladivostok in the Far East,

3 M. V. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin, pp. 259-61; A. F. Kerensky, The Crucifixion

of Liberty, pp. 157-85; Georgii Shavelskii, Vospominaniia, I, 223-414; II, 5-30, 199-312.
4 The joint declaration of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions can be found in Gosudar-
stvennaia Duma, Chetvertyi Sozyv, Sessia IV, Stenograficheskie Otchety, July 26, 1914, pp.
18-20. Hereafter cited as Otchety. See also N. N. Pokrovskii (ed.), Ocherki Oktiabrskoi
Revoliutsii, I, 341-52.
 INTRODUCTION 5

seven thousand miles from the front along the largely single-track Trans-Siberian
Railroad, remained as major ports of entry, though some imports came through
Sweden and, after November of 1916, by way of the hastily built and unreliable
Murmansk Railroad.
This situation not only denied Russia desperately needed military and non
military materials, but necessitated the reorganization of her internal economic
system. To cite but one striking example: before the war, the coal for the major
industrial complex in and around St. Petersburg had come by sea from Cardiff;
after 1914, it was supplied by rail from the inadequate Don Basin fields, already
excessively burdened by wartime demands from Moscow and large industrial
districts in the south which increased with the early loss to the Germans of the
Dombrowo fields in Poland.5 Meanwhile, the scarcity of metals, of food for the
workers, and of trained personnel called to military service progressively re
duced the efficiency of the mines as they did of all enterprises. The average out
put per miner dropped from 9,200 poods in 1913 to 7,400 poods in 1916.6 Al
though the total product of Russian industry had increased, in 1916, by 2 1 .5 per
cent over the prewar output, the figure was deceptive, for it represented prin
cipally the sharp and forced rise in the manufacture of military material. Basic
industries, including fuel extraction, essential for the continued requirements of
defense plants and other branches of the economy, presented a very different
picture. By 1916, production of pig iron was down 14.2 per cent, iron and steel,
11 per cent, and the semifinished products of iron and steel, 13 per cent.7 The
reorganization of economic life as an aftereffect of the blockade and the shortages
of fuel and metals also brought added burdens to the railroads.
In fact, the deficiencies of transport were probably as influential as enemy
encirclement and industrial backwardness on Russias economic plight. Essen
tially, this meant the railroad network and to a lesser degree inland waterways,
for roads were few and bad. The movement of troops, and the shipment of mili
tary supplies, of food, of raw materials to the factories, and of finished goods to
the front and rear strained the system to the utmost. Trackage was limited and
rolling stock insufficient. Locomotive and car manufacture was unable to keep
pace with demand, foreign imports were drastically reduced by the blockade, and
repair of old equipment was handicapped by shortages of material and labor.
According to one authority, by February 1917, over 18 per cent of the locomotives
and 5 per cent of the cars were out of commission; daily loadings per one hundred
versts were down 22 per cent from 1916, while even in 1915 all freight had de
creased by 32.7 per cent.8 Naturally, the rest of the country was more keenly
affected than the front, for military needs received first call on the transportation
available. This was a fundamental factor in the growing food supply problem in
the towns, the absence of needed consumer goods in the rural areas, and the
general shortage of fuel.
Food supply was adversely affected also by the military drain upon rural
manpower and the burgeoning provisioning requirements of the army. Concur
rently, the diversion of metals to military needs decreased the domestic manu
facture and repair of agricultural implements and machinery, while their foreign
5 Alexander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, p. 84; Lozinskii, Ekonomickeskaia Politika,
p. 6.
6 Ibid. 7Ibid., pp. 6-7. s Ibid., pp. 5-6.
6 INTRODUCTION

importation dropped to almost nothing. The availability of work animals steadily

declined as they were requisitioned for the army or other government convey
ance. Yet the food crisis that was clearly evident by the fall of 1915, and which
continued to worsen thereafter, was not due primarily to the decline in agricul
tural production. The resulting shortages were compensated for by prewar sur
pluses and those of 1914 and 1915, augmented by the reduction in exports.9 Other
factors were of greater significance, namely, the above-mentioned breakdown of
transportation, the lack of consumer goods, the inefficient policies of the govern
ment, and the prohibition of vodka.
As a measure for temperance and of national dedication, as well as for the
conservation of grain, the Tsar forbade the manufacture and sale of vodka for
the duration of the war. The consequences of this measure were many and mixed.
Unable to spend his money on liquor, the peasant did become more sober and
industrious. But while he drank less, he ate more. Wartime prices increased his
profits and, deprived of his vodka, he used the additional funds to purchase con
sumer goods. Or at least he attempted to, for adequate supplies of manufactured
goods soon disappeared from the stores as industry became geared to military
needs and the flow of imports ceased. The peasant then had no outlet for his
excess funds. Hoarding money became less attractive as inflation progressed.
Therefore, he hoarded his produce to wait for a better day. By 1915, peasant
savings had skyrocketed and peasant grain was being withheld from the market.
Prohibition also had a detrimental effect on the budget. The sale of vodka was
a government monopoly, whose revenues had constituted the largest single item
of state income, funds badly needed at a time when the financial resources of
the state were strained to the utmost by the exigencies of war .10
Wartime expenses were, of course, unprecedented in any case. Refusing to
increase corporate and individual taxes, the government resorted to currency
emission and internal and foreign loans, the latter to pay for orders abroad. By
the time of the revolution, the national debt had increased four times.11 Although
the situation was not hopeless in itself, the debilitation of the general body eco
nomic and the inflationary trend boded ill for the future unless firm steps were
taken.
Summarizing the many-sided threat of economic disaster that faced the nation,
Rodzianko, in his last report to the Tsar, acknowledged the desperate conditions
imposed upon Russia by circumstance, but denied they were insurmountable.
The widening abyss between failure and success could be bridged by efficient
organization ably administered. In detail, he described the negligence and lack
of foresight that prevented full realization of even the limited potential of Russian
transport, agriculture, industry, labor, and finance. The thus far piecemeal and
confused attempts to mobilize the economy were hopelessly inadequate.
Russia must, he urged, take the road of its allies and its enemies and institute
a systematic plan that subordinated all narrow individual aims to the great na
tional cause. She least of all could afford the luxury of business as usual; she
most of all had need for a comprehensive organization to husband her limited
forces for the greatest good. Essential to the success of such a program was the
full confidence and participation of public organizations and leaders, hitherto
9 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
10 Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 82-83.
11 Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 9-10.
 INTRODUCTION 7

limited in their activity by governmental suspicion and persecution. Only a

government enjoying the confidence of the people, possessing its trust, can induce
the people to bear further sacrifices; only then will the slogan 6War to a victorious
conclusion have a solid basis.12 Whatever the merits of the Presidents specific
recommendations, and however annoying his officiousness to the Tsar, the tenor
of his report was keyed to the pressing economic problems of the moment, and
the Emperor would have done well to heed its contents.

Russia was almost as unprepared militarily as economically for the demands

of a great war.13 In the beginning, the spirit of the army was high, but en
thusiasm, bravery, and numbers could not compensate for inadequate training,
poor generalship, and lack of sufficient modern equipment. Yet, in any appraisal
of Russian military efforts during the First World War, it should not be forgotten
that despite shortcomings and defeats, her army held a large number of excel
lently equipped German divisions on the Eastern Front, inspired the respect of
her enemies, and on several occasions played a major role in saving the armies
of the Western Allies when they were gravely endangered. The first great of
fensive, into East Prussia, was undertaken prematurely for this purpose, and
although it ended with the defeat at Tannenburg, it forced the Germans to trans
fer troops from the Western Front and contributed to the French success in the
Battle of the Marne. Again, in the spring of 1916, first to relieve the pressure on
Verdun, and later to distract the Austrians from their advance against the Italians,
the Russian armies moved forward.
The pattern of these and other major Russian operations was one of initial suc
cess and ultimate reversal, reflecting her military strength and weakness. Simul
taneously with the East Prussian advance of 1914, an offensive was begun against
the Austrians, which, by the spring of 1915, led to very substantial victories and
the occupation of Galicia. But when the Germans eventually came to the aid of
their beleaguered Austrian ally, the Russians were forced back.
The German counterattack that began in the middle of April 1915 pushed the
Russians out of almost all of Galicia by the end of May and out of most of
Russian Poland and the Baltic provinces by the end of summer. The blow to
morale, the loss of territory, and the supply deficiencies evidenced during the re
treat, all had far-reaching consequences for the future. The shortage of guns
and munitions virtually silenced the artillery and sent men into action unarmed
and dependent upon the rifles of their fallen comrades in the forward ranks. The
ineptitude of some commanding officers caused a number of tactical blunders and
much unnecessary suffering. The enemy advance captured many of the north-
south rail lines that had serviced the front and compounded the already difficult
transportation problem. In an effort to deny the enemy resources, the Russian
army ordered a policy of scorched earth and the evacuation of civilians threatened
by German occupation. Earlier in the war, certain elements of the population,
principally Jews, in zones near the front had been removed, allegedly because
of potential unreliability. From 1915 on, millions more swelled the ranks of the

12 M. N. Pokrovskii, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii pered revoliutsiei, KA, X (1925),

69-86.
13 See the volumes of N. N. Golovin, The Russian Army in the World War, and Youri
Danilov, La Russie dans la guerre mondicde, 1914-1917, on Russian military history in the
First World War.
8 INTRODUCTION

dispossessed, who were without adequate provision for their health, food, or
housing.
The shock of the retreat and the accompanying revelations of error and stu
pidity stirred up public indignation, provoked a vigorous discussion of army
questions among the leaders in the Duma, and finally brought the Emperor to
reason. Belatedly and reluctantly the Tsar was persuaded to draw public organ
izations into partial participation with the bureaucracy for the solution of prob
lems of production, supply, and the allocation of military and civilian goods.
General Sukhomlinov, the totally incompetent Minister of War since 1909, was
replaced by General Polivanov, who enjoyed a reputation for mild liberalism
as well as military organizational ability. In September, the Tsar took over the
Supreme Command from his uncle, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who
was relegated to the Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, and appointed the much more
capable General Alekseev as his Chief of Staff to succeed General Yanushkevich.
Though the political results of the Tsars decision were to be disastrous, the mili
tary consequences were undoubtedly advantageous, as Alekseev in fact served
as the Supreme Commander.
Representative of the reaction of informed public men to the calamity which
has descended upon us, was the report to the Tsar in August by the members of
the Army and Navy Commission of the Duma who were also in the newly formed
Special Council for Defense. The signers, headed by A. I. Shingarev, called
attention to the terrible loss of men, to the fatal lack of equipment and munitions,
and to the criminal negligence of military commanders, who were too often
appointed to their posts because of seniority or favoritism rather than ability.
They described the unpardonable failure to provide fortified positions for the
troops to fall back upon in case of retreat, sharply criticized the insufficient train
ing for new replacements, and deplored the needless hardships and confusion
caused by the evacuation of civilians from the western provinces. Not only had
the morale of the troops been shaken by these ominous signs of incompetence, but
the spirit of the whole nation, dedicated to the winning of the war, had suffered.
Doubt and discontent were abroad. Only the Tsar, the authors concluded, could
bring order out of the prevailing chaos, could demand a clear plan of military
action and of internal organization that would allay the growing concern of the
public by introducing direction and purpose to the war effort.14
In fact, the improvement in procurement and supply, thanks to the work of
the public organizations, the reorganizational work of General Alekseev, and the
breathing spell offered by the lull on the front from the fall of 1915 to the spring
of 1916, did bring an upswing in the morale of the army and a betterment of its
fighting efficiency. According to some observers, however, it was at this time
that the effects of the political situation were first evidenced among the troops.
Charges such as those contained in the Duma members report were gaining
circulation in wider circles. The accusations against General Sukhomlinov, the
organization of the opposition of moderate conservatives and liberals in the
Duma, the role of Rasputin, and the cabinet crisis of the fall little by little reached
the front lines, often in distorted form, to increase apprehension concerning the
leadership of the country. Also, the loyalty of Russias allies began to be ques
tioned. The awful sacrifices of the past year, often to relieve pressure upon

14 V. P. Semennikov, Monarkhiia pered krusheniem, 1914-1917, pp. 270-75.

 INTRODUCTION 9

France and Britain, appeared to many unappreciated. Not surprisingly, the feel
ing grew that the Allies were willing to fight to the last drop of Russian blood.
Such eroding influences, if not checked, promised to offset the concomitant im
provement in fighting spirit and efficiency.15
In the spring of 1916, two offensives, in March and May, were undertaken to
assist the Allies. The first was unsuccessful as far as Russian advances were con
cerned, though it seems to have temporarily reduced the German attacks on
Verdun. The May offensive developed into an extremly successful action on the
Southwestern Front under the command of General Brusilov. Nearly a half
million prisoners were taken, large quantities of guns and other equipment cap
tured, and some twenty-five thousand square kilometers occupied. Considerable
aid was given to the Italian and French armies by the transfer of Austrian and
German divisions to the Eastern Front, and Rumania was persuaded, against the
categorical protest of General Alekseev, to enter the war on the Entente side. But
these results, including the belligerency of Rumania, were not nearly as advan
tageous to Russia as to her allies. She faced a larger concentration of enemy
troops and, with the subsequent collapse of Rumania in the fall, was forced to
defend a much longer line.
Although morale on the Southwestern Front improved temporarily with the
advance of 1916, this was not true of the Western and Northern fronts, which
were uncheered by victories and more exposed to the winds of political discontent
blowing from the capital. Meantime, while the supply of munitions was better
than at any previous period of the war, owing to the efforts of the War Industries
Committees, food and fodder were in increasingly short supply because of the
growing breakdown of transport and the lack of organization behind the lines.
The terrible losses of the past years also had their telling effect. In most units,
only a very few men remained of the original and best trained complement, a
constant reminder to the others of their chances of survival and one scarcely
calculated to raise their spirits.16 Contrary to the frequently expressed reliance
of the Allies on the Russian steamroller, the country was close to the end of its
manpower resources.17
Thus, in the balance, despite some melioration in the problems of morale and
materiel in certain areas, the condition of the army continued to be a matter of
grave concern. In November 1916, Rodzianko submitted a report to Stavka
replete with examples of strategic error and inhumane treatment of the soldiers.
The army, he wrote, has ceased to have faith in its leaders . . . does not be
lieve that the leaders are capable of running things effectively and properly . . .
is in such a state that every malicious rumor, every slander is being commented
upon and taken as proof of the complete incapacity of the commanding personnel
to cope with rising difficulties and to lead it to victory. As a consequence, lack of
initiative and a paralysis of courage and valor have appeared in the army. If
measures for the improvement of the high command, for the introduction of more
considerate policies toward the soldiers, and for the punishment of those generals
who bungled at the cost of life and victory were carried out with dispatch,

15 Golovin, The Russian Army in the World War, pp. 238-41.

16 Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, pp. 371-73.
17 Golovin, The Russian Army in the World War, Chap. VI, discusses the fallacy of the
Russian steamroller, and cites a report to the Tsar from the Special Council on Defense
at the end of 1916 elaborating on the desperate manpower shortage.
10 INTRODUCTION

Rodzianko saw the possibility of successful operations in the following year.

Otherwise, he predicted a repetition of past failures.18
The capability of the army and the state of its morale on the eve of the revolu
tion deserves further careful study.19 It remained strong in numbers and was
better equipped than previously. Despite the alarming disorganization of food
supply, war weariness in the ranks, and lack of confidence in the leadership, re
flected in incidents of outright mutiny, its morale was higher than that of the
domestic front. Yet, its relative isolation from the rest of the country could not
protect it forever from the growing discontent. There were letters and rumors
from home, the constant influx of new conscripts with stories true and fanciful
of political and economic chaos and of suspected treason in high places. As in
ternal discontent rose, its effects penetrated more and more deeply into the
armed forces.
An interesting summary of attitudes observed on the Western and Northern
fronts was submitted to the Council of Ministers in the beginning of 1917. Both
officers and men, it asserted, generally believed that the war should be continued
until victory. But there were growing doubts as to the ability of the Government
to accomplish this aim. The evidence of disorganization in supply and the in
formation that reached the front concerning the caliber of ministerial leadership,
plus the many rumors of German sympathy in court and government circles,
contributed to this fear. Although there was little evidence of organized sub
versive activity among the troops, the general atmosphere of dissatisfaction and
distrust suggested that a degree of disillusionment might not be far distant when
such activities would find a favorable response. The Duma was apparently held
in high esteem as a tribune for public criticism and the champion of responsible
governance. The possibility that the troops would be on the side of a coup detat
and of the overthrow of the dynasty should be admitted, the report warned, be
cause, while they love the Tsar, there is too much discontent with the whole ad
ministration of the country. . . . All those who have returned from the rear
speak of the horrible atmosphere which induces them to hasten back to the front
where one can breathe freely.20

Indeed, the soldiers instinctive reaction is substantiated in the perspective of

time. Russias greatest enemy was the monarch himself, intransigent, inept, and
blind to the needs of the moment. Certainly the burden of evidence indicates that
the actions of the degenerated autocracy made the outcome almost inevitable. The
failure to attempt any real economic mobilization and the state of military unpre
paredness, tardily and ineffectively remedied only after the squandering of the
nations best human resources, must be laid at the door of the executive and its
instruments. The Russian people might have borne even greater sacrifices had
they been convinced that everything was being done that could be done to mini
mize their ordeal and that the Government was enlisting the best minds and
hearts for its salvation. Instead, the people became increasingly aware that their

18 Unpublished MS. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

19 In addition to sources cited here, material on the conditions prevailing in the army-
on the eve of the revolution may be found in Razlozhenie armii; P. Bilyk, V tsarskoi armii
nakanune Fevralskoi burzhuazno-demokraticheskoi revoliutsii, KA, XXVI (1937), 105-20;
Joseph Gelis, Revoliutsionnaia propaganda v armii v 1916-1917 gg., KA, XVII (1926) >
36-50; and N. Lapin, Kadety v dni Galitsiikogo razgroma, KA, LIX (1933), 123-27.
20 Russkaia amnia nakanune revoliutsii, Byloe, No. 1, 1918, pp. 151-57.
 INTRODUCTION 11

fate was in the hands of mediocrity directed by obscurantism. It is not surprising

that their fears led them eventually to suspect treason as well.
The stimulus for the renewal of public political activity to stem the tide of
disaster was the Galician defeat in the spring of 1915 and the continued retreat
of the Russian armies through the summer. The revelations of internal disorgan
ization, especially the failure of supply to the front and the rear, prompted public
men and organizations and the liberal membership of the State Duma to end
their political truce and approach the Government with criticism and requests
for a reorganization of internal policy and national defense. In a resolution
passed by a Conference of the Kadet Party in the beginning of June, the members
called for the creation of a new government to carry out the measures necessary
to insure victory, the close cooperation of the Government and the public forces,
and the immediate convocation of the Duma.21
Momentarily, even the Tsar and his ministers were sufficiently impressed by
the terrible lessons of defeat to move part way toward these goals. Hie Govern
ment unwillingly accepted assistance from the War Industries Committees created
by leading industrialists of all Russia in the summer of 1915 during the cata
strophic situation at the front. The central committee of this organization was
responsible for the collaboration between industrialists and representatives of
trade unions and agreed to the establishment of autonomous labor groups inside
the War Industries Committees. These committees together with the labor groups
did excellent work. Also in the summer of 1915, the Tsar approved the formation
of Special Councils on Defense, Fuel, Transport, and Supply, which included
members of the Duma, State Council, and representatives of cooperatives and
other economic organizations engaged in defense work, as well as bureaucrats.
These measures were in the right direction and did alleviate economic problems
to some extent, but their effectiveness was greatly weakened by the continuing
suspicion of the Tsar and many of his advisers concerning their political implica
tions. At the same time, the Emperor was forced by public opinion to remove
the most reactionary ministers who voted against the proposal, and replace them
with men who were both more efficient and more willing to work with the Duma
and public organizations. The newly constituted cabinet was appalled at the in
ternal chaos it had inherited, but was limited in action by the intrigues of the
ineffectual and aging but cunning and cynical courtier Goremykin, who had
remained as Chairman of the Council.
Thus, though somewhat encouraged by the recent actions of the Tsar, the
Duma, when it convened on July 19, prepared to propose still further necessary
changes and to demand a greater role in their implementation. During the spring,
in the face of the growing crisis, the central parties of the Duma had moved toward
greater cooperation, united in their desire to introduce at least a minimum of
needed reform. This trend was exemplified in the first days of the session by a
number of speeches from center members, including that of the Nationalist Count
V. A. Bobrinskii, who voiced the slogan which was to become the battle cry of the
Duma from that time forwardthe creation of a Ministry of Confidence. Al
though some of the Kadets had favored a ministry responsible to the Duma,
the Party agreed, in the hope of wider political support and better chances of
.success, to support the less radical proposal.
During August, in a series of meetings, the leaders of the majority parties,

21N. Lapin, Kadety v dni Galitsiikogo razgroma, KA, LIX (1933), 117-22.
12 INTRODUCTION

ranging from the Progressive Nationalists on the right to the Kadets on the left,
drew up a common platform of reform and organized themselves into the Pro
gressive Bloc, which gained the adherence also of the moderate conservatives
and liberal members of the Council of State and was published at the end of the
month. The major point in the program was the demand for a ministry com
posed of men who enjoy the confidence of the people and would cooperate with
the Duma in a program of specified administrative reform and legislation. Among
the former were demands for the observance of strict legality in governmental
activity and the elimination of the conflict between civilian and military authority.
The Bloc also asked for the removal of some national and religious restrictions,
the rehabilitation of the five Bolshevik deputies of the Duma who had been con
demned to exile in Siberia, amnesty for prisoners condemned for political and
religious crimes, and the authorization of expanded trade union organization and
activity. In the legislative field, governmental approval was requested for bills
relating to the improvement of the war effort and a whole series of acts designed
to restore or expand the participation of the public in national affairs. Included
were the equalization of peasant rights with those of other classes, the extension
and strengthening of zemstvo institutions and municipal dumas, legislation on
cooperatives, and the restoration of justices of the peace.22
Following the publication of the program of the Bloc, some members of the
Council of Ministers, against the wishes of Goremykin, arranged for a confer
ence with its leaders, which took place at the home of the State Controller,
Kharitonov, on August 27.23 Although there were some demands to which the
ministerial representatives took exception, they left the meeting hopeful that a
measure of agreement and cooperation with the Duma might be achieved. But
Goremykin refused to countenance their arguments. Against the wishes of a ma
jority of the Council, which wished to request of the Emperor a recess of the
Duma to allow for quiet discussions with its members as well as the formation
of a new cabinet, Goremykin traveled to Stavka and received from Nicholas au
thority to summarily prorogue the Duma, without further conversations. To the
disgust of most of his colleagues and despite their warnings of its consequences,
the Chairman closed the Duma on September 3.24 Showing remarkable restraint*
the Duma obeyed the order with a minimum of protest. But public organizations
expressed their anger in resolutions, and the Petrograd workers demonstrated
their opposition with a two-day strike. Another milestone on the road to revolu
tion had been passed, with the Tsar heedless of its portent.
Coincident with these events the Tsar reached another fatal decision for his
regime. Influenced by the Empress jealousy of the Grand Duke Nikolai Niko
laevich and her desire to strengthen her husbands power, and prompted un
doubtedly by the most sincere patriotic motives, Nicholas decided to assume per
sonal command of the army. When the Council learned of this on August 6 ,
their consternation was great. The Tsar could now be held directly responsible

22 Golder, pp. 134-36.

23 N. Papin, Progressivnyi Blok v 1915-1917 gg., KA, L-LI (1932), 117-60, contains
P. N. Miliukovs minutes of this meeting. Subsequent issues, LII (1932), 143-96, LVI (1933),
80-135, contained further excerpts from Miliukovs record of the activities of the Bloc. In his
Vospominaniia, II, 217, Miliukov expressed his satisfaction with the publication of these
Soviet-discovered archives and his regret that the series was not completed.
24 Golder, pp. 136-45, and Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, pp. 264-78.
 INTRODUCTION 13

for Russias military fortunes. More important, as some of the ministers frankly
noted, with the Tsar at the front, the central administration would be further
under the influence of the Empress and of her evil genius Rasputin. Even Goremy
kin disapproved of the decision, but always the unquestioning servitor, he was
unwilling to go beyond a mild demurrer. The other ministers were too much
aware of their duty and of the dangerous implications of the act to accept it
without a vigorous protest. First Polivanov, then Prince Shcherbatov, the Min
ister of the Interior, approached the Emperor to try to dissuade him from his
purpose, but to no avail, as they reported to the Council at a later session. It was
agreed, with Goremykins reluctant approval, to ask the Tsar for a Council meet
ing under his chairmanship. Nicholas assented and the session took place on
August 23 at Tsarskoe Selo. After listening in some agitation to the arguments
of his ministers, he closed the meeting with a firm decision not to alter his plans*
The despair of the dissident members of the Council was revealed by their next
act. On the following day they addressed another appeal to the Emperor and sub
mitted their resignations. Eight ministers signed the document. Polivanov and
Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of the Navy, did not sign, because of their
direct military obligation to the Emperor, but they personally advised him of
their concurrence. The Minister of Transport was ill, and Khvostov, Minister
of Justice, and Goremykin refused to sign. The letter was delivered on the same
day. In the evening the Tsar left for the front to assume his new duties.
In the middle of September, the Tsar called his ministers to Stavka, listened
to their repeated objections to the recent Duma prorogation and to his lack of
confidence in their advice, referred to the letter of resignation, and ordered them
to remain at their posts. Soon thereafter he did begin their replacement, but un
fortunately not with men of prescience and ability. In spite of many deficiencies,
the Council of Ministers at that moment, with the obvious exception of Goremykin,
was far superior to any that followed in the remaining months of Nicholas reign .25
It is now necessary to turn to the most tragic and unpleasant aspect of an
unhappy recital, the influence of the Empress in the disastrous decisions of the
Emperor and the role of Rasputin as her principal adviser. The Empress, always
inclined toward mysticism, had consulted a series of spiritualists before the in
troduction of Rasputin to the Court before the war. With the late arrival of a
son and heir after the birth of three daughters, only to discover that he was
the victim of incurable hemophilia, her dependence on supernatural aid deep
ened. The seemingly miraculous healing powers of Rasputin during the young
Alekseis bleeding attacks firmly entrenched him in the palace. Increasingly, the
Empress turned to him not only for spiritual support and medical aid, but also
for advice concerning affairs of state. The Tsar, always the weaker of the pair,
though often not pleased with the recommendations passed on from Rasputin,
was frequently persuaded to follow them. After his assumption of the Supreme
Command and residence at Stavka, the Empress power under the influence of
Rasputin grew immeasurably, with even more unhappy consequences than his
protesting ministers had foreseen.
It was bad enough that major decisions should depend upon the whims of an
illiterate holy man, but the tragedy was compounded by Rasputins use of his
favored position to advance the worst possible candidates for office and by his
scandalous private life, which became public knowledge in the capitals and
25 ibid.
14 INTRODUCTION

eventually all over Russia. Inevitably the extent and nature of his relations with
the Imperial family were warped and exaggerated by rumor beyond the sufficiently
alarming truth to the most unsavory proportions. In addition, Alexandras un
popularity, due to her lack of warmth and charm, weakened her position, as did
her German origin, which was the basis for unfounded accusations regarding her
loyalty to Russia. The effect on national policy and upon the publics confidence
in its rulers was disastrous. Serving as virtual regent during Nicholas absences
at the front, Alexandra received ministers, listened to Rasputin and his dismal
associates, and directed a steady flow of misinformation and bad advice to her
husband. Fortunately for the historian, ample evidence of the character of her
activities has survived in the correspondence between the couple, an invaluable
source for an understanding of a situation so bizarre as otherwise to raise grave
doubts of credibility.26
On the basis of the Empress recommendations, working upon Nicholas own
dissatisfaction with the independent thinking of his ministers, the game of min
isterial leapfrog, so characterized by the conservative V. M. Purishkevich, began.
In the fall, the relatively able Shcherbatov was replaced by the incompetent intri
guer, the younger Khvostov, and the loyal conservative Ober-Procurator Samarin
by Rasputins instrument Volzhin. Although some of the more able ministers, such
as Admiral Grigorovich, managed to survive the frantic turnover in the following
months, the level of new appointments steadily deteriorated. Few grieved when
Goremykin was dismissed at the end of February, 1916, but consternation was
general when he was replaced by the characterless schemer Sturmer, whose ap
pointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior
under the aegis of Rasputin offered new evidence to Russian public opinion and
Allied diplomats of the influence of the dark forces at court. In the spring,
Polivanov and Foreign Minister Sazonov were dropped in favor of the ineffective
General Shuvaev and Sturmer himself, who then held two key positions. Sazonovs
relationships with the French and British had been excellent. His dismissal was
a serious blow to Allied unity, so much so as to prompt the British Ambassador,
Sir George Buchanan, to resort to the irregular procedure of pleading, unsuccess
fully, for his retention.27
The next shocking appointment came in September 1916, when A. D. Protopop-
ov was given the Interior portfolio. At first glance, this could have appeared as an
improvement and an indication of greater cooperation with the legislative branch,
for Protopopov was a Vice-President of the Duma and the head of its parlia
mentary delegation which had visited England that summer. But such was not
the case. In the months before his appointment, certain of Protopopovs acts had
aroused suspicion among his Duma colleagues concerning both his mental balance
and his allegiances. On his return trip from England, he had agreed, against the
advice of the Russian Minister, Nekliudov, to a discussion in Stockholm with the
brother of the German banker Warburg, which prompted considerable unpleasant
speculation on his attitude toward the war. Although at the time he denied that
his intention had been other than to convince the Germans of Russias determi
nation to fight to the end, many were justifiably skeptical. According to Proto
popovs later memoirs, he did seriously entertain the idea of withdrawing Russia
26 Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916; Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa,
1914-1917.
27 Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, II, 16-17.
 INTRODUCTION 15

from the war. These last writings, composed just before his execution by the
Soviets, also revealed his relations with Rasputin and many of his other plans,
which confirmed the suspicions against him and indicated the degree of his mental
instability.28
By the fall of 1916 Russias economic and political illness was moving rapidly
toward its crisis. The gradually mounting confusion of the rear, in other words,
of the entire country, . . . has at the present moment reached that maximum and
monstrous proportion that definitely and at this moment threatens to jeopardize
the results achieved at the front and promises very soon to throw the country
into a devastating chaos of catastrophic and elemental anarchy. The quotation
is from a report of the Petrograd Okhrana in October 1916. The report con
tinued: By the beginning of the month of September of this year an unusual
rise of opposition and animosity was sharply noticeable among the widest and
[most] diverse strata of the residents of the capital. Again and again complaints
against the administration and harsh and merciless condemnations of govern
ment policy were heard. Turning to a delineation, of varying accuracy, of the
activities and attitudes of political groups and parties, the Okhrana concluded
that it must be admitted as unconditional and indisputable that the internal
course of Russian state life is at the present moment threatened by the unrelent
ing approach of a grave shock.29

It was in this atmosphere that the Duma met on the first of November, 1916.
The majority Progressive Bloc, as well as some members of the right, was in no
mood to conceal its anger or alarm. In this it joined the Trudovik and Menshevik
deputies.
The statement of the Progressive Bloc was presented on the first day by its
Chairman, S. I. Shidlovskii. Reiterating the unswerving objective of die Bloc
to achieve military victory, he pointed to the obstacles presented by the intransi
gence and inability of the Government, which had ignored the many warnings
of the Duma and the public, further deteriorated in its membership, and brought
the country economic chaos and disunity. Lack of confidence toward the Gov
ernment, Shidlovskii charged, has changed into a feeling close to indignation.
The food supply situation was impossible, not because of real shortages, but
because of disorganization. Relations with the Allies had worsened under the
new Minister of Foreign Affairs, either through ignorance or by conscious pur
pose. The Bloc, he declared, was no longer warning of impending danger, it was
stating emphatically that the persons whose further participation at the head of
the government endangers the successful course of our national struggle and
who arouse feelings of open distrust must make way for persons who are united
by a common understanding of the tasks of the present moment, and who . . .
will be prepared to rely on the support of the majority of the State Duma and
to put into practice its program. Time does not wait.30

28 Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin, pp. 211-18; A. Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences

Before and During the World War 1911-1917, pp. 424r-28, 438-39, 452-55; A. D. Protopopov,
Predsmertnaia zapiska. S predisloviem P. Ya. Ryssa, Golos Minuvshago na Chuzhoi Storone,
H (1926), 167-93.
29 M. N. Pokrovskii, Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune Fevralskoi revoliutsii v
zhandarmskom osveshchenii, KA, XVII (1926), 3-35.
80 Sessia V, Otchety, November 1, 1917, pp. 10-13.
16 INTRODUCTION

Speaking for the Mensheviks, N. S. Chkheidze rose soon after Shidlovskii and,
while echoing the criticisms of the Government, laid the principal blame for
Russias plight upon the war itself. The imperialist war had to be liquidated,
not through separate peace nor through a peace contrived by diplomats, and
certainly not by the present Government, but by the united democracy of Europe.
But this solution was, he agreed, also impossible with the present leadership in
Russia. Chiding the majority for its unwillingness to face the issues squarely,
Chkheidze asserted that the time and the decisive moment have come when one
should side either with the people against the Government, or with the Govern
ment against the people; tertium non datur. We ask you, gentlemen, to bear this
in mind, and to take in hand precisely that which is demanded by the necessities
of the present moment. . Although he disclaimed any call to unlawful action,
because we are aware of your temperament, his remarks clearly had a revolu
tionary flavor.31
A. F. Kerensky, the leader of the Trudoviks, joined the chorus of disapproval
with an impassioned attack upon the Government, openly questioning its motives
and integrity. Repeatedly warned by the President against the use of such words
as fratricides and cowards in reference to the ministers, he was finally or
dered to leave the rostrum, following a demand that they (pointing to the benches
of the Government) must go [for] they are the betrayors of their country.32
It was on that day also that Miliukov delivered his famous speech delineating
the blunders and misdemeanors of the Government and punctuated by the re
peated phrase is this stupidity or is it treason. His attack was directed chiefly
at the sinister forces close to the royal couple, specifically, Sturmer and his un
savory secretary Manuilov-Manasevich, the Metropolitan Pitirim, and Protopopov.
Rasputins role, though not mentioned, was obviously also ever present in the
minds of the speaker and his auditors. Charging not only incompetence, favorit
ism, and an obvious disintegration of internal order, Miliukov clearly insinuated
defeatist if not treasonable actions among the palace coterie. These speeches, es
pecially that of Miliukov, despite censorship, produced a sensation throughout
the country and particularly at the front.33
In the days following, other members of the Duma continued the engagement
with the Government. V. V. Shulgin, comparing the valor of the army with the
maladministration of the ministry, commented that the people who looked un
flinchingly into the eyes of Hindenburg are trembling before Sturmer, fearful
of his potential for evil.34 From the conservative wing of the Kadets, V. M.
Maklakov came forward to hint at somber possibilities. Denying that he was
appealing for a revolution, he noted that in any case such an appeal was unneces
sary. The revolution is being provoked from the benches of the Government,'99
he charged, because it is more convenient to fight a revolution. . . . But if our
voice is not heeded . . . if the Duma is to be dissolved . . . then, gentlemen,
all the more we must say everything; we must speak up. . . . The Duma might
become in the future the only bulwark of authority . . . to be able to do so, the
Duma must have the right to look unashamedly into the eyes of the fatherland.

31 Ibid., November 1, 1917, pp. 14-22.

**lbid., November 1, 1917, pp. 28-33.
33 Ibid., November 1, 1917, pp. 35-48; and Golder, pp. 154-66.
34 Sessia V, Otchety, November 3, 1917, pp. 67-71.
 INTRODUCTION 17

Therefore, we say to this Government: either we or they. To live together is

impossible.35
The storm of Duma abuse toward Sturmer, as well as his inability to hold in
line his colleagues, who were deeply disturbed and desirous of repairing the
breach with the Duma, persuaded the Empress and the Emperor to dismiss him.
His successor, A. F. Trepov, appeared to the public as an improvement, as did
certain other cabinet changes, N. N. Pokrovskii to the Foreign Ministry, and
A. A. Rittikh to Agriculture. But Protopopov remained. And the dark forces
still stood behind the throne.
It was under these circumstances that the ultraconservative Purishkevich, in
the Duma, struck directly at the very source of corruption. It was not the Proto-
popovs who were to blame, he declared; they were simply symptoms of a more
pernicious disease. All the evil comes from those dark forces, from those in
fluences . . . which are headed by Gregorii Rasputin. He told of his distraction
at the thought of an illiterate muzhik directing the affairs of Russia and, turn
ing to the ministers present, begged them to go to the Tsar and ask him to de
liver Russia from Rasputin and the Rasputinites, great and small.36
In the closing days of the session, Kerensky read the suppressed resolution of
the Moscow Conference of the Union of Towns, which appealed to the Duma not
to desist until it had achieved a responsible ministry and called for a renewal
of patriotism and national unity to save Russia from the catastrophic policies of
the Government. Acknowledging that, as a leader of the left, he could not share
the ultimate goals of the liberal movement, Kerensky, nevertheless, pledged the
support of his faction for all their efforts that were directed toward the true
salvation of the country. On the last day of the session, December 16, he went
much further, suggesting that the Progressive Bloc, while eschewing revolution,
was moving remarkably near a revolutionary position. I would remind you,
he said, that there was in France in 1789 a Count Mirabeau, who for a very long
time did not suspect that he was one of the greatest actors of the revolution and
of the antidynastic---------. At that point he was interrupted and reprimanded
by the presiding officer. Continuing, Kerensky rebuked the liberals for their
timidity: If the regime uses the law and the apparatus of administration for the
purpose of coercing the country, to lead it to ruin, then the duty of the citizens
is not to obey this law. Once again Rodzianko was forced to terminate the
speakers remarks.37
By the end of 1916, words of warning and admonition to the throne were by
no means confined to liberal and leftist sources, as the speech of Purishkevich had
so clearly indicated. The Tsars indifference to the multiplying problems of state
and his willingness to listen to the advice of Rasputin when he did turn his atten
tion to them had also isolated him from the members of his own family. Through
out Rasputins tenure as palace intimate, the Imperial couple had been repeatedly
advised of his dangerous character and immoral private life, but in each instance
the informer had been ignored or dismissed. Now, as the results of his influence
became more flagrantly obvious and potentially fatal to the dynasty, the members
of the Romanov family ceased to hint at their fears and approached the Tsar
directly with their grave forebodings concerning the interference of the Empress
85 Ibid., November 3, 1917, pp. 126-35.
36 Ibid., November 19,1917, pp. 260-88; and Golder, pp. 166-75.
37 Sessia V, Otchety, December 13,1917, pp. 1095-98; and December 16,1917, pp. 1220-26.
18 INTRODUCTION

under the influence of Rasputin. In October, the Dowager Empress apparently

spoke to him on these matters during a visit with her in Kiev. Several of the
Grand Dukes, including especially Nikolai Mikhailovich, Aleksandr Mikhailovich,
and Mikhail Aleksandrovich, also subsequently communicated with him. A con
ference of the Grand Dukes was held at the home of Andrei Vladimirovich, which
discussed ways and means of removing the Emperor from the influence of Alek-
sandra. But all to no avail. The letter of Aleksandr Mikhailovich to the Tsar at
the end of January, 1917, was especially pertinent. I will say,55 he wrote, that
however strange it may seem, today it is the Government which is preparing the
revolution; the people do not want it, but the Government takes every possible
measure to create as many discontented persons as possible and achieves this
with complete success. We assist at the unprecedented spectacle of a revolution
from above, and not from below.5538
From another direction, which should have caused Nicholas pause, came
counsel of considerable significance. The correct and able British Ambassador,
sincerely concerned for Russia itself as well as for its effectiveness as an ally, re
ceived permission from his Government to speak in his own name to the Tsar,
and at the end of October and again at the end of December, he addressed him
frankly on the political crisis. In the last audience, he bluntly stated that You
have, Sire, come to a parting of the ways and you now have to choose between two
paths. The one will lead you to victory and a glorious peacethe other to revolu
tion and disaster.39
Shortly before Buchanans final conversation, an event occurred which re
flected the tensions of the times and the desperation in certain circles. On the
night of December 16, Prince Yusupov, related to the Imperial family by mar
riage, the Grand Duke Dmitri, and the Deputy Purishkevich led a small group
of conspirators in the assassination of Rasputin. The act, which the conspirators
had hoped would, by eliminating the pernicious influence of the holy man, re
unite the Imperial couple with their people and shock both the monarchs and the
public into cooperation to save the throne and Russia, failed completely of its
purpose. Instead, the Tsar and Tsarina retired even further into isolation from
the people, the public leaders, and, horrified by the participation of their own
family in the affair, from their relatives.40
The plot to kill Rasputin was not the only conspiratorial activity in the last
days of the monarchy, though it was the only one to be carried out. Other, less
drastic measures were discussed by several groups in and out of the Duma. In
general, their objectives were at the least to remove the Empress from the center
of power for the period of the war, and at the most to stage a palace coup to force
the Tsars abdication and the succession of the Tsarevich with the Grand Duke
Mikhail Aleksandrovich as Regent. A. I. Guchkov, M. I. Tereshchenko, and N. V.
Nekrasov were among the chief fornjulators of a plan to seize the Emperor on his
train between Stavka and Petrograd, for which they apparently received the sym

38 Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, pp. 389-91, 419-20; Golder, pp. 239-53;
Pismo vel. kn. Aleksandra Mikhailovich a k Nikolaiu II ot 25 dekabria 19164 fevralia 1917,
ARR, V (1922), 333-36; interview with the Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, R e c h No. 56,
March 7, 1917, p. 3; Alexander, Grand Duke of Russia, Once a Grand Duke, pp. 281-84.
39 Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, II, 25-27, 41-49.
40 The plot and the murder are concisely described by Pares in The Fall of the Russian
Monarchy, pp. 398-411.
 INTRODUCTION 19

pathetic approval though not participation of certain high-ranking officers. At the

same time the moderately liberal public men from the zemstvos and town dumas,
including Prince G. E. Lvov, were thinking along similar lines, though their
plans never progressed as far as the first group. They did, however, also consult
with Alekseev and others, including the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who,
though noncommittal, was not entirely unsympathetic to their ideas.41
A powerful incentive to these plots came from the report of General Krymov,
who came to Petrograd on a special mission from some important commanders
at the front in early January. He asked for a private meeting with certain mem
bers of the Duma, the State Councils, and the Special Council on Defense. The
picture he painted was a gloomy one. Unless changes were made in the Govern
ment which inspired the army with faith and confidence, victory was impossible.
The only answer was a coup, for which he assured the support of the army. Gen
eral discussion followed, ranging from an expression of decided approval and
willingness to act by Tereshchenko to a distressed refusal by Rodzianko. No action
was taken, but Krymovs words undoubtedly had a tremendous effect upon those
present.42
The October report of the Okhrana had indicated the degree to which the
police were aware of the latent dangers in the explosive situation. They also had
sufficient information, which they passed on to the Council of Ministers and the
Tsar, to establish the existence, if not the details, of the discussions and con
spiracies under way. Protopopov, who had set up special agencies for espionage
and surveillance to supplement those already existing in his department, was
enough concerned by January to expedite military arrangements in the capital
for putting down any kind of disorders. Plans were elaborated for the successive
use of police, Cossacks, and troops.43 From the political point of view, Prince
Golitsyn, the last Chairman of the Council of Ministers, urged the Tsar to appoint
a responsible ministry, but though the Emperor seemed for a moment to hesitate,
his final decision was to return to the front on February 23, without taking any
action.44
Before the Duma reconvened on February 14, Protopopov decided upon still
another provocative act. He arrested the Central Committee of the labor group in
the Central War Industry Committee, whose members were the most stubborn
defenders of the working class duty to defend the fatherland and to refrain from
unnecessary strikes. Only one member of this committee, Abrosimov, who was
not arrested, continued to appeal constantly for revolutionary action in the sit

41I b id pp. 428-29, P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 35-36;
A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, I, vypusk 1, 37-38; excerpts from the memoirs of A. I.
Guchkov, Posledniia Novosti, No. 5647, September 9, 1936, p. 2, and No. 5651, September 13,
1936, p. 2; V. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919, pp. 64-65; Alexander, Once a Grand
Duke, pp. 280-81. S. Melgunov, in his Na putiakh k dvortsovomu perevorotu, attempts an ac
count of the various conspiracies and discussions on the basis of scattered and incomplete
evidence.
42 M. V. Rodzianko, Krushenie imperii, ARR, XVII (1926), 157-58. A long excerpt
from Rodziankos article, including the description of the meeting with Krymov, has been
translated in Golder, pp. 82-121.
48 V yanvare i fevrale 1917 g.: Iz donesenii sekretnykh agentov A. D. Protopopova,
Byloe, No. 13, 1918, pp. 91-123; Protopopov, Predsmertnaia zapiska, Golos Minuvshago na
Chuzhoi Storone, II (1926), 179-93.
44 Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin, p. 263.
20 INTRODUCTION
tings of the Committee, because he was an agent of the secret police, a fact well
known to Protopopov and his close collaborators, such as General Kurlov.45 The
worker delegates represented as responsible a group as could be recruited from
among the labor leaders and had cooperated well with the Committee in its work,
offering some outlet for labor demands and discouraging arbitrary acts by their
fellows.
Although there was widespread criticism and some demonstrating following
the arrests, the projected protest march on the Duma when it opened was success
fully discouraged by labor and liberal leaders. The first order of business in the
new sitting was consideration of an interpellation by the Progressive Bloc on the
almost complete breakdown of food supply to the army and the cities. But, though
the concern of the Duma with this issue was real enough, not unnaturally the de
bate once again ranged deeper into the roots of the entire national crisis in the
penultimate hours of the Empire.
Miliukov directed the attention of the members to the increasingly urgent
demands that the Duma act as well as speak. The word and the vote for the
time being are our only weapons, he emphasized, but such weapons galvanized
the country and brought supporters to their cause. Yet, while ostensibly warning
against revolutionary action, his words revealed something less than complete
antipathy for such a solution. When the fruits of the great popular sacrifices
are being jeopardized in the hands of an inefficient and ill-intentioned Govern
ment, then, gentlemen, even the man on the street becomes a citizen and declares
that the homeland is in danger and that he wishes to take its fate into his own
hands. Gentlemen, we are approaching this last limit.46
As before, Deputy Kerensky went much further in his denunciation and cer
tainly in his implications. Was it not clear, he argued, that the dark forces
were only the outward symbols of the problem. Did the murder of Rasputin im
prove the situation? I can speak this way freely, gentlemen, he continued,
because you know that in my political and personal convictions I share the
opinion of the party which openly proclaimed . . . the possibility of terror . . .
which openly recognized the necessity of assassinating tyrants. Cautioned by
the President to restrain his language and illusions, Kerensky briefly moderated
his remarks, but soon returned to the attack with a series of oratorical questions
and a premonitory conclusion. Have you finally understood that the root of
evil is personal rule? . . . Have you understood that the historic task of the
Russian people . . . is the abolition of the medieval regime immediately at any
cost. . . ? . . . If you refuse to listen to the warning voices, you, gentlemen,
will meet facts instead of warnings. Behold the flashes of lightning that are al
ready flaring here and there across the sky of the Russian Empire.47
Indeed, the lightning had begun to flare, and within a fortnight would touch
off the combustible material lying all about to spark an explosion that marked the
end of an epoch for Russia.

45 See Golder, p. 186; Sessia V, Otchety, February 17,1917, pp. 1330 and passim; Padenie,
VI, 283-90.
46 Sessia V, Otchety, February 15, 1917, pp. 1343-45.
47 Ibid., February 15, 1917, pp. 1348-59; and an uncensored version in A. F. Kerenskii,
Izbrannyia rechi, pp. 38-47.
 PART I
The February Revolution

Despite the innumerable portents of disaster and the grave warnings uttered
by public leaders and even members of the Tsars own family and entourage,
scarcely anyone recognized the death knell of the old order when it began to toll
on February 23,1917. Long anticipated, much discussed, yet curiously unexpected
at the moment of its achievement, the Revolution finally came to Russia as the
consequence more of the utter bankruptcy of tsarism before wartime exigencies
than of radical ideology or of popular revolt. Faced with the irresolute defense
and unexpected collapse of the Imperial regime, the people moved to realize their
century-old yearning for freedom.
The food riots and demonstrations in Petrograd on the 23rd were neither un
precedented nor unexpected. They were anticipated by the Minister of the Interior,
and the Government, aware of the danger they presented, had worked out elaborate
plans for controlling them with police, troops, and Cossacks. Official confidence
in the efficacy of the arrangements was reflected in the telegram of the Tsarina
to the Tsar, who had recently returned to Stavka at Mogilev. Still living in her
dream world that refused to admit the threatening facts of the moment, she wired
her husband that it was a hooligan movement. All this will pass, she wrote,
. . if only the Duma will behave itself.1
But it did not pass. On the 25th, the Tsar, still not comprehending the depth
of popular feeling, but resolved to put an end to the continuing disturbances, or
dered General S. S. Khabalov, Commander of the Petrograd Military District,
to suppress, beginning tomorrow, all disorders on the streets of the capital, in
short, to open fire on the demonstrators if necessary.2 That night the appropriate
instructions were issued. Meantime, the police had proved unequal to the per
sistence of the crowds, and troops and Cossacks had been ordered into the streets.
Strikers from the Putilov factory had been joined by other workmen who had
left their jobs and by nameless men and women from almost all walks of life. No
longer were the Vyborg district and the area around the Putilov plant the only
scenes of activity. Defying the attempts of the police to isolate them, the mobs
mov^d into the center of the city.
Already there had been some evidences of reluctance on the part of soldiers
and Cossacks to move against the demonstrators, and even some isolated cases
of openly displayed sympathy for the crowds. But General Khabalovs orders
were carried out, and on the night of the 25th and during the day of the 26th

1 Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh, V, 128.

2 Padenie, I, 220. There is a considerable amount of information on the last hours of the
old regime scattered throughout these volumes in the testimony of Tsarist officials.
22 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Government forces on several occasions opened fire, with resulting fatalities. Of

greater significance were the increasing signs of discontent and even disaffection
among the army units, all of which were gleefully noted by the demonstrators.
Nevertheless, the military commanders were not greatly alarmed by these episodes.
That night the unexpected occurred. Following a prolonged discussion in
their barracks, the training detachment of the Yolinskii Regiment decided to cease
firing on the crowds. In the morning, after killing their commanding officer, the
detachment marched onto the streets. Other regiments soon joined the mutiny,
either killing or ignoring those among their officers who sought to stop them. By
the end of the day, the horrified Khabalov found himself literally besieged, first
in the Winter Palace and then in the Admiralty, with forces that had shrunk from
over one hundred thousand to less than two thousand.
The Government was not alone in its surprise and consternation at the unex
pected turn of events. With few exceptions, neither the members of the Duma,
nor the revolutionary party leaders present in Petrograd, nor public opinion at
large had grasped the full significance or potential of the riots. The debates in
the Duma through the 25th continued to deal principally with the food problem.
Only the spokesmen for the left factions voiced concern over the broader implica
tions of the movement. In the night of the 26th, however, the President of the
Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, began to sense the danger of the situation and dispatched
his first telegram of warning to the Tsar. On the other hand, that evening else
where in Petrograd at an ad hoc meeting of socialist leaders of various persuasions,
the Bolshevik representatives maintained that the uprising was hopeless and fated
to end with repressions and deeper reaction.
On Monday, February 27, the members of the Duma gathered in agitation
at the Tauride Palace to discuss an ukase of prorogation received by Rodzianko
during the night. Upon their arrival, they also learned of the mutiny of the military
units and were informed that the soldiers together with the civilian demonstrators
were marching toward the Duma. Inquiry by Rodzianko revealed that most of
the members of the Council of Ministers were incommunicado. The only institu
tion in Petrograd in a position to exercise leadership was the Duma. To continue
in session and ignore the ukase of the Tsar would be to violate the members oath
to the crown, but to adjourn would be to leave the capital without any effective
authority and to encourage anarchy and more extreme political manifestations.
For the most part, the members of the Duma, despite the vociferousness of
their recent attacks upon the Government, were as fearful of the unrestrained
action of the masses as they were opposed to the irresponsible and arbitrary regime
of Nicholas II. What the Progressive Bloc had hoped and worked for was at the
least a government of confidence, at the most one responsible to the legislative
chambers, achieved through continued pressure upon the monarch or, as a last
resort, by a palace coup. The situation which had developed spontaneously on
the morning of February 27 was precisely what they had labored to avoid. Should
they stand apart from the popular movement or attempt to lead and control it?
Faced with this terrible decision, Rodzianko once again telegraphed the Tsar,
appealed to the Grand Duke Mikhail to take some action, and convened the Senoren
konvent. The Tsar reacted to Rodziankos message with the now famous phrase:
That fat Rodzianko has again written me some nonsense, to which I will not even
reply.8 The attempt of the Grand Duke to persuade his brother to appoint a
*Ibid V,38.
 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 23

ministry of confidence was spurned. During the conference of the Senoren kon-
vent, the representatives of the left Kadet, Progressist, Social Democratic, and
Trudovik factions proposed that the Tsars ukase be ignored and an official sitting
of the Duma be held. But the majority of the other factions did not accept this
proposition and decided to organize an unofficial conference of the members which,
though a private meeting, would be clothed with the prestige of the Duma. In
the afternoon, the meeting called in accordance with this decision agreed to author
ize the Senoren konvent to appoint a Temporary Committee to restore order and
make contact with public organizations in Petrograd.
But as the day wore on, it became increasingly clear that more power would
have to be assumed by the Committee. Crowds of soldiers and demonstrators
swirled around and into the Tauride Palace seeking leadership, while arbitrary
acts of violence multiplied throughout the city. The piteous plea of Rodzianko
reveals the dilemma of the majority of the Duma: 1 have no desire to revolt.
I am not a rebel. I have made no revolution and do not intend to make one. If it
is here, it is because they would not listen to us. . . . On the other hand, there is
no government. I am torn to pieces by all sides . * . everyone wishes to know
what to do. What shall I do? Step aside? Wash my hands? Leave Russia with
out a government? But after all, it is a question of Russia! . . . We have obliga
tions toward the motherland. What shall I do? What shall I do?4
There seemed but one alternative to anarchy. That evening the Committee
announced that it was compelled to take the responsibility for restoring national
and public order, and called on the people for assistance in the difficult task
of forming a new government.
But before the appeal of the Committee appeared, another private revolutionary
center was formed in other rooms of the Tauride Palacethe Soviet of Workers
Deputies, to be known from the following day as the Soviet of Workers and Sol
diers Deputies. Remembering 1905, certain trade union leaders, left members
of the Duma, and revolutionary party leaders had met to issue a call for the elec
tion of a new Petrograd Soviet to convene that evening. Talk of a Soviet had been
in the air for several days as the disturbances continued, but only after the mutiny
of the troops and the total collapse of governmental authority was the final deci
sion made. Rejecting the idea of taking power for itself, partly because of doc
trinal considerations which identified the upheaval as the bourgeois rather than
the socialist revolution, and partly because of doubts concerning its ability to
assume effective authority, the Soviet assumed the role of representative of the
democracy, i.e., the masses. It would guard the gains of the revolution from real
or suspected enemies from inside and outside the government which was in the
process of formation. Acting sometimes with the Temporary Committee of the
Duma and sometimes independently of it, the Soviet also moved to restore order
in the capital, establish discipline among the rebellious troops, and relieve the
food shortage.
Meantime, at Stavka, the Tsar, with appalling but characteristic blindness,
still failed to take sufficient alarm. In the night of the 27th he was shocked by
news from Petrograd of the mutiny of the troops and the hopeless position of

4 V. V. Shulgin, Dni, pp. 178-79. This is one of the most vivid personal accounts of the
February Days, especially on events in the Tauride Palace. Excerpts from it have been trans
lated in Golder, pp. 258-77.
24 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

the loyal forces. Belatedly, but still only vaguely realizing the seriousness of
the situation, Nicholas ordered General N. I. Ivanov with a battalion of St. George
Cavaliers to proceed to the city and regain control. On the following morning
the Tsar entrained for Tsarskoe Selo to take personal command. His train was
turned back by order of the Temporary Committee of the Duma through its Com
missar at the Ministry of Transport, A. A. Bublikov, and he decided to go to
Pskov, where the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief for the Northern
Front, General N. V. Ruzskii, was located. Here, finally convinced of the danger
to the monarchy, he agreed, on March 1, to accede to the demand for a respon
sible ministry. But by this time, far behind the accelerating movement of events,
his concessions were too late. The subsequent developments which led to his
abdication are clearly delineated in the documents of Chapter 3. As he reaped
the fruit of years of intransigence and vacillation and of the recent hours of com
placency, deserted by his military commanders, who chose Russia and military
victory over their Emperor and internal disorder, his isolation was finally brought
home to him. When the commissioners of the Duma, V. V. Shulgin and A. L
Guchkov, arrived on March 2, they found that the Tsar had already renounced
the throne for himself and his ailing son in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke
Mikhail.
In the Tauride Palace, while the Tsar reached his decision at Pskov, the mem
bers of the Temporary Committee consulted with representatives of the Soviet
Executive Committee on the question of the new government. By the evening of
March 2 agreement had been reached and a declaration drafted which was accept
able to both. That document was as noteworthy for its omissions as for its asser
tions. None of the vital issues around which political conflict was to revolve in
the following months was included, for consensus among the negotiators on their
resolution was impossible. The declaration promised the introduction of broad,
democratic principles in national life and, significantly, the grant of civil rights
to the soldiers and the retention of the mutinous troops in Petrograd. War and
peace, the disposition of the land, and economic reform were not mentioned, but
the obligation to begin immediate preparation for the calling of a Constituent
Assembly suggested that these issues would be the concern of that body and of
the future permanent government.
The Temporary Committee had wished to include two representatives of the
left in the Provisional Government. Obvious choices were Duma members N. S.
Chkheidze, President of the Soviet, and A. F. Kerensky, Vice-President. They
were offered the portfolios of Labor and Justice respectively. But the Soviet had
voted not to allow its members to accept ministerial posts. Chkheidze abided by
the ruling and declined the offer. Kerensky accepted membership in the govern
ment, and his personal decision was accepted by the acclamation of the entire
Soviet, though not by the Executive Committee, after his speech as the Minister
of Justice of the new revolutionary government, in which he promised, in his
own words, to be the hostage of democracy.
By the morning of March 3 the declaration had been published and the minis
ters named. But the Grand Duke had not as yet responded to Nicholas tender
of the crown. Accordingly, the members of the Government and some of the Tem
porary Committee of the Duma called upon him to receive his answer. P. N.
Miliukov, the new Foreign Minister, and certain of his colleagues in the delegation
who favored a constitutional monarchy urged him to accept. Almost all of the
 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 25

other members of the delegation opposed the idea as impractical. After listening
to the arguments and consulting with Rodzianko and Minister-President Prince
G. E. Lvov, Mikhail announced his rejection of the throne until and unless it
was offered to him by the people through the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.
With that decision, the 303-year rule of the Romanov dynasty came to an end,
and the Provisional Government assumed the plenitude of executive and legisla
tive power.
 I

CHAPTER 1

The Storm Breaks

THE PETROGRAD UPRISING

1. V. Z e n z in o v s D e s c r ip tio n o f t h e F i r s t D ays
[V. Zenzinov, Fevralskie dni Novyi Zhurnal, XXXIV (1953), 196-99; 199-203.]

This occurred most likely on February 22. In the afternoon I was sitting, as
was my custom, in the editorial office of the Severnye Zapiski . . . and was en
gaged in my usual workI was correcting the galley proofs of the next . . .
journal, which was to come out at the end of the month. Several workers entered
five or six personsand said that they would like to see A. F. Kerensky (he was
a collaborator of Severnye Zapiski) . On learning that I was the secretary of the
editorial office, they explained that they represented a delegation from the Putilov
workers and that another similar delegation had at the same time gone to see
Deputy Chkheidze (they were clearly emphasizing Kerenskys and Chkheidzes
title of deputy). They had an important request to make of Deputy Kerensky,
but they did not tell me what it was. Right there and then, in front of them, I
reached A. F. Kerensky by telephone (fortunately, I managed to find him at home
telephone number 119-60), and he agreed to meet them that very day in the
editorial office at 7 :00 p.m. and asked me to be present at this meeting. I then
told the workers about Kerenskys consent, which, apparently, pleased them very
much.
At 7:00 P.M., the appointed meeting between the workers deputies from the
Putilov plant and A. F. Kerensky took place (they later confessed that they were
afraid to go to his homethey thought that the police might interrupt). The
workers gave a detailed account of the lockout at the Putilov works. The purpose
of their going to see both deputies (Kerensky and ChkheidzeI do not know, by
the way, whether their comrades succeeded in seeing N. S. Chkheidze) was as
follows: they considered it their public duty to warn both deputies (they ad
dressed A. F. Kerensky every time with the words Citizen Deputy ) about the
seriousness of the situation that had developed and that they were declining
responsibility for the possible consequences. Such, literally, were their words.
Of themselves they said that they were making this request to both of the depu
ties on behalf of the striking workers. The workers delegates declared very
clearly and seriously to A. F. Kerensky that the strike which had started was not
private in character, and that the question was not one of economic demands or
of food supply difficulties. The workers realized that this was the beginning of
some big political movement and they considered it their duty to warn the deputies
about this. They did not know what the outcome of this movement would be,
but it was clear to them, judging by the mood of the workers around them, that
something very serious might happen. That was how the delegates spoke; they
spoke calmly and firmly, and this calmness only served to emphasize the serious
 THE STORM BREAKS 27

ness of what they were reporting. This warning turned out to be historical in the
full sense of the word, and I often recalled it later on and marveled at the under
standing of the moment which the Putilov workers then exhibited. Very few
understood this at the time. I must admit that I, too, did not attribute any particu
lar significance to this visit at that timeI do not know how A. F. Kerensky re
acted to it. But these were real harbingers of the coming revolution. Their perspi
cacity could probably be explained by the fact that they were at the very source of
the incipient movement and they sensed the extent to which the atmosphere was
already charged . . . in the workers circles of Petrograd. It seems strange to
me that to this day nowhere in the memoir literature has there been any mention
of these delegations from the Putilov workers.

February 24
On the 24th there was already talk of tens and even hundreds of thousands of
strikers. But who could believe this? Since morning workers had been trying
to make their way to the center of the town . . .
These two daysthe 23rd and the 24thI spent most of my time on the
streets. I lived on Serpukhovskaia [Street] behind the Tsarskoe Selo Railroad
Station. This street led to the Zagorodnyi [Prospekt]. The area on which my
observations [are based covered the following]: Zagorodnyi [Prospekt], Liteinyi
[Prospekt], the whole Nevskii [Prospekt] from the Gostinyi dvor to Znamenskaia
Street, Moika [Quay], Fontanka [Quay] . . . I roamed the streets without any
plan, turning from one into another, observing the crowds, listening in on con
versations. There were more than the usual number of people on the streets;
common people [seryi liud] predominated. [They were] in an excited state, but
not irritatedmost of all, one could sense the curiosity of the crowd. It was also
evident that the people were not so much residents of these streets as people who
had made their way from outlying districts. Chains of soldiers were stationed
at many points; undoubtedly their duty was not to let the passers-by go any
farther, but they performed this duty poorly. I remember how I was detained
for a long time by the Moikathe soldiers were given strict orders not to let
anyone pass through the chain, but the passers-by kept getting into conversations
with them, persuading them to let them go through, explaining the necessity for
them to go farther, giving reasons that were obviously fabricatedand the sol
diers, looking around them to make sure that their superiors did not notice their
indulgence, would let [the people] pass . . . In this way I, too, was allowed to
pass. From these fleeting conversations it became clear that all these soldiers
were for the most part recently mobilized; i.e., only very recently they had been
in the same [position] as the crowds around them.

2. T h e A n n o u n c e m e n t o f G e n e r a l K h a b a lo v o n
t h e B re a d S u p p ly in P e t r o g r a d
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14717, February 24, 1917, p. 5.]
The following announcement by the Commander of the Troops of the Petro
grad Military District has been posted on the streets of Petrograd:
During these last days as much flour has been delivered to the bakeries and
as much bread has been baked in Petrograd as before. There should be no short
age of bread in the stores. If there is not sufficient bread in some stores, it is
28 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

because many people, fearing a shortage of bread, have laid in reserves for
hardtack.
Rye flour exists in Petrograd in sufficient quantity, and shipments of this
flour [into the city] proceed uninterruptedly.
The Commander of the Troops of the Petrograd Military District
L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l K h a b a lo v .

3. T h e D um a S essio n o f F e b r u a r y 24
[R ech\ No. 53, February 25, 1917, p. 5.]
On the agenda was the continuation of the debates regarding the food question.
The majority of the speakers had already expressed themselves, and todays speak
ers were compelled more or less to repeat what had been said by others. Even the
serious speech of A. S. Posnikov was heard without the attention which it merited.
The deputies are much more interested in what is going on now outside of the
Tauride Palace than what happens within the Tauride Palace. Since morning
the mood of the streets has been agitated.
During the midday recess a meeting of the Council of Elders,1 summoned by
M. V. Rodzianko, was held in the office of the President of the State Duma. The
President of the State Duma reported that in the morning he drove around the
town first alone and then accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, A. A.
Rittikh. After this trip, M. V. Rodzianko together with A. A. Rittikh visited the
President of the Council of Ministers, Prince N. D. Golitsyn. M. V. Rodzianko
told the Premier what he knew about the food complications in Petrograd, of
which so much has been said during the last days. At the initiative of M. V.
Rodzianko, it was decided to convene an extraordinary conference in the Mariin-
skii Palace under the chairmanship of Prince N. D. Golitsyn, and to consist of
the following: the President of the Council of Ministers, Prince N. D. Golitsyn;
the Chairmen of the Special Councils for Defense, for Food, for Fuel, and for
Transport; the Minister of War, M. A. Beliaev; the Minister of Transport, E. V.
Kriger-Voinovskii; the Minister of Agriculture, A. A. Rittikh; the Minister of
Trade and Industry, Prince V. N. Shakhovskoi; the President of the State Duma,
M. V. Rodzianko; the Deputy President of the State Duma, N. V. Nekrasov; the
Secretary of the State Duma, 1.1. Dmitriukov; the President of the State Council,
I. G. Shcheglovitov; the Vice-President of the State Council, V. S. Deitrich; the
Mayor of Petrograd; and the Chairman of the Petrograd Gubemiya Zemstvo
Board.
Having heard the communication of M. V. Rodzianko and having exchanged
ideas on the problem of supplying Petrograd with food, the representatives of the
parties decided to introduce immediately a resolution questioning the Government
on its plans to eliminate the food difficulties in Petrograd. The resolution was
worked out in a few minutes and signed by the representatives of the various Duma
parties, and the State Duma took it up after its first recess of the day. Debates on
this query were listened to with strained attention. A. I. Shingarev told the
sad story of how the Petrograd municipal self-government attempted to take the
matter of food in Petrograd into its own hands, how it aspired to create public
committees for the regular distribution of food, and how all these good intentions
did not bring any results, for reasons which did not depend on the Petrograd
1 The Sen*oren konvent.
 THE STORM BREAKS 29

municipality. I. V. Godnev explained that the responsibility for food supply is

among the duties of the Petrograd Municipality according to law, and that those
who hindered it in fulfilling this duty were obviously violating the law.
The political side of the question was clarified in speeches by F. I. Rodichev,
A. F. Kerensky, and N. S. Chkheidze.
The resolution was unanimously approved. Even the members of the right
voted for it.
After the end of the session the deputies did not disperse for a long time. In
the Ekaterininskii Hall groups of deputies discussed the events of the last few days.
Everybody expects that at tomorrows session of the State Duma the Govern
ment will give explanations in reply to the query submitted by the State Duma
on a matter which has become so acute.

4. A n E x tr a o r d in a r y C o n f e r e n c e o n t h e P e t r o g r a d F o o d S u p p ly
[Rech9, No. -53, February 25, 1917, p. 6.]
Lately, for the purpose of discussing the questions connected with supplying
the population with food and consumers goods, and in order to unify and co
ordinate the activities of the ministries in the aforesaid area, the Ministers of
War, of the Navy, of Agriculture, of Transport, and of Trade and Industry have
been meeting daily [in the office of] the President of the Council of Ministers.
In view of the present acute [situation] in the matter of supplying food to the
population of the capital, and in view of the urgent necessity of discussing the
existing situation and measures to alleviate it, in the evening of February 2 4 the
President of the Council of Ministers convened an extraordinary session of the
aforementioned heads of departments. The Presidents of the State Council
and of the State Duma, their deputies, the Secretary of the State Council, the
Secretary of the State Duma, the Mayor of Petrograd, and the Chairman of the
Petrograd Guberniya Zemstvo Board were also invited to attend this conference.
(P[ress] B[ureau].)

The conferees unanimously voted to immediately transfer the food supply in

Petrograd to the jurisdiction of the Petrograd municipal administration. At the
same time, it was noted that the Petrograd municipal administration did not have
a suitable organization at its disposal [for this purpose]; the intention of [the]
February 24 [meeting] was nonetheless to grant the municipal administration the
right to appoint representatives to participate in the distribution of food products
and the supervision of the baking of bread. As soon as the Petrograd municipal
administration in conjunction with the municipal [duma] board is able to set
up a suitable organization, the whole matter of supplying food to Petrograd will
be placed under its jurisdiction.
. . . An amendment to the existing law is required to grant the municipal
administration the right to introduce rationing and to apply other means to solve
the question of food supply by issuing appropriate compulsory decrees. As a
consequence, the extraordinary conference came to an agreement among the
representatives of the legislative bodies, of the Petrograd municipality, and of the
government, to the effect that, by the procedural initiative of the State Duma, the
respective bills concerning the expansion during the war of the powers of the
municipal administrations by granting them the right to regulate food supply
should be introduced. It is intended that this bill be passed by urgent procedure.
30 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Furthermore, during the discussion of the food situation in Petrograd it was

ascertained that the capital had sufficient reserves of rye and wheat flour in the
amount of over 460,000 poods and that therefore Petrograd at the present time
was sufficiently supplied with bread. It was also noted that the shipment of flour
to Petrograd is proceeding satisfactorily and that therefore the apprehension
shown by the population of the capital about the possibility of a bread shortage
is quite unfounded. (P[ress] B[ureau].)

5. T h e S u ppl y o f F lour in P etrograd

[Rech9, No. 53, February 25, 1917, p. 6.]
Up to now the shortage of shipments of flour to the capital has not been acutely
felt because, as we have already reported, the city has preserved large reserves
of flour. On February 25 the city had 1,100,000 poods of flour. Up to February
24, 840,000 poods had been delivered and about 260,000 poods still remained;
the major part of the city flour (604,000 poods in all) had been distributed among
the bakeries by the commissioner for supplying Petrograd with food, who himself
had no reserves of flour. The reserves of flour which the city possessed have made
it possible to live through the most acute period, when the shipment of flour to
the capital was reduced to a minimum.
At the present time, the number of cars arriving at the capital with flour has
increased to such a degree that, as attested by the commissioner for the supplying
of Petrograd with food, any apprehensions should be considered unfounded.

6. E d i t o r i a l in R ech5 o n t h e P e t r o g r a d F o o d S u p p ly C risis
[No. 53, February 25, p. 2.]
Yesterdays newspapers contained the announcement by the Commander of
the Troops of the Petrograd Military District that the delivery of flour to the
bakeries and the baking of bread in Petrograd have not increased during the last
days and that therefore there should be no shortage of bread in the stores. At the
same time the Press Bureau reported that during the last days there has been an
acute situation in supplying the population of the capital with food and that there
fore the situation and the measures tending to alleviate it should be urgendy
discussed.
The comparison of these two official communications shows that the presence
alone of one or another product in the usual quantity is not sufficient to supply
the population with food. The announcement of the Commander says that the
shortage of bread is due to apprehension among the population, which forces it
to buy reserves for dried bread.
Evidently the apprehensions are the result of the lack of confidence in tomor
row. And unfortunately there is much foundation for this lack of confidence.
Even the State Council in its last session considered it necessary to address to
the ministers a query regarding the measures being taken to fight the disorganiza
tion which prevails and which constantly increases.
As the evening papers have reported, the Conference was organized through
the initiative of the President of the State Duma. Of the ministers who are
directly interested in the question and who play an important role in its solution,
the Minister of the Interior was absent from the Conference. It turns out that
 THE STORM BREAKS 31

he also did not participate in the preliminary conferences which were held
recently in the [office of the] President of the Council of Ministers. This circum
stance will probably somewhat facilitate the very complicated and responsible
task of the Conference. In any case, from the text of the aforesaid official com
munication it may be seen that the situation is serious and it can be foretold in
advance that no half-measures will be of any help. If our aim is not to remain in
the wake of events but to prevent and to direct them, then a sincere resoluteness
and frankness are necessary; an organization should be created compelling the
population to feel clearly that all measures will be taken to alleviate the existing
painful situation. If such a certainty were to exist, the picture would change
immediately. But without this, all kinds of measures and efforts will be smashed
by lack of confidence, which in such days grows with the rapidity of a rolled
snowball.

7. A n I ncident on Z nam enskaia S quare

[As described bv V. Zenzinov, Fevralskie dni, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXIV (1953),
200-203.]
Khabalovs warning brought no favorable results for the Governmenton
February 25 the movement in the whole town continued to grow. Even his report
that there were three killed and ten wounded the evening before on the Nevskii
[Prospekt] near the Gostinyi dvor did not, evidently, frighten [the Government].
Disorders were on the increase in the town. . . . People were now coming in
flocks along the Nevskiiall heading in one direction, to Znamenskaia Square,
and, seemingly, with some definite purpose in mind. Handmade red banners
appeared from somewhereit was obvious that all this happened extemporane
ously. On one of the banners I saw the letters R.S.D.R.P. On another was
inscribed Down with the war. But this latter evoked protests from the crowd
and it was immediately taken off. I remember this with absolute clarity. Evidently
it belonged either to the Bolsheviks or to the Mezhduraiontsy (who adhered to
the Bolsheviks)and did not fit the temper of the crowd in any way. The nearer
it was [to Znamenskaia Square], the more assured and faster was the movement
of the crowd. In no time we were in the middle of the bridge. This was that first
demonstration of the February Days which ended with the first bloody clash on
Znamenskaia Squarefate willed it that I took part in it. A detachment of Cos
sacks galloped past the crowdthe crowd made way, the detachment galloped
past along a side street and did not touch the demonstrators. When we passed by
the editorial office of the newspaper Den* (on the right side of the Nevskii), the
windows in the upper stories openedhandkerchiefs, towels were waved at us
from the windows and from the small hinged ventilating windows; people were
shouting something at us, greeting us. In Znamenskaia Square itself the crowd
thickened and darkened. The wave had carried the people to the very monument
of Alexander III. A stout, clean-shaven man made his way out of our ranks,
scrambled on the steps of the monument, and turned to the crowd with a speech.
I stood very close to him and observed him well; he was unknown to me. But a
few days later I met him at a session of the Soviet of Workers Deputies and had
something to do with himit was only then I learned that this was Grinevich, a
well-known Menshevik-Internationalist. Several small detachments of mounted
Cossacks stood at different ends of the Square, but they showed no aggressive
32 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

intentions toward the crowd. One of these detachments suddenly moved from one
corner of the Square to the otherthe crowd willingly made way and let the
detachment pass; then it closed its ranks again. The speaker continued . . .
Several small red flags were visible. The clatter of horseshoes on stone was heard
a new mounted detachment appeared from the direction of the Nikolaevskii
Railroad Stationas I found out later on, this was a detachment of mounted
police; in front of it rode an officer in a gray greatcoat, tightly laced with straps.
The warning signal of a horn was heard. Then another . . . It was followed by
the crack of a single shot and [then] a volley resounded. Only later did I learn
that the first shot was fired by one of the Cossacks and that it killed Inspector
Krylov, who was at the head of the mounted police detachment. I started running
with the crowdlosing one of my galoshes in the process. When I looked back,
I saw canes, hats, galoshes on the snowbut there were no people on the Square.
The Square was quickly cleared, and the crowd rushed to the neighboring streets,
which suddenly seemed very narrow.

This demonstration on Znamenskaia Square, during which a police inspector

was killed by a CossackI believe that this was the first government victim of
the revolutionoccurred around 3:00 oclock. As historians and authors of
memoirs later established, this shot fired from a Cossacks rifle at a police in
spector was probably the first offensive movement of the street revolution.

8. A M e e tin g o f L e f t R e p r e s e n ta ti v e s o n t h e N ig h t o f
F e b r u a r y 26
[V. Zenzinov, Fevralskie dni, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXIV (1953), 207-10.]
In the evening of the 26th, at the invitation of A. F. Kerensky, a conference
of several leftist organizations and public groups was held in his flat (on Tvers-
kaia [Street]). During the last weeks (or rather several days) conferences of
this kind were held. They were more in the nature of meetings for [the purpose
of gathering] informationthey were not formal in character in the sense of
representation and had as their only aim the exchange of information on what
was occurring in Petrograd. . . . There were four such informational con
ferences during the pre-February Days; three conferences took place in M.
Gorkiis flat (neither A. F. Kerensky nor I attended them). This onethe fourth
and lasttook place in A. F. Kerenskys flat. Apart from A. F. Kerensky, myself,
and N. D. Sokolov, who came toward the end of the meeting, it was attended
by (I remember this very well) Erlikh [Bund], Aleksandrovich [S. R .], and
Yurenev [Mezhduraionnyi]; possibly, Znamenskii and Berezin [Trudoviks]2
were also there, but 1 am not sure of this. I want to describe the conference in
great detail, because the attitudes of its participants reflected vividly the attitudes
which were then characteristic of diverse political groups.
Judging by the tasks and the idea behind this conference, it should have
played a highly significant rolein a way it lay claim to something like the role
of the general headquarters of the revolution, which was to have adopted very
2 According to A. F. Kerensky, A. G. Shliapnikov, a member of the Bolshevik Central
Committee, was also present.
 THE STORM BREAKS 33

responsible decisions. And there is doubt that, regardless of how those present
exaggerated their own importance, they could have, indeed, exerted some influ
ence on the course of events. It is true that an organized public political force
did not exist in Petrograd at that time, but in the whirl of events, within agitated
groups and the cells of initiative, familiar formulas, slogans, andmost impor
tant of allparty labels could have and must have played a major, active role.
The masses were searching for leaders, they yearned for a more precise formu
lation of their vague desires, [they wanted to be] prompted. And the persons
present at the conference at A. F. Kerenskys, each one of whom could have pub
lished a declaration on behalf of some political organization, could, indeed, have
played an [important] role . . .
I am dwelling in detail on this moment, first, because it seems significant to
me, and second, because the Bolsheviks role at [this conference] was astounding
and, for most people, implausible, incredible.
The meeting was rather stormy, Yurenev, the Bolshevik, wrote later about
this conference. I, too, remember that we had heated arguments. Yurenev and
Aleksandrovich, who during these and the following days were in complete
contact and accord with the Bolsheviks (it was not without reason that he em
phasized his Zimmerwaldism, internationalism, and defeatism on every con
venient and inconvenient occasion), had a somewhat defiant and overbearing
attitude, as though they were the only real socialists who happened to find them
selves in the company of liberals (in his memoirs, Yurenev frankly sets off the
representatives of illegal organizations, i.e., himself and Aleksandrovich, against
the representatives of the organized public [obshchestvennost]in quotation
marks denoting contempt). At the very least they thought of themselves as being
the only genuine representatives of the proletariat. I cannot remember the
exact way in which Aleksandrovich expressed himself (I doubt that he was gen
erally capable of clearly formulating his position) ; as for Yurenevhe took an
amazing kind of stand. In contrast to everyone else present, Yurenev not only
evinced no enthusiasm whatsoever on the subject of current events but was
poisoning all of us with his skepticism and unbelief. There is no revolution
nor will there be any, he reiterated stubbornly . . . The movement in the
armed forces is coming to naught and we must prepare ourselves for a long period
of reaction In this connection he was particularly sharp in his criti
cism of A. F. Kerensky, whom he reproached with the usual hysterics charac
teristic of him and the usual exaggerations. We were maintaining that the
wave was rising, that we should prepare ourselves for decisive events; Yurenev,
who considered himself further to the left, was persistently trying to throw cold
water on us. It was clear to us that this position was not merely his personal one
at the time but also that of the Bolshevik organization in Petersburg [sw?].
Yurenev was opposed to the forcing of events; he maintained that the incipient
movement could not meet with success, and even insisted on the necessity of
calming down the excited workers. . . .

9. D o c u m e n ts o f t h e O k h r a n a o n t h e F e b r u a r y D a y s
[These documents were collected after the destruction of the Okhrana office in Petro
grad on February 27 and were published with editorial annotation by B.G. under the
title Fevralskaia revoliutsiia i okhrannoe otdelenie, in Byloe, No. 1 (29), January
34 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

1918, pp. 158-76. See Doc. 73 for an account of the reports reaching the Tsar at
Stavka.]

The telephonic communications relating to the first two days enumerated with
tedious monotony the names of the enterprises which went on strike and the num
ber of workers, and every time it was noted that the [strike was] caused by a
shortage of bread. There were communications regarding attempts [to form]
demonstrations and processions along the streets, with the singing of revolu
tionary songs and shouts of Give us bread ; also about tramcars being stopped
by the mob. A number of cases of stores and bakeries being smashed and also of
attacks against the police which were dispersing the processions were mentioned.
As a special aspect of these communications, the irresoluteness [shown] even
during the first days by those who were dispersing the crowds is worth men
tioning. For instance, on February 24 at 11:40 A .M ., Police Sergeant Khari
tonov reported that on the Nevskii Prospekt near the Gostinyi dvor and the
Kazan5 Cathedral a crowd of about 2,000 workers gathered, making its way
toward the Nikolaevskii Station. According to the Prefects [gradonachaVnik]
instructions, the Cossacks were ordered to disperse the crowds, but the workmen
behave calmly, and the Cossacks and the police are accompanying them.
. . . The majority of the communications regarding the dispersions con
tain the characteristic annotation: No one was arrested, and there were no
casualties.

[Memorandum of February 24 of the Okhrana Section to precinct superintendents

regarding the events of the first two days.]
On February 23 at 9:00 A .M ., the workers of the plants and factories of the
Vyborg district went on strike in protest against the shortage of black bread in
bakeries and groceries; the strike spread to some plants located in the Petrograd,
Rozhdestvenskii, and Liteinyi districts, and in the course of the day 50 industrial
enterprises ceased working, with 87,534 men going on strike.
At about 1:00 p . m ., the workmen of the Vyborg district, walking out in
crowds into the streets and shouting fiGive us bread, started at the same time to
become disorderly in various places, taking with them on the way their comrades
who were at work, and stopping tramcars; the demonstrators took away from the
tram drivers the keys to the electric motors, which forced 15 tramway trains to
quit the lines and retire to the Petrograd tramway yard.
The strikers, who were resolutely chased by police and troops summoned
[for this purpose], were dispersed in one place but quickly gathered in other
places, showing themselves to be exceptionally stubborn; in the Vyborg district
order was restored only toward 7 :00 P .M .

[Memorandum from the Okhrana, compiled on February 24, late in the evening, to
the Ministry of the Interior, to the Prefect, to the Office of the Prosecutor, to the district
chiefs of police, and to the Commander of Troops.]
The strike of the workers which took place yesterday in connection with the
shortage of bread continued today; in the course of the day 131 enterprises with
158,583 workers shut down.
 THE STORM BREAKS 35

After arriving in the morning at their plants, the workers of the enterprises
which had decided to go on strike departed after short discussions, partly to their
homes and partly to the streets, where they perpetrated disorders.

In this way the crowd quickly increased to two to three thousand men. At
the corner of the Bolshoi Prospekt and Grebetskaia Street the demonstrators
were met by a detail of police, which, being small in number, was unable to stop
the movement and had to let them go on. On the Kamennoostrovskii Prospekt
the crowd was dispersed by Cossacks and mounted police.
The demonstrators included a large number of students.

At about 9:00 a.m ., after arriving at work, 3,500 workers of the Aivaz plant
gathered on the premises of the automobile section and organized a meeting at
which speakers who had arrived from the outside expressed their discontent with
the Government and called the workers to unite and to make an energetic demon
stration demanding from the Duma the elimination of the present Government;
at the same time they emphasized that if they acted, they would be supported not
only by workmen but also by various employees, by those of the railways, of the
tramways, of the telegraph and of the post office. The demands should be accom
panied by demonstrations, but no destruction should be perpetrated. They should
proceed on the streets in separate groups, not in crowds, and they should try to
reach the Duma by 3 :00 p.m. In conclusion, a resolution demanding the removal
of the Government was adopted.

A crowd of about 3,000 workmen moving along the Nevskii Prospekt stopped
at house No. 80 and listened to a speaker who called for the overthrow of the
existing regime and proposed that they gather next day, February 25, at 12:00
noon near the Kazan Cathedral.*
[Okhrana] Chief of the Section
M a j o r G e n e r a l ----------

According to the materials at our disposal, starting with February 25 the

telephonic communications from the precincts became much more scarce. . . .

. . . Here are some of the more characteristic of these communications.

On February 25 a crowd of about 6,000 workmen proceeding from the Bol-

shoi Samsonievskii Prospekt along Botkinskaia Street toward Nizhnii Novgorod
Street was met by Cossacks and a detail of police; present on horseback was

* In the communication of the police sergeant, on the basis of which the above event is
reported, it was added: The Cossacks, who stood close to the crowd, did not disperse it.
There are other communications regarding the inactivity of Cossacks and soldiers. But it
would seem that in its official report regarding these events the Okhrana purposely hushed up
these facts. B.G.
36 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
Shalfeev, Chief of Police of the 5th District. The crowd dragged him down from
the horse and began to beat him with sticks and an iron hook used to switch
railway points; policemen fired into the crowd (evidently the Cossacks were
inactive B.G.) and the shots were returned from the crowd. The Chief of Police
was seriously wounded and was taken to a military hospital.
The crowd is still on the spot. Details are being ascertained. . . .
. . . On . . . February 25, the report of the superintendent of the Vasilev-
skii districts 1st precinct to the Commander of the Finland Guard Regiments
reserve battaliona copy of which was delivered to the Okhranaalso speaks
of the inactivity of the Cossacks. The report advised of the disorders which
occurred on the 25th on Vasilevskii Island, disorders which were suppressed by
the police and the soldiers of the Finland Regiment, while the platoon of the
1st Don Cossack Regiment, which arrived at the spot, did not take any measures
for the restoration of order.
Finally, on the 25th we have the following communication of a secret col
laborator :
February 25, 1917. The pseudonym of the collaborator is Kochegar [fire
man]. Information received by Lieutenant Colonel Tyshkevich. Party: S.R.
Exposition of the information. Today the agitation assumed still greater pro
portions, and it is already possible to detect the leading center from which the
directives are being received; apparently the leading central organ is of non-
party character. If resolute measures are not taken to quell the disorders, barri
cades might be erected on Monday.
It should be noted that, among the military units summoned for the purpose
of suppressing the disorders, one may observe [cases of] fraternization with the
demonstrators, and some units even manifest approval, encouraging the mob by
saying press harder.
If the moment were to be lost and the leadership taken by the upper layer
of the revolutionary underground, events would assume very wide proportions.

On February 26 the number of telephonic communications sharply declines.. . .

Among these communications, which mention several cases of assaults on
the police and also several cases of policemen and soldiers firing at the crowd,
with killed and wounded in two cases . . . , there appears for the first time a
report on a direct mutiny of the soldiers:
Police Sergeant Kharitonov reported that at 6:00 P .M . the 4th company of
the Pavlovsk Guard Regiment, in an outburst of indignation against their [regi
mental] training detachment, which had been detailed to the Nevskii Prospekt,
and which had fired at the crowd after leaving its barracks which are located in
the riding school of the court stables, proceeded toward the Nevskii Prospekt
under the command of a noncommissioned officer with the intention of removing
[the details of the training detachment] from their posts; however, on its way,
in the vicinity of the Church of Christ the Saviour, the 4th company met a
mounted patrol of 10 policemen; the soldiers abused the policemen, calling them
pharaohs, and firing several volleys at them, killing one policeman and one
horse, and wounding one policeman and one horse. Then the soldiers [of the
4th company] returned to the barracks, where they staged a mutiny. Colonel
Eksten came to put it down and was wounded by one of the soldiers; his hand
 THE STORM BREAKS 37

was cut off; later a detachment of the Preobrazhenskii Guard Regiment was sum
moned; it disarmed and surrounded the mutineers.

February 26, 1917. The pseudonym of the collaborator is Stepanov/ In

formation received by Captain of Gendarmes Dubrovin. Party: labor movement.
Witnesses of yesterdays events say that the police inspector was killed by
a Cossack officer because he fired at the Cossack officer and wounded him. In
return the Cossack officer fired twice at the police inspector. Afterward the police
inspectors saber was removed and given to one of the speakers, who brandished
it and shouted: This is the weapon of an executioner!5 . .

February 26, 1917. Collaborators pseudonym N.N. Information received

by Lieutenant Colonel Prutenskii. Party: various sources.
In the State Duma spirits are high. Under the presidency of Rodzianko a
conference is now taking place in relation to the firing by the troops without
forewarning and the shooting of isolated individuals.
Among the deputies it is being said that Police Inspector Krylov was not
killed by the mob, but was hacked by a Cossack because he had fired at the Cos
sacks, who refused to obey the order to disperse the crowd.
A certain manufacturer living at 128 Nevskii Prospekt has telephoned several
times to Rodzianko, stating that all those who appeared near his house were being
shot one by one; he had counted 15 of them.
A number of faction sessions are set in the Duma for tomorrow, February 27.
The Bureau of the Progressive Bloc has proposed to convene an extraordinary
session of the State Duma tomorrow, the 27th; the Progressists and the Trudoviks
support the blocs proposal, but Rodzianko declared that for reasons of procedure
he was unable to convene an extraordinary session.
Tomorrow at 12:00 noon the Senoren konvent will be convened, and at 2:00
P .M . a private conference of all the members of the State Duma will take place.
The Social Democrats and the Trudoviks provoke the Duma by saying that
it should tell the Government either Continue to shoot or We must head the
movement which is taking place.5
The Progressists and the Kadets meet this provocation halfway, but do not
disclose their plans.
The Octobrists, the Nationalists, and the members of the right are frightened
and declare that no questions should be presented to the Government now because
everything is under the orders of the Commander [of the Petrograd Military
District], who, according to the law, may not be questioned and has the right
to suspend the activity of any institution; they frighten the left by saying that he
may also close the State Duma. . .

February 26, 1917. Collaborators pseudonym Timonin. Information re

ceived by Lieutenant Colonel Belousov. Party: R.S.D.W.P.
Exposition of the information: The movement which has started has flared
up without any party preparing it and without any preliminary discussion of a
plan of action. The revolutionary circles began to react only toward the end of
the second day when the desire to develop the success of the movement to the
38 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

widest limits possible became noticeable. . . . The general attitude of the non-
party masses is as follows: the movement started spontaneously, without any
preparation, exclusively on the basis of the food crisis. As the military units did
not oppose the crowds, and in certain cases even took measures tending to paralyze
the initiative of police officials, as for two days the mobs wandered unhindered
about the streets, and as the revolutionary circles advanced the slogans: Down
with the war5 and Down with the Government9the people became convinced
that the revolution had started, that success was on the side of the mobs, that the
Government was powerless to suppress the movement because the military units
were on the side of the latter, that a decisive victory was in sight because in the
very near future the military units would openly join the revolutionary forces,
that the movement which had started would not calm down but would grow un
interruptedly until final victory [is achieved] and the Government overthrown.
It is expected that the water supply and the power stations will cease to
function.

The question of creating a soviet of workers deputies in the near future

has been raised.

It is being said that a strong movement has been started among the sailors
of the Baltic Fleet, who are ready to abandon ship and to appear on shore as an
important revolutionary force.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the bourgeois circles also demand
a change of government, so that the Government remains without any support
whatsoever; however, in this instance, there is one favorable phenomenon: the
bourgeois circles demand only a change of government and have taken the stand
of continuing the war until its victorious conclusion, while the workers have
advanced the slogans: Bread, Down with the Government, Down with the
war.9 This last point introduces [an element of] discord between the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie, and only because of this are they unwilling to support each
other. This difference of opinion represents a circumstance in favor of the Gov
ernment, as it divides forces and pulverizes the initiative of the individual circles.
Now everything depends on the behavior of the military units; if the latter
do not join the proletariat, the movement will quickly subside; but if the troops
turn against the Government, then nothing can save the country from a revolu
tionary upheaval. Only resolute and immediate actions can weaken and put an
end to the movement which has started.
The elections to the Soviet of Workers Deputies will take place in the plants,
probably tomorrow morning; tomorrow night the Soviet of Workers Deputies
will be able to start functioning. This circumstance serves as a further demon
stration of the need to prevent meetings at the plants tomorrow morning by closing
all the plants.

Hereunder are the last two communications received by telephone by the

Okhrana from one of the precincts:
1. February 27,1817 [sic], at 9:00 A .M . Police Sergeant Liubitskii reported
that the training detachments of the Volynskii Regiment have revolted at No.
 THE STORM BREAKS 39

13/15 of the Vilna Alley, and Captain Lashkevich, who was in charge of the
cadres, was killed by a rifle shot; later the Litovskii Regiment revolted; it is
stationed in the barracks at Kirochnaia Street, where it started to plunder the
arsenal, removing cartridges and rifles in automobiles; the part of the Preobra-
zhenskii Regiment which is stationed in these barracks joined them.55
2. February 27,1917. Police Sergeant Liubitskii reported that at 12:00 noon
in the Preobrazhenskii Regiment (Kirochnaia Street No. 37) the soldiers killed
Colonel Bogdanovich, commander of the regiment, because he had refused to
distribute cartridges and weapons; groups of these soldiers scattered in the direc
tions of the Nevskii Prospekt, the Duma, and the Vyborg district, where the
arsenals of this regiment are located; they sent soldiers by horse and by car to
all the other military units for the purpose [of inciting to] mutiny other units
as well. Shooting has started. The crowds on Gospitalnaia, Paradnaia, and other
streets are very large.

THE STATE DUMA

10. A t the T auride P alace

[A description of events at the Duma on February 26, sent by telegraph and telephone
by the Petrograd correspondents of Russkiia Vedomosti and appearing in its special
supplement to No. 47, February 27, 1917, p. 1. If the information it reports was actu
ally received during the night of February 26-27, the decisions of the 27th concerning
the meeting of the Senoren konvent and the unofficial meeting of Duma members were
anticipated on the 26th. See also Doc. 9 for confirming evidence.]
Unusual commotion has reigned at the Tauride Palace since morning. The
joint meeting of the committees on municipal affairs and on local administration
is considering the projected law concerning the transfer of food supply affairs to
the municipal and zemstvo organizations, but the deputies are little interested
in its work. Everybodys attention is concentrated on the events in the city, and
the most diverse rumors circulate in the Ekaterininskii Hall. The deputies are
constantly running to telephones in search of news and they listen with great
agitation to the stories told by new arrivals. The President of the State Duma
is in constant personal touch by telephone with the President of the Council of
Ministers and with highest military authorities. He has conferred all day about the
political situation that has been precipitated and about the manner and the form
in which the State Duma and the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc should react to
the unfolding events. Yesterday, at the meeting of their faction, the K-Ds found
it necessary to transfer the meeting of the State Duma from Tuesday, as set, to
tomorrow, Monday; to devote it to the consideration of the political situation,
and to end it with a firm, decisive resolution. Today, on this matter, they are
being supported by the Progressists and Trudoviks, but the Bureau of the Pro
gressive Bloc and the informal conference of members which took place in the
Presidents office found it unsuitablefor technical and formal reasonsto set
the meeting of the Duma for tomorrow, despite its importance and urgency. In
40 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

place of it, a council of elders [Sen9oren konvent] will be called tomorrow morn
ing, and at 3 :00 oclock there will be a closed informal conference of all members.

11. T h e F i r s t T e le g r a m o f M. V . R o d z ia n k o t o t h e T s a r
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1. Because of the
strike, Petrograd newspapers ceased publication after the morning of February 25.
On February 27 a Committee of Petrograd Journalists, named by the Council of the
Association of Petrograd Journalists and the Board of the Association of Duma Corre
spondents, began publishing this paper, which was printed on the presses of various
publishing houses and distributed throughout the city. There were ten issues to
March 5. See No. 10, March 5, 1917, for an explanation of the origins of the paper.
The Izvestiia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies began pub
lication on February 28 and other Petrograd newspapers resumed publication on or
about March 5.
Copies of this telegram were also sent to the Commanders in Chief of the fronts,
with the request that they support the appeal. Izvestiia February 27, 1917. There
are several versions of the Rodzianko telegram, but the message is substantially the
same in all. See the citation for Doc. 16 as well as M. V. Rodzianko, Gosudarstvennaia
Duma i FevraPskaia 1917 goda Revoliutsiia, ARR, VI (1922), 59.]

On February 26 the President of the State Duma sent the following telegram
to Stavka addressed to the Tsar:
The situation is serious. The capital is in a state of anarchy. The Govern
ment is paralyzed. Transport service and the supply of food and fuel have become
completely disrupted. General discontent is growing. There is wild shooting in
the streets. In places troops are firing at each other. It is necessary that some
person who enjoys the confidence of the country be entrusted at once with the
formation of a new government. There must be no delay. Any procrastination
is tantamount to death. I pray to God that at this hour the responsibility may
not fall upon the Monarch [ventsenosets]

12. T h e M utiny of th e T roops

[V. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919, p. 65. The account of A. T. Vasilev, the
Director of Police, in A T. Wassilieff, Police Russe et Revolution, pp. 166-70, has been
translated by Bernard Pares in The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, pp. 445-48.]
Next day [February 27], early in the morning, I intended to go as usual to
my battalion. Suddenly I heard the telephone ring, and on behalf of Kerensky
I was informed that the Duma was dissolved, that Protopopov was proclaimed
dictator, that the Volynskii Regiment had revolted, had killed its officers, had
walked out carrying rifles into the streets, and was making its way toward the
Preobrazhenskii barracks (my battalion was stationed in these barracks). With
out losing a moment, I grabbed my combat equipment and rushed toward the
battalion. On the corner of the Liteinyi and Kirochnaia [Street] I saw a mob,
which watched attentively what happened on Kirochnaia Street. I approached;
at the end of the Kirochnaia, right in front of the Preobrazhenskii barracks, was
deployed a gray, disorderly crowd of soldiers who were slowly proceeding toward
the Liteinyi Prospekt. Above their heads two or three dark banners made out
of rags were visible.
 THE STORM BREAKS 41

I made my way toward the crowd, but was stopped by an X.C.O., who was
running rapidly from the crowd:
Your honor! Dont go, theyll kill you! The commander of the battalion is
killed, First Lieutenant Ustrugov is killed, and some officers are lying by the gate.
The rest have run away.
I was frightened and went into the school for ensigns located at the beginning
of Kirochnaia [Street]; I tried by telephone to contact my battalion and the State
Duma, but did not get any reply. . . .

13. T h e S e iz u re o f t h e A r s e n a l an d t h e C e n t r a l A r t i l l e r y
A d m in is tr a tio n [ B u ild in g ]
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
In the morning, after overcoming a short [attempt at] resistance, the troops
seized the arsenal and the central artillery administration [building]. General
Matusov, in charge of the ammunition depot, was killed. The arsenal and the
central artillery administration [building] are guarded by the insurgents.

14. F o r c e s J o in in g [ t h e Side o f ] t h e P e o p l e
[Izvestiia, No. 1, supplement 1, February 28, 1917, p. 2.]
During the course of February 27 and during the night before February 28,
almost all the forces of the Guards (some regiments with officers and others
without officers) joined the people. So far, news has been received that the
[following] regiments have joined: Volynskii, Semenovskii, Preobrazhenskii
(with officers), Lithuanian (with officers), Izmailovskii, Finland, Jaeger, Grena
dier, Moscow, Sapper, the Electrotechnical battalion, [and] the First Reserve
Regiment from Okhta.3 Many sailors in the guards [joined]. [These forces
brought] many machine guns and armored cars. The Cossacks are sympathetic
to the people, but have not as yet come forward.
Kronstadt had similarly gone over to the side of the insurgents.
The insurgent troops are headed by a military committee, at the Tauride
Palace, [consisting of] officers and soldiers.
All military units and individual soldiers must turn for instructions to this
committee (Shpalemaia Street, the building of the State Duma).

15. U kase o n t h e P ro ro g a tio n o f t h e S ta te D um a

[5o6. Uzak.9 I, 1, No. 328. A similar ukase (No. 327) prorogued the State CounciL
Prince N. D. Golitsyn, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had available decrees for
both dissolution and prorogation, signed by the Tsar but undated. Padenie, II, 259.]
TO T H E RULING SENATE
On the basis of Article 99 of the Fundamental State Laws, We Command:
the work of the State Duma shall be prorogued beginning February 26th of this
year and a date not later than April 1917 shall be fixed for its resumption, depend
ing upon the extraordinary circumstances.
8 The text erroneously reads battalion.
42 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The Ruling Senate shall not fail to issue proper instructions for the execution
of the present edict.
The original is signed in His Imperial Majestys Own Hand:
N ic h o l a s
At the Tsars Headquarters
February 25, 1917
Authenticated: The Chairman of the Council of Ministers Prince Nicholai Golitsyn

16. T e le g r a m o f F e b r u a r y 27, 1917, f r o m R o d z ia n k o

to t h e T sar
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXI (1927), 6-7.]
The session of the State Duma has been suspended until April by Your
Majestys Ukase. The last bulwark of order has been eliminated. The Govern
ment is absolutely powerless to suppress disorders. Nothing can be hoped from
the troops of the garrison. The reserve battalions of the guard regiments are in
rebellion. Officers are being killed. Having joined the crowds and the popular
movement, they are proceeding in the direction of the Ministry of the Interior
and of the State Duma. Civil war has started and is waxing hotter and hotter.
Order the immediate calling of a new government according to the principles
reported by me to Your Majesty in my telegram of yesterday. Cancel Your
Imperial Ukase, and order the reconvening of the legislative chambers. Make
these measures known without delay through an Imperial manifesto. Sire, do
not delay. If the movement spreads to the army, the Germans will triumph, and
the ruin of Russia, and with her the Dynasty, will become inevitable. On behalf
of all Russia I beg Your Majesty to fulfill the foregoing. The hour which will
decide the fate of Yourself and of the homeland has come. Tomorrow it may
already be too late.
R odzianko ,
President of the State Duma

17. R o d z ia n k o A sk s t h e G ra n d D u k e M i k h a i l A le k s a n d r o v ic h t o
I n te r v e n e in t h e C risis
[M. V. Rodzianko, Gosudarstvennaia Duma i Fevralskaia 1917 goda Revoliutsiia,
ARR9VI (1922), 57. See also Docs. 72 and 94.]
On February 25 I telephoned the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich at
Gatchina, informing him of what was happening and telling him that he should
immediately come to the capital in view of the events which were developing.
On the 27th of February Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich arrived in
Petrograd and we had a conference with him, attended by the President of the
State Duma; his deputy, Nekrasov; the Secretary of the State Duma, Dmitriukov;
and member of the Duma, Savich. The situation in the capital was reported in
detail to the Grand Duke, and it was suggested that the situation could still
be savedhe should assume on his own initiative the dictatorship of the city of
Petrograd, compel the personnel of the Government to tender their resignations,
and demand by telegraph, by direct wire from His Majesty the Emperor, a mani
festo regarding the formation of a responsible cabinet.
 THE STORM BREAKS 43

The irresoluteness of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich contributed to a

favorable moment being lost.
Instead of taking active measures and gathering around himself the units of
the Petrograd Garrison whose discipline was not yet shattered, the Grand Duke
Mikhail Aleksandrovich started to negotiate by direct wire with Emperor Nich
olas II; all his suggestions were completely rejected, and thus, in this instance,
an attempt of the State Duma failed.

18. T h e M e e tin g o f t h e Senoren konvent

[Alexander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 11-13.]

The council of party leaders4 met long before the appointed hour to consider
the situation and to work out a plan of action to be submitted for approval to the
unofficial meeting of the Duma. Those of us who met in the council laid aside all
differences of party, class and age. We were dominated by one thing only: the
realization that Russia was on the brink of ruin and that we must do our best to
save her. Rodzianko, very excited, opened the meeting and informed us of the
steps he had taken within the last forty-eight hours. He read the telegrams he
had sent to the Czar the day before and told us of his telephonic conversation with
the Czars ministers. What was to be done? How were we to determine what was
really happening outside the Duma walls and what should be our attitude toward
these events? The Duma majority had a great deal to forget before it could range
itself on the side of the Revolution, embark upon an open conflict with the Czarist
power and raise its hand against the traditional authority.
We, representatives of the opposition, Nekrassoff, Efremoff, Tcheidze and I,
now officially proposed what might be termed the revolutionary course. We
demanded that the Duma go immediately into official session, taking no notice
whatever of the order of dissolution.5 Some wavered. The majority and Rod
zianko did not agree with us. Argument, persuasion and passionate appeals were
in vain. The majority still believed too much in the past. The crimes and follies
of the government had not yet succeeded in rooting this faith out of their souls.
The council rejected our proposal, deciding that the Duma convene in unofficial
session. Politically and psychologically this meant that there was to be a private
meeting of a group of private individuals, many of them men of great influence
and authority, but still only private individuals. The meeting was not one of a
state institution and it had no formal authority for which it could claim general
recognition.
This refusal to continue in session formally was perhaps the greatest mistake
of the Duma. It meant committing suicide at the very moment when its authority
was supreme in the country and it might have played a decisive and fruitful part
had it acted officially. This refusal revealed the characteristic weakness of a Duma
composed in its majority of the representatives of the upper classes, and which
inevitably gave a distorted reflection of the countrys opinions and state of mind.
And so the Imperial Duma, born as a result of Stolypins counter-revolutionary

4 The Serfoven konvent.

5 Prorogation.
44 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

coup detat of 1907, which destroyed the more democratic electoral law of 1905,
wrote its own death warrant at the moment of the revolutionary renaissance of
the people. The majority deliberately put the Duma on a level with other self-
appointed organizations, like the Council of Workmens and Soldiers Deputies,
which was just then making its appearance. Later there were efforts to revive
the Duma as an official institution, but these came too late. The Duma died on the
morning of March twelfth [N.S.], the day when its strength and influence were at
the highest.
Next day, March thirteenth [N.S.], there were already two centers of authority,
both of which owed their existence to the Revolution: the Duma in unofficial
session, with its Temporary Committee, named as a provisional body to direct
events, and the Council or Soviet of Workmens and Soldiers Deputies, with its
Executive Committee.

19. R e s o lu ti o n o f t h e S t a t e D u m a
[IzvestiiaRevoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
The Senoren konvent, having met in special session and having familiarized
itself with the ukase of prorogation, has resolved [that]:
The State Duma shall not disperse.
All deputies shall remain at their places.

20. A D e le g a t io n f r o m t h e R e v o lu ti o n a r y T ro o p s
[A rrives at] th e S tate D um a
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
Around 1:00 p.m., a delegation from 25,000 insurgent soldiers came to the
State Duma to inquire about the position adopted by the representatives of the
people.
M. V. Rodzianko informed the delegation of the following resolution adopted
unanimously by the Senoren konvenL
The basic slogan of the moment is the abolition of the old regime and the
establishment of a new one in its place. The State Duma shall take active part
in realizing this [slogan], but in order to achieve this, there must first of all be
peace and order.
At the same time the President of the State Duma handed to the delegates the
texts of telegrams sent to the Tsar at Stavka, to the Chief of Staff, General
Alekseev, and to the three Commanders in Chief. . . .

21. T h e R e v o lu ti o n a r y T ro o p s in t h e S t a t e D um a
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
Around 2:00 p.m ., strong detachments of the revolutionary troops, accom
panied by armed civilians, approached the building of the State Duma. The
revolutionary troops were met by the following members of the State Duma:
N. S. Chkheidze, A. F. Kerensky, A. I. Skobelev, and many others. The appearance
of the delegates, and especially of the ones who were more popular with the
masses, was met by a loud Hurrah. Chkheidze, Kerensky, find Skobelev de
livered speeches to the troops.
 THE STORM BREAKS 45

The leaders of the insurgent soldiers removed the guards at the Tauride
Palace, assumed responsibility for the protection of the State Duma, occupied the
post and telegraph offices in the building of the State Duma, and posted guards
around the telephone equipment.

22. U n o f f i c i a l M e e tin g o f t h e M e m b ers o f t h e S t a t e D u m a,

F e b r u a r y 27, 1917
[These notes of the meeting were taken by an unnamed participant and published in
Volia Rossii (Prague), No. 153, March 15, 1921, p. 4. For other accounts see V. V.
Shulgin, Dni, pp. 158-62, and Kn. S. P. Mansyrev, Moi Vospominaniia, FevraVskaia
Revoliutsiia, S. A. Alekseev (ed.), pp. 265-67.]
The session started at 2:30 p.m. in the Polutsirkulnyi Hall. An excited crowd
of deputies surrounded the table of the Presidium.
President Rodzianko declared that at the session which was to be opened no
one could be present except members of the State Duma, and asked [Baron]
Fersen, the Sergeant at Arms, who was present, to withdraw. Then, while stress
ing the importance of the present moment and the necessity for making some kind
of decision, he remarked that We cannot as yet express ourselves definitely,
because the correlation of forces is not yet known to us. It was suggested that the
speeches be limited to five minutes.
Nekrasov: Now we have no Government, and therefore it is necessary to
create one. In my opinion, it would be proper for a person enjoying great confi
dence, together with some representatives of the Duma, to be invested with this
authority. Such a person, in his opinion, was General Manikovskii.
Karaulov proposed the election of an executive commission which would be
charged with the organization of the Government.
Sidorov considered it necessary first to hear the opinion of the democratic
deputies, and only after that to suggest one measure or another regarding the
organization of the Government.
Rzhevskii pointed out that there should be no delay, that the people were
waiting. The District Court had already been taken, one should act promptly;
however, he was against Nekrasovs proposal of handing the authority again to a
General of the old Government. It would be much more expedient to form a
committee for the purpose of [establishing] relations with the army and the
people.
Savich suggested that the Chair and the Secretariat of the Duma should be
entrusted with the organization of the Government; as for the Generals, not
Manikovskii, but Polivanov, who, although older and less energetic but more
popular, should be selected.

2 hrs. 50 m.
Dziubinskii stressed that it was necessary for the Sen oren konvent of the
Duma to take the authority [into its hands] and to announce it immediately to
the population. (Loud cheers.)
Kovalenko pointed out that Nekrasovs proposal boiled down to placing the
power in the hands [of the old regime] and that as a consequence he disagreed
with this proposal.
Nekrasov objected: Do not forget that the governmental machinery is still
46 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

in the hands [of the old regime], while we do not have it as yet; therefore, we
must find some halfway solution.55
Chkheidze also disagreed with Nekrasovs proposal and called it a false
road.
2 hrs. 57 m.
Kerensky entered the hall and requested that the conference delegate him,
together with Chkheidze, to go by car to all the insurgent troops, in order to
announce to them the support and the solidarity of the State Duma. Chkheidze
seconded this proposal.
Chkheidze insisted on the necessity of destroying the old Government and
replacing it by a new one.
Shingarev: We do not know whether the people would recognize the new
Government.
Volkov argued that a government in accordance with Nekrasovs project
could not carry authority in the eyes of the people; therefore, the power should
be transferred to a special committee.
Adzhemov seconded Volkov.

3 hrs. 10 m.
Miliukov: We have here three proposals with regard to the Government:
(1) A committee of 10 persons, but I cannot agree that such a committee could
possess dictatorial powers over everybody, including ourselves; (2) that of
Nekrasov I also consider inappropriate; (3) the proposal of Chkheidze and of
Dziubinskii to create a new Government is impracticable, the [right] moment
has not yet come for this. Personally, I have no concrete suggestion. So what
can we do? To go, as suggested by Kerensky, and appease the troops, but this
would hardly appease them; we must look for something more tangible.
Adzhemov was of the opinion that matters could not be postponed until the
[moment when] the correlation of forces became clear.
President Rodzianko explained that when he mentioned the correlation of
forces he did not have in view postponing the decision until these forces were
counted; he merely pointed out the importance of this correlation.
Dziubinskii was of the opinion that the State Duma had no other and could
have no other alternative than to create a new power and suggested that the State
Duma should hold this power by proclaiming the Duma a Constituent Assembly.
Prince Mansyrev seconded this proposal.
Savich objected: A mob cannot hand us authority. For the people the Duma
represents the last refuge, and if the Duma should take some illegal step, then it
could not [remain] a legislative institution, it would no longer be the Duma.

3 hrs. 30 m.
Kovalenko proposed the transfer of power to the Council of Elders.
Yanushkevich declared his solidarity with the revolutionary people and the
revolutionary army, and stressed the duty of joining with the people, for there
was no other way.
Prince Shakhovskoi was of the opinion that, although the Duma was dis
solved, the Senoren konvent did exist; it could elect the members of the Com
mittee, who could be invested with the power.
 THE STORM BREAKS 47

Shulgin said that promises should not be made which could not be kept:
You must agree that we cannot [guarantee] solidarity with the insurgent part
of the population in e\erything. Imagine that the insurgents would wish to end
the war. We could not agree to accept this. We might accept one of the two more
appropriate proposals, either Nekrasovs or that of Kovalenko.
Rodzianko requested haste, for he who hesitates is lost, and suggested putting
to a vote the 4 proposals moved: (1) to transfer power to the Council of Elders,
(2) to form a Special Committee, (3> to proclaim the Duma a Constituent
Assembly, (4) to elect a commission, which would be charged with the organiza
tion of the Government.
The maj ority approved the proposal to form a special committee to be imme
diately elected by the Sen7oren konvent; this decision was to be reported to the
conference. . . .

23. T h e F o r m a tio n o f t h e T e m p o ra ry C o m m itte e

o f t h e S t a t e D um a
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 28, 1917, p. 1.]
At exactly midnight of February 27, the Executive Committee of the State
Duma was finally organized. It shall consist of the following members:
Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko D. I. Konovalov
A.F. Kerensky I. I. Dmitriukov
N. S. Chkheidze V. A. Rzhevskii
V. V. ShuPgin S. I. Shidlovskii
P. N. Miliukov N. V. Nekrasov
M. A. Karaulov V. N. Lvov
Colonel EngeFhardt

In accordance with the request of the Executive Committee of the State Duma,
B. A. Engelhardt, Colonel of the General Staff and member of the State Duma,
accepted the duties of commandant of the revolutionary Petrograd Garrison and
entered upon his duties shortly after 1:00 a.m .

24. T h e A r r e s t o f M e m b e rs o f t h e O ld R e g im e
[During the first days of the Revolution a number of officials of the Imperial Govern
ment either gave themselves up for self-protection or were arrested. They were held
in the Ministerial Pavilion at the Tauride Palace until March 3, when they were
removed to the Peter and Paul Fortress. The first item is from Izvestiia Revoliut
sionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, p. 1 ; the second, Shulgins account of the same
event in Dni, pp. 170-71; and the third again from Izvestiia No. 5, March 2, 1917,
P. I-]
A. Arrest of the President of the State Council99
Around 5:30 p.m ., the President of the State Council, the former Minister of
Justice, I. G. Shcheglovitov, was brought under heavy escort of the revolutionary
people to the building of the State Duma.
After a brief conference, the Temporary Committee ordered that Shcheglovitov
be temporarily placed under heavy guard in the Ministerial Pavilion of the
Tauride Palace.
48 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

B.
One of the first [February 27] to be brought was Shcheglovitov, President
of the State Council and former Minister of Justice . . . Here for the first time
Kerensky opened up.
The handful of people who dragged the tall, gray-haired Shcheglovitov elbowed
its way through the crowd, which gave way, for they understood that someone of
importance was seized . . . Informed of this, Kerensky cut through the crowd
from the other end . . . They met . . .
Kerensky stopped, facing the former dignitary with an inspired air:
Ivan Grigorievich Shcheglovitov, you are under arrest!
Powerful, menacing words . . . His countenance is terrifying.
Ivan Grigorievich Shcheglovitov . . . Your life is not in danger . . . Know
that the State Duma does not shed blood."
What magnanimity . . . He is magnificent . .
Here Kerensky was revealed: an actor to the core, but a man with an honest
repugnance to the shedding of blood.
Ecclesia abhoret sanguinem
Thus spoke the fathers-inquisitors, while burning their victims . . .
Likewise, while burning Russia on the altar of freedom, Kerensky declared:
The Duma does not shed blood . . .
But be that as it may, the slogan was uttered. The slogan was uttered, and
uttered in a decoratively dramatic form. It affected the minds and the hearts of
the people . . .
How many lives were spared through this.
C. Arrest of Sukhomlinov"
At 10:30 in the evening of March 1, the former Minister of War, V. A. Suk-
homlinov, was brought under the escort of an ensign and two sailors to the
building of the Tauride Palace.
Although the escort tried to conduct Sukhomlinov as quickly as possible to
the room of the Vice-President of the State Duma, news of the arrival of the
former Minister of War spread with the speed of lightning throughout the whole
Tauride Palace.
Soldiers were heard shouting: Give Sukhomlinov up.
It was with great difficulty that the members of the State Duma succeeded in
calming down the agitated soldiers. They rejected [the idea of] lynching, but
demanded categorically the removal of his shoulder boards. The former Minister
of War submitted to this demand without objection. The shoulder boards were
cut from his uniform and shown to the [men of the] Preobrazhenskii Regi
ment. The soldiers selected a special delegate. He was led to the room where
Sukhomlinov was sitting and was given the latters shoulder boards. When the
soldiers calmed down to a certain extent, it was decided to conduct the arrested
Sukhomlinov [out of the building]. His generals coat was brought in. The
shoulder boards had to be removed from it. The former Minister of War expressed
the desire to do this himself. He took a penknife from his pocket and slowly cut
off the shoulder boards. One of the persons surrounding him proposed that the
St. George Cross also be taken from Sukhomlinov.
Never mind. Leave it. The George Cross will be removed from him by
court [order], remarked the sailor from the escort.
 THE STORM BREAKS 49

Everything was finished and Sukhomlinov was led out to be taken to the
Ministerial Pavilion. For greater safety the prisoner was preceded by members
of the State Duma. The soldiers formed a chain holding back the more excited
comrades. In the Polutsirkulnyi Hall [the men of the] Preobrazhenskii Regiment
lined up and let the former Minister of War pass by them in silence. When the
door into the Pavilion closed behind Sukhomlinov, Kerensky emerged and
addressed the following words to the sentries:
Soldiers, Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War, is under arrest. He is
under the protection of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, and if you
permit yourselves, out of your legitimate hatred for him, to inflict on him the
punishment to which he is subject by trial, or exert violence, you will thereby
help him avoid the punishment to which he is subject by trial, and you will meet
with the most vigorous resistance from us, even should this cost us our lives.
The soldiers calmly dispersed.

25. R e s o lu ti o n o f R e p r e s e n ta ti v e s o f P u b lic O r g a n iz a tio n s

[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
Representatives of the following public organizations held a meeting in the
evening of February 27: the war Industries Committee, the Zemstvo and Town
Union, members of the Petrograd Municipal Duma, chairmen of hospital boards
and charity organizations, etc.
After a brief exchange of views, the following resolution was unanimously
adopted:
The representatives of the public organizations which met in conference on
March 12 [sic] welcome the resolution of the State Duma not to disperse and its
decision to take power into its hands.
The Temporary Committee, consisting of members of the State Duma, rely
ing on the forces of the responsible part of the army, as well as the workers and the
inhabitants, will have the support of the public organizations and will, finally,
give Russia complete victory over its external and internal foes.

26. T h e A p p e a l o f t h e D e a c o n s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
The following appeal of the Brotherhood of Deacons of the City of Petrograd
has been delivered to us:
I am with you [now and] for all eternity. Amen.
The time has come when the All-Russian Orthodox Clergy must raise its
voice in the great popular movement toward truth, light, brotherly love, and
freedom.
The [Russian] Orthodox Clergy of Petrograd and all Russia is called upon
to unite with the people. Any delay will threaten Orthodoxy with the wrath of
the people.
Pastors must remain among their spiritual flock. The All-Russian Orthodox
Clergy is indivisible from the great, free, Russian people.
The Brotherhood of Deacons of the City of Petrograd,
who have been attending the infirmaries of wounded
soldiers for the past three years.
50 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

27. A p p e a l o f [ t h e D um a] D e p u tie s f r o m t h e C le r g y
["Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 9, March 4, 1917, p. 1.]
The clerical members of the State Duma, who have unanimously participated
in the selection of the Temporary Executive Committee of the State Duma, are
turning to the [Russian] Orthodox clergy of all Russia with a brotherly appeal
immediately to recognize the authority of the Executive Committee and to explain
to the people in the ardent words of a pastor that the transfer of power has
occurred for their own good and that only under these conditions will it be possi
ble to lead the country to happiness, prosperity, and welfare.
There must be no differences between individual nationalities and classes.
Our duty as pastors is to appeal to everyone for unity and mutual brotherly love
ordained to us by Our Saviour.
Clerical Members of the State Duma.

28. F i r s t S te p s o f t h e T e m p o ra ry C o m m itte e o f t h e S t a t e D u m a
[e7 zvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 28, 1917, p. 1.]
At 2:00 oclock in the morning of February 28, the Executive Committee of
the State Duma issued the two following appeals:
I
The Temporary Committee of the State Duma appeals to the residents of
Petrograd, in the name of common interest, to protect state and public institutions
and equipment, such as: the telegraphic [services], pump houses, electrical sta
tions, street railways, and government buildings and offices. Likewise, the Com
mittee of the State Duma asks that citizens protect factories and mills, whether
these are working for defense purposes or for general consumption. It must be
remembered that damage and destruction of institutions and property benefit no
one and cause enormous harm to the Slate as well as to the people as a whole,
because everyone stands in equal need of water, light, etc. Similarly, encroach
ments on private property, physical assaults, and attempts at murder cannot be
tolerated. Bloodshed and the destruction of property will lie heavily on the
conscience of those who commit these acts and may, moreover, bring incalculable
disasters to the entire population of the capital.
M i k h a i l R o d z ia n k o ,
President of the State Duma
II
Under the difficult conditions of internal chaos brought on by the measures of
the old regime, the Temporary Committee of the State Duma has found itself
compelled to take the responsibility for restoring national and public order.
Conscious of the vast responsibility it has assumed by this decision, the Committee
expresses its assurance that the population and the army will assist it in the diffi
cult task of forming a new government that will correspond with the desires of
the population and will be capable of commanding its confidence.
M i k h a i l R o d z ia n k o ,
President of the State Duma
February 27, 1917
 THE STORM BREAKS 51

29. S p e e c h o f R o d z ia n k o t o t h e P r e o b r a z h e n s k ii R e g im e n t
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 23, 1917, p. 1.]
In the meantime the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, headed by the officers and the
Commander, lined up in the Ekaterininskii Hall.
[Men of] the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, attention,55 ordered the Commander
of the Regiment, saluting the President of the State Duma upon his appearance.
Rodzianko turned to the regiment with the following speech:
First of all, Orthodox soldiers, allow me to greet you as an old soldier: Good
day, young men!55
Good health to you, Your Excellency,55 the regiment answered in unison.
Allow me,55continued the President, to say thank you for having come here
to assist the members of the State Duma in restoring order and in ensuring the
glory and honor of our native land.
Your brothers are fighting out there, in the distant trenches, for the great
ness of Russia, and I am proud that my son has stood in the glorious ranks of the
Preobrazhenskii [Regiment] from the very beginning of the war. But in order
to be able to assist in restoring order, which is what the State Duma has under
taken to do, you must not be a mob. You know better than I that soldiers cannot
exist without officers. I ask you to subordinate yourselves to the officers and trust
them just as we trust them. Return calmly to your barracks so that you will be able
to go, at the first call, where you are needed.
We agree . . . answered the [men of the] Preobrazhenskii Regiment.
Show us the way,55 a shout was heard.
The old regime,55 answered the President of the State Duma, cannot lead
Russia on the proper course. Our first task is to form a new government which
will command everyones confidence and which will be able to exalt our Mother
Russia.55

30. S p e e c h of M iliu k o v to t h e L ifeguard Grenadiers

[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 28, 1917, p. 1.]
The appearance of P. N. Miliukov on the rostrum in the Ekaterininskii Hall
was met with cries of welcome.
Miliukov, member of the Temporary Committee, is speaking to you. (Cries:
We know!55)
When the power fell from the hands of our enemies, it was necessary to take
it into our own. This must be done at once, it must be done today (Hurrah!95) ,
for we do not know what tomorrow may bring.
What, then, must be done today, what must be done in order to take the power
into our own hands? We must first of all be organized, united, and subordinated
to one authority. This authority is the Temporary Committee of the State Duma.
It is necessary to submit to it and to no other authority, for dual authority is
dangerous and threatens to split and divide our forces.
Yesterday I saw the First Regiment, which came here in full array, with
its officers, and recognized the authority of the State Duma. (Bravo! ) Remem
ber that the only condition for our strength lies in our organization. Only
together with your officers will you be strong. A disorganized mob represents
no strength. If the whole army were to become a disorganized mob, a small group
of organized enemy [forces] would be sufficient to break us up. (True!) It is
52 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

necessary to organize this very day and to do what the First Regiment, which
came here yesterday, has done. Find your officers who are under the command
of the State Duma and put yourselves under their command. This is the imme
diate task of the day.
Remember that the enemy does not sleep and is preparing to wipe us off the
face of the earth, (Cries: This will not happen!)
Then this will not he, P. N. Miliukov addressed the soldiers.
It will not be! the men replied unanimously.
[The Commander of the Regiment then addressed the soldiers.]

Miliukov, member of the State Duma, has just spoken. Do you understand
what he has said?
We understand, we understand everything, the answer was heard.
We must become organized, and I will tell you how to do this. All the senior
ranking officers and noncommissioned officers must go at once to their units and
line them up in front of the State Duma. Then march through town, but this must
be done in an impressive way so that the people can admire their army.
Be calm and maintain complete order. Have faith that the State Duma will
act according to the dictates of its conscience. We will be at its disposal.
We are pleased to serve you.8 Hurrah! resounded the answer.

31. T h e F a l l o f t h e A d m ir a l ty
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1. The few troops which
had remained loyal had retired with Khabalov to the Winter Palace on the 27th. On
the morning of the 28th, partly at the urging of the Grand Duke Mikhail, they moved
to the Admiralty. The troops laid down their weapons and came out unarmed when
word arrived that the insurgent forces in the Peter and Paul Fortress would open fire
on the Admiralty. See the testimony of the Minister of War, M.A. Beliaev, and General
Khabalov in Padenie , II, 242-43, 201-6.]
Around 4:00 p.m., February 28. The Admiralty, where members of the old
government have been hiding until now, has been occupied by the popular forces.
Until 12:00 noon, the Admiralty was occupied by three companies of the
Izmailovskii Regiment, a certain number of horse artillery, and a small number
of cavalry [units]. After 12:00 noon, these forces, which, until then, had sided
with the supporters of the old regime, left the Admiralty and dispersed to their
quarters. After this, the ministers who were hiding out there also disappeared.

32. T h e S i t u a t i o n in M o sc o w
Moscow Joins [the Revolution]
[The first item is from Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1.
The second is from Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXI (1927), 45. The
third is from Izvestiia No. 4, March 1,1917, p. 1.]
Today, February 28, not a single newspaper was published in Moscow. Street
cars do not run. Meetings are held all over town. The Municipal Duma is con-

8 Rady staratsia.
 THE STORM BREAKS 53

ferring with civic leaders. Publication of the news on the dissolution of the State
Duma was at first detained by military censorship, but later permitted. The
publication of General Khabalovs order was prohibited by military censorship.

[Telegram] from General Mrozovskii to General Alekseev of March 1, 191799

Sent March 1, 14 hours 30 minutes
Received March 3, 16 hours 10 minutes
Moscow is in complete revolution. Military units pass to the side of the
revolutionaries. 8197. M ro z o v sk ii.

Recognition of the Authority of the Committee of the State Duma99

The authority of the Temporary Committee, [composed] of members of the
State Duma, has been recognized in Moscow and Kharkov.

33. T h e M ilitary C o m m issio n of t h e S ta te D um a

[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde, KA, XLI-XLII (1930), 63-102. In the
evening of the 27th the Temporary Executive Committee of the Soviet delegated
S. Mstislavskii to organize a staff to direct the activities of the insurgent troops. At
about the same time the Temporary Committee of the State Duma also set up a center
for the same purpose. Later in the evening, Rodzianko and Kerensky combined the
two groups to form the Military Commission of the State Duma and appointed Colonel
B. A. Engelhardt, a member of the Duma, Chairman. See S. Mstislavskii, Piat dnei9
p. 18, and N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and
trans., p. 40 and passim, and Docs. 58, 65.]

A. Orders Given by the Military Commission

No. 1, Order
To Colonel Nazimov from the Military Commission of the Temporary Com
mittee of the State Duma: Occupy the Tsarskoe Selo [Railway] Station, the power
plant of the Baltic Company, the savings bank, and protect the whole area between
Nikolaevskaia Street, the Zagorodnyi and the Vladimir Prospekts, by the Tech
nological Institute and the adjacent area.

Y urev ich
Commandant of the Tauride Palace
8 hrs. morning 28/11

No. 2, Order
To Preobrazhenskii Regiment of the Life Guards: Occupy the State Bank, the
telephone exchange (Morskaia 22), place sentinels at the Hermitage and the
Alexander III Museum.
B. E n g e lh a r d t
Chairman of the Military Commission
8 hrs. 01 m. 28/11
54 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

No. 3, Order
To Second Lieutenant Ponomarenko and Second Lieutenant Bobritskii: As
sume temporary command of the Volynskii Regiment.
B. E n g e l h a r d t
Chairman of the Military Commission
of the Temporary Committee of the
State Duma
8 hrs. 30 m. 28/II morning

No. 4, Order
P etr o g r a d
To Colonel A. V. Bobinskii, Commander of the electrotechnical reserve bat
talion: Occupy the Central Telephone Exchange (Morskaia 22) for the purpose of
operating the telephone network; the Colonel will place people at the installations
to be directed by Engineer Tollochko in his capacity as chief of the [telephone]
exchange.
B. E n g e l h a r d t
Chairman of the Military Commission
of the Temporary Committee of the
State Duma
8 hrs. 40 m. 28/11

No. 5, Order
P etr o g r a d
To First Lieutenant Stanislav Shimanskii: Proceed, on the basis of instructions
received, with the arrest of Boris Sturmer, former President of the Council of
Ministers, bringing him to the premises of the Duma. After that, occupy the offices
of the Aircraft Station.
F ir s t L i e u t e n a n t V . F il ip p o v s k i i
[for the] Chairman of the Military
Commission of the Temporary Committee
of the State Duma
8 hrs. 45 m. morning 28/11

No. 23, Order

The reserve battalion of the Preobrazhenskii Life Guard Regiment is ordered
to mount guard posts and preserve order within the whole building of the Tauride
Palace and on its premises.
F ir s t L ie u t e n a n t V . F il ip p o v s k i i
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission of the Temporary
Committee
14 hrs. 45 m. 28/11
 THE STORM BREAKS 55

No. 26, Order

To Captain Vasilev: Occupy the main telegraph building, maintain order,
and organize authority.
F ir s t L i e u t e n a n t V . F il ip p o v s k i i
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission of the Temporary Committee
12:15 a .m . 28/11

No. 29. Order

By order of the Provisional Government,7 First Lieutenant Grekov is instructed
to take command of the ships companies of the Guard and of the 2nd Baltic Fleet,
to occupy the Nikolaevskii and Tsarskoe SCelo stations, and to report after exe
cuting [the orders].
F ir s t L ie u t e n a n t V . F i l ip p o v s k i i
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission
12 hrs. 35 m. 28/11

No. 34, Order

To Second Lieutenant Sibiriakov of the special heavy artillery: Form a detach
ment for guarding the food supply warehouses in the city of Petrograd and its
outskirts, which are placed under the management of Miklashevskii, member of
the Duma; for this purpose said Second Lieutenant is authorized to choose for
himself an assistant among the officers and the necessary number of men.
C a p t a in I v a n o v , for the Chairman
13 hrs. 20 m. 28/11

No. 42, Order

Kazimir Pavlovich Maratov is assigned the duty of stopping cars running
aimlessly and of bringing them to the [assembly] point (corner Sergievskaia
[Street] and Liteinyi Prospekt).
B. E n g e l h a r d t
Chairman of the Military Commission of the
Temporary Committee of the State Duma
2 hrs. 10 m. 28/11

No. 58, Order

To Master Sergeant Garb: Reconnoiter the comer of Nadezhdinskaia and
Jukovskaia streets for the purpose of [removing] machine gunners from the roof.
C a p t a in C h i k o u n i
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission of the Temporary Committee
3 hrs. 6 m. 28/11
7 This term was sometimes used before March 3 to refer to the Temporary Committee of
the State Duma.
56 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

No. 62, Order

On behalf of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma to the Commandant
of the Pavlovskoe Military School: Place the school entrusted to your care at the
disposal of the Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the State
Duma and await further instructions from the Military Commission, reporting
for this purpose to said commission.
F ir st L ie u t e n a n t V . F il ip p o v s k ii
for the Chairman of the Military Commission
of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma
3 hrs. 35 m. 28/11

No. 77, Order

To the Commander of the 9th Cavalry Reserve Regiment: Immediately bring,
with an adequate number of officers, the greatest possible number of squadrons
in full combat equipment and a machine-gun detachment for the purpose of
guarding the Tauride Palace.
F ir s t L ie u t e n a n t V . F i l ip p o v s k ii
[for the] Chairman of the Military
Commission of the Temporary Committee
5 hrs. 15 m. 28/11

No. 84, Order

To I. M. Ramot, member of the State Duma: Take charge and establish the
guard of the State Bank.
B. E n g e l h a r d t
Chairman of the Military Commission
of the Temporary Committee
7 p.m. 28/11

No. 85, Order

To civilian employee Serebriakov of the artillery department: Organize the
guard of the Putilov plant area.
P . P a l c h in s k ii
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission of the State Duma
7 hrs. 16 m. 28/11

No. 89, Order

To V. V. Nikitin, Professor of the Mine Engineering Institute: Organize the
 THE STORM BREAKS 57

militia on Vassilievskii Island in the area adjacent to the Mine Engineering Insti
tute, for the purpose of restoring and maintaining order in said area.
P . P a l c h i n s k i i
for the Chairman of the Military
Commission of the State Duma
9 p.m. 28/11

No. 94, Order

In order to resume the operations of the telephone exchange, it is necessary to
send to the exchange one or two cars with students or someone else to pick up at
their homes the girls [operators] who are frightened. Furthermore, the corpse
lying on the premises of the [telephone] exchange should be removed.
M i k h a i l R o d z ia n k o
President of the State Duma
28/11

No. 96, Order

By order of the Provisional Government the officers of the 2nd Baltic Fleet
and the men under their command are ordered to relieve and remove the guards
of the Government and to take charge of the Winter Palace.
28/11 The Commandant of the Tauride Palace

No. 102, Order

To Kryzhanovskii, Deputy of the Municipal Duma: Organize the militia on
behalf of the public organizations of Petrograd, for the purpose of maintaining
order on the streets of Petrograd. The premises of the prefecture, police stations,
movie theaters, and various public establishments are to be used for the militia.8
1 hr. 15 m. 28/I I 1/111

No. I l l , Order
Restricted
No. 23. March 1,1917. City of Petrograd.
To the reserve battalion of the Life Guard Preobrazhenskii Regiment.
The Commander of the Battalion has ordered:
1
In execution of the order of the Temporary Committee for the protection of
the city of Petrograd, the following posts are to be occupied:
The Winter Palace% companyCaptain Kulnev.

8 See Doc. 34.

58 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The palace of Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna*4 companySecond Lieu

tenant Baron Rosen.
The palace of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich^4 companyEnsign
Goltgoer.
The palace of Prince A. P. Oldenburg *4 company Second Lieutenant
Baron Rausch von Traubenberg.
Telephone exchange (on the Morskaia)^4 companySecond Lieutenant
Illiashevich.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs% companySecond Lieutenant Nelidov.

The detail to set out at 9 :00 oclock.

In addition, outposts are to be sent to :
1) Millionnaia [Street], Moshkov [Alley], Moika [Canal]around the Sum
mer garden along the quaysup to Moshkov to Millionnaia.
2) Millionnaia, Moika, Mariinskii Palace, and back along Morskaia [Street]
and the Palace Square.
3) The small Winter Channel, the quays of the Neva up to the Senate Square,
the Senate Square, Issac Square, Morskaia Street.
The outposts have the duty of dispersing various gathering in the streets.
2
All officers free of service details to assemble today, March 1, at 8:00 oclock
at the quarters of their companies or detachments.
F ir s t L ie u t e n a n t M a k s h e e v
Adjutant of the Battalion
2?. Reports to the Military Commission of the Provisional
Committee of the State Duma
No. 1, Report
A disorganized mob of soldiers, of approximately 1,000 men, has been sent
from Oranienbaum in the direction of Petrograd. They have reached Peterhof.
If the units [of Peterhof] join them, then about 15 thousand men may march on
Petrograd.
Commandant of the Kronstadt Fortress
3 hrs. 45 m. 2/28
No. 2, To the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Temporary
Committee of the State Duma
[From] the chief of the guard at the Respirator plant of the
Central War Industry Committee.
I report that a machine gun, which is shooting at the plant and into the street,
has been placed on the second floor of the building of the Treugolnik rubber
plant, situated in front of the plant. I request an order to search this place.
S e c o n d L i e u t e n a n t L o b a n -Z h u c h e n k o ,
Chief of Guard at the Respirator plant
5 hr. evening 28/11
 THE STORM BREAKS 59

No. 6, Report
Machine guns on the corner of Sadovaia [Street at the] City Hall, on the
corner of Gorokhovaia [Street] and the Moika (2 machine guns)-, on the corner
of Kazanskaia [Street] and Gorokhovaia.
10 hrs. 45 m. 2/28

No. 8, Report to Engelhardt

I report that near the Winter Palace [and] at the Anichkov Bridge there is
shelling from machine guns, also near house No. 8 on the Degtiarnyi Alley.
According to information [received], a battalion of gendarmes is hiding in the
Winter Palace.
4:00 p .m . 2/28 S h a b l i n s k ii , S e c o n d L ie u t e n a n t

No 10, Report
Disorders, meetings, etc., in Kronstadt. By 7:00 a . m . horses will be available.
Request that members of the Duma be sent to organize.
4 hr. 5 min. evening l /I I I

No. 18
The medics of the Winter Palace military hospital request that a detachment
of troops be sent in order to arrest persons hiding there, to stop machine-gun
shooting from the roof, and to guard the Palace.
At present the Palace is in nobodys power; the sentinels are removed, but
inside there are partisans of the old Government.
S t u d e n t I ze
On behalf of the medics
2/28
No. 19
The post of 40 men from the Keksgolm Regiment established for the pro
tection of the Senate requests instruction from the Temporary Government on
what to do and whose orders the post should obey; we believe that to leave the
Senate building to its fate would be criminal in view of the enormous importance
of the documents it contains. Near the Senate are visible crowds of drunks, who,
according to rumors, have plundered the Hotel Astoria.
28/11

No. 21
Request from scouts of the Pavlovskii Regiment, stationed at the Finland
Station, to send to the Petrograd ammunition warehouse a reinforced detach-
60 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

ment and several machine guns, as the warehouse is guarded by only 40 men
without machine guns.
28/11 M a s t e r S e r g e a n t -----------------

C. Personal Records of One of the Military Commissions Members

No. 22
Peter and Paul Fortress
for the time being a base
for shooting at the Admiralty.
To start negotiations
with Captain Myshlaevskii.
2 h. 35 m. 28/111 /III
No. 23
The Semenovskii, Pavlovskii,
and Petrograd regiments have
arrived. The Jaeger Regiment
is marching. There are 3
machine guns.
Note taken. To leave it
in charge of the Lieutenant.
2 h. 40 m.28/II1 /III
No. 24
The Peter and Paul Fortress and
the blocking of its exit.
To postpone until morning, and in the
morning ask V. A. Rzhevskii to go
with a detachment for negotiations.
3 h. 28/II-1/III
No. 25
Re: the arrest of the
Council of Ministers in the
Admiralty building.
To act through the
Preobrazhenskii Regiment and
to ask Colonel Engelhardt to
negotiate with the Regiment.
3 h. 15 m. 28/II-1 /III

No. 33
Re: disarmament of
police stations.
To disarm all the
stations.
4 h. 15 m. 28/111 /III
 THE STORM BREAKS 61

No. 40
Troops have arrived at the Nicolas Station and have surrendered.
6 h. 00 m. 28/111 /III
No. 41
Cossacks and soldiers have arrived from Krasnoe calmly.
Also at the Putilov [plant] everything is calm.
7 h. l/I I I
No. 42
1. About 30 policemen with a machine gun are entrenched on Kirochnaia
[Street] in front of the Combat Engineers Battalion.
2. The Department of Criminal Investigation replied that it does not exist
any longer and that one should address oneself to the Duma.

34. T h e O r g a n iz a t io n o f t h e C it y M i l it ia
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, M arch 1, 1917, p. 1.]
A meeting of the Petrograd Youth was held yesterday under the chairman
ship of Kryzhanovskii, member of the Municipal Duma, for the purpose of
organizing a city militia. The following plan was outlined: The central bureau
will be located in the Municipal Duma. Each district will have its own district
committee. It was found necessary to arm every militiaman. The consent for
this has already been obtained from the Executive Committee.

35, O r d e r on t h e P r o c e d u r e f o r C a r r y in g O u t A r r e s t s
and Searches
[VVP, No. 2, March 7, 1917. Apparently first issued February 28 without part 2. See
Izvestiia99Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
1.
I order all military units and the peoples militia to be guided by the fol
lowing rules in carrying out arrests:
I. The following persons are subject to immediate arrest:
1) inebriates;
2) burglars, arsonists, persons shooting into the air and, in general, dis
rupting peace and order in the capital;
3) those who offer resistance to persons with any special powers delegated
to them by the Provisional Government, or to persons employed for the protec
tion of the town;
4) all ranks of the regular and secret police and the corps of gendarmes;
5) all persons who carry out searches of private residences or arrests of
private persons and, also, of army personnel, without having any special authori
zation from the Provisional Government for such [action].
II. All persons arrested under the aforenamed categories shall be immedi
ately sent directly to the following points, selecting the closest of these: . . .
At all these points, arrested persons shall be transferred immediately to the
Department of the Commandant. Only statesmen and generalsshould there be
occasion to detain such [persons]shall be [transferred] to the Tauride Palace.
62 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

2.
All prisoners who were languishing in prisons for their political convictions
have been released. Unfortunately, along with them, criminals have also been
granted freedom. These murderers, thieves, and burglars, disguising themselves
in uniforms of the lower [military] ranks, are brazenly bursting into private
residences, carrying out illegal searches, robbing, raping, and bringing on terror.
I order that all such persons be immediately detained and be dealt with
severely to the point of being shot in the event of resistance.
Military units which are making the rounds or are on patrol duty must wear
white bands bearing the name of their unit on the left sleeve of the greatcoat.
Apart from this, the person in charge of the rounds or of the patrol must
carry a written attestation from his unit.
Member of the Temporary Committee M. A. K a r a u l o v

36. O r d e r t o O f f ic e r s o f t h e P e t r o g r a d G a r ris o n a n d A l l
O ffic er s in P etrograd !
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
The Military Commission of the State Duma requests all officers who have
not received definite instructions from the Commission to appear on March 1
and 2, between 10:00 a . m . and 6:00 p . m ., in the Hall of the Army and Fleet for
the purpose of correct registration and for the purpose of receiving general passes
and carrying out the instructions of the Commission on organizing soldiers who
have joined the representatives of the people for protecting the capital.
Any delay on the part of the officers in reporting to their units will inevitably
undermine the prestige of the rank of officer.
In addressing this announcement to the officers, the Military Commission
points out that in the face of the enemy, standing at the very heart of the native
land and ready to take advantage of her momentary weakness, it is urgent and
imperative to exert every effort toward restoring the organization of military units.
In this alone lies the strength of our army and the pledge for ultimate triumph.
The blood of our comrades who have fallen in battle during the two and a half
years of war makes this incumbent on us.
Officers, do not lose a single minute of precious time!
M ilitary C o m m issio n o f t h e T em porary C o m m it t e e
o f t h e S tate D um a ,
M. R o d z ia n k o , President of the State Duma

37. A n n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e C o m m an d e r o f t h e P e t r o g r a d
Garrison
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
On this day of March 1 a rumor was circulating among the soldiers of the
Petrograd Garrison to the effect that in regiments officers are confiscating arms
from soldiers. These rumors were checked in two regiments and were found to
be false. As Chairman of the Military Commission of the Temporary Committee
of the State Duma, I announce that the most resolute measures, including exe-
 THE STORM BREAKS 63

cution of the guilty, will be applied to prevent acts of this nature on the part of
the officers.9
B. E n g e l h a r d t , Member of the State Duma

38. T h e R e s o l u t io n of the O f f ic e r s in t h e H all of the

A rmy and N avy
[Izvestiia" Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
The officers who are stationed in Petrograd and are in complete sympathy
with the people met in the Hall of the Army and Navy at the request of the
Executive Committee of the State Duma and, recognizing the necessity for the
fastest possible establishment of order and concerted action in the rear for a
victorious conclusion of the war, resolved unanimously:
To recognize the authority of the Executive Committee of the State Duma
pending the formation of a permanent government.
Chairman of the Meeting: C o l o n e l Z a s h c h u m
Deputy Chairmen: C o l o n e l K h o m e i k o and
C o l o n e l D r u t s k o i -S o k o l in s k ii
Secretary: D v in l in n o v
1 :00 p .m ., March 1, 1917

39. A ppea l of the O f f ic e r s to t h e S o l d ie r s

[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No, 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
Our fighting comrade soldiers! The hour of national liberation has struck.
The army, the navy, and the people, along with you, have raised the sacred
banner of freedom.
And we, your partners in the advanced positions, who have received the bap
tism of fire out there in combat in the face of death, we equally have shed and
mingled our blood with yours on the field of battle.
Believe, then, that we hold dearest of all the freedom of our native land.
Only a free Russia can smash the German power. Remember that the salvation
and victory of Russia [lie] in our mutual trust and concerted [action].
As for the old, autocratic regime which, during two years of war, was unable
to bring final victory to Russialet it be buried in oblivion.
We, together with you, are committing the old regime to damnation.
Comrade soldiers I Do not abandon your guns; take care of them. You need
them here just as you needed them in the trenches. Help us to prevent looting
and to restore order. Return to your units for concerted work with us. To our
greatest distress, there were traitors to the peoples cause both among the soldiers
and among the officers, and there were many victims from among honest cham
pions of freedom who fell at the hands of these traitors.
But let us apply our common efforts to [achieve] unity among ourselves, and
[gain] final victory over the enemy on the front as well as within Russia.
Long live the great, free [land] of Russia!
Your Comrade Officers.
The State Duma.
9 Compare the severity of tTria order -with Order No. 1.
64 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

40. C o s s a c k R e g im e n t s J o in [ t h e R e v o l u t io n a r y P e o p l e ]
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
On the morning of March 1, M. S. Voronkov and S. V. Cherechukhin, deputies
from Cossack oblasts and members of the State Duma, visited the barracks of
the 1st and 4th Don Cossack regiments.
From discussions with the officers it was learned that both regiments are
ready at any moment to give their support to the Executive Committee of the
State Duma. At the request of Voronkov and Cherechukhin, both regiments
were lined up with their officers [standing] in front of them.
M. S. Voronkov addressed an impassioned speech to the lower ranks, re
minded them how they had always loyally served their native land, and called
upon them to serve just as loyally the new Government, which has undertaken
the defense of the Fatherland.
Voronkovs speech was drowned in shouts of Hurrah!

41. A d d it io n a l M il it a r y U n it s J o in t h e R e v o l u t io n
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]

Almost all the insurgent troops in Tsarskoe Selo, Pavlovsk, Kronstadt, and
Oranienbaum are making their way to the State Duma and are requesting, through
their deputies, that members of the State Duma be sent to them for organiza
tional purposes.
This morning the entire Escort of His Majesty came to the State Duma. The
representatives of the Escort declared that some of the officers granted them com
plete freedom of action and requested that officers who refused to take part in
the uprising be placed under guard.

The size of the revolutionary troops increases with every day. During the
course of the morning [the following units] have joined the insurgents: Pyro
technists-Artillerymen, Mine Sweeping Company (in full complement with all the
officers), the General Staff Academy in full complement (350 officers), the Life
Guards of the Mounted Guards Regiment in full complement, the Imperial Naval
Guard in full complement with all the officers, the crews of the Baltic Fleet (the
latter elected 16 delegates and dispatched them to the Soviet of Workers Depu
ties) , the lower ranks of the gendarme division, the 2nd Baltic [Imperial] Naval
Guards consisting of approximately 5,000 men, with the greater part of the officers.

42. T h e G r a n d D u k e K ir il l V l a d im ir o v ic h in t h e
S tate D u m a
[MIzvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1. The Vladimir branch
of the royal family was particularly ambitious as well as hostile to Nicholas and
Alexandra, but probably the Grand Duke was motivated principally by the desire to
preserve control over his units, though he may have had ulterior motives. See Golder,
pp. 246-47.]
At 4:15 P.M. of March 1, Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich arrived at the
Tauride Palace. The Grand Duke was accompanied by the Admiral in command
of the Naval Guards and by an escort of lower-ranking Naval Guards.
 THE STORM BREAKS 65

The Grand Duke went to the Ekaterininskii Hall, to which the President of
the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, was also summoned. Turning to the Presi
dent of the State Duma, Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich declared:
I have the honor of coming to Your Excellency. I am at your disposal. Like
all the people, I desire the good of Russia. This morning I explained the sig
nificance of the current events to all the soldiers [szc] and I can now announce
that all the Imperial Naval Guards are at the complete disposal of the State Duma.
The words of the Grand Duke were drowned in shouts of Hurrah!
M. V. Rodzianko thanked the Grand Duke and, turning to the soldiers [sic]
of the Imperial Naval Guards surrounding him, said:
I am very glad, gentlemen, [to hear] the words of the Grand Duke. I had
confidence that the Imperial Naval Guards, like all the rest of the forces, would
discharge their duty in complete order, would assist in coping with the common
foe, and would lead Russia to the path of victory.
The words of the President of the State Duma were similarly drowned by
shouts of Hurrah!
Then M. V. Rodzianko, addressing the Grand Duke, asked whether he wished
to remain in the State Duma. The Grand Duke replied that the Imperial Naval
Guards were approaching the State Duma in full force and that he would like
to present them to the President of the State Duma.
In that case, M. V. Rodzianko declared, you will call me out when you
need me.
Then M. V. Rodzianko returned to his office. Since all the rooms in the State
Duma were occupied, the representatives of the Committee of Petrograd Jour
nalists suggested that the Grand Duke go to their room.
The Admiral of the Imperial Naval Guards and the adjutant of the Grand
Duke accompanied him to the journalists room.

43. T h e K r o n st a d t F o r t r e ss J o in s [ t h e R e v o l u t io n ]
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
The insurgent garrison of Kronstadt took control of the Fortress. Admiral
Viren, who defended the old regime, was killed.
Deputies Pepeliaev and Taskin were commissioned to Kronstadt by order of
the Executive Committee of the State Duma.
When the deputies arrived, the insurgent troops announced their complete
submission to the Executive Committee of the State Duma. Pepeliaev and Taskin
delivered fervent speeches to the troops, who were lined up in front of them at
attention, and received an enthusiastic response.
Pepeliaev, member of the State Duma, was appointed Temporary Comman
dant of the Kronstadt Fortress.

44. O r d e r t o t h e M il it a r y S c h o o l s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
The Temporary Committee of the State Duma on Restoring Order in Petro
grad has issued the following order to the Vladimirskii, Pavlovskii, and Topo-
grafischeskii military schools:
66 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The Vladimirskii School belongs to the forces of the Provisional Govern

ment [sic] of the State Duma, which has instructed the said School to continue all
normal activities and to make good progress in preparing future cadres of officers.
It is prohibited, under the strictest accountability before the Provisional
Government [sic], to demand of anyone in authority at the School to issue arms,
military supplies, uniforms, and provisions.
The School is ordered not to issue arms to anyone and to arrest any person
who takes the liberty of demanding arms and indulges in any form of coercion
with respect to the School and to send such persons to the Office of the Comman
dant of the State Duma.
A. F. K e r e n s k y and M. A. K a r a u lo v , Members of the State Duma
For the Chairman of the Temporary Committee
Similar orders were issued to the Pavlovskii Military School and the Topo-
grafischeskii Military School.

45. T o the T roops

[Izvestiia99Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 8, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
All troops of the Petrograd Garrison are requested to introduced order in
their units at once, based on new principles. One representative each of the offi
cers and the soldiers shall be dispatched to the Military Commission of the State
Duma with appropriate personal identification. Information is requested for
registration purposes as follows:
1. On the staff of commanding officers and the number of their units.
2. On the quantity of ordnance at hand and the amount of shortage.
3. On the organization of supply units.
4. [On] the re-establishment of normal living conditions.

Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma.

B. E n g e lh a r d t , Chairman of the Commission, Member of the State Duma.

46. C ontinued S cattered R esistance by S u ppo rters of t h e

O ld R eg im e
[Issued as an Order to the City of Petrograd, published in Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi
Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
Many attics and roofs of houses in the capital are occupied by the supporters
of the old regime who are hoping for its return and are permitting themselves
to fire at the troops and the inhabitants.
Janitors and landlords are directed to search thoroughly all attics and roofs
and to check on their tenants.
All suspect persons must be reported immediately to the Military Commission
of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma.
Those guilty of harboring [supporters of the old regime] will be court-
martialed.
N. A. K a r a u lo v , Member of the Temporary Committee
 THE STORM BREAKS 61

47. T h e A p p o i n t m e n t o f C o m m is s a r s to t h e M in is t r ie s and
O t h e r G o v e r n m e n t A g e n c ie s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March I, 1917, p. 1.]
A.
The Committee of the State Duma has selected the commissars who will be
appointed on March 1 to the ministries, the Central Post Office, the Central Tele
graph [Agency], and other governmental institutions for the purpose of general
supervision over the course of work.
B.
On February 28, in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Com
mittee, A. A. Bublikov, transport engineer and member of the State Duma, entered
upon his duties as Commissar in charge of transport.

48. A p p e a l to t h e R a il r o a d W o r k e r s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 28, 1917, p. 1.]
Member of the State Duma Bublikov was instructed by the Temporary Com
mittee to adopt measures to ensure that railroad services would not be disrupted.
Deputy A. A. Bublikov issued the following appeal to the railroad workers:
Railroad workers: The old regime, which brought disorganization into all
spheres of national life, has turned out to be impotent.
The Committee of the State Duma, having undertaken the formation of the
new Government, addresses the following words to you on behalf of the Father
land: The salvation of our native land now depends upon you. Train schedules
must be maintained without interruption and with twice as much energy.
The country is expecting more than a fulfillment of duty on your part. It
expects a feat.
The technical shortcomings and weaknesses of the Russian railroad network
must be compensated by dauntless energy, love for our native land, and aware
ness of the role of transport in war and in the planning and organization of public
services in the rear.

49. T h e T e l e g r a p h A g e n c y Is in t h e H a n d s of t h e
E x e c u t iv e C o m m i t t e e
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
On March 1 the Commissars of the Executive Committee of the State Duma,
Deputies P. P. Gronskii and A. S. Salazkin, accompanied by the Executive Com
mittee of the Petrograd Journalists, went to the Petrograd Telegraph Agency
with the aim of placing the Executive Committee in control of information issued
to the provinces.
In the Agency, the Commissars were met by the director of the Agency,
Gelser. P. P. Gronskii, member of the State Duma, presented to Mr. Gelser the
Order of the Executive Committee and proceeded at once to reorganize the
Agency.
A. M. Loviagin, the manager, was appointed temporary Director of the
Agency.
68 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

S. A. Adrianov was appointed Director of the Agency by the Executive Com

mittee.

On the same morning circular telegrams were immediately composed in the

presence of Gronskii and Salazkin, members of the Executive Committee, giving
an account of all the events during the past three days, and were urgently trans
mitted to all the provincial newspapers.
In addition, very detailed, supplementary telegrams giving an account of the
entire course of events were sent to all large towns, such as Kharkov, Odessa,
Kiev, and Saratov.
The editors of the Agency and the entire personnel of machinists were left
in their same positions.
The change was accepted with great joy in the Agency. In agreement with
the member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Journalists who was
present at the time, it was decided that the Agency would release information only
to provincial newspapers; the newspapers in Moscow and the capital would hence
forth be served by their own correspondents.
The bulletins of the Telegraph Agency will henceforth be issued under the
signature of P. Gronskii, Commissar of the State Duma.

50. T h e T e m p o r a r y C o m m it t e e a n d A l l ie d D ip l o m a t ic
R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s
[These two items in Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 4 and No. 6, March 1, 3,
1917, p. 1 were rather exaggerated accounts of the early contacts between the Duma
and the Allied representatives in Petrograd.]

A . Official Recognition of the Provisional Government by

England and France99
The French and British Ambassadors have officially notified the President
of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, that the governments of France and Eng
land are entering into de facto relations with the Temporary Executive Committee
of the State Duma, which expresses the true will of the people and is the only
legal Provisional Government of Russia.

B. wThe Recognition of the Provisional Government by

Foreign Powers99
The Executive Committee of the State Duma and B. A. EngeFhardt, the Com
mander of the Petrograd Garrison, received the military agents and the diplo
matic representatives from England, France, and Italy today. They announced
their willingness to enter immediately into de facto relations with the Executive
Committee of the State Duma, as the sole representative of power in Russia.
The Italian delegation also visited the Tauride Palace today. Enormous masses
of people and troops, overcrowding the Ekaterininskii Hall since morning,
welcomed the delegation with enthusiasm. Cries of Long live Italy! filled the
Ekaterininskii Hall for several minutes.
 THE STORM BREAKS 69

51. O f f ic ia l R e p o r t o f t h e C o m m is s a r o f T r a n s p o r t on t h e
F ood S u p p l y in P etr o g r a d
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 3, March 1, 1917, p. 1.]
A decrease in the shipment of food by rail recently became evident in the
capital and in other large centers. This decrease was for the most part tempo
rary and occurred as a result of unfavorable weather conditions and the exhaus
tion of personnel.
Snowdrifts and blizzards on most of the roads, reaching absolutely unprece
dented proportions this winter, had stopped not only freight but even passenger
service.
However, even in this period of difficult road conditions, food supplies still
continued to be loaded. Fortunately for the country, the weather has changed
during the past two days. A thaw has set in in the southern region of Russia,
which had especially suffered from snowstorms.
In the central region the weather is fairly calm with moderate temperature.
[Railroad] service is now becoming adjusted. Food and fuel supplies for the
army and the population are the first to be dispatched by rail. Over 6,000,000
poods of food freight are on the way by the principal railroads. Over 2,000,000
poods of grain freight, approximately half of which is flour, have been loaded
daily during the past few days. The amount of food freight coming into Petro
grad is beginning to increase. One hundred and twenty-three thousand poods
of flour alone arrived on February 26. The shipment of food supplies will in
crease in the future as the traffic improves. The Commissar of the Committee of
the State Duma has adopted the necessary urgent measures for increasing the
traffic and there remains only the organization of the most energetic unloading
of freight from Vindavskaia, Nikolaevskaia, and the northwestern railroads in
order to avoid a bottleneck at the stations.
Thus, there are no longer any grounds for concern for the supply of food
to the capital, and the population should view the future with complete calm and
confidence with respect to the supply of grain.
A. B u b l ik o v , C om m iss a r of the Committee of the State Duma

52. A p p e a l o f t h e T e m p o r a r y C o m m it t e e o f t h e D u m a a n d t h e
E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e o f t h e S o v ie t f o r C o o p e r a t io n i n
S u p p l y in g t h e P o p u l a t io n a n d t h e A r m y w i t h F oo d
[IzvestiicP Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1. See also the appeal of
the War Industry Committee, Golder, pp. 284-85.]
c it iz e n s !

A great event has taken place: the old regime, which was destroying Russia,
has collapsed.
The Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies cannot assume temporary authority and are establishing order and ad
ministration in the country.10 Their primary concern at the present is to supply
10 This sentence in the text is obviously contradictory and may well be a misprint. In
Izvestiia, No. 4, March 3, 1917, p. 6, the first line of the second paragraph reads: The Com
mittee of the State Duma and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers9Deputies have assumed tem-
70 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

the army and the population with food. They have established food commissions
which have taken charge of the entire matter. Very little remains of the grain
reserves left at its disposal by the old regime, and further procurement must be
expedited.
Citizens of Russiaagriculturalists, landowners, merchants, railroad em
ployees, and workershelp our native land. The army and the [civilian] popu
lation must be fed. The war still goes on. Let everyone, as one man, whoever
he is, come to the assistance of the country in these great and grave days; let
not one hand falter. Let no one refuse to perform his civic duty; let each mans
conscience prompt him as to what to do. Sell the grain to the authorized repre
sentatives as soon as possible; give all you can spare. Lose no time in bringing
the grain to the railroad stations and wharves; load it quickly and ship it promptly
to its destination. The country is waiting for your friendly help. Give bread to
her fighters, her workers, and to those that serve her. Time does not wait. Every
hour is precious. Do not procrastinate.
Citizens, come to the aid of your country by [contributing] your bread and
your labor.
M. R o d z ia n k o , President of the Committee of the State Duma.
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF

WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES

53. T h e S o v ie t o f W o r k e r s D e p u t i e s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
In the afternoon [February 27], representatives of workers and soldiers and
several civic leaders held a meeting in the building of the State Duma. A Soviet
of Workers Deputies was organized, which resolved to address an appeal to the
population.

54. P r o c la m a tio n C a llin g f o r t h e E le c t io n o f W o r k e r s 5

a n d S o ld ie r s D e p u tie s t o t h e P e t r o g r a d S o v ie t
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. 1.]
The representatives of the workers, soldiers, and inhabitants of
c it iz e n s :
Petrograd, meeting in the State Duma, announce that the first session of their
representatives will take place at seven oclock tonight in the building of the
State Duma. All those troops that have joined the side of the people should
immediately elect their representatives, one for each company. Factory workers

porary authority and are establishing order and administration in the country. This reading
also appears in other papers and is probably the correct one, though it is inconsistent with the
views of both the Temporary Committee and the Soviet concerning any joint holding of tem
porary power. If it is the right version, it no doubt resulted from hasty drafting without con
sideration of its implications.
 THE STORM BREAKS 71

should elect one deputy for each one thousand. Factories with fewer than one
thousand workers should elect one deputy each.
THE TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
SOVIET OF WORKERS DEPUTIES

55. A p p e a l o f t h e T e m p o ra ry C o m m itte e o f t h e P e t r o g r a d S o v ie t
t o S u p p ly t h e I n s u r g e n t T ro o p s w i t h F o o d
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 1, February 27, 1917, p. L]
c it iz e n s : The soldiers who have joined the side of the people have been in the
streets since morning without food. The Soviet of Deputies, the workers, soldiers,
and inhabitants are making every effort to feed the soldiers. But it is hard to
organize the food supply all at once. The Soviet appeals to you, citizens, to feed
the soldiers as best you can.
t h e t e m p o r a r y e x e c u t iv e c o m m it t e e o f t h e
s o v ie t o f w o r k e r s d e p u t ie s

56. Zenzinov s A ccount o f t h e O rganization

o f t h e P etrograd S oviet
[V. Zenzinov, Fevralskie dni, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXV (1955), pp. 215-18.]
On this very day (February 27), inside the walls of the Tauride Palace, the
foundation was laid for the Soviet of Workers Deputies, and this occurred some
how with amazing ease. I had occasion to be not only a witness of, but a partici
pant in this action. All this happened in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. I do not
know who was the first to come up with the idea of creating a Soviet of Workers
Deputies. In his verbose memoirs (Zapiski o Revoliutsiiseven volumes!),
N. N. Sukhanov asserts that elections to the Soviet had already been held in
factories for several days. Perhaps, I have no recollection of this whatsoever, hut
I will not dispute it. In any event, the actual birth of the Soviet in the Tauride
Palace occurred through the process of revolutionary initiative.5 There is noth
ing surprising in the fact that the idea of creating a Soviet of Workers Deputies
was born at this minutethe idea of a Soviet of Workers Deputies was alive, the
first Soviet of Workers Deputies of October 1905 was well rememberedat this
point they could have acted simply by drawing an analogy to the year 1905, when
the crest of the revolution was at its peak. They could also have been reminded
of the Soviet of Workers Deputies by the presence of the former President of the
SovietKhrustalev-Nosaramong those who were released from the Kresty
[Prison], who, incidentally, was in very bad repute because, according to news-
paper reports, it turned out that he was involved in some criminal casethe left-
wing circles were very negatively disposed toward him at this time. In any event,
the fact of the matter is that in the afternoon . . . 30 to 40 persons met in Room
No. 12, positively none of whom were delegated by anyone, and decided to take the
initiative in forming a Temporary Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers
Deputies. Among those present I remember N. D. Sokolov, N. S. Chkheidze,
N. I. Skobelev, N. N. Sukhanov, Gvozdev, Erlich, Bogdanov, Aleksandrovich,
Grinevich . . . Steklov may also have been there, but I am not certain of this.
On behalf of the improvised Temporary Executive Committee of the Soviet of
72 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Workers Deputies, an appeal was drawn up right there and then without any
arguments or altercations.11

This appeal was dated February 27. It was published immediately, and dozens
of people rushed in automobiles to the factories, distributing [the appeal] . . .
along the way. And the amazing thing is that by seven oclock the delegates,
elected by factories at brief meetings that were held continually during these hours,
had actually started to gather. Some of them were provided with appropriate,
hurriedly written credentials, but the majority came with verbal mandates.
The meeting of the Soviet opened only around 10:00 P .M . N. D. Sokolov presided
over this first meeting. Up to 250 persons attended the meeting (which was grad
ually filling up as the delegates arrived). The first tasks that were set [before the
Soviet] were purely organizational. It was decided to elect eight persons to the
Executive Committee. Chkheidze, Kerensky, Skobelev, Steklov, Sukhanov, Shliap-
nikov, Aleksandrovich, and Kapelinskii were elected. Nominated to the Presidium
of the Soviet and approved immediately without any objections were Chkheidze
(President) and Kerensky and Skobelev (Vice-Presidents). In addition, it was
decided to include in the Executive Committee two representatives each from
socialist parties who would have a deciding vote (they entered on the morning of
the 28th). These representatives were: Bogdanov and Baturskii from the Menshe
viks; Shliapnikov and Molotov (Shliapnikov was later replaced by Stalin, who
arrived on March 12 from exile in Siberia) from the Bolsheviks; Rusanov and
Zenzinov from the Socialist-Revolutionaries; Erlich and Rafes (Liber replaced
the latter after several days) from the Bund; Bramson and Chaikovskii (he was
later replaced by Stankevich) from the Trudoviks; Peshekhonov and Charnoluskii
from the Popular Socialist; Yurenev from the Mezhduraiontsy; Stuchka and
Kozlovskii from the Latvian Social Democrats. Later, in connection with the
arrival of new persons from abroad and the inclusion of soldiers delegates in the
Soviet, the membership of the Executive Committee underwent marked change.

It was announced that the plenary sessions of the Soviet of Workers Depu
ties would be held continuouslyChkheidze and Skobelev were to take turns
in presiding. In addition to workers delegates, soldiers delegates began to
appear. They were armed with rifles, and, standing on stools, they related in
excitement what was happening in their units. They were accorded ovations by
those present. Representatives came from the Volynia, Pavlovskii, Lithuanian,
[and] Finnish Regiments. They all delivered fervent speeches, announced their
support of the revolution and the workers. Especially heated were the ovations
drawn by a delegate from the Semenovskii Regiment, who literally burst into the
meeting and reminded [the audience] that in December 1905 the Semenovskii
[Regiment] was putting down the Moscow Revolt, whereas now the Semenovites
were marching together with the revolution.
Nearby in the Ekaterininskii Hall, soldiers armed with rifles made themselves
comfortable; they drank tea, had snacks, [their] rifles stood in the trestles. There
were several machine guns and boxes with cartridges and cartridge belts; sacks of
flour and cans of milk obtained from the street were lying [on the floor] (it was I
who managed to catch a truck with milk cans on the street and I forced Trudovik
11 See Doc. 54.
 THE STORM BREAKS 73

V. M. Vershinin to pay for this milk out of some kind of funds of the Duma, for
which he could not forgive me for a long time). The parquet of the Ekaterininskii
Hall was trampled over with slush that was brought in from the streets.

57. S u k h a n o v s A c c o u n t of t h e F ir s t M e e t in g
of the P etr o g r a d S o v ie t
[N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and trans.,
pp. 58-64.]
I elbowed my way through the crowd from the Catherine Hall to the rooms
occupied by the Soviet.
The hall was filling up. Sokolov was running around giving orders and seating
the deputies. In an authoritative way, without, however, any discernible justifica
tion, he was explaining to those present what sort of vote they had, whether con
sulting or deciding, and who had no voice at all. In particular he explained to
me that I had a voteI dont remember now what kind. But of course these
judicial decisions of the future senator had not the slightest practical significance.
I ran into Tikhonov, and we took places at the table at a respectful distance
from its head, which was occupied by official personages, the deputies Chkheidze
and Skobelev, members of the self-appointed Ex. Com., Gvozdev, Kapelinsky of
the Cooperative movement, and Grinevich, one of the leaders of the Petersburg
Mensheviks.
B. 0. Bogdanov, the most active member of the Ex. Com., was missing for
some reason; I think he only turned up a day later. Nearby at the table towered
the massive figure of Steklov, more reminiscent of a bearded central-Russian
small holder than an Odessa Jew.
Also there at the head of the table, pestering all and sundry with something
or other, was Khrustalev-Nosar, the former chairman and leader (together with
Trotsky) of the Soviet in 1905. Sokolov was bustling about there too; at 9 oclock
precisely he opened the session of the Soviet with a resolution to elect the Prae-
sidium . . . Kerensky turned up for a short time.
I no longer felt any longing for the centres of the movement; I had no feeling
of being cut off from the living process. I was in the very crucible of great events,
the laboratory of the revolution.
* * *
At the moment the meeting opened around 250 deputies were there. But new
groups kept pouring into the hall, God knows with what mandates or intentions.

Naturally, the Duma deputies Chkheidze, Kerensky, and Skobelev were nomi
nated to the Praesidium and elected immediately without opposition. Besides
the chairman and his two colleagues four secretaries were electedGvozdev,
Sokolov, Grinevich, and the worker Pankov, a left Menshevik. If Im not mistaken,
Kerensky declaimed a few meaningless phrases that were supposed to be a hymn
to the peoples revolution, and immediately vanished into the right wing, not to
appear again in the Soviet.
I dont remember what happened to the future permanent chairman of the
Soviet, Chkheidze. Skobelev was left to take the chair; in the midst of the hurly-
burly and the general excitement he had neither a general plan of action nor
control of the meeting itself, which proceeded noisily and quite chaotically. But
74 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

this by no means prevented the Soviet from performing at this very first session
its basic task, vital to the revolutionthat of concentrating into one centre all the
ideological and organizational strength of the Petersburg democracy, with undis
puted authority and a capacity for rapid and decisive action.
Immediately after the formation of the Praesidium the customary demands
for order5rang out from various sides. The chairman, wishing to end formalities,
put forward for confirmation the already functioning Credentials Committee,
headed by Gvozdev, but it was not in the least surprising that business was inter
rupted at this point by the soldiers, who demanded the floor to make their reports.
The demand was enthusiastically supported, and the scene that followed was
worthy of enthusiasm.
Standing on stools, their rifles in their hands, agitated and stuttering, straining
all their powers to give a connected account of the messages entrusted to them,
with their thoughts concentrated on the narrative itself, in unaccustomed and half-
fantastic surroundings, without thinking and perhaps quite unaware of the whole
significance of the facts they were reporting, in simple, rugged language that
infinitely strengthened the effect of the absence of emphasisone after another
the soldiers delegates told of what had been happening in their companies. Their
stories were artless, and repeated each other almost word for word. The audience
listened as children listen to a wonderful enthralling fairy-tale they know by heart,
holding their breaths, with craning necks and unseeing eyes.
"Were from the Volhynian Regiment . . . the Pavlovsky . . . the Lithuan
ian . . . the Keksholm . . . the Sappers . . . the Chasseurs . . . the Fin
. . . the Grenadiers . . .
The name of each of the magnificent regiments that had launched the revolu
tion was met with a storm of applause.
We had a meeting . . . Weve been told to say . . . The officers hid . . .
To join the Soviet of Workers Deputies . . They told us to say that we refuse
'to serve against the people any more, were going to join with our brother
workers, all united, to defend the peoples cause . . . We would lay down our
lives for that. Our general meeting told us to greet you . . Long live the
revolution! the delegate would add in a voice already completely extinguished
by the throbbing roar of the meeting.
Dreadful rifles, hateful greatcoats, strange words! Theoretically all this had
been known, well known, known since that morning. But in practice no one had
understood or digested the events that had turned everything topsy-turvy . . .
It was then and there proposed, and approved with storms of applaus
fuse together the revolutionary army and the proletariat of the capital and create
a united organization to be called from then on the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies . .
But a great many regiments were still not with us. Were they hesitating,
consciously neutral, or ready to fight the enemy within?
The situation was still critical. There was the possibility of bloody skirmishes
between the organized regiments and their officers. The revolution might still be
captured with bare hands.
* * *
Frankorussky, the Supply Man, finally got the floor, and having given a
short sketch of the supply position in Petersburg and all the possible consequences
of hunger amongst the masses, proposed that a Supply Commission be elected,
 THE STORM BREAKS 75

ordered to set to work at once, and given adequate powers. There was of course
no debate on this. The Commission was elected at once from the Socialist supply
specialists headed by V. G. Grohman. Having waited for this moment, all those
elected immediately withdrew in order to work.
Meanwhile M. A. Braunstein, who had apparently been elected to the Supply
Commission, came up to me and urged me to take the floor at once with a resolu
tion on the defense of the city. I didnt see the slightest advantage in coming
forward and suggested that I merely second his motion. He got the floor and
very successfully, with the full attention and sympathy of the meeting, described
the state of affairs.
Braunstein proposed that directives be given the city districts through the
delegates present for every factory to appoint a militia (100 men out of every
thousand), for district committees to be formed, and for plenipotentiary Com
missars to be appointed in each district to restore order and direct the struggle
against anarchy and pogroms. I spoke in support of his resolution, after inform
ing the meeting of the activities of the Military Commission and warning them
of the danger of confusing functions and powers. The resolution was accepted in
principle, but there was still no machinery to put it into practice; there were
neither boundaries between the districts (were they to be the future Soviet and
municipal wards or the old police divisions?) nor assembly points, nor volunteer
Commissars . . .
In connexion with the defense of the city there naturally cropped up a pro
posal for a proclamation to the populace in the name of the Soviet. In general,
supplying the capital, and as far as possible the provinces, with information and
elementary directives to the populace was the most pressing task of the moment,
even though it was relatively simple and required no special attention from the
meeting. One of my neighbours proposed the election of a Literary Commission
to be entrusted with the immediate composition of an appeal to be presented to
the Soviet later for confirmation.
But this organizational work, which had already taken up about an hour, was
interrupted again. A young soldier burst through the flimsy barrier at the doors
and rushed to the centre of the hall. Without asking for the floor or waiting for
permission to speak he raised his rifle above his head and shook it, choking and
gasping as he shouted the joyful news:
Comrades and brothers, I bring you brotherly greetings from all the lower
ranks of the entire Semyonovsky Regiment of Life Guards. All of us to the last
man are determined to join the people against the accursed autocracy, and we
swear to serve the peoples cause to the last drop of our blood!
In his emotion, bordering on frenzy, the youthful delegate of the mutinous
Semyonovskys, who had plainly attended a school of party propaganda, was really,
in these banal phrases and stereotyped terminology, pouring out his soul, over
flowing with the majestic impressions of the day and consciousness that the
longed-for victory had been achieved. In the meeting, disturbed in the midst
of current business, there gushed forth once again a torrent of romantic enthu
siasm. No one stopped the Semyonovsky from finishing his lengthy speech,
accompanied by thunderous applause. The importance of this news was obvious to
everyone: the Semyonovsky Regiment had been one of the most trustworthy
pillars of Tsarism. There was not a man in the room who was not familiar with
the glorious traditions of the Semyonovsky boys5 and in particular did not
76 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

remember their Moscow exploits in 1905. All that was over. In a flash the
stinking fog was dispersed by the light of this new and blinding sun.
It appeared that there were delegates from the newly insurgent regiments
in the hall. They had not ventured to ask for the floor but now came forward after
the Semyonovsky had opened the way for them. Once again the assembly heard
tales of a whole series of army unitsone of the Cossack regiments, I think an
armoured division, an electro-technical battalion, a machine-gun regimentthe
terrible enemies of the people just a short while before and from now on a firmly
united band of friends of the revolution. The revolution was growing and in
creasing in strength with every moment.
Elections continued for the Literary Commission. Sokolov, Peshekhonov,
Steklov, Grinevich, and I were elected. No objections were raised: there were no
fractional struggles or party candidates. Moreover, no directives at all were given
to the Commission, and it was clear to everyone that the proclamation would be
published in the form in which they submitted it. Thus was accomplished the
Soviets first act of any political significance.

58. T h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e of t h e P e tr o g r a d S o v ie t
[.Protokoly, pp. 287-88; Golder, pp. 288-89.]
The Executive Committee was elected at the very first meeting of the Soviet,
February 27. On the same day the first meeting of the Executive Committee took
place. No minutes of this meeting have been found. The following items were
on the agenda: 1. the make-up of the Executive Committee; 2. the organization
of the city wards; 3. the arming of the workers; 4. selection of representatives to
the Military Commission of the Committee of the State Duma.
At the second meeting of the Executive Committee, on the morning of Feb
ruary 28, only one question was decided, i.e., the order of the day for the plenary
session of the Soviet set for that day. The Soviet discussed the report of the
Executive Committee and confirmed the personnel of the Executive Committee,
chosen the day before, and decided to add to it persons of left tendencies. After
the meeting of the Soviet, the third session of its Executive Committee took place,
at which the question of organizing the soldiers was discussed. The next session
of the Executive Committee was held on March 1, when the text of Order No. 1
was accepted. The fourth session was on March 2.
At the session of March 3, the Executive Committee appointed a number of
commissions, and at the session of March 14, it selected a special Bureau, com
posed of seven members, to prepare all business for the plenary sessions and
conduct all current business. On April 12, the Executive Committee was com
pletely reorganized, and all current affairs were turned over to the sections, which
were wholly autonomous, within the limits provided by the Executive Committee.
Matters of great importance, or such as required solution as a matter of policy,
were transferred to the Bureau, which was composed of representatives of the
sections, chosen directly by the Executive Committee. Questions of national
importance were settled by the plenary meeting of the Executive Committee, but
nothing could be submitted to the Executive Committee without its first going
through the Bureau. The decisions of the Bureau were subject to the confirmation
of the Executive Committee.
 THE STORM BREAKS 77

59. S u k h a n o v s A c c o u n t o f t h e F ir s t M e e t in g s
of the E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e o f t h e P etr o g r a d S o v ie t

[N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and trans.,
pp. 8384.]
It was already about 11 oclock [February 28] when the Ex. Com. session
opened. I have the impression that during these first days its work went on almost
uninterruptedly around the clock. But what work it was! They were not meetings,
hut a frenzied and exhausting obstacle race.
The agenda had been set up, as pointed out above, in relation to the urgent
tasks of the moment. But neither at that session nor in general during the days
that followed could there be any questions of fulfilling a programme of work.
Every five or ten minutes business was interrupted by urgent announcements,
or emergency reports, matters of exceptional importance which couldnt
tolerate the slightest delay, and on which the fate of the revolution depended,
etc. These emergency questions were for the most part raised by the Ex. Com.
members themselves, who kept getting some sort of information on the side, or
prompted by people who were besieging the Ex. Com. But again and again the
petitioners, delegates, and messengers from every possible organization and
agency, or simply from the nearby crowds, would themselves burst into the
meeting.
In the great majority of cases these emergency matters were not worth a
barley-corn. I dont remember what the Ex. Com. did during these hours. I
remember only unimaginable hubbub, tension, hunger, and the feeling of irrita
tion at these exceptional reports. There was simply no way of stopping them.
There was no order even in the meeting itself. There was no permanent
chairman. Chkheidze, who later performed the chairmans duties almost perma
nently, didnt do much work in the Ex. Com. during its first days. He was con
stantly being summonedeither to the Duma Committee or the Soviet sessions
or, above all, to the people, the constantly-changing crowd standing in front of
the Tauride Palace. He spoke practically without stopping both in the Ekaterin
inskii Hall and in the street, sometimes to workers and sometimes to soldiers. He
would scarcely have time to return to the meeting of the Ex. Com. and take his
things off before some delegate would burst in with a categorical demand for
Chkheidze, sometimes even reinforced by threatsthat the mob would break in.
And the tired and sleepy old Georgian would get his fur coat on again with a
resigned look, put on his hat, and disappear from the Ex. Com.
There was still no permanent secretary, nor were any minutes taken. If they
had been taken and preserved, they would not report any measures or acts of
state during these hours. They would reflect nothing but chaos and emergency
reports about every possible danger and excess we lacked the means to combat.
There were accounts of pillage, fires, and pogroms; pogromist Black Hundred
leaflets were brought inhandwritten, alas, and thoroughly illiterate. We gave
orders not expecting them to be carried out and sent out detachments without
any hope that they would really he formed or do their duty.
I dont remember who presided at this meeting, nor whether there was any
chairman at all . . . On the writing-desk of the chairman of the former Finance
Committee12 there appeared from somewhere or other tin mugs of tea with crusts*
12 Budget Committee of the State Duma.
78 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

of black bread and other eatables. Someone was looking after us. But there was
not much food, or else there was simply no time to get it. A feeling of hunger
remains in my memory . . .

60. T h e R e d u c tio n o f t h e N u m b e r o f D e p u tie s in t h e S o v ie t

[.Protokoly, p. 292; Golder, p. 291.]
In accordance with the resolution of the Temporary Executive Committee of
February 27, the representation of workmen in the Soviet was one for every
thousand, and for soldiers, one for every company. At this rate the number of
deputies quickly reached 3,000, of whom more than 2,000 were soldiers. It
became necessary to reconstruct the Soviet, for as it stood there was not room
enough in the Duma and too many representatives to accomplish anything.
Nothing came of the various projects of the Executive Committee, and the reduc
tion of the number of delegates was brought about by a stricter verification of
credentials. In this way the number of deputies was cut down to half.

61. To the P eo p l e P etrograd and R ussia f r o m t h e S oviet of W ork ers

of
D e p u t ie s
[Izvestiia, No. 1, February 28, 1917, p. 2; Golder, pp. 287-88.]
The old regime has brought the country to ruin and the population to famine.
It was impossible to bear this longer, and the inhabitants of Petrograd came out
on the street to express their dissatisfaction. They were greeted by a volley of
bullets. In place of bread, the Tsars ministers gave them lead.
But the soldiers would not act against the people and turned against the
Government. Together with the people they seized guns, arsenals, and important
governmental institutions.
The fight is still on and must go on to the end. The old power must be com
pletely crushed to make way for popular government. In that lies the salvation of
Russia.
In order to succeed in this struggle for democracy, the people must create their
own governmental organ. Yesterday, February 27, there was formed at the capital
a Soviet of Workers Deputies, made up of representatives of factories, mills,
mutinied troops, and democratic and socialistic parties and groups. The Soviet,
sitting in the Duma, has set for itself as its main task the organization of the
popular forces, and the fight for the consolidation of political freedom and popu
lar government.
The Soviet has appointed commissars to establish the peoples authority in
the districts of Petrograd. We invite the entire population of the capital to rally
at once to the Soviet, to organize local committees in their districts, and to take
into their hands the management of local affairs.
All together, with our forces united, we will fight to wipe out completely the
old Government and to call a constituent assembly on the basis of universal,
equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

62. S o v ie t A p p e a l t o t h e S o ld ie r s
[Izvestiia, No. 1, February 28, 1917, p. 2.]
Soldiers! The people, all Russia, thanks youyou, who have risen for the
just cause of freedom.
 THE STORM BREAKS 79

May the memory of the fallen fighters live forever!

Soldiers, some of you are still hesitating to join the comrades, your comrades
and ours, who have risen in arms.
Soldiers, remember your hard life in the village, in the factory, and in the
plants, where the Government was always strangling and oppressing you. Join
the people and the people will give you and your families a new life and happiness.
Soldiers, if you have broken off from your units, go to the State Dumathere
you will find your comrades and you will share your joys and sorrows with them.
Soldiers, dont shoot at random in the streets; shoot sparingly, but aim well!
Remnants of the police, the Black Hundred, and other scoundrels are hiding
in ambush on rooftops and in flats. Try everywhere to remove them by a well-
aimed bullet or by the right attack.
Soldiers, maintain order everywhere. On your part, march in line, by com
mand, or in formation, observing all the military practices of combat.
Soldiers, do not forget to send reconnoiterers to the dangerous areas, and to
maintain outposts and communications between the posts and the detachments.
Remember everything you know about how one should fight the enemy.
Soldiers, do not allow hooligans to hurt peaceable civilians; do not allow
them to break into stores, or rob homesthis should not happen!
Direct all your requests for information, inquiries, and orders to the State
Duma where the Military Commission of all the Petrograd regiments is perma
nently located.
Be firm and unshaken in your decision to fight for freedom until death.
Let us pledge rather to die than to give up our freedom to the enemy.
Your sacrifices, your services, and your honor will never be forgotten by
Russia!
Long live freedom!

63. Do N o t T o l e r a t e L o o tin g
[,Izvestiia, No. 1, Supplement, February 28, 1917, p. 2.]
Gangs of hooligans are beginning to roam around town, looting stores and
properties of the inhabitants.
Under no circumstances should the revolutionary people and the army tolerate
this.
The looting by hooligans could reflect unfavorably on the sacred cause of
freedom. The revolutionary people and the army should arrest the hooligans
who indulge in looting and send them to the Commandant of [the] Petrograd
[forces] at the State Duma.
Random gunshots resound through the streets, causing the inhabitants to
panic . . .
A meaningless waste of cartridges should not be tolerated: they are essential
to the people for the decisive struggle against the Government.
The revolutionary patrols must confiscate the firearms of anyone shooting
aimlessly in the streets and must turn him over to the revolutionary government.
The [buildings of the] Circuit court and the Okhranka are being burned
down, several police stations are on fire, the documents of the okhranniki and the
agents provocateurs have been burned. By destroying the documents of these
Institutions, the hooligans have eaten into the vitals of the country and dealt
painful blows to the revolutionary people.
80 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

It is essential to destroy everything that would be of assistance to the agents

of the old regime, but fires and arson which undermine security and threaten the
property of peaceful inhabitants should be avoided.

64. R eso lution of th e S oviet of W o rk ers D epu t ie s on F inancial Q uestions

[Izvestiia, No. 2, March 1, 1917, p. 2.]
In accordance with a motion of the Finance Committee, the Soviet of Workers
Deputies has resolved that:
1) All financial resources of the state should be immediately wrested from
the control of the old regime. To do this, the revolutionary guards must immedi
ately, in the interest of security, occupy the following [establishments]:
a. The State Bank,
b. The Central and Guberniya Treasuries,
c. The Mint,
d. Bureau of Printing and Engraving.
2) The Soviet of Workers' Deputies entrusts the Temporary Committee of
the State Duma with carrying out the present resolution immediately.
3) Pending the appointment of a Minister of Finance by the Provisional
Government, all the financial resources, kept under guard, must be placed under
the responsible charge of the present officials, guarded, however, by a revolu
tionary sentry.
4) The Soviet of Workers Deputies and the Temporary Committee of the
State Duma will jointly elect the Finance Committee. This Committee shall be
made responsible for [the following]:
(1) The adoption of all measures necessary for the prevention of financial
disorder in the country.
(2) The supervision and control of the normal course of all the financial
and credit operations in all credit establishments.
( 4 ) 13 The Finance Committee shall be authorized to appropriate funds
from the State Treasury for the existent or anticipated needs of revolutionary
institutions.
(5) The Finance Committee shall also be authorized to cancel all credits
extended by the old regime.
(6) All the Executive Committees of the Soviet of Workers Deputies
shall submit their estimates, but the final estimate and the determination of the
total credit required by the Soviet shall be the responsibility of the Financial
Committee.
(7) The Finance Committee shall be in charge of all private funds received
by the Soviet.

65. S o viet C oncern O ver t h e R elations B etw een

the T em porary C o m m it t e e of t h e D um a and t h e P etrograd Garrison
[,Izvestiia, No. 3, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
An excerpt from the minutes of the session of the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies of March 1.
13 Point No. 3 is missing in the text.
 THE STORM BREAKS 81

The behavior of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma toward the
Petrograd Garrison causes much anxiety. The representatives of the units, which
have had time to organize elections to the Soviet, appeared [at the session]. It
was decided to continue the session uninterruptedly.
A report was made to the soldiers who arrived concerning the progress of the
organization of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies, the [existing] relationship with
the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, the formation of the Military Com
mission and its work.
It was decided to devote the session to the discussion of the following issues:
1) The attitude of the soldiers toward the returning officers.
2) The question of issuing arms.
3) The Military Commission and the limits of its competence.

Only the representatives of the Garrison took the floor for [the discussion of]
all these issues.
The first to speak was Comrade Maksim who raised the issue of the menacing
attitude of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma toward the revolutionary
troops. He proposed the following concrete measures:
1) To propose immediately to the comrade soldiers not to issue arms to
anyone.
2) To propose to the comrade soldiers to elect immediately their representa
tives to the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies, one representative from
each company.
3) To propose to the comrade soldiers to obey during their political demon
strations only the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
4) To propose to the comrade soldiers, while obeying officers on duty, to
consider them as equal citizens when off duty.

The representatives of the following military units made speeches: the Jaeger
Guard Regiment, the Litovskii Guard Regiment, the air force units, the Pre
obrazhenskii Guard Regiment, the Semenovskii Guard Regiment, and many other
military units.
It was decided to send the following address to the Garrison:
Not to issue weapons. To elect company and battalion committees which
would manage all the internal order in the regiments. To organize soldiery in
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. To obey the orders of the Mili
tary C o m m iss io n only in so far as they do not dissent from the decisions of
the Soviet of Workers Deputies. To delegate to the membership of the Military
Commission the representatives of the soldiers.
Temporarily, for three days, representatives have been elected to the Executive
Committee. The following soldiers have been elected: Sadovskii, Paderin,
Badenko, Linde, Sokolov (a sailor), Kudriavtsev, Borisov, Klimchinskii, Barkov,
Vakulenko.
The next session of the Soviet is set for March 2 at 1 :00 p . m .
82 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

66. A n A p p e a l [ t o t h e S o l d i e r s ] f r o m t h e E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e o f t h e
S o v i e t o f W o r k e r s 5 a n d S o l d i e r s 5 D e p u t i e s 55
[Izvestiia, No. 6, March 5, 1917, p. 1.]
COMRADES, SOLDIERS!

Old Russia does not exist. There is a New, Free, Revolutionary Russia. But
the old regime is not dead yet. Only a small, insignificant part of its power has
been seized. The task of creating a new power is not yet completed. It may even
be said that the most difficult part of the taskthat of preserving and strengthen
ing the freedom we have wonstill lies ahead of us.
Comrades: Let us not forget this task for a minute. Let us guard and con
solidate our gains. We succeeded in overthrowing the old power of the monarchy
only because we united our forces. And now we must not disunite them. We
must remember that every internal dissension splits our forces and assists those
old forces, which are already organizing a campaign against freedom, in their
struggle against us. These old forces are taking every possible step to sow discord
in our ranks. They do not stop at anything; be on your guard. Now they are
trying to sow dissension between you and the officers who have joined the revolu
tion. Do not be lured by the bait of provocateurs; remember that the revolution
ary officers are now our comrades. Any clashes or insults which have no basis or
which occur only on the basis of rumor are dangerous and should not be permitted
to occur. Do not believe these rumors; do not make any rash moves against your
officer comrades. Only when the evidence is indisputable should you give the
information immediately to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies. Also, do not believe speakers who do not have a special
certificate of authorization from the Executive Committee. The Executive Com
mittee supplies its speakers with stamped certificates.
Comrades: Preserve the freedom which has been won. The cause of freedom
is in our hands; let us not destroy the freedom which has been won.
Consolidating our revolutionary gains, let us march ahead side by side with
the officer comrades who are dedicated to the revolutionary cause.
Long live freedom!
Long live the revolutionary army!
Long live the Constituent Assembly!
 CHAPTER 2

The Collapse o f the Monarchy

THE ABDICATION OF EMPEROR NICHOLAS II

67. T e le g ra m fro m t h e M in is te r o f W a r t o S ta v k a
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago ARR, III (1922), 249.]
To Stavka. To the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, a copy to the
Commander in Chief of the Northern Front.
The situation in Petrograd is becoming very serious; the few units which
have remained faithful to their duty are not able to quell the rebellion; on the
contrary, many units gradually go over to the rebels. Fires have started, and there
is no means of fighting them. It is essential that really reliable units should be
hastily dispatched here and in sufficient number for simultaneous actions in
various parts of the city. 197. B e l i a e v . February 27.

68. T e le g ra m fro m t h e P r e s id e n t o f t h e S ta te D um a t o
G e n e r a l a .d .0 .1 R u z s k i i , C o m m a n d e r i n C h i e f o f t h e N o r t h e r n F r o n t
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, A R R , III (1922), 247.]

February 27, 1917

The disturbances which have begun in Petrograd are acquiring an elemental
character and threatening proportions. The reason is the shortage of baked bread
and scarce shipments of flour, which cause panic; the main reason is complete
distrust of the Government, which is incapable of leading the country out of the
difficult situation. In this situation, there is no doubt that events will develop
which can be temporarily kept in hand [only] at the cost of shedding the blood of
peaceful citizens, but which, if repeated, will be impossible to check. The move
ment may spread to the railways, and the life of the country will come to a stand
still in the most difficult moment. The defense plants working in Petrograd have
ceased work because of lack of fuel and raw materials; the workers remain without
jobs, and the hungry, unemployed mob takes the path of elemental and irrepressi
ble anarchy. Railroad communications are completely disrupted all over Russia.
In the south, [only] 28 blast furnaces out of 63 are functioning because of the
absence of fuel shipments and of the necessary materials. In the Urals, 44 out of
92 blast furnaces have stopped and the production of pig iron, which is decreasing
from day to day, threatens to reduce greatly the production of ammunition.
The population, fearing the clumsy directives of the authorities, does not bring
its grain products to the market, and this stops the mills, and there is a threat
to the army and the population of a great shortage of flour.
1 The designation a.d.c. indicated that the officer had the distinction of an appointment
as aide-de-camp to the Tsar.
84 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The governmental authority is in a state of complete paralysis and is quite

helpless to restore order. Humiliation and shame threaten Russia, because the
war cannot be ended victoriously under such conditions. I consider that the
only and the necessary way out of the situation which has been created is imme
diately to call upon a person in whom the whole country can have confidence and
who would be charged to form a government having the confidence of the whole
population. Such a government would be followed by all Russia, animated in her
faith in herself and in her leaders. In this terrible hour, unprecedented in its
dreadful consequences, there is no other way to a fortuitous future, and I beg
Your Excellency to support my convictions with His Majesty, in order to prevent
a possible catastrophe. It is impossible to delay any longer; delay means death.
President of the State Duma, R odzianko

69. T elegram fro m General R u zsk ii to t h e E m pero r

[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam9 Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 247-48.]
To Stavka. To His Imperial Majesty the Emperor.
I deem it my duty to submit to Your Majesty the telegram received by me from
the President of the State Duma, which points out the serious situation in the
capital and within the country, a situation which causes alarm for the fate of the
Fatherland. Although the army remains imbued with a sense of duty and a desire
to bring the war to a victorious end, the consequences of the food and railway
disorders are beginning to be directly reflected also in the army, while the informa
tion reaching the front on the grave crisis which is being experienced by the
population and on the disorders in Petrograd may create very unfavorable condi
tions in the future.
Now the army includes in its ranks the representatives of all classes, profes
sions, and convictions; therefore it cannot fail to reflect the mood of the country.
Therefore I take the liberty to report to Your Majesty that urgent measures to
calm down the population, to give it confidence and good morale, faith in itself
and its future, are essential. These measures, if taken now, on the eve of the forth
coming resumption of combat activity at the front, would renew the strength of
the army and of the people for their further efforts in fighting the enemy; I take
the liberty to submit that, under the existing conditions, repressive measures may
rather aggravate the situation than give the necessary permanent satisfaction.
No. 1147 R u zskii February 27.

70. C onversation by H u gh es A pparatus B e tw een t h e C h ie f o f S t a ff o f t h e

S u pr e m e C omm ander and t h e Ch i e f o f S t a ff o f t h e N o rth ern F ront
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, A R R , III (1922), 249. See
also A. S. Loukomskii, Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, by General Loukomskii,
Mrs. Vitali, trans., pp. 52 ff.f for a description of these days at Stavka.]
At the apparatus is the Chief of Staff. Report it to General Danilov.
General Danilov is at the apparatus.
Hello, Yurii Nikiforovich. I refer to the telegram No. 197 of the War Minister
to the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front of todays date.
His Majesty the Emperor has ordered:
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 35

The appointment of General a.d.c. Ivanov as Commander in Chief of the

Petrograd Military District; troops consisting of two cavalry regiments, if possible
from the 15th Division which is now in reserve, of two of the most reliable and
steady regiments, and of one Colt machine-gun detachment for the St. George
detachment which is proceeding from Stavka should be sent as quickly as possible
from the Northern Front to Petrograd for his disposal. Reliable generals should
be appointed, as apparently General Khabalov has lost his head, and General
Ivanov should have at his disposal reliable, energetic, and bold assistants. The
troops should be sent with limited supplies and the supplies should be organized
from the front, as it is difficult to say what is happening now in Petrograd and
whether the local garrison can supply the troops. Circumstances demand that the
troops arrive promptly; therefore I ask you to give appropriate instructions and
to advise me which regiments will be assigned so that I can inform General
-Ivanov, who is proceeding in all haste on February 28 with the St. George
Battalion. A detachment of equal force will proceed also from the Western Front,
about which I am now going to talk with General Kvetsinskii.
The moment is full of danger and it is necessary to do everything in order to
hasten the arrival of reliable troops. On it depends our whole future. Good-bye.
Alekseev, [21 hours, February 27]

71. T e le g ra m o f t h e E le c te d M e m b ers o f t h e S t a t e C o u n c il t o t h e T s a r
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 2, February 28, 1917, p. 1.]

In the night of February 27-28 the undersigned members of the State Council
sent the following telegram to the Tsar:
Your Imperial Majesty. We, the undersigned elected members of the State
Council, conscious of the imminent danger threatening our country, are turning
to you in fulfillment of our conscientious duty before you and before Russia.
Owing to the complete disruption of transport and the consequent lack of
supply of essential materials, the factories and mills have stopped working. The
unavoidable unemployment and the extremely acute food crisis brought about by
the said disruption of transport have driven the popular masses to complete
despair. This feeling is intensified, moreover, by their hatred of the Government
and the grave suspicion of the authorities, which has sunk deep into the na
tional soul.
All this has assumed the form of a popular uprising, an elemental force, a
spontaneous movement which the troops are now joining. The Government,
which has never commanded confidence in Russia, has now been thoroughly dis
credited, and is completely helpless in the face of the grave situation.
Your Majesty. Should the present government continue to remain in power,
it would signify the complete breakdown of law and order and would entail
inevitable defeat in war, the end of the dynasty, and the greatest disasters for
Russia.
We consider that the last and only remedy for your Imperial Majesty is a
decisive change in the trend of our internal policy, in accordance with the repeat
edly expressed desires of the representatives of the people, the estates, and public
organizations; the immediate convocation of the legislative chambers; the dis
86 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

missal of the present Council of Ministers; and the commissioning of a person

who has earned the confidence of all the people, to submit for Your Majestys
confirmation a list of names for a new government capable of governing the
country in complete harmony with the representatives of the people. Every hour
is precious. Any further delay or vacillation carries the threat of incalculable
disasters.
Loyal subjects of Your Imperial Majesty, members of the State Council:
Vasilev, Vernadskii, Vainshtein, Glebov, Grimm, Guchkov, Prince Drutskoi-
Sokolinskii, Diakov, Zubashov, Komsin, Laptev, Marin, Meler-Zakomelskii,
Oldenburg, Stakheev, Savitskii, Stakhovich, Count Tolstoy, Prince Trubetskoi,
Shmurlo, Shumakher, and Yumashev.

72. C o n v e rs a tio n b y D i r e c t W ir e B e tw e e n G e n e r a l A le k s e e v a n d
G r a n d D u k e M i k h a i l A l e k s a n d r o v i c h o n F e b r u a r y 27, 1917
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXI (1927), 11-13.]

About 22 hours 30 minutes.

The Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich is at the apparatus.I request you
to report on my behalf to His Majesty the Emperor the following: in order imme
diately to calm down a movement which has assumed large proportions, it is
necessary, according to my deep conviction, to dismiss the whole Council of
Ministers; this has been confirmed to me also by Prince Golitsyn. In case the
Cabinet is dismissed, it is necessary to appoint at the same time those who are to
replace it. Under the present conditions I think that the only [solution] is to
choose a person enjoying the confidence of His Majesty and the respect of wide
circles, and to entrust such a person with the functions of President of the Council
of Ministers, which would be responsible only to Your Imperial Majesty. It is
essential to entrust him with the composition of the Cabinet in accordance with
his own judgment. In view of the extremely serious situation, would not Your
Imperial Majesty deign to delegate me immediately to announce this officially
on behalf of Your Imperial Majesty; for my part, I consider that such a person
at the present time might be Prince Lvov.
[Alekseev:] I will immediately report to His Imperial Majesty the telegram
of Your Imperial Highness. Tomorrow His Majesty the Emperor leaves for
Tsarskoe Selo.
I take the liberty to report that if some order of His Majesty the Emperor
follows immediately, I will immediately telegraph it to Your Imperial Highness.
[Mikhail:] I will expect your answer in the house of the Minister of War and
I request you to send it to me by direct wire. At the same time I request you to
report to His Imperial Majesty that, according to my conviction, it perhaps would
be desirable to postpone the arrival of His Majesty the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo
for several days.
[Alekseev:] Is His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandro
vich at the apparatus? His Majesty the Emperor ordered me to thank Your
Imperial Highness on his behalf and to report to you the following: First, in view
of the exceptional circumstances, His Majesty the Emperor does not consider it
possible to postpone his departure, and he will leave tomorrow at half-past two
in the afternoon. Second, His Imperial Majesty will postpone until his arrival in
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 87

Tsarskoe Selo all measures which concern changes in personnel. Third, tomorrow
General a.d.c. Ivanov is proceeding to Petrograd as Commander in Chief of the
Petrograd District, having at his disposal a reliable battalion. Fourth, tomorrow
four infantry and four cavalry regiments from the most reliable units of the
Northern and Western fronts will start for Petrograd. Let me end with a personal
request to the effect that during personal reports to His Imperial Majesty, the
thoughts expressed by Your Imperial Highness be insistently reaffirmed both with
regard to the replacement of the actual members of the Council of Ministers and
with regard to the manner of choosing the new Council [of Ministers]. Let the
Almighty God help Your Imperial Highness in this important matter.
[Mikhail:] For my part, I communicate personally to you that I am afraid
we will let the time slip until the return of the Emperor because under the present
conditions literally every hour is valuable.
Thank you, Mikhail VasiFevich, for the tasks which you have taken on your
self. I wish you complete success.
[Alekseev:] Tomorrow at the morning report I will report to His Imperial
Majesty the desirability of taking some measures immediately, because I realize
perfectly well that under such conditions the time which has been lost cannot be
compensated for. I wish good health to Your Imperial Highness and success in
the aid which you wish to render to His Majesty the Emperor in those decisive
moments through which we are living and on which depend the fate and the
further course of the war and of the countrys life.

73. T e le g ra m fro m G e n e r a l A le k s e e v , C h ie f o f S t a f f o f t h e
S u p re m e C o m m a n d e r, t o A l l t h e C o m m a n d e rs in C h ie f ,
S e n t o n F e b r u a r y 28

[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam5 Gen. A. Lukomskago, A R R 9 HI (1922), 250-51.]

Communicated for your information: On the 26th at 13 hours 40 minutes

a telegram was received from General Khabalov [reporting] that on February 25
the crowds of workers which had gathered in various parts of the city had been
frequently dispersed by the police and military units. At about 17 hours demon
strators started singing revolutionary songs and displayed red banners in the
vicinity of the Gostinnyi dvor. Several revolver shots were fired from the crowd
in answer to a warning that arms would be used against it; one private was
wounded. A platoon of dragoons dismounted and opened fire on the crowd;
three persons were killed and ten wounded. The crowd immediately dispersed.
At about 18 hours a hand grenade was thrown into a detail of mounted gen
darmes, wounding one gendarme and a horse. The evening was relatively calm.
On February 25, 240,000 workers were on strike. General Khabalov announced
that any gathering in the streets was prohibited and confirmed that any mani
festation of disorder would be suppressed by force of arms. According to Gen
eral Khabalovs report, on the morning of the 26th the city was calm. On the
26th at 22 hours, a telegram was received from Rodzianko, President of the
State Duma, who reported that the unrest, which had started in Petrograd, was
acquiring an elemental character and threatening proportions, and that the
reason for the unrest was the shortage of baked bread and scarce shipments of
flour, which gave rise to panic. On the 27th the Minister of War reported to His
88 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Majesty that the disorders which had started in the morning in some of the
military units were being firmly and resolutely quelled by companies and bat
talions which have remained faithful to their duty. The rebellion was not sup
pressed as yet, but the Minister of War expressed his belief in a speedy restora
tion of calm; drastic measures being taken to this effect.
On February 27 about midday, the President of the State Duma reported
that the troops were passing to the side of the population and killing their officers.
General Khabalov around midday on the 27th reported to His Majesty that
one company of the Pavlovskii Regiments reserve battalion had declared on the
26th of February that it would not fire on the people. The Commander of a bat
talion of this regiment was wounded by the crowd. On February 27 training
detachments of the Volynskii Regiment refused to proceed against the rebels, and
its commander committed suicide. Then these cadres together with a company
of the same regiment proceeded to the quarters of other reserve battalions, and
men from these units began to join them. General Khabalov requested that re
liable units be sent him from the front. Toward the evening of the 27th of Feb
ruary, the War Ministry communicated that a battery summoned from Peterhof
refused to entrain in order to proceed to Petrograd. On February 27, between
21 and 22 hours, the Commanders in Chief of the Northern and Western fronts
were ordered to send to Petrograd two cavalry and two infantry regiments from
each of the fronts with energetic generals at the heads of the brigades, and [also]
from each front one Colt machine-gun detachment for the St. George Battalion,
which has been ordered to proceed from Stavka to Petrograd on February 28.
By order of His Imperial Majesty, General a.d.c. Ivanov was appointed Com
mander in Chief of the Petrograd Military District with extraordinary powers,
all the ministers to be subordinated to him.
On the 27th, at around 24 hours, I communicated to the Commander in Chief
regarding the necessity of taking measures to maintain at all cost the work of
the railroads.
On the 27th, after 1200 hours, the Minister of War reported that the situ
ation in Petrograd had become very serious. The few units which have remained
faithful to their duty cannot quell the rebellion, and troop units have gradually
joined the rebels. Fires have started. Petrograd has been declared under martial
law. On the 28th at 0200 hours a telegram was sent by me to the Commanders
in Chief of the Northern and Western fronts ordering them to send to Petrograd,
over and above the troops already assigned, also one brigade of light artillery
and one brigade of artillery from each of the fronts.
On the 28th at 0300 hours I sent a telegram to the Commander of the Troops
of the Moscow Military District regarding the necessity of taking measures in
the event of the disorders spreading to Moscow, and in order to maintain the
work of the railroad junctions and the flow of food products.
On the 28th of February at 0100 hours His Majesty received a telegram from
General Khabalov stating that he was unable to restore order in the capital. The
majority of the units have betrayed their duty and many have passed over to the
side of the rebels. The troops that have remained faithful to their duty, after
fighting during the whole day, have suffered heavy casualties.
Toward evening the rebels seized the greater part of the capital, and the small
units, which have remained faithful to their oath, have been rallied in the vicinity
of the Winter Palace.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 89

On February 28 at 0200 hours the Minister of War reported that the rebels
had occupied the Mariinskii Palace and that the members of the revolutionary
government were there. On the 28th of February, at 0825 hours, General Khabalov
reported that the number of those who have remained faithful has decreased to
600 infantrymen and 500 cavalrymen with 15 machine guns and 12 guns having
only 80 shells; the situation is extremely difficult.
The vanguard echelon of the infantry regiment sent from the Northern Front
will approach Petrograd approximately toward the morning of March 1.
His Majesty the Emperor left for Tsarskoe Selo during the night of the 27th
28th of February. According to private information, the revolutionary govern
ment has taken over the administration of Petrograd, declaring in its manifesto
that four guard reserve regiments have passed over to its side, and that the arsenal,
the Peter and Paul Fortress, and the Central Artillery Administration have been
occupied.
We have just received a telegram from the Minister of War, stating that the
rebels have seized the most important establishments in all parts of the city. Under
the influence of tiredness and propaganda the troops have laid down their arms,
passed to the side of the rebels, or become neutral. In the streets disorderly shoot
ing is going on all the time; all traffic has stopped; officers and soldiers who
appear in the streets are being disarmed.
The ministers are all safe, but apparently the work of the Ministry has stopped.
According to private information, the President of the State Council, Shche
glovitov, has been arrested. In the State Duma, a council of party leaders has
been formed for the purpose of establishing contact for the revolutionary gov
ernment with institutions and individuals; supplementary elections to the Petro
grad Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies from the workers and the rebel
troops have been set.
We have just received a telegram from General Khabalov which shows that
actually he cannot any longer influence events. Communicating to you the fore
going, I would add that we, the active army, all have the sacred duty before the
Emperor and the fatherland to remain true to our duty and to our oath, and to
maintain railroad traffic and the flow of food products. 1813. A l e k s e e v . Feb
ruary 28.

74. L e t t e r t o N i c h o l a s II f r o m G e n e r a l J o h n H a n b u r y - W i l l i a m s ,
C h i e f o f t h e A l l i e d M i l i t a r y M i s s io n t o R u s s i a
[C. F. Villiamy and A. L. Hynes, From the Red Archives, pp. 274-75, as translated
from Romanovy i soiuzniki v pervye dni revoliutsii, KA, XVI (1926), 46-47. General
Williams later wrote that the letter was returned to him unopened (Sir John Hanbury-
Williams, The Emperor Nicholas 11 as I Knew Him, p. 155), but I. Gelis in his intro
duction to the Krasnyi Arkhiv documents stated that a translation was made by an
officer of the General Staff, suggesting that the letter was at least read by Stavka, if not
by the Emperor himself.]
Your Imperial Majesty need have no doubt that I would not have dared to
approach Your Majesty with a letter, either now or at any other time, were it
not that my devotion to the Emperor and Empress of Russia compelled me to
do so. I am no diplomat or politician, but an old soldier who has had much
experience in Great Britain and during the war.
90 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Russia, I am fully aware, is a country where the methods of procedure suit

able for other states are not permissible, but all nations pass through times when
it is imperative to put a velvet glove upon the iron hand. . . .
Your Majesty is an autocratic monarch, but even an autocratic ruler can
govern at the present time only with the assistance of good councilors; and the
people wish to know that those councilors are chosen from among persons in
whom they have faith. During the disturbances which I have witnessed in vari
ous countries, it has always proved the best means to have a vent hole.55 It is
as with an abscess in the body which has to be lanced in order to allow the poison
to escape. Freedom of speech in Parliament or the Duma might serve as the vent
hole, and by this means the people would know that they could express their
feelings to their Sovereign through their chosen representatives.

There can be no doubt that German intrigues lie at the bottom of the present
disturbances, but these intrigues could be brought to nought if the people were
told that Your Majesty trusts them to indicate the necessary measures to be
adopted at the present time, and that you agree to accept the government chosen
hy them. It appears to me that the time has come to call upon your people to
help you to bear the prodigious burden which lies upon your shoulders.
I am fully conscious that Your Majesty might say that it is not for me to
meddle in these matters, and command me to return to my own country; but I
have absolute confidence and faith in Your Majestys devotion to the Allied cause,
and only this confidence of mine, together with my boundless and sincere devo
tion to Your Majesty and Her Majesty the Empress, gives me courage to speak;
in spite of the fact that such an action is in itself incorrect, and that I risk being
sent home. But whatever happens, nobody will be able to say that there is in
Russia, among the Russians, as among the Allies, a man more sincerely devoted
to the happiness of your country than myself. I have served here from the very
beginning of the war with the same loyalty to Your Majesty as that with which
I serve my own King; it is this loyalty to both Monarchs which gives me courage
to write these lines. I believe that Your Majesty will forgive me for speaking out
on matters which lie so near my heart.
Your Majestys most humble and most devoted Servant,
[March 1, 1917] H anbury -W il l ia m s .

75. T e l e g r a m f r o m t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e S t a t e D u m a t o t h e
C o m m a n d e r in C h ie f o f t h e N o r t h e r n F r o n t

[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III, 252.]

The Temporary Committee of the State Duma advises Your Excellency that
in view of the elimination from the Government of all the members of the former
Council of Ministers, the governmental authority has now been taken over by
the Temporary Committee of the State Duma.
March 1, 1917. The President of the State Duma R o d z ia n k o .
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 91

76. T e l e g r a m f r o m G e n e r a l A l e k s e e v S e n t t o t h e E m p e r o r
in P s k o v o n M a r c h 1

[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 253-54.

The Tsar had been turned back in his attempt to reach Tsarskoe Selo and was en route
to Pskov, the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front, General
Ruzskii. Alekseev had remained at Stavka.]

Your Imperial Majesty:

The ever-increasing danger of anarchy spreading over all the country, of the
further disintegration of the army, and the impossibility of continuing the war
under the present conditions urgently demand an immediate publication of an
Imperial act which could still have a calming effect, and this is possible only by
calling a responsible Ministry and by charging the President of the State Duma
to form it.
The news which reaches us gives us reason to hope that the members of the
Duma under the leadership of Rodzianko are still in a position to stop the general
disintegration, and that it would be possible to work with them; but the loss of
every hour reduces our last chances to preserve or restore order and contributes
to the possibility of the power being seized by elements of the extreme left. In
view of this, I beg Your Imperial Majesty to deign to order immediately the
publication from Stavka of the following manifesto:
We declare to all our faithful subjects:
A terrible and cruel foe is straining its last forces in the fight against our
fatherland. The decisive hour is nearing. The fate of Russia, the honor of our
heroic army, the welfare of the people, the whole future of our dear fatherland
demand that war should be brought to a victorious end at all costs.
66In the desire to unite all the forces of the people for the purpose of achiev
ing victory as soon as possible, I have considered it necessary to call a Ministry
which would be responsible before the representatives of the people, entrusting
its formation to the President of the State Duma Rodzianko; the Ministry should
be composed of persons enjoying the confidence of all Russia.
I trust that all the true sons of Russia, closely united around the throne, and
the representatives of the people will unanimously help our valorous army to
complete its great feat.
In the name of our beloved motherland, I appeal to all the Russian people
to fulfill their sacred duty toward her, to prove once again that Russia is as in
vincible as always and that no intrigues of her enemies can vanquish her. Let
God help us. 1865. G e n e r a l a j d . c . A l e k s e e v . March 1, 1917.

77. T e le g ra m fro m t h e T s a r t o G e n e ra l Iv a n o v D a te d M a r c h 2, 1917

[FevraFskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXI (1927), 53.]

[To] Tsarskoe Selo:

I hope you have arrived safely. I request you not to take any measures before
my arrival and your report. N ic h o la s . March 2, 1917. 0 hour 20 minutes.
92 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

78. C o n v e r s a t io n by D ir e c t W ir e B e t w e e n G e n e r a l R u z s k ii
a n d R o d z ia n k o
[Dokumenty k 'Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 255-58.
The conversation began at 3 hours 30 minutes. March 2, 1917.]
Please report to General Ruzskii that the President of the State Duma,
Rodzianko, is coming to the apparatus.
General a.d.c. Ruzskii is at the apparatus.
[Ruzskii:] Hello, Mikhail Vladimirovich. Today [March 1] at about 7:00
p . m . His Majesty the Emperor arrived at Pskov.
Upon meeting me, His Majesty told me that he expected your arrival.
Unfortunately, I learned later on that you were not coming and I regret it
deeply. I ask permission to talk to you with complete frankness as required
by the seriousness of the current moment. First of all, I would ask you to let me
know the real reason for the cancellation of your journey to Pskov. The knowl
edge of this reason is necessary for our further conversation.
[Rodzianko:] Hello, Nikolai Vladimirovich. I regret very much that I cannot
come; Ill tell you, frankly, there are two reasons for my not coming: first of all,
the echelons which you sent to Petrograd have rebelled; they left their cars in
Luga; they declared that they have joined the State Duma; they decided to seize
all weapons and not to let anyone pass, even the lettered trains; I have immedi
ately taken measures to free the tracks for the passage of His Majesty; I do not
know if this will be possible.
The second reason is the information received by me that my coming [to
Pskov] may have very undesirable consequences; it is impossible to leave the
raging popular passions without my personal presence, because up to now they
believe only in me and obey only my orders.
[Ruzskii:] From the conversations which His Majesty had with me today, I
found out that His Majesty the Emperor wanted at first to suggest that you should
form a cabinet responsible to His Majesty, but later on, when I took leave of him,
His Majesty, meeting the general desire of the legislative bodies and of the people,
expressed his final decision, and has authorized me to inform you that he has
decided to grant a Ministry responsible before the legislative bodies, charging
you with the formation of the Cabinet. In the event that His Majestys wishes
are welcome to you, a manifesto has been drafted which I will transmit to you
now. The manifesto could be announced today, on the 2nd of March, from Pskov.
Kindly let me know your thoughts on this.

Before I transmit the text to you, could you tell me what kind of solution of
the dynastic question there is in view?
[Rodzianko:] With an aching heart I will now answer you, Nikolai Vladi
mirovich.
I repeat once again: the hatred toward the dynasty has reached extreme limits,
but all the people, all with whom I have spoken when coming out to the crowds
and to the troops, have firmly decided to continue the war until its victorious end
and not to fall into the hands of the Germans.
The whole Petrograd and Tsarskoe Selo garrisons have joined the Duma; the
same is repeated in all the towns; nowhere is there any divergency of views;
everywhere the troops have passed to the side of the Duma and of the people,
and the threatening demands for abdication in favor of the son, under the regency
of Mikhail Aleksandrovich, have become a very definite demand.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 93

I repeat: with a terribly aching heart I tell you about it, but there is nothing
else to do; while the people represented by their valorous array shed their blood
and bore incalculable sacrifices, the Government positively mocked us; remember
the liberation of Sukhomlinov; remember Rasputin and all his clique; remember
[N. A.] Maklakov, Sturmer, Protopopov; all the constraint of the ardent desire
of the people who help the war [effort] to the extent of their forces; remember
the appointment of Prince Golitsyn; the disruption of transport and of monetary
circulation; the absence of any measures to smooth these conditions of life; the
constant alteration of the membership of the legislative chamber in an unde
sirable sense; continuous arrests, chasing and searching for a revolution which
then did not existthere are the causes which have brought us to this sad end.
Her Majesty the Empress has taken before the Almighty a heavy responsi
bility by detaching His Majesty from the people.

Unfortunately the manifesto has come too late; it should have been published
immediately after my first telegram, as I asked His Majesty the Emperor to do;
time has been lost and there is no return to the past. I repeat again: the passions
of the people are aflame and their hatred and indignation are great; our valorous
army will not be in want of anything; in this there is complete unity among the
parties, and railway communications will not be hampered; we hope also that
after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, the peasants and all the
inhabitants will bring bread, ammunition, and other articles of equipment; the
supplies are numerous, because the public organizations and the Special Council
have always taken care of this part.
I pray God that He should give us the force to keep ourselves at least within
the bounds of the present confusion of minds, thoughts, and feelings, but I am
afraid that it may become still worse.
I cannot tell you anything more; let God help you, our glorious leader, to
destroy in battle the accursed German; the proclamation which has been sent to
the army by the committee of the Duma makes this intent very clear in the form
of wishing successes and victories. I bid you good night, if it is possible in such
times to sleep calmly. With much respect and affection to you.

[Ruzskii:] Let God help us that everything will be as you say. A last word.
Tell me your opinion: Is it necessary to issue the manifesto?
[Rodzianko:] Really, I dont know how to answer you; everything depends
on the events, which happen with extraordinary rapidity.
[Ruzskii:] I have received the order to transmit it to Stavka for publication,
and therefore I will do it, and then let us see what happens. I will report your
conversation to the Emperor.
[Rodzianko:] I have nothing against it and even ask you to do it.
The conversation ended at 7:30 a .m . on March 2 and was transmitted to
Stavka to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander.

79. C o n v e r s a tio n b y T e le g r a p h B e tw e e n t h e Q u a r t e r m a s te r -
G e n e r a l o f t h e S u p re m e C o m m a n d e r a n d t h e C h ie f
o f S ta f f o f th e N o rth e rn F ro n t
[<eDokumenty k Vospominaniiam5 Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 258-59.
The conversation began at 0900 hours, March 2, 1917.]
94 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

General Danilov is at the apparatus.

Hello, Yurii Nikiforovich; Lukomskii is at the apparatus.
General Alekseev requests that it be reported immediately to the Commander
in Chief that it is necessary to wake the Emperor and to report to him immedi
ately regarding the conversation between General Ruzskii and Rodzianko.
We are going through a very serious moment, when the issue of not only the
Emperor but of the whole Imperial Family and of Russia is being decided.
General Alekseev urgently requests you to do it immediately, because now every
minute is important and all questions of etiquette should be forgotten.
After the question is resolved, General Alekseev requests you to communicate
it at once officially, since it is necessary that the higher military authority should
make a report to the army because the unknown is worse than anything else and
threatens the spread of anarchy in the army.
This is the official part, and now I ask you to report on my behalf to General
Ruzskii my deep conviction that there is no choice and that the abdication should
take place. One should remember that the Tsars family is in the hands of the
rebellious troops, because, according to information received, the Palace of Tsar
skoe Selo has been occupied by the troops, as you were already advised yesterday
by General Klembovskii. If he will not agree [to abdicate], then probably further
excesses will take place, excesses which would menace the Imperial children.
Then a fratricidal war would start, and Russia would be destroyed under the
blows of Germany and the dynasty would be ruined. It is very painful for me
to say, but there is no other solution. I will await your answer.

80. T e le g ra m fro m G e n e r a l A le k s e e v t o t h e C o m m a n d e rs in
C h ie f o f t h e F r o n ts
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 259-62.]
His Majesty is in Pskov, where he announced his consent to issue a manifesto
meeting the popular desire of having a ministry responsible before the chambers,
charging the President of the State Duma to form the cabinet.
After the communication of this decision by the Commander in Chief of the
Northern Front to the President of the Duma, the latter, in a conversation by the
[Hughes] apparatus at 0330 hours on March 2, replied that the publication of
such a manifesto would have been timely on February 27; at the present time
this act comes too late, because now one of the most terrible revolutions has made
its appearance; it is difficult to keep the passions of the people in hand; the troops
are demoralized. Although for the time being the President of the State Duma
enjoyed confidence, he was nevertheless afraid that it would be impossible to
check the popular passions. Now the dynastic question has been put point-blank,
and the war may be continued until its victorious end only provided the demands
regarding the abdication from the throne in favor of the son and under the
regency of Mikhail Aleksandrovich are satisfied. Apparently the situation does
not permit another solution, and each minute of further hesitation would only
increase the claims based on the fact that the existence of the army and the work
of the railroads are actually in the hands of the Petrograd Provisional Govern
ment. It is necessary to save the active army from disintegration; to continue
the fight against the external enemy until the end; to save the independence of
Russia and the fate of the dynasty. It is necessary to put this in the foreground,
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 95

even at the price of expensive concessions. If you share my views, then kindly
telegraph through the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front your petition
as faithful subjects to His Majesty, advising me of it.
I repeat that the loss of every minute may become fatal for the existence of
Russia, and that a unity of thought and of goals should be established among the
high commanders of the active army, and that the army should be saved from
hesitations and possible cases of betrayal of duty. The army must fight with all
its forces against the external foe, while the solution of internal matters should
deliver her from the temptation of participating in the upheaval, which would be
less painfully solved by a decision from above. March 2. 1917. 10 hours 15
minutes. 1872. A l e k s e e v .

81. T h e R e p ly o r G e n e r a l Y a n u s h k e v ic h t o G e n e r a l A le k s e e v
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, K A , XXI (1927), 72.]
Received March 2. 12 hours 28 minutes.
Immediately after its wording is completed, the answer will be communicated.
It is being compiled in the sense of the wishes [expressed] by General Alekseev.
G e n e r a l Y a n u s h k e v ic h .

82. T e le g ra m fro m G e n e ra l A le k se e v t o t h e E m p e ro r, S e n t
M a r c h 2, 1917, a t 14 H o u r s 30 M i n u t e s , T r a n s m i t t i n g
t h e R e p li e s o f t h e C o m m a n d e rs in C h i e f
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, AR R , i n (1922 ), 261-62.]

I submit to Your Imperial Majesty the telegrams received in the name of

Your Imperial Majesty:
From Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich:
General a.d.c. Alekseev advised me of the unprecedented and fatal situation
which has been created and requested me to support his opinion that a victorious
end of the war which is so necessary for the good and for the future of Russia
and for the salvation of the dynasty required taking extraordinary measures.
As a faithful subject I consider it necessary, in accordance with the duty of
allegiance and in the spirit of allegiance, to fall on my knees and implore Your
Imperial Majesty to save Russia and your heir, for I well know your sacred
feeling of love for Russia and for him.
Making the sign of the cross, transmit to him your heritage.
There is no other solution. As never before in my life, I especially ardently
pray God to give you strength and to guide you. G e n e r a l a .d .c . N i k o l a i .
Telegram from General a.d.c. Brusilov:
Please report to His Majesty the Emperor my request as a faithful subject,
*based on my loyalty and my love for the homeland and for the Throne of the
Tsar, that at the present moment the only solution that could save the situation
and make possible the continuation of the struggle with the external foe, without
which Russia would perish, is the abdication of the throne in favor of the heir
Tsarevich, under the regency of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich. There is
no other way out; speed is necessary, so that the popular conflagration which has
grown to large proportions can be rapidly extinguished; otherwise it will result
96 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

i n i n c a l c u l a b l e c a t a s t r o p h i c c o n s e q u e n c e s . B y th e s e a c ts th e d y n a s ty its e lf w o u ld
b e s a v e d i n t h e p e r s o n o f t h e la w fu l h e ir . G e n e r a l a .d . c . B r u s il o v .
From General a.d.c. Evert:
Your Imperial Majesty: The Chief of Staff of Your Majesty has explained
to me the situation which has been created in Petrograd, Tsarskoe Selo, the Baltic
Sea, and Moscow, and the result of the negotiations between General a.d.c.
Ruzskii and the President of the State Duma.
Your Majesty. The army in its present composition cannot be relied upon
for the suppression of internal disorders. It can be held together only for the
sake of saving Russia from subjugation by the cruel enemy of our country, which
would be the inevitable result if it proved impossible to continue the struggle
further. I am taking all necessary steps in order that information concerning the
situation in the capitals does not penetrate into the army, so as to safeguard it
from disorders which would be certain to occur. There are no means whatsoever
of stopping the revolution in the capitals.
A decision which can bring cessation of disorders and can preserve the
army for its fight against the enemy is necessary immediately.
Under the conditions which have been created, and not seeing any other
answer, I, an infinitely loyal subject of Your Imperial Majesty, implore Your
Majesty, for the sake of saving the homeland and the dynasty, to make a decision
which would be in agreement with the declaration of the President of the State
Duma as expressed by him to General a.d.c. Ruzskii, as the only measure which
apparently can stop the revolution and thus save Russia from the horrors of
anarchy. G e n e r a l a .d .c . E v e r t .
In reporting these telegrams to Your Imperial Majesty, I implore you to
immediately make the decision which the Almighty will dictate to you; a delay
threatens Russia with disaster. For the time being, we manage to save the army
from the disease that has infected Petrograd and Moscow, Krondstadt, and other
towns, but further maintenance of military discipline cannot be guaranteed.
On the other hand, participation by the army in matters of internal policy
would mean the inevitable end of the war, Russias shame and her disintegration.
Your Imperial Majesty loves Russia dearly, and for the sake of her integrity,
of her independence, and for the sake of victory You should deign to make a
decision which may give a peaceful and favorable issue to a situation which [has
become] more than difficult.
I am awaiting orders. March 2, 1917. G e n e r a l a .d .c . A l e k s e e v .

83. T h e R e p ly o f G e n e r a l S a k h a r o v
[Dokumenty k Tospominaniiam Gen. A . Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 262.]
[To General Ruzskii.]
Copy to General Alekseev
General a.d.c. Alekseev has communicated to me the criminal and shocking
reply given to you by the President of the State Duma with regard to the gracious
decision of His Majesty the Emperor to grant to the country a responsible Min
istry, and he requested the Commanders in Chief to report through you to His
Majesty regarding the solution of this question in connecton with the situation
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 97

which has been created. My ardent love for His Majesty does not permit my
soul to reconcile itself with the possibility that the odious proposal communicated
to you by the President of the Duma can be carried out. I am certain that this
crime was plotted not by the Russian people, which has never touched its Tsar,
but by the small band of criminals called the State Duma, which has treacherously
availed itself of an opportune moment to carry out its criminal design. I am
certain that the armies of the front, were they not called upon to defend the
fatherland from the external foe, and were they not in the hands of these same
political criminals who have taken in their hands the sources of the armys life,
would have unhesitatingly stood for their August Leader. Passing to the plane
of rational thinking and taking into account the desperate situation which has
been created, I, who am unswerving in my loyalty to His Majesty, am compelled
tearfully to state that perhaps the least painful solution for the country and for
preserving the possibility of fighting the external foe would be to meet the con
ditions already stated, so that a delay would not foster the proposal of further,
still more odious claims. Jassy, March 2. G e n e r a l S a k h a r o v .

84. T h e R e p ly o f V ic e -A d m ira l N e p e n in
[ Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago. ARR, III (1922), 264]

For Report to His Majesty the Emperor:

With tremendous difficulty I retain the obedience of the Fleet and the troops
entrusted to me.
In Revel the situation is critical, but I do not yet lose hope of controlling it.
A s a faithful subject I join in the petition of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich
and the Commanders in Chief of the fronts regarding an immediate acceptance
of the solution formulated by the President of the State Duma. If this solution
is not accepted within the next hours, it will bring about a catastrophe with
incalculable calamities for our fatherland. 20 hours 40 minutes. March 2,1917.
260. V i c e - A d m i r a l N e p e n i n .

85. T h e T s a r A p p o i n t s P r i n c e L v o v P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s
a n d t h e G ra n d D u k e N ik o la i N ik o la e v ic h S u p re m e C o m m a n d e r
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 265.]

A. Ukase to the Ruling Senate

We order Prince Georgii Evgenevich Lvov to be President of the Council
of Ministers.2 N ic h o la s .
G e n e r a l a .d . c . C o u n t F r e d e r i k s , Minister of the Imperial Court. City of
Pskov. March 2, 1917. 14 hours.

2 The first thought of Emperor Nicholas II was to entrust the formation of the first respon
sible government to the President of the State Duma, but as I have already said, I could not
undertake this task for various imperious reasons and besides, the Kadet Party resolutely
opposed my cabinet . . . Without the participation of the Kadet Party it was impossible to
form a stable government. M. V. Rodzianko, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, i FevraTskaia 1917
goda Revoliutsiia, ARR, VI (1922), 65.
98 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

B. Ukase to the Ruling Senate

We order our Viceroy in the Caucasus, His Imperial Highness Grand Duke
Nikolai Nikolaevich, to be Supreme Commander. N ic h o la s .

G e n e r a l a .d .c . C o u n t F r e d e r i k s , Minister of the Imperial Court. City of

Pskov. March 2, 1917. 14 hours.

8 6 . T h e E m p e r o r D e c id e s to A b d ic a t e in F avor of H is S o n
[ Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, A R R , III (1922), 262-63.]
After signing these two telegrams shortly before 3:00 p . m . the afternoon of March 2 ,
the Tsar was informed that Duma Deputies A. I. Guchkov and V. V. ShuPgin had left
Petrograd for Pskov. He accordingly took back the telegrams before they were trans
mitted. See Doc. 89.]

A. Telegram from the Emperor to the President of the State Duma

To the President of the State Duma, Petrograd.
There is no sacrifice which I would not bear for the sake of the real welfare
and for the salvation of our own Mother Russia. Therefore I am ready to abdi
cate the throne in favor of my son provided that he can remain with me until he
comes of age, with the regency of my brother the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksan
drovich. N ic h o la s .

B. Telegram from the Emperor to the Chief of Staff of the

Supreme Commander
To the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, Stavka:
For the sake of the welfare, the calm, and the salvation of my ardently beloved
Russia I am ready to abdicate the throne in favor of my son.
I r e q u e s t e v e r y o n e to s e rv e h i m f a it h f u l ly a n d s in c e r e ly . N ic h o l a s .

87. R o d z ia n k o R e q u e s ts t h e A p p o i n t m e n t o f G e n e r a l K o r n i l o v
as C om m ander o f th e P e tro g ra d M ilita ry D is tric t
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, HI (1922), 264.]

Telegram from General Alekseev to the Emperor

The following telegram has been received:
The Temporary Committee of the State Duma, which has been formed in
order to restore order in the capital, was forced to take power into its own hands
in view of the fact that, under the pressure of the army and of the people, the old
government did not undertake any measures for the purpose of appeasing the
population and has been completely eliminated. At the present time the power
will be transmitted by the Temporary Committee of the State Duma to the Pro
visional Government, which has been formed under the presidency of Prince
Georgii Evgenevich Lvov.
The troops, not excluding . . . [omission] are obeying the new govern
ment; also the members of the Imperial Family who are in Petrograd and all
elements of the population recognize the new government.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 99

In order that complete order may be restored, in order to save the capital
from anarchy, it is necessary to send here as commander in chief of the Petrograd
Military District a valorous combat-experienced general whose name will be
popular and will have prestige in the eyes of the population. The Committee of
the State Duma considers that such a person is the valorous Lieutenant General
Kornilov, a hero known to all of Russia, Commander of the 25th Army Corps.
For the sake of saving the fatherland, for the sake of victory over the enemy,
so that the incalculable victims of this long war will not have [died] in vain on
the eve of victory, it is essential that General Kornilov be sent in all haste to
Petrograd. Please communicate with General Kornilov immediately and telegraph
us when he will arrive in Petrograd.
President of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, M. R o d z ia n k o .
March 2.
While reporting this telegram to Your Majesty, I ask Your Majestys per
mission to fulfill [this request], considering that the fulfillment of this desire
might mean the beginning of appeasement in the capitals and the restoration of
order in the army units, constituting the garrison of Petrograd and its outskirts.
At the same time I ask permission to summon back to Mogilev General a.d.c.
Ivanov. March 2,1917. 1890. G e n e r a l a . d . c. A l e k s e e v .
The Emperors order on this telegram: To be executed.53

88. S h u l g in s A c c o u n t o f t h e J o u r n e y t o P sk o v and t h e
A b d ic a t io n o f t h e T sar
[V. V. Shulgin, Dni, pp. 23876. See the account of Guchkov in Padenie, VI, 26266.]

I think that after 3:00 a . m . [March 2], Guchkov arrived for the second time
[at the Tauride Palace]. He was greatly upset. Just before that, Prince Via-
zemskii had been killed next to him in the car. . . .
And it was actually decided then and there. Our membership was not com
plete. There was Rodzianko, Miliukov, myselfI do not remember the others.
But I remember that neither Kerensky nor Chkheidze was there. We were by
ourselves. And therefore Guchkov spoke quite freely. He said approximately
the following:
We must make some kind of decision. The situation grows worse every
minute. Viazemskii was killed just because he was an officer. The same thing,
of course, occurs in other places. And if it does not happen tonight, it will happen
tomorrow. While I was coming here I saw many officers in various rooms of the
State Duma: they simply hide here. They are afraid for their lives. They plead
to be saved. Something must be decided . . . to take us out of this dreadful
situation with a minimum of losses. In this chaos, in everything that goes on,
the first thought should be to save the monarchy. Without the monarchy Russia
cannot live. But apparently the present Emperor can no longer reign. An Imperial
order by him is no longer an order: it would not be executed. If that is so, then
how can we calmly and indifferently await the moment when all the revolutionary
riffraff starts to look for an issue itself? And they would destroy the monarchy.

3 See Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 10, for the telegram from
Ruzskii informing Rodzianko that Ivanov had been recalled and Kornilov appointed.
100 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

And, in the course of events, this will happen inevitably if we let the initiative
out of our hands.
Rodzianko said:
I was to go this morning to the Emperor. But they did not let me pass.
They declared that they would not let the train go and insisted that I go with
Chkheidze and a battalion of soldiers.
I know thissaid Guchkovtherefore we should act differently. We should
act secretly and swiftly without asking anyone, without taking anyones advice.
If we act following an agreement with them, it will surely turn out to be the least
favorable for us. They should be confronted with an accomplished fact. Russia
must have another Emperor. Under this new banner must be gathered what can
be gathered in order to organize resistance. For this purpose we must act swiftly
and resolutely.
Well, be more precise. What do you intend to do?
I propose to go immediately to see the Emperor and to bring about his
abdication in favor of the Heir.
Rodzianko said:Ruzskii has telegraphed me that he has already spoken of
this to the Emperor. Alekseev has asked the Commanders in Chief of the fronts
about the same thing. The answers are expected.
I think that someone must gosaid Guchkov.If you agree and if you
delegate me, I will go. But I would like someone else to go with me.
We looked at each other. There was a long pause? after which I said:
I will go with you.

At 10:00 oclock we arrived. The train stopped. We went out on the platform.
Blue lanterns illuminated the tracks. A few tracks away stood a lighted train.
We understood that it was the Emperors train.
Immediately someone approached us.
The Emperor expects you.
And we were led across the tracks. Then it means that everything will happen
now. Can it be averted?
No, it cannot. It is necessary. There is no other way. We went as people go
toward the greatest danger. Not quite understanding. Otherwise we would not
have gone.
But I was also tormented by another thought. A very stupid thought.
It was unpleasant to appear before the Emperor unshaved, with a crumpled
collar, in a business coat.
Our overcoats were removed. We entered the car.
It was a large salon car. Walls covered with green silk. Several tables. An
old, thin, tall, yellowish-white-headed general with shoulder boards.
It was Count Frederiks.
His Majesty the Emperor will come immediately. His Majesty is in another
car.
I felt still more hopeless and miserable.
The Emperor appeared in the doorway. He was in a great Circassian coat. I
did not expect to see him thus.
The face?
It was calm.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 101

We bowed. The Emperor greeted us, shaking hands. This gesture was rather
friendly.
And Nikolai Vladimirovich?
Somebody said that General Ruzskii had requested it be reported that he would
be somewhat late.
Then we will start without him.
By a gesture the Emperor invited us to sit down. The Emperor took a place
on one side of the small quadrangular table which was placed along the green silk
wall. On the other side of the table sat Guchkov. I sat near Guchkov obliquely
across from the Emperor. In front of the Emperor was Count Frederiks.
Guchkov was speaking. He was greatly moved. He evidently said well-
thought-out words but it was difficult for him to master his emotion. He did
not speak fluently and his voice was dull.
The Emperor sat, leaning slightly against the silken wall, and looked straight
ahead. His face was absolutely calm and impenetrable.
My eyes did not leave his face . . .

Guchkov spoke of what was occurring in Petrograd. He was able to get

control of himself somewhat. He spoke (as was his habit) covering his forehead
slightly with his hand, as if to concentrate better. He did not look at the Emperor
and spoke as if he were addressing some inner person residing in Guchkov him
self. As if he spoke to his own conscience.
He spoke the truth. He did not exaggerate nor did he conceal anything. He
told of what we saw in Petrograd. He could not say anything else. We did not
know what was happening in Russia. We were crushed by Petrograd, not by
Russia.
The Emperor looked straight in front of him calmly; he was completely
impenetrable. The only thing that it seemed to me could be guessed from his
face was:
This long speech is superfluous.
At that moment General Ruzskii came in. He bowed to the Emperor and
without interrupting the speech of Guchkov he sat down between Count Frederiks
and myself . . .
Guchkov again was excited. He broached the subject that perhaps the only
way out of this situation was the abdication of the throne.
General Ruzskii whispered to me:
The matter has been decided. Yesterday was a hard day. There was a storm.
And praying to God . . . Guchkov was saying.
At these words, something appeared for the first time on the face of the
Emperor. He turned his head and looked at Guchkov with an expression which
could mean:
This might have been left unsaid.
Guchkov finished. The Emperor replied. After the emotional words of
A.I., his words were calm, simple, and precise. Only his accent was slightly
alien, the accent of a guardsman:
I have made the decision to abdicate the throne. Until 3:00 oclock yes
terday, I thought that I could abdicate in favor of my son Aleksei. But at this
102 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

time I have changed my decision in favor of my brother Mikhail. I hope you

will understand the feelings of a father.
The last sentence he pronounced more softly.
We were not prepared for this. I think that A.I. attempted to present some
objections. I think I asked for a quarter of an hour so as to have a consultation
with Guchkov. But for some reason it did not happen. And we consented, if
it could be called consent, there and then. But during this time how many
thoughts ran through the mind, one outrunning the other.

Sometime later the Emperor came in again. He extended a paper to Guchkov

saying:
Here is the text.
There were two or three quarter sheets, such as evidently were used at Stavka
for telegram blanks. But the words were typewritten.
I started to glance through it, and excitement, pain, and something else pressed
my heart, which during these days seemed to have become deprived of the capac
ity for any feelings. The text was written in those extraordinary words which
now are known to everyone.

. . . There was one point which made me anxious. I thought during the
whole time that if Mikhail Aleksandrovich would directly and finally declare
a constitutional form of government, it would be easier for him to maintain
'himself on the throne. I said this to the Emperor. I asked him at the place
where it was said: . . . with the representatives of the people in their legislative
institutions, on the basis of principles to be established by them . . to add:
giving an oath before all the people to this effect.
The Emperor agreed immediately.
Do you think it is necessary?
And, sitting down at the table, he added with a pencil:
To take an inviolable oath to this effect. He did not write before all the
people but inviolable, which, as a matter of style, was certainly much more
correct.
It was the only alteration that was made.

89. G e n e r a l R u z s k ii o n t h e E v e n ts o f M a r c h 2 a t P s k o v
[Russkaia Volia, N o. 2, M a rc h 7 ,1 9 1 7 , p . 3.]

Nicholas II, who as a rule was not too talkative, was even more solemn and
sparing of words this time. Events both disturbed and irritated him. However,
he no longer dreamed of any repressive measures against the revolution. On
jthe contrary, by 2:00 oclock in the morning he asked me to come to see him
and said:
I decided to compromise and grant them a responsible ministry. What is
your opinion?
The manifesto about the responsible ministry, already signed, was on the
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 103

table. I knew that this compromise came too late and would serve no purpose.
But with no directives whatsoever from the Executive Committee or even news
of what was taking place, I hesitated to voice my opinion. I therefore proposed
that the Tsar speak directly with Rodzianko over the telegraph apparatus. I did
not succeed in reaching Rodzianko over the apparatus, w'hich was in the Petro
grad Joint Staff, until after 3:00 oclock in the morning. Our taEc lasted over
two hours. Rodzianko gave me all the details of the events which were occurring
with terrific speed. He was emphatic that the only way out for the Tsar was to
abdicate the throne.
I relayed my conversation with Rodzianko immediately over the telegraph
to Alekseev and the Chiefs of Staff at the fronts. About 10:00 oclock in the
morning I came to the Tsar with a report about my negotiations. Fearing that
he would treat my words with suspicion, I asked my Chief of Staff, General
Danilov, and the Chief of Military Supplies, General Savich, to accompany me.
They were to support me in my urgent advice to the Tsar to abdicate the throne
for the sake of Russias welfare and her victory over the enemy. By that time
I had all the replies from Generals Alekseev, Nikolas Nikolaevich, Brusilov, and
Evert. They were all unanimous in their view that the abdication was necessary.
The Tsar listened to my report and replied that he was ready to abdicate
the throne, but that he should like to do so in the presence of Rodzianko, who
allegedly had promised him to come to Pskov. However, Rodzianko expressed no
desire to come. On the contrary, in my night conversation with him over the
apparatus, he stated emphatically that under no circumstances could he leave
Petrograd. Moreover, he did not wish to do so.
We left the Tsar and awaited concrete actions from him. After lunch, around
3 :00 oclock in the afternoon, the Tsar called me in and said that he had already
signed the act of abdication and that he abdicated in favor of his son.
He gave me the telegram of abdication signed by him. I put it in my pocket
and went to Headquarters to send it from there. On reaching Headquarters I
was, quite unexpectedly, handed a telegram over the signatures of Guchkov and
Shulgin, informing me that they were departing for Pskov at 3:35 in the after
noon. On receiving the telegram I refrained from announcing the manifesto of
abdication and returned to the Tsar. He appeared to be very pleased that the
delegates were being sent to him, in the hope that their trip was indicative of
some change in the situation.
The train with the delegates was somewhat late and arrived at 10:00 oclock
in the evening. The Tsar waited impatiently and was nervous. I personally
kept away from him, trying to avoid meeting or talking to him. The aged
Frederiks never left his side.
I was in my railroad car at the moment when the delegates arrived. In spite of
my instructions that the delegates be first brought to me, someone among the
court generals intercepted them and ushered them directly to the Tsar. When I
entered the Tsars car, A. I. Guchkov was giving him a detailed account of
recent events. News that his personal escort had gone over to the side of the
rebel troops made a particularly strong impression on Nicholas II. This fact
shocked him to such an extent that he listened to the rest of Guchkovs report
with no attention.
104 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

To the question of the Tsar, what was he to do now, Guchkov replied in a

tone which tolerated no two decisions:
You must abdicate the throne.
The Tsar listened calmly to the statement of the delegate of the Executive
Committee. After a long pause he replied:
Very well, I have already signed the act of abdication in favor of my son,
but I have come now to the conclusion that my son is not of sound health, and
I do not wish to part with him. Therefore I decided to yield the throne to
Mikhail Aleksandrovich.
The delegates did not contradict . . .
Thus, within twenty-four hours Nicholas signed three acts in succession. At
2:00 oclock in the morning on March 2 he signed a manifesto about granting
a responsible ministry ; at 3 :00 oclock in the afternoon, the abdication in favor
of his son, Aleksei; and finally, at 10:00 oclock in the evening, the abdication
in favor of Mikhail Aleksandrovich.

90. T h e A b d ic a t io n b y t h e S o v e r e ig n E m p e r o r N ic h o l a s II o f t h e T h r o n e
of th e R u s s ia n S t a t e a n d H is L a y in g D o w n o f t h e S u p r e m e P o w e r
[Sod. Uzak., 1,1, N o. 344.]
General Headquarters
To the Chief of Staff
At a time of great struggle with an external foe, which has been striving for
almost three years to enslave our native land, it has been Gods will to visit upon
Russia a grievous new ordeal. The internal disturbances which have begun
among the people threaten to have a calamitous effect on the further conduct of
a hard-fought war. The destiny of Russia, the honor of our heroic army, the wel
fare of the people, the whole future of our beloved fatherland demand that the war
be carried to a victorious conclusion no matter what the cost. The cruel foe is
straining his last resources and the hour is already close at hand when our
valiant army, together with our glorious allies, will be able to overwhelm the foe
completely. In these decisive days in the life of Russia, We have deemed it our duty
in conscience to help Our people to draw closer together and to unite all the
forces of the nation so that victory may he won as soon as possible, and, in agree
ment with the State Duma, We have judged it right to abdicate the Throne of the
Russian State and to lay down the Supreme Power. Not wishing to be parted
from Our Beloved Son, We hand over Our Succession to Our Brother the Grand
Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich and Bless Him on his accession to the Throne of
the Russian State. We enjoin Our Brother to administer the affairs of the State
in complete and inviolable union with the representatives of the people in their
legislative institutions, on the basis of principles to be established by them, and
to take an inviolable oath to this effect. In the name of Our dearly beloved native
land, We call upon all true sons of the Fatherland to fulfill their sacred duty to
It by their obedience to the Tsar at this difficult time of national ordeal and to-
help Him, together with the peoples representatives, to lead the Russian State
onto the path of victory, prosperity, and glory. May the Lord God help Russia*
N ic h o l a s .
Pskov
March 2 3:00 p .m . 1917
Minister of the Imperial Court Chief a.d.c. Count Frederiks
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 105

91. T el e g r a m o f G u c h k o v a n d S h u l g in t o R o d z ia n k o
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 15-16.]
March 3, 1917
The Emperor has agreed to abdicate the throne in favor of Grand Duke Mikhail
Aleksandrovich with the obligation for the latter to swear allegiance to the
Constitution. Prince Lvov has been entrusted to form the new government. At
the same time Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich has been appointed Supreme
Commander. A manifesto will follow immediately. Communicate immediately
to Pskov the situation in Petrograd. G u c h k o v . S h u l g in .

92. T elegram f r o m t h e Ch ie f of S t a f f o f t h e N o r t h e r n F r o n t to
G e n e r a l A l e k s e e v A n n o u n c in g the S e v e r a l A c ts S ig n e d b y N ic h o l a s
at P sk o v
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 16.]
March 3, 1917
No. 1244/B
A copy to the Commander of the 42nd Corps, the Commanders of the 12th, 5th,
and 1st Armies.
To the Commander in Chief of the Western Front, to the Commander of the
Fleet.
Received March 3. 1 hour 28 minutes.
His Majesty has signed the ukases to the Ruling Senate regarding the ap
pointments of Prince Georgii Evgenevich LVov as President of the Council of
Ministers and of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich
as Supreme Commander. His Majesty the Emperor later on deigned to sign the
act of abdication from the Throne and its transmission to Grand Duke Mikhail
Aleksandrovich. His Majesty will leave today around 2:00 oclock for a few
days at Stavka via Dvinsk. The manifesto and the ukase will be communicated
by telegraph later on. March 3. 1:00 a . m . 1244/B. D a n il o v .

93. L a st A d d r ess o f N ic h o l a s II t o t h e A r m y
[A . S. L oukom skii, Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, by General Loukomskii, M rs.
Vitali, trans., pp. 69-70.]
For the last time I address myself to you, my much beloved troops! After my
abdication for myself and my son the power of the Russian throne has been
transferred to the Provisional Government which has been created by the initia
tive of the State Duma.
May Almighty God help it to lead Russia along the path of glory and pros
perity.
May Almighty God help you, my gallant troops, to complete your task of
defending your homeland from the evil foe. For two and a half years you have
ceaselessly carried on the hard task of combat. Much blood has been shed, many
efforts have been made and the hour is nearing when Russia, in one common
exertion for victory, in close contact with her gallant allies, will break the last
effort of the enemy. This unprecedented war must be brought to a victorious
conclusion.
Those who now think of peace or desire it are traitors of their Fatherland,
they are its betrayers. I know that every honest soldier realizes this. Fulfill
106 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

your duty, defend courageously our homeland, obey the Provisional Govern
ment, listen to your commanders.
Remember that any weakening of order merely plays into the hands of the
enemy.
I firmly believe that the boundless love for our great Russia has not been
extinguished in your hearts. Let the Almighty God bless you and let the Holy
Martyr and Victor St. George lead you to victory.
Stavka. March 8,1917.

THE REFUSAL OF THE GRAND DUKE MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH

TO ACCEPT THE THRONE

9 4 . T h e A c t iv i t ie s o f t h e G r a n d D u k e M i k h a i l A l e k s a n d r o v ic h
D u r in g t h e F e b r u a r y R e v o l u t io n
[Vozrozhdenie, XXIV (1952), 141-45. These excerpts are from the diary of A. S.
Matveev, the Executive Secretary of the Grand Duke.]
On Monday, February 2 7 , I went at the usual time to the office of the Grand
Duke M.A. The streets were alive with people and in places one could see groups
formed. In general, great excitement was felt in the air. I left the office at 8 : 3 0
in the afternoon. I was returning home by automobile, and at times we had to
drive very slowly because of the crowds of people, particularly numerous in
Blagoveshchenskaia Square. On returning home, I spoke over the telephone with
the chauffeur Kozlovskii, who told me that he had been ordered by telephone from
Gatchina to have the automobile ready at the Warsaw Railroad Station to meet
the Grand Duke M.A. In notifying me of this, Kozlovskii wondered if the Grand
Duke knew of the uneasy mood in Petrograd. Since I was not aware of the Grand
Dukes arrival in Petrograd, I telephoned Gatchina immediately after my con
versation with Kozlovskii. I learned that Mikhail Alexsandrovich had already
left for Petrograd, accompanied by N. N. Johnson [friend and private secretary
of the Grand Duke], following a telephone conversation with the President of the
State Duma, Rodzianko. Around 8 : 0 0 oclock in the evening N. N. Johnson tele
phoned me and informed me that M.A. was in the Mariinskii Palace in a confer
ence with the prominent members of the State Duma and others, called by M. V.
Rodzianko. N. N. Johnson spoke from the lobby of the Mariinskii Palace.
At 1 2 :0 0 oclock midnight the chauffeur Kozlovskii telephoned me at the
request of N. N. Johnson to let me know that the Grand Duke M.A. was with
the Minister of War in his home on the Moika. In passing on this information
to me, he used hints, apparently fearing to speak openly of the Grand Dukes
whereabouts over the telephone. At the same time Kozlovskii added that the
Grand Dukes car was concealed in the courtyard of the house. At 4 : 0 0 oclock
in the morning of February 2 8 , N. N. Johnson telephoned me that the Grand
Duke was in the Winter Palace and that they had to remain in Petrograd
because it was impossible to make their way from the home of the Minister of
War to the Warsaw Railroad Station on account of the large crowds in the
street. At 8 : 0 0 oclock in the morning of the same day (Tuesday, February 2 8 ) ,
N. N. Johnson telephoned me that M.A. was at the apartment of Princess 0. P.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 107

Putiatin, on 12 Millionnaia Street, because it was dangerous to remain in the

Winter Palace. The guards were removed and the doors of the palace were
left open. In notifying me of this, N. N. Johnson explained that the apartment
of 0. P. Putiatin was chosen as the nearest to the Winter Palace and that they
*made their way to it not through the street but through the courtyard of the
Hermitage and the palace of the Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich.

On Wednesday, March 1, I decided to go to the Grand Duke Mikhail Alek

sandrovich on 12 Millionnaia Street. I left the house around 12:00 oclock
noon . . . On approaching the front entrance of house No. 12 where the Grand
Duke M.A. was, I met Princess Putiatins governess who told me that she had
just seen with her own eyes an officer killed on the Neva embankment. I entered
the apartment of Princess 0. P. Putiatin about 1:00 oclock, as they were begin
ning lunch. In the anteroom I was met by N. N. Johnson, who told me of the
danger to which the Grand Duke was subjected that morning by staying in the
private apartment because the adjoining apartments were searched, among them
those of the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, Raev, and of Stolypin.4 For
tunately the persons who were conducting the search did not enter the apartment
of Princess 0. P. Putiatin. In telling me this, N. N. Johnson added that at the
moment M.A. was in less danger because, on the one hand, a guard was sum
moned from the Ensigns School to protect him and, on the other hand, the Grand
.Duke signed the act brought to him from the State Duma in which the Grand
Duke recognized the urgency of a constitutional regime in the Russian empire.
Subsequently I learned that this act was prepared in Tsarkoe Selo on February 28
by Eugene A. Bironov, who was at the time head of the office of the palace com
mandant, and Prince M. S. Putiatin, and signed by the Grand Dukes Pavel
Aleksandrovich, Kirill Vladimirovich, and, I think, Dmitri Konstantinovich. As
Bironov told me, this act was offered for signature to the Empress Alexandra
Feodorovna, who had to sign for the young heir. But the Empress refused to sign.
The Grand Duke M.A. was the last to sign this act. He apparently signed in
haste, because on the same day he removed this signature by means of a special
letter addressed to the President of the State Duma to whom the act was addressed.
After arriving at the apartment of Princess Putiatin at 1:00 oclock on
Wednesday, March 1, I remained there with the Grand Duke M.A. until 11:00
oclock in the morning of Saturday, March 4. After lunch, M.A. told me about
the conference in the Mariinskii Palace on the evening of February 27, which
resulted in his conversation with the Tsar through General Alekseev, over the
direct wire to Stavka. During lunch the guard from the Ensigns School arrived.
It consisted of 20 junkers and five officers. The officers took their place in the
private study of Princess Putiatins apartment and the junkers in the adjoining
apartment, a floor lower . . .
The same day, around 9:00 oclock in the evening the Grand Duke Nikolai
Mikhailovich also came. He had returned on that day to Petrograd (he lived in
his palace near the apartment of Princess Putiatin) from his estate Grushevka,
where he had been in residence by order of the Tsar since January 1. I think on
that day the English Ambassador Buchanan came also. Thursday, March 2, M.A.
remained in the apartment of Princess Putiatin. He learned of what was taking

4 A. A Stolypin, right journalist and brother of former Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin.

108 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

place in the State Duma from the persons who came to see him. On this day the
Grand Duke wrote a letter to M. V. Rodzianko expressing his willingness to come
to the State Duma if his presence could do any good, in view of the situation. M. V.
Rodzianko replied by letter. From this letter the Grand Duke learned for the first
time about the Tsars proposed abdication from the throne in favor of the heir
under the regency of the Grand Duke, M.A. This letter was received in the eve
ning. But the Tsars own decision was not known to M.A.
Thus ended the day of March 2.
In the morning of March 3 (Friday), at 5:55 a . m . I heard a telephone bell
and then I saw standing near the telephone, first, N. N. Johnson and then the
Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Apparently the call was from the Minister
of Justice, Kerensky, who asked permission for the members of the Provisional
Government and the Duma Committee to come to see him. The Grand Duke gave
his consent and began to make preparations to receive them.
Mikhail Aleksandrovich thought, in the light of the letter of the President
of the State Duma, that the members of the Provisional Government and the
Duma Committee were coming to report to him on the regency. He therefore
was thinking over the appropriate reply expressing his consent.
It was expected that the Provisional Government and the Duma Committee
would arrive immediately after the telephone conversation, but they needed more
time to get ready, and they began to arrive at 9:15 in the morning. Among the
first to arrive were M. V. Rodzianko and Prince G. E. Lvov. The last to arrive
were A. I. Guchkov and V. V. Shulgin. M. V. Rodzianko asked the Grand Duke
M.A. through me not to open the meeting until the arrival of the latter, inasmuch
as they were returning from Stavka with important news.
Mikhail Aleksandrovich came out around 9:45 to join those who had gathered.
About that time A. I. Guchkov and V. V. Shulgin also arrived. I was not present
at the reception of the above persons, but I heard the concluding words of the
Grand Duke from the adjoining room: On hearing the speeches of those who
came to see him, M.A. announced that he was withdrawing to the adjoining room
to think. Member of the Duma, Kerensky, stated that he believed the Grand Duke
M.A. would decide the question proposed to him according to his conscience and
without the aid of outside people, excepting of course consultation with his wife.
The Grand Duke announced that his wife was not in Petersburg and that he would
like to make the responsible decision after discussing the question with M. V.
Rodzianko and Prince Lvov. Following these words, M.A. and the above-named
persons withdrew to the adjoining room, and after a time he gave his decision,
announced in the Act of March 3.
This was around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
After this, all those present departed, except Prince LVov and Shulgin, who
were invited by Princess 0 . P. Putiatin to have lunch. Present at the lunch were
the Grand Duke M.A., Princess 0. P. Putiatin, Prince LVov, V. V. Shulgin,
N. N. Johnson, and myself.
After lunch, M.A. suggested that Prince LVov and Shulgin begin, with my
participation, to set down in proper form what had taken place. I pointed out
that in preparing the Act it was necessary to have before us the original abdica
tion of the Tsar and the Fundamental Laws. It was agreed to call in V. D.
Nabokov, who had the original abdication of the Emperor (apparently as Head
of Chancellery of the Provisional Government), and Baron Nolde, Professor
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 109

of International Law. The first to arrive was V. D. Nabokov, who handed

over to M.A. the Tsars abdication and outlined the draft of the Act, prepared,
according to Nabokov, by Nekrasov, Minister of Transport. After Baron Nolde
arrived, M.A., together with the above-named persons (Lvov, Nabokov, and
Nolde), launched into a discussion of the draft of the Act. I withdrew. Around
4:30 in the afternoon M.A. came out of the conference room and handed me
for my perusal the Act about the temporary refusal to accept the Supreme Power.
The Act was copied in Nabokovs handwriting. After reading the Act, I intended
to express my views directly to the Grand Duke. M.A. suggested that I give them
to him in the presence of the members of the conference.5
On entering the conference room, I noticed, in addition to the above-mentioned
persons, M. V. Rodzianko and A. F. Kerensky. I proposed certain changes in the
text of the Act, some of which were accepted by M.A. and the members of the
conference. After the changes were introduced, the Act was signed by the Grand
Duke and handed to Prince LVov.
The following day, Saturday, March 4, the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandro
vich departed from Petersburg for Gatchina, accompanied by N. N. Johnson and
General Ya. D. Uzefovich, whom they met en route.

95. C o n v e r s a t io n b y T e l e p h o n e B e t w e e n G e n e r a l R u z s k ii and
M. V. R o d z ia n k o a n d P r in c e L vov
[Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A. Lukomskago, ARR, III (1922), 266-68.]
At 5:00 A.M. March 3, General Ruzskii was summoned to the direct wire
by the President of the State Duma, Rodzianko, and Prince Lvov.
General Ruzskii is at the apparatus.
[Rodzianko:] Hello, Your Excellency. It is extremely important that the mani
festo regarding the abdication and the transmission of power to the Grand Duke
Mikhail Aleksandrovich should not be published until I advise you of it. As a
matter of fact, it is with great difficulty that we managed to retain the revolutionary
movement within more or less bearable limits, but the situation is as yet far from
settled and a civil war is quite possible. Perhaps they would reconcile themselves
to the regency of the Grand Duke and the accession of the heir Tsarevich, but
his accession as Emperor would be completely unacceptable. I request you to
take all the measures at your disposal to obtain postponement.
Rodzianko has left; Prince LVov is at the apparatus.
[Ruzskii:] All right. The order will be given, but as to whether it will be
possible to stop the publication of the manifesto I cannot say, because too much
time has elapsed.
I am very sorry that the deputies who were sent yesterday were not sufficiently
informed of their role and in general of the reason why they had come. In any
case, everything will be done that at the present moment is within human power*
I request you to clarify now what it was that took place yesterday, and the conse
quences which it might have in Petrograd.
[Rodzianko:] Rodzianko is at the phone. As a matter of fact, the deputies
should not be blamed. Unexpectedly for everybody, a mutiny of soldiers has flared
up, the like of which I have not yet seen; of course they were not soldiers but
5 For Nabokovs account and his comments on the issues involved, see his Vremennoe
Pravitelstvo, ARR,I (1921), 16-22.
110 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

.simple peasants taken away from their plows, who thought it would be wise to
present their peasant demands now. From the crowd one could hear Land and
Freedom, Down with the Dynasty,55 Down with the Romanovs,55 Down with
the Officers,55 and in many units a massacre of officers had started. Workers
joined them and anarchy had reached its climax. After lengthy negotiations with
the deputies from the workers, we managed during the course of last night to
come to a certain agreement by which a Constituent Assembly should be convened
in a certain period of time so that the people could express their views on the form
of government; only then Petrograd breathed freely and the night passed rela
tively calmly.
Little by little the troops were brought to order during the night, but the proc
lamation of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich as Emperor would pour oil into
the fire and a merciless extermination of everything that can be exterminated
would start.
We will lose from our hands all authority and no one will remain to appease
the popular unrest.
In the proposed formula, the return of the dynasty is not excluded, and it
is desirable that approximately until the wars end, the Supreme Council and
the Provisional Government now active should continue to act. I am quite certain
that under these circumstances, a rapid restoration of order is possible and a
decisive victory would be guaranteed, because there is no doubt that there will
be a resurgence of patriotic feeling, that everything will be functioning at an
intensified tempo, and, I repeat, that victory could be guaranteed.

[Ruzskii:] I think that Prince Lvov is at the phone. Would he like to speak
with me?
[Rodzianko:] Nikolai Vladimirovich, everything has been said. Prince Lvov
cannot add anything else. We both firmly trust in the help of God, in the greatness
and might of Russia, in the valor and firmness of the army, and, in spite of all the
difficulties, in the victorious end of the war. Goodbye.
[Ruzskii:] Mikhail Vladimirovich, tell me for the sake of clarity whether I
have understood you correctly: it means that for the present everything remains
as before, as if there was no manifesto and Prince Lvov was not charged to form
a cabinet. I would like to know your opinion also regarding the appointment of
the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander by order of His
Majesty in a ukase issued by His Majesty the Emperor. According to the request
of the deputies, these ukases were already widely publicized yesterday, even in
Moscow, and of course to the Caucasus.
[Rodzianko:] Today a government has been forced with Prince Lvov at its
head and telegrams in this respect have been sent to all the commanders of fronts.
Everything remains as follows: the Supreme Council; a responsible ministry;
the legislative chambers to be active until the question of the constitution is solved
by the Constituent Assembly.
We have nothing against the circulation of the ukase concerning the appoint
ment of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander. Goodbye.
[Ruzskii:] Tell me, who is at the head of the Supreme Council?
[Rodzianko:] I have made a mistake, not the Supreme Council but the Tem
porary Committee of the State Duma under my chairmanship.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 111

[Ruzskii:] All right. Goodbye. Do not forget to communicate this to Stavka,

.because further negotiations should be carried on in Stavka and I should he
informed of the course of events and of the situation.
March 3. 1917. 6 hours.

9 6 . C o n v e r s a t io n B e t w e e n G e n e r a l A l e k s e e v and R odzlanko by D ir e c t
W ir e
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda KA, XXII (1927), 25-27.]
March 3, 1917
From 0600 to 0645 hours
The President of the State Duma asks General Alekseev to come imme
diately to the apparatus.
General Alekseev is at the apparatus.
[Rodzianko:] Good day, Your Excellency. Events here have not calmed
down, the situation is still alarming and confused; I urgently request you not to
publish any kind of manifesto before receiving my views, which alone can stop
the revolution at once.
[Alekseev:] Good day, Your Excellency. The manifesto which was signed
last night on the 3rd of March [sic] in Pskov has been communicated to the
Commanders in Chief, to the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and to the com
manders of the troops of the districts, because a complete lack of information
provoked queries from them as to how to act, what their directives should be,
what they should uphold, in connection only with the troops and the life of the
troops. The manifesto was telegraphed to me from Pskov at around 2 :00 oclock
in the night. After receiving the manifesto, I telegraphed to the President of the
Council of Ministers . . . [text confused]. If all this does not correspond with
your views, kindly inform me, as the main thing is to achieve clarity, which is so
necessary for the army and for those just behind the front.
[Rodzianko:] Wouldnt it be possible to withhold the publication of the mani
festo, because the combination proposed may cause a civil war, as the candidacy
of Mikhail Aleksandrovich as Emperor is unacceptable to everyone?
[Alekseev:] I did not communicate it for the purpose of being published.
Now I will send a supplementary telegram, but I am afraid that within the armies
the manifesto will become more or less known. Probably A. I. Guchkov has tele
graphed its essence to you from Pskov. I would have preferred to receive your
directives before, so that I would have known what to do. Now I will send the
telegrams.
[Rodzianko:] It was supposed that the heir Tsarevich would accede under
the regency of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich. We did not succeed in
reaching an agreement, and only an armistice has been established; it is supposed
that a convening of the Constituent Assembly is necessary, and until that time
the Supreme Committee and the Council of Ministers, which we have already
published and appointed, together with the simultaneous activity of both legisla
tive chambers, will be in charge. Therefore, I ask you not to publish the manifesto
until you hear from me, because the aforesaid combination has already brought
a great measure of calm. Only with this combination is it possible to hope for a
restoration of discipline in the army units and for a calming down the population
in general; the decision regarding the Constituent Assembly does not exclude
112 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

the possibility of the dynasty returning to power, because for the further develop
ment of Russia it is necessary that this solution be acknowledged by all the people.
The indignation which existed against the regime cannot be calmed down by
anything else. Under the aforesaid combination a colossal upsurge of patriotic
feelings toward the homeland, an unprecedented upsurge of energy, absolute
quiet in the country, and the most brilliant victory can be guaranteed. The troops
that rebelled, which consist evidently of peasants, were quieted down only by
this, and they have decided to return to their commanders and to obey the demands
of discipline and the decisions of the Provisional Government. Only today Petro
grad, having heard this decision, has calmed down somewhat.
[Alekseev:] I will take all necessary measures to have the manifesto go no
further than the Commanders in Chief and the commanders of the district troops.
What you have communicated to me is far from pleasant. The unknown and the
Constituent Assembly represent two dangerous toys for the active army, which
has such large troop concentration points as Kiev immediately behind the front.
The Petrograd Garrison, which has tasted the fruits of betrayal, will easily betray
again and again. This is harmful for the fatherland, it is useless for the army
and for you, and for your cause it is dangerous. Such is the general military
opinion regarding these units, which apparently are in a state of complete moral
disintegration. I would like to receive as soon as possible something final and
definite, which is so necessary for the least steady units of the fleet and for the
ground forces subordinate to the latter. Revel5, which is also not far removed
from the army rear, is in such a situation. All the thoughts, all the aspirations of
the chiefs of the active army are directed toward making the active army think
only of the war and not be in contact with the unhealthy internal state that appar
ently prevails in part of Russia. Let it be the wish of God that all these efforts
will bring us to the desired goal and that the active army will remain an armed
force exclusively faithful to the fatherland in its struggle against the external
enemy.
[Rodzianko:] I share entirely your pains and apprehensions, but the country
'is not to blame. For two and a half years it was tormented, in addition to the
war, by all sorts of disorders and constant offenses against its national self
esteem. The Constituent Assembly cannot be convened earlier than six months
from now, and until then I am completely convinced that because of the consid
erations just described it will be possible to keep the country calm and bring the
war to a victorious conclusion. I will not keep you any longer. I wish you a quiet
night while taking the measures intended for the delaying of the manifestos pub
lication. Goodnight.
[Alekseev:] The orders are being given. I will delay what it is possible to
delay. I will add that I am a soldier, that at the front all my thoughts are directed
toward the west, toward the enemy. Good-bye. May God help you.

97. T e l e g r a m f r o m G e n e r a l A l e k s e e v t o t h e C o m m a n d e r s in C h i e f o f
t h e N o r t h e r n , W e s t e r n , S o u t h w e s t e r n , a n d R u m a n ia n F r o n t s
[ Dokumenty k Vospominaniiam Gen. A . Lukomskago, A R R , III (1922), 268-69.]
0700 hours, March 3.
The President of the State Duma, having summoned me to the phone, advised
me that affairs in Petrograd were far from settled, that the situation is alarming
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 113

and unclear, and therefore he urgently requested that the manifesto signed on
March 2, which has already been communicated to the Commanders in Chief,
not be circulated and the publication of this manifesto be postponed.
The reason for this insistence was more clearly and definitely expressed by
the President of the Duma in his conversation by phone with the Commander in
Chief of the Northern Front; a copy of this conversation has just now been
communicated to me. They might be reconciled to the regency of the Grand Duke
and the accession of the heir Tsarevich, but the candidature of the Grand Duke
as Emperor is unacceptable to all of them, and a civil war would be probable.

Some information already received points out that the manifesto is already
known and has already been published in certain places; anyway, it is unthinkable
to keep secret an act of great importance, which was meant for general knowledge,
the more so since a whole night has elapsed between the time of its signature and
Rodziankos request to me.
From all the conversations between the President of the State Duma and the
Commander in Chief of the Northern Front and myself, the following conclusions
can be drawn:
First, there is no unity within the State Duma and its Temporary Committee;
the parties of the left, strengthened by the Soviet of Workers Deputies, have
acquired great influence.
Second, very strong pressure is being exerted on the President of the Duma
and of the Temporary Committee, Rodzianko, by the parties of the left and the
Workers Deputies, and there is no frankness or sincerity in the communications
of Rodzianko.
Third, the goals of the parties that are dominating the President are clearly
defined by the aforementioned suggestions of Rodzianko.
Fourth, the troops of the Petrograd Garrison have been completely propa
gandized by the Workers Deputies and are harmful and dangerous elements for
everyone, not excluding the moderate elements of the Temporary Committee.

His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich having ordered me

in all serious cases to address him by urgent telegram, I am reporting to him the
foregoing and am requesting instructions, adding [the requests]: (1) to com
municate to the President of the Duma the essence of my present conclusions and
to demand for the sake of the homeland and of the active army the realization of
the manifestos; (2) to convene in Mogilev a conference of commanders in chief
in order to establish unanimity in all circumstances and in any eventuality.

I would ask you to express your opinion; maybe you will consider it necessary
to ask the army commanders to express their opinions as to the expediency of
convening a conference of commanders in chief. Mogilev 1918. G e n e r a l
A lek seev

98. T e l e g r a m o f G r a n d D u k e N ik o l a i N ik o l a e v ic h t o G e n e r a l A l e k s e e v
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 25. This is apparently in
answer to Alekseevs report mentioned in Doc. 97. It seems to answer several of the
points he proposed to include in his telegram to the Grand Duke.]
114 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Received: March 3, 18 hr. 22 min.

1919. I consider that in relations with the Government I must act as spokes
man for the combined opinion of the Army and Navy, but not for the collective
opinion of the Commanders in Chief. Unquestionably, this requires that I have
your opinion and the opinion of the Commanders in Chief. It is the sacred duty
of all army and naval commanders to take all measures [for ensuring] that the
Army and the Navy perform their duty in combat with the enemy, despite every
thing. I find it impossible to leave for Stavka at the present time, since there will
be no possibility for a few days of contacting you or the Government in Petrograd
for orientation purposes in order to give proper instructions to the Army and Navy.
I have already sent a telegram to the President of the Council of Ministers asking
him to keep me up to date so that I can inform him of my opinion on what meas
ures would be advisable in the rear and in order to coordinate our actions. Was
expecting a manifesto on abdication of the throne in favor of the Tsarevich under
the regency of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich. As concerns the manifesto
on abdication in favor of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, reported by you
this morning, it will inevitably provoke a slaughter [reznia], Furthermore, its
wording and the failure to indicate the successor to the throne will doubtlessly
give rise to complications. It is particularly important for me to know the opinion
of the President of the Council of Ministers on this very question about which I
am making inquiries. As for the Constituent Assembly, I consider it totally
unacceptable in terms of the welfare of Russia and the victorious conclusion of
the war. 3318.
G eneral a .d . c . N ik o l a i

9 9 . T h e Q u e s t io n of th e A c c e s s io n o f M ik h a il
[M. V. Rodzianko. Gosudarstvennaia Duma i Fevralskaia 1917 goda Revoliutsiia,
ARR9VI (1922), 61.]

Thus, allegedly, the Supreme Power passed to Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksan
drovich, but immediately the question rose as to the consequence this completely
unexpected solution would provoke and whether the accession to the throne of
Mikhail Aleksandrovich would be possible, all the more so as the act of abdication
did not say a word regarding the abdication for the son.
First of all, according to the existing laws on succession to the throne, the
reigning emperor cannot abdicate in somebodys favor and has only the right to
abdicate for himself, allowing the person to ascend the throne who has the right,
according to the laws of succession.
Thus, with the undoubtedly increasing revolutionary mood of the masses and
of their leaders, we would have been from the very first in the presence of a well-
founded, juridical dispute as to whether the ascension to the throne by Mikhail
Aleksandrovich could be considered lawful. As a result, there would have been a
further flare-up by those persons who endeavored to overthrow definitely the
monarchy and to establish immediately a republican regime in Russia.
At least, member of the State Duma Kerensky, who was a member of the
Temporary Committee of the State Duma, quite frankly declared that if Mikhail
Aleksandrovich ascended the throne, the workers of Petrograd and the entire
revolutionary democracy would not tolerate it.
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY 115

It was evident that a tsar newly ascending the throne in a troubled and
dangerous period could not face such a situation. But what was most important,
taking into account the mood of the revolutionary elements as defined by member
of the State Duma Kerensky, was that it was quite obvious to us that the Grand
Duke would have reigned only a few hours and that terrible bloodshed, marking
the beginning of a general civil war, would have immediately started within the
walls of the capital.

100. T h e D e c is io n of M ik h a il to R efu se the T hrone

[P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 53-55. V. V. Shulgins
account, in his Dni, pp. 295-307, of the meeting with the Grand Duke generally con
forms to Miliukovs, but Alexander F. Kerensky in The Catastrophe, pp. 68-71, wrote
that he spoke only once during the meeting, to agree to Mikhails request to withdraw
for a private consultation, and that Prince Lvov as well as Rodzianko was asked by the
Grand Duke to meet privately with him. Guchkovs account is in Padenie, VI, 266-68.
See also Doc. 94.]
. . . During the conference on the morning of March 8 [A. F. Kerenskys]
opinion that it was necessary to convince the Grand Duke to abdicate had a de
cisive influence. N. V. Nekrasov had already prepared a draft for the abdication.
The opposite view, that of preserving a constitutional monarchy until the Con
stituent Assembly convened, was held only by P. N. Miliukov. After many heated
arguments, it was decided that both sides would explain to the Grand Duke their
opposite points of view and would leave the decision to the Grand Duke without
entering into further discussions. At about midday the members of the Govern
ment . . . and [some] members of the Temporary Committee . . . gathered at
the home of the Grand Duke on Millionnaia [Street]. The necessity to abdi
cate was argued at length by M. V. Rodzianko, and then by A. F. Kerensky.
After them, P. N. Miliukov developed his idea that a strong authority, which was
essential for the consolidation of the new order, required the support of a symbol
of power, to which the masses were accustomed. He said that the Provisional
Government alone, without a monarch, represented an unseaworthy craft which
might sink in an ocean of popular unrest; in this case, the country would be in
danger of completely losing its national consciousness and of falling into com
plete anarchy, before the convention of the Constituent Assembly; [if left] alone,
the Provisional Government would not live long enough to see it, and so forth.
In spite of previous agreement, this speech was followed by other speeches of a
polemical nature. Then P. N. Miliukov asked to be heard once more, and, in
spite of the heated objections of A. F. Kerensky, his request was granted. In his
second speech he stressed that, although those who were saying that the accept
ance of power would jeopardize the personal security of the Grand Duke and of
the ministers themselves were right, this risk should [nevertheless] be taken in
the interest of the fatherland, for only thus could the persons involved be freed
from their responsibility for the future. Besides, outside of Petrograd there was
ample possibility of gathering the military force required for the protection of the
Grand Duke. A. I. Guchkov alone supported P. N. Miliukov. Both sides declared
that in the event of a decision contrary to their views, they would not object and
would support the Government, although without participating in it.
116 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

After the speeches were finished, the Grand Duke, who had remained silent,
asked for some time to think the matter over. Going to another room, he asked
M. V. Rodzianko to follow him in order to talk with him alone. Returning from
this conversation to the deputies who were waiting for him, he said rather firmly
that his final decision was in favor of the opinion defended by the President of
the State Duma. Then A. F. Kerensky made a pathetic declaration: Your High
ness, you are a noble man! He added that henceforth he would always state it.
Kerenskys pathos was out of tune with the decision being taken. Not love and
grief for Russia but only personal fear was felt behind it.

1 0 1 . T h e R e f u s a l o f t h e G r a n d D u k e M i k h a i l A l e k s a n d r o v ic h t o
A s s u m e t h e S u p r e m e P o w e r P e n d in g t h e D e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e
C o n s t it u e n t A s s e m b l y o f t h e F o r m o f G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e
N e w F u n d a m e n t a l L a w s o f t h e R u s s ia n S t a t e
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 345.]
A heavy burden has been laid upon Me by the will of My Brother, Who has
given over to Me the Imperial Throne of All the Russias at a time of unprece
dented warfare and popular disturbances.
Inspired by the thought, which is shared by all the people, that the good of
our native land is above everything else, I have taken a firm decision to assume
the Supreme Power only in the event that such is the will of our great people,
upon whom it devolves by a general vote, through their representatives in the
Constituent Assembly, to determine the form of government and the new funda
mental laws of the Russian State.
Therefore, invoking Gods Blessing, I ask all citizens of the Russian State to
pay allegiance to the Provisional Government, which has come into being at the
initiative of the State Duma and which is endowed with full power, until such
time as the Constituent Assembly, to be convened in as short a period as possible
on the basis of a universal, direct, equal, and secret vote, by its decision on the
form of government, expresses the will of the people.
M ik h a il
March 3, 1917
Petrograd
 I

CHAPTER 3

The Formation o f the Provisional Government

102. T h e C o n f e r e n c e s B e t w e e n t h e D e l e g a t e s o f t h e E x e c u t iv e
C o m m it t e e o f t h e S o v ie t a n d t h e T e m p o r a r y C o m m it t e e
o f t h e S tate D u m a

[N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and trans.,
pp. 116-57.]
It was not more than half an hour to midnight [March 1]. Kerensky was
expected to come back then and it was up to usthe Ex. Com.to select our
representatives at once. But the Ex. Com. had dispersed and was unable to be
present at the meeting as a whole. Nor was there any need for this. What was
worse was that we had no formally authorized delegation, and there was no time
left to elect one. Some of the members, who were present, had to talk it over pri
vately, and as a result the conduct of the negotiations was entrusted to four
persons: Chkheidze, Sokolov, Steklov, and myself.
Just after midnight we assembled in the ante-room of the Duma Committee. . . .
Kerensky came back. We were invited into the Duma Committees meeting-
room . . .
To the left of the door, at the farthest end of the room, Rodzianko was sitting
at a table drinking soda-water. At another parallel table Miliukov sat facing him
over a pile of papers, notes, and telegrams. Further away Nekrasov was seated
at the next table nearer the entrance. Behind him, opposite the entrance, there
were four or five unknown and negligible deputies or other people, who were
simply spectators. In the middle of the room, between Rodziankos table and
Nekrasovs, the arm-chairs and chairs were occupied by the future Premier G. E.
Lvov, Godnev, Shidlovsky, and another Lvov, the future Procurator of the Holy
Synodthe same who was to go as Kornilovs courier to Kerensky. Beyond them,
usually standing or strolling about, was Shulgin.
I dont remember whether anyone else was there, and in any case I dont know
their names. During the conference not only any others but most of those already
named preserved utter silence. Prince Lvov in particular, the head of the future
Government, didnt utter a single word all night.
After the meeting had already begun Kerensky settled himself at one of the
tables standing along the other wall, in a line with Miliukovs. Sunk in sullen
meditation the whole time, he also took not the slightest part in the talks.

There was no chairman formally elected: Rodzianko was informally asked for
the floor. The meeting was not formally constituted, opened, or conducted. The
talks began in a rather domestic way; it was some time before they took on a
businesslike and responsible tone and still longer before they took the bull by
the horns.
118 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

It seemed plain to me that there had been enough of this desultory conver
sation and of the obscuring alike of the central question and of the general situ
ation; enough, too, of the obscuring of the mutual relations between the two sides.
I spoke for the first time, and pointed out that the basic technical task of the
Soviet now consisted of the struggle against anarchy; this struggle was in its own
interests no less than in those of the Duma Committee; it was conducting it and
would go on conducting it; and in particular, with respect to relations with the
officers, we were already printing a special appeal to the soldiers. However, all
this was far from covering the main object of this conference. The Provisional
Committee of the Duma, which had taken the executive power into its hands, was
still not a Government, not even a provisional one; the creation of this Govern
ment still lay ahead, and the leading groups of the Duma undoubtedly had defi
nite intentions and plans on that score. The Soviet, for its part, would leave the
formation of a provisional Government to the bourgeois groups, on the view that
this followed from the existing general situation and suited the interests of the
revolution. However, as the organizational and ideological centre of the popular
movement, as the only organ capable of guiding the movement into one channel
or another, and as the only organ now wielding any real power in the capital, it
wished to express its relationship to the Government being formed in the right
wing, make clear its views on the tasks of that Government, and state the demands
which in the name of the entire democracy it was presenting to the Government
created by the revolution.
Our interlocutors could have nothing to object to in this agenda and pre
pared to listen. Steklov, as we had agreed, gave the report, solemnly standing up
with his sheet of paper. . . .

Steklov tried to unify all our demands, arguing, proving their rationality and
acceptability, making historical excursions and giving illustrations from the prac
tice of Western Europe. He dwelt especially on the conversion of the army to a
civilian basis, thinking that this point would inevitably provoke opposition and
trying to demonstrate that the demand was thoroughly compatible with keeping
the army fighting fit; its strength would not he weakened, but would increase to
the extent of the armys union with the revolution and the granting to the mass
of the soldiery of all human, political, and civil rights.

Steklov concluded by expressing the hope that the Cabinet then being formed
would accept our demands and publish them as its programme in the proclama
tion which announced to the people the creation of the first new Government of
the revolution.
Miliukov spoke in reply. He spoke for the entire Duma Committee; everyone
considered this a matter of course. It was clear that Miliukov here was not only
a leader, but the boss of the right wing.
In general the conditions of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
are acceptable, he said, and in general they may constitute the groundwork for
an agreement with the Committee of the Duma. Nevertheless there are some points
the Committee definitely objects to.
Miliukov asked for the sheet of paper on which our programme had been
set out and made his comments as he copied it out. The amnesty was a matter
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 119

of course. Miliukov didnt think it proper to contest it and rather reluctantly hut
obediently wrote down: for all crimes: agrarian, military, or terrorist. It was
the same with the second pointpolitical liberties, the abolition of religious or
class disabilities, etc. These were demanded of Miliukov and he yielded.
But the third point aroused his resolute opposition. This read: The Provi
sional Government must not take any steps to predetermine the future form of
government. Miliukov defended the Romanov monarchy and dynasty, with Alexis
as Tsar and Michael as Regent.
What I personally found rather unexpected was not that Miliukov should
fight for the Romanov monarchy, but that he should make this the most con
tentious point of all our terms. . . .

He made some liberal advances to us, pointing out that the Romanovs could
no longer be dangerous now, and that Nicholas was unacceptable to him too and
must be removed. He naively tried to convince us of the acceptability to the
democracy of his arrangement, saying of his candidates that one was a sick child,
the other a thoroughly stupid man.
In Miliukovs position, of course, no theoretical arguments could help him;
they could only spoil his case. But the other kind of argument, the practical, was
unsuitable, and Miliukov simply insisted, without any arguments, somewhat dis
concerting even his colleagues from the Progressive Bloc.
Chkheidze and Sokolov observed that Miliukovs plan was not only unaccept
able, but also utopian, in view of the general hatred of the monarchy amongst
the masses of the people. They said that an attempt to defend the Romanovs,
with our sanction, was completely absurd and would lead to nothing. But the
bourgeois leader was irreconcilable and, seeing the fruitlessness of wrangling,
turned to the succeeding points.
He went through the whole programme to the end, accepting municipal elec
tions, the abolition of the police, and a Constituent Assembly, in the authentic
sense. Further, while protesting against the shifting of the army to a civil status
when off duty, he did not reject this point in principle and merely spoke of its
dangers. Finally he again returned to the third point, indicating that for him
this was the only inadmissible one, whereas the others could be discussed.
Rodzianko spoke next. As far as I remember he dwelt primarily on the date
for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and its elections. We were de
manding an immediate start on the work of organizing the elections, and the elec
tions themselves as quickly as possible, independent of any circumstances what
soever. Rodzianko pointed out the impossibility of this, particularly for the army
in wartime. However, he spoke far from categorically, but rather by way of
expressing doubt. I dont remember whether he supported Miliukov on the ques
tion of the monarchy and regency.
Then Shulgin made a speech which shifted the centre of gravity to the point
concerning the army disorders. He spoke about the war, victory, patriotism, and
the extreme danger of our military programme/ But I dont remember any
intransigence in his speech either, and with respect to the monarchy he, intro
ducing himself as a monarchist, was milder than Miliukov, merely expressing his
own general views on the subject.
Nekrasov can scarcely have been altogether silent, but nothing of his speech,
if there was one, remains in my memory.
120 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

But I clearly recall the comical, elongated, bald-headed, and moustachioed

figure of Lvov, the future Procurator, who made a long, noisy, and naive speech
from the depths of his easy-chair. . . .
The next speaker was myself. I very briefly pointed out that the demands
which had been presented were in the first place a minimum, and secondly abso
lutely categorical and final. I observed that among the masses an incomparably
broader programme was developing with every day and every hour, and that the
masses were supporting it and would go on doing so. The leaders were straining
all their energies to direct the movement into a definite channel and keep it within
reasonable limits. But if these limits were to be imprudently contracted a spon
taneous explosion would sweep them away together with all the contemplated
governmental combinations. Either we could stop this explosion or nobody
could. The real power therefore was either ours or nobodys. There was only
one solution: to agree to our conditions and accept them as the Government
programme.
The exchange of opinions on the substance of our demands was concluded.
Miliukov took the floor again.
These were your demands, he said, addressed to us. But we have our own
demands of you . . .
Were off! I thought, sure that then would follow an attempt to pledge the
Soviet to the support of the Government.
But strangely enough no such attempt was made, or at least it never took any
definite form. Miliukov began talking of something quite differentthe imme
diate action to be taken by the Ex. Com. to restore law and order and, in par
ticular and especially, to establish contact between soldiers and officers.
Miliukov demanded from us a declaration which would point out that whereas
the Government was being formed by agreement with the Soviet of Workers
Deputies, this Government should be recognized as legitimate by the masses of
the people and enjoy their confidence. The main thing he demanded, however,
was that the declaration should contain an appeal for confidence in the officers
corps and for recognition by the soldiers of the commanding staff.

* * *

At this point Engelhardt came in with an orderly and said that Headquarters
was asking to speak to Rodzianko by direct wire. As a matter of fact it was not
Headquarters but Pskov, where the Tsar had arrived (via Dno) towards 8 oclock
in the evening . . .
Rodzianko refused to go to the telegraph-office alone. Let Messieurs the
Workers and Soldiers Deputies give me a guard or accompany me, he said,
turning to us, or else I shall be arrested there, at the telegraph-office. I dont,
know whether I shall be able to travel; we must ask Messieurs the Deputies!
The old man was suddenly very agitated. Really! You have the power and
the authority, he continued excitedly. You can of course arrest me. Perhaps
you will arrest all of us, who knows!
We calmed the former Jupiter of the Duma, whose nerves were beginning
to fail under the burden of events. We reassured him that we would not only
not touch his person but would guard it most carefully.
Sokolov left to get him a reliable escort, and Rodzianko went off to the tele-
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 121

graph-office for a last conversation with his recent ruler, the musical-comedy
sovereign of a sixth of the globe.

* * *

The question of the conditions for forming the Government had been cleared
up first. We passed on to the last item, concerning its personal composition, and
reported the Ex. Com.s decision. We were told the proposed Cabinet members,
no mention being made, however, of Kerensky. We made some adverse comments
on Guchkov, pointing out that he might prove a source of complications. In reply
we were told that in view of his organizational talents and extremely widespread
army contacts he was completely irreplaceable. Well, let him apply his talents
and exploit his contacts: we intended to start up our own.
Tereshchenkos name caused some surprise. Where had this gentleman sprung
from and why, and by what stroke of fortune had he popped up among the Min
isters of the revolution?
The answer was rather evasive and obscure: it was clear that we were not the
only ones at a loss. But we didnt insist on a positive response.
* *
Our preliminary conference was over. We agreed to meet again in an hour,
around 5 oclock, in the same room. . . .

In our conference room [in the early morning of March 2] almost no one
was now left of the former participants and witnesses. The lights were extin
guished, morning was already looking in through the windows; the snowdrifts
and trees covered with hoar-frost could be seen in the empty Tauride gardens
. . . Miliukov and Sokolov were sitting at a table, near the last lighted lamp.

Miliukov was finishing the Ex. Com.s proclamationin the version I had
begun. He added a third (and last) paragraph to the second paragraph that I
had written, and fixed his signature below mine.
This version begins betterand is clearer andshorter, Miliukov explained.
But he was already completelyworn out, andfinally got to his feet,interrupting
the work.
No, I cant go on, he said, stuffing the papers into his pocket. Well finish
to-morrow. Let it be postponed a day.
We all went our separate ways.

The resolution on the Government was passed, the agreement of the Ex. Com.
with the propertied elements was approved, and the business of forming the Gov
ernment had to be concluded. The following morning, whatever happened, the
placards of the new Provisional Government had to be hanging in the streets,
proclaiming the definitive establishment of a new era in the history of the Rus
sian State.
Between 7 and 8 that evening [March 2] I hastily collected our delegation
for the final settlement of this question in the right wing. . . .

Properly speaking there was no meeting: there was a conversation between

122 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Miliukov, Steklov, and myself, in which none or practically none of the other
people in the room took part. Even the external arrangements of the room pre
cluded, you might say, the idea of any kind of meeting. Miliukov was sitting and
writing in a corner of the room at a table set against the wall or the window. Next
to him, also facing the wall, were ourselves, the Soviet delegates. Two or three
listeners from among the Duma people were also sitting there. The whole of the
rest of the room was behind us and thus excluded in advance from any part in
the conversations. Besides us three, someone else put in an occasional sentence.
The work itself consisted of the definitive formulation and writing down of
a Government programme.
The first thing we turned to was, of course, the third point, the constitutional
question. We maintained that nothing whatever would come of Miliukovs stub
bornness and his attempts to thrust the Romanovs upon us except complications
that would not help the monarchist cause, but at best simply destroy the prestige
of his own Cabinet.
To prove this we brought up our experience of that day, during which the
liquidation of the Romanovs had already become a fighting slogan. We pointed
out that it was the position he, Miliukov, occupied as leader of the whole right
wing, that exacerbated not only the question itself but the general situation as
well. We referred to the dissatisfaction aroused by Miliukovs speech in the
Catherine Hall . . .
Miliukov listened and seemed to acknowledge that we were right. He also
had experienced that days events, and may have been reflecting that the trip he
had organized to Pskov had been a rather risky enterprise . . . However, to begin
with, the thing was done; secondly, however risky this gamble on the monarchy
may have been, it was indispensable to Miliukov and Guchkov: for a gamble on
the monarchy was still less risky than a gamble on bourgeois statesmanship with
out the monarchy. Miliukov listened and reflected . . .
You can scarcely be hoping,5 I said at last as a final argument, that a Con
stituent Assembly will leave a monarchy in Russia? So all your efforts will be
fruitless after all . .
In reply to this Miliukov, squarely in the face of his Cabinet colleagues and
of the Premier himself, turned to us and said, emphatically and with evident
sincerity:
The Constituent Assembly may decide as it pleases. If it pronounces against
the monarchy, then I shall be able to go. But now I cannot. Now, if I am not
here, there is no Government at all. And if there is no Government, then . . .
you yourselves can understand . . .
These words reflected the whole tragedy of thinking but bankrupt monarch
ism, and all the proud self-confidence of the monopolistic leader of a whole class,
a ruling class buta stupid one, whose every move had to be minutely scruti
nized.
* * *
At long last the question of the third point was settled in this way: we agreed
to leave out of the governmental proclamation the official pledge 6not to take any
steps to predetermine the form of government.9 We agreed to leave it to the
Government, or more accurately to its individual components, to deal with the
Romanov monarchy. But we stated categorically that for its part the Soviet would
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 123

engage without delay in a broad struggle for a democratic republic. It was on

this basis that we came to terms on the contents of the Government proclamation.1

This resolution of the third point5 brought to an end all our discussions of
questions of high policy, and we now had only to draw up the first Constitution
of the Great Russian Revolution, put it in order and give it to the presses. The
list of Ministers already drawn up had to have the proclamation appended, and
then the signatures of the Cabinet members collected below it.
The programme5 had been written down by Miliukov the night before. We
re-read it, and Miliukov obediently wrote down from dictation at the end of it:
The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it is far from
intending to take advantage of the circumstances of war to postpone in any way
the realization of the reforms and measures described above.9
All three of us who drew up the final version of the programme were writers,
and writers of considerable experience. But the revision was laborious, with many
hesitations and corrections. I remember that we took a long time groping for the
phrasing of this last pledge. Reforms and measures5could you say that? We
shrugged our shoulders and said it.
* * *
Steklov had vanished somewhere and I was left alone with Miliukov to com
plete the Constitution. I remember that the irregular scrap of paper on which
the proclamation was written passed into my hands, and with Miliukovs help
I wrote at the top of it: In its activities the Government will be guided by the
following principles.
Nowhow should the document be headed?
From the Provisional Committee of the Duma, Miliukov suggested to me.
But I was not satisfied. Why the Duma?
To preserve the succession of authority, Miliukov replied. After all, Rod
zianko ought to sign this document.
I didnt like any of this. I preferred to dispense with the succession, and with
Rodzianko. I insisted that the document be headed From the Provisional Gov
ernment, and said that in my view there was no need for Rodzianko to sign it.
The question was of no practical importance, but it was curious to see that
it was settled in favour of punctilio by the learned representative of bourgeois
monarchism, who had stuck his claws into the revolution. Miliukov clearly had
no definite opinion about this.
You dont think Rodzianko should sign? he said dubiously. Then he tried
over a few arrangements of words for the heading and said:
Oh, very well, put down From the Provisional Government.
I wrote this at the top of the pasted-together scrap of paper, which had an
extremely untidy look. It was essential to have it typed out and sent to the printers
not later than 10 oclock. But first the Ministers signatures had to be collected
on the original.
We went through the Duma rooms looking for them. Most of them signed
on the spot, without reading it or in any case without going into details. I re

1 See P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 46.

124 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

member that for some reason the State Comptroller, Godnev, turned stubborn
and, also without reading it, refused to sign. After spending some five minutes
with him we left him in peace.
But to make up for this, Rodzianko turned up; the Ministers referred the
paper to him and he himself thought it indispensable to give the revolutionary
Government his blessing by signing it.
The constitution had to be sent to the printers, when we had appended to the
Government declaration the Ex. Com.s proclamation, consisting of three para
graphs and written by three hands.
Let me send them off together, suggested Miliukov. Then something strange
happened. I dont know why, but I was suddenly seized by a doubt whether
Miliukov could be trusted with it. I didnt want to leave the documentseither
ours or his ownin his hands, even though no real danger, either of their dis
appearance or of their being altered, could arise. But how could I express these
doubts of mine, completely hazy and without any foundation?
What press will you have them printed at?5 I asked.
I dont know, Miliukov answered. The printing-presses are more under
your control.
I think we can get them printed at once in a printing-shop that is occupied by
the Soviet and working for it. You probably havent got one yet.
Excellent, said Miliukov; in that case you send both documents, since you
can guarantee that tomorrow morning they will be pasted up in the streets . . .
I was embarrassed by this turn of affairs and gathering the papers together
went off to have them transcribed. Quite unnecessarily, simply succumbing to
my embarrassment, I decided to return the original to Miliukov together with
a copy.
Please see to it, he called after me, that our proclamations are printed and
pasted up on a single sheet of paper, one under the other.
* * *

It was after 9 oclock. . . .

103. T h e S e l e c t io n of th eM em bers of th e F ir s t P r o v is io n a l
Governm ent
[P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 45-46.]

. . . The immediate task of the Temporary Committee and of the government

it was forming was to find out what its relations would be with the representa
tives of the socialist parties, which, from the very beginning, claimed to represent
the democratic classes of the population, the workers, the soldiers, and, later on,
the peasantry. . . .
The slogans, which were thus cast independently from the State Duma [by
the Petrograd Soviet], were quickly adopted by the worker and soldier masses
of the capital. Only the left wing of the Temporary Committee, starting with the
Kadets, could accept them and remain true to their own political views. However,
there were no objections heard from the members of the parties more to the right.
Soon it turned out that they were even ready to make more rapid and greater
concessions, required by the moment, than some of the Kadet representatives.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 125

Anyway, it was impossible to delay any longer for clarification of the Temporary
Committees attitude toward the democratic slogans. It was also essential to speed
up the formation of the Government. Therefore, on March 1 the Temporary Com
mittee indicated the composition of the cabinet to which it was to transmit its
powers. In accordance with an agreement which took place even before the revo
lution, a person was placed at the head of the revolutionary Government whose
[candidature] was due to the position [he was holding] in the Russian zemstvo
Prince G. E. LVov, who was personally little known to the majority of the
Temporary Committee members. By virtue of their former activity in the State
Duma, P. N. Miliukov and A. I. Guchkov were promoted to the offices of Minister
of Foreign Affairs and of War (and also of the Navy, as at the moment the right
candidate for this office could not be found). Two portfoliosthose of Justice
and of Laborwere designated for the representatives of the socialist parties.
But only one of them, A. F. Kerensky, agreed on March 2 to accept the former
post. N. S. Chkheidze, who was considered for the Ministry of Labor, preferred
to remain President of the Soviet of Workers Deputies (actually, from the very
beginning, he also took no part [in the activities] of the Temporary Committee).
The Ministries of Transport and of Finance went to N. V. Nekrasov and M. I.
Tereshchenko, two ministers who were fated to play a special role in the revolu
tionary cabinets, both on account of their personal intimacy with A. F. Kerensky
and because of their special intimacy with the conspiratorial circles which had
prepared the revolution. This choice was not understood by the general public. . . .

1 0 4 . A t t it u d e o f t h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e o f t h e S o v ie t o n the
Q u e s t io n o f P a r t ic ip a t io n i n t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t
[From the Minutes of the Session of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers9Deputies on
March 2. Izvestiia, No. 4, March 3,1917, p. 4.]
Before the meeting, there was an informal conference with the deputies of
the soldiers who had become members of the Soviet. They were informed about
what had been done on March 1. While this conference was on, word was re
ceived of trouble in the Life Guard Regiment. Ten men from those present were
instructed to proceed at once to the different regiments to quiet them and explain
to them Order No. 1.
The conference ended with a speech by N. S. Chkheidze, who greeted the revo
lutionary army in the name of the laboring class and of the people who had
revolted.
In the regular order of business, the report of the Executive Committee was
taken up on its negotiations with the Temporary Committee of the State Duma,
on the subject of the formation of a provisional government and the attitude of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies toward
such a government. The Executive Committee declined to participate in the Pro
visional Government and submitted the following demands:
1. Complete and immediate amnesty for all charged with political, religious,
terroristic crimes, military uprisings, etc.
2. Political freedom in all its forms: freedom of speech, press, unions, meet
ings, and strikes; this freedom to apply equally to the army.
126 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

3. The organization of the army on the basis of self-government. It was the

opinion of the Duma Committee that it was impossible, in time of war, to intro
duce a system that had not been tried out by any other army in the world. After
considerable discussion, the Duma Committee did agree that while on duty the
soldier should be subject to strict military discipline, but when off duty he should
have the same rights enjoyed by other Russian citizens.
4. The organization of a citizen militia to enforce order; this militia to be
subject to the local authorities, elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct,
and secret suffrage.
5. The abolition of all class, nationality, and religious restrictions.
6. The garrison of Petrograd not to be removed from the city and not to be
disarmed.
All the above were accepted unanimously by the Duma Committee.
The proposition to establish at once a democratic republic was set aside on
the ground that the form of government for the Russian Empire was a matter for
the decision of the Constituent Assembly, and that the Provisional Government
would call such a body in the very near future.
A. F. Kerensky was offered the office of Minister of Justice, and N. S. Chkheidze
that of Minister of Labor, but the Executive Committee did not give them its
sanction to accept these offices.
The Executive Committee recommended that the Soviet of Workers Deputies
take note of the intended declaration of the newly formed Government to appeal
to the inhabitants to organize, to cease disorder, and to support the Provisional
Government in so far as it followed the lines marked out in the above articles.
Following the report of the Executive Committee, Kerensky, in a strong and
ardent speech, appealed to the Soviet, as a whole, to approve his action in accept
ing the duties of Minister of Justice in the Provisional revolutionary Government.
Kerenskys speech was received with thunderous applause, which turned into a
long ovation.
In the debate that followed, two points of view were brought out: one against
contact with the Duma Committee and demanding a provisional government of
the Soviet of Soldiers and Workers Deputies; and the other in favor of sending
a representative of the Soviet of Deputies into the Provisional Government. . . .
After a lively discussion, all the recommendations of the report of the Execu
tive Committee were approved, with the following corrections:
1. The Provisional Government should proceed to carry out the indicated
measures, notwithstanding the fact that the country is in a state of war.
2. The Manifesto of the Provisional Government should be signed both by
the Government and by M. Rodzianko.
3. An article should be included in the program of the Provisional Govern
ment giving cultural and national self-determination to all nationalities.
4. A committee of representatives from the Soviet of Soldiers and Workers
Deputies should be formed to watch over the acts of the Provisional Government.
All the corrections were accepted by an overwhelming majority vote. The
session lasted about seven hours. The next session was set for six oclock on the
evening of March 3.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 127

105. K e r e n s k y s D il e m m a C o n c e r n in g H is A cceptance o f t h e
M in is t r y o f J u st ic e
[V. Zenzinov, Fevralskie dni, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXV (1953), 225-31. Sukhanovs
account to which Zenzinov refers can be found in his The Russian Revolution, 1917,
Joel Carmichael, ed. and trans., pp. 136-44.]
In the course of negotiations between both Executive Committees (of the
State Duma and the Soviet) and during joint conferences, the question of the
type of executive power to be established, i.e., the Provisional revolutionary
Government, was several times brought up for discussion by the Soviet; these
discussions were constantly interrupted by current business and again resumed.
Of course, it was only logical that they should plan to include all the political
trends of the State Dumaincluding the groups of the leftin the future gov
ernment; after all, both Chkheidze and Kerensky, representing these left-wing
groups, were included in the Temporary and, later, the Executive Committee of
the Duma. It was quite natural, therefore, that these two names were brought up
in discussing the membership of the future government. But ]\T. S. Chkheidze, of
whom a certain political indecisiveness and, frankly speaking, even a tendency
to avoid responsibility in general was always characteristic, categorically refused
to enter the future government. The position of A. F. Kerensky was more com
plicated. Here it must be emphasized that from the moment the question of the
future government was raised, the opinion that prevailed among the leaders of
the Soviet (the members of the Soviet at that particular time) was that the entry
into the future government of Soviet representatives or of Soviet workers in
general was both unnecessary and undesirable. They based their opinion on the
following dogmatic premise: the victorious revolution which has broken out is
a bourgeois revolution; therefore, only bourgeois representatives can and must
enter the government of this revolutionthere is no place for socialists and
workers representatives in this government. N. Sukhanov defended this point of
view with particular zeal and dogmatismmore stubbornly and more persistently
than any of the Marxists and Social Democrats among the leaders of the Soviet,
for whom the axiom was . . . that only a bourgeois revolution could occur
in Russia of 1917 and that her government must only be a bourgeois govern
ment. . . .

In this lay the difficulty of A. F. Kerenskys position: he faced a dilemma

to enter the government and resign from the office of Vice-President of the Soviet,
or to remain in the Soviet and not enter the government; in other wordsto
enter the government and break with the democracy (the Soviet), or to remain
with the democracy but reject the offer to enter the future government. The
decision came to him with great difficulty.

During these one and one-half daysMarch 1, the night before March 2, and
the morning of March 2A. F. Kerensky probably spoke with several persons
about the offer he received to enter the new government. He also spoke with me,
and I expressed myself very definitely in favor of accepting this offer. But how
was he to decide this question in connection with the attitudes of the Soviet in
which the majority had declared its opposition to this offer?
128 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Finally, after long and tormenting hours of hesitation and reflection, he

reached a decision. He telephoned P. N. Miliukov, who was on the Temporary
Committee, and told him that he accepted the offer to fill the post of Minister of
Justice in the new government about to be formed. This apparently occurred
on the morning of March 2. And it was then that he decided for himself to explain
frankly his position . . . to the Soviet and to try to change its mind.
It only remains for me to confirm the truthfulness and accuracy of this account
by Sukhanov. Everything was, indeed, just as Sukhanov described it. But from
here on I will relate my own recollectionsimpressions that are deeply engraved
and entrenched in my memory, because it seemed to me then, as it seems to me
even now, that that was one of the decisive moments of those days. I am repro
ducing the speech delivered by A. F. Kerensky not only from some of the records
which have already been published, but also as I remember it (its a strange thing
over 35 years have passed since then, but it seems to me that even now I can
still hear every word uttered by A. F. Kerensky) .2

. . . I can only add for myself personally that in terms of the strength of
the impression that this speech created at this emotional moment, I can compare
it to no other speech of A. F. Kerensky that I later had the occasion to hear. We
were all gripped by one feeling, by one impulse. A. F. Kerensky was picked up
and carried out of the assembly hall amid wild applause and cries of approval.
I remember that when I myself returned to my senses after all that had happened,
I noticed with surprise that my face was covered with tears - . .

106. A. F. K e r e n s k y s S t a t e m e n t in the S o v ie t of
W o r k er s D e p u t ie s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
After the organization of the new Government, A. F. Kerensky, the Minister
of Justice, appeared at the meeting of the Soviet of Workers Deputies [March 2],
and asked permission to make a statement out of order. He was immediately given
the floor, and A. F. Kerensky addressed the following words to the Soviet of
Workers Deputies:
Comrades! Do you trust me? (Cries from the whole audience: We trust
you, we trust you. ) I am speaking from the depths of my heart; I am ready to
die if need be. (General stir in the audience. A . F. Kerensky is greeted with
prolonged applause, turning into a long ovation.) Comrades, in view of the
formation of a new Government, I had to give an immediate answer, without
waiting for your formal approval, to the offer I received of accepting the port
folio of the Ministry of Justice. (Storm of applause, general enthusiasm.) Com
rades, the representatives of the old regime were in my hands and I could not
bring myself to let them [slip] out of my hands (storm of applause and cries:
Right!) . I accepted the offer extended to me and entered the new Provisional
Government in the capacity of Minister of Justice. (General applause and shouts:
Bravo!) My first step was an order to release immediately all political pris

2 Zenzinov then gives a slightly different version of the Kerensky speech from that which
appears below.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 129

oners, without any exceptions, and to send here from Siberia, with special honors,
our fellow deputies of the Social-Democratic faction (a thunder of applause,
general enthusiasm). In view of the fact that I assumed the duties of the Minister
of Justice prior to receiving your formal authorization for this, I resign from the
office of Vice-President of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies. But I am ready to
accept this title from you once again, if you find this necessary. (Storm of ap
plause and cries from the audience: We ask, we ask.55) Comrades, in entering
the new Provisional Government, I remain, as I always have been, a republican.
(Loud applause.) I declared to the Provisional Government that I am a repre
sentative of the democracy and that the Provisional Government should look
upon me as a spokesman for the demands of the democracy and must be particu
larly considerate of those views which I shall uphold in the capacity of a repre
sentative of the democracy by whose efforts the old regime was overthrown.
Comrades, time does not wait, every minute is precious, and I call upon you to
organize, to [maintain] discipline, to support us, your representatives, who are
ready to die for the people and who have dedicated their whole lives to the people.5
A. F. Kerenskys speech, which was delivered with great animation, was
drowned in a storm of applause. It is difficult to convey the enthusiasm which
gripped the audience. Isolated voices which tried to protest against the fact that
A. F. Kerensky acted without the formal consent of the Soviet of Workers Depu
ties were drowned by the unanimous cries of the overwhelming majority of the
Soviet of Workers Deputies, who accorded A. F. Kerensky a stormy ovation such
as never was heard within the walls of the Tauride Palace.

107. S p e e c h o f M iliu k o v in t h e E k a te r in in s k ii H a l l o f t h e T a u r id e P a la c e
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 6, M a rc h 2, 1917, p. 1.]
An uninterrupted meeting took place today [March 2] in the Ekaterininskii
Hall. Many speeches were delivered. Among the more interesting speeches were
the following:

p. n . m i l i u k o v s s p e e c h

We are present at a great, historical moment; only three days ago we were
[but] a modest opposition, while the Russian government seemed omnipotent.
Now this government has toppled into the mire from whence it came, while we
and our friends of the left wing have been brought forward by the revolution, the
army, and the people to take the place of honor as members of the first Russian
government to represent the public. (Loud, prolonged applause.) How could
this event have transpired, that which only so recently had seemed improbable?
How did it happen that the Russian revolution, which has once and for all over
thrown the old regime, turned out to be practically the shortest and least bloody
of all revolutions in history?
This happened because no other government in history has been known to
equal this one in its stupidity, dishonesty, cowardice, and treachery.
The presently overthrown government, having disgraced itself, deprived itself
of the roots of sympathy and respect which are the ties of any relatively strong
government with its people.
We overthrew the government quickly and with ease. But this is still not all
130 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

that needs to be done. There still remains the other, the biggest half of the task.
There remains [the task] of preserving the victory in our hands, [the victory]
which came to us with such ease. How is this to be achieved? The answer is clear
and simple. The victory must be organized by us. And in order to achieve this,
we must, above all, preserve that unity of mind and will which carried us to
victory. There were many old and important disputes and differences of opinion
among us members of the present government. Perhaps these differences of opin
ion will soon again become serious and important. But today they pale and recede
into the background before that important task we have in common, [the task]
which has not as yet been fully accomplishedthat of creating a new popular
power in place of the old, fallen regime. It is better to be united in proceeding
toward this goal. Be united in eliminating political strife, which, though it may
be important, may still, at the present time, tear the fruits of victory out of our
hands.
Be united. And [this applies] also to you soldiers and officers of the great and
glorious Russian army. Remember that the strength of the army lies in its internal
unity: if this unity is weakened and fractured, the army turns into a disorderly
crowd and any handful of armed, organized people can capture it with bare hands.
Preserve then this unity for the sake of yourselves and for us, and demonstrate
that after we have so easily overthrown the omnipotent old regime, it will not be
so easy to overthrow the first popular power, brought forward by the people.
(Loud and prolonged clapping.) I know that there are skeletons in our closets
and the attitudes in the old army were often based on principles of serfdom. But
now, the officers understand only too well that the human dignity and civic pride
of subordinates must be preserved and respected. And the victorious soldiers
know equally well that they can consummate the victory and preserve it in their
hands only by preserving ties with their officers. (Loud, prolonged applause and
cries from the audience.) I can hear you; I am asked: Who elected you? No
body elected us, since if we had sat down to wait for an election by the people,
we could not have wrested the power from the hands of the enemy. While we
were arguing about whom to elect, our enemy would have had time to organize
and defeat [both] you and us. We were elected by the Russian revolution.
(Loud, prolonged applause.) It was our good fortune that at a moment, when
there was no time for waiting, a small group of people were at hand whose
political past was sufficiently well known to the public and against whom there
could not be a trace of the kind of opposition that brought about the downfall
of the old regime. But we remembered only too well how only recently we our
selves were defending the principles of [responsible government]. We will not
keep this power for a minute longer when we are told that the freely elected
representatives of the people want to see other individuals, more deserving of
their confidence, take our places. (Clapping.) Believe us, ladies and gentlemen,
we are struggling to maintain power not because we crave power. This is neither
an award nor a pleasure, but a reward and a sacrifice. (Loud clapping.) And
as soon as we are told that the people no longer need these sacrifices, we will leave,
grateful for the opportunity we had been given. But we will not relinquish this
power now when it is needed to consolidate the victory of the people and when
the power, should it slip out of our hands, would only fall into the hands of the
enemy. (Clapping. Cries: Who are the ministers? ) There can be no secrets
from the people. This secret will become public knowledge throughout Russia in
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 131

a matter of hours, and, of course, it wasnt for the purpose of veiling our names
with secrecy that we became ministers. I will teli you the names now. At the
head of our ministry we placed a man whose name symbolizes organized Russian
society (cries: Tsensovogo) ,3 which was so ruthlessly persecuted by the old
regime. Prince G. E. Lvov, the head of the Russian zemstvos icries: Tsenso-
vogo ), will be our Minister-President and the Minister of the Interior and will
take the place of his oppressor. You say privileged society. Yes, but [at the
same time] the only organized society [there is] and one which will later make
it possible for other strata of Russian society to become organized. Clapping.)
However, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to say to you that the nonprivileged5
society is also represented in our ministry. I have just learned that my comrade
A. F. Kerensky has agreed to fill a post in the first Russian peopled cabinet.
(Storm of applause.) We were extremely happy to entrust this public figure with
the ministry where he can administer just retribution to the obsequious servants
of the old regime, to all these Stunners and Sukhomlinovs. f Clapping.) Fate
has willed it that the cowardly heroes of the days gone forever will find themselves,
not under the authority of Shcheglovitovskoi justice, but under A. F. Kerenskys
Ministry of Justice. {Stormy applause, cries.) Do you want to know the other
names? (Cries: How about you?) My comrades have entrusted me with the
reins of Russias foreign policy. (Stormy and prolonged applause, growing into
an ovation to the speaker, who bows in all directions.) It may be that I will turn
out to be a weak minister in this post, but I can promise you that while I am in
office the confidential matters of the Russian people will not fall into the hands of
our enemies. (Stormy and prolonged applause.) Now I will mention a name
which, I know, will arouse objection here. A. I. Guchkov was my political enemy
(cries: Friend!) during the course of the entire life of the State Duma. But,
ladies and gentlemen, we are now political friends, and then one should be just
even to the enemyafter all, it was Guchkov who, in the third Duma, undertook
the reorganization of the Russian army, as disorganized as it was after the Man
churian fiasco. And he laid the cornerstone of that victory with which the new
and resurrected army will emerge from the great present struggle. Guchkov and
I are different types of people. I am an old professor who is used to delivering
lectures, while Guchkov is a man of action. And even now as I speak to you in this
hall, this very minute Guchkov is organizing for victory on the streets of the
capital. (Clapping.) What would you say if, yesterday evening, instead of post
ing troops at railroad stations, where the arrival of troops, hostile to the revolu
tion, was anticipated, Guchkov had been participating in our political discussions,
and in the meantime the enemy troops, having occupied the railroad station, had
taken possession of the streets and finally of this very hall? What would have
become then of you and me? (Exclamations of approval.) (Cries: True.)
(Question: How about the Minister of the Navy? ) Until we find a worthy
candidate, we will also leave the post of Minister of the Navy in the hands of
Guchkov. Further, we gave two posts to the representatives of that liberal group
of the Russian bourgeoisie who were the first in Russia to attempt to organize the
representatives of the working class. (Applause. Cries: Where is it? ) Ladies
and gentlemen, this was done by the old government. A. I. Konovalov helped in

3 Roughly: of the privileged class, with reference specifically to those who were qualified
to vote by virtue of property holding or income. It also had a social connotation.
132 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

organizing the labor group at the Central War Industry Committee in Petrograd,
while M. I. Tereshchenko accomplished the same thing in Kiev . . . (Questions
from the audience: Who is Tereshchenko? ) Yes, ladies and gentlemen, this is
a famous name in southern Russia. Russia is vast and it is hard to know every
where the names of all our best people. (And [how about] agriculture . . . ? )
Ladies and gentlemen, in these days, when the serious and difficult problem is
supplying the army, when the old government has led our native land to the brink
of the precipice and when every minute of delay threatens hunger riots some
where, which already are beginning to take placein such times, we appointed
A. I. Shingarev as Minister of Agriculture. He, we feel, is assured of that public
support, the absence of which provoked the downfall of Mr. Rittikh. (Stormy
and prolonged applause.) (And [how about] Transport? )
To this other office, important to our country, we nominated N. V. Nekrasov,
Vice-President of the State Duma, who is especially well liked by our left-wing
comrades. (Renewed applause.) Well, it seems that this is almost all that would
interest you. (How about the program? ) I am very sorry that in answer to
this question I am not able to read you from the sheet of paper with the outline
of this program. But the truth of the matter is that the only copy of the program
which was discussed yesterday during a long all-night conference with representa
tives of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies is at the present time [in their hands]
for final examination. And I hope that in a few hours you will find out about
this program. But, of course, I could tell you, even now, about some of the most
important points . . . (Noise. Loud cries: How about the dynasty? ) You
ask about the dynasty. I know beforehand that my answer will not satisfy all of
you. But I will tell it to you. The old despot who brought Russia to the brink of
ruin will either voluntarily renounce the throne, or else will be deposed. (Ap
plause.) The power will be transferred to the regent, the Grand Duke Mikhail
Aleksandrovich. (Prolonged bursts of indignation, exclamation: Long live the
republic! Down with the dynasty! ) (Weak applause, drowned by new bursts
of indignation.) The heir will be Aleksei. (Cries: This is the old dynasty! )
Yes, ladies and gentelmen, this is the old dynasty, which perhaps you dont like
and which perhaps I do not like either. But [the question of] who it is that we
love is beside the point right now. We cannot leave unanswered and undecided
the question concerning the form of government. We can visualize it as a [form
of] parliamentary, constitutional monarchy. Perhaps others visualize it differ
ently, but if we start arguing about this now instead of reaching an immediate
decision, then Russia will find herself in a state of civil war which will only
revive the ruined regime. We have no right to do this, neither with respect to
you nor to ourselves. However, this does not mean we solved the problem hap
hazardly. You will find a point in our program, in accordance with which, as
soon as the dangers disappear and order is securely restored, we will proceed to
the preparation for a convocation of the Constituent Assembly (loud applause)
. . . which will be convoked on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret
suffrage.
The freely elected representatives of the people will decide [the question as to]
who more faithfully expresses the public opinion in Russia: we, or our opponents.
. . . (Applause, noise, cries: Publish the program!) These cries remind me
of an important problem, the solution to which depends on the Soviet of Workers
Deputies, who have the typographical workers under their control. Free Russia
cannot do without the widest publication and discussion of that news which,
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 133

at the present moment, is of interest to all Russia. I hope that tomorrow it will be
possible to resume the regular publications of the press, which from now on shall
be free. Ladies and gentlemen, I could enumerate still other points of the program,
but I think that those I have mentioned are the ones that interest you most [of all],
while you will soon (find out) about the others from the press. My voice is
becoming hoarse; it is difficult for me to continue speaking; allow me to close
my speech with these explanations. . . . (Tempestuous applause. Commotion
in the halL The speaker is lifted several times, sivung, and finally carried out of
the Ekaterininskii HalL)

108. S t a t e m e n t o f M il iu k o v C o n c e r n in g H is R e f e r e n c e to t h e
D y n a s t y i n H is E k a t e r in in s k ii H a l l S p e e c h
[Izvestiia, No. 4, March 3,1917, p. 3. In his Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk
1, 52, Miliukov explained the reasons for the issuance of the statement. **By the end of
the day (March 2) the excitement aroused by Miliukovs announcement on the regency
of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich was greatly intensified. Late in the eve
ning a large crowd of overexcited officers made their way to the Tauride Palace and
declared that they could not return to their units unless P. N. Miliukov took back his
words. Not wishing to involve the other members of the Government, P. N. Miliukov
gave out the requested statement. . . . (It) was, of course, not true, because in all the
preceding discussions this question had been considered settled, precisely in the sense
it was presented by Miliukov.]
In answer to the inquiry of representatives of several public and military
organizations, P. N. Miliukov pointed out that the portion of his speech which
dealt with the temporary regency of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich
and the succession of Aleksei was an expression of his personal opinion.

109. S peech of the M in is t e r o f J u s t ic e D e l iv e r e d to

S o l d ie r s a n d C it iz e n s
[wIzvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
In the evening of March 2, A. F. Kerensky, the new Minister of Justice,
addressed the soldiers and citizens in the Ekaterininskii Hall. When the new
Minister appeared on the rostrum, the enormous Ekaterininskii Hall was filled
with a storm of prolonged applause from a crowd running into thousands.
Comrade soldiers and citizens, began the Minister of Justice. I am A. F.
Kerensky, member of the State Dumathe Minister of Justice. (Storm of applause
and enthusiastic shouts of Hurrah!) I publicly announce that the new Provi
sional Government has entered upon its duties in accordance with an agreement
with the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
The agreement concluded between the Executive Committee of the State Duma
and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers Deputies
has been approved by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies by a majority
[of several hundred votes against 15]. (Stormy, prolonged applause, cries:
Bravo!) The first act of the new Government is the immediate publication of
an act on complete amnesty. Our fellow deputies of the Second and Fourth Dumas
who were illegally exiled to Siberian tundras will be released immediately and
will be brought here with special honor.
Comrades, all the former presidents of the Council of Ministers and all the
ministers of the old regime are in my charge. They shall answer, comrades, for
134 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

their crimes against the people, in accordance with due process of law {Cries:
Without mercy!5). Comrades, free Russia will not resort to those shameless
methods of struggle which the old regime used. No one shall be subjected to
punishment without a trial. Everyone will be given an open trial in the peoples
court. Comrades, soldiers and citizens, all measures passed by the new Govern
ment will be published. Soldiers, I ask for your assistance. A free Russia is born
and no one will succeed in wresting freedom from the hands of the people.
Do not heed the appeals which come from the agents of the old regime.
Obey your officers. Long live free Russia! (Stormy applause and shouts of
Hurrah! )

110. T h e S p e e c h o f N. S . C h k h e i d z e
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
The deputy Chkheidze, who was enthusiastically greeted by the crowd and
was accompanied by soldiers and officers, made a speech about the magnitude
of the splendid feat of the revolutionary soldier, who is greeted by the heroic
revolutionary worker. Chkheidze told of the last provocative efforts of the
Okhranka, which consisted of issuing an odious proclamation regarding the
killing of officers by soldiers, and ardently appealed to the soldiers to greet the
officers as citizens who had raised the revolutionary banner and to remain brothers
for the sake of the great revolution and for the sake of Russian liberty. A crowd
of workers, soldiers, and officers carried Chkheidze on their hands.

111. O r der of th e T e m p o r a r y C o m m it t e e of the S tate D u m a ,

M a r c h 2 , 1917
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
The difficult period of transition has come to an end, a Provisional Govern
ment has been formed. The people have performed the civil feat and have over
thrown the old regime in the face of a dangerous threat to their native land.
Conscious of its responsible duty, the new Government will adopt every measure
for guaranteeing order based on freedom, and for saving the country from
external and internal collapse. The inevitable confusion, which was fortunately
of very short duration, is coming to an end.
Citizens of Russia! Citizens, excited by events in the capital, must first of all
return to a peaceful life of work. The troops must similarly return to normal life.
Their vigilant protection of the new order is only possible and is particularly
valuable when they are prepared to go wherever necessary at the first summons
of the Government.
General Khabalov, the former Commandant of the Petrograd Garrison, has
been dismissed and placed under arrest. To the [post of] Commander in Chief
of the forces of Petrograd and its environs, the Temporary Committee of the
State Duma has appointed Lieutenant General Kornilov, Commander of the 25th
Corps, whose incomparable valor and heroism in the field of battle are known
to the whole army and to Russia. An order has been issued recalling General
Kornilov from the active army. Until he arrives at Petrograd, the duties of the
Commander in Chief shall be temporarily discharged by Major General Anosov,
Commander of the 19th Reserve Brigade.
 FORMAT JON OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 135

A parade of the troops of the Petrograd Garrison, which will receive the Pro
visional Government, shall be set for March 4.
M. R o d z ia n k o , President of the Temporary Committee,
President of the State Duma.

112. F rom the P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t 55

[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
The Temporary Committee of the members of the State Duma, with the
assistance and the sympathy of the army and the inhabitants of the capital, has
now attained such a large measure of success over the dark forces of the old
regime that it is possible for the Committee to undertake the organization of a
more stable executive power.
With this end in mind, the Temporary Committee of the State Duma has
appointed the following persons as ministers of the first cabinet representing the
public; their past political and public activities assure them the confidence of the
country:
Minister-President and Minister of the InteriorPrince G. E. LVov
Minister of Foreign AffairsP. N. Miliukov
Minister of War and NavyA. I. Guchkov
Minister of TransportN. V. Nekrasov
Minister of Trade and IndustryA. I. Konovalov
Minister of FinanceM. I. Tereshchenko
Minister of EducationA. A. Manuilov
Ober-Procurator of the Holy SynodV. LVov
Minister of AgricultureA. I. Shingarev
Minister of JusticeA. F. Kerensky

The actual work of the cabinet will be guided by the following principles:
1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and religious
nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offenses, etc.
2. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to unionize and
strike with the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed
forces as limited by the exigencies of military and technical circumstances.
3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality.
4. The immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constituent Assem
bly on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot, which will
determine the form of government and the constitution of the country.
5. The substitution of a people5s militia for the police, with elective officers
responsible to the organs of local self-government.
6. Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis
of universal, direct, equal suffrage and secret ballot.
7. Those military units which took part in the revolutionary movement shall
be neither disarmed nor withdrawn from Petrograd.*

4 Miliukov wrote in his Vospominaniia, EE, 307, that he could not oppose point 7 because
after all, we did not know at that moment whether or not they [the insurgent troops] would
have to engage in further combat with the loyal units that would be sent to the cap ital/
136 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

8. While preserving strict military discipline on duty and during military

service, the soldiers are to be freed from all restrictions in the exercise of those
civil rights to which all other citizens are entitled.
The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it has not the
slightest intention of taking advantage of the military situation to delay in any
way the realization of the reforms and the measures outlined above.
P resid en t of the State D um a, M. R odzianko
M inister-P resident of the Council of M inisters, P rince L vov
M in isters: M iliukov , N ekrasov , M anuilov , K onovalov ,
T e r e sh c h e n k o , V. Lvov, S hingarev , K erensky

113. F rom t h e E xecutive C o m m it t e e o f t h e S oviet of

W o rk ers and S oldiers D e p u t ie s
[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedjli, No. 7, March 3, 1917, p. 1.]
Comrades and citizens!
The new government, which was created from socially moderate elements of
society, today has announced all the reforms which it pledges to carry out, partly
in the process of struggling with the old regime, partly upon the conclusion of this
struggle. These reforms include some which should be welcomed by wide demo
cratic circles: the political amnesty, the commitment to make preparations for
the Constituent Assembly, the realization of civil liberties, and the abolition of
nationality restrictions. And we believe that, in so far as the emergent govern
ment acts in the direction of realizing these obligations and of struggling reso
lutely against the old regime, the democracy must lend it its support.
Comrade citizens. The complete victory of the Russian people over the old
regime is approaching. But enormous efforts, exceptional endurance and stead
fastness are still required to [attain] this victory. Disunity and anarchy cannot
be tolerated. All excesses, looting, breaking into private lodgings, plundering-
and destroying property of any kind, [and] aimless seizures of public establish
ments must be stopped at once. A breakdown of discipline and anarchy will ruin
the revolution and the freedom of the people.
The danger of an armed movement against the revolution has not been elimi
nated. In order to avert this danger, it is very important to assure the harmonious,
coordinated work of soldiers and officers. Officers who value freedom and the
progressive development of the country must exert every effort to adjust their
joint activities with the soldiers. They will respect the personal and civil dignity
of the soldier, they will be sensitive to the soldiers sense of honor. The soldiers,
on their part, will remember that an army is strong only in so far as there is a
union between soldiers and officers, that one cannot stigmatize the entire officers*
corps for the bad conduct of individual officers. For the sake of the success of the
revolutionary struggle, one must show tolerance and forget the insignificant
misdemeanors against the democracy on the part of the officers who have joined
the decisive and final struggle which you are now waging against the old regime.5
5 In the same issue of Izvestiia appeared a statemeht from Kerensky as Minister of
Justice and Chkheidze as President of the Soviet that any orders which call upon soldiers to
disobey their officers and not to execute the orders of the Provisional Government are [acts}
of malicious provocation.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 137

114. T h e R umored R evo lution in G erm any

[ Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 8, March 3. 1917, p. 1, entitled: Whose
Work? N. N. Sukhanov in his The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed.
and trans., pp. 150-51, describes the scene in the Soviet -when this false news was
received, including the excitement of Chkheidze.]
Persistent rumors have been circulating around town this morning about a
revolution in Berlin, about the murder of Wilhelm, etc.
These rumors are not only absurd but have obviously an evil design. Every
thing is perfectly calm in Germany. Furthermore, taking advantage of the temp
orary confusion in Russia, our enemies are redoubling their efforts in their strug
gle against us.
Enough has been said to make clear to anyone the interest in whose name
those people are acting who are attempting to lull the vigilance of the Russian
people and the Russian army at the present difficult moment.

115. T elegram of the P resident of t h e Coun cil of M in ist ers

[ Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 9, March 4, 1917, p. 1.]
On March 4, Prince Lvov, the President of the Council of Ministers, sent a
circular telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, General
a.d.c. Alekseev, to all the mayors, to gubemiya and oblast capitals, to the presi
dents of gubemiya boards of zemstvos, to the Commanders in Chief of all the
fronts, to the commanders of all military districts, to the commanders of the
Baltic, Black Sea, and Siberian Fleets, to the commanders of the ports of Vladi
vostok and Kronstadt, and, also, to the Vice-Governor General of Finland;
On March 2, His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne on
behalf of himself and his son in favor of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich.
On March 3, Mikhail Aleksandrovich refused to assume Supreme Power pending
the determination of the form of government by the Constituent Assembly- He
appealed to the population to submit to the Provisional Government, which arose
at the initiative of the State Duma and which is vested with full power pending
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly which, by its decision on the form
of government, shall express the will of the people.
P rince L vov , Minister-President of the Council of Ministers.

116. T h e F irst M e etin g of the C ouncil o f M in ist ers A way from

the T auride P alace
[Izvestiia99 Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 10, March 5, 1917, p. 1.]
On March 4, the session of the Council of Ministers was held outside of the
walls of the Tauride Palace, for the first time since the Provisional Government
was formed.
Until now, the members of the Provisional Government have conferred day
and night in the building of the State Duma. It was here, too, that the representa
6 The meeting was held in the building of the Ministry of the Interior. Later it met in the
Mariinskii Palace and finally in the Winter Palace.
138 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

tives of the new government, after closing the evening sessions, spent the night on
small and uncomfortable divans*

117. S o v iet P ro test A gainst t h e A cceptance o f N ic h o l a s 9 A p p o in t m e n t

o f P rin ce Lvov and t h e G rand D u k e N ik o l a i N ik o la ev ich
IIzvestiia, No. 7, March 6, 1917, p. 2, entitled: The Tsars Minister and the Most
August Supreme Commander.]

The democracy should demand from the Provisional Government a clear

and unequivocal announcement that it does not recognize the validity of Nicholas
IIs appointment of Prince Lvov. Should the Government refuse to fulfill this
demand, it would thus confess to its monarchistic symphathies and prove that
it is unworthy as the Provisional Government set up by the revolutionary people.
According to information in the newspapers, in addition to the appointment
of Prince LVov, Nicholas has also signed a ukase appointing the Grand Duke
Nikolai Nikolaevich Supreme Commander. This rumor is not confirmed, but
should it prove to be true, it would be even more inadmissible [than the LVov
appointment].

The Supreme Commander is responsible to the new [Provisional] Govern

ment and can be appointed only by the authority of this government. An appoint
ment by the old Government is not valid. And the [new] Government should
at once set it aside.
It is inadmissible also because, as a member of the old dynasty, Nikolai
Nikolaevich cannot hold a responsible post in the State . . .
By retaining him in the post of Supreme Commander, the Provisional Gov
ernment violates its duty to the revolutionary people from whom it received its
power.

The democracy should demand from the Provisional Government the imme
diate replacement of all officers (especially those in high positions) who were
members of the old dynasty.

118. R odzianko on t h e R o le o f t h e D u m a A f t e r F ebruary

[M. V. Rodzianko, Gosudarstvennaia Duma i fevralskaia 1917 goda revoliutsiia,
ARR, VI (1922), 71.]
For the general public, the question of why the State Duma from the very
beginning faded away and did not show sufficient vitality, did not hold meetings,
and did not continue its legislative work remains unclear.
The causes of this phenomenon are rather complicated. On the one hand,
they are found in the very fact of the existence of the revolutionary upheaval, and,
on the other, they should be explained partly by the fact that the members of the
State Duma were unprepared for an energetic resistance in the revolutionary
struggles and in the attitude of the different parties represented [in the Duma]
toward the question of convening the State Duma at that moment.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 139

It should not be forgotten that by the February 26 ukase of Emperor Nicho

las II, the State Duma was dissolved at the same time as the State Council and
its work suspended for an undetermined period.
Thus, juridically, under the existing constitution, the State Duma could not
convene, but when the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, as has been
explained before, was forced to head the revolutionary movement which had
begun and to take the whole power into its own hands, the obvious question arose
whether the act of abdication of Nicholas II and the transfer of the Supreme
Power to Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, as well as the abdication of the
latter, should take place in a public meeting of the State Duma.
Thus the State Duma would have been the bearer of the Supreme Power and
the organ before whom the Provisional Government would have been responsible.
This was the project of the President of the State Duma. But this project was
resolutely opposed, mainly by the members of the Kadet Party, followed naturally
by the whole left wing of the State Duma. . . .

119. S h id lo v sk ii
on t h e R e l a t io n sh ip of th e T em porary C o m m it t e e ,
the P rovisional G overnm en t , and the S oviet a fter F ebruary
[S. 1. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, II, 64-65.]
The first Provisional Government was formed by the Temporary Committee
of the State Duma, following agreement with the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies; this was announced to everybodys knowledge, so that the opinion
which for a certain time prevailed among the public that the Temporary Com
mittee was the government was completely wrong.

At first, periodical sessions of the Government with the participation of the

members of the Temporary Committee and with a certain number of the repre
sentatives of the Soviet of Workers Deputies took place.
The presence of the latter and their participation was completely irregular
from a juridical point of view but was the result of the real situation, because,
actually, the Soviet considered itself the representative of the people and was
acquiring a greater and greater significance.
The Government did not protest against it and very quickly became a servant
of the Soviet, having lost any kind of independence and having broken its ties
with the State Duma. In a great measure the theory that the Government had
received the absolute plenitude of power, a theory which was energetically pro
claimed by Kerensky, Miliukov, and V. LVov, contributed to this circumstance.

The acceptance by the Government of this theory of Kerensky and Miliukov

regarding the plenitude of power was obviously an enormous mistake, as it
deprived it, in the matter of counteracting the influence of the Soviet whose
servant it finally became, of its only, and besides perfectly lawful, support.
140 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

120. T h e V ic t im s o f t h e R evo lution in P etrograd

[ V . V J No. 17, March 25, 1917, p. 3. From the Registry Information Bureau of the
Sanitation and Statistics Department of the All-Russian Union of Towns and the United
Student Body.]
On March 17 the Registry Information Bureau had information about 1,443
killed, wounded, and sick who were victims of the revolution in Petrograd. Of
those, 996 were wounded, 169 killed and dead of wounds, and 279 sick, hospital
ized as a result of the revolution (frostbite, nervous shock, etc.).
Of the total number killed, wounded, and sick, military personnel numbered
869, distributed as follows: 60 officers (9 sick, 11 killed, 40 wounded), 809
soldiers (247 sick, 59 killed, 503 wounded). Victims among workers were 237
(13 sick, 22 killed, 202 wounded); among these, 197 were men and 30 were
women. Victims from higher institutions of learning were 25 (6 killed, 19
wounded) ; the number of men among them was 21, women, 3. Other citizens,
231 (10 sick, 55 killed, 166 wounded), among them, 182 men, 49 women. Chil
dren up to 15 years killed and wounded thus far registered20 (killed 5,
wounded 15), according to sex16 male, 4 female.
In addition, the number of killed and wounded policemen and gendarmes
Registered is 61; among them, 18 of higher rank and 43 of lower. The total
number killed among them was 11, wounded 50.
Such are the preliminary totals of the thus far incomplete data gathered in
the Registry Information Bureau of the Union of Towns and the United Student
Body. News continues to come daily, and the Bureau is taking all steps to make
the list of victims of the great Russian revolution as accurate as possible in its
primary and principal center.

121. T h e F allen Go vernm en t and t h e N ew

[Novoe Vremia, No. 14719, March 5, 1917, p. 7.]
On March 2, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne and gave up
the Supreme Power.
He handed over his lost heritage to his brother, the Grand Duke Mikhail
Aleksandrovich. But the fate of the people was not the personal property of
Emperor Nicholas II, and the Grand Duke did what was dictated to him by his
duty as a Russian citizen who did not wish to bring confusion into the rejuvenat
ing life of Russia: he in his turn refused the Supreme Power, and it returned to its
sourcethe will of the people.
From now on, determination of their fate is in the hands of the people them
selves, who have regained their native liberty and governmental power.
One cannot read without deep emotion the last state document of the former
Emperor. What brilliant possibilities were open to our recent ruler. He took the
throne in the bloom of happy youth. To him were turned the hearts of the people
who were tired of the uneasy atmosphere of the previous period. He warned, on
meeting the envoys of the people who came to greet him, of senseless dreams.
The desire of the people to live a free life in close communion with the Supreme
Power, which was created by the very same people, appeared to him only as sense
less dreams.7
7 A reference to Nicholas' reply to a petition of the Tver zemstvo, presented on his acces
sion to the throne and asking for a very modest liberalization of the regime.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 141

In front of the envoys of the sovereign people stood the charming, shy youth
with the tender eyes of a gazelle. And he, from a written note prepared for him
by men who forgot Russia in their obsequious worship of the Supreme Power, was
pronouncing those fateful words. Called by fortune to rule over a great people,
raised over one-sixth of the land area of the earth, he was repeating words which
cast everyone into despair.
It seemed as if the Far Eastern war had taught the fatally unlucky creature
something. He declared his decision to rule together with the people and not
contrary to, or for the disadvantage of, the people.
The manifesto of October 17 [1905] was proclaimed.
But as soon as the first storm passed, the good promises were taken back, one
by one. In place of the governmental work in common with the people, the old
work of the blind, egotistical handful of men who surrounded the throne started
again; the campaign was resumed against legitimate participation of the people
in the constructive processes of the State. Political freedoms, proclaimed in the
October manifesto as irrevocable principles of the new Russian life, quickly were
reduced almost to zero. The sacred trust in the Emperors word was demolished.
The invasion of the enemy inside Russian borders opened new brilliant possi
bilities before Nicholas II. He took up the challenge thrown to Russia; he
destroyed the power of the green dragon8 which had been devastating Russia,
and for that the people forgave him everything. The people closed their ranks
around the throne. All political bickering stopped. All political parties, including
the Social Democrats, united for the struggle against the foreign foe.
A new, happy opportunity to become the sole leader of the united people
opened before the Emperor.
But he preferred something different. Not listening to the voice of the press,
cities, zemstvos, gentry, State Duma, or State Council, he entrusted the State
power to toadies, madmen, betrayers, enemies of the people, and traitors. In an
unfathomable way, he placed his weak mind and vacillating will above the thought
and will of the entire Russian State.
Disorganization came to the whole Russian land. And the people had to
as 303 years ago9again take power into their own hands in order to save the
country from catastrophe.
This historical task was fulfilled within three days, as if by magic. The power
and the scepter, which were being handed about by the court underlings, fell
from the weak hands of yesterdays monarch, and the Russian State again, as of
old, became the sole sovereign and master of its fate. Great and unconquerable,
it will be able to come out of all difficulties created by foreign invasion, domestic
treason, and the stupidity of the historical power.
The new government has met recognition throughout the whole expanse of
the Russian State. It is the legitimate expression of the entire peoples will. It
has assumed heavy obligations. It has to restore order destroyed by the ineptitude
and criminal inactivity of the deposed power, to put aright the business of food
supply to the army and the population, to restore the production of munitions
and their delivery to the army, to establish lawful administration in all parts of
Russia, and help realize everything that is necessary so that the Russian people
will be truly independent.

8 Intoxicating liquor.
9 The election of the first Romanov to the throne in 1613, following the Time of Troubles,
142 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

In the fulfillment of these multifarious obligations, the population of Russia

must render all possible assistance and unquestioned obedience to the new gov
ernment. A new order is being born. The Russian Land, now as three hundred
years ago, will be able, in these circumstances, to emerge victorious from the trials
that have befallen her.
We trust that Russian citizens will do their duty.

122. E ditorial in R usskiia V edom osti

[No. 48, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
The inevitable has happened. Lightning has struck. When the policy which
had justly been named the dictatorship of madness and which had set as its goal
not the salvation of Russia but the preservation of the regime of irresponsible
administration ruinous to Russia had placed the country at the brink of the
abyss, the peoples instinct of self-preservation asserted itself with irrepressible
force. When it became clear to everyone that no efforts would suffice to unravel
gradually the Gordian knot which had been tied by dark forces and which was
being tightened all the time in a deadly noose at the throat of the country, a
sword was raised to cut this knot.
In the chain of tragic events which took place and are still taking place in
Petrograd, the sudden interruption of the Duma meeting was the first link. We
have experienced more than once the unexpected dissolutions of the State Duma
which were completely contrary to the fervent desires of the whole country.
But never before has a dissolution fallen as such an unexpected and heavy
blow on the country; never before has it disclosed with such terrifying clarity
the internal break between the governing and the governed as did the dissolution
which took place yesterday. In the face of dire disaster which confronted the
capital, and of the popular unrest caused by this disaster, at the moment when the
Duma was exerting its efforts in order to find a way out of the difficult and dan
gerous situation, when it seemed that it had succeeded in wresting from the
Government at least a partial admission of mistakes committed by it and a promise
of concessions commensurate with this admissionat that very moment, the
representatives of the country were suddenly removed from participation in the
determination of its affairs. The work of the Duma was interrupted in the middle
of a sentence at its most important and responsible moment!
But immediately following the interruption of the Duma meeting, the capital
of Russia became an arena of events such as had never before taken place in
Russian history. Into the collision of the government and the country, there has
been injected an element which the people cherish to the utmost, i.e., the army.
In a short time, Petrograd found itself in the hands of armed forces which had
rebelled against the old government but which recognized the power and the
authority of the Duma. The Temporary Committee of the leaders of the Duma
parties and factions took upon itself the preservation of order and the conduct
of the most important branches of administration.
In Moscow, the second capital of Russia, events are already taking place
which are similar to those in Petrograd. At the moment these words are
being written, news has been received concerning a telegram from M. V. Rod
zianko to M. V. Chelnokov which tells of the fall of the old government and sug
gests that measures be taken for the establishment of a new order in Moscow.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 143

Truly, a great and decisive moment in the life of our fatherland has come.
It makes huge demands on all of us, and we must respond to them with all our
strength, with all our love for our mother country, with all our understanding.
The entire future of the Russian people depends on the personal conduct of each
one of us in this critical moment, on the degree of undertsanding of events, on
the inner discipline and organization which the country will show now, and,
most important, on the countrys ability to unite and to concentrate all its aspira
tions on important and pressing problems.
The old, irresponsible system of administration has been thrown into oblivion
by the events of the last three days. But it is necessary, as soon as possible, not
losing a minute, to create a new order in its place. And first of all we need an
executive power which recognizes its responsibility before the country and its
representatives, which enjoys their trust, and which is capable, supported by
them, of leading Russia to victory in the world struggle. The Committee of the
Duma is the embryo and the first temporary form of such a power. It must be
recognized and supported by the whole country, irrespective of party affiliation.

123. E ditorial in R eck9

[No. 55, March 5,1917, p. 1.]
During the long week of our involuntary silence great events have taken
place, opening a new page in the history of Russia. Only a week ago the old
regime was defending its existence with extraordinary stubbornness, criminally
sacrificing all national interests; it was firmly convinced of its solidity. Crazy
Protopopov threatened to drown all of Russia in blood and to scatter machine
guns on the housetops of the capital; it seemed that no popular movement could
withstand them. Even when the revolution was in full swing, Kryzhanovskii
haughtily asserted that all of it was nothing but sham, and that with the appear
ance of Kurlov everybody would be dispersed.
However, even at that moment Kurlov had been arrested, and it was the old
regime, falling with fantastic rapidity as if at the wave of a magic wand, that
turned out to be a sham. . . .

Unity and organization, which are the guarantee of all success, have accom
plished this eighth wonder of the world; for history shall forever visualize as
such the present revolution. . . .

124. T h e R evo lution and O ur T asks

[Editorial in Den9, No. 1, March 5, 1917, p. 1.]
Our first word will be:
Long live the great Russian revolution!
Long live the revolutionary nation and the revolutionary army!

The old regime will not be resurrected. Even before dying, it began to rot and
to decay. But the centuries of its pernicious domination have left Russia a dread
ful legacy. The very sources of life have been destroyed. The disintegration has
144 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

penetrated deeply into all the tissues of the great [hut] powerless organism. The
tormented motherland is bleeding.
The great destroyer must become a great creator. For we are not afraid of
the specter of the old regime, but rather of the fruit of its secular, senseless
crimes. One week of revolutionary storm could not clear all the obstacles in
the path of the erection of the Russian nation . . . The old regime has ended,
but the revolution still continues. The basis of the construction of a new Russian
life has been laid, but the vestiges of an accursed past are not yet destroyed.
Therefore, the Provisional Government cannot be anything but a revolutionary
government, and such it is and shall be while the initiators of the Russian revolu
tion stand guard over Russian freedom. They are the working class and the
rebellious army. Their brotherly unity sealed in blood is the token of the future
victories of revolutionary Russia. . . .
Colossal tasks, whose precise features are as yet hard to define, are facing the
revolution. But amid the confusion of a multitude of revolutionary tasks at the
present time, one of them perhaps overshadows all the others. It is the organiza
tion of the revolutionary nation. We are now in the process of organizing the
proletariat and the army.
But their unity should be broadened by the revolutionary organization of the
peasantry and, ascending the social scale, by the revolutionary organization of
the numerous groups of the Russian democratic intelligentsia. Side by side with
the Soviets of Workers5 and Soldiers should emerge the soviets of revolutionary
peasantry. Side by side with them must emerge a union of the unions of the
Russian intelligentsia, which has not dissolved, in an organized class organiza
tion [$c] of one kind or another.
To this problem of an all-national revolutionary organization we shall devote
our liberated word. We shall devote to it our main efforts. And, while entering
into the new period of Russian history, we shall, at the same time, firmly bear in
mind those principles which we have endeavored to serve according to our
strength, within the limits of our liberty and of our ability.
We shall fight against any attempt to delay the accomplishment of revolu
tionary tasks on behalf of the limited interests of the numerically limited social
elements.
We shall fight against all chauvinistic, nationalistic, and imperialistic words,
thoughts, or deeds, whatever their source, and with equal energy we shall oppose
any attempt to inject into the consciousness of the masses elements of anarchism,
maximalism, and defeatism, elements of rebellious utopianism and the venture
some tactics of irresponsible circles or persons.
We shall support the Provisional Government without depriving ourselves of
the right or abandoning the duty to criticize any erroneous steps, [while] in the
growth of solidarity and inner discipline of worker and democratic organizations
we shall look for proof that the Provisional Government will stand firmly on the
road it has taken, revolutionary transformation of the country.
Trusting in the completion of the great tasks of the second Russian revolution,
we are hoisting the banner of the henceforth free Russian word.

125. E ditorial in Delo Naroda

[No. 1, March 15, 1917, p. 1.]
. . . A republican form of government has been established in Russia.
It was established without any pompous ceremony, without any declarations.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 145

It was established apparently without any effort. It came unobtrusively, by

itself. This greatest of all historic achievements in the contemporary world, this
instantaneous landslide of the heavy, three-centuries-old geologic layer, pitifully
scattered to the winds in its sudden fall, occurred quietly, almost without any
obstacles and even almost without any sacrifices. So it would appear at first
sight, and such is the prevailing opinion about the political upheaval.
As a matter of fact, however, we did not come by this change as easily as that.
Nothing comes free. Nature demands sacrifices.
If we ponder the causality of events, it becomes apparent to anyone that
Russia bought her deliverance from the disgraceful yoke of autocracy at a very
high price. She paid for it in millions of lives, in a boundless torrent of human
blood, never before known in the world.
The unprecedented blood-letting war rocked the Russian popular masses to
their very foundation. It opened their eyes to the depravity, dishonesty, and
criminality of the traditional government. It completely shattered the attraction
and prestige [of the old regime], and thus led to the saving results which, under
different circumstances, probably would not have occurred for the next ten years.
Old idols were uncrowned and thrown from their splendid pedestals. The
happy thought of liberty brightened the minds of the people. The most important
thing took placea revolution in the minds and the hearts of the people.
The present task is to give a solid political organization and form to the
liberty which is an accomplished fact. And this form should be given a vital
content of radical democratic and social reforms.
The toiling masses, rural and urban, have paid dearly for the republic estab
lished in Russia. And we hope they will send their representatives to the Con
stituent Assembly, lest the positions won be again surrendered to the monarchy.

126. T h e F in is h
[Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 1, March 7,1917, p. 1.]
The strongholds of the age-old regime of club law and violence have fallen.
The long-awaited dawn of freedom has finally risen over our tortured country.
Like a series of magic transformations, the great events of the revolutionary
week have rushed past us. Many people were astonished by the complete un
expectedness of the political revolution, and by its lightning speed.
But nothing is accidental in the course of historical events. The revolution
did not fall out of the blue: under the cover of the war, with its limitless collapse
of food supply and other things, an underground work of destroying the props
of the old regime had been going on. And the most fatal role was played by the
crash of the main prop, the armed force.
Other strata had begun to stir much earlier. The working class had for a
long time . . . waged the struggle for complete political emancipation. The
liberal strata of bourgeois society had also begun to stir, attempting to soften the
horrors of unrestrained arbitrary rule and rottenness revealed by the military
reverses.
But the Tsars Government insolently mocked the demands of the people: it
felt secure under the protection of millions of bayonets. This was its main support,
but precisely here, too, was hidden the doom of the old regime.
It had forgotten that the millions of soldiers were the millions of peasants
and workers; that, after two and a half years of war, the troops no longer con
146 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

sisted of drilled automatons, beaten into insensibility by military discipline, as

had been the case before. Besides, during those two and a half years, the masses
of the people had experienced more than would be experienced during two decades
of ordinary living. The bloodstained plow of the great world war was turning
over powerful layers of the people, and it was leaving deep furrows in the peoples
soul. The universal collapse and the disintegration of the old regime were plant
ing fertile seeds of political consciousness in those furrows. And a rich harvest
came up.
The advanced workers of Petrograd arose. The demands for bread immedi
ately passed into demands for freedom. The Petrograd proletariat came out in
the streets, starting the open struggle. But the workers were unorganized and
unarmed. The Tsars Government sent against them its organized, armed force,
and thereby doomed itself.
Most of all, the autocratic government feared organized force. It was because
of that fear that it suppressed in the embryo every attempt at organization on
the part of workers, peasants, and other strata. It had created the organized
force only for itself and kept arming it. And precisely this very force turned its
weapons against the Tsars Government.
Thus, relentless history avenged its centuries-old crimes on the regime of
violence and club law. The revolution won. The Romanov dynasty surrendered.
The life of a free, democratic state began. More preciselythe struggle began
for the realization and consolidation of the proclaimed political liberties. To
work, comrades!

127. E ditorial in Rabochaia Gazeta

[No. 6, March 12,1917, p. 2. Den\ No. 8, March 14, 1917, p. 1, refers to this statement
as an absolutely correct appreciation of the role of the Provisional Government.]
The Provisional Government is the government of the revolution and corre
sponds to that evolutionary level at which revolutionary Russia now stands.
Under the pressure of rushing events, under the influence of an uncontrollable
historical torrent, which has washed away within two weeks all the decayed
supports of century-old slavery, the Government, contrary to the wishes of the
majority of its members, became a revolutionary government.
Our task is to aid it in bringing the revolution to its completion, and at the
same time to hinder any attempts on its part to retard or turn back this revolu
tion. But this second task also will be best achieved not by shouts of betrayal or
by attempts at seizure of power by the proletariat, but by an organized pressure
on the Government and by an indefatigable propagation of our views among the
backward sections of the population. Organize yourselves and remove the ground
from under the feet of counterrevolution; enlighten those in whom the old regime
still hopes to find support. This means to support the Provisional Government
in its revolutionary work and at the same time to prevent any kind of counter
revolutionary designs on its part.

128. T h e F uneral
[.Izvestiia, No. 22, March 23, 1917, p. 2.]
This is the day of the funeral of fighters who died for national freedom. The
heroes of the Great Revolution who braved the battle departed from life just when
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 147

the red banner unfurled over it. They departed, but their memory will live eter
nally, as life [itself]. Even the dead, buried in a fraternal grave, will continue
to further their great cause.
. . . On this day of deep national sorrow we will give a pledge on their grave
to continue their fight for freedom and to guard it like a sacred object.
On this day the names of the great martyrs of Freedom will be engraved eter
nally in our memory, and our deep sorrow for them in our hearts. We will turn
our desire to make the life of the people worthy of their heroic deaths into steeled
determination.
Our brother-fighters fell as first citizens of new Russia. There will only be
the people between the bodies of the fighters for freedom and their fraternal grave.
The people themselves will bury their children. They themselves will sing
Eternal Glory to them; they themselves will give the funeral speech; they them
selves will bury their saints, surrounding their grave with red banners of freedom.
And in clear and firm awareness of this heavy but honorable cause, the people
will show tomorrow that they know how to honor the memory of their martyrs.
Today there not only will be the burial of the dead, but also a review of the
living forces of the revolution.
Tomorrow the people will show that they are prepared for concordant and
rational actions, that they are capable of establishing order.
On going out to accompany their brothers to the graves, everyone is to re
member that their memory would be insulted and desecrated should someone
dare to disturb the solemnity of the burial.
And we firmly believe that the living will prove themselves worthy of the dead.
Eternal glory to the heroic champions of national liberty!
Long live the new life built on the grave of those who fell in its name in an
uneven battle!

129. T h e D issem ination O utside P etrograd of t h e N ew s of

the R evolution
[C. F. Vulliamy and A. L. Hynes, From the Red Archives, pp. 231-35, translated from
the first section of Mart-Mai, KA, XV (1930), 30-60, which was a report based on
information gathered by the Guberniya Section of the Temporary Committee of the
Duma.]
The tidings of the revolution were spread in an exceedingly uneven manner;
the information which reached the people being influenced by various local
conditions.
One may cite as an illustration of this haphazard dissemination of news, the
fact that the tidings of the Revolution reached Pskov (a province comparatively
near Petrograd) a fortnight later than Nicolaievsk, which is situated in a prov
ince bordering on the Black Sea, 8,000 versts from the capital. There everything
was known in detail and corresponding measures were undertaken for the estab
lishment of the new order. This unequal distribution is in the first place to be
attributed to the suddenness and intensity of the upheaval, so that the central
revolutionary organisation had neither opportunity nor time to inform the whole
of the population systematically and fully. Naturally the tidings first reached
the large industrial centres (owing to their proximity to railways, and the special
responsiveness of the factory worker to political events). But apart from the
facility or inconvenience of communications, the spreading of the news was
148 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

governed by the political tendencies of the local rulers, as well as the prevailing
attitude of the population itself. Where reactionary forces were in the ascend
ancy, there the people learnt of the revolution far too late. In some provinces,
notably the Mogilievsky government (where the spirit of the Imperial Stavka
[G.H.Q.]10 was strong), the Kazansky government, and others, nothing definite
was known till the 31st of March or even April. The whole phalanx of the old
power, from rural police inspectors to petty gendarmes, remained at their posts.
Priests, even in the suburbs of Petrograd, continued to pray for the Tsar, and
conducted themselves as though nothing had occurred.
In such localities the mass of peasants began to show signs of uneasiness,
which found an outletmainly at the prompting of desertersin looting shops
and private houses, in the dispersion of guards from Crown estates, in the felling
of forests, etc. Owing to complete ignorance as to the aims of the revolution and
the trend of events, combined with a long-cherished desire for land and hostility
to landowners, the movement acquired in many provinces a blind, irresponsible
character, especially in the Nijegorodsky government, where the enmity between
peasants and landlords had reached an acute stage. In the government of Bessa
rabia, that hotbed of reaction, matters were greatly complicated by the agitation
of the Black Hundred [a police organisation employing terrorist methods]. The
extreme ignorance of the population, among whom the percentage of illiteracy is
surprisingly high; a powerful party of wealthy landowners, who had gathered
into their hands the local administration; the virtual absence of industrial workers
and of a democratically-inclined intelligentsia: all this was a fruitful soil for
counter-revolutionary pogroms and plots in favour of restoration.
To this must be added a large number of liberated prisoners, who were fre
quently let loose without any means of subsistence, and who, either owing to
starvation or making the best of a favourable opportunity, terrorised the popu
lation.
But the peasant movement bore this fortuitously revengeful character mainly
through ignorance, and the activity of irresponsible persons. On the whole it
manifested itself with less violence than in 1905, when unspeakable outrages were
perpetrated on many occasions. Simple persuasion soon brought the peasants
to their senses; they realised that now, without the Tsar, the position was dif
ferent; the old authorities would not return; and it was for them to prevent
random cruelty.

The widely circulated notion that the Russian peasant was deeply attached
to the Tsar, and could not live without him, was strikingly disproved by the
universal joy which swept over the country at the news of the Tsars abdication.
The story of Rasputin was well known in the furthest corners of Russia. The
feelings of the peasants expressed themselves in few words: What a state the
Tsar has got himself into! And brought us to total ruin also!
If there were some with monarchic sympathies, they were not heard in the
general turmoil of opposing tendencies. They cowered in retirement; and if a
few daring spirits tried the ground by expressing their opinions, they quickly
changed their toneso hostile was the reception of them. The province of Bes-

10 Brackets in this document are in the English source.

 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 149

sarabia, the southern districts of the Chernigov and Mogiliev provinces, in the
vicinity of the Stavka [G.H.Q.], must be quoted as exceptions: here the monarch
ist currents flowed strongly.
The greatest sympathy for the old regime, and the least activity in promoting
the establishment of the new order, was evinced by the clergy. There is not a
report but emphasises this fact.
The petty bourgeois element of the small country towns proved itself par
ticularly unreliable and wavering. At the least sign of real or imaginary danger,
it is ready to turn back. (For this reason frequent applications were made to
the Petrograd authorities for the withdrawal of coins and stamps bearing the
Tsars image, as these caused this part of the population to waver in its adherence
to the revolution.)
But they represented an insignificant minority of the nation; all the rest
peasants, soldiers, intelligentsiatook a firm stand in favour of the new order
[i.e., the Provisional Government].
The ease of the transition is, of course, to be explained by the fact that the
nation has long consciously striven for the change. The men who took over
power were known and regarded with confidence in the remotest corners of the
land. For the first time the people saw the authorities ; instead of meaningless
names, which emerged, from time to time, out of the Tsars anteroom, they saw
men in whom they could put their trust, and from whom they expected a just
administration. The names of Kerensky and Miliukov were universally known.
And this explains the devotion to the government which was everywhere shown
by the people, with requests (to the delegates) to convey to it their most dutiful
greetings, and assurances of being ready to serve it unto death.

130. T h e F ebruary R evo lution in S iberian E xile

[S. Samoilov, Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda v Minusinskoi ssylke, PR , IX
(1926), 195-98. Characteristic of many similar descriptions. Samoilov and Shagov
were among the Bolshevik members of the Fourth Duma who were arrested and exiled
to Siberia in 1914.]
In the town theater a meeting was called at which all the telegrams [con
taining the first news of the February revolution] were read. The emotion that
they stirred was unforgettable. No one could put into words the scenes of joy
which I saw at that time. After the telegrams were read, many of the political
exiles who came out to speak became hysterical. Somebody would begin: Com
rades, it has been fifteen years since I was sent to Siberia and I no longer thought
that it would ever be my lot to go back home and . . Here the speaker would
begin to sob and could not continue. Another would come out, and the same
would happen to him. This, however, was only in the first days. After that,
people became entirely engrossed in organizing new government organs, and be
haved in a more businesslike and calm manner. Only my comrade from the State
Duma, Deputy [N. R.] Shagov, hopelessly lost his balance. The events impressed
him so that from the first he lost sleep and began to show signs of mental abnor
mality. Unable to sleep, he walked in the night from house to house, aroused the
comrades, and said: How can you sleep? How can anyone sleep now that the
revolution is here? . . .
Even at the first meeting in the town theater the divergent opinions among
150 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

the exiles on the attitude to be taken toward the World War were brought into
the open, . . .

[When several of the exiles set out on their homeward journey to European
Russia,] the trip from Minusinsk to Achinsk, about 500 versts, had to be made
under very extraordinary circumstances. We drove through a multitude of vil
lages, and everywhere the inhabitants met us with bread and salt. We accepted
the gifts and then opened a meeting in which we explained to the peasants the
meaning and the essence of the revolution that was taking place. . . . Although
the roads were very bad, now that spring had begun and the snow was melting,
every village was eager to put horses at our disposal.
The entire way from Minusinsk to Achinsk was an uninterrupted triumph for
us, and everything would have been fine were it not for Shagov, who gave evi
dence of progressive mental illness. . . .
At Achinsk we stepped into a train overcrowded with political exiles on their
way home . . . At most stations we were met by throngs of inhabitants or by
soldiers who played the Marseillaise.
It was still a long way to Petrograd when many of us, from uninterrupted
speaking, lost our voices, fell ill, and no longer left the cars; but even in the cars
people would not leave us in peace. At many stations, upon learning that some
of us could not come out, the public invaded the cars, asked about our health,
brought flowers, and in every way tried to show their joy.

131. M essage o f L loyd G eorge to P rince Lvov

[ The Times (London), March 23, 1917, p. 7.]
It is with sentiments of the most profound satisfaction that the peoples of
Great Britain and of the British Dominions across the seas have learned that their
great Ally Russia now stands with the nations which base their institutions upon
responsible government.
Much as we appreciate the loyal and steadfast cooperation which we have
received from the late Emperor and the armies of Russia during the past two and
a half years, yet I believe that the revolution whereby the Russian people have
based their destinies on the sure foundation of freedom is the greatest service
which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been
fighting since August, 1914.
It reveals the fundamental truth that this war is at bottom a struggle for
popular government as well as for liberty. It shows that, through the war, the
principle of liberty, which is the only sure safeguard of peace in the world, has
already won one resounding victory. It is the sure promise that the Prussian
military autocracy which began the war, and which is still the only barrier to
peace, will itself, before long, be overthrown.
Freedom is the condition of peace, and I do not doubt that as a result of the
establishment of a stable constitutional Government within their borders the
Russian people will be strengthened in their resolve to prosecute this war until
the last stronghold of tyranny on the Continent of Europe is destroyed and the
free peoples of all lands can unite to secure for themselves and their children the
blessings of fraternity and peace.
 FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 151

132. T h e O rdeal o f R ussia

[The Times (London), April 12, 1917, p. 7.]
No event of our times has excited sympathy so deep and widespread amongst
the great self-governing democracies of the world as the resolve of the Russian
people to govern themselves. It has immeasurably strengthened the bonds between
Russia and her chief Allies, and it has breathed a new warmth into the traditional
friendship which unites her to the great Republic beyond the Atlantic. . . . So
much depends, not for Russia only or for themselves, but for the world through
long generations to come, upon her success in solving these issues, that Russians,
we are sure, will understand the eager watchfulness of their friends. All revolu
tions are beset by certain maladies from the cradle, which it needs great qualities,
both in the leaders and in the masses, to overcome. It would be strange, indeed,
did not Russia show symptoms of them, for they are naturally most acute where
the previous condition of the patient has been most sickly. . . .
In Russia the change is unusually far-reaching, and we note with natural
concern, but without surprise or exaggerated disquiet, the familiar signs. They
were almost inevitable. The most serious and the commonest of them lies in the
claims of rival bodies to authority in the name of the people. . . . The candid
confession of h e r r PAUL rohrba ch in a recent lecture in Berlin that Germanys
peace schemes wholly depend upon the triumph of the Russian extremists,
and that it is to her interest to get rid of the Liberal Provisional Government,
will not be lost on intelligent Russian patriots, military or civil. . . .
True democracy means government by the will of the people, and not gov
ernment by the irresponsible heads of secret organizations. It may be impossible
at present to ascertain the will of the Russian people through the medium of a
Constituent Assembly. The Armies are in the trenches, and the whole community
is more or less disorganised by the work of providing them with munitions and
supplies. The difficulties about convening such an Assembly resemble the diffi
culties which a General Election presents in the other constitutional countries of
the Alliance, but the novelty and magnitude of the experiment greatly accentuate
them. But there are other organsthe Zemstvos, for instancethrough which a
very fair representation of that will may be secured. The great thing is that the
unity of will and opinion, which exists, we believe, in the nation, should find clear
and emphatic expression without avoidable delay. That unity, we have not the
least doubt, is absolute so far as the war is concerned. . . .

133. R u s s ia n U n it y
[Uhomme enchaine, No. 883, March 18,1917, p. L]
The revolution triumphs in Russia! . . . I have already expressed my cer
tainty that the Russian people from the Grand Duke to the muzhik, as well as the
army, will resoundingly declare themselves in favor of a more energetic conduct of
the war. In this respect everyone is unanimous. There were even professions
of enthusiasm for France and for England. It is because of this burst of patriotic
feelings alone that the danger came to a governmental bureaucracy whose crimi
nal negligence, as in other countries, had resulted only in disorganizing disorder
itself and in promoting all the violence of an unbridled authority.
152 THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The Duma, where an elite of statesmen has revealed itself, resisted spon
taneously the outrage of a decree for its suspension, and from the outside an
immense clamor of excited gratitude announced the ardent adhesion of the whole
capital. Henceforth there is a truly representative assembly. The revolution has
broken loose. . . .

Let us take our eyes away from this sight in order to look at that proud
aristocracy which, without being tempted by the tradition of the emigres, joined
the popular movement in an irresistible impulse, with its Grand Duke at its head;
henceforth this movement is the movement forward of a whole nation for the
defense of the fatherland. Thus the admirable unity of all the Russians is mag
nificently achieved. Unity! Unity! Such is the unexpected phenomenon which
culminates a history of long internecine disturbances, but which suddenly ends
by a mighty concentration of wills, even supreme enthusiasm, of the popular soul
tending toward the complete unity of all energies. This is what should be seen
in the marvelous efforts of superior patriotism, the sight of which is offered to us
by our great allies and friends. If they were divided, it would have meant weak
ness anew. United they represent a final force which must vanquish everything.
It is a pure miracle that this unity has been realized. [But] it has. We see it in
action, in the life of its combat formations. To be one and everyone together at
the same time in the decisive battles which are inevitably forthcoming means
success against which no endeavors of Boche reaction can prevail.

G. C lem en c ea u
 PART n
Toward a Democratic Order

The tasks hefore the Provisional Government were overwhelming: the res
toration and maintenance of internal order, the introduction of fundamental
reforms, the prosecution of the war, and the preparation of elections to the Con
stituent Assembly.
But its authority was circumscribed by inhibitory tenure and weakened by
the force of circumstance. Established to administer Russia only until the con
vocation of the Constituent Assembly, it was prohibited any activity that might
predetermine the permanent form of government or the structure of the state.
The ministers, attempting to avoid any taint of arbitrary rule, were constantly
subjected to the conflicting pressures of factional politics and the recurring
intervention of the Soviet. Meantime military requirements made claims upon
their time and energy and upon the resources of the state, which reduced the pace
and scope of domestic reform. These restrictions and distractions were frustrat
ing, complicating, and extremely difficult to explain to an impatient people.
But the problems of governance did not end there. With the monarchy had
vanished the machinery of government and its bureaucracy at every level. New
organs had to be created and appropriate administrative and legislative proce
dures elaborated. Inexperienced and untrained civil servants were appointed
with a concomitant reduction in efficiency. In the first weeks particularly, the
burden of work was crushing. Council meetings were long, crowded with matters
requiring immediate attention, and constantly interrupted by delegations with
declarations of loyalty and petitions for consideration.1
One of the most immediate and delicate issues was the disposition of the
former Imperial family. Anxious to deal humanely with them, the Government
was prepared to grant a reasonable measure of freedom and to arrange, if pos
sible, their departure to England. Initially, the British cabinet indicated its will
ingness to cooperate, but later, when the necessary arrangements had been made,
apparently decided that the residence of the ex-Tsar and Tsarina in Great Britain
during the war would be inadvisable. Meanwhile, the Soviet, fearful of some
attempt at counterrevolution, and moved by hatred of the deposed autocrat and
his consort, demanded their arrest. Cognizant of the degree and extent of this
feeling in the country, the Provisional Government confined the Imperial family
at Tsarskoe Selo. In midsummer, after it had become clear that their journey

1 Alexander F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, Chap. IH; P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi

russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 61-76; V. Nabokov, Vremennoe PraviteFstvo, ARR, I (1921),
24 ff.; and Paul P. Gronsky and Nicholas J. Astrov, The War and the Russian Government,
Chap. IV.
154 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

abroad was impossible, Kerensky moved them to Tobolsk for greater safety.
Their subsequent fate at the hands of the Bolsheviks is well known.2
The Provisional Government was assured of the support of all sectors of
society for a program of political democratization and legal reform. The basic
civil liberties were established by law, and the numerous restrictions based upon
nationality, religion, class, and sex removed or invalidated by other legislation.
Almost at once an amnesty for political prisoners was proclaimed and the sen
tences imposed for certain other crimes reduced. With near unanimity, the nation
welcomed the abolition of the death penalty. Other penal methods which had
long shocked enlightened society were done away with and needed reforms in
augurated throughout the entire system.
All special and extraordinary courts for treason, state and political crimes,
and malfeasance were immediately abolished and jury trials introduced. A spe
cial commission was approved to restore, and if necessary improve, the original
provisions of the Judicial Charters of 1864 which had been altered or nullified
by subsequent reactionary legislation. The Government reinstituted the elected
justices of the peace in all provinces of Russia.8
The re-establishment and enforcement of public order on the basis of law
was a matter of exceptional urgency. During the February days the police agen
cies of tsarism, including the hated Okhrana, had been swept away before the
pent-up fury of the populace. The Government had no desire to restore the
Okhrana, but it obviously required a police force. Accordingly, it recognized
the militia units, so called to avoid association with their hated predecessor,
which had been spontaneously organized throughout Russia. Significantly, the
militia, as established by law, though an organ of the central authority, was under
the immediate jurisdiction of the local zemstvo and municipal administrations.
The restoration of the state administration in the provinces demanded com
parable attention. As an emergency measure in the first hours of the new regime,
Prince LVov appointed the chairmen of guberniya and uezd zemstvo boards as
government commissars to replace the Imperial officials. In many cases the
appointees were scarcely more acceptable to the population than their prede
cessors. In time, new commissars were named, if possible with reference to local
wishes, but in the beginning their authority suffered from the breakdown of the
entire administrative system, and later their difficulties were compounded by the
absence of means to implement decisions and the interference of self-appointed
public organizations. Furthermore, considerable confusion existed concerning
their actual powers, a problem unresolved until late summer with the issuance of
the necessary legislation.
In the area of local self-government, legislation included the expansion of
the zemstvo organization throughout Russia and the creation of volost and settle
ment institutions. The rights and functions accorded by the zemstvo act of 1864

2 For additional information on the Imperial family after February, see Paul Bulygin and
A. F. Kerensky, The Murder of the Romanovs; N. A. Sokolov, Ubiistvo Tsarskoi Semyi; P. M.
Bykov, The Last Days of Tsardom; Pierre Gilliard, Imperator Nikolai i Ego Semia; and Count
Paul Benckendorff, Last Days at Tsarskoe Selo.
8 P. N. Maliantovich, Revoliutsiia i pravosudie, and A. Demianov, Moia sluzhba pri
Vremennom Pravitelstve, ARR, IV (1922), 55-129, describe, from the point of view of the
authors, the work of the Ministry of Justice. The legal institutions of Russia after 1864 are
well described in Samuel Kucherov, Courts, Lawyers an d Trials Under the Last Three Tsars.
 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER 155

were restored and extended, and universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was
introduced, except for the gubemiya assemblies, which were elected by the next
lower units. The powers of the representatives of the central government were
limited to legal oversight of the activities of the local institutions. However,
pending the promulgation of the new legislation, soviets and other hastily or
ganized bodies often took affairs into their own hands or arbitrarily democra
tized the existing zemstvos and municipal dumas. This phenomenon became so
widespread that the Government perforce sanctioned it as a temporary solution.
But even after the statutes were published and the new institutions established,
the pretensions of these organs frequently challenged their authority.4
It was inevitable that the revolution should encourage regionalism and bring
a resurgence of the national movements within Russia far in excess of 1905 and
1906. The repressive russification policies of the nineties had been resumed and
in some cases intensified in the years preceding the war, with a consequent rise
in resentment and agitation. Prevailing Russian opinion deplored these policies
and supported the introduction by the Provisional Government of a considerable
measure of self-rule in the Ukraine, Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Baltic provinces,
and among the Cossacks. Yet, it also agreed that final decisions concerning the
territorial organization of the state and any grant of independence were reserved
to the Constituent Assembly. The attempt to observe this often-indistinct line of
demarcation, clouded by differing political as well as legal interpretations, pre
sented the Government with innumerable problems. This was particularly true
in relation to the Ukrainian question.5
On March 7 the constitution of Finland, which had been systematically vio
lated by the Tsarist regime during the previous quarter-century, was completely
restored. Many Finns, however, not satisfied with this act and the promise of
further revisions in the relationship between the two nations, claimed that the
abolition of the monarchy had severed the dynastic union with Russia. The Pro
visional Government refused to countenance that argument, maintaining that it
had succeeded to the authority and prerogatives of the Emperor as Grand Duke
of Finland until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.6
In the case of Poland, the recognition of independence was deemed proper,
with implementation left to the Russian and Polish Constituent Assemblies.

4 For general accounts of the reforms in local government, see Tikhon J. Polner and others,
Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos, Chaps. XIV, XV, and
Gronsky and Astrov, op. c i t pp. 299-311.
5 The best recent scholarly treatment of the Ukraine in the Provisional Government period
is to be found in John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, Chap. II; of
Belorussia, in Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, pp. 96-98. See also his
A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia. By far the most valuable work on the national move
ments during the revolution outside of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic region is Richard Pipes,
The Formation of the Soviet Union, with its excellent annotated bibliography. His organization
and terminology have generally been observed in documenting the corresponding sections of
Chapter VII. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, Chap. HE, is useful for
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia,
chap. X, for the Moslem movements. For Latvia, see Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Latvia,
pp. 280-82; for the other Baltic states, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic
States, pp. 18-21, is of some assistance.
6 Recent studies on Finland that include accounts of this period are C. Jay Smith, Finland
and the Russian Revolution, pp. 8-24, and Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West,
pp. 39-45. Both have helpful bibliographies.
156 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Although the realization of independence was impeded by the German occupa

tion of most of Poland, the Government began preparatory activity with the
creation of a liquidation commission for matters pertaining to the Kingdom of
Poland.7
Clearly, the consequences of the interim limitations upon the activity of the
Provisional Government were impressive evidence of the necessity to expedite
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. In April a Special Council was
authorized to draft the electoral law, while other organs, including the Juridical
Council, were assigned the task of working out legislation in various fields for
the consideration of the Assembly. The debates in the Special Council mirrored
the desire of its members to create an electoral system based upon the most
advanced democratic principles and ensuring the broadest representation. Indeed,
much of the delay in completing the statute can be attributed to scrupulous at
tention to these aims, though other factors, including the size of the Council and
the distracting political activities of many of its members, played a role as well.
After the publication of the electoral law, further time was lost because of
complications in the introduction of implementation of the reforms in local self-
government, which were considered a necessary prerequisite to the national
elections. Finally, continuing military considerations and, more especially, the
recurrent political crises, notably the July Days and the Kornilov Affair, served
to interfere with the election and convocation, as they did with the fulfillment of
all the policies of the Provisional Government.8

7 See W. F. Reddaway and others, The Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to
Pilsudski, Chap. XX; N. M. Lapinskii, ed., Russko-Polskie otnosheniia v period mirovoi voiny;
and the Bibliography in Bernadotte E. Schmitt, ed., Poland, pp. 467-69.
8 M. V. Vishniak, Vserossiiskoe Uchreditel 9noe Sobraniie, is the most informative volume
on the preparations for the Constituent Assembly. The author was a member of the Special
Council to draft the electoral law. The elections to the Assembly are excellently described and
analyzed in Oliver Henry Radkey, The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly.
 CHAPTER 4

The Central Government

THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
134. T h e F irst D eclaration o f t h e P rovisional G ov ernm en t
[VVP, No. 2, March 7,1917, p. 1.]
Citizens of the Russian State!
A great event has taken place. By the mighty impulse of the Russian people
the old order has been overthrown. A new free Russia has been bora. The great
upheaval crowns many years of struggle.
By the act of October 17, 1905, under pressure of the awakened popular
forces, Russia was promised constitutional liberties. However, those promises
were not kept. The spokesman of national hopes, the First State Duma, was dis
solved. The Second Duma suffered the same fate. And, powerless to crush the
national will, the Government decided, by the Act of June 3, 1907, to retract
from the people part of the rights to participation in legislative work which had
been granted to them. In the course of nine long years, step by step, the people
were deprived of all of the rights which they had gained. Once more the country
was plunged into an abyss of arbitrary rule and absolutism. All attempts to make
the Government listen to reason proved futile, and the great world struggle into
which our motherland was drawn by the enemy found it in a state of moral decay,
alienated from the people, indifferent to the future of the motherland, and steeped
in the infamy of corruption. Neither the heroic efforts of the army, staggering
under the crushing burdens of internal chaos, nor the appeals of the peoples
representatives who had united in the face of national peril were able to lead the
former Emperor and his Government into the path of unity with the people. And
when Russia, owing to the illegal and fatal actions of her rulers, was confronted
with the gravest disasters, the nation was obliged to take the power into its own
hands. The unanimous revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, fully aware of
the gravity of the moment, and the determination of the State Duma have created
the Provisional Government. And the latter deems it its sacred duty and re
sponsibility to fulfill the peoples hopes and lead the country onto the bright path
of free civic organization.
The Government believes that the spirit of lofty patriotism, manifested during
the struggle of the people against the old regime, will also inspire our valiant
soldiers on the field of battle. For its own part, the Government will make every
effort to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a vic
torious conclusion.
The Government will sacredly observe the alliances which bind us to other
powers and will unswervingly carry out the agreements entered into with the
Allies.
158 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

While taking measures to defend the country from the foreign enemy, the
Government will, at the same time, deem it to be its primary duty to open a way
to the expression of the popular will with regard to the form of government and
will convoke the Constituent Assembly within the shortest time possible on the
basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, also guaranteeing partici
pation in the elections to the gallant defenders of our native land who are now
shedding their blood on the fields of battle. The Constituent Assembly will also
issue the fundamental laws guaranteeing the country the inalienable rights of
justice, equality, and liberty.
Realizing the full gravity of the lack of rights, which oppresses the country
and hinders the free creative impulse of the people at a time of grave national
upheavals, the Provisional Government deems it necessary to provide the country
immediately, even prior to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, with laws
safeguarding civil liberty and equality in order to enable all citizens to apply
freely their spiritual forces to creative work for the benefit of the country. The
Government will also undertake the enactment of legal provisions to assure all
citizens equal participation in the elections of organs of self-government on the
basis of universal suffrage.
At this moment of national liberation, the whole country remembers with
reverent gratitude those who, in defending their political and religious convictions,
fell victims to the vindictive old regime. And the Provisional Government con
siders it its happy duty to bring back from their exile and imprisonment, with
full honors, all those who have suffered for the good of the motherland.
In fulfilling these tasks, the Provisional Government is animated by the belief
that it will thus execute the will of the people, and that the whole nation will
support it in its honest efforts to ensure the happiness of Russia. This belief
inspires it with courage. The Provisional Government sees the only guarantee
for the triumph of the new order in the wholehearted support of all of the people.
March 6, 1917.

135. P rince Lvov S tates t h e A im s and H opes of th e N ew

G overnm en t
[R ech\ No. 57, March 8, 1917, p. 5.]
On March 7, at 1:00 p .m ., Prince G. E. Lvov, head of the Provisional Gov
ernment and Minister of the Interior, received the representatives of the daily
press and expressed a few considerations in regard to the current situation.
Naturally this is not the right time for interviews and superfluous conver
sations. The Provisional Government works day and night in order to establish
the new order of things in the country.
To the greetings and congratulations of the newspapermen Prince G. E. Lvov
replied:
Gentlemen, it is not I but the great Russian people that you should con
gratulate; the genius of the people has achieved miracles; may glory and honor
be with it. It is from the popular source that we have drawn our forces, and they
have brought results which astounded the world by their majesty and their gen
erosity toward the past. The great historical change has already occurred. The
ancient foundations have collapsed and we must proceed without the least delay
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 159

with our creative work. The most difficult [task] will be to imbue minds with a
new way of thinking, to uproot old conceptions. Men are needed who will be
able to put into practice the great principles required by the national freedom
and the new order of life. According to the information received by the Govern
ment, the historical change is received all over the country almost painlessly, the
liberation of the people is greeted with j oy, and everywhere the population meets
the establishment of the new order halfway. At first we had apprehensions re
garding the front, where they live in a different emotional climate. But there also
the genius of the people has felt the dawn of a new era and has saved us from
shocks. The troops recognize the new authority, and only the Baltic Fleet was,
unfortunately, the scene of painful misunderstandings.
It would be superfluous to speak of the Provisional Governments program,
which is clear and obvious to everyone, that of liberating the people from all the
bonds which enchained it and of giving it [the opportunity] to demonstrate all
its spiritual forces.
Our essential sacred taskPrince G. E. LVov further notedis the prep
aration for the Constituent Assembly, in which all the people, all the troops must
participate. The will of the people is sacred to us; it will determine the form of
our Government and will be reflected in the results of the Constituent Assembly.
Fortunately, in general, the public has become aware of the concept of a Con
stituent Assembly. Owing to current events, a period of 3 to 6 months will be
required for the preparation for the Constituent Assembly. Naturally, the Pro
visional Government wishes to carry it out as rapidly as possible.
Prince G. E. LVov expressed himself metaphorically on the subject of the
countrys administrative organization: when putting on clean clothes, one should
shed the dirty ones. It is essential to introduce the new order at all levels of life.
It is essential to place everywhere people imbued with the new ideals, loyal to
the new regime. The main thing is not to think or act in the old manner. The
Provisional Government is sending commissars all over the country, who, in
agreement with the local committees composed of public men, will select suitable
people for given functions. Russia is large; the deep meaning of the upheaval
which has taken place was not understood everywhere. We cannot be content
with the fact that the old regime has been overthrown and [just] thank the
Almighty. All the agents of the Government should be imbued with the desire
to consolidate the new order of national life and must realize that the old regime
has been overthrown forever.
For the time beingsaid Prince G. E. LVovthe Ministry of the Interior
does not exist; it has to be created anew.
To a query regarding the future fate of Nicholas II, Prince G. E. LVov replied
that next day the Provisional Government would discuss the matter and would
publish its decision in a special act. As for the further fate of the arrested min
isters and of other former administrators, the head of the Provisional Govern
ment said that they would receive the treatment suggested by the generosity of
the people, a generosity which has found its expression in our present great revo
lution, the most bloodless revolution in world history.
Taking leave of the newspapermen, Prince G. E. LVov mentioned that it
would be superfluous to stress how greatly he valued the free press, and that, as
far as his forces and time would permit, he would always be at its disposal.
The speech of Prince G. E. LVov made a most heartening impression; in
160 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

each of his words, in each of his gestures, one felt indomitable energy and a deep
faith in the cause for which he works.

136. T h e F irst M eetings of t h e P rovisional G overnment

[V. Nabokov, Vremennoe Pravitelstvo, AR R , I (1921), 32-33. Nabokov was the first
Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.]

In the evening of March 7, as I have already mentioned, the Provisional

Government held its first session in the Mariinskii Palace. In the first few weeks
the sessions were set twice a day for 4:00 P .M . and 9:00 P .M . Actually, the after
noon session (like the evening session) opened with great delay and continued
until after 7:00 P .M . The evening session always ended in the early hours of the
morning. . . .
This is an appropriate place to give an outward description of the sessions
of the Provisional Government which I witnessed in the course of the first two
months of the revolution.
As I have just said, the sessions invariably opened with great delay. I waited
for the opening [of the session] in my office, occupying myself with some kind
of work or with receiving the numerous daily visitors. [Someone] came to tell
me when a sufficient number of ministers had gathered to open the session. Prince
LVov, I. Godnev (State Controller), and A. A. Manuilov were more punctual
than the others. Sometimes the sessions opened with a very small quorum of
ministers in order to attend to urgent but unimportant matters. These matters
were reported by the ministers and were promptly settled. It took some time
before we succeeded in having a definite agenda established, or having the matters
for reporting submitted beforehand to the Head of the Chancellery. At the first
sessions, which were conducted very chaotically, the ministers reported on the
matters [at hand], and the decisions that happened to be reached were recorded
in very approximate form. I succeeded in establishing that, as a general rule,
every presentation submitted to the Provisional Government conclude with a draft
resolution, which, of course, would be subject to changes, depending upon the
course and the outcome of the deliberations. As concerns deliberations . . . ,
it was decided at the outset not to record them officially and, also, not to note
down the differences of opinion during the voting, not to enter dissenting opinions
in the minutes, and so on. The point of departure in this connection was the aim
of avoiding anything which might disrupt the unity of the Government and its
responsibility as a whole for every decision adopted. Besides, the keeping of
detailed minutes of every session would have presented a number of serious dif
ficulties, hard to overcome. The members of the Provisional Government tended
to have a somewhat suspicious and distrustful attitudeespecially at the begin
ningtoward the presence of clerks of the Chancellery at the sessions. Detailed
recording of everything said would have evoked protest and demands for verifi
cation, and, in the end, what with the enormous number of matters examined at
every session, not a single record of the proceedings would have been completed.
It should be said, by the way, that, with rare exceptions, the deliberations at the
open sessions did not present any great interest. The ministers came to the meet
ings always tired to the utmost. The work of each minister, of course, exceeded
normal human capacities. Highly specialized questions, unfamiliar to the ma-
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 161

jority, were often examined at the meetings, and the ministers were often half-
asleep, listening to the report with one ear. Animation and passionate speeches
began only in closed sessions, as well as in meetings with the 44Contact Commis
sion of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers5and Soldiers5Deputies.

137. M inutes o f an E arly M eeting o f t h e P rovisional

G o vernm ent
[Zhurnaly, No. 4, March 4, 1917. No. 3 cf the same date is the first meeting in the
rare Hoover Institution copy of the Zhurnaly. However, V. Nabokov wrote in Vremen-
noe Pravitelstvo, ARR, I (1921), 24, that No. 2 was the first printed. No. 1, which
was disorganized and incomplete, was taken by Miliukov for correction and never
returned.
In this and following excerpts, wherever the Resolved repeats the Heard almost
verbatim, the Heard has been omitted.]
The session was attended by the Minister-President, Prince G. E. LVov, and
the Ministers: Foreign Affairs, P. N. Miliukov; Agriculture, A. I. Shingarev;
Trade and Industry, A. I. Konovalov; Transport, N. V. Nekrasov; Education,
A. A. Manuilov; Finance, M. I. Tereshchenko; Justice, A. F. Kerensky; War and
Navy, A. I. Guchkov; the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, V. N. LVov; and
the Assistant Minister of the Interior, Acting Minister D. M. Shchepkin.
The State Controller, I. V. Godnev, attended the session.
The session was opened at 19 hours.

Resolved:
To abolish the Central Committee for the protection of the railways and the
special committees attached to the administrations of the railways.

Resolved:
To increase by 2 billion rubles the [State] Banks right to issue state
bank notes.

Resolved:
To discontinue allocating credits for all kinds of secret expenditures out of
the funds of the State Treasury.
Heard:
v) On using the American and Japanese money markets for State loans.
At the same time the Minister of Finance reported that the abolition of the
old regime and the formation of the Provisional Government, which enjoyed
the confidence of the people, had the most favorable repercussions on the solvency
of Russia in foreign countries; it would be expedient to take advantage in full
measure of this circumstance.
Resolved:
To instruct the Minister of Finance to study the possibility of using the
Japanese and American money markets for the purpose of concluding loans
162 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

required for maintaining the currency, and to present his considerations on the
subject during one of the next sessions of the Provisional Government.

Resolved:
To transfer His Majestys Kabinet to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Finance, appointing member of the State Duma Ivan Vasilevich Titov to manage
its affairs as Commissar. To instruct the Minister of Finance to clarify the
question of the possibility of converting the available funds of the Kabinet into
obligations of the internal war loan.

Heard:
j) On an address to the population pointing out the necessity of paying all
the formerly established taxes, customs, and duties, and also declaring on behalf
of the Provisional Government that the state, as represented by the Provisional
Government, will be completely responsible for all the monetary and other obliga
tions formerly concluded on behalf of the state.
Resolved:
To recognize the necessity of the aforesaid address and to instruct the Min
istry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs to take care of its earliest possible publi
cation both within the empire and abroad.

Heard:
3. Regarding the management of the palaces, museums, and other property
of the Ministry of the Court and of the Central Administration of the Appanages.
Resolved:
1. To entrust the general management of the aforesaid properties to the
Commissar of the Provisional Government, member of the State Duma Nikolai
Nikolaevich Lvov.
2. To form a special commission for the purpose of receiving and protecting
palaces, museums, and other properties of the Ministry of the Court.
3. To recognize as necessary that the representative of the State Controller
should be present when the former palace and Kabinet properties are received.

Resolved:
Until a special ministry of food is formed, to transfer all the institutions con
cerned in matters pertaining to the supply of food to the population to the Min
istry of Agriculture.

Resolved:
To instruct the Minister of Agriculture, in agreement with the Minister of
the Interior, to present a project for a ukase concerning the discontinuance of
measures for the liquidation of the German landholdings, as they concern the
permanent inhabitants who are Russian subjects, measures which had been carried
out under the procedure of article 87 of the Fundamental Laws.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 163

Resolved:
To instruct the Minister of War and of the Navy to work out with dispatch the
question of abolishing the national, religious, class [soslovie], and political
restrictions for the promotion of privates to officers, and to introduce the respec
tive proposal for sanction by the Provisional Government.
Heard:
6. On the abolition in Finland of the legislation pertaining to the empire as
a whole.
Resolved:
To abrogate the law of June 17,1910 (Code of Laws, article 1097), to instruct
the Minister-President to present drafts of ukases.
Heard:
7. Oral proposals of the Minister-President:
a) On the reorganization of the local administrative authorities.
Resolved:
1. To remove from office temporarily the governors and vice-governors.
2. In the guberniyas, where the zemstvo regulation is in force, the functions
of the governors are temporarily to be entrusted to the chairmen of the guberniya
zemstvo boards, who are to be designated guberniya commissars of the Provi
sional Government.
3. The direction of administrative activity in the uezds of the localities, where
the zemstvo regulation is in force, to be entrusted to the chairmen of the uezd
zemstvo boards as uezd commissars of the Provisional Government.
4. For the purpose of maintaining a normal course of life in the country, to
acknowledge it advisable to preserve as far as possible the whole existing admin
istrative apparatus.
5. To leave open temporarily the question of the administrative organization
of the authority in the guberniyas in which the zemstvo regulation does not exist,
in the Cossack oblasts, in the prefectures, and in Siberia until the question is
solved jointly with the local public organizations and functionaries.

Resolved:
To authorize the [new] Petrograd Prefect not to arrest the officials of the
Petrograd city police who have voluntarily reported to the commissars of the
Provisional Government and who were not compromised by their previous activi
ties, and, if deemed possible, to issue them certificates to reside freely in Petrograd.

Resolved:
1. To abolish the Central Administration for Press Affairs, preserving within
the Ministry of the Interior its registry services and the Bureau for the Review
of the Foreign Press.
2. To obligate the editors and publishers to continue sending all published
works to the aforesaid registry services.
3. To dismiss from the service according to his request for reasons of health
the Head of the Central Administration for Press Affairs, Aleksandr Andreevich
Katenin.
164 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

4. To abolish the committee for the codification of Finnish laws, attached to

the State Chancellery.
5. To instruct the Minister-President and the Minister of the Interior to
present the drafts of the respective ukases regarding the abolition of the aforesaid
institutions (paragraphs 1 and 4).

Resolved:
To abolish the percentage quota for Jews entering schools, restoring at the
same time the right to continue their education to those students who were dis
missed from schools for political subversion.
Resolved:
To instruct the State Controller to present the Provisional Government with
a project for a regulation of inspections, discussed by the State Duma, after
introducing into the aforesaid project the necessary corrections and amendments.
The session was closed at 23 hours.

138. T h e O rganization and P rocedures of th e P rovisional G overnm en t

[From the Zhurnaly as indicated.]
No. 9. March 7,1917
Resolved:
The assistant ministers may substitute for the ministers at the sessions of the
Council of Ministers in all cases except those when the Council of Ministers,
acting as the supreme state organ of authority, confirms acts of a legislative
nature.
No. 11. March 8,1917
Heard:
1. Oral proposals of the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government:
a) The following procedure to be established for introducing the issues to
be considered and decided by the Provisional Government: issues which are
subject to discussion should be introduced in writing, together with a draft of the
decision; the Journals should contain the substance of the matter and the respec
tive decision; the will of the Provisional Government is to be single and its
responsibility collective; therefore neither the opinion of the minority nor indi
vidual opinions are to be inserted in the Journal or remain in the file.
Resolved:
To establish the procedure for introducing issues to be considered and
decided by the Provisional Government, outlined by the Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government.
Heard:
b) The following procedure to be established during the meetings of the
Provisional Government. The closed meetings are to be attended by the Head
of Chancellery, his deputy, and one of the secretaries selected by the Head of
Chancellery. The other meetings of the Provisional Government are to be attended
by, in addition to the Head of Chancellery and his deputy, the secretaries selected
by the Head of Chancellery; and, in case of necessity, at the latter meetings the
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 165

representatives of departments can be present, a special list being compiled for

them. The Head of Chancellery is invited to attend the absolutely secret meetings
of the Provisional Government, while the other officials are invited in each case
by special instruction from the Minister-President.

12. Oral proposals of the Minister-President:

a) Regarding the advisability of forming at the earliest possible moment
the so-called Litde Council of Ministers.
Resolved:
To entrust the presidency of the Little Council of Ministers or Conference
of Assistant Ministers to one of the members of the Provisional Government,
or to a person to be specially designated. . . .
No. 12. March 9,1917

Resolved:
To consider that the replacement of the chiefs of the central administrations
by persons elected by the employees is inadmissible.
No. 13. March 9,1917
Resolved:
I. To apply the following procedure for publishing the enactments \raz-
poriazheniia] of the Provisional Government:
1) For matters requiring consideration of a legislative nature to publish
Laws [Postanovleniia] of the Provisional Government, signed by all its members.
2) On matters which, according to the existing laws, are to be decided by
an act of the Supreme Power, to publish ukases of the Provisional Government,
signed by its [Minister-] President.
3) For matters which are to be decided, in accordance with the existing laws,
by the authority of the individual ministers, to issue enactments of the ministers.
II. The present decision of the Provisional Government is not to be published
for general knowledge but should be taken as a directive and be communicated
to the parties concerned as an instruction.
No. 14. March 10,1917
Resolved:
Until a permanent government is established, the Council of Ministers is to
be titled the Provisional Government . . . [and the Chancellery and its officials
accordingly].
No. 15. March 11,1917
Heard:
3. The conclusions of the Juridical Council1 attached to the Provisional Gov
ernment on the questions of:
a) The form of a solemn oath of the Provisional Government.

1 See Doc. 139.

166 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Resolved:
To establish the form of the oath of allegiance in the following wording:
As a member of the Provisional Government, which has been created by the
will of the people at the initiative of the State Duma, I promise and swear before
Almighty God and my own conscience to serve faithfully and truthfully the people
of the Russian state, strictly safeguarding its liberty and rights, its honor and
dignity, and firmly respecting in all my actions and orders the principles of civil
liberty and civil equality, and suppressing by all the means at my disposal any
attempts to restore directly or indirectly the old order.
I swear to dedicate all my intelligence and all my forces to the realization
in full of all the obligations which the Provisional Government has accepted
before the whole world.
I swear to take all the necessary measures to convene the Constituent Assem
bly at the earliest possible date on the basis of universal suffrage, to transfer into
its hands the plenitude of power which I, together with the other members of
the Government, am temporarily exercising, and to obey the peoples will, which
will be expressed by this Assembly with regard to the form of government and
the fundamental laws of the Russian state.
God help me in the fulfillment of my oath.
No. 17. March 13,1917
Resolved:
To inform the ministers by a circular that all of the proposals introduced by
the ministries for the consideration of the Provisional Government which touch
subjects that are under the jurisdiction of other ministries should be directed to
the Provisional Government after preliminary consultation among these min
istries.
This rule should not, however, concern measures of an especially urgent
nature.
No. 21. March 16,1917
Heard:
7. [Matters] reported by the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Govern
ment:

b) The conclusion of the Juridical Council attached to the Provisional Gov

ernment with regard to the question presented for its consideration regarding the
further awarding of orders and regarding promotions into the next rank [chin].
Resolved:
In accordance with the conclusions of the Juridical Council attached to the
Provisional Government:
I. To discontinue awarding orders and other signs of distinction, excepting
orders and signs of distinction awarded for valor in action against the enemy.
II. To award orders and other signs of distinction awarded for valor in action
against the enemy following the previous procedure, except that the confirmation
of the award by the Emperor is replaced by the confirmation by the Provisional
Government.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 167

III. To discontinue promotions in rank [chin] in the civil departments.2

IV. The decisions mentioned in sections IIII to be communicated to the
chiefs of all the departments for their knowledge and direction, without rendering
them public for general knowledge.

No. 24. March 19,1917

Resolved:
To transmit for the examination of the Council which is formed of assistant
ministers [Little Council] under the chairmanship of the Assistant Minister of
Education, member of the State Council David Davidovich Grimm, issues which
bear no significance of principle and require an immediate solution. The con
clusions of the aforesaid Council are to be presented in the form of draft protocols
of the meetings of the Provisional Government and are to be sent in the form of
galley proofs to all the ministers; they are to be introduced for discussion by the
Provisional Government only in cases of dissent or at the demand of one of the
ministers. Accordingly, it is advisable that the ministers when directing matters
to the Provisional Government should indicate whether they are to be subject to
consideration by the [Little] Council or by the Provisional Government in its
full membership.

Heard:
2. Oral proposals of the Minister of Justice:

g) On sending member of the First State Duma Bukeikhanov for the purpose
of clarifying the question of organizing local authorities in the Turgaiskaia
region.
Resolved:
To appoint member of the First State Duma Bukeikhanov Commissar of the
Provisional Government in the Turgaiskaia oblast.

No. 33. March 28,1917

Heard:

7. Oral proposal of the Assistant Minister of the Interior D. M. Shchepkin

on the necessity of taking measures for the wide and swift dissemination over
all Russia of the enactments of the Provisional Government, its addresses to the
population, and all kinds of official information.

2 This decision was in fact an abolition of the chin system or Table of Ranks. Subsequently,
the Provisional Government never employed chin designations in the civil services, though it
did, of course, retain the military designation of captain, general, etc. See, however, the refer
ence to chin in the Declaration of the Provisional Government of July 8, 1917, in Volume EL
168 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Resolved:
To request: 1) the Minister of the Interior to ask all the guberniya commissars
what measures they are taking on the subject under discussion;3 2) the Minister
of Transport to start negotiations with student organizations for the purpose of
making use of their offer to inform the population; 3) the Minister of Education
to take care of finding a person who could be entrusted with the publication of a
special systematic collection of governmental laws, ukases, and enactments.

No. 63. April 26,1917

Heard:
11. The conclusions of the Juridical Council of the Provisional Government
regarding the procedure [to be adopted] for making public the enactments and
ukases of the Provisional Government.

Resolved:
To transmit to the Minister of Justice all the enactments of the Provisional
Government of a legislative nature, for the purpose of issuing the necessary
instructions for the publication of such enactments by the Ruling Senate in the
Sobranie TJzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii of the Government and later on for making
them public in the Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva.

No. 66. April 29,1917

Resolved:
2) In cases where it is necessary to implement with dispatch laws, ukases,
or enactments . . . [they] should state that they are to be put into effect by tele
graph, before being made public. . , .

No. 75. May 11,1917

Resolved:
To issue the following decree:
In amendment of article 1, section I, of the law of the Provisional Govern
ment dated March 9, 1917, regarding the form in which the enactments of the
Provisional Government should be presented (Zhurnal No. 13, Article 1), it has
been decided:
For matters requiring consideration of a legislative order, the laws of the
Provisional Government are to be issued over the signature of the Minister-
President and of the ministers concerned, with the exception of laws of special
importance, which are to be signed by all the members of the Provisional Govern
ment.
No. 85. May 21,1917
Resolved:
To consider the attendance of five members of the Provisional Government
sufficient for opening a meeting.

3 See various circulars to local authorities concerning this problem in Chapter 6.

 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 169

No. 91. May 27,1917

Resolved:
When complying with the request of delegations to be received by the Provi
sional Government, to take for a directive that the receptions be held not by the
whole membership of the Provisional Government but only by its individual
members, to be delegated in each instance for the purpose.

No. 102. June 8, 1917

Resolved:
To include in the enactments of the Provisional Government of an urgent
nature the reservation that they are to be implemented before their publication
by the Ruling Senate, as from the date each of them is printed in the Vestnik
Vremennago PraviteVstva.
No. 135. July 18,1917
Resolved:
I. To establish the permanent attendance at the sessions of the Provisional
Government of the Chairman or one of the members of the Juridical Council
of the Provisional Government.

No. 139. July 25,1917

Resolved:
To issue the following decree:
Amending and supplementing the respective laws, it is decreed:
1. All the statutes, rules, instructions, directions, regulations [nakazy], and
enactments issued by ministers or heads of independent departments are to be
valid only after they are made public through the Ruling Senate.
2. Compulsory directives concerning matters related to trade, industry, or
agriculture are to be issued, when a special procedure in this respect is not
established by law, by agreement among the minister concerned and the Ministries
of Trade and Industry, Food, Agriculture, and Labor, and in the instances when
the aforesaid compulsory directives touch areas under the jurisdiction of the
Ministries of Transport or Finance, by agreement with these ministries/

No. 147. August 4,1917

Heard:

b) To expedite action on questions raised by the ministries and bearing no

significance of principle, they may be decided upon by the Minister-President
and his deputy, together with the minister concerned, rather than in the plenary
sessions of the Provisional Government, while for issues connected with alloca
tion of funds from the State Treasury, the participation of the Minister of Finance
and of the State Controller is also [required].
Resolved:
To take under consideration.
170 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

No. 149. August 7, 1917

Resolved:
To recognize that the members of the Provisional Government, in case they
wish to visit a unit or an installation of the army or of the navy located behind the
lines or at the front, should inform the Minister of War or the Minister of the
Navy or the Acting Minister of War or the Acting Minister of the Navy, whomever
it concerns, beforehand of such intentions.

No. 157. August 1791917

Resolved:
To notify all the departments for their direction of the following explanation
concerning the procedure [to be followed] for introducing proposals to the
Provisional Government:
I. Only ministers or the heads of independent departments or their designated
substitutes have the right to introduce proposals to the Provisional Government.
II. All other governmental institutions, with the exception of those mentioned
in the preceding section (I), have the right to introduce directly to the Provi
sional Government proposals on subjects under their jurisdiction only in instances
when such a right is directly established by law or is stipulated in the statutes
concerning their establishment. On the other hand, the institutions for which
there are no respective stipulations should submit their proposals to the Pro
visional Government through the minister concerned.

139. T h e E st a b l ish m e n t o f t h e J uridical C ou n cil A ttached to t h e

P rovisional G o v ernm en t
[Sob. Uzak.91 ,1, No. 404.]

Law of the Provisional Government

The Juridical Council shall be established, attached to the Provisional Gov
ernment, on the following basis:
1. The Juridical Council shall consist of the Chairman and six Members,
appointed by the Provisional Government. In addition, the Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government shall be included in the membership of the Council
with the rights of a Member.
2. Questions of public law arising in connection with the establishment of
the new state order shall be submitted to the Juridical Council for examination.
In the same manner, the Council shall give preliminary judicial opinions on
measures of the Provisional Government which have the character of legislative
acts as well as on others on which the Provisional Government shall deem such
opinions necessary.
3. The conclusions of the Juridical Council shall be reported to the Provi
sional Government by the Chairman of the Council, or by a Member authorized
for this purpose by the Council.
4. The rules of procedure of the Juridical Council shall be determined by its
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 171

Chairman in agreement with the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Govern

ment.
Minister-President and other Ministers
March 22, 1917

140. T h e V isit of K erensky to M oscow

[The first item is from Zhurnaly, No. 6, March 5, 1917; the second and third from
VVP, No. 4, March 9, 1917, p. 3; and the fourth from Russkoe Slovo, No. 53, March 8,
1917, p. 3.]
A.
Heard:
6. The announcement of the Minister-President regarding the troubled mood
of the Moscow city population in connection with the current events.
Resolved:
To ask the Minister of Justice to go to Moscow to find out how matters stand
and to make contact with the population for the purpose of explaining to them the
real significance of the events which have taken place.
B.
March 7. In the morning Minister of Justice Kerensky came to Moscow; he
was greeted at the station by the representatives of public organizations. . . .
Then Kerensky, accompanied by two aides-de-camp, went by automobile to the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers Deputies. At 3:00 oclock Keren
sky arrived at the Judicial Building. Meantime the representatives of the bar,
of the magistracy, and of the Office of the Prosecutor had gathered in the Oval
Hall of the court. Kerensky was greeted by a speech from N. K. Muravev, who
welcomed the first Minister of Justice of Free Russia. Kerensky replied to this
greeting with the following speech:
Gentlemen, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors! Free Russia was born and at
the same time the principles of justice, legality, and freedom of judicial conscience
were born. The old regime has been overthrown forever and irrevocably. We
must start to organize [our] new life. I hope that those of the judges who served
the old regime will be able to clarify in their conscience whether they are in a
position to dedicate themselves to the service of justice, or whether they will find
within themselves enough strength to fulfill their civic duty and to withdraw. I
hope that the upheaval which has taken place in our country will not compel me
to resort to some extraordinary measures and thus to darken our common joy.
I hope that this will not be. You gentlemen, office employees, and messengers, I
give you my word that henceforth you will enjoy all the rights which should be
enjoyed by all the citizens of Russia. Organize yourselves on a comradely basis,
protect your own interests. Long live justice and right within Free Russia!
Then Kerensky went into the hall of the Council of the Bar where he was met
by the whole membership of the Council. To the speech of greeting by Dobrokho-
dov, Chairman of the Council, the Minister answered in the following words:
I greet in my comrade lawyers the only corporation which to the last moment
preserved faithfulness to honor and duty. As soon as I was appointed Minister
of Justice, I first of all went to the Petrograd Council of the Bar in order to stress
172 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

that above all I placed justice, that the new regime must be based on justice and
truth, and that justice had been respected only in this corporation. I would suggest
to you, comrade lawyers, to resolve the question of admitting into the corporation
women jurists, because the former practice with regard to women was deeply
unfair.
Then Kerensky said that he considers as his first task the care of the fate of the
liberated, political [prisoners]. From all ends of Russia large sums are flowing
for that purpose. The consortium of the Petrograd Bank had donated 500,000
rubles. V. N. Figner will be at the head of the organization for the assistance of
the fighters for freedom.
After Kerenskys speech, those attending the assembly addressed a whole
series of questions to him. Among them the question of the former Tsars fate
interested those present. Kerensky declared that the deposed Tsar was in the
hands of the Prosecutor-General. From the Judicial Building, Kerensky went
to the Conference of the Justices of the Peace. Replying to the greeting of Cheli-
shchev, Chairman of the Conference, Kerensky replied by making a low bow to
the Conference of the Justices of the Peace, to that court which, according to fair
ness and conscience, carried out the legacy of the judicial statutes. You always
acted according to your conscience and in absolute independence. One must hope
that the judges of the crown will follow your example. Chelishchev acquainted
Kerensky with the situation of the Court of Justices of the Peace in Moscow. After
this brief conversation the Minister of Justice went to the movie theater Ars where
at that moment a session of the Soviet of Officers and Soldiers Deputies was being
held. . . . Kerensky with great spirit addressed the assembly with a speech in
which he said:
Comrades, officers and soldiers. I, Kerensky, Minister of Justice, have come
here on behalf of the Provisional Government, which has been formed at the
initiative of the people and of the State Duma. We have achieved liberty. You
have proved that you are worthy sons of the great homeland and that we have
no reason to be afraid of the future. . . . We must now prove to our people and
to the army the force not of external discipline, nor that of external orders, but
the unanimity of our interests and our iron discipline of duty toward the father
land. We must all fulfill our duty to the end. The greatest training of will, the
greatest wisdom, colossal self-control, and restraint are necessary. Our ardent
desire has already been fulfilled. In Moscow the commanding personnel and the
soldiers have joined together. Complete unity has been reached. Long live the
great Russian army, which, in a historical moment, has managed to become the
savior of the homeland (Tumultuous applause)

. . . You asked me whether it is correct that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolae

vich has been appointed Supreme Commander. I can answer you: dont worry;
we will take all the necessary measures so that this shall not be: but if it were to
happen, I would not remain in the Council of Ministers.
Gruzinov, Commander of the Troops of the Moscow Military District, ap
peared in the audience. The audience met the Commander with an ovation.
Tomorrow I will transmit to the Provisional Government, said Kerensky,
your desire that Lieutenant Colonel Gruzinov remain your commander forever
and I will do everything in order that your desire may be immediately fulfilled.
Accompanied by Gruzinov and by shouts of Hurrah! Kerensky passed into
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 173

the English Club to the session of the Committee of Public Organizations. The
appearance of the Minister was greeted with enthusiasm. Kishkin, Commissar of
the Provisional Government, greeted the Minister.
I have just returned from Petrograd, said Kishkin, and I can testify that
without Kerensky we would not have what we possess. . . . Kishkin continued:
Yesterday, Prince Lvov showed me a paper and when I read it I said to myself,
Tt is accomplished. It was a telegram from General Alekseev in which, on behalf
of the deposed Tsar he asked Prince Lvov to authorize the Tsar to go to Tsarskoe
Selo, to take his family, and to leave for England. You see that the revolution
has triumphed.
Then Kerensky spoke: As soon as it was possible, the Provisional Govern
ment sent me to Moscow in order to confirm to you that we are absolutely resolved
to fulfill to the end the will of the people and to convene the Constituent Assembly.
At the present time all the old dynasty has placed itself at the disposal of the
Provisional Government. Under the present conditions and with the great blood
less upheaval, the further tasks of the people should remain [colored] in the same
shades.
All the actions of the old regime will be investigated by a supreme investiga
tive commission organized by me, which m il reveal to the country a complete
picture of the old regime. Even on such a borderland as the Caucasus no signs
whatsoever of danger for the new regime are to be foreseen. Some confusion
occurred in the immediate rear on the northern front, where, according to infor
mation of the staff of the Supreme Commander, a German blow is under prepara
tion: but we have taken measures and feel confident that everything will be
adjusted.
The Chief of Staff of the Navy told me yesterday that unity between officers
and sailors of the fleet has already been achieved. All kinds of misunderstandings
will be liquidated. The Minister of Agriculture told me yesterday that the food
question is losing its acuteness; matters are improving every day. Recently
finances were in a very difficult situation, but now any kind of financial assistance
will be readily given us from abroad. In the near future we expect to float a
national loan of Free Russia.
The organization of transport is in such excellent hands as those of Nekrasov
and this should suffice [for us] to look confidently ahead. . . . You would like
to learn of the activity of the Provisional Government. There I am the only
representative of democracy and must say that for the time being we act in unity.
. . . All of us have decided to forget our party [interests] and everyone of us
carries out according to his conscience what he considers necessary in order to
consolidate the country and the liberty which she has achieved. As for my per
sonal activity as Minister of Justice, I will not retreat from my principles, which
are based on faith in man. My basic principle is judgment by juries. The cases
of the former ministers also will be sent to this court. The order for the abolition
of the death penalty has already been worked out by me. Tomorrow I will sign
it. The Provisional Government agrees with it and in three days the whole
country will know of it.4 I am a partisan of complete equality of rights for women
and will defend it within the Government.
At 6:00 p . m ., Kerensky received the representatives of the Moscow press and

4 See Docs. 174,178.

174 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

the Minister said: . . We consider that our participation in the Government

is due to the [initiative] of the people and of the State Duma, and therefore we
will preserve the best relations with the representatives of the people. As for the
date of convening the Constituent Assembly, we have decided to convene it as early
as possible. . . . Everything depends on how soon we will manage to carry out
all the preliminary work. On the question of participation in the elections by the
citizens who are at the front, this requires the agreement of the Supreme Com
mander, who at the present moment is nonexistent. All the liberties will be granted
immediately.
The newspapermen were interested in the question of who appointed Grand
Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to the post of Supreme Commander. Kerensky ex
plained that the former Tsar before his abdication transmitted the Supreme Com
mand to Nikolai Nikolaevich, Thus the Provisional Government was faced with
an accomplished fact, but it considered that this situation was inadmissible and
was taking every measure to eliminate it.
Some newspapermen asked whether it was true that the deposed Tsar was at
Stavka. Kerensky replied that the Tsar actually was at Stavka but did not have
there any significance whatsoever. General Alekseev had asked that he be removed
from there as soon as possible because the army and the population were ex
tremely aroused against him. Concluding his conversation, Kerensky requested
that it be made public that very valuable documents regarding the agents of the
police department had fallen into his hands.

C.
Moscow, March 7. Todays session of the Municipal Duma was opened by the
speech of the Mayor, who described the revolutionary events of the past days
and pointed out the special role that had been played during the revolution in
Moscow by Lieutenant Colonel Gruzinov. At the first movement among the
troops, he had come to the Mayor and declared his decision to take upon himself
the organization of the troops in order to complete the victory over the old regime.
Chelnokov proposed that Grozinov be acclaimed. The Mayor, together with the
administration, was entrusted with working out the manner of immortalizing
the feat of Gruzinov, initiated by him during the days of the Moscow revolution.
Replying to the greetings, Gruzinov expressed his thanks and said: What I have
done I have done feeling the enthusiasm that has taken hold of me and of all of
you and of the whole Russian people. I merely was able to take in hand this
enthusiasm and this is my great luck. Then the Mayor proposed to greet the
Minister of Justice Kerensky. The deputies and the public staged an ovation for
him. Kerensky said:
Mr. Mayor. The Provisional Government, which by the will of the people
has been placed in power, has ordered me to come here and to bow low to Moscow
and in its person to the whole Russian people. The Government has authorized
me to declare that it will dedicate all its life to the fulfillment of the tasks that
face it and then will transmit its power to the one and only organ of the popular
will enjoying the plenitude of power, the Constituent Assembly. We request your
support and your assistance. It is especially agreeable for me to tell you this
because today precisely is the fiftieth anniversary of the Moscow municipality.
This period in the life and in the activity of the Moscow municipality will remain
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 175

forever unforgettable in history. Moscow was always at the head of the Russian
municipal self-government [movement].

. . . Then the Duma approved a resolution in which it expressed its greet

ings to the new regime and the hope that the present municipal organization,
based on limited suffrage, would be replaced by a new Duma created on the basis
of universal suffrage.
D.
Addressing himself to A. F. Kerensky, L. M. Khinchuk, President of the
[Moscow] Soviet of Workers5 Deputies, said:
Comrade Kerensky. We greet you as the Vice-President of the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers Deputies. The workers do not send their representatives into
the cabinet. But while you, Comrade Kerensky, are in the cabinet, we know that
there will be no betrayals. We believe in you.
The assembly again gave a tumultuous ovation to A. F. Kerensky.
Kerensky took the floor and gave a detailed explanation of his entry into the
cabinet:
If you believe in me, concluded Kerensky, do not undertake anything
without taking my advice. At any time telegraph to me when necessary and I will
come in order to tell you the whole truth. Remember that I am yours, wholly
yours. Here I am not a Minister but a comrade to you and to the peasants.
Queries came from the crowd of workers:
Why is Nicholas II allowed to travel in Russia? Who is the Supreme Com
mander?
I just wanted to tell you about it, comrades, answered A. F. Kerensky.
And briefly and clearly he declared:
Nikolai Nikolaevich will not be Supreme Commander. As for Nicholas II,
the former Tsar has himself asked the new Government for protection. Now
Nicholas II is in my hands, in the hands of the Prosecutor General! And I ll
tell you, comrades: the Russian revolution has passed bloodlessly, and I do not
wish, I will not allow it to be darkened. I will never be the Marat of the Russian
revolution. But in a very short time Nicholas II under my personal supervision
will be taken to a port and from there on a ship he will go to England.
Shouts of Hurrah! were heard and tumultuous applause.

141. T h e W ork of t h e P rovisional G o v ernm en t

[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 59, March 15, 1917.]
The slogan of harmonious unity around the Provisional Government is not a
mere phrase but the expression of the most pressing, of the primest necessity of
the moment. In the course of each struggle, the most responsible moment comes
the day after victory. It is bitter enough not to attain success in struggle. Still
more bitter is it, after having attained success, not to be able to retain it. The
victory over the old order has been achieved. Now it is necessary to strengthen
and secure it.
Whose affair is it? It is the affair of all of us together and each one of us
separately. Now we ourselves are the builders of our life, and if we do not sue-
176 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

ceed in building the edifice of our freedom for which such a beautiful foundation
has just been laid, then the responsibility before our native land will be placed
on ourselves, and there will be no one else to blame.
The first condition for the strengthening of the new order is the firm recogni
tion by everybody of the common fulcrum, without which the unity of efforts
directed toward the common goal cannot be attained. To guard liberty like the
apple of ones eye, to bring it unblemished to the convocation of the Constituent
Assemblythat is the common goal. Confidence in, trust and obedience to the
Provisional Governmentthat is the fulcrum for the attainment of this common
goal which everyone must unanimously recognize in order to avoid internal dis
sension in the camp of the friends of freedom.
The declaration of the Provisional Government is before the eyes of everyone.
From it we know how deeply the Provisional Government realizes the obligations
assumed by it. Not in a single line, not in a single detail does this program diverge
from the broadest interpretation of the essence of peoples rule [democracy].
But the broader the tasks set for itself by the Provisional Government, the more
complex is the work which is in store for it; and the more necessary for the
fulfillment of this work is an atmosphere of confidence and moral support. Of
course, we do not at all mean by that that the actions of the Provisional Govern
ment should not be subject to criticism. Free criticism is the best vitalizing ele
ment for any kind of work. . . .
But free criticism must be honest, it must rest on the conscientious appraisal
of real factors. Without observing this condition, criticism degenerates into
demagogy of bad taste, which betrays either light-mindedness or direct dishon
esty of those who engage in it. We have just encountered an example of such
demagogy in a certain sheet, which poses a question: The Provisional Govern
ment has been in existence ten days and what has it done? According to the
author of the sheet, the new government has done almost nothing during that
time . . .
During that time the old government has been deposed; the determination
of the fate of the crown and of the order of the coming establishment of the future
form of government has been taken; throughout all of Russia the transition from
the old order to the new has been achieved . . .
During those ten days there have been issued: the Act of Amnesty; the mani
festo affirming the constitution for the Grand Duchy of Finland; the act abolishing
the death penalty; an order of the Minister of the Interior removing the governors
and vice-governors from their posts and replacing them with chairmen of zemstvo
administrations as commissars of the Provisional Government, with the simul
taneous transformation of police into militia; an order of the Minister of Agri
culture directing the governors to give over to the chairmen of zemstvo adminis
trations their powers, credits, and affairs as delegates to the special conference
on food supplies; an order of the War Minister concerning the change in mutual
relations between the commanding staff and enlisted personnel, and concerning
the abolition of former limitations on enlisted personnel during their presence in
public places; and the abolition of the Chief Administration on Press Affairs.
Right here there are seven measures realized during the ten days of the existence
of the Provisional Government. Quantitative results are more than eloquent. As
for qualitative results, hardly any one would deny that all these measures concern
the most fundamental questions of our life, and some of them constitute whole
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 177

events, the coming of which had been passionately awaited by many generations.
But even this does not exhaust the constructive work of the Government during
these days. Already committees are at work on preparation of laws concerning
civil liberties and equal rights, on the reforms in the realm of military organiza
tion, and on a number of other questions.

THE FORMER TSAR AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

142. T h e E xecutive C o m m it t e e of t h e P etrograd S oviet

D emands the A rrest of t h e R omanovs
[Session of March 3, 1917. Protokoly, pp. 9-10.]

RESOLVED:

1) To inform the Workers5 Deputies that the Executive Committee of the

Soviet of Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies has resolved to arrest the Romanov
family and to propose to the Provisional Government that it carry out this arrest
conjointly with the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies. In the event of a refusal, to
inquire what the attitude of the Provisional Government would be, should the
Executive Committee itself carry out the arrest. To discuss the Provisional
Governments reply at the session of the Executive Committee.
2) With respect to Mikhailto carry out an actual arrest, but to announce
officially that he is subjected only to the surveillance of the revolutionary army.
3) With respect to Nikolai Nikolaevichin view of the danger of arresting
him in the Caucasus, to summon him preliminarily to Petrograd and order strict
surveillance over him during the journey.
4) The arrest of the women from the House of the Romanovs must be carried
out gradually, depending upon the role of each in the activities of the old regime.
To instruct the Military Commission of the Soviet of Workers Deputies to
work out the procedure and the organization of the arrests. Chkheidze and
Skobelev were instructed to inform the Government of the resolution adopted by
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers Deputies.

143. T elegram o f G eneral A le k se e v to P rince Lvov T ran sm ittin g

N ic h o l a s R equests to t h e P rovisional G ov ernm en t
[Fevralskaia Revoliutsiia 1917 goda, K A , XXII (1927), 54. Nicholas note in pencil
to Alekseev instructing him to demand these guarantees from the Provisional Govern
ment included a fourth point: <6To return to Russia, after the end of the war, for
permanent residence in the Crimea-Livadia. Ibid., pp. 53-54.]

The abdicated Emperor requests that I communicate with you in regard to

the following matters. First. To permit unobstructed passage for him and persons
accompanying him to Tsarskoe Selo in order to join his ailing family there.
Second. To guarantee the safe sojourn in Tsarskoe Selo of himself, his family,
and the same persons until the children recover their health. Third. To grant
178 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

and guarantee unobstructed passage to Romanov [Murmansk] on Murman for

himself, his family, and the same persons.
Informing Your Excellency of the request made of me, I urgently solicit
earliest possible decision of the Government on the aforesaid matters, which are
of particular importance to Stavka as well as to the abdicated Emperor himself.
G eneral a.d .c . A lek seev
No. 54. March 4, 1917.

144. T e le g r a m o f G e n e r a l A le k s e e v t o P r in c e L v o v a n d R o d z ia n k o
[Fevralskaia Revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 54.]
Pursuant to my telegram of March 4, No. 54, I urge you to expedite the
decision on the questions raised and to commission representatives of the Govern
ment to escort the trains of the abdicated Emperor to their points of destination.5
March 5. [No.] 55. A lek seev .

145. T e le g r a m o f P r in c e L vov t o G e n e r a l A le k s e e v in R e p ly t o
N ic h o l a s R e q u e s ts
[Fevralskaia Revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXII (1927), 55.]
(Notations on the telegram: Translation transmitted to General Williams on
March 7, 1917. Sent March 6,1917, at 12:00 p . m . to 1) His Majesty, 2) Admiral
Nilov, and the same was reported to the Caucasus.)
The decision of the Provisional Government on all three questions is positive;
it will take all measures at its disposal to assure unobstructed passage to Tsarskoe
Selo, the sojourn in Tsarskoe Selo, and passage to Romanov [Murmansk] on
Murman.
[N o.] 938. Minister-President, P rince Lvov.
March 6, 1917

146. M easures for t h e P rotectio n o f the I m p e r ia l F am ily

at T sarskoe S elo
[Zhurnaly, No. 5, March 5, 1917.]

Heard:
4. Communications of the Minister of Justice:

v) On the necessity of taking measures for the purpose of safeguarding the

Tsars family located in the Tsarskoe Selo Palace and of replacing the comman
dant of the aforesaid palace by a person appointed by the Provisional Govern
ment.

5 Alekseev was apparently concerned by the obvious difficulties attendant upon the deposed
Tsars presence at Stavka. The unpopularity of certain members of Nicholas retinue, specifi
cally Generals Frederiks and Vocikov, led Alekseev to request their departure, which took
place on March 5.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 179

Resolved:
To charge the Minister of War to replace immediately the Commandant of
the Tsarskoe Selo Palace and to send to Tsarskoe Selo a commissar in order to
ascertain the measures required for the protection of the Tsars family, and to
provide for care and medical assistance to the former heir to the throne [now]
sick.

147. D eclaration o f t h e M em bers o f t h e P etrograd S ov iet of

W orkers 5 and S oldiers D e p u t ie s , M arch 7, 1917
[Trebovanie naroda o zakluchenii Nikolaia Romanova v krepost, KA, LXXXI
(1937), 122-23. The Declaration had over a hundred signers.]
The undersigned members of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
bring to the attention of the Executive Committee the following:
1) Extreme indignation and concern prevail among the wide masses of
workers and soldiers who have won freedom for Russia, because of the fact that
the deposed Nicholas II, the blood-stained; his wife, exposed traitor of Russia;
his son Aleksei; his mother, Mariia Feodorovna; as well as other members of the
House of Romanov continue to enjoy up to this time complete freedom. They
ride about Russia and even [appear] in the theater of military actions. This is
quite intolerable and extremely dangerous for the restoration of normal order
and peace in the country and in the army, as well as for the successful course
of defense of Russia against the external enemy.
2) We propose to the Executive Committee to demand immediately that the
Provisional Government take the most vigorous steps to concentrate without
any delay all members of the House of Romanov in one definite place under trust
worthy guard of the Peoples Revolutionary Army.
3) We demand that this declaration be publicized immediately and that it
be voted upon at the present Congress of the Soviet of Soldiers and Workers
Deputies.

148. T h e D ecision of t h e E xecutive C o m m it t e e o f t h e P etrograd

S oviet to A rrest t h e I m pe r ia l F am ily
[Session of March 8, Protokoly, p. 28.]
21, ON T H E ARREST OF N ICHO LAS II AND H IS F A M IL Y .
It was decided to arrest the whole family, confiscate their property immedi
ately, and deprive them of civil rights. To send an envoy with the delegation
which will make the arrest.

149. R epo r t to t h e T em porary C o m m it t e e o f t h e S ta te D u m a by

t h e M em bers o f t h e D uma D elegated to E scort N ic h o l a s II
F rom M ogilev to T sarskoe S elo
[A. G. Shliapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, II, 214-15. The members of the Allied Military-
Mission at Stavka requested permission to accompany the former Tsar to Tsarskoe
Selo, but General Alekseev refused to grant it. Romanovy i soiuzniki v pervye dni
revoliutsii, KA, XVI (1926), 48-51.]
By order of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, the following
members of the State Duma were assigned to accompany the abdicated Emperor
180 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Nicholas II from Mogilev to Tsarskoe Selo: A. A. Bublikov, S. F. Gribunin,

V. M. Vershinin, and S. A. Kalinin.

At 3:00 oclock sharp [March 8] the train with the commissars of the State
Duma arrived at the station in Mogilev. Here the delegates were met by the
highest personnel of the railway, headed by Acting Minister of Transport at the
front, General Kisliakov. There was also a large crowd of people at the station.
Following the brief speeches of greeting by deputies Bublikov and Gribunin, the
commissars, accompanied by shouts of Hurrah, departed in an automobile
for the headquarters of the Chief of Staff, where they had a twenty-minute chat
with General Alekseev. A. A. Bublikov submitted to General Alekseev the in
struction from the Provisional Government on the detention of the former
Emperor. General Alekseev told the commissars that the Imperial train was
ready to depart and awaited the commissars5 instructions. The commissars de
manded that a complete list of persons accompanying Nicholas II be submitted
to them. The list contained the names of 47 persons of the retinue, including the
servants. Included in the list was Flag Captain Admiral Nilov, to whom it was
suggested that he leave the train. He complied.
Following the commissars of the State Duma, General Alekseev, in charge of
Stavka, Chief of Staff, arrived in the station.
The abdicated Emperor was at this time in the adjoining train of the Dowager
Empress Mariia Feodorovna. General Alekseev transmitted to the abdicated
Emperor the decision of the Provisional Government.
In compliance with General Alekseevs order, ten men from the guardsmen
railway battalion under the command of a noncommissioned officer were placed
at the disposal of the commissars. After everything was ready, the abdicated
Emperor left the car of the Empress Mother and boarded the Imperial train.
The people on the platform preserved complete silence. The Empress Mother
stood at the window of her car and observed everything that was taking place.
The train was assembled with the usual stock and consisted of 10 cars. The com
missars car was attached at the rear of the train. Taking their places in the car
reserved for the retinue were Major General Prince Dolgorukov, Major General
Naryshkin, aide-de-camp Colonel Duke of Leichtenberg, aide-de-camp Colonel
Mordvinov, and the Emperors surgeon, Professor Fedorov.
At 4:50 in the afternoon the train left Mogilev. As the train pulled out, there
were neither greetings nor hostile outcries.
All instructions about stops and changes in the route were to proceed from
the commissars. Also, all telegrams which were received en route were handed
over to them. The first stop was in Orsha, at 9:00 oclock in the evening. The
train made a short stop in Vitebsk.
The commissars took turns in attendance all day.

The train arrived in the Tsarskoe Selo station at 11:30 in the morning,
March 9. On the platform awaiting the arrival of the train were the Commander
of the Tsarskoe Selo Garrison, the Commandant of the Station, and other ad
ministrative personnel.
Upon leaving their car the commissars asked the administrative persons who
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 181

met the tram whether they had instructions on takingc charge & of the abdicated
Lmperor.
The Commander of the Tsarskoe Selo Garrison and other administrative
persons stated that they had received all instructions from the Provisional Gov
ernment through the Commander of the Troops of the Petrograd Military District.
In view of this the commissars considered their mission completed and departed
for Petrograd, using the branch line.
Commissars of the Provisional Committee: members of the State Duma,
A. A. B ublikov , A. V e r sh in in , S. G rib u n in , and S. K a lin in
March 9, 1917

150. M in u tes of t h e P etrograd S oviet E xecutive C o m m it t e e S ession

o f M arch 9 C oncerning t h e D ispo sitio n o f t h e I m p e r ia l F a m il y
[.Protokoly, pp. 29-33.]
1 . ON T H E ARREST OF N ICHO LAS ROM ANOV.

In view of the information that the Provisional Government has decided to

permit Nicholas Romanov to depart for England, and that he is at present on his
way to Petrograd, the Executive Committee has decided to adopt extraordinary
measures, immediately, for his detention and arrest. An order has been issued
for occupying all the railway stations by our troops, and commissars [vested]
with extraordinary powers have been dispatched to the stations of Tsarskoe Selo,
Tosno, and Zvanka. In addition, it was decided to send radiotelegrams to all
towns with instructions to arrest Nicholas Romanov and, in general, to adopt a
series of extraordinary measures. At the same time, it was decided to inform the
Provisional Government at once of the unswerving determination of the Execu
tive Committee not to permit the departure of Nicholas Romanov for England,
and to arrest him. The Trubetskoi Bastion of the Peter and Paul Fortress was
decided upon as the place of confinement for Nicholas Romanov, and its com
manding personnel was changed for this purpose. It was decided to carry out
the arrest of Nicholas Romanov at all costs, even if severance of relations with
the Provisional Government is threatened.

3. c h k h e id z e ?s r epo rt on the visit of the delegation from the Executive

Committee to the Provisional Government.
Comrade Chkheidze reports that Nicholas II has already arrived at Tsarskoe
Selo. Under the pressure of the Executive Committee, the Provisional Govern
ment rejected the idea of permitting Nicholas Romanov to leave for England
without the special consent of the Executive Committee. He has been left tem
porarily in Tsarskoe Selo. The Provisional Government and the Minister of
Justice, Kerensky, guaranteed that [Nicholas Romanov] would not go anywhere.
The Provisional Government has agreed [to let] the Executive Committee ap
point its own commissar to Tsarskoe Selo for surveillance of Nicholas II . . .
In the future, the question of Nicholas Romanov will be resolved in agreement
with the Executive Committee.
After hearing this report, the Executive Committee resolved to remove the
guards from the railroad stations, with the exception of the Tsarskoe Selo Rail-
182 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

road Station; to send commissars to Tsarskoe Selo and to the Tosno Station; to
hold a final discussion and decide the question of Nicholas II tomorrow. . . .

13. T H E REPORT OF T H E REPRESENTATIVE COM M ISSIONED TO TSARSKOE SELO.

[The task of] guarding the palace is in the hands of the revolutionary forces.
An order has been issued that no one is to be let in or out of the palace. All the
telegraph and telephone [wires] have been disconnected. Nicholas Romanov is
under vigilant surveillance. Around three hundred soldiers are there from the
3rd Rifle Regiment. The officer from the Mikhailovskii Riding School refused
to release armored cars, because he considered that the signature of the Execu
tive Committee without the countersignature of Karaulov was insufficient.
Naryshkin, Benckendorf, and Dolgorukov are in the status of the arrested in
the palace. All letters and telegrams are delivered to the guardhouse. The repre
sentative went into the inner chambers; he personally saw Nicholas Romanov.
The regiment asked to relay [the message] that it would guard [the palace]
continuously in order to prevent him from leaving. The officers guarding the
palace consider it completely acceptable for the Committee to send its repre
sentatives for supervising the guard over [Nicholas Romanov]. They refused to
surrender Nicholas because they considered it their duty to obey the order of
General Kornilov, who ordered that he not be surrendered. Having been assured
of the reliability of the guard, the representatives found it possible to leave
Nicholas in his former position. The Riflemen insisted on the withdrawal from
Tsarskoe Selo of the highly unreliable composite detachment.
In connection with the report of the representative of the most active officers,
it was reported that, according to one physician, there is agitation against the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers5 Deputies in the 1st Reserve Regiment in Tsar
skoe Selo. The forces are in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The officers are
particularly persistent in this regard.
After discussing all these reports, the Executive Committee resolved to com
mission S. D. Maslovskii in the capacity of a commissar of the Executive Com
mittee for inspecting the custody and organizing the whole matter.6

151. The A ttem pt to S end the I m p e r ia l F a m il y to E ngland

fo r A sylum
[Sir George Buchanan in his My Mission to Russia pp. 104-5, wrote that upon the
request of Miliukov he telegraphed to the British Foreign Office for authorization to
offer the Imperial family asylum in England and on March 10 received an affirmative
reply, but that because of the opposition of the Soviet and the weakness of the Pro
visional Government the plan was not carried out. Kerensky and others have denied
this, asserting that the British Government itself had a change of heart after the initial
offer. For a discussion of this issue see Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian
Revolution, pp. 34-37, which also cites the principal sources.
The first item is from Sir Georges memoirs, p. 106, the second and third are from
those of his daughter Meriel Buchanan, The Dissolution of an Empire, pp. 192,195-97.]

6 In the session of March 10, Chkheidze announced Maslovskiis refusal to assume the
duties of commissar.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 183

A.
. . . I would point out that I did not call in question the good faith of the
Provisional Government, nor suggest that they intentionally placed impediments
in the way of the Emperors departure. On the contrary, I made it clear that it
was they who took the initiative in the matter by asking us to offer the Emperor
and his family an asylum in England. We, on our part, at once complied with
their request, and at the same time pressed them to make the necessary arrange
ments for the journey to Port Romanoff [Murmansk]. More than this we could
not do. Our offer remained open and was never withdrawn. If advantage was
not taken of it, it was because the Provisional Government failed to overcome
the opposition of the Soviet. They were not, as I asserted and as I repeat, masters
in their own house.

B.
Those who knew him [Sir George Buchanan] and were with him through
those dark and anxious days know the integrity with which he faced the situation,
and know, too, how easy it would have been for him to justify himself, and how
it was only loyalty to what he considered was his duty, which kept him silent.
Later on, when he had retired from the Diplomatic Service, he had, I know, the
intention of including in his book the truth about the attempt that was made to
get the Imperial family out of Russia, but he was told at the Foreign Office, where
he had gone to examine some of the documents, that if he did so, he would not
only he charged with an infringement of the Official Secrets Act, but would have
his pension stopped, and as he was a poor man, and had also suffered the loss of
the greater part of his personal estate and possessions owing to the Revolution,
he decided to hold his hand. The account he gives of the promise of the British
Government to receive the Emperor in England, and the way in which, afraid of
a few extremist Members of the House, they were persuaded to take no further
action, is therefore a deliberate attempt to suppress the true facts, and thus save
those who were responsible from criticism and contempt.

C.
And then, just as hope seemed in sight, a telegram arrived from England I
It was the 10th April [N.S.], and the memory of that day has remained vividly
in my mind. There had been a certain amount of desultory shooting during the
night, but my father had gone as usual to the Foreign Office, and when he had
not come up for luncheon at one oclock my mother, who never knew a moments
peace of mind when he was out of the house, grew anxious, and rang for William
to ask if anything had happened.
His Excellency came in a few moments ago, William replied. He went
straight into the Chancery, as he was told that there was an urgent telegram from
England.
. . . There were, after all, telegrams from England every day, and there was
no reason why this one should be of any special importance, and yet those
moments of waiting stand out in my mind with a peculiar and unforgettable
distinctness.
Then at last the big white doors were flung open and my father came into the
184 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

room, and seeing his face, my mother gave a little exclamation of dismay. Are
you ill? she exclaimed. Has anything happened?
He had sunk down in the chair in front of his desk, and put both hands to his
forehead, in a gesture that was habitual to him when he was worried and anxious.
I have had news from England, he said, and his voice sounded flat and lifeless.
They refuse to let the Emperor come over!

They say, my father continued, that it is wiser to discourage the idea of

the Imperial family coming to England. The Government are nervous of any
interior unrest leading to strikes in the shipyards, the coal-mines or munition
factories. There has been a certain amount of revolutionary talk in Hyde Park,
the Labour Party declare that they will make the workmen down tools if the
Emperor is allowed to land. They have told me to tell the Provisional Govern
ment to cancel all arrangements. . . . They are afraid, that is the truth of it;
they are afraid!
That day I remember Mr. Lloyd Georges name was not mentioned, and it
was only much later that my father told me that the whole plan of the Emperors
journey to England had been wrecked because Mr. Lloyd George had warned
the King that the feeling in the country was violently against the Russian Imperial
family, that the Labour members had sworn to create trouble if they were re
ceived, and that it would be very unwise to risk offending them at that critical
juncture of the war. He had at the same time managed to convince the King that
the danger to the Imperial family was grossly exaggerated, and had created the
impression that the British Embassy in Petrograd was inclined to listen to scare
mongers and be unduly influenced by the old Court faction who still believed in
the possibility of a counter-revolution.

152. R e s o l u t io n s A d o p t e d a t t h e C o n g r e s s of D elegates fro m

t h e F r o n t , A p r il 12, 1917

[Trebovanie naroda o zakluchenii Nikolaia Romanova v krepost, KA, LXXXI

(1937), 123.]
In view of the incongruity of the conditions under which the former Tsar
and former Tsarinas [including the Dowager Empress Mariia] are living and
the weight of their guilt before the people, and in view of the obvious danger of
their further remaining under such conditions, which afford them an oppor
tunity for contact with sympathizing circles, the Congress of the Delegates from
the Front resolved on March 12:
To present the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies with an unequivocal demand to transfer the former Tsar and both former
Tsarinas to the Peter and Paul Fortress.
P r e s id e n t
S ecretary

153. How N ic h o l a s R o m a n o v a n d H is F a m i l y A r e B e in g M a in t a in e d
in T s a r s k o e S e l o
[Izvestiia, No. 72, May 21, 1917, p. 4.]
The following declaration was received by the Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies:
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 185

At a meeting of May 16, a Conference of Delegates from the Front adopted

a resolution demanding that the forthcoming All-Russian Congress of the Soviets
of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies confine the former Tsar Nicholas Romanov
in the Peter and Paul Fortress.55
In view of the fact that this resolution was adopted on the basis of a report
by I. Belianskii, who called himself a representative of the 4th Rifle Regiment
of the Tsarskoe Selo Garrison,55 we, without even touching on the question of
the expediency or timeliness of transferring the former Tsar from Tsarskoe Selo,
consider it our duty to declare staunchly that all the facts, reported by I. Belianskii
in support of his contention that surveillance over Nicholas Romanov has weak
ened, are a product of the idle fantasy of an irresponsible soldier, if not a vicious
fabrication on his part.
I. Belianskii5s assertion that the whole Tsarist family walks at liberty in the
park of the Tsarskoe Selo Palace55 is untrue, because not only the children of the
former Tsar but all the servants attending the palace are only permitted to walk
in a special area that has been set apart in the park directly adjoining the palace,
which is guarded by three sentry lines.
It is not true that, according to present rules, the period for walking allotted
to the former Tsar is limited to two hours per day: according to instructions from
the former Commanding General Kornilov, as confirmed by Minister Kerensky,
the former Tsar has the right to walk at any time during the day, from 8 :00 a . m .
to 8 :00 p . m . ; in practice, however, he is allowed to go for a walk from 11:00 A.M.
to noon and from 2:00 p . m . to 5:00 p .m .
It is not true that the former Tsar has once again accumulated a whole
cellarful of wine.55 Only on April 30, the regimental committee of the Tsarskoe
Selo Garrison ordered the pouring out of 30 buckets of wine and champagne
into the ditch.55 Not to mention the fact that no regimental committee of the
Tsarskoe Selo Garrison55 exists at all, everything that is stated here represents a
complete perversion of the truth. It was not on the 30th but on the 7th of April,
and not by order of some committee or other but at the personal initiative of the
Commandant of the Palace, in the presence of the Commander of the Garrison,
the Commander of the Guard, the officer on duty, Generals Count Benckendorf
and Prince Dolgorukov, and many riflemen on regular guard duty from the
reserve battalion of the 4th Rifle Regiment of the Guards, that the entire personal
stock of vodka (27 cases) was destroyed, after which no more vodka was brought
into the palace cellar.
It is completely untrue that the command and the officers who are on guard
duty drink with the Tsar.55 It is not the first time that this stupid slander has
been repeated, and it has more than once been irrevocably refuted by a special
investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor Comrade Davidov, who was
given a commission for this purpose by the former Minister of Justice A. F.
Kerensky.
An equally preposterous fabrication was I. Belianskiis assertion that there
are six disguised Pharaohs55 [a derisive nickname for policemen] in the
palace.
The only thing that could, perhaps, be called the truth in the entire report of
I. Belianskii was that a sailor drives Aleksandra Feodorovna in an open car
riage,55 but even this truth requires a correction: she is being pushed in a wheel
chair and not driven in an open carriage, and it is not only for walks in the garden
18 6 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

but even in the corridors of the palace, [and] . . . to church services. This is
called for by her heart ailment and an affliction of the legs.

. . . We consider it necessary to testify that by their composition, solidarity,

and consciousness of duty, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Rifle Battalions of the Guards
who are entrusted with guarding the former Tsar in Tsarskoe Selo represent the
best guarantee that the proper high standard of surveillance over the arrested
Nicholas Romanov and his wife is being maintained and will continue to be
maintained in the future.
We request that the Executive Committee be informed of the present statement.
Commandant of the Aleksandrovskii Palace,
P. K o r o v ic h e n k o
Commander of the Tsarskoe Selo Garrison,
C o l o n e l K o b y l in s k ii
May 19, 1917, Tsarskoe Selo

154. Ca l l s fo r R eveng e

[Izvestiia, No. 77, May 28,1917, p. 3.]

The workers section of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies adopted
a resolution on transferring the former Tsar Nicholas Romanov to Kronstadt.
It is true that this decision was adopted after two factions had declared that they
would not participate in the voting in view of the fact that the meeting had assumed
a character that was obviously not serious. Nonetheless, news of this decision
spread all across Russia. Here and there it met with response. The ships com
panies of three vessels of the Baltic Fleet adopted similar resolutions.

We would like to note that all these resolutions are permeated by one and the
same mooda dissatisfaction with the extremely mild treatment on the part of
the victorious revolution of the person who was the bitterest enemy of the people.

But the revolution would have disgraced itself if it had followed in the foot
steps of tsarism in the matter of punishing its enemies. The cruelty of tsarism
was an expression not of its strength but of its cowardice. The magnanimity of
the victorious people stems from the fact that they do not fear their enemies, whom
they have beaten to the ground; they despise them too deeply to stoop to their level.
The revolution has deprived of freedom only those of its enemies who have
discredited themselves by obvious crimes. They will be tried by the people at a
free and public trial.
But a trial is not a revenge.
The revolution has no intention of making martyrs out of its enemies. And
least of all do its plans include making a martyr out of the former Tsar Nicholas
Romanov.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 187

155. T h e I m p e r ia l F a m il y at T sar sk o e S elo

[Elizabeth Narishkin-Kurakin, Under Three Tsars, pp. 218-28. The author -was Lady
in Waiting to the Empress.]
March 1: . . . No news of the Emperor; we dont know where he is. Some
one has broken into the Empresss apartment at night. The guard has deserted
her; the Imperial children are ill, the little fellows temperature is 104. I know
I ought to go to Tsarskoye Selo, but it is impossible to get there. There are no
horses, no autos. . . .

March 6: . . . Benkendorff telephoned me today that my apartment in the

Alexander Palace [at Tsarskoe Selo] was ready. I shall move there tomorrow.
. . . Have seen the Empress. She is very gentle, very calm, and shows amazing
magnanimity. She says that God is stronger than man. And she said it seemed
that everything was beginning to smooth out, again! She doesnt even know that
all that has happened has largely been her fault. . . .
March 8: Have been at Church to hear Mass. The deacon has been arrested.
When he began to pray for the Tsar, the congregation started to hiss. Unspeak
ably sad! Have seen a few people crying from sympathy. Returned and am told
by Benkendorff that we are arrested. We may not go out, or telephone; we may
only write by way of the Central Committee. The Empress asked to have prayers
said for the Emperors trip. Refused!

March 20: . . . I believe that she [Anna Vyrubova] has brought about every
thing systematically, and that her power over the Tsar was as great as that over
the Empress. The whole situation is subtly permeated with occultism, mysticism
and satanic suggestions! A compromise with the Vyrubova is impossible. We
all ignore her completely, but Their Majesties spend every evening with her, and
only come to us occasionally to chat about some indifferent matters. . . .
March 21: I am just looking out of the window and watch the Emperor as
he takes his walk. He is in front, behind him Vanya, then the officer on duty.
I feel a bitter ache. How far has he sunk who once owned the riches of the earth
and a devoted people! How splendid his reign could have been, if he had only
understood the needs of the era! Great news! Kerenski, the new Minister of
Justice, and the new Commandant have just arrived with a large retinue, to inspect
us and to take the Vyrubova away with them. The Empress is in despair.
March 24: I have been with the Empress. We spoke of the imminent de
parture [of Anna Vyrubova, who was to be arrested and taken to Petrograd]
and about the choice of persons to accompany Anna. She is angry with the young
Grand Duchesses, because they did not go to see her while she had the measles.
I said: It is because they know that she has done evil things to you. She grew
angry and cried: Anna has devoted her whole life to me; it is wicked of you to
say such things about her. I can never forgive you.

March 29: I am afraid that the diatribes of the Empress may reach the ears
of the Government, which after all is trying its best to help the Tsars family.
188 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

I wish they understood what I realized a long time agothat the Empress is a
pathological case! This is her only excuse, and may become her only salvation.

April 16: Kerenski is said to be coming here in order to cross-examine the

Empress. I have been called in as witness to the conversation. I found her excited
and in an irritated, nervous mood. She was prepared to say a number of silly
things to him, but I succeeded in calming her, by telling her: For the love of
God, Your Majesty, dont say a word of all this. Remember that you are in his
power and that you are risking the lives of your husband and children. Kerenski
is trying his utmost to save you from the Anarchist Party. By interceding for you
he is risking his own popularity. He is your only prop. Please try to understand
the situation as it is. You are facing the greatest dangerdont spoil everything
by a mistake.
At this moment, Kerenski entered, followed by the Commandant. He begged
me to withdraw and remained alone with the Empress. I stepped into the small
salon with the Commandant, and here we found Benkendorff and Vanya. A few
minutes later the Emperor, returning from a walk, joined us there too. I stepped
into a bedroom with him, and told him what was going on. Then we joined the
Empress while Kerenski withdrew into the Tsars study.
The Empress has been pleasantly impressed by Kerenskishe finds him sym
pathetic and honest. . . . One could arrive at an understanding with him, she
thinks. I am hoping that he has received as favorable an impression of her.
Kerenski was compelled to come again late at night, as a Revolutionary depu
tation from the Front had arrived in Tsarskoye Selo in order to see for themselves
that the captives were secluded securely enough and to demand their transfer to
the fortress. Kerenski was compelled to send for the Commandant in the middle
of the night. It was a dangerous moment, but the forenoons conversation had
evidently left Kerenski with a good impression and everything remains as it has
been. But Kerenski comes out victorious with only the greatest difficulty. As long
as he is with us, we are more or less safe, but there will be no trip for us.
April 17: The little Tsaryevich said to me the other day: Papa has examined
us. He was very much dissatisfied and said, Is that all you have learned? The
daughters have volunteered to teach him and the parents are following their
example. The Emperor has chosen History and Geography, the Empress Religion
and German for their subjects. Isa is teaching English, Nastenka, History of Art
and Music. All this is very good, for it keeps them busy and throws a ray of
culture into this democratic home. This has impressed even one of the sub
alterns who takes turns in guarding the Emperor. He thinks that the Imperial
Family has only lost its pedestal, and that the Emperor is gradually getting used
to his present mode of life if he only is allowed the privilege of his habits, his
walk, his five oclock tea and the other meals!

May 8: . . . The Emperor who had been breaking ice and shoveling snow
during the winter is cultivating a small vegetable garden on the front lawn of
the palace, in order to do some physical work. All his co-captives share zealously
in this labor, at which they spend the three hours allotted to them daily for their
walkfrom two to five in the afternoon. The Emperor enjoys this physical
exertion.
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 189

156. T h e D e c is io n o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t to S end the

I m p e r ia l F a m il y to T o b o l s k
[Buchanan to Balfour, Inostrannye diplomaty o revoliutsii 1917 g., KA, XXIV
(1927), 152.]
Petrograd, July 12 (25), 1917
p r iv a t e .

The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me today that Kerensky, who saw the
Emperor yesterday, has made arrangements with him regarding his departure
to Tobolsk on Tuesday. His Majesty would have preferred to go to the Crimea,
but, apparently, was pleased by the proposal to change his residence. I expressed
the hope that in Siberia the freedom of the Emperor would not be as restricted
as in Tsarskoe Selo and that he would enjoy freedom of movement. In spite of
the many errors he has committed, and in spite of the weakness of his character,
he is not a criminal and should be treated with the greatest possible considera
tion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that Kerensky, fully sharing this
opinion, was ready to meet His Majestys wishes. He authorized him to choose
the persons who would accompany him. As for his freedom of movement, it
would depend exclusively on the [state of] public opinion in Tobolsk. In Tsar
skoe Selo it was very dangerous for him. The real cause of the Emperors transfer
was the apprehension of counterrevolution, which increased among the socialists.
I told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in my estimation, as far as the dynasty
was concerned, such apprehensions were groundless. It was true that there existed
a movement in favor of order and of a strong authority, but . . . this was quite
another matter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs fully agreed with this.

157. T h e D eparture of th e I m perlal F a m il y fo r T o b o l sk

[Alexander F . Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 274?
76.]
The departure of the Czar and his family for Tobolsk took place on the night
of August fourteenth [N.S.]. All the arrangements were completed to my satis
faction and, at about eleven oclock in the evening, after a meeting of the Pro
visional Government, I went to Tsarskoye Selo to supervise the departure. I first
made the round of the barracks and inspected the guards, chosen by the regiments
themselves, to accompany the train and guard the Czar on his arrival at his
destination. They were all ready and seemed cheerful and contented. There had
been vague rumors in the town concerning the departure, and from early evening
curious onlookers had begun to collect around the palace park. In the palace
the final preparations were under way. Luggage was being brought out and stored
in motor cars, etc. We were all rather on edge. Before their separation I per
mitted the Czar to see his brother, Michael Alexandrovitch. Naturally, I had to
be present at this interview, much as I disliked the intrusion. The brothers met
in the Emperors study at about midnight. Both seemed much agitated. All their
experiences of the last months came back to them. For a long time they were
silent, and then they began the casual, fragmentary conversation characteristic
of such hurried interviews: How is Alice? And how is mother? asked the
Grand Duke, etc. They stood facing each other, fidgeting all the while, and some
times one would take hold of the others hand or the buttons of his uniform.
May I see the children? Michael Alexandrovitch asked me.
190 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

No,55 I answered. I cannot prolong the interview.55

Very well,55 the Grand Duke said to his brother. Kiss them for me.55
They began to take leave of each other. Who could have thought that this
was the last time they would ever meet!
This unusual and exciting night seemed to fill the Czars young son with
mischief. As I sat in the room near the Emperors study, giving the final orders
and awaiting news of the arrival of the train, I could hear the youngster running
about noisily, trying to get across the corridor to where I was, to see what was
going on there.
The time was passing and still the train from the Nikolayevsky Railway did
not arrive. The employees had hesitated about making up the train and delayed
carrying out orders until confirmed by some reliable authority. It was daylight
by the time the train arrived. We motored over to where it was waiting, just
outside the Alexandrovsky station. We had previously arranged the order of
seating in the cars, but everything was muddled at the last moment.
For the first time I saw the former Empress simply as a mother, anxious and
weeping. The son and daughters did not seem to mind the departure so much,
though they too were excited and nervous at the last moment. Finally, after the
last farewells had been said, the motor cars moved, with Cossacks in front and
behind. The sun was already shining brightly when the convoy left the park, but
fortunately the town was still asleep. When we reached the train we checked the
list of those who were going. Another farewell and the train was off. They were
leaving forever, but no one foresaw the terrible end that was awaiting them.

i
 CHAPTER 5

Justice and Law Enforcement

INITIAL ACTS

158. I n the M inistry of Justice

[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
It was disclosed at the Conference of Commissars of the State Duma and the
officials of the Ministry [of Justice] that the Petrograd court establishments will
resume their activities in two days. The Department of Prisons will not function
for a considerable length of time in view of its complete disorganization. The
Land Surveying Department will be abolished. Members of the Ministry were
requested to do away with bureaucratic red tape.

159. O n the E ve of A mnesty

[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 5, March 2, 1917, p. 1.]
A ukase on amnesty is being drafted by the Commissariat of Justice. I. V.
Godnev, the Commissar of the Senate and member of the State Duma, is adopting
measures [to provide] for the publication by the Senate of all the orders of the
new government.

160. T h e F irst O rders of t h e N ew M inister of J ustice

[wIzvestiia*9Revoliutsicnnoi Nedeli, No. 7, March 3,1917, p. 1. The released prisoners
in item I were the Bolshevik members of the Fourth Duma, arrested and banished to
Siberia for treason in November 1914 because of their opposition to the war.]
I
,
To the Governor General Irkutsk
,
To the Yenisei Governor Krasnoiarsk
March 2, 1917
I hereby confirm the instructions of Deputy Minister Chebyshev [of the Tsar
ist Government, who acted on the instructions of Duma members M. S. Adzhemov
and V. A. Maklakov] on the immediate and complete release of members of the
State Duma, Petrovskii, Muranov, Badaev, Shakhov, and Samoilov, and I assign
to you the duty, under your personal responsibility, of ensuring their honorable
return to Petrograd.
C itize n A. K e r e n sk y
Member of the State Duma, Minister of Justice
192 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

II
To the Councils of the Bar99
Conscious of the full importance and responsibility [of this decision], in the
name of the salvation of our native land, I accepted the post of Minister of Justice
in the Provisional Government. Welcoming the Councils of the Bar, who have
always stood on guard over the rights and liberties of the people, I ask them to
take the most active part in establishing true justice in our native land and in
raising it to heights that correspond to the greatness of the people and the im
portance of the historical moment.
C it iz e n A . K e r e n s k y
Minister of Justice, Member of the State Duma

161. T h e E s t a b l is h m e n t o f T e m p o r a r y C o u r t s in P e tr o g r a d
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 354. Detailed instructions were issued March 22, 1917, VVP9
No. 19, March 29, 1917, pp. 1-2. See also the section on Temporary Local Courts
below.]
ORDER OF T H E M IN ISTER OF JU ST IC E

The regrettable misunderstandings which are occurring in the city between

soldiers, population, and workers must be rapidly eliminated.
For this purpose I request all justices of the peace immediately upon receipt
of the present order to take part in the formation of temporary courts for the
settlement of these misunderstandings. The court shall consist of three members:
the justice of the peace, a representative of the army, and a representative of the
workers, and shall sit in the chambers of the justice of the peace.
The existing boundaries of court districts shall be maintained. Questions shall
be decided by a majority vote, and members of the court shall enjoy equal rights.
The court shall sit in chambers from 10:00 A .M . to 5:00 P .M .
Serious cases shall be referred for decision to the Commandant appointed by
the Provisional Government.
The present measure is provisional in nature.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister of Justice
March 3, 1917

162. T h e A b o l it io n of S o m e J u d ic ia l a n d P o l ic e E s t a b l is h m e n t s
a n d I n s t it u t io n s

[Zhurnaly, No. 3, March 4,1917.]

Resolved:
1. To abolish: a) special civil courts, b) the Okhrana sections, and c) the
special gendarme corps, including also the railroad police.
2. The officers and enlisted men of the abolished special gendarme corps (in
cluding also the gendarme railroad police) to be immediately transferred for
registration to the competent military authorities [voinskie nachaVniki] for the
purpose of their assignment in the army.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 193

163. T h e A b o l it io n o f t h e S u p r e m e C r im in a l C o u r t a n d t h e S p e c l ^l
C h a m b e r s o f t h e R u l in g S e n a t e , A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , a n d C ir c u it
C ourts w it h C la ss ( Soslovie) R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 361. These courts dealt with political and state crimes. For a
description of their institution and function see Samuel Kucherov, Courts, Lawyers
and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars, pp. 44, 86-87, 201.]

TO T H E RULING SENATE

The Provisional Government has decreed:

The special courts established by law are abolished, namely: the Supreme
Criminal Court and the special chambers of the Ruling Senate, appellate courts
and circuit courts, in which class representatives participate.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister of Justice
March 4, 1917

164. T h e E s t a b l is h m e n t o f a S p e c ia l C o m m is s io n t o I n v e s t ig a t e the
M a l f e a s a n c e o f C e r t a in S e n a t o r s
[In the Zhurnaly. No. 11, March 8, 1917, the Provisional Government granted the
Ministry of Justice the right to propose resignation to those senators who had no
higher education. The acceptance of these resignations was noted in the Zhurnaly,
No. 43, April 15, 1917. Not wishing to violate the inviolability of the senators of the
Cassation Department as judges, Minister of Justice Kerensky advised certain of them
to resign. The Provisional Governments acceptance of these resignations appears
separately in various numbers of the Zhurnaly. New senators were appointed, belong
ing to various political groups and from various courts and institutions.]

4, 1917
U KASE TO T H E RULING SENATE OF M A R C H

The Provisional Government has decreed:

To set up a Special Commission of Inquiry for investigating the malfeasance
of senators of the Criminal Cassation Department of the Ruling Senate during
[their] examination of cases of state offenses.
The Minister-President and the Minister of Justice

165. T h e E s t a b l is h m e n t of the E x t r a o r d in a r y C o m m is s io n
of I n q u ir y

[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 363. The initial enactment was No. 362, dated March 4, 1917.
In the Zhurnaly, No. 11, March 8, 1917, the Provisional Government approved the
appointment of Nikolai Konstantinovich Muravev as Chairman and of Senators Mikhail
Romulovich Zavadskii and Sergei Mitrofanovich Zarudnyi as members. The testimony
before the Commission was published as Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, 7 vols., Leningrad,
1924-27. For a provocative discussion of the work of the Commission, see the Preface
of B. Maklakoff to La Chute du regime tsariste9 which is a French translation of some
of the most significant testimony.]
194 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

TO T H E RULING SENATE

STATUTE

On an extraordinary commission of inquiry for the investigation of malfea

sance in office of former ministers, chief administrators, and other persons in
high office of both the civil and the military and naval services.
I. An extraordinary commission of inquiry is established under the Minister
of Justice, as Prosecutor General, for the investigation of malfeasance in office
of former ministers, chief administrators, and other persons in high office of both
the civil and military and naval services, and shall consist of a Chairman, enjoy
ing the rights of an Assistant Minister of Justice, two Assistant Chairmen, and
four Members, appointed by order of the Provisional Government.
Persons shall be assigned to the Commission by the Minister of Justice for
conducting investigations.
The Chairman of the Commission may draw upon officials of all departments
as well as private persons for participation in its proceedings. . . .
II. For the accomplishment of the task entrusted to the Commission the per
sons assigned to conduct investigations shall enjoy all the rights and shall per
form all the duties of investigators under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Military and the Naval Judicial Procedures, and shall observe the following
rules:
1. The knowledge and consent of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry
shall be required for opening a preliminary inquiry, calling persons as defendants
and also carrying out searches and seizures of postal and telegraph correspond
ence. Persons carrying out investigations shall have the right to require the
personal appearance for questioning of all persons mentioned in the note to
art. 65 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
III. The Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry shall have the right to give
instructions to the persons conducting investigations and shall exercise continuing
supervision over the performance of such activities.
IV. The records of the completed investigation shall be submitted by the
Commission, with its written conclusions concerning further action in the matter,
to the Prosecutor General for report to the Provisional Government.
P r in c e L vov , Minister-President
A. K eren sk y , Minister of Justice
March 11, 1917

166. Civ il R ig h ts and t h e S tro ngh old o f D emocracy

[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 8, March 7, 1917, p. 2.]
The Provisional Government has published its political platform. It has
promised the people to declare an amnesty and it has promised to guarantee
them freedoms.
The scope of these freedoms will now depend on the people. The people
must know that the Government can always restrict the scope of freedom at will.
However, the people must not forget that in the Fundamental Laws of the over
thrown regime we read that Russian subjects have the right to organize meet-
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 195

ings . . . But it was added: for purposes which are not in opposition to the
Laws.
According to the same Fundamental Laws, Russian subjects have the right
to express their thoughts orally and in writing and to disseminate them by means
of the press, or in any other way. But again it was added: within the limitations
prescribed by law.
Russian subjects also have the right to form societies and unions, but,
once again, for purposes which are not in opposition to the Laws.
Russian citizens know what these freedoms of the press, speech, and assembly
were converted into by the old regime!
Free thought was stifled; freedom of association and of the exchange of ideas
among citizens was completely abolished!
Russia was converted into an enormous prison. A graveyard silence reigned
in Russia and only obscurantist ideas and words of hate and malice had unqual
ified freedom!
We must firmly declare to the Provisional Government that the people will
demand lasting guarantees for these freedoms, that the people will not tolerate
arbitrary rule or findings.
But the people must prove by their actions that they value the freedoms of
speech, press, and association, that they consider these freedoms to be the foun
dation of political freedom.
We must take the fullest advantage of the present state of affairs.
Everyone must form associations, a free press must be created, and meetings
must be called where the freedom of speech must be exercised in a tireless
struggle against the old order. Only the constant exercise of these freedoms can
organize the democratic masses into so strong a force that attempts by propertied
classes to restrict the rights of the democracy will not frighten them.
But if the people do not exercise the freedoms gained by the revolution to
the fullest extent and remain unorganized, then the way will be paved for cutting
down the rights of the people.
Citizens, form associations, call meetingsagitate!
Remember that every minute is valuable during a revolution.
Remember that every right is determined by the correlation of social forces!
The chief strength of the democracy lies in its organization!

AMNESTY

167. F ive H undred T housand R ubles to A id P o litic a l P risoners

[Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, No. 10, March 5,1917, p. 1.]
In accordance with a decision of the board of the Russian Asiatic Bank,
A. I. Putilov has been instructed to contribute 500,000 rubles to Kerensky,
Minister of Justice, for the benefit of released political prisoners.
196 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

168. T h e D ecisio n of t h e P rovisional G overnm ent

to I ssue a U kase on A m n esty
[Zhurnaly, -No. 8, March 7, 1917.]
Resolved:
To send to the Ruling Senate for publication and execution the ukases com
piled by the Minister of Justice: 1) on amnesty and 2) on the reduction of the
terms of punishment for persons accused of general criminal offenses and lib
erated by the people from the places of their detention in case of their voluntary
return.

169. T h e R elease o f A l l P o litic a l P risoners

[Circular of the Minister of Justice, VVP, No. 2, March 7, 1917, p. 1.]
The Minister of Justice telegraphed the following order to all prosecutors
of courts of appeal and circuit courts:
I direct you to release immediately, on your own responsibility, all im
prisoned persons who have been convicted or are under investigation for political
crimes of any category or for religious crimes. I request that you effect the
release personally, relaying greetings on my behalf to each person released.
Direct the heads of Okhrana Sections to release immediately all persons detained
for the same crimes by administrative order.
A. K erensky , Minister of Justice
Member of the State Duma

170. U kase of th e P rovisional G ov ern m en t on A m nesty

[Sob. U z a k I, 1, No. 346.]
In fulfillment of the imperious demands of the national conscience, in the
name of historic justice, and to mark the complete triumph of a new order
founded on law and freedom,
a general po l it ic a l am nesty is declared .
On this basis the Provisional Government has decreed:
I. To absolve of responsibility and release from punishment with all its
consequences persons convicted for acts stipulated: . . .
[There follows an enumeration of articles from the Code of Laws covering
crimes and misdemeanors in the following general categories:
1. Religious, (a) questions of blasphemy and sacrilege, (b) improper
public conduct (speech, assembly, press) with respect to religious services, re
ligious institutions, and persons representing religious institutions, (c) violations
of regulations on baptism, marriage, and burial, and (d) heresy and the infraction
of laws on religious conversion.
2. Sedition against the Supreme Power. (a) crimes against the inviola
bility of the Emperor and members of the Imperial family, (b) attempts to change
the Fundamental Laws of the State, or any parts thereof, by means of violence,
including the separation of any territory from Russia.
3. Subversive activities, (a) actions outside the scope of authorized politi
cal activity with respect to speech, press, assembly, organization, and literary work,
(b) armed revolts and actions against the Supreme Power or against the Funda
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 197

mental Laws of the State, or any action leading to the disruption of public safety
and order, (c) participation in agrarian or labor disorders.
4. Unlawful acts committed in governmental service or public office. (a)
failure to denounce criminal activities, (bj improper conduct with respect to
arrested or convicted persons.]
The effect of the present Ukase shall extend also to all acts prohibited by
criminal laws perpetrated during the commission of one of the acts mentioned
in the present section.
II. Persons convicted for acts mentioned in the preceding ( I ) . section are
absolved of all consequences of their conviction; any of them who were sentenced
for these acts to forfeiture or restriction of their political and civil rights shall
have restored to them and to their legitimate children, bom after sentence was
passed upon the parents, all rights enjoyed by them personally and by reason of
their status before conviction, with the proviso that this shall not affect property
rights.
III. Cases involving acts mentioned in section I which were tried in secret
and also those under adjudication are terminated and made void for all time.
IV. Likewise made void for all time are cases involving acts prohibited by
criminal laws which were committed for political motives (with the exception
of motives of a treasonable nature) during the period from February 23, 1917,
to the day of publication of the present Ukase.
V. Persons who committed, before February 23, 1917, for political and
religious motives, acts prohibited by criminal laws which do not fall within the
category of those mentioned in section I of the present Ukase may petition the
appropriate judicial establishments for the application to them of the measures
mentioned in sections IIII of the present Ukase. These petitions shall be acted
upon in executive sessions, at which time the petitioners and their attorneys may
submit written or oral explanations. The findings of judicial organs in cases of
this nature shall be subject to appeal . . .
VI. All criminal cases involving inorodtsy7 arising as a result of the execution
of the order of June 25, 1916 (Code of Laws, article 1526), concerning the use
of the inorodets for work behind the front lines of the army, are terminated and
made void for all time and the effect of the measures mentioned in sections IIII
of the present Ukase extends to persons convicted in cases of this nature.
VII. The effect of the present Ukase extends to cases mentioned in it which
are subject to the jurisdiction of either civil or military judicial establishments.
VIII. The execution of the measures mentioned in sections IVII of the
present Ukase shall be entrusted to the appropriate judicial organs if sentence
has not yet been passed, or if sentence has not yet entered into legal force, or
if it has not yet been carried out. The Ministry of the Interior and local pro
vincial and regional authorities shall deal with the cases of those at hard labor
or deported to Siberia and the prosecutors office shall deal with all remaining
cases.
IX. All penal measures imposed by extra-judicial procedure on order of
civil and military authorities for acts enumerated in the present Ukase, for the
violation of compulsory regulations, or for political unreliability are abrogated
with the exception of measures taken against persons suspected of state treason.
The execution of the measure mentioned in the present section shall be entrusted
to the higher organs of the local administration.
198 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

X. Persons expelled from communes and classes of society for political rea
sons are relieved of all restrictions on their rights which are a consequence of
such expulsion. Petitions for the restoration of such rights shall be submitted
to district courts at the place of location of the appropriate communal and class
[institutions] . . . The petitions of persons disbarred shall be considered by
councils of lawyers or institutions acting in their stead.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President, Minister of the Interior
[and all other ministers]
Petrograd, March 6, 1917

171. A m n esty
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 4, March 3, 1917. Typical of the unanimously favorable
press reaction to the news and official promulgation of the amnesty.]
Previously all the people were shackled in chains, but the chains were twice
as heavy for those who dared to raise their voices in protest of slavery, who
demanded freedom and fought for it.
There were many who languished in convict prisons, in fortress dungeons,
in exile, and in emigration, and only once, in the memorable days of the year
1905, were they able to escape to freedom.
Now the chains are broken and our comrades, together with the people,
are freewe are joyfully awaiting their return to our midst. There is still a
great deal of work to be done. Tsarism has been dealt a fatal blow, but its
survivals will have to be fought for a long time to come, clearing the way for a
socialist order [of society].
Political freedom has been won, but ahead lies a long and persistent struggle
for the complete emancipation of the workers.
Comrades in exile, comrade-convicts, comraie-emigres, in the name of all
the democratic forces, we welcome you as the liberated hostages of Tsarist autoc
racy, as the loyal champions of freedom in the past and in the future!

172. T h e R edu ction or C ancella tion o f P u n ish m e n t fo r P ersons W h o

H ad C o m m it t e d C r im in a l O ffe n se s
[5o&. U z a k I, 1, No. 386.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
At a time of grievous ordeals, when the brutal enemy is striving to strike at
the very heart of our native land, when the fatherland requires the exertion
of all the creative forces of the people to commemorate the final triumph of the
new state order proclaimed by the people, founded on justice and freedom,
[and] opening the way to a new life of promise even for those citizens who have
lapsed into crime, the Provisional Government . . . appealing for strict and
steadfast observance of peace and order and for a resolute termination of any
encroachments on the inviolability of the person and property of citizens [and]
with the aim of establishing lawfulness under the new order, has decreed the
alleviation of the lot of persons who have heretofore committed criminal acts
on the following basis:
[There follows a detailed list of reduction of punishments and in some cases
of exemption from punishment for persons who are under sentence or indictment
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 199

for criminal acts. The most noteworthy of these is the commutation of the death
penalty to hard labor for fifteen years.]

P r i n c e L v o v , M i n i s t e r - P r e s i d e n t
[ a n d a ll o th e r m in is t e r s ]
March 17,1917

173. D isorders in T o m sk G uberniya

[Delo Naroda, No. 68, June 7, 1917, p. 3. Telegraphic report addressed to Minister-
President, Minister of Justice, and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies from
Tomsk, signed by Vice-Chairman of the Tomsk Guberniya Executive Committee
Naumov.]
The common criminals who were amnestied and conscripted for military
service have joined with other criminal elements from among the civilian popu
lation to form organized bands. They have committed robberies and murders
and, under the anarchist banner, organized mass robberies of banks, stores, and
institutions, murdered leaders of public organizations, and commandeered gangs
from other cities for robberies.
Taking advantage of the shortage and high prices of goods, and the unpopular
requisition of grain in the villages at fixed prices, they have been conducting
among the troops intensive agitation for the expropriation of private property
and the annihilation of all authority.
In order to put a stop to this, a state of martial law was decreed on the night
of June 3 by the joint decision of the executive committees of Soviets of Soldiers,
Officers, and Workers Deputies, of the Garrison Soviet, of the Guberniya,
Municipal, and Uezd Popular Assemblies, of the Tomsk committees of the SD
and the SR Parties, and of the Commander of the Tomsk Garrison. Over 1,500
amnestied common criminals were thereupon arrested from among the troops
and about 800 found in criminal haunts. Among the arrested are men belonging
to the 8th Regiment, who had recently been responsible for some murders.
Shooting took place in the 14th Company of the 38th Regiment where, with
the majority of men being amnestied common criminals, this criminal organiza
tion had its center under the guise of anarchism. . . . In the 6th Company of
the 25th Regiment, when several men showed armed resistance to arrest, about
twenty persons were killed and several wounded in the resulting shooting fray.
The resolute measures taken have eliminated the danger. Complete order pre
vails in the city. A special investigating commission has been organized.

ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

174. T h e A b o l it io n o f t h e D e a t h P enalty
[So&. U z a k 1 ,1, No. 375.]
LA W OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1. The death penalty is abolished.
200 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2. In all cases in which existing civil, military, and naval penal laws provide
for the death penalty as punishment for criminal acts, such penalty shall be
replaced by a limited or indefinite term at hard labor.
3. The present law shall also apply to judicial sentences, passed before its
promulgation, which have not yet been carried out.
Lvov, Minister-President
P r in c e
[and all other ministers]
March 12,1917

175. W h a t Is a R e v o lu tio n ?
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14725, March 12, 1917, p. 5.]
In the minds of frightened people, revolution means wild destruction.
Revolution is a prolonged, hopeless disturbance. Revolution means murder,
conflagration, robbery, desecration of temples, infants killed against rocks,
rape, disregard of all law, human or divine. The mob gets drunk on liquor and
blood, women are transformed into hyenas. The savage rabble carries chopped-
off heads on spears in the streets. Self-appointed courts send to the gallows
thousands of innocent people. On the plazas guillotines are erected, and their
blades know no rest.
That is what revolution was in the imagination of frightened people. This
crimson shadow darkened the minds and made hearts contract with horror. For
fear of that specter, thousands of decent people who hated the tyranny which
hung over our land still reconciled themselves to it in practice. Revolution
seemed to them more frightful than the accustomed slavery. . . .
By the will of fate, the revolution broke out nonetheless. Let the eternally
memorable days of the 27th and 28th of February be blessed. They showed us
the real face of the Russian revolution. The peoples5 army, the workers and the
citizens smashed the idol of autocracy within forty-eight hours. And if unneces
sary bloodshed occurred during that time, it was committed by the lackeys of
the destroyed despotism, and not by the people. Protopopov, Shcheglovitov
the Cain, Stunner, Makarovall are alive. Almost all the perfidious lackeys
of the ill-fated Emperor are living. He himself is kept under protection and
enjoys complete safety. His family lives in its own house in complete inviola
bility, thirty versts from the center of the revolution.
So where is the axe of the guillotine? Where are the blood-smeared heads
on the spears of cannibals? Where are rape, conflagrations, destruction? Where
are the maddened furies? Where are the wails for blood and vengeance?
On the contrary, one of the first acts of the new government is the law abol
ishing the death penalty.

176. E ditorial in Reck9

[No. 59, March 10, 1917, p. 1.]
One item of good news follows the other. Amnesty is followed by the abolition
of the death penalty. The death penalty is abolished forever. Only four words,
but what a thundering echo they will call forth from the whole Russian land!
The amnesty and the abolition of the death penalty are essentially two sides
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 201

of the same coin. But here there is no reverse side; they are both equally
beautiful, they both call for a new life, they are both building peace and harmony
in place of malicious spite and cruel vindictiveness.
It would be naive to try now to prove the necessity for abolishing the death
penalty. It hung as an ignominy over the history of humanity. For a long time
the advanced minds of all countries and nations have been carrying on an ener
getic fight for the elimination of this most repulsive form of murder. . . .
Therefore, it would be superfluous to force an open door and to repeat . . .
the arguments against the death penalty which have already deeply penetrated
into everybodys conscience, and this is especially [true] for us, where for the
last ten years such energetic propaganda against the death penalty has been
carried on, where thousands of signatures covered protests against this terrible
form of punishment, where leagues and unions were organized for the fight
against this evil.
However, all this shows only how difficult and tenacious was the fight. There
fore, the greatest merit of the revolution is that one of its first achievements has
been to abolish the death penalty forever. Forever and ever this act shall remain
a solemn evidence of the greatness of the popular soul and as a manifestation
of straightforward nobleness . . .

The Russian revolution . . . confronted by its worst enemies, who have

inflicted so many wrongs on our beloved country, begins by fulfilling the tradi
tional wishes of the advanced public and boldly abolishes the death penalty.
The old regime would hardly be able [to show] anything comparable to the
might of this moral thunderclap.

177. T h e A bo litio n o f t h e D ea t h P enalty

[.Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 6, March 12, 1917, p. 2.]
The death penaltythis age-old nightmare of our lifehas been abol
ished. . . .
The death penalty, a survival of the ancient blood vendetta, was one of the
most terrifying tools of enslavement in the hands of the autocratic government.
How many fighters for freedom laid their lives on the chopping block or perished
in the hangmans noose! And the most awful thing was that these murders were
being committed legally. The executioners were cloaking themselves with the
law. . . .
The Provisional Government, which obtained its power from the hands of
the revolutionary people, has dissipated this nightmare. It rejected the bloody
weapon of the Tsars government. The death penalty no longer exists.
At the present moment, the peoples wrath is hanging over the heads of the
former enslavers of the people. The abolition of the death penalty will perhaps
bring a sigh of relief to them. But the revolutionary people will find other means
to render them harmless for all time to come, and, first of all, it will destroy the
conditions which made their domination possible. In these circumstances, the
revolutionary people can magnanimously grant them life.
But the death penalty must never again be a tool in the hands of the strong
against the weak, in the hands of oppressors against fighters for freedom.
202 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

178. T h e D elay in P u b lish in g the L aw A b o l ish in g the D ea th P enalty

[Den\ No. 8, March 14, 1917, p. 1. An editorial similar in tone and implication
appeared in Rech\ No. 63, March 15,1917, p. 2. Pressure was put upon A. F. Kerensky
and the Government by representatives of the extreme left who wished to have the
death penalty available for application against leaders of the old regime. The law was
published in VVP, No. 12, March 18, 1917, p. 1. Significantly, Pravda and Izvestiia,
the latter then edited by Y. M. Steklov, who inclined toward the Bolshevik position
and later joined the Party, greeted the news of the enactment with silence.]
It is said that the decree abolishing forever the death penalty in Russia has
already been signed.
It is said that the promulgation of this decree has been delayed for a whole
week thanks to the pressure which is being put on the Provisional Government
from the outside.
It is said that one of democracys leaders has said that first a few heads must
fall, and only after that can the decree abolishing the death penalty be promul
gated.
It is said , . . But all these sayings are too improbable to be given credit.
It is to someones advantage to disseminate these rumors; it is someones wish
to smear democracy and to cast a shadow over it. It is impossible to steal some
one elses money and then live in clover on it, imagining oneself an honest man.
It is impossible to steal from the great revolution its assets of generosity and
kind-heartedness and then to spend the rest of ones life on the interest from this
capital. Revolution is war, but not banditry; it disarms, but does not finish its
prisoners. We need not play at being little Marats or Robespierres.
There must be no delay. Each day of delay casts a shadow on the Russian
democracy. We expect from the Provisional Government and the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies a decree abolishing the death penalty.

179. E d itorial in Novoe Vremia

[No. 14730, March 18,1917, p. 13.]
The death penalty is abolished in Russia. It is difficult in a few words to
express the whole colossal majesty of this act of the Russian governmental power
which furnishes from above the most potent evidence of respect for human per
sonality and for its right to the most valuable entityhuman life.
By abolishing the death penalty, the regime thereby furnishes to the public
a lofty example of the ennobling of mores, and this at a time when the war and
the turbulent sea of human passions cause most drastically the diminution of
the value of human life in the subjective appraisal of the masses. And what is
especially importantwhat in no case can be treated with silenceis that such
an act of highest culture comes from the Russian revolution which thus pro
claims humaneness as its slogan and in advance grants life to its own worst
enemies. The great French Revolution of the eighteenth century, while proclaim
ing its lofty principles of the rights of man and the citizen, nevertheless did
not disdain the inculcation of those principles with the aid of the executioner
who bore a sort of honorable title vengeur p u b l i c The Russian revolution of
the twentieth century, in the name of the same principles, begins by taking
human life under its protective wing and endeavors to inculcate in the public
the realization of the fact that people in the mass must also, following the
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 203

example of the government, refrain from acts of self-assumed justice and respect
the right of every person to life. And in this we see the grandeur of the Russian
revolution and of those humane cultural principles which permeate it.

180. V la d im ir N a b o k o v o n t h e A b o litio n o f t h e D e a t h P e n a l t y
[R ech\ No. 66, March 18, 1917, p. 3.]
. . . Surely in no other country has moral opposition to this worst type of
murder reached such shattering force as with us. It should suffice to remember
Turgenev (The Execution of Tropman), Tolstoy (Resurrection55), and espe
cially Dostoyevsky (The Idiot55). Also Russian criminological literature never
defended the principle of the death penalty. Its main pillarsTagantsev, Foinit-
skii, Kistiakovskiiwere convinced abolitionists. And today the first of them
has the great joy of witnessing how his cherished hope is being fulfilled and
the noble efforts of many years crowned with success.
The author of these lines well remembers the day of June 19, 1906, when
the first Duma unanimously adopted the first bill which today has been repeated.
. . . Everyone . . . understood then that the fate of the bill was tied up to the
fate of the Duma, of which no one was certain. Nevertheless spirits were raised
by the joyous thought that among the first popular representatives there was not
one single partisan of the gallows. . . .
. . . Now it is no longer a platonic impulse, nor a fruitless declaration.
Now it is a realization of the will, a border which has been crossed with no way
of return.
* * *

The abolition of the death penalty at the moment of revolution^ triumph

is a comforting phenomenon, a sign of genuine magnanimity and of wise fore
sight. The people do not want bloody retributions against anyone, not even
against its worst enemies . . . Let them bear the severe punishment which they
merit, but let this punishment also reflect the impulse of die popular soul, which
in its conscious manifestation does not [seek a] bloody revenge and does not
forget the man within the most obvious evildoer.
V lad . N abokov

181. T h e M agnanimity o f t h e R ussian R evo lution

[Delo Naroda, No. 5, March 19, 1917, p. 1.]
One more and perhaps the greatest victory of the revolution: the revolution
passed a death sentence upon the death sentence itself. The most disgraceful
blot of culture on our conscience and that of all mankind has been removed.
Who will now dare accuse the revolution of bloodthirstiness? Who will dare
question her magnanimity and profound purity?
We had no rightsrevolution gave them to us.
We had no freedomsthe revolution presented them to us without any limi
tations.
Thousands of victims of the old regime were languishing in prisons. The
revolution opened the doors for them.
204 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Prisoners were flogged. The revolution abolished corporal punishment.

Methods of inquisition reigned in the dark cells. The revolution abolished them.
The revolution is unlimited in its magnanimity. It threw the doors open to
the fighters for freedom; it also granted amnesty to a great number of criminal
offenders.
Like the sun the revolution is generous in its magnanimity. Like the sun
it shines upon the just and unjust. Like the spring whirlwind it pulls out every
where the thistles of evil. Like the spring shower it awakens everything that is
living, it refreshes the dry shoots of goodness and shines with the lightening of
heroic deed . . . The soul of the revolution is one impulse of magnanimity.
And it contains no meanness, not one atom of cruelty, no cry of kill him! is
heard.
Who will now dare accuse the revolution of bloodthirstiness? Who will dare
dispute her lawful attributespure conscience and nobility? No one and never.
Hail the great soul of the Russian revolution!

PENAL REFORM

182. T h e A bo l it io n o f B rutal P rison P ractices

[Sob. VzaK I, 1, No. 377.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
I. Whipping and the use of irons and strait jackets, established in existing
laws for deportees and prisoners, are abolished.

IV. . . . The solitary confinement assigned . . . for women at hard labor

is reduced by half.
V. Delete from . . . the Code of Regulations on deportees [in Siberia]
. . . mention of the use of irons or fetters, and . . . mention of punishment by
whipping.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 17,1917

183. T h e O rganization of S ocieties of P atronage

[S&or. Ukaz.9vypusk 1, otdel VI, No. 14.]
A struggle against criminality that is confined solely to the enforcement of
punishments can never bring auspicious results. It will only be in a position to
achieve success when other measures for improving the health of the society are
implemented along with punishments. Regardless of the high standard of prison
education, it alone cannot properly fulfill its purposes if no measures are adopted
for making provisions to care for the subsequent fate of persons who have served
their sentences. . . .
At the present time thousands of prisoners have been released. Among them
can be found not a few who sincerely desire to begin a new life. . . .
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 205

Ways to a new, bright life are being opened for many of the persons released
from imprisonment. Their hopes are aroused for beginning a life in which they
will enjoy the same full rights as other citizens. It is necessary to support these
persons. Not only their own interests demand this [support], but the interests
of public safety as well. Deprived of appropriate support, these persons could
once again lapse into crime and thereby create a great threat to society.
On the basis of all the above considerations, the pressing need of the moment
is a broad development of societies for sponsoring persons released from im
prisonment, societies of patronage. Present organizations of this type are too
few in number and, moreover, are devoid of democratic elements; it would
appear desirable to cover our whole vast motherland with a network of such
organizations and to enlist the participation in their activities of that whole
section of the population which has always until now stood apart from this entire
matter and which is now legitimately demanding that it be accorded an appro
priate role in the construction of new Russia. Representatives of the democratic
strata of the population must be given the opportunity of taking due part in the
activities of the societies of patronage. It is hoped that the growth of public and
personal initiative which is evidenced at the present time and the general enthu
siasm for the destruction of the old and the creation of the new in all spheres of
our life will everywhere induce the awareness of the importance of organizing
societies of patronage. All such societies may rely on every support from the
State should the need for such support be felt.
In view of the particular importance for the present moment of developing
societies of patronage, I request the guberniya prison inspectors and persons
[acting] in that capacity to render every possible assistance to the rise of such
organizations and to ascertain the degree of their need of material support from
the State Treasury according to the state of their financial resources.
March 17, 1917 Head of the Central Prison Administration

184. T h e R e pla c em en t o f P rison A dm inistrators and W arders

[Sbor. Ukaz., vypusk 1, otdel VI, No. 15. The courses in prison administration herein
referred to were established by law April 7, 1917, Sob. U z a k I, 1, No. 489.]
The present prison personnel, brought up in an atmosphere of lawlessness
and of disrespect for human dignity and having absorbed the practices of the
former regime, must be generally considered as being little suited for fulfilling
those tasks in the internal reorganization of prisons which are being called for
insistently by the new system of government and free public life. On the other
hand, special training, which the present prison personnel hardly possesses, must
be made requisite for filling administrative positions in places of detention in
the same way as for any [other] kind of work. In the meantime, the difficult
and responsible matter of prison education must be entrusted only to specially
trained persons.
On the basis of these considerations I am contemplating the announcement
of short-term courses in prison administration at the earliest moment.
Desirous, at the same time, of coming to the assistance of disabled officers
of the valiant army and recognizing that among military persons, accustomed
to discipline, there may be found many suitable workers for this new field of
206 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

work so beneficial to society, I would consider it expedient to give preference in

enrollment in the contemplated courses to these persons, in so far as, with respect
to their physical condition, they are fit for employment in places of detention.
In view of this, I would ask guberniya prison inspectors and persons acting
in their capacity to adopt measures within their sphere of competence, ensuring
that new vacancies for the offices of prison directors and their assistants be filled
by suitable persons on a strictly temporary basis in order that subsequently these
vacancies could be filled by persons with special training in courses of prison
administration.
In addition, I consider it necessary to point out that in filling the offices of
prison warders preference should be given to disabled soldiers who are fit for
this work, pending the organization of cadres of prison warders having had
specialized training in special schools which are about to be opened in certain
towns in the very near future.
March 18, 1917 Head of the Central Prison Administration

185. C h a n g e s in t h e O r g a n iz a t io n o f t h e C e n t r a l A d m in is t r a t io n of

P l a c e s o f D e t e n t io n
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 555.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
I. The Central Prison Administration is renamed the Central Administration
of Places of Detention and the Council on Prison Affairs is renamed the Council
on Affairs of Places of Detention.

III. In amendment of existing legislation concerning the Council on Prison

Affairs, the articles [enumerated] . . . shall read as follows:
7734. The Head of the Central Administration of Places of Detention is
chairman ex officio of the Council on Affairs of Places of Detention.
7735. The Council on Affairs of Places of Detention shall include, in
addition to the Head of the Central Administration of Places of Detention and
his Assistants, nine members, namely: 1) the Senior Presiding Judge of the
Petrograd Appellate Court or one of the Presiding Judges of a Department or
Judges of the same Court, to be chosen by the General Assembly of its Depart
ments; 2) the Prosecutor of the Petrograd Appellate Court or, at his designation,
one of his Assistants; 3) the Presiding Judge of the Petrograd Circuit Court or
one of the Assistant Presiding Judges or Judges of the same Court, to be chosen
by the General Assembly of its Divisions; 4) the Presiding Justice of the Metro
politan Chamber of Justices of the Peace of the Petrograd circuit or one of the
Justices of the Peace of the same circuit, to be chosen by the aforesaid Chamber;
5) one of the Members of the Bar attached to the Appellate Court of the Petrograd
circuit, to be chosen by the General Assembly of Members of the Bar of the afore
said circuit; 6) a representative of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies,
to be chosen by this Soviet; 7) a representative of the Petrograd municipal
administration, to be chosen by the latter; 8) a representative of the Petrograd
societies for assistance to persons released from places of detention in Petrograd,
to be chosen by these societies, and 9) a representative of the societies adminis
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 207

tering Petrograd educational and correctional institutions for minors, to be

chosen by these societies.

773i 9. The Council on Affairs of Places of Detention shall receive all new
proposals concerning: 1) the organization of places of detention and the treat
ment of inmates, as well as their transfer, 2) the improvement of the management,
administration, and accounting of places of detention, as well as 3) drafts of
general estimates of revenues and expenditures for places of detention, 4) annual
reports on the activity of the Central Administration of Places of Detention,
5) matters affecting institutions and societies having as their purpose the welfare
of persons released from places of detention or the correctional education of
minors, and 6) other matters which, because of their importance, the Minister
of Justice or the Head of the Central Administration of Places of Detention
considers necessary to refer for preliminary discussion to the Council.

P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister of Justice
V l a d . N a b o k o v , Head of Chancellery of the
Provisional Government
April 26, 1917

186. T h e A bo litio n o f D epo rtatio n to S iberia

[Sob. U zak.I, 1, No. 556.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. Deportation [to Siberia], as a form of punishment, is abolished on the
following basis:
1. Deportation under the criminal code [of 1903] is replaced by im
prisonment in a fortress for a term of not less than three years.
2. Deportation with forfeiture of all rights of status under the Code of
Punishments is replaced, with the exception mentioned below in article 3 of the
present section, by removal to a correctional workhouse for a term of from four
to six years with forfeiture of all special rights and privileges.
3. Deportation as defined by pt. 1 of article 1504 of the Code of Punish
ments, with forfeiture of all rights of status, is replaced by imprisonment in a
fortress for a term of from six years and eight months to ten years.
II. Settlement in designated localities provided by law as a consequence of
a sentence to deportation at hard labor [to Siberia] and to hard labor is abol
ished.
III. Residence in designated localities with assimilation to the status of forced
settler, provided by law as a consequence of conviction for vagrancy, is abolished.
IV. Instead of the settlement and residence mentioned in sections II and III
for persons released from detention on completing a sentence of deportation at
hard labor, or hard labor, as well as a sentence for vagrancy, the following
restrictions are established on their right to choose and change their place of
residence for a period of three years after their release.
1. The former prisoner shall be transferred, following his release from
the place of detention, to the supervision of a patronage society or other public
208 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

organization designed to assist persons released from places of detention or to

promote their welfare, and in the absence or refusal of such societies or organi
zations to take him under their protection, he shall be transferred to the super
vision of the administrative authorities, within whose immediate jurisdiction the
former prisoner belongs by reason of his place of residence.

10. In the event the former prisoner fails to appear at the place of resi
dence chosen by him or fixed for him, or in the event of his unauthorized absence
from such place or reprehensible conduct on his part jeopardizing public secur
ity, he shall be subject, at the place of his residence or detention, as a security
measure, to arrest or imprisonment for a period of not more than one year, upon
order by the appropriate justice of the peace or municipal justice.
The aforesaid order may not be issued except at the request of the public
organization or administrative authority under whose supervision the former
prisoner has been placed, or at the request of the prosecutors office, and shall
not be subject to appeal.

P rince L vov , Minister-President

A. K erensky , Minister of Justice
V lad, N abokov , Head of Chancellery of the
Provisional Government
April 26,1917

187. T h e P a r o l e S y ste m
[Sob. Uzak.f I, 2, No. 1326.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT

I. In abrogation of articles 416-39 of the Prison Regulations (Code of Laws,

Vol. XIV, Supplement 1912), the following rules are established on the parole
system:
1. Persons who have been sentenced to detention in prison, in a correc
tional section [Penal Code, edit. 1885] or house of correction [Criminal Code,
edit. 1909], or to deportation to a limited term of hard labor may be released
on parole after serving not less than half of the sentence imposed on them by
judicial verdict, provided they have spent not less than six months in a place of
detention in fulfillment of the sentence.
Persons sentenced to deportation for an indefinite term of hard labor may
be released on parole after serving not less than twelve years of their sentence.

2. Parole may be granted to prisoners if their good conduct during

imprisonment gives adequate grounds to suppose that they will follow a respect
able way of life after release.
3. Action to obtain parole for prisoners may be initiated by the head
of the place of detention, clergymen attached thereto, doctors and teachers,
officials of the prosecutors office, representatives of the legal profession chosen
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 209

by the Council of the Bar, members of patronage societies or other societies

designed to look after prisoners and persons released from places of detention.
4. The question of granting parole to a prisoner shall be submitted by
the head of a place of detention for discussion to a special commission on release
from places of detention, which shall be organized in each place of detention,
under the chairmanship of one of the local justices of the peace, appointed by
the conference of justices of the peace or by the circuit court, respectively, and
consisting of the following members: the head of the place of detention, an
official of the prosecutors office, a representative of the legal profession chosen
by the Council of the Bar, and two representatives from patronage societies or
other societies designed to look after prisoners and persons released from places
of detention. . . .

6. Parole shall be granted to a prisoner only when he expresses his will

ingness to comply with all the conditions for his freedom which may be laid
down for him by the parole commission. . . .

11. During the period of parole, the parolee shall not have the right to
leave the place of residence assigned to him without permission of the society or
organ of administrative authority under whose supervision and care he has been
placed; permission for absence shall be given for valid reasons for a period of
not more than one month. Absences for a longer period, as well as a change in
the place of residence assigned to the parolee, shall be allowed only with the
permission of the local justice of the peace, on proposal of the society or organ
of authority responsible for care and supervision of the parolee.
12. If the parolee commits any criminal act or is absent without leave from
the place of residence assigned to him or violates any of the conditions under
which his freedom was granted (article 6 of the present section) during his
period of parole, the parole may be revoked.

18. When a parolee returns, on the basis of article 12 of the present section,
to a place of detention, the time spent by him at liberty shall not be included
within the term of sentence, and the term of imprisonment remaining to be served
shall be calculated from the time that he was placed under arrest.
19. If in the course of the period of parole, such parole is not revoked on
the basis of article 12 of the present section, the sentence imposed by judicial
verdict shall be considered completed from the day of granting of parole.
In this case the restrictions on choosing and changing the place of residence,
laid down by law as consequences of criminal acts, shall be dropped.

A. K erensky , Minister-President
Z arudnyi, Minister of Justice

1 August 1917
2 10 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS BASED UPON NATIONALITY,

RELIGION, AND CLASS1

188. T h e D e c isio n o f t h e G o v e rn m e n t t o A b o lis h A l l R e s t r i c t i o n s

B ased u p o n N a t i o n a l i t y o r R e lig io n
[Zhurnaly, No. 13, March 9,1917.]
Resolved:
To authorize the Minister of Justice to introduce for the consideration of the
Provisional Government a bill abolishing all national and religious restrictions.

189. T h e A b o litio n o f Classes and R anks [Chin]"

[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 13, March 12, 1917, p. 4.]
The Provisional Government has announced that it plans to abolish all re
strictions based on religion, nationality, and class. The abolition of all restric
tions based on religion, as planned by the Provisional Government, represents
the fulfillment of an old demand on the part of the democratic forces concerning
the freedom of conscience. The democratic forces have always demanded that
every citizen [be granted] freedom of religion and freedom from religion.
The abolition of restrictions based on religion and creed does not [result in
the] elimination of either religion or creed; but they are [thereby] made free.
The abolition of all restrictions based on nationality must result in the achieve
ment of equality among the nationalities in Russia.
Under the old regime, Russian citizens were deprived of their rights, but
the representatives of nations which were persecuted by law were deprived twice
as much. Democratic Russia must put an end to this disgraceful state of affairs.
The abolition of all restrictions based on class, anticipated by the Provisional
Government, means, in the opinion of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu
ties, the complete abolition of classes.
Any other interpretation of this point would mean that newly created demo
cratic Russia would not be representing a homogeneous mass of citizens, pos
sessing equal rights, but [rather] would be divided, as in the past, into noblemen
and peasants.
It cannot be assumed that with the abolition of all restrictions based on class,
all that will remain will be innocent-sounding labels. This is not so! These labels
noblemen, peasantsconceal the [social] relations of the dark times of slavery
and deprivation of peoples rights.
The people of France 125 years ago, in a burst of civil fervor, threw out all
class designations.
The Russian revolution will similarly once and for all destroy classes.
But what do we see at the present moment?
After a revolutionary outburst unequaled in history, after the spontaneous
destruction of the principal strongholds of tsarism, our Provisional Government

1 For further materials on the nationality question and religion, see the appropriate chap
ters below. The word class as used in this section refers to the legally recognized estates
(sosloviia) of Imperial Russia: nobility [dvorianstvo], clergy [dukhovenstvo], merchants
ikupechestvo], peasants [krestianstvo], petit bourgeois [meshchanstvo], and the Cossacks,
who formed a separate military class.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 211

still holds fast to the Table of Ranks and in its orders [it] writes about the ap
pointments of such-and-such councilors of state and acting councilors of
state and other councilors to responsible posts of the recuperating power.
Russian citizens know that the despotic government did not give out these
ranks gratuitously! . . . Only their loyal lackeys were awarded the more ele
vated ranks!
And if among these servants of the old regime the Provisional Government
thinks of finding loyal servants to itself, then at least it should not designate
them by titles [employed by] the overthrown monarchy. . . .
Russian democracy understands the complete abolition of restrictions based
on class to mean the abolition o f classes , . . . and the a n n ih ila tio n of the Table
o f R a n ks.
And if our privileged ones do not find sufficient honor in themselves to
follow the example of the French during the time of the Great French Revolution
and to take the initiative themselves in renouncing all their titles and privileges,
then it is the duty of the Provisional Government to take this initiative on itself.2
The preservation of classes, titles, and the Table of Ranks for functionaries
is i n a d m i s s i b l e in a democracy, because it represents a complete refutation of
the principle of equal rights o f citizens.

190. The A b o l it io n of R e s t r ic t io n s B a s e d o n R e l ig io n a n d
N a t io n a l it y

[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 400.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Holding the steadfast conviction that in a free country all citizens must be
equal before the law, and that the conscience of the people cannot tolerate restric
tions on the rights of individual citizens because of their faith and origin,
The Provisional Government has decreed:
All restrictions established by existing legislation on the rights of citizens of
Russia by reason of their adherence to a particular religious denomination or
sect or by reason of nationality are abolished.
In accordance with this:
I. All the laws and statutes are abolished, whether in effect throughout all
Russia or in its various parts, which establishon the basis of the adherence of
citizens of Russia to a particular religious denomination or sect or by reason of
nationalityany restrictions in respect of:
1. Settlement, residence, and travel;
2. Acquisition of the right of ownership and other material rights to any
movable and immovable property, as well as possession, use, and administration
of this property and the giving or receiving of mortgages against it;
3. Engaging in any handicraft, trade, and industry, including mining, as
well as participation in state contracts and supply and public auctions;
4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial and industrial com
panies and associations, as well as occupying any office in these companies and
associations, either elective or appointive;

2 See Zhurnaly, No. 21, March 16, 1917, Doc. 138, on the abolition of chirt in the Civil
Service. See Doc. 194 for comment on estates.
212 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

5. Hiring servants, clerks, foremen, workers, and taking trade apprentices;

6. Admission to state service both civil and military, the procedure and
conditions of performing such service, participation in elections to institutions
of local self-government and any other public institutions, holding any office in
government and public establishments, and fulfilling all duties connected with
such offices;
7. Admission to any institutions of learningprivate, public, or govern
mentalcompleting a course of study and receiving scholarships, as well as
engaging in teaching and instruction;
8. Fulfilling the duties of guardians, trustees, and jurors;
9. Using languages and dialects other than Russian in business proceed
ings of private companies, in teaching in private institutions of learning, and in
keeping business books.

VIII. The effect of all administrative orders issued by civil or military

authorities before the promulgation of the present law, by virtue of which the
enjoyment of any right is restricted by reason of adherence to a particular re
ligious denomination or sect or by reason of nationality, is terminated.
IX. The present law applies to corresponding restrictions established in re
spect of aliens, other than citizens of powers at war with Russia, by reason of
their adherence to a particular religious denomination or sect or by reason of
nationality.
X. The present law enters into force from the day of its promulgation.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 20, 1917

191. E qual R ig h t s
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14734, March 23, 1917, p. 4.]
A decree of the Provisional Government has abolished all national and re
ligious discrimination. The free new regime could not tolerate even for one day
those artificial partitions of varying height and durability which had been created
for one or another of the peoples inhabiting Russia, depending on the degree of
trust or distrust toward them on the part of the former regime. For all practical
purposes, these discriminations were swept away at the moment when people,
on the Petrograd streets, without distinction as to nationality or religion, tore
the power from the hands of defenders of the government-sponsored triple formula
unlimited autocracy, bureaucratic orthodoxy, and official nationality.
This ancient formula, which forced upon Russian nationality bureaucratic guard
ianship under the guise of protecting its dominant position, and which tangled
other nationalities in a web of unnecessary and insulting discriminations, only
served as the most striking expression of the slogan divide and rule, an anti
social and antigovernmental slogan. And one can state with full justification
that in no domain of the former state administration did the Russian public so
drastically disagree with the government as here. Nothing provoked among the
Russian public such hatred for the government as those persecutions of nationali-
 IV ST ICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 213

ties and religions. And nothing created for Russia a more real danger of the
gradual decomposition of the state into its component parts than the developing
centrifugal forces and separatist aspirations of the nationalities which compose
Russia. In place of strong internal connection, community of interests, and cul
tural development, the former regime endeavored to establish the appearance of
outward official unity of the imposing bureaucratic fagade onalasa very
shaky foundation.
And behind that fagade a struggle was being waged for the freedom of re
ligious and spiritual views and cultural self-determination; for the right of un
impeded residence [in any part of Russia], of participation in the public and
economic life of the country, etc. How much energy and strength were spent on
this unnecessary struggle! How much has Russia lost in her cultural and eco
nomic development because of those national restrictions which, besides being
unnecessary in the rejuvenating country, were also inexpedient and senseless?
And in this connection one has, of course, to place in the foreground the Jewish
policy of the old regime. Anti-Semitism, when carried on in an administrative
way, assumes the nature of governmental injustice in relation to one of the
nationalities. And when it was carried to such grotesque extremes as was the
discrimination against the Jews in our country, up to the limitation of their right
of residence, this governmental anti-Semitism was turned into an obviously sense
less measure and into a method of corrupting the local administration by means
of bribery and the easy abuse of power.
Our Polish policy, for which the Russian public was not to blame, led to hos
tility between two related Slavic peoples, to hostility which was mitigated only
later by the established mutual relations of the Russian and Polish peoples. In
this case, the old regime was only interfering with the consolidation of friendship
which was being established.
In Galicia the old regime disgraced Russia by its policy of intolerance toward
the local population. In the countries allied with us the same policy of the old
regime created obstacles to complete moral unification with the Russian peoples;
it caused distrust in the ability of Russia to pursue a policy worthy of a great
nation in those countries where the Russian armies had penetrated. . . .
Now all obstacles to mutual understanding among the peoples of Russia have
withered away in the light of liberty dawning over the country. As if by the
waving of a magic wand, the distrust for the Russian government on the part of
the allied nations suddenly disappeared. The entire population of Russia has
received equal rights. There are no longer any insulting discriminations in the
right of residence, ownership of property, pursuit of trade, engaging in business,
industry, etc., enrolling in schools and colleges, appointment to civil service, and
use of local languages and dialects. All this nightmarish heritage of the past has
been done away with and will never return. Among the citizens of this great
country there are no longer any who are oppressed by the age-old injustice of a
division into those who have full rights on the one hand and those subjected to
national discrimination on the other.
It will be up to the nationalities, themselves, inhabiting Russia to bind the
state organism of a great nation by strong bonds of internal unity and indissolu
bility. And we believe it will be done. The old regime placed Russia in danger
of internal dismemberment. Liberty will unite and increase Russias strength
tenfold in her struggle against the age-old enemy.
214 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

192. T h e A b o l it io n o f R elig ious and N ational R estrictio n s

[.Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 65, March 22,1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government has signed a decree on the abolition of all re
ligious and national restrictions. Another pillar of the old order has fallen, a
survival of barbarism, which has for a long time outraged the popular sense of
righteousness, but on which the defenders of the order built on inequality and
oppression have so long and persistently leaned. . . .
Everyone remembers those cruel persecutionswhich evoked heartfelt sor
row in every true believerof the Russian sectarians and of everyone who had
a different faith: persecutions because of faith. These persecutions were not
stopped even by the formal pronouncements of tolerance in the matter of faith,
made by the former government. Sectarians and people of minority faiths lived
under conditions of oppression, violence, and disfranchisement. The Dukhobors
alone could tell so many sorrowful things about the persecutions they have suf
fered that the epoch which is receding now into the past will never free itself
from heavy moral censure.
Incomparably heavy restrictions were placed on the Jewish population, on
people who were adherents of the Judaic faith, on those pariahs of Russian legis
lation. Our legislation, which refused the Jews the recognition of their elementary
human rights, was making of the Jewish population disfranchised slaves in the
hands of the adherents of the old regime, and it trained the ignorant and unedu
cated people to regard the Jews as people who stood outside the law, against whom
everything was permitted, everything was possible. They were blamed for all
misfortunes, they were made responsible for others9 guilt, they were slandered
and libeled, and the totally innocent were made to answer for the guilty.
The new Russia puts an end to this evil. Let it not darken the coming days
of the new life.

193. T h e G reat V ictory o f t h e R evo lution

[Editorial in Den\ No. 15, March 22, 1917, p. 1.]
The revolution achieves one conquest after another. Today the act abolishing
all religious and national restrictions is being promulgated, and Russia now joins
in this respect the ranks of the advanced democracies of the world.
If we do not take into account the [achievement of a] republican form of
government, which has not as yet been formally attained, [then] the act abolish
ing religious and national restrictions should be considered as the greatest con
quest of the revolution. . . .

It is dreadful to recall all the evil, savagery, inhumanity, and barbarity that
the lack of national rights brought into the life of Russia. The history of national
persecutions has not as yet been written. But today is truly a feast of the revo
lution, today one of its greatest conquests has been given legal form and expressed
in official terms. With this victory we congratulate the revolutionary nation and
the Provisional Government.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 215

194. T h e A bo litio n o f E states

[Zhurnaly, No. 141, July 27, 1917. This document is included to facilitate an explana
tion of the question of classes or estates as it was approached by the Provisional
Government. Before the revolution, the nobility was a privileged class, with a definite
place in the state system and enjoying certain privileges, especially in connection
with local government. These privileges were automatically abolished with the intro
duction of the new democratic organization of local government and the abolition of
class representatives in certain courts by the summer of 1917. This and other legisla
tion also, of course, virtually did away with other class institutions. For all practical
purposes these designations were no longer of any significance, though they were often
employed out of habit or for political attacks. The Odessa Municipal Committee was,
therefore, asking for direct legislation on an issue that had already been or was in the
process of being solved through other measures. See, however, the reference to estates
in the Declaration of July 8, 1917, of the Provisional Government.]
11. The conclusion of the Juridical Council attached to the Provisional Gov
ernment:
Heard:
v) With regard to the petition of the Odessa Municipal Committee regarding
the liquidation of institutions of estates before the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly.
Resolved:
To form within the Juridical Council a special committee for a detailed dis
cussion of the question of liquidating the institutions of estates before the con
vocation of the Constituent Assembly, provided that the conclusions of the afore
said committee be presented to the consideration of the Provisional Government
as they are worked out.

POLICE AGENCIES

195. T h e S e iz u re o f t h e O k h r a n a a n d t h e P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t
[V. Z e n z in o v , F e v r a ls k i e d n i, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXV (1953), 218-20.]
I was far more interested in liquidating the Police Department, the Okhranka,
[and] the organization of provocateurs who were in the service of the police and
who were still, perhaps, to be found in our ranks.
It was precisely this interest that led me to an encounter on this day or this
night [February 28]we could not tell the difference between day and night
during this period; this whole period seemed to be one dazzling, radiant, trium
phant day to us!with M. Gorky and his friend, Tikhonov, the editor of Letopisi
[Chronicles]. At night I went with the two of them in one of the requisitioned
automobiles to the Department of the Okhrana on Kronverskii Prospekt. There
I found that the walls were already ripped, the windows broken, the doors tom
down. It was with difficulty that I recognized the familiar staircase along which
I was at one time led as a prisoner, and I barely managed to find the office of
Von Kotten, Chief of the Okhrana, in which he tried to interrogate me during
216 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

my last arrest in the year 1910. We devoted particular attention to collecting the
documents. I suspect that during our searches M. Gorky was motivated not only
by political but by literary aims as well; on my part, however, I intended as
quickly as possible to disentangle the wily network which by acts of provocation
could damage, for a long time to come, the cause of revolution and emancipation.
We actually succeeded in discovering several flats used by the Okhrana for con*
spiratorial purposes and made the rounds of them during the same night. But
strange thing!all of them were already opened and raided. These nests were
being burned out and destroyed by the people independently, and they were dis
covered, for the most part, by directions [given] by the very same plain-clothes
men and policemen. Light and open air was certain death to all these shady
characters.
On the basis of the papers we found in the Okhrana and the Police Depart
ment, we succeeded in identifying several dozen agents provocateurs who were
active in revolutionary parties and were in the service of the Police Department.
Several days later their names were published in all the newspapersthe first list
contained names of 18 persons, not one of whom was suspected until that time.
Among them I remember the name of one prominent BolshevikChernomazov,
one of the editors of Pravda. Even before the [list] was published, they were all
arrested at the same time and sent to prison (I do not know their fate). This
operation was prepared and carried out by several persons, among them the
Menshevik Internationalist, Grinevich . . . I, too, participated in this work of
disinfection.

196. T h e A bo litio n of th e D epa r tm en t o f P o lice and t h e E sta b lish m en t

of a T em po ra ry P olice A d m in istra tio n
[Sob. U z a k I, 1, No. 453.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. The Department of Police is abolished and its officers shall be placed on

the unassigned list on a general basis.
2. A temporary police administration is established within the Ministry of
the Interior for the protection of the person and property of citizens.
3. The Minister of the Interior, in agreement with the Minister of Finance,
is authorized to close the credits allocated under the budget of the Ministry of
the Interior which are not required at the present time.
4. For the purpose of liquidating cases of a political nature of the former
Department of Police a special commission shall be formed, by agreement with
the Ministry of Justice.8
P rin ce L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]

March 10,1917

3 This Commission was abolished on June 15,1917, and replaced by a Special Commission
under the Minister of Justice, charged with supervision of all aspects of the investigation of
police agencies of the Tsarist regime. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 941.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 217

197. T h e A b o litio n o f t h e O khrana A gency in P aris

[Zhurnaly, No. 18, March 14, 1917.]

Resolved:
To abolish the Okhrana agency of the Ministry of the Interior in Paris and
the transfer of all its documents to the Minister of Justice.4

198. T h e A bo litio n o f t h e Gendarme C orps

[Zhurnaly, No. 24, March 19, 1917.]
Resolved:
To issue the following law of the Provisional Government:
I. To abolish the separate gendarme corps.
II. To assign within the ranks of the army the officers of the gendarme corps,
with the exception of those who because of their age or state of health are not
subject to the draft into the armed forces.
III. The officials of the gendarme corps who are not subject to assignment
into the ranks of the armed forces are to he dismissed in accordance with the
usual procedure.
IV. The uniforms and arms of the enlisted men of the abolished gendarme
corps are to be transferred to the uezd military administrative representative
fvoinskii nachaVnik\ .
V. All the archives, files, and correspondence of the central administration
of the corps and of the staff of the gendarme corps to be transferred to the juris
diction of the central staff.
VI. Special commissions are to be formed for the study of the archives, files,
and correspondence of the guberniya, oblast, and town gendarme administrations,
Okhrana sections, and investigative units . . .
VII. To form special commissions for the study of the archives, files, and
correspondence of the gendarme administrations of the railways and the sections
of these administrations . . .
VIII. All the archives, files, and correspondence of the guberniya, oblast, and
town gendarme administrations, Okhrana sections, and investigative units of the
gendarme administrations of railroads, and the sections of the latter admin
istrations touching the military or economic services, to be transferred to
the respective uezd military administrative representative. All the archives, files,
and correspondence of political and criminal nature of the aforementioned insti
tutions to be transferred to the prosecutors of the district courts. All the files and
correspondence touching enemy espionage to be transferred to the headquarters
of the military districts.
4 These documents were still in Paris when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. The
Ambassador to France of the Provisional Government, V. A. Maklakov, secretly sent them to
the Hoover Institution in the mid-twenties to prevent their falling into the hands of the Soviets.
In accordance with the conditions of the bequest, the existence of the documents at Hoover
Institution was not revealed until 1957, following Maklakovs death.
218 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

IX. The files of the offices of the gendarme corps located in Finland to he
transmitted to the central administration of the general staff.
X. The commission mentioned above to be vested with the duty, in case cash
is found in the treasuries of the gendarme corps institutions, to compile reports
on this subject and send the latter to the presidents of the district courts, com
municating to the Ministry of the Interior the amount of the sums, while the
detected sums are to be paid into the deposits of the court district, until the ques
tion to whom the money belongs or to what purposes these sums are assigned is
clarified.

199. T h e O rganization o f a T em porary M il itia

[Circular from the Temporary Militia Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to
guberniya, town, and oblast Commissars, March 22, 1917, No. 25062. Sb. Tsirk. MVD,
p. 60.]
The project of the permanent militia regulations is being urgently worked
out. For the time being, a temporary militia should be organized without taking
into account the laws concerning the former police. The enrollment of former
police officials in the militia is left entirely to your discretion, provided, of course,
there is an individual appraisal of the suitability of these officials. On the other
hand, enrollment of the younger officials of the former police, who are subject
to the draft, is not desirable. The militia should, as of now, be reinforced with
wounded military personnel exempted from military duty. It is essential to
organize the custody of liquor deposits and stores. In case of aggravation of
disorders and the impossibility of stopping them by means of persuasion, the
summoning of the troops and the destruction of liquor supplies are permitted.
The question of the further fate of the officials of the former police shall be
decided by the Government in the very near future.

200. T h e E sta b lish m en t of a M il it ia

[So6. U za k 1,1, No. 537. For the establishment of a militia for the cities of Petrograd,
Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa, see ibid., I, 2, No. 1756.]
LAW O F T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
In abrogation and amendment of relevant legislation it is decreed:
I. In place of the police a militia is established on the basis of the rules
annexed hereto.
II. The appropriations intended for the maintenance of the staff and offices
of the police in 1917 from the funds of the state treasury shall be transferred to
the appropriate uezd zemstvo and municipal administrations for the maintenance
of the militia.

VIII. The organization of the militia in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa
will be the subject of a special statute.
P rin ce L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 17, 1917
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 219

Annex to Section I
PROVISIONAL STATUTE ON T H E M ILITIA
1. The militia is the executive organ of state power on the local level, under
the direct jurisdiction of zemstvo and municipal administrations.
Part I.
On the composition of uezd and municipal militia.
2. The entire uezd including all uezd seats and other cities, towns, villages,
and settlements located in it shall be subject to the jurisdiction of a uezd zemstvo
militia. All guberniya capitals and the more important cities, towns, and villages,
for which a separate police is established on the basis of laws and government
ordinances in effect on March 1, 1917, shall have their own separate militia.

3. The militia shall be composed of the chief of militia, his assistants, precinct
chiefs of militia, their assistants, senior militiamen, and militiamen.

9. Militiamen shall be armed with sabers and revolvers.

Part II.
On the procedure for appointing and dismissing officers of the uezd and
municipal militia.
10. Chiefs of the militia shall be chosen and dismissed by municipal and uezd
zemstvo boards, as appropriate, without specification of their term of service.
11. Assistant chiefs of militia shall be appointed and dismissed from the
service, at the suggestion of chiefs of militia, by municipal and zemstvo boards,
as appropriate.
12. The remaining militia posts shall be filled by chiefs of militia at their
discretion.

15. Persons appointed to posts of chiefs of militia and their assistants must
have at least secondary education; all other persons appointed to posts in the
militia must be completely literate.

Part IV.
On the duties and powers of the militia.
18. The militia shall preserve public safety and order and defend each and
all [citizens] against any violence, injury, and assault.
19. The duties of the militia in preserving public order and security and in
matters of public welfare shall include:
1. taking measures to end breaches of order, or of laws, and ordinances;
2. prompt notification of the population concerning ordinances of govern
ment and public authorities and concerning announcements and communications
issued by them;
3. preserving rights of civil freedom;
4. cooperating with the organs of government and public authority in
carrying out the duties entrusted to them;
5. issuing identification cards, as well as all other certificates, documents,
information, and attestations provided by existing laws, including paupers cer
tificates;
220 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

6. keeping a register of the population in places where such register is

established;
7. drawing up documents and official reports on all accidents and acts of
violence, as well as on any kind of circumstance if this is required by citizens
for the defense of their rights;

8. maintaining order in public places as well as watching over the good

condition of roads, bridges, brushwood roads, streets, squares, etc., and super
vising the movement of traffic on them;
9. taking measures for preserving safety and order during fires, floods,
and other public disasters as well as rendering assistance in accidents; and
10. requesting the cooperation of citizens to supply assistance during
public disasters and accidents.

26. The militia shall draw up an official report of each case of arrest, showing
exactly the place, day, and hour of the arrest, as well as the reasons for the use
of this measure. At the request of the person arrested, a copy of the official report
shall be issued immediately to him or to the members of his family or to his repre
sentative by the person who has drawn it up.
27. Persons participating in the case and members of the family of the person
arrested shall have the right to request officers of the militia to issue them a copy
of the official report within a period of three days.
28. Persons arrested without a written order of a judicial authority to that
effect must be released immediately or within a period of 24 hours be brought
before the judge or examining magistrate who has jurisdiction in the case, if the
arrest occurred in his uezd; in other cases they must be brought before the nearest
judge or examining magistrate.
29. If the arrest occurred in a place remote from the permanent jurisdiction
of representatives of the judicial authority (art. 28), the 24-hour period laid
down for producing the person under arrest shall be increased to the extent re
quired by local conditions.

81. A violation of a law or a compulsory regulation, discovered by the militia,

must be set down in writing, in an official report.

33. The report must show who drew up the report; where, when, and by whom
the violation was committed; what it consists of; what law or compulsory regu
lation it infringes or what consequences are threatened, as well as the nature of
the demand made by the militia.
34. The circumstances established by the report must, as far as possible, be
attested to by onlookers or witnesses, as well as by experts, if the circumstances
of the case require their opinion.
Part V.
On the lines of command and communication of officers of the militia.
35. The Minister of the Interior through the Militia Administration has the
following powers: 1) general direction of the activity of the militia; 2) issuance
of instructions and regulations defining the technical aspect of the activity of the
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 221

militia; 3) review and inspection of the institutions and activity of the militia;
4) the drawing up of budget estimates for the maintenance of the militia and the
allocation of funds appropriated for it to cities and uezds.
36. In the gubemiyas special posts of government inspectors of militia shall
be set up on the basis of the Statute on Guberniya and Uezd Commissars.
37. The guberniya authorities have the following powers: 1) direction of the
activity of the militia within the boundaries of the guberniya; 2) issuance of
relevant instructions, enactments, and explanations; 3) review and inspection of
the activity and institutions of the militia; 4) transfer of militia cadres within
the guberniya boundaries on the basis of instructions to the guberniya and uezd
commissars.
38. Chiefs of the militia shall be directly subordinate to the uezd zemstvo and
municipal boards, as appropriate.

Part VII.
On reporting and responsibility of officers of the militia.
44. A chief of militia shall submit a report on his activity annually through
the uezd zemstvo and municipal boards to the uezd zemstvo assembly or mu
nicipal duma, as appropriate. At the same time this report shall be submitted
by the chief of militia to the local government inspector. If necessary, the zemstvo
assembly or municipal duma may call for personal explanations from the chief
of militia.
45. Complaints against acts of the chief of militia and his assistant shall be
made to the uezd or municipal board, to the government inspector or the prose
cutors office, or to an administrative tribunal, as appropriate.
46. Complaints against acts of other officers of the militia shall be made
directly to their superiorsto the uezd commissar, to the prosecutor, or to an
administrative tribunal.
47. Chiefs of militia and their assistants are not subject for their acts to dis
ciplinary penalties under administrative procedure.

50. In case of obvious unsuitability of a chief of militia for the post occupied
by him, the government inspector is entitled temporarily to suspend him from
his post, after having so informed the appropriate uezd or municipal board for
the purpose of dismissing him finally from such post. If the board does not
dismiss such a chief of militia within seven days, the government inspector shall
submit the whole case to the Minister of the Interior.

52. All militiamen are liable in court for crimes in office, under the, procedure
established by law.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery of the
Provisional Government
April 17, 1917
 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

THE COMMISSION FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE

JUDICIAL CHARTERS

2 0 1 . T h e F o r m a tio n o f a C o m m :s? h > n to R e sto r e th e J u d ic ia l C h a r t e r s

OF 1801 A M ) 7 0 MVKE ThV C ^ ? .'.'I> 7 ? :\T V.TTH T H E X e .V ST A T E
O rder. and in n ny \ P n o v i? :o n a l S u p rem e
l):> T r ie in a l

5 Following the formation of the First Coalition. See VoL HI, Doc. 1095.
6The Law of August 14, 1881, stipulated that the Government had the right to introduce
in a given region of the Empire Usilennaia Okhrana [Increased Security] or Chrezvychcdnaia
Okhrana [Extraordinary Security]. Increased Security measures were introduced for one
year; Extraordinary Security measures for six months. However, the Minister of the Interior
had the right to submit to the Committee of Ministers a proposal to extend both the Increased
and Extraordinary Security measures for the same length of time. This could be done re
peatedly. Gradually, from a temporary measure, Increased Security was converted into a
permanent order of life for almost all guberniyas and oblasts of the Empire. After the revo
lutionary movement of 1905, many territories of Russia found themselves for two or three years
under the regime of Extraordinary Security.

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The fail of the oid state order, which was a survival of past times, could occur
wish such ea*e, amidst such universal rejoicing and with such unanimous ex
pressions of the wrath and hatred of the people for the old regime and its agents,
only i e au*t* the old order had fallen into complete decay and impotence, had
ceased completely to reckon with the interests of the people, and had been per
vaded fcy falsehood, crime, and corruption. All branches of the state adminis
tration had fallen into impotence. With a feeling of profound sorrow it must be
admitted that this taint had also affected the Russian courts. The Judicial Char
ters of November 2U, 1364, which in their original form were an excellent example
of a judicial system extremely advanced for its time, were considerably vitiated
by later legislation which undermined the principles of proper judicial organiza
tionpublicity, independence of judges, and the participation in the court of
the public element [juries]. Judicial practice departed even further from these
principles: the independence of judges became an empty phrase, publicity dis
appeared from the court at the first wish of the administration, the most impor
tant casesinvolving state crimes, crimes in office, and offenses of the press
were removed from the jurisdiction of trial by jury. The extraordinary military
tribunal became a common occurrence. Once again there appeared in the popu
lation that distrust for the court which was such a scourge in the old pre-reform
Russia of the last century. For example, it is sufficient to point to the not un
common interrogation of witnesses with bias and threats during the holding of
preliminary investigations; to the forgeries in records of investigations which
have come to light; to the torturesterrible to relatewhich were sometimes
inflicted on suspects during the inquisitions which replaced investigations or
which were carried out parallel with them. It is enough to point to the fact that
courts which had heard of these tortures, or which had been convinced of the
falseness of the documents in the investigation file lying on the courts table, found
it possible sometimes to try a case in spite of the existence of such judicial evi
dence, and that the Criminal Cassation Department of the Ruling Senate, having
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 223

information of the forgeries committed during the preliminary investigations in

certain cases, found it impossible in some instances to uphold verdicts of guilty
reached under such circumstances, and at the same time did not find it necessary
to start criminal proceedings against the evildoers who had carried fraud and
crime into the temple of justice. Once and for ail, an end must now be put to this
evil, to these horrors. May truth and mercy reign in the court, not by order of
the Tsar but by the will of the people. Subsequent legislation will define in full
detail the judicial system which the people deem best. But the most flagrant
shortcomings of our judicial system must be eliminated without delay. For this
purpose, on the one hand, the text of the Judicial Charters must be purified of
those later innovations that so vitiated the original text of this law and must be
coordinated with the changes that have occurred in the state order, and, on the
other hand, persons wiio have become accustomed to practices in court that can
be tolerated no longer must be removed from the bench. For the revision of the
text of the Judicial Charters the Provisional Government has decreed the forma
tion under the Ministry of Justice of a Commission for the Restoration of the
Basic Principles of the Judicial Charters and Their Coordination with the Change
Which Has Occurred in the State Order, whereas, for the second purpose, the
Government deems it necessary to change the composition of the Supreme Disci
plinary Tribunal and to place senators also under the jurisdiction of this court.
Under the law now in effect . . . the Minister of Justice brings acts of negli
gence in office of a judge, and any other acts that indicate that a judge is unfit
for the office occupied by him, to the attention of the Supreme Disciplinary Tri
bunal of the Senate, which may decide to remove the judge from office. This
Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal consists of 12 senators of the First Department
and of both Cassation Departments.
Leaving it to future legislation to decide the question of how far such a pro
cedure for supervision of judges is generally proper and useful under normal
conditions of state life, the Provisional Government deems it necessary for the
time being to maintain the powers of the Minister of Justice granted to him. . . .
The principle of the irremovability of judges in so far as it is established by
existing laws is not violated thereby. . . . With a view to ensuring both proper
understanding of popular needs by this Supreme Tribunal and the guarantees
necessary for the impartiality and independence of judicial decisions, provision
should be made for participation in this Tribunal of the public element.
In view of these considerations the Provisional Government has decreed:
I. A Commission for the Restoration of the Basic Provisions of the Judicial
Charters and Their Coordination with the Change Which Has Occurred in the
State Order is established under the Ministry of Justice, with the Minister of
Justice as chairman with the right to appoint the assistant chairman and members
of this Commission.
II. In place of the Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal of the Ruling Senate . . .
a Provisional Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal is established under the chairman
ship of a person appointed by the Provisional Government either from among
the senators of one of the Cassation Departments or from the First, Second, or
Judicial Department of the Ruling Senate and has the following membership:
1. Five persons appointed by the Provisional Government from the
senators of the Civil and Criminal Cassation, First, Second, and Judicial Depart
ments of the Ruling Senate;
221 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2. Six persons elected by the following institutions from among the sena
tors, or presiding judges or judiros of general and local judicial establishments,
or, finally, from barristers who ha\e held this title for not less than six years:
a. Two by the Temporary Committee of the State Duma or a meeting
of Duma members calif-d by thi? Comnakfe^;
b. Twoby the Petrograd and Moscow Municipal Dumas, one from
each, and
c. Two person*, elected by the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of
Workers* and Soldier?- Deputies, one from each.
III. AH cares involving officials of the judiciary, not excepting senators of
the Ca^ation a:id other Departments of the Ruling Senate, shall be considered
subject to the jurisdiction of this Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal.
IV. In addition . . . the Minister of Justice is authorized to make proposals
to the ProvL-ional Supreme Disciplinary Tribunal in those cases in which he dis
covers that a judge, in the exercise of his office or in his earlier nonjudicial service
or public activity, or finally, in private life, committed such acts as indicate
insufficient respect for the law on the part of the judge and create apprehension
concerning the possibility of manifestations of irregularity or injustice on his
part in the exercise of the office of judge.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 25, 1917

202. T h e O pening o f t h e C o m m ission fo r t h e R estoration of t h e

B asic P rovisions o f t h e J udicial C harters
[H 7\N o. 31, April 14,1917, p. 2.]
On April 13 at 2:00 p . m . in the great hall of the Ministry of Justice there took
place the solemn opening of the newly appointed special commission, whose task
it wTill be to restore the basic provisions of the Judicial Charters and to adjust them
to the changes that have taken place in the regime of the country. Scholars of
civil and criminal lawTfrom the judiciary, from the bar, and from among pro
fessors have joined the Commission.

. . . The total membership of the Commission is more than 60 persons. The

Commission was opened by A. F. Kerensky, Minister of Justice, who addressed
all those present. In his speech the Minister outlined the future tasks of the
Commission. . . .
Concluding his speech, A. F. Kerensky said that, bearing as he was the brunt
of other labors connected with the Ministry, he was appointing as his deputy for
the chairmanship of the Commission A. A. Zarudnyi, son of [one of] the creators
of the Judicial Charters.
After A. F. Kerenskys speech, a speech was delivered by A. F. Koni who gave
to the assembly a full picture of the gradual decline of the Charters [original]
conception; he mentioned the institution of the zemshii nachaVnik, the special
political investigations by gendarmes, changes in the procedures regarding ar
raignment and regarding the publicity of court trials, etc. Then speeches were
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 225

made by a number of other participants. . . . The speakers were unanimous in

advocating the revision of the Charters, and precisely in the sense outlined by
A. F. Kerensky, Minister of Justice. Zarudnyi. in his last speech, specially stressed
this unanimity.
This session solved a number of questions of a purely organizational nature.
It was decided to divide the Commission into three subcommissions: 1 for the
[organization of] judicial institutions, under the chairmanship of G. D. Skariatin,
Deputy Minister of Justice, 2* for the criminal laws, under the chairmanship of
A. F. Koni, and 3 i for the civil laws, under the chairmanship of Senator Ya. F.
Ganskau.

203. T h e Q u e s t io n o f W o m e n J u r o r s
[VVP, N o. 76. J u n e 10. 1917. p. 2.]
The last plenary session of the Commission on the Restoration of the Judicial
Charters was devoted to a discussion of the question of including women on juries.

The question of how to edit paragraph 84 where womens right to jury duty
should be mentioned aroused some lively discussions. Out of a number of
proposed revisions the editing of the paragraph worked out by A. F. Koni was
accepted by the majority. The text of the paragraph is as follows: . . . 2 *Tn-
cluded in the general lists of jurors are local residents who comply wTith the re
quirements stated in paragraph 81; also, and on the same basis, those persons of
the female sex wTho express their wish to the Commission to be included in the
general lists. . . .

204. An A m en d m en t to t h e S tatute on J udicial I n stitu tio n s

C oncerning J urors
[5o6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1830. Article 84 is omitted from this law, since it appears in the
document above.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Considering it essential to renew as soon as possible the body of jurors in
accordance with the principles which have been deemed fundamental to this
institution by the Commission now working on the restoration of the Judicial
Charters, the Provisional Government has decreed:
I. Pending the approval by legislative procedure of the draft Statute on Judi
cial Institutions prepared by the aforesaid Commission, Chapter II of Part II
of the present Statute, in the edition of 1914, shall read as follows:
Art. 81. Jurors are selected from citizens of Russia of the male sex:
1) with a knowledge of the Russian language and able to read and
write Russian;
2) aged not less than 25 and not more than 70, counting the said age
as of January 31 of the year in which the selection takes place, and
3) residing for not less than two years in the uezd or city where the
selection for jury duty takes place.

Art. 89. General lists of jurors shall be drawn up for the uezd by zemstvos,,
and where the latter do not exist, by organs of volost self-government, under the
22G TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

supervision of the uezd commi^ar, and for cities* by the militia under the super
vision of the mayor.

Art. 91. Genera! list- of jur cs ha;I he forwarded by the uezd commissars
and may^r* of cil;^ to the pre.-ider.t of the i*>cai circuit court together with all
claim? :r,2"k' cun-,-:ernir.> the aforesaid lists.
Art. 93. T rat? p*.nerai lists, together with claims made concerning their
content?, shali I e f-u; mlilrd ;.y the president of the circuit court for the compila
tion ot re iiiiar i>N to a:: e\t cutive K'ssion of the court. The court shall proceed to
the corraliatiMn <>f the regular lists after their correction on the basis of those
*. lain'ir ^ hi.h it f.r/is va*id.
Arl. 07. ,'TLe following] shall be invited to participate in sessions of the
*:3re;;:i c--uri f j r the compilation of regular lists of jurors: the chairman of the
ruLernlya or yezd zemstvo board, the mayor, and persons chosen for this purpose:
ihr**e I y the ruberniya or uezd zemstvo asembly and three by the municipal duma.
Ira legalities which do not possess organs of zemstvo and municipal self-
ime:,t reorganized on new principles, the president of the circuit court is
auihTS7-d to invite to sessions persons who, because of their official position or
prolonged residence in the uezd and acquaintance with its population, may fur
nish r.ece??ary information or indications to the court; persons invited on this
}*3>is shall participate in the proceedings and decisions of the court on an equal
footing with permanent members.

Art. 101. No one may be called to perform jury duty more than once a
year. Moreover, persons who have appeared to perform this duty in one year
^hall have the right to refuse it in the following year.

A. Kerensky, Minister-President
A. D e m ia n o v , Acting Minister of Justice
September 21,1917

THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY, ASSOCIATION, AND

PUBLIC PERFORMANCES

205. M eetings and A ssociations

[Sob. Uzak.t I, 1, No. 540.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In abrogation and amendment of relevant legislation it is decreed:
1. All citizens of Russia without exception have the right, without any special
permission being required, to hold meetings both indoors as well as outdoors.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 227

3. Armed persons are not entitled to have access to meetings, with the excep
tion of those authorized to carry arms by law.
4. All citizens of Russia without exception have the right, without any special
permission being required, to form societies and unions not contrary to criminal
laws.
5. Societies and unions have the right to establish permanent relations with
public and other organizations as well as to conclude agreements with associa
tions or societies formed abroad.
6. The right to acquire and alienate real estate, raise capital, assume obliga
tions, and act as plaintiff and defendant in court is granted only to those societies
and unions whose charters have been registered by judicial authority. The pro
cedure for registration of societies and associations is to be defined in a special
law.
7. The forcible closing of a society or union may nor occur other than by
court action and then only if its activity has pursued purposes prohibited by the
criminal laws.
8. The present law does not extend to profit-making societies and associations.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 12, 1917

206. T h e S u p e r v is io n of P u b l ic P e r f o r m a n c e s
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 599.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. Preliminary dramatic censorship is abolished.
II. The provisions of criminal and procedural laws on crimes committed by
means of the press and on the procedure for instituting criminal prosecution
also apply accordingly to public performances.

V. Supervision of public performances is entrusted to the local Commissar

of the Provisional Government or to the person or institution acting in his stead.
The persons or institutions supervising the performance have the right to request
that from one to four seats be made available for the persons to whom inspection
of performances has been directly delegated, depending on the size of the premises
set aside for the public performance; one of the seats made available shall be no
farther back than the third row of the orchestra.
VI. The authority supervising public performances is authorized to stop a
performance, if the latter has caused a disturbance threatening public tran
quillity.
VII. If the authority supervising public performances finds evidence of a
criminal act in a performance, it may, at the same time that it communicates
this fact to the appropriate institution for the initiation of criminal prosecution,
decide to prohibit a repetition of this performance, immediately referring to a
228 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

local justice of the peace for decision the question of maintaining this prohibition
until a verdict is reached by the appropriate judicial body. Decisions of the
justice of the peace on this subject may be appealed by the responsible director
of the public performance under the procedure provided for formal appeals.
VIII. Persons guilty of violating the rules set forth in section III are liable
to a fine of not more than 300 rubles.
Minister-President
P r in c e L v o v ,
[and all other ministers]
April 27,1917

207. T h e P r e ss
[Sob. JJzak., I, 1, No. 597.]
I. The press and trade in the publications of the press are free. They are not
subject to administrative penalties.
II. The procedure for printing and publishing is governed by the following
rules:
1. Within 24 hours after the publication of newly printed books, pam
phlets, magazines, newspapers, music, and other works of the press, printing
houses shall be required to submit to the local Commissar of the Provisional
Government or to the institution or official acting in his stead eight copies in
excellent condition of each individual book, or pamphlet, or number of a peri
odical publication, of which three copies are for the Book Chamber and one copy
each for the Commissariat, the [Petrograd] Public Library, the Academy of
Sciences, the Moscow Public Library and Rumiantsev Museum, and the Alexander
University in Helsingfors.
2. Everyone wishing to publish a new periodical is required to submit to
the local Commissar of the Provisional Government or another institution or
official acting in his stead a statement in two copies, showing: a) the place in
which the publication will appear; b) the type of publication (literary or political,
or technical, etc.), the frequency of publication, and the subscription price; the
first names, patronymics, surnames, and places of residence of the publisher and
the responsible editor, or if there is more than one publisher and editor, the first
names, patronymics, surnames, and places of residence of each of them, and
c) the printing house in which the publication will be printed. The local Com
missar or another institution or official acting in his stead is required to issue a
receipt to the person presenting the statement mentioned in the present (2)
article.
3. In places outside of cities a statement on the publication of a new
periodical (article 2) shall be handed in to the Commissar of the Provisional
Government of the nearest uezd or gubemiya capital, or to another institution
or official acting in the Commissars stead.
4. Responsible editors of a periodical publication or a part thereof may
only be persons residing within the boundaries of the Russian state who are of
age, possess all civil rights, and are not restricted in their rights by judicial
sentence.
5. If, after the appearance of a periodical, any change occurs in one of the
circumstances of its publication (article 2), a corresponding statement to this
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 229

effect must be presented under the procedure indicated above (article 2) within
seven days.
6. One of the copies of the publication statement of the periodical or the
statement of change in the circumstances of its publication shall be kept by the
local Commissar of the Provisional Government or the person or institution acting
in his stead; the other shall be forwarded to the Book Chamber.
7. In each number of a periodical publication the surnames of the respon
sible editor and publisher must be printed, and the printing house in which the
number was printed as well as the address of the editorial offices must be indicated.
Each nonperiodical publication must indicate the name and location of the print
ing house in which the publication was printed.
8. Every periodical publication shall be required to insert without charge
dailies within three days and weeklies or monthlies in the next numberan offi
cial denial or correction, communicated to it by the Provisional Government, of
a news item published by that periodical, without any changes and comments in
the text of the denial itself, printing it in the same place where the original news
item was printed and in the same size type.
9. On the same basis and within the same period, a periodical which has
published any news item about a governmental or public institution or about an
official or private person shall be required to insert a denial or correction by such
institution or person of what was published, provided that the aforesaid denial
or correction does not exceed the size of the original news item, that it is signed
by the authors, that it does not contain evidence of a criminal act or abusive
expressions, that it is not in the nature of a controversy, and that it is limited
to factual information alone.
10. The rules set forth in the present (II) section concerning nonperiodi
cal publication do not apply to publications serving the purposes of industry and
commerce or domestic and social custom such as circulars, visiting cards, etc., as
well as election ballots if they correspond to the form established by law or by
government order.
III. Typographies, lithographies, metallographies, and all other printing
establishments are subject to the rules laid down for industrial enterprises and
must in addition observe the regulations set forth below.
1. Everyone wishing to found a typographic, lithographic, metallographic,
or any other establishment for printing letters and pictures shall be required to
submit to the local Commissar of the Provisional Government or to the official
or institution acting in his stead a statement to that effect which must show the
first name, patronymic, and surname of the founder, as well as the location of
the printing establishment to be opened by him, and the proposed number of
workers.
2. With the statement mentioned in the preceding (1) article the founder
of the printing establishment shall be required to enclose a loose-leaf book in
which all work coming into the establishment shall be entered, with the exception
of work on the nonperiodical publications mentioned in article 10 of section II.
IV. The local Commissar of the Provisional Government or the official or
institution acting in his stead, on receiving the statement mentioned in article 9
of section II and article 2 of section III and the loose-leaf book, shall be required
230 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

within a period of three days to countersign the aforesaid book by pages and
return it to the applicant together with a receipt for the statement.
[V through VII delineate the penalties for violations of the law.]

Lvov, Minister-President
P r in c e
[and all other ministers]
April 27,1917

208. I n s t it u t io n s for P r e ss A f f a ir s
[Sob. U z o k I? 1, No. 598.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. The Central Administration for Press Affairs, the office and position of
special censors of dramatic compositions and officials on special assignment
attached to it, the local committees for press affairs, the positions of inspectors
for press affairs and inspectors of printing houses and the book trade, the com
mittees on foreign censorship and the positions of censors of the aforesaid cen
sorship, as well as the Committee on Popular Publications founded on July 13,
1914, by personal order of the Sovereign under the Central Administration on
Press Affairs are abolished.

III. A Book Chamber shall be established . . .

V. The Special Commission for the Liquidation of the Central Administra

tion for Press Affairs, established by law of the Provisional Government of
March 8, 1917, is entrusted with the implementation of the measures occasioned
by the founding of the Book Chamber and the Bureau for . . . Reviews of the
Periodical Press, with the reorganization of the Petrograd Telegraphic Agency
now attached to the Provisional Government and of the publication Vestnik
Vremennago PraviteTstva, formerly under the supervision of the Central Admin
istration for Press Affairs, as well as with the temporary management of the
institutions mentioned above.
VI. The Minister-President is authorized to approve instructions defining
the organization of the activity of the Special Commission for the liquidation
of the Central Administration for Press Affairs and institutions . . . These
instructions shall be published for general information through the Ruling Senate.

X. The local Commissars of the Provisional Government or the persons and

institutions acting in their stead are entrusted with: 1) registration of printing
houses, organs of the periodical press, and nonperiodical publications; 2) receipt
from printing houses of copies of publications of the press for state libraries and
forwarding of these copies to the Book Chamber, and 3) supervision of the
fulfillment of typographic, lithographic, and other similar establishments of the
requirements of the law.
P r in c e L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 27,1917
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 231

209. R e g u l a t io n s f o r t h e S p e c ia l C o m m is s io n f o r t h e L iq u id a t io n o f
the C e n t r a l A d m in is t r a t io n f o r P r ess A f f a ir s , t h e Vestnik Vremennago
PraviteVstva9 t h e B o o k C h a m b e r , a n d t h e B u r e a u f o r R e v ie w s o f t h e
P e r io d ic a l P r e s s in R u s s ia a n d A b r o a d
[Sob. Uzak., 1 ,1, No. 761. Dated May 25, 1917.]
REGULATION FOR THE SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION FOR PRESS AFFAIRS
I. The Special Commission for the Liquidation of the Central Administration
for Press Affairs is responsible for:
1. Carrying out the measures required by the abolition of the Central
Administration for Press Affairs and the central and local institutions under
its [the Central Administrations] jurisdiction; [and the establishment and/or
reorganization and the activities of the following institutions].

r e g u l a t io n f o r t h e Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva

3. The Vestnik has as its purpose the complete publication, for general
information, and the observance of the exact letter of the text of acts and docu
ments (of a legislative and administrative nature) originating with the Provi
sional Government, as well as the publicizing of the activities and ordinances
of various ministries and government institutions. The Vestnik also provides
information on the preparatory activity of government institutions which usually
precedes the elaboration of official acts.

12. The Vestnik is published from funds received from subscriptions to

the newspaper and from payment for advertisements inserted in it. Surpluses
which may occur on fulfillment of the estimate shall be placed in a reserve fund
from which possible overexpenditures shall be covered.

14. All ministries and administrations shall be obligatory subscribers to

the Vestnik and shall submit to the Editorial Office annually lists of central and
local institutions and officials under their jurisdiction required to subscribe to
the Vestnik.
15. The Vestnik shall publish for an established fee state advertisements,
as well as the notices of banks, commercial and industrial and other enterprises
required to render public accounting.

r e g u l a t io n f o r t h e book cham ber

I. The Book Chamber is a government scientific institution, devoted to the

work of registration, description, systematization, and collection of all new
publications of the printing press appearing in Russia. Registering and system
atizing all books appearing in Russia and many articles published in periodicals,
its basic task is thereby to make it possible to use all necessary literary material.
At the same time the Chamber shall assume the obligation to facilitate in every
way access to collections of books, to develop and direct the work of enriching
232 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

libraries existing in the state, as well as to create the most favorable conditions
for the development of library work in Russia.
The Chamber shall achieve these fundamental purposes through the inter
mediary of the following four departments:
i. Department of Registration of Publications of the Press, and publication
of the Book Chronicle [Knizhnaia letopis
ii. Russian Bibliographical Institute.
iii. Bureau of International Bibliography on Natural Science and Mathe
matics.
iv. Book Fund.

6. The duties of the Director of the Department of Registration of Pub

lications of the Press, and publication of the Book Chronicle :
a) supervision of the prompt submission to the Book Chamber of
periodicals and other publications of the press in the number of copies required
by law and in perfect condition;
b) supervision of the distribution and punctual dispatch to the estab
lished institutions of compulsory copies of publications of the press submitted
to the Chamber;
c) supervision of the registration of all books published in Russia in
the current year, according to a bibliographic plan prepared by the presidium
of the Chamber;
d) supervision of the registration of all dramatic works produced
in Russia in the current year, both printed and manuscript, according to a
bibliographic plan prepared by the presidium of the Chamber;
e) supervision of the prompt publication at intervals determined by
the presidium of an alphabetical list of new books (Book Chronicle) and the
editing of it according to a plan prepared by the presidium of the Chamber;
f) supervision of the prompt dispatch to other departments of pub
lications of the press submitted to the Department.
7. The duties of the Director of the Russian Bibliographic Institute:
a) supervision to ensure that all work of the Institute is placed on the
proper scientific level while coordinating bibliographic work in all other depart
ments of the Chamber ;
b) supervision of bibliographic cataloguing on cards of the contents
of periodical publications and books appearing in Russia in the current year
according to a directive approved by the Council of the Chamber;

d) the editing and supervision of the prompt publication by th

Institute of systematic yearbooks of books and articles appearing in Russia in
the current year in all branches of knowledge;

g) preparation of a plan for publication as soon as possible of a

complete list of all books appearing in Russia since the beginning of printing, as
well as of other bibliographic publications of the Institute;

8. The duties of the Director of the Bureau of International Bibliography

for Natural Science and Mathematics:
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 233

Continuation of bibliographical work and publication of the Russian

Bibliography on Natural Science and Mathematics according to plans approved
by the Academy of Sciences.
9. The duties of the Director of the Book Fund:
1) investigation, elaboration, and application of the most effectiv
means for the earliest possible formation and uninterrupted replenishment of
book stocks;

3) distribution and transfer at cost price or by special agreemen

of books and whole sets to libraries requiring them;

8) assistance to scholars in using all book resources kept in libraries

of the scientific type maintained by state funds or with state participation;
9) assistance to libraries of the scholarly type both in their mutual
relations and in organizing the exchange of publications between the institutions
to which the given libraries are attached and similar Russian and foreign insti
tutions;
10) preparation of a list of libraries in Russia, their registration, and
supervision of changes occurring in their organization and composition;
11) preparation of a general catalogue of books of libraries in Russia;

REGULATION FOR THE BUREAU FOR REVIEWS OF THE PERIODICAL PRESS

APPEARING IN RUSSIA AND ABROAD59
1. The purpose of compiling reviews is to ascertain, as far as possible, all
aspects of the situation in a given country, the interests and aspirations pre
dominating in it, changes in the state of public opinion, etc.
2. Reviews shall be compiled on the basis of the Bureaus study of Russian
periodicals and the most important foreign newspapers and magazines . . .
3. The reviews compiled daily shall be printed in a form convenient for
binding and shall be delivered by subscription to all those interested.

210. T h e M inistry of t h e I nterior W arns A gainst I nfringements of th e

F reedom of the P ress
[Circular from the Temporary Militia Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to
Guberniya Commissars, June 12,1917, No. 18804/D. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 77-78.]
A number of complaints and statements reaching the Ministry of the Interior
point at the illegal activity of local public committees in respect of the organs
of the press.
Therefore, the Central Administration of the Militia proposes that the Gu-
beraiya Commissars explain to the aforesaid organizations the following:
1) Immediately after its formation, the Provisional Government, in its first
declaration of March 5, announced that the freedom of speech and of the press
was one of the main foundations of its activity;
2) The law of the Provisional Government of May 16,1017 [sic] , regarding
the press, proclaimed the freedom of the press and of the trade in printed material,
and it is inadmissible to apply in their respect administrative penalties.
234 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

3) The aforesaid law determines the procedure for printing and issuing
printed material and establishes penalties under the law for the violation of these
rules.
In view of the foregoing, it should be immediately pointed out to the local
public committees that the activity of the press can be prosecuted only by the
juridical authorities and only in cases of a criminal nature, whereas all opposition
to the freedom of the press tends only to weaken the foundations of the new
regime.

LOCAL COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

211. T h e T e m p o r a r y O r g a n iz a t io n o f L o c a l C o u r t s
[So6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 577. The temporary courts established by the Minister of
Justice on March 3, 1917 [see Doc. 161], were abolished on July 19, 1917, in accord
ance with Art. Ill, Sec. VI, of this law. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 911.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Recognizing the imperative necessity of taking urgent measures in order to
ensure the proper administration of justice by local judicial establishments, the
Provisional Government, pending a general reorganization of the aforesaid
establishments along lines corresponding to the new order of state life, has
decreed:
I. The following amendments are introduced in the provisions of the Statute
on Judicial Institutions (Code of Laws, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, edit. 1914), applicable in
the localities enumerated in para. I of Note 1 to article 1 of the aforesaid statute:
1. Criminal and civil claims cases subject to the jurisdiction of justices
of the peace, with the exception of cases based on title deeds, notarial documents,
and other documents attested to according to the rules of the notarial regulations,
as well as on protested promissory notes, shall be decided by district and supple
mentary justices of the peace sitting together with two members of the court of
the peace.

2. The justice of the peace shall preside on the judicial bench formed
under article 1 and shall accordingly enjoy all rights of presiding officers in
general judicial establishments.
3. The cases mentioned in article 1 shall be tried in the volost to which
the aforesaid cases appertain under the general rules of jurisdiction, with the
participation of members of the court of the peace elected for the particular
volost. In municipal districts, justices of the peace shall try relevant cases with
the participation of members of the court of the peace elected for the particular
district.
4. Persons of both sexes who have reached the age of twenty-five may
be elected as justices of the peace either if they have received certificates attesting
to the completion of a course of studies in an educational institution of not lower
than the secondary level or attesting to the passing of a corresponding examina
tion, or if they have served for not less than three years in positions in which
they were able to acquire practical knowledge of judicial procedure, or, finally.
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 235

if during the same period they have handled clients cases in the capacity of
private attorney \_chastnyi poverennyi] or attorney [prisiazhnyi poverennyi].5

2. All judicial establishments formed by the population on its own initia

tive are considered abolished from this time forward (article 1 of the present
section).
3. The Minister of Justice is authorized to take steps to abolish, to the
extent he deems possible, the temporary courts established by his orders of
March 3,1917, and subsequent orders.
4. The appropriate zemstvo asemblies and municipal councils are author
ized immediately to proceed to the holding of elections to fill the offices of justices
of the peace and members of the court of the peace according to the newly estab
lished procedure.

P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
A. K er ensk y , Minister of Justice
May 4,1917

212. E x p la n a tio n an d C o m m e n t o n t h e R e fo r m o f L o c a l C o u r ts
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 106, May 13, 1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government has issued a decree concerning the reorganiza
tion of local courts. Along with the decrees which reorganize on new principles
the local administration in general, the present law introduces substantial changes
into the organization of the local-court judicial processes. Used as the basis of
reorganization of the justice-of-the-peace courts is the collegial principle of their
organization, the broadening of the circle of persons out of which the justices
may be selected, and the drawing of the broad masses of population into participa
tion in the election of judges. These principles, which are laid at the basis of the
arrangement of justice dispensed by the justices of the peace, constitute a reform
of the courts in the direction of democracy. Simultaneously with the reorganiza
tion of the justice-of-the-peace courts, the volost courts, which are operating at
present, are abolished.
First of all, the new decree of the Provisional Government introduces the
courts of the justices of the peace everywhere. As is well known, the law of
June 15, 1912, concerning the reorganization of local courts which was designed
to introduce the elective justices of the peace instead of appointed judges and
to abolish the judicial authority of zemsky nachalniki was being put into
practice extremely slowly by the former government. . . .
. . . The justice-of-the-peace courts are being changed from one-man to
collegial courts. The official court personnel is composed of a justice of the peace
who presides, and two members of the court. The full composition of the court
is necessary during the consideration of all criminal cases; of the civil cases, only
the ones not based on title deeds and notarized records require the full composi-

5 For an explanation of these two categories of attorney, see Samuel Kucherov, Courts,
Lawyers and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars, pp. 155-59.
236 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

tion of the court. Justices of the peace are elected in the same way as before, but
the circle of persons from which they can be selected is considerably broadened.
Property qualifications are abolished altogether; all the progressive groups in
the State Duma had been much opposed to them. Persons of either sex who have
reached the age of twenty-five are eligible for election. As educational require
ment, graduation from a school not lower than secondary is demanded. This
requirement may be waived if a person has served not less than three years in
posts that give an opportunity to acquire practical knowledge of court procedure,
or has been for the same term either an attorney or a registered practitioner of
the law.
The members of the justice-of-the-peace courts, who are being introduced
for the first time into the reorganized court, are to be elected in the volosts by
the volost zemstvo assemblies which will be established in the very near future
following the adoption of the expected zemstvo reform, and in the cities by the
municipal dumas. The educational requirements for the members of the justice-
of-the-peace courts are confined only to literacy. Persons of either sex are eligible
for election. . . .
. . . The present law assumes even greater significance because, along with
the reorganization of the justice-of-the-peace courts, the presently operating
volost courts are abolished. . . . Now the posts of volost judges are abolished.
They are replaced by the collegial sittings of the justice-of-the-peace courts con
sisting of the district justice of the peace and two members elected by the volost
zemstvo assembly. This is precisely the bill that was submitted by the Trudovik
group of the State Duma. Now it is being introduced by the decree of the Pro
visional Government. . . .
. . . On the whole, the reorganization of the local courts is as imperative
as other reforms that touch upon the arrangements of local life. The strengthen
ing of the bases of law in local life is now one of the pressing tasks advanced by
the present epoch. This task can be fulfilled only by a court that will command
the complete confidence of the population. The new justice-of-the-peace court,
which is close to the population and which is organized on the principle of
election by a wide stratum of the population, will be able to fulfill this lofty task
of reaffirming the legal bases of the new order.

213. A d m in is t r a t iv e C o u r t s
[*So6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 692. The law on the criminal and civil liability of government
employees was promulgated April 11, 1917. Ibid., No. 492.]

LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. The statute on administrative courts annexed hereto is approved and shall
be put into effect beginning June 1, 1917 . . .

P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
P . P e r e v e r z e v , Minister of Justice

May 30,1917
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 237

STATUTE ON ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

I. ON ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
1. Judicial authority in administrative cases belongs:
to administrative judges,
to circuit courts, and
to the Ruling Senate.
2. One or more administrative judges shall serve in each uezd. . . .

7. For the settlement of administrative cases in a guberniya or oblast,

special administrative divisions are formed within the circuit courts located in
guberniya and oblast capitals, consisting of an assistant president and members
of the court designated at the time of their appointment for service specifically
in the administrative division of the circuit court.

II. ON THE PROCEDURES TO BE USED BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES AND IN

CIRCUIT COURTS
1. On jurisdiction
10. The administrative court has jurisdiction over: 1) cases involving
protests of commissars [of the government] against decisions, enactments, acts,
and negligence of institutions and officials of the municipal, zemstvo (guberniya,
uezd, and volost), and settlement [poselkovyi] administrations; 2) cases involv
ing complaints of government establishments and officials against the decisions,
enactments, acts, and negligence mentioned in paragraph 1; 3) cases involving
complaints of municipal dumas, zemstvo and settlement assemblies, and private
persons, societies and establishments against the decisions, enactments, acts, and
negligence of the institutions and persons mentioned in paragraph 1, as well as
of commissars, their assistants, and other subordinates, and 4) cases specifically
placed by law under the jurisdiction of the administrative court,
11. Grounds for protests and complaints may be: 1) irregularities con
sisting either of a violation of a law or order of the authorities, or of exercise
of authority in violation of the purpose for which this authority was created;
2 ) failure to perform acts required by law or orders of the government, and 3)
dilatoriness. A complaint may be made by those persons, societies, and estab
lishm ents whose interests or rights have been infringed by the decision, enact
m ent, act, or negligence.

14. Cases involving complaints against guberniya commissars are con

sid ered by the First Department of the Ruling Senate.

P rince Lvov, Minister-President

P. P ereverzev, Minister of Justice
May 30,1917

214. Comment on the S tatute on A dministrative Courts

[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 133, June 14,1917, p. 3.]
I n the Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva of June 9 The Statute on Admin,
istra tiv e Courts is published.
238 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

The new law fills in and corrects one of the least orderly parts of our old
code. It puts an end to almost complete immunity of the administration from
complaints about its actions and orders. It stops the dependence of the organs
of local self-government on the will of the administrators.
The place of this will be taken by a free judgment of a free court, accessible,
nearby, and expeditious. In the past it has been too arbitrary altogether too often.

The statute decisively rejects the former right of the administration to base
its actions, its orders, and its supervision over public institutions on consideration
of benefits and needs, of expediency, etc. The history of Russian local self-
government is filled with examples of naked and harmful arbitrary judgment
which cloaked itself with care about the well being of the population entrusted
to it (which somehow could never come of age politically). From now on, only
the law, the legally issued orders and decrees, their violations, evasions, and pro
crastination in executing them serve as bases both for actions and orders of
administration and for its protests against the actions and orders of public
institutions, as well as for all the complaints of private and government-employed
individuals.
The outstanding singularity of the law which distinguishes the administrative
court from the ordinary civil one is the right of the court to undertake on its
own initiative an independent check of evidence, to call witnesses not indicated
by either side, to call for expert testimony, to demand necessary documents from
any source, to instruct the participants in the case as to the nature of evidence
they must produce in court, and so on. Thus, the administrative court is free
from that difficult and not always reasonable situation which is obligatory, by
law, for the civil court. The administrative court does not wait for the evidence
to be submitted to it; it does not limit itself only to what has been submitted to
it in rendering its judgment, leaving the inexperienced litigant to drown, while
it looks on, in the morass of judicial ignorance and practical ineptitude.
The administrative court, touching in each case on public interest, naturally
had to be granted the right to overstep these limits which are obligatory and, even,
theoretically justifiable for the civil court. But in Russia, with its still-low level
of culture, this right must be especially welcomed.
Such, in general, are the new administrative courts.
There is no doubt that they, as one of the valuable attainments of political
liberty, will quickly become a part of Russian life, inculcating law and order
where previously extremely arbitrary personal rule prevailed.

THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE BAR AND THE CIVIL SERVICE

215. T h e A d m is s io n of W om en to t h e Bar
[So6. U z a k I, 1, No. 706.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1. Women are authorized: (a) to be admitted as attorneys [prisiazhnyi
poverennyi], and as attorneys in commercial courts [prisiazhnyi striapchii],
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 239

(b) to receive certificates entitling them to plead clients cases as private attorneys
[chastnyi poverennyi], and (c) to engage in court practice under the supervision
of attorneys, as their assistants [pomoshchiki\.

P rince L V ov, Minister-President

P. P ereverzev, Minister of Justice
June 1, 1917

216. T h e E xtension of the R ights Granted to W omen to E nter th e

Civil S ervice
[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 1413.]

LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. In amendment and supplement of the relevant statutes it is hereby decreed:
1) Women may be appointed both by unrestricted [temporary] recruit
ment and with civil service rights, to all civil departments on an equal basis with
men and shall enjoy the same rights in the performance of their service, if they
meet the same conditions as are required of men filling the appropriate positions,
and shall discharge the same duties and responsibilities.
2) Pending review of the educational requirements for appointment to
the civil service mentioned in the Code of Service in government appointments,
women may be appointed: a) to positions up to the 8th class inclusiveif they
possess diplomas indicating completion of a course of studies not below that of
girls gymnasia, institutes, diocesan girls schools, and other equivalent educa
tional institutions or have received the title of private tutor; b) to positions of
the 7th class and higherif they have completed the course of studies in higher
public educational institutions or equivalent private institutions or if they possess
a certificate indicating the passing of an examination in the examination com
missions attached to higher educational institutions.

7) Women who have served in government establishments without pen

sion rights before the publication of the present law, if appointed to positions
involving pension rights, shall have the time of their previous service credited
toward the period required for earning pensions and special allowances, pro
vided that they contribute to the treasury pension fund seven rubles, 20 kopeks,
for each year of previous service without pension rights. The payment of this
money may be made at once or in installments, if approved by the appropriate
minister.

N . N ekrasov, Deputy Minister-President

Z arudnyi, Minister of Justice
August 5, 1917
240 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

THE DISPOSITION OF CASES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL ARREST

217. T h e P rocedure fo r C o n s id e r in g C a s e s o f P e r so n s S u b j e c t e d
to E x t r a ju d ic ia l A r r e s t
[Sob. VzaK I, 2, No. 1077.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The revolution, having removed all former authorities, has deprived society
of the possibility of fighting against the enemies of the new order by legal ways
and means. The natural consequence of this situation has been the widespread
use of means of social self-defense, which have taken the form of numerous arrests
of servants of the old regime by the public organizations that have come into
being. Now that it is possible for a government established by the people to use
fully all measures provided by law for the defense of the new order and the rights
and freedom bestowed by it on all citizens of the Russian State, further use of
the aforesaid exceptional measures is, in the view of the Provisional Government,
not only undesirable but also dangerous to the further consolidation of the new
order and the achievements of the revolution.
Accordingly, the Provisional Government has decreed:
I. 1) To prohibit on pain of criminal liability all government and public
institutions without exception, as well as official and private persons, from sub
jecting anyone except under the procedure provided in existing legislation to
detention or restrictions on his right to choose freely his place of residence and
to enjoy freedom of speech.

5) To establish the following procedure for the consideration of cases of

persons arrested under extrajudicial methods from the beginning of the revolu
tionary movement in February of the current year until the day of the promul
gation of the present law.
6) For the consideration of the cases mentioned in article 5, guberniya
(oblast) commissions shall be organized under the chairmanship of a member
of the circuit court, chosen by the general assembly [of the court], with members
to consist of one member chosen by the guberniya zemstvo board and one by the
municipal board of the gubemiya capital.
In places where no zemstvo self-government exists, the representative of the
zemstvo board shall be replaced by a representative of the gubemiya commissar.

8) The gubemiya (oblast) commission is authorized to decide: 1) if the

previous activity of the person detained is considered to constitute an overt threat
to the state order or to public safety, a) to continue to hold the person arrested
for a period of not more than three months from the day of promulgation of the
present law and b) to carry out a search and seizure in the premises of the person
detained; and 2) in the absence of grounds for further detention of the person
arrested, to authorize his release.
9) Copies of the decision of the commission shall be forwarded to the
prosecutor of the local circuit court and to the place of detention.
10) The decisions of gubemiya (oblast) commissions may be abrogated
 JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 241

by the Minister of Justice both on complaints of the persons concerned and on

objections by prosecutors, as well as under review procedure.
11) Every person called under the present law before the commission has
the right to require that the preliminary examination, as well as the considera
tion of his case in the commission, be carried out under the rules of the Code of
Criminal Procedure concerning preliminary and judicial examinations, . . .
12) Persons and organizations at whose demand the prisoner is held
under arrest are required to submit to the chairman of the guberniya (oblast)
commission within one week after receipt of notice to that effect all information
in their possession concerning the harmful activity of the prisoner.
13) If this information is not submitted within the period mentioned in
article 12, the commission shall decide to release the prisoner, if there is no other
information in its possession attesting to his harmful activity.
14) Persons and organizations at whose demand the prisoner is held under
arrest must inform the chairman of the commission within one week after re
ceiving notice to this effect whether they desire personally or through an attorney
to maintain charges against the prisoner during examination of the case in the
commission.
15) Failure of the accuser to appear shall not hold up consideration of
the case.
16) In carrying out searches and seizures the rules of the Code of Crimi
nal Procedure shall be observed.
17) The present law shall expire on the day of the opening of the Con
stituent Assembly.
II. The present law shall be put into effect without awaiting its promulgation
by the Ruling Senate.
N. N ekrasov, Deputy Minister-President
Iv. Y efremov , Minister of Justice
July 16,1917

CODIFICATION AND COORDINATION OF THE LAWS

218. T h e C oordination of the Code of L aws (S vo d Zakonov) with

the L aws of th e P rovisional G overnment
[SoZ>. Uzafc., I, 2, No. 1075. A Codification Division to carry out this work was estab
lished by the law of July 16,1917. Ibid., No. 1828.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of existing rules concerning the publication of the Code of
Laws and the Code of Local Legislation, it is hereby decreed:
I. The existing Code of Laws and the Code of Local Legislation of the Baltic
gubemiyas are to be considered subject to coordination with the laws and ukases
242 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

of a legislative nature of the Provisional Government, on the same basis as pre

vious legislation.
II. The Commissar of the Provisional Government for the State Chancellery
is authorized, with respect to volumes or parts of the Code of Laws or the Code
of Local Legislation of the Baltic guberniyas newly published by the State Chan
cellery, as well as the Supplements to these Codes, to submit proposals to the
Provisional Government concerning the promulgation of these books of laws by
the Ruling Senate.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
S k a r ia t in , for the Minister of Justice

July 1,1917
 CHAPTER 6

Local Government and Administration

THE COMMISSARS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND

THE ORGANIZATION OF TEMPORARY LOCAL COMMITTEES

219. T h e A ppointm ent of Guberniya and U ezd Zemstvo Chairm en

asCommissars
[Circular from the Minister of the Interior, March 5, 1917, No. 891-932. Sb. Tsirk.
MVD., p. 5.]
Attaching the greatest importancefor the purposes of establishing order
within the country and a successful defense of the stateto the guarantee of an
uninterrupted functioning of all the governmental and public institutions, the
Provisional Government has deemed it necessary to temporarily remove the
governor and the vice-governor from the execution of their functions. The Chair
men of the Guberniya Zemstvo Boards are entrusted with the administration of
the guberniya in the capacity of Guberniya Commissars of the Provisional Gov
ernment, with all the rights granted by existing legislation to the governor, and
continuing the direction of the work of the Guberniya Zemstvo Board. The Chair
men of the Uezd Zemstvo Boards are entrusted with the duties of the Uezd Com
missars of the Provisional Government, while continuing the direction of the work
of the Uezd Zemstvo Boards. The local self-governments must proceed to re
organize the police into a militia.

220. I nstructions from the P rovisional Government C oncerning

th e Commissars and th e L ocal P ublic C omm ittees

[Circular from the Department of General Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to the
Guberniya Commissars, March 14, 1917, No. 1372. Sb. Tsirk. M V D pp. 23-24.]
From information received it appears that for the purpose of maintaining
order and organizing the administration on the new principles all over the country,
there have arisen in some localities a number of public committees of various
denomination and composition, whose activities are not always coordinated. For
purposes of coordination and of the systematic carrying out of forthcoming ad
ministrative tasks, the Provisional Government considers it necessary to unify
the existing and newly arising committees into gubemiya, uezd, and volost, and,
in the larger centers, into municipal and settlement committees. The interests of all
the groups of the population of the given locality should be represented in these
committees. The guberniya committees should direct and unify the activity of the
uezd, municipal, and other local committees. Coordinating their activity with the
respective committees, the temporary guberniya commissars, who are entrusted
with the duties of the governors, and the uezd commissars are the persons locally
delegated by, and the local executive organs of, the Provisional Government.
244 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2 2 1 . T h e N e e d t o I n f o r m t h e P o p u l a t io n o f t h e A cts and
A c t iv it y o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t
[Circular from the Department of General Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, March 20, 1917, No. 1614. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 28. This problem
continued to plague the Government throughout its tenure. Ibid., p. 34.]
From information received it appears that the local population is not suffi
ciently informed with regard to all kinds of proclamations, addresses, and in
structions of the Provisional Government. Therefore it is proposed to take all
possible measures, in order that the acts and instructions of a general nature
received [from] the Provisional Government shall be immediately reprinted and
widely distributed . . . in towns, large villages, and villages through the volost
and village institutions, schools, cooperatives, and other public organizations,
and posted in the streets of the towns and other populated areas. The expenses
connected with this measure shall be covered from special credits which will be
opened in the course of the next days.

2 2 2 . T h e O r g a n iz a t io n of V o l o s t C o m m it t e e s
[Circular from the Zemstvo Section, Ministry of the Interior, to Guberniya Commissars,
March 20,1917, No. 91. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 53.]
Having in mind the regular and orderly course of affairs in the volosts pend
ing the completion of the urgent tasks concerning the organization of the volost
zemstvo, the Provisional Government empowers the Guberniya Commissars to
immediately proceed, through the medium of the uezd commissars and at their
indication, to organize where necessary volost committees which should be tem
porarily entrusted with the functions of the volost administration.
When forming these committees, reliance should be put upon the existing
volost food committees, on the cooperative organizations, [and] on the volost
organizations for the protection of soldiers, or on the already elected volost com
mittees, depending on which of these organizations, under the local conditions,
are the more active and efficient and which inspire the greatest confidence from
the population. It is recommended also that local landowners and all the intel
lectual forces of the village be drawn in for work in these committees. The chair
men of the volost committees elected from the midst of the latter and their as
sistants, if the committee considers it necessary to appoint them, shall take care
of the executive side of the volost administration. Pending the publication of the
ukase regarding the organization of the volost zemstvo, the procedure, the objects
of jurisdiction, and the extent of authority shall remain unchanged. The present
circumstances impel the Provisional Government to pay special attention to the
regular organization of the volost committees for the purposes of uninterrupted
activity in supplying the army, maintaining order, and preserving intact the
buildings and all the files of the volost administrations.

223. T h e V o l o s t C o m m i t t e e s
[Mart-Mai, 1917 goda, KA, XV (1926), 41-45. This is part of a report compiled
by the Provincial Section of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, based on
reports of its field representatives for the first three months of the Revolution.]
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 245

The organization of the volost committees proceeded at a much slower rate

and with much greater difficulty than that of the municipal committees. . . .
This fact is easily understood if one considers the ignorance of the population,
the great distances which separate some districts from the center of information,
the season of the spring floods which coincided with the revolution, and the almost
complete absence of intelligent cooperation.
The first steps taken by the peasants in the matter of local organization were
the arrangements for elections to the village and volost committees.
Toward the end of the second month these committees were formed in almost
all localities.
The election procedures in the villages where they were conducted by the
peasants themselves were usually far from secret, owing not only to illiteracy but
also to primitive methods of checking the ballot; they depended to a great extent
upon the persistence of determined individuals. The villagers are so interdepend
ent that few dare come out openly with objections against a candidate put forward
by the more vociferous and resolute peasants. This timidity is exploited by those
who can make themselves heard through sheer loudness of voice, and who force
the candidature of their benefactors upon the villagers.
Elections conducted in this manner invariably left behind them much dis
content, which accumulated and grew till at last the whole village would be in a
ferment, and re-elections would take place which often led to fist fights.

Nevertheless, the peasants avoid electing representatives of the intelligentsia

this has been particularly noticeable lately. As time goes on, they become more
and more convinced that the intelligentsia has no place among them; that they
must manage their own affairs without interference.

Owing to the complete absence of any educated people (even members of

credit societies are boycotted), complete disorganization and lack of system are
very prevalent.
Constant re-elections, moreover, interfere with the superintending of current
affairs. Some of the volosts have re-elections several times a week, so that urgent
and important questions concerning the reorganization of local life remain un
solved.
It should also be borne in mind that almost the entire village intelligentsia
left the villages during the first days of the revolution.
As for the teachers, and in particular the women teachers of the village schools,
who were sedulously guarded under the old regime from any contact with the
peasants, they have no points of contact with them and enjoy no authority
whatever.

The work of the volost committees is greatly hampered by the enormous

number of orators who invade the villages, and who now replace the former
readers. These are for the most part soldiers from the front and from Petro
grad. They win the peasants confidence by propagating the most extreme doc
trines, answering to the hidden hopes of a landless populace, who advocate the
adoption of a new land policy without restrictions or moderation. The peasants
are, moreover, impressed by their long and wordy harangues, which they are
frequently unable to understand. He talks and talks, gets tired out, sits down
246 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

with closed eyes till he revives a little, then begins again, until he has no strength
for more.

. . . A well-known man of letters, who has devoted many years of his life to
the improvement of the peasants lot, and who consequently cannot be suspected
of moderation, writes: The volost committees must often be regarded as nega
tive, not positive, manifestations of Russian life. Many of them have been estab
lished, not through the medium of the secret ballot, but through the efforts of
platform agitators; those who made the most noise came to the fore and were
elected. Hence, in many of the committees there is neither authority nor a sense
of civic responsibility, But notwithstanding all these deficiencies, lack of en
lightenment, and helplessness, there is one noteworthy factall excesses come to
an end with the establishment of volost committees.

224. T h e O r g a n iz a t io n a n d R e l a t io n s h ip o f G u b e r n iy a a n d U ezd
C o m m it t e e s a n d M u n ic ip a l C o m m i t t e e s in G u b e r n iy a
a n d U ezd C a p it a l s

[Circular from the Minister of the Interior to Guberniya Commissars, March 26, 1917,
No. 173. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 6.]
At the present time, when uezd committees, more or less representing the
whole population of the uezd through the inclusion in their membership of [per
sons] elected by volost committees and the municipal committee of the uezd
capital, have been organized in the majority of the uezds, it becomes necessary
to organize correctly guberniya committees, as far as possible, immediately [and]
independently of the municipal committees of the guberniya capitals. The guber
niya commissar, as the representative in the guberniya of the authority of the
Provisional Government, should be able to base his activity on a guberniya com
mittee, which is very closely tied in with the guberniya as a whole; and, at the
same time, a constantly functioning organ restricted in its membership, which
[shall be] selected by such a committee, should serve as the responsible inter
preter of the whole guberniyas public opinion. Of course, the membership of
the guberniya committee should include the representatives of the municipal com
mittee of the guberniya capital, [and] also the representatives of those towns of
the guberniyas which, owing to their importance, have a special commissar, ap
pointed by the Government on the recommendation of the commissar of the guber
niya. The above is communicated for guidance.

225. T h e A p p o i n t m e n t o f N e w U e z d C o m m is s a r s
[Circular from the Minister of the Interior to Guberniya Commissars, March 26, 1917
(no number), Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 6.]
In answer to inquiries from various localities, the Provisional Government
confirms, for the purpose of continuous guidance, that the appointments of new
persons to the office of uezd commissars, enjoying the confidence and the neces
sary authority among the wide circles of the local population, are being made by
the Government exclusively on the recommendation of the guberniya commissars.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 247

226. P u b l ic D iss a t isf a c t io n w i t h A p p o i n t e d C o m m is s a r s

[Mart-Mai, 1917 goda, KA, XV (1926), 40-41. See Doc. 223. The frequent replace
ment of uezd commissars is deplored in a circular from the Section on Local Adminis
tration, Ministry of the Interior, to Guberniya Commissars, April 27, 1917, No. 926.
The guberniya commissars are urged to find persons who not only are capable but
enjoy confidence among the broad circles of the local population. Sb. Tsirk. MVD^
pp. 13-14.]
General discontent was aroused by the appointment of commissars from among
the members of guberniya and uezd [zemstvo] boards.
The chairmen of uezd boards have never enjoyed the confidence or good will
of the people. Moreover, under the present system of popular elections, the idea
of appointment did not fit in with the national understanding. It suspected in this
practice an encroachment upon its liberties. It must be remembered that in many
places commissars themselves gave cause for this accusation, as, for example, in
Novgorod guberniya, where in one of the uezds neither the volost committee offi
cials nor the chief administrative functionaries were put to the test of re-election,
but were simply reaffirmed in their positions by order of the uezd commissar. In
some localities they [the commissars] tried to wrest the supreme authority from
the committees.
The Government very soon endeavored to meet the peoples wishes by en
couraging them to propose their own candidates in place of those commissars
who were unacceptable to them. Then began feverish re-elections. It must be
pointed out here that where the commissars were not subjected to this test of
re-election they are not trusted by the public.
But even where the commissar in question is a person enj oying the confidence
and good will of the people, he cannot supply all the needs of his area. The uezd
commissars are particularly overworked.

Frequently a commissar, having set out with the definite purpose of organ
izing a volost committee, finds himself, by the will of fate, in a completely dif
ferent place, where an acute quarrel between landowners and peasants, threat
ening serious consequences, urgently demands his presence.

227. T h e D e c is io n to R e f o r m L o c a l A d m in is t r a t io n
[Zhurnaly, No. 28, March 22, 1917. On March 28, 1917, the Minister of the Interior
requested, by Circular No. 228, precise information from the guberniya commissars
concerning the nature, composition, and scope of authority of existing local institu
tions, to be used in elaborating the projected reforms. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 7.]
Heard:
4. Proposals of the Ministry of the Interior:
a) On the reform of local administration to be based on the reorganization
of the organs of direct local state administration into organs of local self-govern
ment which would retain the right to exercise in full State authority.
Resolved:
To instruct the Ministry of the Interior to begin immediately and urgently
to work out the temporary reform of local administration and self-government
248 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

and to unify under the jurisdiction of the Ministry all the work of the individual
ministries in respect of this matter.

228. T h e G o v e r n m e n t U rges E c o n o m y in L o c a l A d m in is t r a t io n
[Circular from the Department of General Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, March 30, 1917, No. 1993. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 30.]
Following inquiries regarding the procedure for the compensation of ex
penditures connected with the work of guberniya and uezd commissars and the
activity of the committees indicated in the Ministry telegram of the 14th instant,
it is explained that in view of the extraordinary demands made upon the funds
of the State Treasury, it is necessary to be guided in expenditures by considera
tions of strict economy so that the upkeep of the institutions created under the
new regime not weigh as an extra burden on the national economy, and the new
administration not earn the blame of being more expensive than the old regime.
[Procedural details follow.] . . .

229. T h e P l a c e o f t h e C o m m is s a r in L o c a l A d m in is t r a t io n
[Circular from the Minister of the Interior to Guberniya Commissars, April 1, 1917,
No. 310. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 7-8.]
On the question of the relationship between the commissars and the guber
niya and uezd committees, and between the commissars and the chiefs of the
militia, the Provisional Government issues the following [instructions] for guid
ance:
1) The guberniya commissar is the bearer of the Provisional Governments
authority in the guberniya and he shall be vested with all the rights and duties
entrusted by law to the governor, with the exception of those which have become
obsolete because of change in the state order. Additional detailed instructions
to the commissars will be forwarded.
2) The uezd commissars are appointed from among the persons suggested
by the guberniya commissar and recommended or elected by the uezd committees,
where [the latter] have been formed; they are the representatives of the Pro
visional Government in the uezd, their activities being under the direct super
vision of the guberniya commissars.
At the same time it should be borne in mind that the officials established in
the uezd continue to execute their duties.
3) In cases of extreme necessity the guberniya commissars may appoint as
sistants to the uezd commissars.
4) The committees formed in the volosts administer the volost under the su
pervision of the uezd commissar and, up to the publication of the law regarding
zemstvo self-government, they are to be unified and directed in their activities
by the uezd committee, which includes also the representatives of the municipal
committees in cases where the latter are formed, which is permitted for large towns.
In large cities, the municipal committees may function independently of those
of the uezd.
5) Commissars maintain supervision over the legality of the activities of all
persons and all places.
6) Uezd commissars may be discharged only by a decision of the Govern
ment at the recommendation of the guberniya commissar, provided he recom
mends at the same time a candidate as a replacement.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 249

7) The chiefs of the militia must carry out instructions of the commissars
for the preservation of national order and security of the persons and property
of all citizens.
The general statute of the militia shall be decreed by the Government.
8) It is the duty of the guberniya commissar to advise immediately the uezd
commissars of all orders [received from] the Government, for the latter com
municates directly with the uezd commissars only in exceptional cases.

230. T h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t R e q u e s t s C o m p l e t e and
C o n t in u o u s I n f o r m a t io n o n L o c a l O c c u r r e n c e s
and D ev elo pm ents
[C ircular from the T em porary MilitiaAdministration, Ministry o f Justice, to G uber
n iy a and Oblast C om m issars, A p ril 11,
1917, N o. 15354. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp . 63-64.]
For the purpose of a daily comprehensive [flow of] information to the Pro
visional Government with regard to the situation all over the country and the
course of local life, the information in question should be immediately commu
nicated by telegraph to the Militia Administration (Mokhovaia 34), as far as
possible in compliance with the following pattern:
FirstAgrarian movementregarding any kind of violation of land rights
cases of and attempts at arbitrary actions in respect of owners, possessors, or
tenants of real estate, unauthorized tillage, arson, illegal felling of timber, seizure
of agricultural implements, cattle stealing, destruction of landmarks, [illegal]
cattle grazing, and so forth.
SecondAny kind of disturbances and occurrences in the factories [or]
plants and trades [or] industrieslockouts, strikestheir causes, motives, and
nature; cases of violation of workers or employers rights.
ThirdOutstanding cases of agitation against the new government and the
authorities which it has appointedincitement of one part of the population
against another on the basis of national, religious, or party divergencies.
FourthAny infringements of the law committed by groups of people or
mobs in other spheres of local life.
FifthArbitrary actions by individuals or various groups tending to hinder
the local organs of the new government from exercising their legal authority or
[to promote] the arbitrary exercise, by individuals and various groups, of the
rights and duties belonging to the aforesaid governmental organs, such as, for
instance, unwarranted arrests, hindering the release of irregularly arrested per
sons, etc.
Moreover, measures taken for the purpose of putting an end to settling the
aforementioned occurrences and violations are to be communicated.

231. T h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t O r d e r s t h e R e l e a s e o f L o c a l
O f f ic ia l s P l a c e d in C u s t o d y D u r in g t h e F e b r u a r y
R e v o l u t io n
[Circular from the Temporary Militia Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to
Commissars, April 12, 1917, No. 25318. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 64.]
Following receipt by the Militia Administration of petitions from various
persons regarding their release from custody, said Administration informs you
for your respective enactments that the Provisional Government in its meeting
250 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

of March 5,1917, decreed the release of all members of the local Administration
placed in custody during the overturn of the [old] regime without orders from
the competent authorities, provided these persons are not accused of having
committed criminal acts; in Journal No. 8, p. 7 [of the meeting of the Govern
ment], of March 7, it was decided to enjoin, by means of a circular communica
tion, governmental organs and persons to proceed with arrests only by delegation
of the judiciary authorities or of the Provisional Government,

232. T h e C o n f e r e n c e o f G u b e r n iy a C o m m is s a r s , P e t r o g r a d ,
A p r il 22-24, 1917
[Sezd gubemskikh kommissarov: protokoly zasedanii 22-24 aprelia 1917 g. The
origin of this mimeographed copy (in the Hoover Institution) of the minutes of the
sessions is unknown, but comparison with other evidence shows it to be a concise and
apparently accurate account. Compare the decisions of the Conference with the tem
porary statute on commissars as it was finally promulgated, Doc. 236.]

The Afternoon Session of April 22

The first session of the Conference of Guberniya Commissars took place on
April 22, at 2 :00 oclock in the afternoon, in the building of the Ministry of the
Interior. In opening the Conference the Minister-President addressed those
present with a speech of welcome in which he outlined the role and the impor
tance of the Commissars in the events that are taking place. He proposed that
they begin their important work by discussing, first of all, the main points of the
draft statutes for guberniya and uezd commissars worked out by the Ministry of
the Interior.
Following this, S. M. Leontev, Assistant Minister of the Interior, stated that
a Special Council had been formed at the Ministry of the Interior, which had
worked out a number of drafts on the reform of local government and self-govern-
ment. Some of these drafts, as, for example, the temporary statute on the militia1
and the statute on the election of members of the municipal duma,2 have already
been put into effect. Likewise the Council has worked out the chief bases for the
reform of the organs of local self-government. And a proposal for the organi
zation of organs of administrative justice is in preparation. In accordance with
these reforms the general principles of a temporary statute on guberniya and
uezd commissars have also been outlined by the Ministry of the Interior. These
principles have been examined by the Special Council and approved in principle
for the consideration of the Provisional Government.
However, in view of the intricacy of this question and the desirability of a
complete accord with practical needs, it was deemed necessary to submit the
project of the Council for discussion to the Conference of the Commissars.
Simultaneously a question of no lesser importance is offered for the consid
eration of the Conference, the question of the financing of the new local admin
istrative institutions. In conclusion, S. M. Leontev pointed out that all of the
proposed reforms bear a purely temporary character and do not have as their
aim an organic reorganization of local government. This will be the task of the
future Constituent Assembly.

1 Doc. 200. 2 Doc. 240.

 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 251

Further, having heard the brief explanations of the speaker from the Council
on the essential points of the project, the Conference paused on the question of
the timeliness of the publication now of any statutes standardizing the activity
of the guberniya and uezd commissars. Moreover, some members of the Confer
ence thought that both the position of the commissar and his rights and respon
sibilities until the introduction of the reform of local and municipal self-govern-
ment were not sufficiently clear. However, taking into consideration the local
conditions and bearing in mind the forthcoming introduction of the zemstvo and
municipal reform, the Conference expressed itself in favor, with only one nega
tive vote, of publishing special temporary rules for the commissars.
The question of the structure of the higher gubemiya authority in various
places aroused lively debates. Some members of the Conference thought that at
the head of the guberniya administration as representative of the Provisional
Government should be a collegial organ, elected by local executive committees
and other public organizations. However, this opinion was not shared by the
majority of those present, who thought that at the head of the guberniya admin
istration should be a single representative of the government authority in the
person of the commissar, supported in his activity by the confidence of the popu
lation and acting in harmony with local public organizations.
On the question of the relations of the government commissar and executive
and other committees as bearers of public authority, the Conference thought that
in view of the diverse structure of these public committees, their role and impor
tance in the guberniya, it would be rather difficult at this time to arrive at a
general formula for these relations. Consequently, it resolved to appoint a small
commission composed of some of its members to work out this formula, with the
request that it submit a proposal for this formula at the evening session.

The Evening Session of April 22

In fulfillment of the instruction given by the Conference, the Commission
submitted to the Conference the following formula defining the relations of the
commissar and the elected committees.
Inasmuch as at the present time and down to the reorganization of the organs
of local self-government the gubemiya commissar, along with supervision, bears
also the function of active administration and carries out the task of state con
struction in various localities in unity with public organizations, it is necessary
to supplement the draft bill with regard to the commissars with the following
points:
1. In all measures bearing on the local life of the guberniya the commissar
acts in unity with the gubemiya committee of public organizations.
2. The gubemiya commissar is appointed by the Provisional Government in
agreement with the gubemiya committee of public organizations.
Inasmuch as on the second question the Commission failed to reach a unani
mous decision, the following variant of point 2 was submitted for consideration
by the Commission: The gubemiya commissar is elected by the guberniya com
mittee of public organizations and is submitted for approval by the Provisional
Government.
The first point of the formula was accepted unanimously. At the balloting
on the second point, following the exchange of opinions, a variant was approved,
252 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

leaving the appointment of the commissar to the Provisional Government with

the agreement of the guberniya committee of public organizations.
Following this, the Conference passed to the examination of the paragraphs
in the draft bill defining the rights and responsibilities of the commissar in super
vising the activity of all guberniya government establishments, except courts,
institutions of State Control, the State Bank, and higher institutions of learning.
The Conference expressed itself against a sample illustration, as outlined by the
draft bill, of responsibilities with respect to supervision by the commissar. It felt
that either an exhaustive enumeration of plenary rights should be made, or [they
should be] limited to a general formula, as has already been done in paragraph 7
of the draft bill.
In consideration of this, the Conference thought it necessary to exclude from
the draft bill paragraph 8. In discussing the paragraphs defining the order of
supervision by the commissar over the legality of the activity of the organs of
local self-government, the Conference, admitting the necessity to grant the com
missar such right, expressed itself, however, against the right of the commissar
to conduct inspection. In the opinion of the Conference, the granting of this right
to the commissar is not necessary, inasmuch as, first of all, the organs of self-
government themselves will, with the aid of their inspection commissions, protect
in sufficient measure the interests of public economy and administration. The
commissar will reserve the right in line of supervision to protest against illegal
actions of these organs. Past experience, however, showed that inspections of
guberniya authorities in most cases failed to achieve their purposeto expose
abusesand led only to an undesirable interference in the free economic activity
of organs of self-government, disrupting their normal course and introducing
ill will in the relations between the guberniya authority and organs of self-gov
ernment.
In conclusion, after introducing some editorial changes, the Conference ap
proved the paragraphs, establishing the responsibility of the guberniya commissar
and the procedure for petitioning against his actions. As a result of the work of
the Conference, 27 paragraphs of the draft bill were approved covering in an
exhaustive manner the status, rights, and responsibilities of the guberniya com
missar.
The following session was set for April 23, at 11:00 oclock in the morning.

The Morning Session of April 23

At the morning session of April 23, under the chairmanship of the Assistant
Minister of the Interior, S. M. Leontev, the Conference examined the question
of establishing in gubemiyas special guberniya councils under the chairmanship
of guberniya commissars.
According to the explanations of the reporter, the formation of guberniya
councils was prompted chiefly by considerations of a technical nature and of
expediency.
Bearing in mind the fact that part of the plenary powers of the guberniya
administration and a number of mixed offices have either ceased altogether or
will in the nearest possible future be transferred to the organs of self-government
and administrative justice, the Ministry of the Interior thought it most convenient,
for reasons of economy and ease of administration, to merge all matters that
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 253

preserved strength and vitality and were managed by general administrative

guberniya institutions into one collegial organthe gubemiya council.
In keeping with this concept it was planned to introduce into the composition
of the council representatives of various branches of administration and to divide
the council into four offices (general, administrative, agricultural, and economic),
upon which the solution of part of the questions of prereform gubemiya institu
tions should be imposed.
In addition, for the purpose of administering all affairs, it was contemplated,
according to the project, to institute one central office attached to the guberniya
commissar that would combine all offices of the existing gubemiya institutions.
In discussing the outlined assumptions, some members of the Conference
expressed themselves against the formation of a gubemiya council. They thought
it necessary to eliminate immediately the now existing gubemiya administration
and all the miscellaneous offices of general administration, transferring the matters
under their management to the organs of local self-government, to the office of
gubemiya commissar and other special organs of gubemiya administration now
being reorganized. However, the overwhelming majority of those present con
sidered it inexpedient to eliminate immediately with one general decree the guber
niya institutions prior to a preliminary organization of those institutions that
could take upon themselves the management of appropriate affairs, and deemed
it at the same time entirely proper to transfer to the organs of local self-govem-
ment a number of matters belonging as a matter of fact to their administration.
After an exchange of opinions, the Conference, rejecting the proposal for
organizing a guberniya council and a central office attached to the gubemiya
commissar, deemed it necessary temporarilyuntil the introduction of the re
forms of zemstvo and municipal self-government, which must be introduced in
the shortest possible time, and the organization of other special organs of admin
istrationto maintain all the presently existing general administrative institu
tions that are actually functioning.

The Evening Session of April 23

The evening session of the Conference of Gubemiya Commissars was devoted
to a discussion of questions of a financial character. Of particular interest to the
members of the Conference was the question of allocation of funds for the main
tenance of the executive [public] committees which have been formed everywhere.
The explanation given by Assistant Minister of the Interior D. M. Shchepkin was
to the effect that the Provisional Government deems it impossible to assign funds
from the State Treasury to organizations which pursue party-political or class
aims, permitting the assignment of state funds to be placed at the disposal only
of organizations or individual persons who take direct part in the building of
local life.8
The Session of April 24

The balance of the session was devoted to a discussion of the relations between

8 This position was officially confirmed in a Circular from the Department of General
Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to Guberniya Commissars, April 28, 1917, No. 2166, and in
a. Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to Gubemiya
and Oblast Commissars, May 14,1917, No. 1341. Sb. Tsirk. MVD^ pp. 33,15.
254 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

military and civil authorities in areas adjacent to the front. Assistant Minister of
the Interior S. M. Leontev acquainted the members of the Conference with the
proposal of the Provisional Government about to be promulgated to create a
special organ to regulate these relations through commissars of the Provisional
Government attached to commanders of fronts and of individual armies. After
an exchange of opinions and after hearing reports of individual members of the
Conference on the state of affairs in various places, the Conference unanimously
adopted the proposal submitted by the Assistant Minister, in accordance with
which a special civilian commissar of the Provisional Government would be
attached to the commanders in chief of the fronts. A similar commissar should
be attached to commanders of armies and heads of military districts. Attached
to the commissar at the front is a council made up of commissars assigned to the
commanders of individual armies and heads of military districts and the com
missars of the gubemiyas concerned. The organization of this council and the
relations of representatives of the Provisional Government are to be established
at the first organizational session of the council. The commissars attached to the
commanders of armies and heads of districts reserve the right to appeal against
orders of military authorities which are slanted without obvious need for it to the
detriment of the civilian population. Having expressed itself against any lessen
ing of the rights of the commanders in chief toward the civilian population of
localities adjoining the front, the Conference expressed the desire that the orders
issued by the heads of military districts on civilian matters bear two signatures,
one of the head of the district and the other of the commissar of the Provisional
Government.4 The Conference further emphasized the necessity of a thorough
and urgent revision of the regulations of the localities under martial law in order
to coordinate these regulations as closely as possible with the prevailing social
and political conditions. The Conference also emphasized the need for immediate
contraction of the area of the theater of military actions by retaining in this area
only places immediately bordering on the points where armed forces of the active
army are stationed. The Conference expressed a desire that all these questions
be immediately submitted for discussion by an interdepartmental commission
formed at the Ministry of the Interior.

2 3 3 . T h e N e g lig e n c e o f G u b e rn iy a C o m m issars in A n s w e rin g

I n q u ir ie s f r o m t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e rn m e n t
[Circular from the Department of General Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, May 12, 1917, No. 2995. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 35.]
In many instances it has been observed that the guberniya commissars either
fail to answer written queries or telegrams from the Ministry of the Interior, or
answer them after considerable delay. I beg you to note that the queries from
the Ministry should unfailingly be given an immediate answer; in case it is im
possible to give an immediate answer, the causes of the delay should be explained
by telegraph.

4 Although commissars were appointed to the armies, the elaborate system discussed here
was not put into effect.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 255

234. Guberniya C om missars O rdered to T a k e E ner g etic A ctio n

A gainst I ncreasing D isorders and A rbitrary A ctions
[Circular from the Temporary Militia Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to
Guberniya Commissars, May 12, 1917, No. 16702. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 72-73.]
According to information in possession of the Ministry of the Interior, in
various localities of the country there have been and continue to be cases of
unwarranted arrests, investigations, discharges from office, management of prop
erty, management of industrial enterprises; destruction of property; robberies,
hoodlumism; violence on private persons [and] officials; misappropriation by
various organizations of rights and prerogatives belonging solely to governmental
organs; imposition of taxes [and] collections on the population; incitement of
mobs against the representatives of authority [and] of one part of the population
against another on the basis of class, national, or religious differences. All such
actions are to be considered unlawful, in certain cases even anarchic [and] under
mining the foundations of the new regime. An energetic counteraction against
[these actions], in execution of the Provisional Government declaration of May 5,5
is the immediate task both of the representatives of the Government on the spot
and of the whole population. I ask you to take, with the assistance of the public
committees organized in the localities, the most resolute measures for the liquida
tion of the phenomena indicated, which disorganize the country, and for securing
normal conditions of life.

235. Russkiia Vedomostfs C o m m e n t on t h e D ra ft S ta tu te on

G uberniya and U ezd C om m issars
[No. 149, July 2, 1917, p. 3.]
Awaiting the approval of the Provisional Government at the present time is
a draft of the statute about the local representatives of the supreme governmental
authority, [namely] the guberniya and uezd commissars, worked out by the Min
istry of the Interior.
As a matter of fact, the guberniya and uezd commissars came into existence
immediately after the revolution and after the Provisional Government released
the governors and vice-governors from their duties. They inherited from the
governors a considerable share of the authority of the latter. To be sure, with
the revocation of the Statute on Increased and Extraordinary Security Measures,6
with the transfer of the militia to the organs of self-government,7 and with the
publication of the Statute on the Administrative Court,8 which canceled the ad
5 Following the formation of the First Coalition. See VoL HI, Doc. 1095.
6 The Law of August 14, 1881, stipulated that the Government had the right to introduce
in a given region of the Empire Usilennaia Okhrana [Increased Security] or Chrezvychcdnaia
Okhrana [Extraordinary Security]. Increased Security measures were introduced for one
year; Extraordinary Security measures for six months. However, the Minister of the Interior
had the right to submit to the Committee of Ministers a proposal to extend both the Increased
and Extraordinary Security measures for the same length of time. This could be done re
peatedly. Gradually, from a temporary measure, Increased Security was converted into a
permanent order of life for almost all guberniyas and oblasts of the Empire. After the revo
lutionary movement of 1905, many territories of Russia found themselves for two or three years
under the regime of Extraordinary Security.
7 See Doc. 200.
8 See Doc. 213.
256 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

ministrative-court function of the governor, part of the rights and responsibilities

of gubernatorial authority dropped completely. However, another part of the
function of former governors was preserved and passed on to the commissars,
who were forced up to this time to be guided in their activity by the General
Guberniya Administration. However, since the latter is not in keeping with the
conditions of the new order, a number of doubts and misunderstandings followed.
Hence the need to work out a special temporary statute on guberniya and uezd
commissars.
A harmonious combination of local and national interests was considered fun
damental to this statute. The entire creative work on local administration must be
transferred into the hands of the population itself in the name of zemstvo and
municipal self-management, elected on the basis of direct, universal, secret, and
equal balloting. The commissars, who represent the Provisional Government
locally, are entrusted with the preservation of national interests and supervision
over lawful actions of local governmental institutions and organs of local self-
government.

Thus the guberniya commissar is actually the head of all governmental insti
tutions for his guberniya, with the exception of a few which by their very nature
preclude interference from the administration (Treasury Department, the courts,
State Bank, etc.).
The rights of the guberniya commissar are considerably more limited with
respect to the uezd and guberniya zemstvo and to municipal institutions. Here
his duty is the guarantee of lawful action by these institutions and organs. Having
no administrative authority with respect to the organs of local self-government,
the guberniya commissar limits himself only to voicing a protest to the admin
istrative court in the event of illegal actions on the part of uezd and guberniya
zemstvos and municipalities. The latter institutions appear before the adminis
trative court with equal rights with the commissar and advance arguments to his
protest. They may on their part appeal to the administrative court with complaints
about illegal actions of the commissar. No control over the activity of zemstvos
and municipalities in matters of substance is granted to the commissar.

The action of the statute on guberniya and uezd commissars is expected to be

extended to all of European Russia and to the guberniyas and oblasts of Siberia.

236. T h e T em porary S tatute on G uberniya , O blast , and

U ezd C ommissars
[Sob. UzaK I, 2, No. 1749.]
C H A PTER I . T H E GUBERNIYA (O B L A ST ) COM MISSAR

1. The guberniya commissar is the representative of the Provisional Govern

ment in the guberniya, supervising the faithful observance everywhere in the
guberniya of laws, enactments, and orders of the Government by local organs of
administration and self-government.
2. The guberniya commissar, placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of the Interior, is appointed to office and removed by the Provisional Government
on recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 257

3. Only persons who have received higher, preferably legal, education shall
be appointed to the office of guberniya com m issar.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF T H E GUBERNIYA (O B L A ST ) COM M ISSAR

4. The guberniya commissar shall take measures to acquaint the population

with the laws as well as with enactments and orders of the Provisional Govern
ment and other central state establishments, which are required to be published
for general information.
5. The guberniya commissar is responsible for supervising the status and
activity of all guberniya and uezd government establishments of the civil admin
istration, with the exception of the judicial establishments, the institutions of
State Control, the State Bank, and institutions of higher learning; in other edu
cational institutions the guberniya commissar is not responsible for supervision
of academic matters.
6. In exercising supervision (article 5), the guberniya commissar has the
right of general review of the proceedings of local gubemiya institutions, as well
as the right to request information and explanations and to carry out inspections.
7. With respect to the general enactments of the Provisional Government or
of the individual ministers communicated to the gubemiya commissar for exe
cution, heads of local governmental civil establishments shall receive instructions
from the gubemiya commissar and shall inform him of all measures taken to
execute the aforesaid enactments.
8. All government establishments in the gubemiya shall report to the guber
niya commissar for information, appointments, transfers, and dismissals of offi
cials of the civil service.
9. In case of dereliction of duty, violation of law, abuse of authority, or inertia
noted in the activity of local government establishments (article 5), or in case of
the exercise of powers in violation of the purpose for which they were granted,
the guberniya commissar, depending on the circumstances of the particular case
and the procedure laid down by law: 1) shall propose measures to be taken to
remedy die irregularities discerned; 2) shall bring the matter to the attention of
the authorities concerned, as appropriate; 3) shall take measures to impose dis
ciplinary penalties on officials subordinate to him; 4) shall submit protests to
the administrative court; 5) shall communicate the matter to the prosecutors
office for the institution of criminal prosecution.
10. The rights and duties of the gubemiya commissar with respect to the local
militia and administrative courts are defined by the respective provisions of the
statute on the militia and the statute on administrative courts. The guberniya
commissar is responsible for supervising the fulfillment of decisions of adminis
trative courts.
11. The organs of local self-government are placed under the supervision of
the guberniya commissar with respect to the legality of their action. The rights
and duties of the gubemiya commissar with respect to the supervision of the
activity of organs of local self-government and the holding of elections to the said
organs are defined by the respective statutes of the Provisional Government.
12. The gubemiya commissar is responsible for supervising the activity of
gubemiya and uezd institutions of public administration, such as food-supply
committees, land committees, etc.
The gubemiya commissar shall submit protests to the administrative division
258 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

of the circuit court against enactments and decisions of these institutions of public
administration if he finds them to be inconsistent with the law. In case these
decisions and enactments are not consistent with the interests of the State, with
the public good and public needs or the legitimate interests of private persons,
the commissar shall submit a protest to a higher appropriate instance; this protest
does not suspend the effect of such decisions and enactments.
13. Pending legislative review of the corresponding statutes, the rights and
duties of guberniya commissars are defined both by the present Law [promul
gating the Statute] and the Temporary Statute annexed to it as well as by general
and local statutes concerning the authority of the governor which have not been
abrogated by laws of the Provisional Government.
14. The guberniya commissar shall draw up budget estimates for the office
of the guberniya and uezd commissars and submit them to the Ministry of the
Interior.
15. The guberniya commissar shall submit written reports and information
on the condition of the guberniya to the Minister of the Interior under the pro
cedure laid down by instructions of the Minister of the Interior.

ASSISTANT GUBERNIYA (O B L A ST ) COM MISSARS

16. The assistant guberniya commissar is appointed to office and removed by

the Minister of the Interior on recommendation of the guberniya commissar, acts
under the direction of the latter, and is his deputy.

APPEALING AGAINST ACTS O F T H E GUBERNIYA (O B L A ST ) COMMISSARS

AND T H E IR ASSISTANTS, AND TH E IR LIABILITY

21. Complaints against acts of guberniya commissars and their assistants,

subject to settlement under administrative court procedure, shall be made to the
First Department of the Ruling Senate (articles 11 and 14 of the Statute on Ad
ministrative Courts).

CHAPTER I I. T H E UEZD COM MISSAR

23. The uezd commissar, acting in the capacity of immediate assistant to the
guberniya commissar in the uezd, supervises the faithful and general observance
of laws, decisions, and orders of the Government by local organs of administra
tion and the appropriate organs of self-government.

25. Only persons who have received at least secondary education shall be
appointed to the office of uezd commissar. [The rights and duties of the uezd
commissar correspond, within his area, to those of the guberniya commissar.]

A. N ik itin , Minister of the Interior

September 19,1917
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 259

MUNICIPAL REFORM

237. E ditorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e R e fo r m of the

M u n icipa l D uma

[No. 78, April 9, 1917, p. 3.]

On the eve of very serious battles with a threatening foe, and in the hurly-
burly of the revolution, liberated Russia undertakes the rebuilding of public life
in the provinces. Age-old hopes and attempts of the best Russian men and women,
which had invariably met rebuffs from the Tsarist Government, are ready now
to be transformed into reality. Within a very few days the Provisional Govern
ment is expected to publish laws regarding the volost zemstvos and the election
to the municipal dumas on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot.
The elections to the volost zemstvos are scheduled, for most of Russia, in the
second half of May, and elections to the municipal dumas are scheduled for June.
At the Ministry of the Interior, urgently and with unusual energy decrees are
prepared pertaining to changing the zemstvo and municipal statutes, the structure
of governmental apparatus in the guberniyas, the militia, and the regional dumas
in the large municipal centers. Publication of these decrees will not be delayed.
The great country is now on the verge of complete reconstruction of the entire
order of public administration on the local level. . . .
This task is equally dear to the hearts of all who love our fatherland and who
hold dear its happiness. Successful realization of this task requires unity of forces.
Let us, then, put this unity above party bickerings, and let us prove our readiness
for mutual concessions for the sake of teamwork, in an atmosphere of peace and
agreement. . . .
All existing political parties agree that the reform of elections to municipal
dumas is urgent and that those elections must be put into effect without delay,
on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot of all the residents of
cities and towns without discrimination as to sex, nationality, or religion. On
this, everybody is agreed at the present time, and this agreement is so important
that compared to it the objects of party disagreement appear to have little sub
stance.
The first point of such party disagreement is the age of electors. . . .
The second point of disagreement is the question of minimum residence. . . .
It would seem that the disagreement is more substantial on the question of
permitting the members of armed forces units stationed in a given town to take
part in the municipal elections. However, even this controversy is not one of
principle. Those who object to granting military personnel the right to vote in
municipal elections do not at all wish to deprive them of participation in local
self-government. They only point to a too-weak connection on the part of the
military garrison with the life and interests of the rest of the city population, and
they think that every soldier is much more closely bound to his own native village
than to the town in which military service has accidentally deposited him. There
fore, the opponents of participation of military personnel in municipal elections
grant these soldiers the right of personal or by-proxy participation in local elec
tions in the village or town whence the given person originates. Thus, the argu
ment is reduced to the place where the military men would realize their right of
260 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

participation in local elections, and there is no question of limitation of military

personnel in their civic rights.
The three indicated points exhaust the party difference of opinion on the
question of the reform of municipal elections. . . . To fan and exaggerate the
significance of party disagreements in this sphere would inflict harm on the cause
for whose realization many Russian local public men thirsted passionately, who
went to their graves before a chance at that realization.

238. E d i t o r i a l m D en9 o n t h e R e o r g a n iz a tio n o f L o c a l

S e lf - G o v e r n m e n t
[No. 11, March 17,1917, p. 1.]
At the present time Russia is in a fever of organization. Through organiza
tional ties the Soviets of Deputies and public committees connect the most obscure
corners of our country. But it should not be forgotten that all this organizational
work is based on spontaneous local foundations, which would be absolutely in
applicable to the elections to the Constituent Assembly. For we will have to apply
for the first time the principles of universal and equal suffrage, while the present
organization is very remote from these principles. The elections of local organs
of self-government will immediately introduce the population to the elements of
universal, direct, and equal suffrage and will give the Constituent Assembly a solid
organizational and political foundation.
Let us have faith in the legislative strength of the Russian revolution. But let
us not sacrifice to this faith the duty of hard practical daily labor. We have lived
too long as slaves, and the body of the people still aches from the chains which
now have been smashed; it will take many more efforts for it to rise to full height
and stretch its limbs numbed by centuries of servitude. As yet it is difficult for
us to take a deep breath in the vastness of the new life, and everything that can
facilitate the transition from the gloomy vaults of the past into the infinite horizons
of the future should be done immediately.
One of the matters that will brook no delay is the reorganization of the whole
structure of local life on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage. In the very next
month the small zemstvo, the democratic and decentralized unit of self-govern
ment, must become a solid element of our civic life.
And when this is done, then, without doubt, the Constituent Assembly will be
an organ worthy of the great tasks of the great revolution.

239. Izvestiia E ditorial on L ocal R efo r m

[No. 39, April 13, 1917, p. 3.]
Out of all departments of the Ministry of the Interior, the most intensive work
is presently being carried on in the Section on Local Administration; questions
of a legislative character have almost completely absorbed its current business,
which, before the revolution, bore the character of police work. At the present
time, the Ministry does not consider it possible to invade local life and hamper it
with any restrictions. In accordance with this, numerous committees, holding
meetings every day and even twice a day, are working out reforms pertaining to
municipalities, zemstvos, volosts, and small villages. The reforms are based on the
principle of concentrating the full rights of self-government as well as of local gov
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 261

ernment in the hands of local public organs. Organs of the central governing
authority in the persons of governors or uezd commissars will have controlling
power from the point of view of keeping the actions, orders, and resolutions of
local organs of self-government in conformity with law. There will be no control
over the expediency of such actions. In general, all the reforms are beginning to
approximate the English system of local government, which is in contradistinc
tion to the French system of complete centralization. The uezd and guberniya
zemstvos are being preserved, but, of course, the electoral system is being funda
mentally changed in the sense of broadening the circle of persons who are eligible
for local administrative positions; elections will be based on universal, equal, and
direct suffrage. With respect to towns, there are tentative plans for organizing
small units of so-called regional dumas, with the provision of democratizing their
electoral system along the same lines as in the zemstvos. While the Section on
Local Administration is urgently preparing the corresponding drafts, it is also
raising all kinds of other questions for immediate consideration, which may be
partially resolved prior to the passage of general legislative acts. In this way,
incidentally, it is anticipated that in the very near future the Petrograd suburban
areas will be included under the regional jurisdiction of the Petrograd municipal
administration.

240. T em porary R ules on t h e E l ec tio n of M u n icipa l D u m a M em b ers

AND ON T H E E ST A B L ISH M E N T OF D IST R IC T A D M IN IST R A T IO N S
in M u n icipa lities
[5o6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 529. Ibid., No. 612, sets forth electoral procedures and orders
prompt elections.]
LAW O F T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government has decreed:

II. Pending publication of a new law on municipal administration of cities,

there shall be established: 1) temporary rules for holding elections of municipal
duma members in cities in which the municipal statutes of June 11, 1892, are in
effect as well as in the cities of Petrograd and Tashkent, and 2) temporary rules
on district administrations in municipalities annexed hereto.

P r in ce L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 15,1917
Annex 1 to Section II
TEM PORARY RULES FO R HOLDING ELECTIONS OF
M U N IC IPA L D U M A M EM B E R S

1. In municipalities in which the municipal statutes of June 11, 1892, are in

effect, . . . as well as in the cities of Petrograd and Tashkent, the municipal
boards [upravy] (municipal elders) immediately upon promulgation of the
present law shall undertake the preparation of a municipal election list for the
holding of elections for the municipal duma without waiting for the expiry of
the term of office of its [present] members, elected on the Basis of legislation now
262 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

in force. At the same time municipal boards (municipal elders) shall, if neces
sary, divide the municipality into separate election districts for convenience in
voting.
2. Municipal duma members shall be elected for a term until January 1,
1919. . . .
3. The right to participate in the election of duma members shall be enjoyed
by citizens of Russia of both sexes, of all nationalities and religious denomina
tions, who have reached the age of 20 years at the time of preparation of the elec
tion lists, if they reside in the particular city at such time, or have a domestic
establishment in the city or are employed there, or have other definite occupations
connected with the city.
Persons in military service shall participate in the elections on a basis of
general eligibility.
4. Among persons meeting the conditions mentioned in the preceding (3)
article, the following shall not participate in municipal elections: 1) the higher
representatives of administrative authority and their deputies and assistants within
the borders of the guberniya (oblast), prefecture, or uezd, 2) persons employed
within the borders of a guberniya, oblast, or prefecture in the local militia
(police), 3) persons in monastic orders, and 4) persons recognized in the pro
cedure established by law as insane, mad, or deaf-mute.
5. Persons sentenced by a court to penalties involving forfeiture or restric
tion of civil rights and convicted by a court for theft, swindling, embezzlement,
receiving stolen goods, purchasing or taking on pledge, as a regular occupation,
property known to be stolen or acquired by fraud, forgery, usury, extortion, or
bribery, as well as those convicted by a court for criminal acts against the election
law . . . shall be deprived of the right to participate in elections until the expiry
of three years after sentence has been served.
6. As members and alternates, not only may persons be elected who enjoy
the right to participate in elections, but all other persons as well, even though
they may not reside in the city and may not maintain a domestic establishment,
employment, or occupation there (article 3), who meet the other requirements
laid down for participation in elections.

8. The municipal election list shall be drawn up by the municipal board

(municipal elders) not later than two weeks from the day of promulgation of the
present law.
9. The election lists prepared by the municipal board (municipal elders) shall
be produced for general inspection.

Lvov, Minister-President
P r in c e
Head of the Chancellery
V la d . N a b o k o v ,
of the Provisional Government
April 15, 1917
Annex 2 to Section II
TEM PORARY R U LES, DISTRICT ADM INISTRATIONS IN M U NIC IPA L IT IE S
1. In cities with a population of not less than 150,000 inhabitants, municipal
dumas may establish municipal district administrations. . . .
2. Municipal district administrations shall assist the municipal administra
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 263

tion in carrying out tasks of municipal economy and management that affect the
needs of the various parts of the city. Detailed definition of the duties of the
municipal district administrations shall be left to the municipal duma.
3. The municipal district administration shall be composed of a district duma
and a district board,
4. The district duma shall consist of members elected by the established pro
cedure. . . . Detailed definition of the number of district members, depending
on the number of inhabitants in each district, shall be left to the municipal duma.
. . . The chairman and the members of the district duma shall receive remuner
ation as determined by the municipal duma.
5. The district board shall consist of a chairman and members whose maxi
mum number shall be defined by the municipal duma.
The chairman and members of the board shall receive salary as determined
by the municipal duma.
6. During the discussion in the municipal duma of matters affecting a par
ticular district, the chairman of the district duma and board shall, if necessary,
be invited to the meeting of the duma with the right of advisory vote. In similar
cases chairmen of district boards shall be invited to participate in meetings of
the municipal board with the right of advisory vote. Moreover, for the purpose
of unifying the activity of municipal district administrations, the municipal board
shall call meetings of all chairmen of district dumas and boards at intervals
established by it.

P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President

V lad . N abokov , Head of the Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 15,1917

241. T h e M in istry of t h e I n ter io r W arns A gainst L ocal A rbitrary

P rocedures for Z em stvo and M u n icipa l D um a E lec tio n s
[Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, April 24, 1917, No. 793. See also Docs. 246 n, 248.]
In view of the fact that the Ministry of the Interior continues to receive in
formation that in some places elections to zemstvo and municipal institutions are
held in accordance with various regulations worked out locally, the Ministry of
the Interior proposes the following for guidance and for urgent communication
to all institutions concerned.
1) The elections to the municipal dumas should be held following the regu
lations sanctioned by the Provisional Government with regard to the election
of members to the municipal dumas and with regard to the municipal district
administrations, published in Nos. 33 and 35 of the Vestnik Vremennago
PraviteFstva.
2) The working out of the regulations regarding the elections to the zemstvo
institutions is already completed and shall be published shortly, after its approval
by the Provisional Government. Until the respective ukase is published, it is
necessary to abstain from [holding] elections to zemstvo institutions. Until the
reform of local self-government on a uniform basis is put into practice locally,
264 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

the reinforcement of the organs of self-government by representatives of the

democratic groups of the population, in a number [sufficient] to guarantee to the
[organ of] self-government the confidence of large circles of the local [popula
tion], is admissible only as a temporary measure, in cases when, owing to excep
tional local conditions, same is urgently required. . . .

242. T h e S itu a t io n in t h e T o w n s
[Marti-Mai, 1917 goda, K A , XV (1926), 58. See Doc. 223 for a description of the
source.]
The general impression of the situation in various localities is this: a fine,
exhilarating holiday, followed by ever drearier workdays.
The town dweller, who impetuously invaded the streets at the first signs of
disorder, soon came to the conclusion that nothing catastrophic had occurred;
and having satisfied himself that the revolution was over and liberty secured, he
returned to his home without evincing any desire for active participation in the
establishment of the new order.
On the surface life flows peacefully in its usual channels: the factories are
working, trade is flourishing, dealers are returning to their occupations, order is
maintained without repressionbut there is no sense of security. People feel
that it is safer to stay at home; and this fear of personal assault has been inten
sified of late by frequent lootings of wine shops. The atmosphere in the towns
does not inspire hope; the prevailing notes are those of anxiety and fatigue. The
inhabitants show little interest in the work of reorganization; they are sinking
more and more into inertia, from which, however, they might be aroused by
skillful agitators, quite irrespective of the doctrines preached.
The villages show a far healthier spirit: the fear and vacillation, which are
so obvious among the town dwellers, are absent here; there is no occasion to
suspect a sudden and cowardly jump backward. The inhabitant of the town
is as a rule easily frightened, and he even likes being frightened. On the whole,
he is noted for his intense conservatism; and though he was called upon to
forgive much to the old authorities, he will certainly not forgive the new admin
istration for any errors it might commit. He is accustomed to bow down only
to power; the slightest weakening of the new authority or the spread of any
abuses of the revolution causes him to look regretfully backward and to level
reproaches against the new and the untried.
If the peasant can be made to move only under pressure of heavy trials, the
town dweller is seized with panic at the thought of losing even a little comfort.
To the peasant the new order means the acquisition of land. He has grasped
this idea with unshakable determination. The land is everything to him. The
town dweller, who does not, on the whole, set very great store by liberty, regards
the new order with favor only when it falls into his lap like manna, without
causing him any inconvenience or anxiety or threatening him with the loss of
his ease. This applies to the petty bourgeoisie of the towns, not to the industrial
workers, who value liberty for its own sake.
Demonstrations by extreme parties are anathema to the average town dweller.
And in the meantime, as though aware of this unspoken support, the conservative
and retrogressive elements, which had cowered in their hiding places during the
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 265

first enthusiastic days of deliverance, slowly reappear. They make use of the town
dwellers discontent, and his fear of the sweeping power of the revolution.

243. T em porary S tatu te on M u n icipa l A d m in istra tio n

[S0&. Uzak.y I, 2, No. 869.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
The Provisional Government, considering it appropriate, pending the promul
gation of the new law on municipal administration, to make the most pressing
changes in the existing statutes concerning said administration, has decreed:

1. The municipal administration shall deal with matters of local administra

tion and economy, as well as with other matters assigned to it by specific legis
lation.
2. The duties of the municipal administration include, in particular:
1) preparation of a city plan and subsequent modifications thereto, as
well as responsibility for suitable organization of the city in accordance with the
plan and supervision of proper construction.
2) administration of city taxes and collections.
3) administration of the movable and immovable properties of the city.
4) responsibility for the organization and maintenance in good repair of
streets, squares, roadways, sidewalks, public parks, boulevards, . . .
5) organization and maintenance in good repair of municipal lighting,
water supply, sewerage, various means of transportation and comm unication,
. . . as well as other public utilities, enterprises, and installations, . . .

6) taking precautionary measures against fires, floods, and other disas

ters . . .
7) responsibility for institutions designed to raise the morals of the
municipal population, and measures to fight against drunkenness and obscenity.
8) organization and maintenance of municipal elementary schools, as
well as of other academic institutions that are organized and maintained from
municipal funds; . . . organization of preschool and adult education; respon
sibility for the organization of educational and publicly useful institutions such
as peoples universities, conservatories, public libraries, museums, theaters, and
so forth, as well as assistance to these institutions.

10) taking measures to protect public health; . . .

11) responsibility for the food supply of the population and elimination
of shortages and high prices of articles of prime necessity and of housing;
organization of maintenance, for these purposes, of houses with low-price apart
ments, peoples dining rooms and tea rooms, as well as organization of the sale
of bread, meat, milk, fuel, and so forth.
12) supplying legal assistance to the population.
13) responsibility for the welfare of the poor . . .
14) protection of labor; organization of public works, campaign against
unemployment; organization of labor exchanges and intermediary employment
offices, . . . philanthropic institutions, public workshops, and overnight lodging
houses.
266 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

15) promotion of the development of local trade and industry by means

within the power of the public administration; . . .
16) carrying out statistical studies of the city.
17) organization of congresses of municipal leaders, making agreements
with zemstvo, municipal, and setdement administrations for the unification and
coordination of their activity and the formation among them of associations on
the basis of specific rules.
18) taking the measures provided by laws for the protection of personal
and public security and order; . . .

11. Responsibility for supervising the legality of acts of the municipal public
administration shall be placed upon the guberniya commissar.

63. Paragraphs 16, 17, and 21. The Municipal Duma is authorized:
16) to draw up and issue compulsory ordinances on the subjects men
tioned in article 108 of the present Statute;
17) to draw up and change the plan of the city;

21) to submit petitions to the Government on matters affecting the city.

67. The Municipal Duma initiates discussion of matters under its jurisdiction:
1) on proposals of the guberniya commissar;
2) on proposals of the mayor and [duma] members;
3) on representations of the Board [uprava], and
4) on requests and complaints of private persons.

79. [The following] decisions of the Municipal Duma shall be subject to

the approval of the Minister of the Interior, in agreement with the appropriate
ministers:
1) concerning the alienation of immovable properties belonging to the
city, with the exception of small plots intended under the municipal plan for
the erection of private buildings and the regulation of the municipality.
2) concerning loans, sureties, and guarantees on behalf of the city
which, when added to earlier loans and obligations, exceed the total amount of
municipal revenues under the estimate for the last complete year;
3) concerning the conclusion of contracts with private businessmen deal
ing with the organization and operation by them of municipal public utility in
stallations and enterprises in cases where the term of the contract exceeds twelve
years or the cost of the installation exceeds half of the annual total of municipal
revenues for the last complete year or amounts to more than 500,000 rubles;

5) concerning the fixing of fees to be collected as municipal revenue:

a) for areas assigned to private individuals or companies for use as steamship
piers or for the storage of goods loaded and unloaded; b) for the berthing of
ships, on waterways passing through municipal lands for a period longer than
the time required for loading, unloading, and meeting other needs of navigation,
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 267

and c) for the wintering of ships in backwaters and harbors organized from
municipal funds;
6) concerning the preparation or modification of the city plan.

81. If the Minister of the Interior does not find it possible to approve one of
the Dumas decisions submitted to him in accordance with article 79 of the present
Statute, such decision shall be considered invalid and the Duma shall be advised
accordingly, with a statement of the considerations on which the Ministers de
cision was based. If the Ministers decision was based on the fact that the [Duma]
decision was not in accordance with law, the Duma shall be authorized to make
an appeal on this subject to the Ruling Senate within a period of one month after
having been so advised.
82. Decisions of the Municipal Duma that are not subject to approval by the
Minister of the Interior shall be put into effect unless the guberniya commissar,
within a period of two weeks after receipt of the decision, enters a protest in the
circuit court (administrative division) on grounds of nonconformity of the de
cision with law. The enforcement of the decision challenged shall be suspended
until it assumes the force of law. In case of emergencies (civil disasters, war),
the decision challenged may be carried out immediately on the responsibility of
the municipal board, of which both the gubemiya commissar and the circuit court
shall be informed.

90. The Municipal Board shall consist, under the chairmanship of the Mayor,
of assistant mayors, where these offices exist, and members of the board.
91. The offices of assistant mayors may be established at the discretion of the
Municipal Duma, which shall also determine the number of these offices. The
division of duties between the Mayor and his assistants shall be determined by
the Duma.
The Municipal Board shall include not less than two members of the Board.
The Municipal Duma may decide, if necessary, to establish a larger number of
members of the Board.

95. The Mayor and the Municipal Board, with the executive organs of public
administration under the latter, shall be responsible for the direct management
of affairs of the municipal economy and administration according to the provi
sions of the present Statute, relevant regulations and laws, as well as in accord
ance with the decisions of the Duma; the Board shall maintain an inventory of
all municipal property; it shall carry on current business in municipal adminis
tration and economy, seek measures for their improvement, collect necessary in
formation for the Duma and fulfill its decisions, draw up municipal draft budget
estimates, collect and disburse municipal taxes as authorized by law and by valid
decisions of the Duma, act as plaintiff and defendant in court on municipal prop
erty cases, define, with the permission of the Duma, rules and time limits for
accounts of subordinate institutions and persons, audit such accounts, and submit
reports to the Duma:
1) concerning its activity;
2) concerning money turnover of municipal funds; and
268 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

3) concerning the condition of departments, institutions, and properties

under its jurisdiction,

110. Ordinances drawn up by the Duma shall be communicated to the guber

niya commissar, who, in case of disagreement with such ordinances, shall return
them to the Duma within two weeks, together with his observations, for recon
sideration. In this case the ordinance must be adopted by a majority of two-
thirds of the members present and shall be put into effect unless it is challenged
by the guberniya commissar under the procedure in article 82.
Ordinances to which no exception has been taken by the guberniya commissar
shall be made public three times by the Municipal Board in local official publi
cations and, in addition, shall be announced by other means which ensure that
the population will be familiar with them. The abrogation or amendment of ordi
nances shall be carried out by the same procedure as established for their pub
lication.

115. The Mayor, his assistants or deputy, Members of the Board, and Mu
nicipal Secretary shall be elected by the Municipal Duma; the Duma, however,
shall be authorized, without filling the office of Municipal Secretary, to entrust his
duties to one of the employees of the Municipal Board; alternate members of the
Board may be elected.

117. In choosing officials for the municipal administration, care shall be taken
to prevent persons working simultaneously in the same institution who are in
the first degree of kinship by marriage and in degrees of blood relationship:
in direct line, without limitation; and in lateral lines, to the third degree inclusive.
118. Officials of the municipal administration shall not be subject to approval
by governmental authority and shall enter upon the performance of their duties
following the entry into legal force of Duma decisions concerning their election.

142. Complaints alleging illegality of decisions of the Municipal Duma which

have been put into effect shall be submitted to the circuit court (administrative
division) under the established procedure.

144. Complaints alleging illegality of orders of the Municipal Board shall be

submitted under the established procedure to the circuit court (administrative
division); all other complaints against acts of the Board shall be submitted to
the Municipal Duma.

147. The Chairman of the Municipal Duma, the Mayor, his assistants and
deputy, the Members of the Board, the Municipal Secretary, persons elected by
the Duma to assist the Board in the immediate management of the various branches
of the administration and economy, members of preparatory and executive com
missions, district inspectors, and other elective officials of the municipal admin
istration, as well as its employees, shall be liable for crimes and misdemeanors
in office under disciplinary proceedings or in accordance with sentences of the
criminal courts.
148. Cases involving liability of the persons mentioned in the preceding (147)
article shall be brought by decisions of the Municipal Duma or by orders of the
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 269

gubemiya commissar, or, with respect to officials subordinate to the Municipal

Board, also by decisions of the Board, and, after a preliminary request for proper
explanations from the accused, shall be referred for action under the established
procedure.

X. In amendment of relevant statutes it is decreed:

1. The appellate court [sudebnaia palata] shall try cases of criminal acts in
office committed by the Chairman of the Municipal Duma, the Mayor and As
sistant Mayor in the cities of Petrograd and Moscow, as well as cases of such acts
committed by the Chairmen of Dumas and Mayors of gubemiya and oblast capital
cities and chief cities of prefectures.
2. The circuit court shall try criminal acts in office of all officials of the
municipal administration whose cases are not referred to the appellate court.

XV. All cases under consideration in relevant institutions which arose as a

result of the application of articles of the existing statutes on municipal admin
istration (Code of Laws, Vol. II, edit. 1915) which have been abrogated or
amended by the present law, with the exception of cases of liability of officials of
the municipal administration for criminal acts in office and cases before civil or
criminal courts, shall be terminated. The persons, companies, and establishments
concerned shall be granted the right, within six months after the entry of the
present Law into force, to petition relevant institutions for settlement of cases
brought by them, maintaining at the same time their right to seek recovery of
damages inflicted on them, on general grounds.

P rince L V ov , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k e n , Vice-Minister, for
the Minister of the Interior
June 9, 1917

244. S tatute on M u n ic ipa l R evenues , E x pen d itu r es , E stim a tes ,

and R eports

[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 2010.]

STATUTE ON M U N IC IPA L R EVEN U ES, EXPEN DITU R ES, E ST IM A T ES, A ND REPORTS

I. On Municipal Revenues
1. The sources of municipal revenues shall be: 1) taxes collected for the city,
as laid down by the present Statute and other legislation; 2) grants-in-aid and
various receipts from the Treasury and the zemstvos; 3) receipts from municipal
capital and other municipal properties, enterprises, and quitrent; 4) grants-in-
aid from funds of the State Treasury, fixed in accordance with special rules, and
5) various kinds of casual income.
2. Municipal dumas shall be authorized to establish the following taxes:
1) assessed on real estate;
2) special on real estate;
3) supplementary to national income tax and a separate income tax;
4) apartment;
270 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

5) on trading licenses for commercial and industrial enterprises;

6) on premises of industrial and commercial enterprises;
7) on taverns;
8) on hothouses, nurseries, etc.;
9) on street hawking and street vending;
10) on the cab trade;
11) on the moving trade;
12) on advertising and announcements;
13) on goods shipped in and out on the railroads;
14) on cargoes shipped in and out on inland waterways;
15) for the wintering of ships and barges on waterways within the city;
16) for stationing on streets and squares of carts with agricultural products
and other wares brought to the city for sale, as well as on large and small cattle
and horses driven to the municipal markets;
17) for sanitary inspection of meat brought to the city;
18) for occupying sidewalks during the construction of new buildings or
the remodeling of existing buildings;
19) for the examination of plans for new structures, and for granting of
licenses for remodeling and major repairs of existing buildings, as well as for the
installation of elevators;
20) for inspecting buildings constructed in the city, major alterations, and
newly installed elevators;
21) on auction sales of movable property carried out with the participation
of municipal auctioneers;
22) for the use of public weights and measures in trading places;
23) for the marking of weights and measures;
24) on various documents, during completion, notarization, protestation,
and presentation for recovery;
25) on horses and carriages;
26) on dogs;
27) on bicycles, horseless carriages, yachts, and motorboats;
28) seasonal [for spas, resorts, etc.];
29) on public spectacles and amusements;
30) the taxes collected by some cities . . . introduced before the publica
tion of the present Statute for revenue purposes of individual cities on the basis
of special statutes [shall be maintained] pending abolition of these taxes or the
end of the period for which they were established.
Note. The taxes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3-12, 15, 18-27, and 29 of the
present (2) article may be established only if the expenditures of the municipal
administration cannot be covered by revenues from municipal properties and
enterprises; the tax supplementary to the national income tax, the separate income
tax, and the apartment tax may be introduced after establishment of the assess
ment tax.

II. On Municipal Expenditures

114. Compulsory municipal expenditures shall include:

3) all payments and expenditures in general and performance of all obli

gations entrusted to the city by existing statutes and ordinances of the Municipal
Duma.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 271

116. All bills newly submitted for the consideration of the Municipal Duma
which involve the expenditure of funds from municipal resources must be accom
panied by the conclusions of the Estimate or Finance Commissions, or, where the
latter do not exist, of the Finance Department of the Municipal Board.

V. On Reports of the Municipal Board

163. The annual report of the Municipal Board concerning the fulfillment of
the estimates and the activity of all executive institutions of the municipal admin-
istration shall be transmitted to the Audit Commission (article 68 of the Mu
nicipal Statutes) by May 1 of the year following the period covered by the report.
The Audit Commission shall transmit its conclusions on this report to the Board
not later than August 1 of the same year. The Board shall submit the report with
its explanations to the Municipal Duma by September 1, which shall consider it
not later than October 1.

165. On the basis of the reports of the Audit Commission, the Municipal
Duma shall be entitled to fine both elective and appointed officials of the mu
nicipal administration for deficits, fixing the period for payment of the fine. In
case of nonpayment of a fine for deficit within the period fixed, the guilty party
shall be removed from office, and a suit shall be brought in court for recovery
of the deficit.
166. The annual report as approved by the Municipal Duma shall be sub
mitted to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance.
167. Forms for estimates and reports, and directives for their preparation*
and for the keeping of accounts shall be published by the Minister of the Interior
in agreement with the Minister of Finance and the State Controller.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
M. B e r n a t s k ii , Minister of Finance
September 29,1917

245. A d ver se C o m m e n t by Russkiia Vedomosti on th e M u n i c ip a l

F in a n c e s S t a t u t e
[No. 241, October 21,1917, p. 3.]
The Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva (No. 167) published a law which is
of great and substantial interest to Russian cities. It is the law of the Provisional
Government on the change of rules with regard to city incomes and expenditures.
The above resolution is the concluding act in the reform of municipal legis
lation which the Government began within the very first weeks following the fall
of the old regime. The greater the acute money crisis was felt, the greater the
impatience with which the municipal financial reforms were awaited. And one
can say with confidence that this heated impatience will now be replaced by a
profound disappointment.
The published act was drawn up at the time when the nations finances were
in a truly critical state, urgently calling for a way to find new sources of the
countrys income and to increase the existing sources. The nations assessment
screw must be tightened with all the means at our disposal. Forced by necessity
272 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

to follow this course, the state encounters on this course competitors in the name
of zemstvos and municipalities, which are also forced to have designs upon the
same sources of income that now must replenish the State Treasury. In search
of new means, the state competes with its own organs of local self-government.
Because of the fact that interests of the state, of necessity, must be placed above
local interests, the authors of the law were forced to deprive the municipalities
of those sources of income which they so long and so stubbornly solicited.

We can confidently assert that the published law on municipal finances will
be unable to help the cities out of the financial crisis which they are experiencing.
The law will undoubtedly provoke sharp attacks and condemnation on the part
of municipal administrations. The cause of its inadequacy lies, however, not in
the will of its authors. It resides in the catastrophic state of the nations finances
which prevent the Government from foregoing its revenue receipts in favor of the
organs of local government. No satisfactory solution of the municipal finances
is possible until a normal state of national finances is established.

GUBERNIYA AND UEZD ZEMSTVO REFORM

246. T em porary R ules on t h e E l e c t io n of G u b e r n iy a and U e zd
Zem st v o M e m b e r s

[So>. Uzak.91,1, No. 730.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Provisional Government has decreed:

II. Pending the publication of a new law on guberniya and uezd zemstvo insti
tutions, the Temporary Rules annexed hereto on holding elections of guberniya
and uezd zemstvo [Assembly] members are established.

IV. The first elections of guberniya and uezd zemstvo members following the
promulgation of the present law shall be held in 1917, observing these rules:
1. Uezd zemstvo boards [uprava] immediately on promulgation of the present
law shall undertake preparatory activities for the holding of elections of uezd
zemstvo members.
2. For organizational activities in connection with the election of uezd zem
stvo members, the membership of uezd zemstvo boards shall be supplemented by
representatives of local public organizations. The detailed procedure for adding
the aforesaid representatives to the uezd zemstvo boards shall be determined by
regulation of the Minister of the Interior.9

Minister-President
P r in c e L v o v ,
[and other ministers]
May 21,1917
9 See Doc. 248 below. Also Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 991, while ordering zemstvo elections as
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 273

Annex to Section II
TEM PORARY RULES ON HOLDING ELECTIONS OF
GUBERNIYA AND UEZD ZEMSTVO M EM BERS

I. ON T H E ELECTION O F UEZD ZEM STVO M EM B E R S

1. The uezd zemstvo assembly shall be made up of zemstvo members (1) from
rural localities and (2) from municipal communities.
2. Uezd zemstvo members shall be elected for three years in a number defined
for each uezd zemstvo assembly by the schedule annexed to the present article.
At the first elections following the promulgation of the present Temporary Rules,
uezd zemstvo members shall be elected for a term until January 1, 1919.

[Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to eligibility requirements. Reference should be

made to similar requirements in the earlier law on municipal dumas, Doc. 240.]
7. Uezd zemstvo members from municipal communities shall be elected sepa
rately in each municipal community located within the uezd for which the schedule
annexed to article 2 defines the number of uezd zemstvo members eligible for
election. For the purpose of electing uezd zemstvo members, each municipal
community shall constitute a single election district, which, on the basis of a de
cision by the municipal board (municipal elders), may be subdivided, if neces
sary for convenience in voting, into separate election wards. Municipal commu
nities, for which the schedule annexed to article 2 does not define the number of
uezd zemstvo members eligible for election, shall be assimilated for electing zem
stvo members to rural localities.
8. In municipal communities for which the schedule annexed to article 2
defines the number of uezd zemstvo members eligible for election, but in which
municipal administration has not yet been introduced, pending the introduction
of such administration the rights and duties of the municipal dumas mentioned
in the present Temporary Rules, as well as the right of the Municipal Board to
divide a city into election wards (article 7), shall be granted to the appropriate
uezd zemstvo boards; and the rights and duties of municipal boards, with the
exception of the above-mentioned right, and of mayors shall be granted to special
municipal election commissions and their chairmen, as appropriate. The afore
said commissions shall be formed, under the chairmanship of a person appointed
by the uezd zemstvo board, of persons mentioned in article 15 of the Temporary
Rules for holding elections of municipal duma members.
9. For elections of uezd zemstvo members from rural localities, the uezd zem
stvo board shall divide the uezd, with the exception of the municipal communities
located within its boundaries, into several election districts with, as far as pos
sible, the same amount of population in each of them.

15. Election lists, on being corrected . . . shall again be produced for gen
eral inspection not less than two weeks before the day of elections.
The lists mentioned in the present (15) article shall be accompanied by lists

soon as possible, directed the uezd food supply committees to elect representatives of local
public institutions to supplement existing uezd zemstvo board members before the board
carried out new elections. Ibid., No. 1164 specifically amends the present rules to this effect.
274 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

drawn up by the military units located within the boundaries of the municipal
community or election district (article 9) concerned for the elections of municipal
duma members and volost zemstvo assemblies . . . ; these lists shall be verified
and corrected by them for the elections of uezd zemstvo members and shall include
all persons in military service in the above-mentioned military units . . .

17. An elector may participate in the election of uezd zemstvo members in

only one municipal community or election district (article 9),

21. For holding elections of uezd zemstvo members in each ward of the elec
tion district (article 9), a ward election commission shall he set up under the
chairmanship of a person appointed by the uezd zemstvo board, consisting of
three persons invited by the chairman from among the electors of the ward. In
addition, the commission shall include, from each group of electors who have
signed a petition for a candidate for member (article 27), the first person who
has signed the petition, or a person specially chosen for this purpose by members
of the group from their midst.

27. Lists with names of candidates who have expressed their willingness to
run for member shall be submitted by the electors not later than ten days before
the day of elections, in municipal communities to the mayor (city elder), and in
election districts to the chairman of the district election commission. The number
of candidates on the list must not exceed the total number of members eligible for
election in the given municipal community or election district . . . ; on lists with
a larger number the superfluous candidates, who are last on the list, shall not be
taken into account.
28. Each of the declared lists (article 27) shall be signed by no fewer than ten
electors. Each elector may sign only one list of candidates for member.

30. Elections of uezd zemstvo members shall be held by secret ballot, using
ballot papers.

38. In order to determine the number of members to be allotted to each of

the declared lists, the total number of members eligible for election (article 2,
annex; article 11) multiplied by the number of votes cast for the given list shall
be divided by the number of votes cast in the entire election district for all lists.
The number of members elected on each list shall be determined by the figures
(quotient) received from such divisions. From each list there shall be counted
as members elected, in the order of their inscription on the list, beginning with
the first, such a number of them as corresponds to the quotient received from the
division. If there are whole numbers with fractions or only fractions in the
quotients received, as a result of which the number of members elected is one or
more short of the total number eligible for election, the quotients with fractions
shall be arranged in the order of their relative size, beginning with the largest,
and the number of members lacking shall be distributed among the lists to which
the largest fractions correspond, one to each list.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 275

42. Persons guilty of committing acts designed to violate the freedom and
regularity of elections of zemstvo members shall be liable under articles 328i
3287 of the Code on Criminal and Correctional Punishments (supplement 1912).
43. On completion of the elections, the election commissions shall be closed,
and all election proceedings with relevant documents and election sheets shall be
handed over within two days by the chairmen of the election district and mu
nicipal election commissions to the uezd zemstvo board for immediate dispatch
to the highest representative of the local administrative authorities, who may
declare protests within a period of seven days to the appropriate instance of the
administrative court.
44. Complaints against irregularities committed during the elections may be
made only by persons entitled to participate in the elections; in the case of elec
tions in election districts and wards, such complaints shall be made within ten
days of the completion of the elections, and in elections in municipal communities
within three days from the same time. These complaints shall be made to the
appropriate instance of the administrative court.
45. The protests and complaints mentioned in articles 43 and 44 shall be
considered by the administrative court within seven days of receiving the election
proceedings. If as a result of such consideration the court finds the elections held
in an election district or municipal community irregular in their entirety, it shall
decree their abrogation. The uezd zemstvo board, on receiving the finding of the
court in this case, shall decide to hold new elections in the election district or
municipal community concerned within a period of one month.
In the event the court finds the election of individual members irregular, they
shall be excluded by the uezd zemstvo board from the number of members elected
and shall be replaced by the candidates next in turn . . .
Findings of the court in the cases mentioned in the present (45) article shall
be carried out, but may be appealed to the Ruling Senate within a month of the
announcement of the courts findings.

49. In the event the Ruling Senate abrogates the elections of the entire body
of uezd zemstvo members for an individual municipal community or election
district, new elections shall be fixed for the respective community or district, on
the basis of the rules laid down above. Uezd zemstvo members elected under the
present (49) article shall remain in office until the expiry of the term of office of
the corresponding uezd zemstvo assembly.

II. ON T H E ELECTION O F GUBERNIYA ZEM STVO M EM B E R S

52. The gubemiya zemstvo assembly shall be composed of members elected
by the uezd zemstvo assemblies and municipal dumas of cities . . . from among
persons enjoying the right to be elected as uezd zemstvo members . . .
Provincial zemstvo members shall be elected for three years . . .
53. Not later than one day before the election of gubemiya zemstvo members,
persons participating in their election shall be authorized to submit to the chair
man of die uezd zemstvo assembly or the city mayor, as appropriate, lists of per
sons nominated by them for election as gubemiya zemstvo members who have
agreed to run. The number of candidates included in the list shall not exceed the
total number of gubemiya zemstvo members eligible for election from the given
276 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

uezd zemstvo assembly or municipal duma, as appropriate; in lists with a greater

number the superfluous candidates who are last in the list shall not be taken into
account. Each of the lists submitted shall be signed by no fewer than five mem
bers. Each uezd zemstvo or municipal duma member, as appropriate, may sign
only one list of candidates for guberniya zemstvo members.

P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister
of the Interior
May 21,1917
247. o f Russkiia Vedomosti
Co m m e n t
[No. 124, June 3,1917, p. 1.]
One thing that is comforting even in our difficult times is the rapid realization
of the reform of local self-government, which has been awaited with such im
patience and for such a long time.
On May 21the same day that the Government approved the temporary
statute on the volost zemstvo10it also approved the Law on Holding Elections
of Uezd and Guberniya Zemstvo Members.
Under that modest title, an act of utmost importance for the future of Russia
was published, an act which contains within itself a radical reform of the exist
ing zemstvo and the creation of new zemstvo organizations on truly democratic
principles.
From now on, the right of electing the members of the zemstvo is granted to
all Russian citizens who have reached the age of twenty, irrespective of sex, na
tionality, or religion. There are no longer property or tax-paying qualifications
required for the participation in the zemstvo elections, nor the qualification of
residence, i.e., of residing in a given locality for some specified minimum term.
Everyone who has resided within the uezd, who has had his household there, who
has worked there, or who has been connected with the district by some sort of
definite occupation by the time the lists of electors are compiled, is eligible to vote
in the uezd zemstvo elections. The limits of eligibility are more liberal than any
where, and the Russian zemstvo, from now on, will become the most democratic
organ of local self-government in Europe.
The uezd boards must undertake the preparation of the zemstvo elections im
mediately upon the publication of the decree of the Provisional Government on
the election of the members of the zemstvo. . . .
. . . Since the lists of electors for the municipal elections have already been
compiled, and the elections to the volost zemstvo will take place simultaneously
with the elections to the uezd zemstvo, there will be no need to compile special
lists for the elections to the uezd zemstvo: the final lists on the election of the volost
zemstvo and the municipal dumas will serve as the uezd lists. . . .
. . . The election of the uezd zemstvo members is conducted according to the
system of electoral lists. Each list contains the number of candidates to be elected
in a given electoral district. Each list must be signed by at least ten electors, and
must be submitted not later than ten days before elections. The elections in all
electoral districts take place on the same dayeither a Sunday or a holiday.
The total number of elected members is distributed in proportion to the num
10 See Doc. 252.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 277

ber of votes cast for each list, i.e., on the principle of proportional representation.
The zemstvo members are elected for a three-year term, but in the first election
they are elected until January 1, 1919, i.e., only for a year and a half.
The members of the guberniya zemstvos are elected by the municipal dumas
and by uezd zemstvo assemblies in the number specified in a special schedule.
The elections take place not only from among the municipal duma and the uezd
zemstvo members, as heretofore, but also from among the total number of per
sons who are eligible for election to the municipal dumas or uezd zemstvos. Elec
tions are conducted by list system, with proportional representation. . . .

248. T h e D e m o c r a t iz a t io n o f M u n ic ip a l D u m a s and of Ze m s t v o s
P e n d in g N e w E l e c t io n s
[Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to Guher-
niya Commissars, June 6, 1917, No. 2143. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 17.]
In view of the fact that the Ministry of the Interior continues to receive in
formation to the effect that in some places elections to zemstvo and town institu
tions are held in accordance with various regulations, worked out locally, the
Ministry of the Interior proposes for guidance and for urgent communication to
all institutions concerned: 1) It is necessary to hasten as far as possible the elec
tions to municipal dumas following the Rules on the Election of Municipal Duma
Members approved by the Provisional Government on April 15 and published in
No. 33 of the Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel9stva and in No. 95 of the Sobranie
Uzakonenii [Doc. 240]. 2) Until the reform of local self-government on a uni
form basis is put into practice locally, the reinforcement of the municipal dumas
and boards by the representatives of the democratic groups of the population is
admissible only as a temporary measure; the dumas may be increased by a num
ber equal to the number of duma members, while the boards may be increased
in accordance with actual need. 3) Urgent measures should be taken in order to
proceed with the elections to the volost and uezd zemstvo assemblies in accord
ance with the rules approved by the Provisional Government on May 21, permit
ting the democratization of the membership of the zemstvo assemblies only as a
temporary measure, within the limits established under point 2.11 4) In cases
where it should be necessary to carry out the democratization of zemstvo assem
blies and municipal dumas within limits broader than those indicated under points
2 and 3, the Ministry of the Interior should be contacted, informing it of the
reasons requiring a reinforcement of a larger size than the norm indicated, and
the assemblies may be convened only following [this] preliminary contact and
after reaching an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior.

249. T em porary A m en d m en ts to t h e Sta tute on G u b e r n iy a and

U ez d Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s
[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 870.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT
The Provisional Government, considering it appropriate, pending the pro
mulgation of the new Statute on gubemiya and uezd zemstvo institutions, to make
the most pressing changes in the existing Statute, has decreed:
11 See Docs. 246 and 252.
278 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Art. 1. Guberniya and uezd zemstvo institutions shall deal with matters of
local administration and economy in the guberniya and uezd, as well as with other
matters assigned to them by specific legislation.

Art. 2. The duties of zemstvo institutions include, in particular:

1) administration of local, guberniya, and uezd zemstvo obligations, in money
and in kind;
2) administration of capital funds and other properties of the zemstvo;
3) elimination of shortages and high prices of foodstuffs and articles of prime
necessity; supplying relief to the needy; promoting the establishment of con
sumers societies and the organization of food shops, bakeries, and similar estab
lishments, as well as administration and direction of uezd zemstvo food-supply
funds, where such exist;
4) maintenance in good repair of roads, road installations, and towpaths
under zemstvo jurisdiction; organization and maintenance of piers outside the
city limits and responsibility for improvement of local means of communication;
5) organization and maintenance of zemstvo postal and telephone communi
cations ;
6) administration of mutual zemstvo property insurance;
7) administration of zemstvo medical and charitable institutions; care of the
poor, the incurably ill, and the insane, as well as of orphans and cripples; organi
zation of poorhouses;
8) taking measures for the protection of public health, . . . ;
9) taking measures to prevent and extinguish fires, as well as precautionary
measures against floods and other disasters; measures for better rural planning;
10) development of public education; organization and maintenance of ele
mentary schools and other educational institutions; management of the aforesaid
schools and institutions maintained by zemstvo funds in academic, administrative,
and economic matters, as well as participation as stipulated by law in the admin
istration of other educational institutions; organization of preschool and adult
education; book publishing and the book trade; organization of public libraries,
museums, and so forth; responsibility for the protection of monuments and relics
of antiquity;
11) measures designed to raise the economic welfare of the population as well
as measures for carrying out works of public improvement . . . ;
12) veterinary and veterinary police measures; organization and maintenance
of slaughterhouses, responsibility for improving the breeds of horses and cattle;
13) protection of labor; organization of public works, public workshops,
overnight lodginghouses, labor exchanges, and intermediary employment offices,
as well as administration of these institutions;
14) taking the measures provided by law for the protection of personal and
public security and order, . . . ;
15) supplying legal assistance to the population;
16) responsibility for organization of migration at places of departure and
settlement of migrants;
17) carrying out statistical studies;
18) meeting the requirements of the military and civil administrations en
trusted under the established procedure to the zemstvo;
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 279

19) matters placed under the jurisdiction of zemstvo institutions on the basis
of specific legislative provisions and regulations.

Art. 5. Responsibility for supervising the legality of acts of zemstvo institu

tions is entrusted to the guberniya commissar.

Art. 65. Zemstvo assemblies shall be convened by the zemstvo board as fol
lows: 1) Regular sessionswithout failonce a year, uezd assemblies not later
than November 1, guberniya assemblies not later than January 15, for the con
sideration, among other current business, of the estimate of revenues and ex
penditures and for the apportionment of taxes for the coming year. 2) Special
sessionsas required.

Art. 81. Decisions of the zemstvo assembly that are subject to approval by
government authority on the basis of articles 82 and 83 (of the present Law) or
other statutes shall not be put into effect pending approval.
Art. 82. The following decisions of zemstvo assemblies are subject to approval
by the Minister of the Interior: 1) concerning the conclusion of contracts with
private businessmen on the organization and operation by them of zemstvo public
utility installations and enterprises for a period of more than 12 years and when
the cost of the installation exceeds 500,000 rubles; 2) concerning the termination
of employee pension and providence funds in zemstvo institutions and the condi
tions of their liquidation; and 3) concerning the conversion of guberniya and
uezd roads into secondary country roads and concerning the organization of new,
and the transfer of existing, piers on navigable rivers and lakes. . . .
Art. 83. Decisions of zemstvo assemblies 1) concerning the conclusion of
bond loans, and loans secured by immovable properties and funds belonging to
the zemstvo, as well as by funds administered by the zemstvo, and 2) concerning
the conclusion of other loans and sureties and guarantees on behalf of the zemstvo,
if their total, when added to earlier loans, exceeds the total annual amount of
zemstvo revenues under the estimate for the last complete year, shall be approved
by the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of Finance.

Art. 85. Decisions of zemstvo assemblies that are subject to the approval of
the appropriate minister (articles 82 and 83 of the present Law) shall be sub
mitted, as appropriate, by the guberniya commissar with his conclusion within a
period of two weeks after he has received them from the zemstvo board. If the
Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Finance, as appropriate, does not find
it possible to approve one of the decisions of the zemstvo assembly, submitted in
accordance with articles 82 and 83 (of the present Law), such decisions shall be
considered invalid, and the zemstvo assembly shall be advised accordingly, with
a statement of the reasons on which the Ministers decision was based. If the
Ministers decision was based on the fact that the decision was not in accordance
with law, the assembly shall be authorized to make an appeal on this subject to
the Ruling Senate within a period of one month after having been so advised.
Art. 86. Decisions of zemstvo assemblies that are not subject to approval
(articles 82 and 83 of the present Law) shall be put into effect, unless the guber-
230 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

niya commissar, within a period of two weeks after their receipt, enters a protest
in the circuit court (administrative division) on grounds of nonconformity of the
decision with law, having simultaneously so informed the appropriate zemstvo
hoard. The enforcement of the decision challenged shall be suspended until it
assumes the force of law.
In case of emergencies (civil disasters, war) . . . the decision challenged
may be carried out immediately on the responsibility of the zemstvo board, of
which both the guberniya commissar and the circuit court shall be informed.

Art. 96. Guberniya and uezd zemstvo boards shall consist of a chairman and
not less than two members. The number of members of guberniya and uezd zem
stvo boards may be increased by decisions of the appropriate zemstvo assemblies.
Art. 97. Zemstvo boards shall be responsible for the immediate management
of the affairs of the zemstvo economy and administration, under the rules of the
present Statute and relevant regulations and statutes, and in accordance with
directives of zemstvo assemblies. They shall conduct the current business of the
zemstvo economy; seek measures for its improvement; make arrangements for
convening zemstvo assemblies; inform both assembly members and local govern
ment establishments in good time of the convening of zemstvo assemblies and of
the matters proposed for consideration; collect necessary information for the
assembly and carry out its decisions; draw up draft zemstvo estimates and ap
portionments; supervise the receipt of zemstvo revenues; disburse zemstvo taxes;
plead suits in zemstvo property cases under the supervision of zemstvo assemblies;
determine, with the permission of assemblies, accounting rules and time limits for
persons and institutions subordinate to them, audit such accounts, and submit to
regular assembly sessions reports concerning their activity, the monetary turnover
in zemstvo funds, and the condition of departments, institutions, and properties
under their jurisdiction.
In addition, uezd zemstvo boards shall be responsible for: determination of
the boundaries of newly formed volosts in accordance with the rules of the Tem
porary Statute on Volost Zemstvo Administration, during incorporation of prop
erties which were not included in the boundaries of the former volosts; appoint
ment and dismissal of the chief of the uezd militia and his assistant, as well as for:
1) local arrangements, within the uezd, on instructions of the guberniya zem
stvo board, for the organization of means of communication, for the fulfillment
of requirements of the military and civil administrations assigned as guberniya
obligations, for mutual zemstvo insurance, and for other matters assigned as duties
under the jurisdiction of guberniya zemstvos;
2) submitting reports on these subjects to the guberniya board;
3) furnishing to the guberniya board local information on the uezd, required
for the estimate of guberniya zemstvo obligations, and
4) keeping zemstvo tax books according to models approved for that purpose
by the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of Finance.

Art. 98. Uezd zemstvo boards shall draw up and approve village plans, after
preliminary consultation with the village assembly and with landowners whose
property is located within the village plan as laid out.
In those cases where a difference of opinion arises between the zemstvo board
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 281

and the village assembly or the landowner concerned in the matter, the question
of approving the village plan shall be referred to the uezd zemstvo assembly for
settlement.

Art. 103. The guberniya commissar shall be authorized personally or through

his assistant, or the appropriate uezd commissar, to carry out inspections of the
matters assigned to the jurisdiction of zemstvo institutions by paragraph 18 of
article 2 (of the present Statute) and to review the activity of zemstvo institutions
in other branches of their administration and economy and to request the sub
mission of information and explanations by them. If he discovers unlawful acts
of the above-mentioned institutions during the aforesaid inspection and review,
or in any other way, the guberniya commissar shall so inform the appropriate
zemstvo assembly; and in the event that the assembly fails to take measures for
the restoration of lawful procedure, he shall enter a protest in the circuit court
(administrative division). The decision of the court on this protest may be
appealed by the zemstvo assembly under the established procedure. On the same
basis the Minister of the Interior, through the intermediary of persons appointed
by him for this purpose, shall be authorized to carry out inspections of the activity
of zemstvo institutions, with the proviso that in case unlawful acts are discovered,
the matter shall be referred to the guberniya commissar for action under the pro
cedure mentioned in the present (103) article.
In case evidence of crimes or misdmeanors in office is discovered during re
views or inspection of the activities of the board and other executive organs of
the zemstvo administration, the case shall be referred for action as indicated in
article 133 (of the present Statute).

Art. 110. Ordinances drawn up by zemstvo assemblies must in no way con

tradict laws in force. The assembly shall proceed to draw them up on its own
initiative, or as proposed by the gubemiya commissar, or on petition of joint
meetings (article 79 of the present Statute) and volost zemstvo assemblies. . . .

Art. 115. The offices of chairmen and members of the zemstvo boards shall
be filled by elections of the appropriate zemstvo assemblies. . . .

Art. 123. The term of office in elective positions in the zemstvo administration
shall last three years. . . .

Art. 128. Complaints alleging illegality of decisions of the zemstvo assemblies

which have been put into effect shall be submitted to the circuit court (adminis
trative division) under the established procedure.
Art. 129. Complaints against acts and enactments of the zemstvo board shall
be submitted, at the discretion of the complainant, either to the circuit court or
to the appropriate zemstvo assembly.
Decisions of the circuit court on complaints against the zemstvo board shall
be put into effect, but may be appealed within one month to the Ruling Senate.

Art. 132. The chairman of the zemstvo assembly, the chairman and members
of the zemstvo board, persons elected by the zemstvo assembly to assist the board
282 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

in direct management of various branches of the zemstvo administration and

economy, members of special executive commissions (councils), district inspec
tors and other elective officials of the zemstvo administration, as well as its em
ployees, shall be liable for crimes and misdemeanors in office under disciplinary
proceedings or in accordance with sentences of criminal courts.
Art. 133. Cases involving liability of the persons mentioned in the preceding
(132) article shall be brought by decisions of the zemstvo assembly or orders of
the guberniya commissar, or, with respect to officials subordinate to the zemstvo
board, also by decisions of the board and, after a preliminary request for proper
explanations from the accused, shall be referred for action under the established
procedure.

B (Annex to Art. 6)

Art. 1111. Complaints of private persons, companies, and establishments al

leging illegality of ordinances issued by a zemstvo assembly shall be submitted
to the circuit court (administrative division) and shall not be subject to any
statute of limitations. These complaints shall be handed to the zemstvo board,
which shall submit them to the circuit court within one week with its conclusion.
Art. 1141. Persons guilty of noncompliance with ordinances issued by zemstvo
assemblies shall be held liable on general grounds and shall be sentenced to the
penalties stipulated in article 29 (of the law of the Provisional Government of
March 17,1917, Collection of Laws, Art. 376) of the Code of Penalties imposed
by justices of the peace, unless violation of the aforesaid ordinances is dealt with
by other penal legislation.

P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
June 9, 1917

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VOLOST ZEMSTVOS AND

SETTLEMENT (POSELOK) ADMINISTRATIONS
250. T h e V o l o st Ze m st v o

[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 91, April 25, 1917, p. 3.]

The work of the Provisional Government regarding the reform of local self-
government proceeds at full speed. Recently the statute on municipal elections
and the statute on municipal district dumas were published. Within a few days a
statute on the volost zemstvo is slated to be published, so that the elections of the
volost delegates could take place at the end of May, or at the beginning of June,
when the rural population has an interruption in its field work. Thus, the age-
old dream of the finest public men of Russia regarding a small zemstvo unit is
today on the eve of its realization. In the heat of the battles of our allies and our
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 283

enemies, and at the peak of the revolutionary movement in the country, the
Government is embarking upon the greatest of all impending reforms in the realm
of local self-government. It is laying the foundation for the future edifice of the
independent initiative of our peasant population. It is creating the unit which is
destined to become the school for civic education of the Russian village. . . -
. . . The volost zemstvo is not appearing now in the ugly shape that was
imparted to it by the Third State Duma.12 In the present conditions, it will be a
truly democratic organ elected on the principle of direct, universal, equal, and
secret ballot by all the residents of a volost without discrimination as to sex, social
origin, or nationality. The entire population that has attained the age of twenty
years will be admitted to participation in elections, regardless of whether the voter
is present within the confines of the volost by the time the rolls are compiled, or
whether he is temporarily absent (e.g., working in the city) but nevertheless
retains his household or his farm within the volost. Thus, even the workingmen
who live in cities but who have not yet broken the ties with their native village
will be given the right to take part in the volost elections in their native place.
For the zemstvo employeesphysicians, teachers, agronomiststhe volost zem
stvo opens an opportunity to play a leading role in volost affairs and to influence
the latter. During the first weeks of the new regime, in many localities of Russia
a tendency can be observed on the part of the peasants to cope unassisted with the
problems that have arisen before them; a certain suspicion of the participation
of intellectuals in peasant affairs is observable. However, it must be stated that
these phenomena will disappear quickly. The problems with which the village is
faced are so complex that, in the effort to solve them, the peasant would sooner
give credence to the words of a local teacher, physician, or agronomistall of
whom he knows well and who have been giving their labor and their very lives
to the peoplethan to the eloquent exhortations of the visiting orator who in
variably is a stranger in the village. The influence of the zemstvo employees upon
the volost zemstvo is bound to be tremendous in the future, and this influence
will serve for the modest workers as a just reward for the unselfish care about
peoples welfare, earned by lifelong labor. . . .
. . . Immediately upon publicationwithin the next few daysof the statute
on the volost zemstvo, the compilation of electoral rolls for each volost will be
started everywhere, and harmonious, creative work will begin in constructing the
organ that will be the foundation of local public administration.

251. A r t ic l e in Izvestiia on L o c a l S e l f -G o v e r n m e n t

[No. 69, May 18,1917, p. 2.]

The seventh article of the Governments declaration18 is devoted to the ques
tion of local self-government.

When the revolution broke out, all these organs of self-government were swept
away and destroyed.

12 For a description and discussion of this proposal, see V. L Gurko, Features and Figures
of the Past, pp. 522, 532-33.
18 Declaration of May 5,1917, following the formation of the First Coalition. See Vol. DI,
Doc. 1095.
284 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Local administration passed into the hands of various temporary committees

and soviets. . . .
It is understandable that under these circumstances no uniform regulation is
possible in local affairs. Yet without establishing order on the local level there can
be no order in national affairs. In particular, it is inconceivable to cope with eco
nomic ruin, it is impossible to bring order into the economic life of the country
without regulating local self-government.

But apart from this, it is extremely important for the democracy to organize
local self-government on a correct basis.
As the revolution develops, new ways of life for free Russia come into being.
And the organs of local self-government must play an enormous role in a free
country. These organs must deal with questions of national health, education,
care of the needy, and general welfare.
All these problems can be effectively handled only by organs elected on the
basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret ballot.
Setting its immediate task to be the creation of such organs of local self-gov-
ernment, the Provisional Government is striving toward a threefold goal:
1. To consolidate the gains of the revolution in the sense of introducing plan
ning in the organized construction at the local level, which has previously pro
ceeded sporadically and haphazardly.
2. To establish an organ for combating economic ruin.
3. To build the life of a new, free Russia.
In all these questions the path which the democracy must follow is clearly
indicated. Its basic interests demand that the program of the new Provisional
Government, with respect to local self-government, must be carried out in the
very near future.
But as to the last question, concerning the time it would take to establish the
new democratic organs of self-government, everything depends, primarily, on the
initiative [shown] by the democracy.
The central government creates only the legal forms of the organs of self-
government. The local democracy must give life to these forms.
It is up to the peasantry to transform the volost zemstvo, which is in the process
of being established, into an invincible stronghold of Russian freedom, into a
granite foundation for reviving our economic forces.
The soldiers and the workers will determine the composition of our municipal
dumas and the progress of their work.
The efforts of the organized democracy in furthering this cause will not be
wasted. Here a display of initiative by the democracy is the best way to support
the new Provisional Government, the best way to support the revolution.

252. Tem porary S tatute on V o l o st Z e m s t v o A d m in is t r a t io n

[Sob. U z a k 1 ,1, No. 655. For the order for holding the elections, see ibid., No. 827; and
for a supplement on certain technical election details, see ibid., I, 2, No. 1315. For rules
concerning the volost zemstvos duties in the apportionment and collection of state,
guberniya, uezd, and volost taxes, see ibid., 1 ,2, No. 867.]
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 285

I. General Provisions
1. Matters of local public economy and administration shall be subject, within
the limits of the volost, to the jurisdiction of the volost zemstvo.
2. The jurisdiction of the volost zemstvo administration shall extend to
continuous districts formed from all types of holdings located outside munici
palities, and to all persons residing within these limits, irrespective of status.
Note 1. In determining the borders of volosts, care shall be taken to ensure:
1) that a volost shall not be separated from any of its land by other volosts, and
2) that rural communities, as far as possible, shall not be parceled out among
several volosts. . . .
3. Matters under the jurisdiction of volost zemstvo institutions, within the
limits set by the present Statute, relevant charters, and other codes of regulation
include:
1) the administration of zemstvo taxes, in money and in kind, to the
extent determined [for this purpose] by the uezd zemstvo assembly;
2) the determination, by agreement with uezd and gubemiya zemstvo
institutions, of methods of participation of volost institutions in all kinds of
zemstvo measures, undertaken at the expense and under the direction of uezd
and gubemiya zemstvos;
3) the administration of the funds and other properties of the volost
zemstvo;
4) action to eliminate shortages of food supplies and to organize food
shops, bakeries, and similar establishments; assistance in promoting consumers
societies;
5) the organization and maintenance in good condition as well as the
improvement of local roads, towing paths, and road installations, such as river
crossings, bridges, brushwood roads, ditches, etc.;
6) care to prevent and extinguish fires, such as organization of fire
prevention societies, maintenance of fire brigades, carts, etc.;
7) responsibility for public education, organization and maintenance of
schools and other educational institutions, assistance to all types of [preschool
and adult] education, trade in books, etc.;
8) responsibility for public health, organization and maintenance of medi
cal institutions, such as hospitals, casualty wards, dispensaries, pharmacies, and
administration of these institutions;
9) responsibility for care of the poor, organization of charitable institu
tions, shelters, almshouses, hospices, etc., as well as administration of these
institutions;
10) participation in measures for the improvement of local sanitary con
ditions and in the fight against contagious diseases;
11) participation in measures to prevent cattle plague, responsibility for
veterinary care, arrangements for medical treatment of animals, organization of
slaughterhouses, etc.;
12) assistance to local agriculture, trade, and industry, promotion of the
establishment of cooperative institutions, adoption of measures for the protection
of fields, meadows, forests, orchards, against damage and destruction by harmful
animals, organization of training workshops, exhibitions of products of the local
economy and industry, storage of machines, tools, seeds, fertilizers, handicraft
articles, stations for pedigree cattle, etc.;
286 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

13) assistance in the protection of labor, supervision of the sanitary con

ditions of living quarters assigned to hired hands, organization of labor exchanges,
support of the activity of conciliatory institutions, etc., on lines mentioned in the
relevant statutes;
14) furnishing legal assistance to the population;
15) organization of public small-credit institutions;
16) responsibility for carrying out work in drainage, irrigation, afforesta
tion, reinforcement of gullies, etc.;
17) responsibility for public welfare, for better community planning,
paving of streets, water supply, lighting, sewerage, public gardens, ponds, wells,
etc.;
18) meeting the requirements of the military and civil administrations
entrusted under the established procedure to the volost zemstvo;
19) preservation of public order and safety;
20) fulfillment of state and zemstvo obligations as well as of lawful orders
of both government and public institutions, and
21) matters placed under the jurisdiction of volost zemstvo institutions
on the basis of specific legislation and charters.
4. The duties enumerated in paras. 5-14 of the preceding (3) article shall
be performed by volost zemstvo institutions to the extent and on the basis deter
mined by agreement of the volost zemstvo assemblies with uezd assemblies, and,
in appropriate cases, with guberniya zemstvo assemblies.
5. Volost zemstvo institutions shall have the right, on behalf of the volost
zemstvo and on the basis of general civil laws, to acquire and alienate property,
conclude contracts, assume obligations, and also to act as plaintiff and defendant
in court in cases involving the volost zemstvo, observing the rules established for
government administrations.
6. To meet the needs, for which responsibility has been placed upon the
volost zemstvo administration, the volost zemstvo assembly shall have the right
to levy taxes on all real properties located within the volost, as well as to establish
special taxes on the basis of special rules to that effect.
7. To meet the needs arising from the duties entrusted to the volost zemstvo
by article 3, the volost zemstvos may enter [zemstvo] unions and associations on
the basis of special rules to that effect.
II. On Elections of Members of Volost Zemstvos
[The procedures and qualifications are essentially the same as those for
municipal dumas and uezd and guberniya zemstvos, except that voting is for
individual candidates, not lists.]

III. On Volost Zemstvo Assemblies

42. The volost zemstvo assembly shall be composed of the volost zemstvo
members.
43. The duties of a volost zemstvo member shall be performed without remu~
neration.
Note. For the reimbursement of expenditures incurred in the course of per
forming a members duties in assemblies and commissions, volost zemstvo assem
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 287

blies may fix special amounts in the form of travel (cost of the trip) and sub
sistence allowances.
44. A. member of a volost zemstvo assembly shall not have the right to transfer
his vote to another.
45. The volost zemstvo assembly shall elect a chairman annually from among
its members.

47. The election of chairman and vice-chairman of the volost zemstvo assem
bly shall be held by secret ballot.
48. Volost zemstvo assemblies shall be authorized:
1) to hold elections for offices provided by law and to determine the
amount of salary to be assigned these offices;
2) to determine the procedure for activity of the volost executive organs
and to furnish them with proper instructions;
3) to consider and adopt volost zemstvo estimates and assessments of
taxes in money and in kind;
4) to determine the amount of volost zemstvo taxes on the basis of
special rules on this subject;
5) to strike off arrears and fines on account of volost zemstvo taxes which
there is no hope of collecting or which were wrongly calculated;
6) to determine rules for the administration of funds and other proper
ties belonging to the volost zemstvo or in its possession and control, as well as
for medical, charitable, and other establishments of public utility under the
jurisdiction of volost zemstvo institutions;
7) to acquire and alienate real properties;
8) to establish special funds for particular purposes;
9) to negotiate loans for the needs of the volost zemstvo and short-term
borrowings from funds of the volost zemstvo for a specific purpose;
10) to verify activities and accounts of volost zemstvo boards and to
consider complaints concerning their activities;
11) to present conclusions on questions proposed for discussion in
assemblies by gubemiya and uezd government authorities;
12) to present to gubemiya and uezd zemstvo assemblies information
and conclusions on questions proposed by them, and
13) to consider and decide all matters related to duties of the volost
zemstvo, and also to petition for appropriate action on questions affecting local
welfare and needs.
49. The volost zemstvo assembly shall be convened by the chairman of the
volost zemstvo board by means of notices sent to members of the assembly.
50. Regular volost zemstvo assemblies shall be convened at intervals deter
mined by the assembly itself. For the preparation and consideration of the volost
estimate and the assessment of taxes, a regular assembly must be convened in the
period between August 15 and September 15 of each year.
51. Volost zemstvo assemblies shall be convened without fail within a period
of two weeks: 1) on application by not less than one-fifth of the volost zemstvo
members, made to the chairman of the volost zemstvo board [uprava], 2) on
request of the uezd zemstvo board, 3) on application of the auditing commission,
4) on request of the gubemiya representative of the administrative authorities.
288 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

IV. On the Volost Zemstvo Board [uprava] and Volost Officials

62. The volost zemstvo board shall consist of a chairman and not less than
two members . . .
63. The chairman and members of the volost zemstvo board shall be elected
for a three-year term by the volost zemstvo assembly from literate persons who
have reached the age of twenty-one and who are eligible for election as volost
zemstvo members. . . . The officers of the first volost zemstvo board after the
implementation of the present Temporary Statute shall be elected for a term
until January 1,1919.

69. The office of chairman of the volost board may not be held at the same
time as any other paid offices in state and public service.

72. The chairman and members of the volost zemstvo board shall serve as
members of the volost zemstvo assembly even though they may not be [elected]
members.
73. The chairman and members of the volost zemstvo board may not,
throughout the entire tenure of office, take part in contracts, purveyance, and
other similar agreements concluded by the volost zemstvo of which they are
officials.

76. In the sphere of economy and administration of the zemstvo the volost
zemstvo board shall be entrusted with:
1) calling volost zemstvo assemblies, preparing information necessary
for them, and carrying out their decisions;
2) drawing up draft volost zemstvo estimates and assessments, super
vising the receipt of volost revenues and the expenditure, according to the rules
of the present Statute, of volost zemstvo funds;
3) determining, with the permission of the volost zemstvo assembly,
the rules and time limits for the accounts of persons and institutions subordinate
to the zemstvo, as well as the auditing of these accounts;
4) pleading, under the supervision of the volost zemstvo assemblies, of
suits on business of the volost zemstvo, and
5) submitting to the volost zemstvo assemblies reports on its activity,
on the handling of monies in volost zemstvo accounts, and on the condition of
districts, establishments, and properties under its jurisdiction.
77. In the matter of military and civil administration the volost zemstvo
boards, within the limits of the volost:
1) shall proclaim, on instructions of the administration, laws, and
enactments of the Government;
2) shall keep, on the basis of the relevant laws, election lists for the
election both of volost and uezd zemstvo members;
3) shall keep family lists, arrange calls to military service, deliver to the
proper agency information required for the registration of members of the reserve
and soldiers of the territorial force [opolchenie], shall issue mobilization orders
as well as other orders mentioned in laws for the performance of military service
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 289

and the levy of mounts to the army, shall allocate among their members adminis
tration of districts for the levy of mounts to the army;
4) shall perform the duties in connection with the food supply laid down
in relevant laws and enactments;
5) shall participate in the appraisal of buildings insured under the rules
of zemstvo insurance and in the inspection of buildings after fires, shall forward
to the proper agency documents required for the payment of insurance awards,
shall make (on instructions of gubemiya or uezd boards) payment of compen
sation for fire, and shall carry out other orders and activities mentioned in the
rules on compulsory insurance;
6) shall supervise building within the limits of the volost and shall issue
corresponding permits according to the Construction Code and the existing in
structions;
7) shall supervise the execution of ordinances published under the es
tablished procedure;
8) shall issue, after requesting proper certification, [internal] passports,
and shall also notarize the identity and signatures of local inhabitants; and
9) shall keep a book of transactions and contracts under the procedure
established by law.
78. One of the members of the volost zemstvo board shall be entrusted by
decision of the board with:
1) enactments, within the limits of the volost and pending the arrival of
officers of the militia or the investigating authorities, for the restoration of order,
the protection of the security of persons and properties, and the detention of the
guilty, apprehended flagrante delicto9 and the taking of measures in such cases
to preserve the evidence of such crimes;
2) notification of one of the officers of the local militia of criminal acts
that have occurred in the volost;
3) assistance to the investigating authorities in their visits to the scene
of the crime, in calling witnesses and participants in the case.
79. In addition to the duties enumerated in articles 76-78, the volost zemstvo
boards shall fulfill all other duties placed upon them by law.
80. In all matters falling under the jurisdiction of the volost zemstvo admin
istration, the volost zemstvo board shall be authorized to issue orders to officials
of the rural and, in appropriate cases, settlement administrations, who shall be
required to furnish proper cooperation to the volost board.
81. Matters under discussion in the board shall be decided by a majority vote.
If, however, the chairman of the board finds the majority decision inconsistent
with the law or with a decision of the volost zemstvo assembly, he shall suspend
the execution of this decision and bring it to the attention of the next volost
zemstvo assembly.

V. On Supervision and Appeal

88. The following decisions of the volost zemstvo assembly shall be submitted
for confirmation by the next uezd zemstvo assembly:
1) concerning the alienation and mortgaging of real properties belong
ing to the volost zemstvo;
290 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2) concerning the amount of tolls to be collected from persons using

[river] crossings maintained by the zemstvo or by private individuals;
3) concerning the conclusion of contracts for a term of more than ten
years; and
4) concerning the negotiation of loans,
89. The decisions of the volost zemstvo assembly which, on the basis of the
preceding article 88, are subject to confirmation by the uezd zemstvo assembly
shall not be carried out pending such confirmation.
90. Copies of the decisions of the volost zemstvo assembly which do not re
quire confirmation (article 88) shall be submitted within a week by the volost
zemstvo board to the uezd representative of the administrative authorities, who
shall have the right to request necessary information on these matters from the
appropriate volost boards.
91. The decisions of volost zemstvo assemblies mentioned in article 90 shall
be carried out if, within a period of two weeks after their communication to the
uezd representative of the administrative authorities, they have not been sus
pended as inconsistent with the law.
92. In cases which brook of no delay, the volost zemstvo board shall be
authorized to carry out under its own responsibility decisions of the zemstvo
assembly before the end of the period mentioned in article 91.
93. Guberniya and uezd zemstvo assemblies may elect commissions to inspect
volost zemstvo establishments. The zemstvo assembly concerned shall inform the
volost zemstvo board of the results of the inspection for report to the next volost
zemstvo assembly.
94. The uezd representative of the administrative authorities shall be author
ized to carry out inspections of the records of the volost zemstvo establishments
with respect to the matters mentioned in paras. 18-20 of article 3 of the present
Statute. The uezd representative of the administrative authorities shall inform
the volost zemstvo board of the results of the inspection for report to the next
volost zemstvo assembly. He shall protest any violations of law noticed by him
or make criminal charges on general grounds.
95. The procedure for entering a protest and appealing against illegal de
cisions, orders, or acts of organs of the volost zemstvo administration is laid down
in the law of the Provisional Government on the establishment of administrative
courts.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
May 21, 1917

253. T h e A c t iv it ie s o f V o l o st P u b l ic C o m m it t e e s P r io r to t h e
E l e c t io n o f V o l o s t Z e m s t v o s

[Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, June 8,1917, No. 2225. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 19.]
In addition to the circular telegram No. 197 of May 2 and in connection with
the publication of the law in respect of the volost zemstvos, the Ministry of the
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 291

Interior proposes to immediately take measures for the cancellation of the arbi
trary compulsory taxation established by some volost committees, explaining that
such taxation is inadmissible prior to the formation, on the basis of the law pub
lished, of volost zemstvo institutions. At the present time only voluntary collec
tions may be made in order to cover the expenses exactly specified in the estimate
and necessitated by actual needs in connection with measures taken by the com
mittees for the re-establishment of order and with the struggle of the committees
against the arbitrary seizures of lands, agricultural implements, and other prop
erties of the citizens. The decisions of the committees that are not based on law
should be canceled immediately; the whole population should be warned that such
decisions, being arbitrary, have no force whatsoever. The volost committees
should act in conformity with the directives of the uezd committee, which, together
with the commissar representative of the Provisional Government, has the duty
to combat steadfastly the violations of law [and] to watch that the volost com
mittees do not misappropriate rights which do not belong to them. The foregoing
instruction should be immediately [and] widely published to the population of
the whole guberniya.

254. T h e T em porary S tatute on S ettlem en t (Poselok)

A d m in is t r a t io n

[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1082. A detailed Regulation on election procedure was issued,
ibid., No. 1462.]
CHA PTER I. GENERAL PROVISION

1. Settlement administration shall be introduced for the purpose of managing

affairs of town planning and public welfare:
1) in railroad, waterfront, factory, mining, trade, suburban, and other
inhabited places, if local requirements for town planning and public welfare are
so developed that they cannot be satisfied by means of voluntary agreement of
the residents of the inhabited place but require special administration;
2) in inhabited places having rural administration, if the introduction of
settlement administration proves necessary in view of the large size of such settle
ments, the numbers of the population, their commercial and industrial develop
ment, and other conditions which make these inhabited places comparable to
municipal communities.
2. On petition of the settlement assembly, the settlement may, by order of the
appropriate authority (article 8), be removed from the jurisdiction of the volost
zemstvo and established as an independent volost zemstvo unit. In such case the
settlement administration shall also fulfill all duties entrusted to volost zemstvo
institutions by military and civilian administrations, obeying the rules laid down
in this respect for the aforesaid institutions.

3. The duties of the settlement administration, within the limits mentioned by

the present Statute, relevant charters, and other laws, shall include: [duties simi
lar to volost zemstvos].

8. Matters involving the introduction of settlement administration, the re

moval of a settlement from the jurisdiction of the volost zemstvo and its establish
292 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

ment as an independent volost zemstvo unit, the determination and modification

of the boundaries of the inhabited area of the settlement and subsequent modifi
cations in these boundaries, as well as matters involving the approval of settle
ment plans and modifications thereto, shall be decided by uezd zemstvo assem
blies, on the basis of proposals and conclusions of uezd zemstvo boards.
Copies of decisions of uezd zemstvo assemblies for the establishment of settle
ments as independent volost zemstvo units with settlement administration shall
be submitted to gubemiya zemstvo assemblies for approval. Guberniya zemstvo
boards shall inform uezd zemstvos of the decisions taken and, in case of approval
of the decision, shall enter the settlement [thus] established in a special list.

10. In order to satisfy the needs assigned to the jurisdiction of the settlement
administration, the settlement assembly (sobranie) shall have the right, on the
basis of the rules of the present Statute, to assess monetary taxes on real estate
situated within the settlement and to establish other taxes . . .

15. The organs of the settlement administration shall be:

1) the settlement assembly, and
2) the settlement board [uprava]
CH A PTER II. ON T H E ELECTION OF SE T TL E M EN T [A SS E M B L Y ] M EM BERS

16. Settlement [assembly] members shall be elected by the population of the

settlement for three years. At the first elections following the introduction of the
settlement administration in the inhabited place, members shall be elected for a
term of one year. [Suffrage and eligibility to office same as volost zemstvo re
quirements.]

158. Gubemiya and uezd zemstvo assemblies may elect commissions to inspect
settlement establishments. The appropriate zemstvo assembly shall inform the
settlement board of the results of the inspection for report to the next settlement
assembly.
159. The highest representative of administrative authority in the uezd shall
be authorized to carry out inspections of the proceedings of settlement institu
tions . . . The highest representative of administrative authority in the uezd shall
inform the settlement board of the results of the inspection for report to the next
settlement assembly. He shall lodge a protest or criminal charges on general
grounds concerning any violations of law observed by him.
160. The procedure for lodging a protest and submitting complaints against
unlawful decisions, orders, or acts of settlement administration organs is defined
in articles 13 and 18-34 of the Statute on Administrative Courts (Collection of
Laws 1917, article 692).
I r. T se r e t e l l i
Acting Minister of the Interior
July 15, 1917

255. Russkoe Slovo

E d it o r ia l o n t h e V o l o s t Ze m s t v o s in
[No. 192, August 23,1917, p. 1.]
In many localities of European Russia the elections to the volost zemstvo have
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 293

already been completed; in other localities these elections m il soon be com

pleted. . . .

In the volost zemstvos the peasantry is called upon for a great creative national
work; it is called to be examined in the matter of self-government. On the results
of this examination also depends the future of the country. Perhaps the signifi
cance for the destiny of Russia of the volost zemstvo reform is not realized by
many. Through this reform is laid the foundation of the edifice of the Russian
State, which must be erected and furnished by the all-national Constituent As
sembly. And let the cultured workers of the villages remember, while directing
all their forces for the organization of zemstvo affairs in the thousands of the
volosts of our vast fatherland, that their individual efforts, like small streamlets,
will flow into one mighty current, which will renovate the supports of our state.

256. How W e r e t h e V o l o s t E l e c t i o n s C o n d u c t e d ?
[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 217, September 23, 1917, p. 1.]
Much interesting material may now be found in the local press which throws
light on the recent elections to the volost zemstvos. These are reports on pre
election meetings, elections themselves, chats with peasants, observations and im
pressions of eyewitnesses. On the whole, the picture is quite dismal. Why is it
that almost everywhere, with rare exceptions, the population has exhibited great
indifference and lack of cooperation in elections? At best, half of the voters par
ticipated, more frequently only one-fourth, and, on the whole, in a number of
volosts elections could not be conducted because the voters failed to report.
How can this indifference on the part of the population be explained? The
local press sees the cause in the unpreparedness of the population for the elections,
in its ignorance. In many instances lack of understanding on the part of the popu
lation of the aims of the new zemstvo is pointed out. They regard the volost
zemstvo as unnecessary. Some fear that it will bring only the burden of new taxes.

The technique of elections as such was badly mastered and presented. Reports
on elections testify that in many places secret ballots were turned in open. In the
case of illiterates, the marking of candidates was usually made by other persons,
and no secrecy was observed.

In a number of places the local authorities themselves, commissars and

militia, participated in the campaign. The campaign was either in favor of some
party or in their own favor. (Saratov Vestnik)
On the whole, however, it is pointed out that the participation of political
parties in the volost elections was quite weak. The parties proved to be powerless
to expand a campaign throughout. There were very few instructions for a wide
spread pre-election campaign such as that conducted in the large village of
Bogorodskii of Nizhnii Novgorod guberniya, where on election day they drove
through the village on horseback bearing various election placards with five lists
competing with each other. Absence of party interference had both its positive
and negative side. Poor organization, too few candidates for members of the
assembly were the result of absence of party activity. To compensate for it, elec
294 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

tion of local candidates who were most acceptable to the population took place
where there was no party interference. The Permskiia Zemskiia Novesti points
out that wherever the majority of members of the assembly elected consisted of
outside elements, it aroused great dissatisfaction on the part of the local popula
tion, that taxes will not be paid to such a zemstvo, and that it will not last long.
On the other hand, where propaganda was conducted, excess not infrequently-
occurred. The propaganda waged in villages was of the most simplified type.

Who were the members of the assembly elected by the volosts? In the over
whelming majority they were rank-and-file peasants. The village intelligentsia is
poorly represented. Property owners and clergy are almost entirely absent. Only
in a few zemstvos were old zemstvo members re-elected. There are practically no
women among the members of the assembly, in spite of the fact that in many
volosts women predominated among the voters. The majority of members range
in age from 40 to 50 and older. The elections revealed the scarcity of people in
the village : there was a shortage of the able-bodied. Consequently, everywhere
doubts were expressed about the efficiency of the forthcoming activity of the
zemstvos. Among those elected, there are few people familiar with zemstvo work.
Advice is consequently heard to secure experienced third element secretaries
and bookkeepers with zemstvo experience, to keep in constant contact with uezd
zemstvos, etc. On the other hand, some misgivings prevail that the primitive
campaign that took place did not pass without leaving some traces. The popu
lation is drawn into politics, which may assume primitive forms such as one
is obliged to observe in the activity of some land committees. Again there may
be words and no deeds. And tremendous educational work is needed that would
lay the foundation for the state construction of a new life.

THE ALL-RUSSIAN UNION OF ZEMSTVOS AND THE EXTENSION

OF ZEMSTVO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

257. T h e Statute on t h e A l l -R u s s ia n Z e m s t v o U n io n
[So6. U z a k I, 2, No. 1827. See Tikhon J. Polnev and others, Russian Local Govern
ment During the War and the Union of Zemstvos, for an account of the work of the
Union and of zemstvo activities before and during the war.]
PUR PO SE O F T H E U N IO N

1- The All-Russian Zemstvo Union, a unified organization of zemstvo insti

tutions, carries out measures required: a) by the needs and tasks of common
zemstvo activity and b) by the war and its aftermath.
Note. The All-Russian Zemstvo Union is also authorized: a) to found manu
facturing, commercial, and credit enterprises; b) to open educational institutions
(higher, secondary, and primary) and cultural organizations, as well as to render
assistance to such; c) to publish and distribute printed works.
2. The Union may also carry out other measures by agreement with the
appropriate government authorities, both civilian and military.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 295
CO M PO SITIO N OF T H E UNION

3. The composition of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union includes all those

guberniya zemstvos whose assemblies have decided or shall henceforth decide
to join the Union and have made contributions to the funds of the All-Russian
Zemstvo Union.

RIG H TS OF T H E U N IO N

4. The All-Russian Zemstvo Union has the right, on the basis of the general
civil laws, to acquire and alienate properties, to conclude contracts, to enter obli
gations, as well as to bring civil suits and to act as defendant in court in property
cases of the Union,

FU N D S OF T H E U N IO N

6. The funds of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union are made up:

a) of amounts appropriated for the Union by zemstvo assemblies;
b) of contributions and private collections;
c) of treasury appropriations;
d) of revenues from Union properties.

ADM INISTRATION OF AFFA IR S OF T H E U NION

7. The highest executive organ of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union is the

assembly of representatives. Three representatives are allotted to each guberniya:
two elected by the guberniya zemstvo assembly, and one elected from the guber
niya zemstvo board by the board itself. In the assembly of representatives, the
Chief Representative of the Union, his assistants, and members of the Central
Committee and the Control and Inspection Commission shall also participate with
the right of full vote. The assembly has the right to invite to its meetings, with
advisory vote, persons useful because of their knowledge and experience.
8. The duties of the assembly of representatives include:
a) general direction of the activity of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union;
b) consideration and approval both of the budget of the All-Russian Zemstvo
Union and reports of the Central Committee of the Union;
c) inspection of the activity of the Central Committee of the Union and of
local institutions of the Union;
d) determination of the composition of executive organs, their duties and
rights, as well as the publication of appropriate directives to executive organs
within the framework of the present Statute;
e) election of the Chief Representative, his two assistants, and members of the
Central Committee and the Control and Inspection Commission of the Union.
9. The Chief Representative, his two assistants, the Central Committee, and
the Control and Inspection Commission are elected for a term of three years.

12. The duties of the Central Committee include:

a) fulfillment of the decisions of the assembly of representatives, adoption
within the limits granted to the committee by the assembly of representativesof
independent measures required by the tasks of the Union, and, in general, man
agement of all affairs of the Union and of its monetary resources;
296 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

b) supervision of the activities of institutions of the Union;

c) distribution among individual zemstvos of individual tasks, as well as dis
tribution among them of funds for the fulfillment of the aforesaid tasks;
d) appointment of executive organs of the Union and election of representa
tives for fulfillment of individual tasks;
e) representation of the Union in government, judicial, and public institu
tions and in all civil and commercial transactions with private persons.
13. The Chief Representative is the Chairman of the Central Committee of
the Union.
14. Local organs of the Union are gubemiya and uezd committees, the com
position and procedure of which are determined by the zemstvo assemblies, re
spectively. Zemstvo assemblies may, without forming the above-mentioned com
mittees, by special decision entrust their functions to zemstvo boards.
In guberniyas in which the Statute on Zemstvo Institutions has not been in
troduced, committees organized by the Central Committee of the Union shall
function.
Local organs of the Union, within the limits of the tasks carried out by them,
enjoy the direct right of representing the Union in government, judicial, and
public institutions and in transactions with private persons, with the exception
of transactions concerning real estate.

D. S h c h e p k in , Assistant Minister of the Interior

June 7,1917

258. T h e C h a r t e r o f t h e Ze m s t v o I n su r a n c e U n io n
[Sob. U za k I, 2, No. 1625. The Provisional Government began to study the expansion
of zemstvo economic activity as early as March 16, 1917. See Zhurnaly, No. 20, of that
date.]
On the original is written: Approved on the basis of the Law of the Provi
sional Government. May 13, 1917. P r in c e L v o v , Minister of the Interior.

p u r p o s e o f t h e u n io n a n d it s r ig h t s

1. The Union shall be founded in Moscow for the purpose of accepting from
zemstvos immovable and movable properties for reinsurance on a mutual basis,
making studies and carrying out all measures designed to improve the organiza
tion of insurance and the prevention of fires.
2. The founders of the Union shall be the guberniya zemstvos [seven are
named] . . . and the All-Russian Zemstvo Union for assistance to sick and
wounded veterans.
3. Irrespective of this, the Union shall be authorized to carry out all forms
of property insurance in nonzemstvo provinces and, in zemstvo provinces, to
accept for insurance those risks that are not accepted by local zemstvos,
4. The Union may place risks accepted for reinsurance and insurance either
partially or wholly with other insurance companies and institutions, both Russian
and foreign, of noncommercial nature, as well as accept risks from such com
panies and institutions.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 297

The Union shall be fully responsible for risks transferred in this way, to the
extent of the amount of reinsurance.
5. The Union may carry out a survey of the organization of insurance opera
tions in its member zemstvos and zemstvo unions (3). Such a survey shall be
carried out on the basis of a directive approved by a general meeting of members.
6. In order to replenish its funds, the Union may make loans.
7. Within the limits of the tasks laid down in the present charter, the Union
shall acquire rights and conclude contracts on the basis of general laws.

M EM B E R S OF T H E UNION

8. Only zemstvos or zemstvo unions may be members of the Union; their

membership shall extend from the time a reinsurance contract takes effect until
they leave the Union (25).

259. S t a t e T r e a s u r y G u a r a n t e e s o n Z e m s t v o a n d M u n i c i p a l L o a n s

[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 1424.]

R U LES

1. The operation provided by the present Rules for granting a government

guarantee on loans of municipalities and zemstvos shall be established as a tem
porary measure.
2. The granting of a government guarantee on municipal and zemstvo loans
from private and public credit institutions is designed to make it easier for local
administrations to obtain funds to meet their urgent requirements in those cases
where these funds can be supplied neither from local budgets nor from normal
credit sources.
3. The government guarantee on the above-mentioned loans shall be granted
by the Ministry of Finance, in agreement with the Ministry of the Interior and
the State Control. In case of disagreement among the aforesaid departments, the
question of granting a guarantee shall be decided by the Provisional Government.

M. B e r n a t s k ii , for the Minister of Finance

N. A v in o v , for the Minister of the Interior
August 8, 1917

260. T h e F o u n d a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e M u n i c ip a l a n d Z e m s t v o
C r e d it B a n k
[Sofc. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1851.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. [The following] annexed hereto is established: 1) Charter of the State
Municipal and Zemstvo Credit Bank, organized to replace the Municipal and
298 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Zemstvo Credit Fund, and 2) the staff list of the State Municipal and Zemstvo
Credit Bank.

III. All capital, property, rights, obligations, and business of the Municipal
and Zemstvo Credit Fund are transferred to the State Municipal and Zemstvo
Credit Bank.

V. Members of the Council of the State Municipal and Zemstvo Credit Bank
from cities and zemstvos are elected: a) from citiesfrom among members of
the municipal dumas organized according to the Temporary Rules of April 15,
1917, for a term until January 1, 1919, and b) from zemstvosfrom among
members of guberniya zemstvo assemblies; with the reorganization of guberniya
zemstvo assemblies according to the Temporary Rules of May 21,1917, the mem
bers of the Council of the Bank from the zemstvos are subject to re-election and
hold their office for a term until January 1, 1919.
M. T e r e s h c h e n k o , Deputy Minister-President
M. B e r n a t s k ii , Minister of Finance
September 14,1917
Annex 1 to Section I
CHARTER OF T H E STATE M U N IC IPA L AND ZEMSTVO CREDIT BANK
CHAPTER I* GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The State Municipal and Zemstvo Credit Bank is founded in order to grant
short-term and long-term loans to municipal and settlement local administrations
and to zemstvo institutions.
2. Long-term loans are granted by the Bank with an exact definition of their
purpose for the acquisition, organization, and expansion of immovable prop
erties, installations, and enterprises, as well as to liquidate loans concluded before
the publication of the present law and short-term borrowings for basic expendi
tures carried out after its publication.
3. Short-term loans are granted by the Bank primarily to strengthen the
current resources of borrowers, and also, in exceptional cases, may be granted
for other current economic needs, with an exact definition of their purpose.
4. The Bank is authorized to realize bond issues of municipal and settlement
local administrations and zemstvo institutions.

261. I n d u s t r ia l A c t iv it y o f t h e Z e m st v o s
[Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledeliia, No. 34, November 1, 1917, pp. 748-49.]
During recent years, as already pointed out in the Izvestiia,, an interesting new
movement in the field of industry is observed among the zemstvos. It is expressed
in the organization of independent zemstvo plants for the manufacture of various
industrial items.
Formerly the field of industry attracted the attention of the zemstvos only in
so far as it had bearing on the handicrafts, to which the zemstvos rendered assist
ance in one form or another. In the course of time and with the introduction into
agriculture of advanced techniques and with the development of improved agri
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 299

cultural organization, the zemstvos were faced with the question of possibly satis
fying the needs of the peasant population directly in these economic spheres. On
the other hand, the war changed radically the condition of the Russian market
[usually] saturated with imported foreign merchandise. This prompted the zem
stvos to take steps toward the replenishment of the meager market. Under the
influence of these factors the zemstvos began the organization of their own factory-
mill production.
This road was followed almost exclusively by the gubemiya zemstvos, in whose
hands were concentrated larger financial resources than in the uezd zemstvos.
Among these zemstvos were the following:
The Simbirsk zemstvo equipped a tremendous cement factory to satisfy, for
the most part, the needs of the Volga zemstvos. A similar factory has recently
been planned by the Poltava zemstvo.
The Viatka zemstvo took over the management of the national Kholunits mills,
which were shut down, and adapted them to the smelting of cast iron and the
manufacture of farm machines and implements.
The Perm zemstvo opened a factory for artificial fertilizers (superphosphate)
and anticipates the organization of factory production of separators.

The Penza zemstvo opened a factory for twine for binding sheafs. The factory
is small, but in view of a great demand for this merchandise, the zemstvo plans
to expand it for greater production.
The Ufa and Kostroma zemstvos opened large chemical factories to serve the
needs of the army. At the end of the war these factories will be converted to serve
the same needs as those of the Nizhnii Novgorod chemical factory. And the Ufa
zemstvo contemplates building a plant for the production of farm machines, lathes,
motors, etc.
The Kherson zemstvo organized a factory for the manufacture of various farm
machine parts.
The Ekaterinoslav zemstvo planned the opening of a soap factory, and the
Yaroslavsk, a factory of cheap hard candy for the needs of the village in place
of sugar.
The Samara zemstvo has already assigned one hundred thousand rubles for
a leather factory.
The Moscow zemstvo has widely developed toy manufacture and has already
succeeded in making foreign toys that have never been manufactured here before.

All these large zemstvo factory-mill enterprises have proved their ability to
survive, and we think that the organization of similar enterprises is destined to
occupy in the future a prominent place in the zemstvo economy.
300 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

THE EXTENSION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

TO OTHER AREAS OF RUSSIA

262, T h e T e m p o r a r y O r g a n iz a t io n o f A d m in is t r a t io n a n d L o c a l
S e l f -G o v e r n m e n t in t h e G u b e r n iy a o f E st l a n d ( E s t o n ia )

[5o6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 952. See also Zhurnaly, No. 27, March 21, 1917. The act was
implemented and supplemented, including provision for volost zemstvos, by Sob. Uzak.9
I, 2, No. 953. Lifland and Kurland were granted the same institutions, ibid., No. 954.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of March 30, 1917,
to publish the following Law on the temporary organization of administration
and local self-government in the guberniya of Estland:
L To include within the guberniya of Estland the uezds of Yurev, Verossk,
Fellinsk, Pernovsk, and EzeFsk of the guberniya of Lifland.
II. The natural boundaries between the guberniyas of Estland and Lifland shall
be delimited on the basis of the following rules:
1) A special conciliation commission shall determine whether frontier
volosts are of Estonian or Latvian nationality.
2) The conciliation commission shall be formed of 10 members invited in
equal numbers from the guberniyas of Lifland and Estland, in their new bound
aries, by the appropriate guberniya commissars. The commission shall elect a
chairman from among its members.
3) The commission shall draw up a plan for demarcation, questioning the
population of disputed volosts if necessary.
4) The plan for demarcation drawn up by the commission shall be sub
mitted by it through the Minister of the Interior to the Provisional Government.
III. Pending the publication of the Statute on the new administrative organi
zation of the Baltic krai, it is decreed:
1) The administration of the guberniya of Estland in its new boundaries
shall be entrusted to the guberniya commissar of the Provisional Government.
Two assistants shall be attached to the guberniya commissar, one of whom shall
be responsible for the uezds of Yurev, Verossk, Fellinsk, Pernovsk, and EzeFsk.
2) A temporary guberniya zemstvo council shall be attached to the com
missar.
3) The guberniya zemstvo council shall be formed of members from the
uezds and towns, with one representative for each 20 thousand inhabitants; towns
with a smaller population shall elect one representative from each.
4) The elections of members of the temporary guberniya zemstvo council
shall be carried out on the basis of the rules set forth in articles 13-17 of the
present (III) section.
5) The guberniya commissar, together with the temporary guberniya zem
stvo council, shall be responsible for: a) management of the affairs of local self-
government in the guberniya and of the zemstvo economy of the guberniya, b)
management of affairs of the general administration, c) management of local
zemstvo obligations and establishment of general zemstvo taxes on the basis of
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 301

existing laws, d) assessment of general zemstvo taxes on the basis of existing

laws, e) assessment of general zemstvo taxes by administrative and zemstvo units,
f) levying temporary local taxes to cover expenditures on urgent gubemiya needs,
g) administration of affairs and zemstvo properties formerly under the jurisdic
tion of local zemstvo-gentry institutions, and h) preliminary study of questions
concerning the preparation of draft temporary rules for the administrative or
ganization of the gubemiya of Estland and the statute on local self-government,
on the basis of a universal, equal, secret, direct, and proportional vote, without
distinction as to sex.
6) Temporary uezd zemstvo councils shall be established in the uezds.
7) The uezd zemstvo councils shall be formed of members elected in the
number of 7 to 15 from the volosts of the uezd.
8) The elections of members of the uezd zemstvo councils shall be carried
out on the basis of the rules set forth in articles 14-17 of the present (III) section.
9) The uezd zemstvo councils shall be responsible, within the limits laid
down by the gubemiya commissar, together with the gubemiya council, for: a)
affairs of local self-government, b) affairs of general administration, and c) es
tablishment within the uezd of temporary local taxes.
10) The gubemiya and uezd zemstvo councils shall be granted the right to
establish individual or collegial executive organs.
11) The official language in guberniya and uezd zemstvo councils shall be
determined by decisions of these institutions, everyone having the right to address
these institutions and receive replies from them in Russian or in one of the local
languages.
12) All dealings with the central authorities of the State, as well as with
local government institutions, shall be carried on in Russian.
13) The members of the temporary gubemiya zemstvo council shall be
elected by the uezd zemstvo councils and the municipal dumas.
14) The members of the uezd zemstvo councils shall be elected at uezd elec
tion meetings.
15) The members of the uezd election meetings, one for each thousand in
habitants, shall be elected at volost meetings by a universal, direct, equal, and
secret vote, without distinction as to sex, with minority representation ensured.
Volosts with a population of less than one thousand shall elect one representative.
16) The franchise shall be enjoyed by all inhabitants of volosts who have
reached the age of 21 and who, by March 1,1917, have lived not less than a year
within the volost or the estates or hamlets belonging to it.
17) The right to be elected to the temporary gubemiya and uezd zemstvo
councils shall be enjoyed not only by local inhabitants of the volost but also by
persons residing outside its limits.
IV. The Minister of the Interior shall be authorized to submit for the considera
tion of the Provisional Government detailed rules concerning the implementation
of the present Law.
The original Journal is signed by the Minister-President, the Ministers, the
Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, and the State Controller, and is counter
signed by the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.
302 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

263. T h e O r g a n iz a t io n of L o c a l A d m in is t r a t io n in S ib e r ia

[Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to

Siberian administrators, April 12, 1917, No. 539. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 9-10. Another
Circular from the same Section, to Guberniya and Oblast Commissars, April 27, 1917,
No. 923, requested detailed information on the composition of recently formed public
committees from guberniya down through settlements. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 13.]
For the purpose of organizing a normal administration as soon as possible,
and also in view of the necessity for an uninterrupted functioning of the organs
of peasant administration and to contribute to the economic welfare of those
peasant settlers who have not yet acquired a solid footing and have been especially
affected by the draft of the head of the household, the Ministry of the Interior has
considered it necessary:
1) To entrust the general direction of the guberniyas administration to the
guberniya commissar with the rights and duties of the governor, in so far as they
have not been canceled as a result of the changes in the state order.
2) To resume under the chairmanship and direction of the commissar the
activities of the central council of the guberniya (oblast) administration.
. . . The composition of the council to remain the same as before. If local
conditions require the addition of new persons to the council, then directives must
be requested from the Ministry of the Interior.
3) To appoint, for the unification of the activities of governmental institu
tions and officials in the uezd, uezd commissars, entrusting them also with the
duties of chairmen of the Conference of kresfianskie nachaVniki.

4) In order to assist the commissar within the limits of the uezd, deputies to
the commissar may be appointed, to whom must also be handed matters connected
with the loans to the new settlers for economic assistance in those sectors of the
uezd where such matters were handled by the kresfianskie nachaVniki and not
by officials dealing with matters pertaining to the settlers. The duties of the
deputies may be placed on the officials of various departments at the discretion
of the gubemiya commissar. Following the issue of the decree regarding the
abolition of peasant institutions, councils are to be created under the chairman
ship of the uezd commissar, composed of his deputies, the tax inspector, and
officials dealing with matters pertaining to the settlers, in order to decide on
questions of land and on other matters concerning the rural population; this
council shall assume the duties of a uezd council.
5) In the matter of the relations between the gubemiya and uezd commissars,
and also [between] the commissars and the [public] committees and the chiefs
of the militia, the directives in telegram No. 310 should be followed.14
6) In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to inform [the Ministry] of the
candidates to the office of uezd commissars. After their appointment the Ministry
shall immediately [provide for] the creation of gubemiya and uezd organizations
on the bases outlined. At the same time the necessary measures should be taken
[to provide] for the uninterrupted functioning of all governmental institutions
14 Doc. 229.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 303

or officials, replacements in office by new persons being tolerated only in cases

where the former incumbent does not respond to the new conditions. It is im
perative to confer with regard to these appointments with the respective central
departments, on which depend the discharge and the appointment of the officials.
At the same time, the guberniya commissar has the right to remove them tem
porarily.

264. T h e I n t r o d u c t io n of Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s i n t h e G u b e r n iy a of
A r k h a n g e l sk and in t h e G u b e r n iy a s a n d O b l a s t s o f S ib e r ia
[So&. U z a k I, 2, No. 894. The elections for the new institutions were authorized by
Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1165.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNM ENT

I. The Temporary Statute annexed hereto concerning zemstvo institutions in

the guberniya of Arkhangelsk and in Siberia shall be established.
II. The Temporary Statute on zemstvo institutions in the guberniya of Ar-
khangelsk and in Siberia shall be put into operation in the [following] guber
niyas: Arkhangelsk, with the exception of the Kaninsk, Bolshezemersk, and
MalozemePsk tundras and the islands of Vaigach, Kolguev, and Novaia Zemlia;
Tobolsk, with the exception of the lands occupied by nomadic Samoyeds in the
uezd of Berezovsk; Altaisk; Tomsk, with the exception of the lands occupied
by inorodtsy in the uezd of Togursk; Eniseisk, with the exception of the lands
occupied by migratory inorodtsy, and in the [following] oblasts: Transbaikal;
Yakutsk, with the exception of the uezd of Verkhoyansk and the lands occupied
by inorodtsy in the uezd of Kolyma; Amur; Maritime and Sakhalin, with the
exception of the lands occupied by migratory inorodtsy in these oblasts, and also
with the exception of the lands of the Siberian, Transbaikal, Amur, and Ussuri
Cossacks situated within the guberniya of Altaisk and the Transbaikal, Amur,
and Maritime oblasts.

IX. The appropriate guberniya (oblast) and uezd establishments shall transfer
to the newly established zemstvo institutions, respectively, jurisdiction over mat
ters dealing with: a) the discharge of local state obligations; b) public welfare;
c) medical and veterinary services in villages; d) guberniya mutual property
insurance; e) administration of quarters for persons serving sentences imposed
by justices of the peace; and f) in the guberniya of Arkhangelsk, in addition,
compulsory ship insurance.
X. There shall be transferred to the newly established zemstvo institutions
monies, properties, revenues, and stocks connected with matters under the juris
diction of these institutions, as well as establishments maintained by local state tax.

LIL With the beginning of operations of volost, uezd, and guberniya (oblast)
zemstvo assemblies, volost, uezd, and guberniya (oblast) committees of all kinds,,
organized by the population both on its own initiative and on instructions issued
by the Minister of the Interior, which have assumed responsibility for matters
placed by the present Law under the jurisdiction of the zemstvo administration,
shall be deemed abolished.
304 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

LIII. The present Law shall he put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate,
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
June 17, 1917

265. T h e I n t r o d u c t io n o f Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s i n t h e O b l a s t s o f
A k m o l in s k , S e m ip a l a t in s k , S e m ir e c h e n s k , T u r g a isk , a n d U r a l s k

[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 910. The elections to the new institutions were authorized by
Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1165.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. The Temporary Statute concerning zemstvo institutions in the guberniya

of Arkhangelsk and in the guberniyas and oblasts of Siberia, approved by the
Provisional Government on June 17,1917 (Collection of Laws, article 894), shall
be put into effect in the oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Tur
gaisk, and Uralsk, with the exception of the lands of the Siberian, Semirechensk,
and Uralsk Cossacks situated within the oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk,
Semirechensk, and Uralsk, in compliance with the rules annexed hereto.
II. The Minister of the Interior, and, with respect to the oblast of Semire
chensk, the Turkestan [State] Committee, shall be authorized to determine, in
accordance with the conclusions of the appropriate oblast zemstvo assemblies and,
in the oblast of Semirechensk, the conclusions of the uezd zemstvo assembly, the
times and procedure for establishing volost zemstvo institutions in localities where
this is deemed possible by the oblast zemstvo assemblies.
III. The Minister of the Interior shall be authorized, in agreement with the
Minister of War, to put into effect at times determined by him . . . the present
Law in the lands of the Siberian and Semirechensk Cossacks situated within the
oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechensk, with the proviso that if
it proves necessary to supplement or modify the above rules, proposals to this
effect shall be submitted in the established procedure for legislative decision.

P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
June 17, 1917

266. T h e I n t r o d u c t io n o f Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s in L o c a l it ie s R e s e r v e d
fo r t h e U se o f N o m a d ic Inorodtsy in t h e G u b e r n iy a o f S t a v r o p o l 5
[So6. U z a k I, 2, No. 985.]
LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. The statute on Guberniya and Uezd Zemstvo Institutions (Code of Laws,

Vol. II, edition 1915), with subsequent amendments, as well as the Temporary
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 305

Statute on volost zemstvo administration approved by the Provisional Govern

ment on May 21, 1917 (Collection of Laws, article 655), shall be put into effect
in the localities reserved for the use of nomadic inorodtsy in the gubemiya of
Stavropol.

XXIX. The present Law shall be put into effect before its promulgation by
the Ruling Senate.
P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
July 1, 1917

267. T h e I n t r o d u c t io n o f Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s i n t h e O b l a s t s of
T r a n s c a s p ia , S a m a r k a n d , S y r D ar y a , a n d F e r g h a n a

[So6. U z a k I, 2, No. 986. Municipal dumas were authorized in all municipalities of

the Turkestan Krai by Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 816.]

LAW OF T H E PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. The Temporary Statute on zemstvo institutions in the guberniya of Ar
khangelsk and in Siberia, approved by the Provisional Government on June 17,
1917 (Collection of Laws, article 894), shall be put into effect in the oblasts of
Transcaspia, Samarkand, Syr Darya, and Ferghana.
II. The Turkestan [State] Committee shall be authorized to determine, in
accordance with the conclusions of the appropriate uezd zemstvo assemblies, the
dates and procedure for the establishment of volost zemstvo institutions in the
localities occupied by a nomadic population, where this is considered possible by
the uezd zemstvo assemblies.
III. The Turkestan Committee shall be authorized to establish rules for the
implementation of Sections I and II, in accordance with the rules for the imple
mentation of Section I of the Law of the Provisional Government of June 17,1917
(Collection of Laws, article 894), on the introduction of zemstvo institutions in
the oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Turgai, and Uralsk, with
those modifications and additions that are considered necessary by the Turkestan
Committee because of local conditions; the Turkestan Committee shall also be
authorized to issue a regulation defining the procedure for holding elections of
zemstvo members.

XVII. The present law shall be put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D . S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
July 1, 1917
306 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

268. T h e I n t r o d u c t io n o f Z e m s t v o I n s t it u t io n s i n t h e K a l m y k S t e p p e
and t h e K ir g h iz I n n e r H orde o f t h e G u b e r n iy a o f A s t r a k h a n

[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 968.]

LAW OF t h e PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The Statute on Guberniya and Uezd Zemstvo Institutions (Code of Laws,
Vol. II, edition 1915), with subsequent amendments and supplements, as well as
the Temporary Statute on Volost Zemstvo Administration approved by the Pro
visional Government on May 21, 1917 (Collection of Laws, article 655), shall be
put into effect in the localities occupied in the guberniya of Astrakhan by nomadic
Kalmyks and the Kirghiz of the Inner Horde.

2. The administrations of the lands mentioned in article 1 shall bear the name
of the Kalmyk Steppe and Kirghiz Inner Horde Zemstvo Administrations. The
headquarters of these administrations shall be fixed as follows: in the Kalmyk
Steppe, the settlement of Elista, and in the Kirghiz Inner Horde, the settlement of
Khanskaia Stavka.

P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
D. S h c h e p k i n , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of the Interior
July 1, 1917

THE PROGRESS OF THE REFORM IN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION15
269. S u m m a r y o f t h e A c t iv it y o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t on
L o c a l S e l f -G o v e r n m e n t t o A u g u st 1,1917

[VVP, No. 125, August 8, 1917, p. 3.]

On March 23 it was resolved by the Provisional Government to concentrate
all work on the reform of local self-government in a Special Council on Local
Reforms established in the Ministry of the Interior under the chairmanship of
the Minister.
The first session of the Council took place on March 26. During the sessions
of March 26 and 27 the general plan of the said Council was established and the
following proposals were approved, to be worked out by the Council immediately.
The bases of the future system of local self-government should include the
following: a) organs of self-government in guberniyas, uezds, volosts, and small
villages, in cities and their districts; b) organs of government administration,

15It should be noted that these documents come after the July crises and are tinged by
the reactions to those events. Other chapters, especially those dealing with supply and the land
question, reflect local conditions, and some chapters in Volume III have material dealing with
the subject.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 307

with the functions of general supervision and inspection in guberniya and uezd
centers, and special organs of government administrations which carry out par
ticular functions of administration (treasury and control boards, etc.) ; and c)
organs of administrative justice in guberniya and uezd centers. The contemplated
reorganizations cannot take the form of integral laws. They should, however, have
as their aim the necessary regularization of local life up to the final establishment
of institutions by legislation [Constituent Assembly].
The immediate tasks of the reform of local self-government and administra
tion may be reduced to the following desiderata: a) the establishment of volost
zemstvo and settlement administrations; b) the reform of electoral laws in zem
stvos and municipalities, also some revision, within the limits [set] by the urgency
of the need, of the zemstvo and municipal regulations in accordance with the
changed conditions; c) the organization of the militia; d) the organization of
local organs of administrative justice; e) rules about commissars of the Provi
sional Governmentguberniya and uezd; f) local finances in connection with
the regular order of collecting taxes; and g) the reform of the local order in non
zemstvo guberniyas.
The present division of the country into guberniyas (oblasts), uezds (okrugs),
and volosts is being preserved in the introduction of the new system.
Elections to municipal dumas, volost and uezd zemstvo institutions, and settle
ment administrations must be built on the bases of universal, direct, equal, and
secret suffrage, irrespective of sex. Members of guberniya zemstvo assemblies
are elected by the appropriate uezd and municipal units. Electoral rights (active
and passive) are granted to citizens who have reached the age of twenty. Active
electoral rights are given to persons who have ties with a certain locality; passive
electoral rights are not limited by the above condition. Limitation of electoral
rights is permitted only as a result of a court sentence, or because of insanity,
affiliation with a monastic order, foreign citizenship, etc. Elections are conducted
from election lists in election districts. Moreover, elections on the bases of pro
portional representation are permitted in those cases and to the extent precisely
stipulated by law.
The numerical composition of the directing organ of self-government is de
termined for uezd and guberniya zemstvos, for municipal dumas and small city
units in accordance with special schedules, and for large villages and volosts, in
accordance with the numerical strength of the local population.
The executive organs of self-government are: a) boards, and b) persons and
commissions, elected by competent organs.
The organs of supervision over the legality of the actions by settlement, volost,
zemstvo, and municipal self-government are: a) the First Department of the
Senate; b) in the guberniyaa special department of the circuit court, extending
its competency over the entire guberniya, even though legally the said circuit court
functions only in part of the guberniya; c) in the uezda special administrative
court; and d) guberniya and uezd representatives of the central government
(commissars).
The actions of the uezd and guberniya zemstvos and municipal self-govern
ment are subject to supervision of the special department of the circuit court.
The large village and volost self-governments are subject to supervision by the
uezd organ of administrative justice.
The commissars reserve the right to request, in line with [their duty of]
308 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

supervision over legality, information on and acquaintance with the activity of

the organs of local self-government. These responsibilities in cases of organiza
tions smaller than the uezd are entrusted to the uezd commissars. In the event the
commissar discovers any deviations from the legal procedure, he is free to bring
to the attention of the appropriate administrative court the matter of repealing
the illegal resolutions of local self-governments.
All cases, with no exception, arising from complaints are subject to final de
cision by the First Department of the Senate.
At the very first session seven commissions were formed for a detailed elabo
ration of the proposals outlined by the conference on the following questions:
1) on volost zemstvo and settlement administration, 2) on electoral law and on
the revision of the zemstvo and municipal regulations, 3) on guberniya and uezd
administration, 4) on local finances, 5) on administration and self-government
in nonzemstvo guberniyas, 6) on the militia, and 7) on the establishment of
organs of administrative justice.
All these commissions began their work at once. And by April 15 they had
worked out a whole series of legislative acts related to the organization of local
government on a new basis.
1. In accordance with the regulation on volost zemstvo administration, the
volost zemstvo is the nuclear cell not only of self-government but also of admin
istration, concentrating in the hands of the population of the entire district of a
zemstvo volost the management both of matters of public economy and of ad
ministration. Election of volost zemstvo members is conducted according to a
majority system, but with the subdivision of the volost into village election dis
tricts, each of which is to have no fewer than three persons. The volost zemstvo
enjoys independence in deciding matters under its jurisdiction, except in cases
clearly indicated in the law when the resolutions of the volost zemstvo assembly
are submitted for approval by the uezd zemstvo assembly. The guberniya and
uezd zemstvos have the right of supervision and revision of the organs of the
volost zemstvos. The government authority in the person of the local representa
tives, commissars, has only the right of supervision of the legality of the resolu
tions and actions of the organs of the volost zemstvos.
The regulations on volost zemstvo administration extend to Vilna, Grodno,
and Kovno guberniyas. And it is expected that they will be extended to IzmaiFskii
uezd, of Bessarabia gubemiya, with the changes modified by local peculiarities
and military circumstances. In the case of elections of volost zemstvo members
in Vilna, Grodno, and Kovno guberniyas a proportional system is established.
Settlement administration may be introduced in railway, mining, port, factory
mill, trade, resort, and other populated localities, whose local needs call for an
administration peculiar to them; also in populated localities that have a village
public administration but which are similar to municipal settlements because of
commercial and industrial development, considerable size, density of population,
and other considerations. The regulations on settlement administration are built
in part on the model of the simplest municipal self-government and in part on the
model of the volost zemstvo. The most important of the settlements may be sepa
rated from the volost as enjoying the special rights of volost zemstvo units.
2. The Commission on Electoral Law and on revision of the zemstvo and
municipal regulation has elaborated new laws on municipal elections, as well as
uezd and gubemiya zemstvos members, based on universal, direct, equal, and
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 309

secret suffrage, protecting the interests of the minority by means of a proportional

system. Elections of the uezd zemstvo members are conducted separately by each
municipality and settlement and separately from village localities in the number
determined by schedule.
The exceptional importance of this reform, which transfers all the zemstvo
administration from the hands of a very small group of persons with electoral
qualifications directly into the hands of the wide masses of the population, is
unquestionable.
The Regulation on Guberniya and Uezd Zemstvo Institutions was changed
considerably. The scope of the activities of the departments of the zemstvo insti
tutions was expanded; they were given complete independence, with the limitation
of administrative supervision on questions of legality only; the list of acts that
call for approval by governmental authority was reduced to a minimum; the limits
of authority in the field of issuing ordinances was expanded; the number of
persons elected to zemstvo posts was considerably expanded by eliminating the
interference of the Government in these elections; the order of responsibility of
zemstvo officials and complaints against actions of zemstvo institutions was
changed; and, finally, all articles determining the procedures of the zemstvo
assemblies were considerably changed by the elimination of all obstacles to their
self-activity. In working out this draft bill, special rules about the order of con
ducting matters in the zemstvo assemblies had to be added to replace those that
were outmoded.
Similar changes were introduced in the Regulation on Municipal Adminis
tration and in the Regulation on the public administration of the city of Petro
grad. Moreover, the Commission worked out: 1) rules on district municipal
administrations, the purpose of which is to give to large cities an opportunity to
form district (regional) dumas and boards as an aid to municipal dumas and
boards; 2) rules about unions, associations, and congresses of zemstvo institu
tions and municipal and settlement administrations; 3) rules on the procedure
for removal of cities from membership in zemstvos; 4) rules on the preparation
and confirmation of plans of cities; and 5) rules on the organization of house
committees. The first two projects have already been approved by the Provisional
Government. Projects 3 and 5 have been submitted for local reactions.
3. The Commission on the Militia has worked out the establishment and
routine work of the militia. The latter, called upon to replace the former police,
is an executive arm of the local state authority. The militia is under the imme
diate jurisdiction of the zemstvo and municipal self-government. At the head of
the militia are chiefs of militia who are elected and discharged by municipal or
uezd zemstvo boards, respectively. Chiefs of militia are not responsible to the
uezd commissar. And neither they nor their aides are subject to penalties ad
ministratively. In order to take care of the technical aspect of the activity of the
militia, a post of government inspector is instituted in the guberniya, who, in the
event of an obvious unfitness of the chief of militia for the post occupied by him,
can remove the latter from the post and notify the uezd or municipal boards to
that effect for his final dismissal from same. The guberniya authority guides the
work of the militia within the limits of the guberniya. It provides it with appro
priate directions and explanations; it surveys the activity of the militia and revises
it. Moreover, it has charge of the movement of the personnel of the militia within
the guberniya.
310 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

4. The Commission on the Establishment of Organs of Administrative Justice

began the working out of a statute on administrative courts (approved May 30,
No. 692, Sobranie Uzakonenii) ,16 and about the staff of these courts. The admin
istrative court is an institution to which governmental and public organizations,
as well as private individuals whose interests are protected in one form or another,
affected by the acts of the administrative authority, can appeal. It is a court,
established on a strictly legal basis of correct trial procedure, that will serve as
a guarantee of legality in administration. Administrative courts are of three in
stances: uezd instance, in the form of an individual administrative judge acting
within the rights of a uezd member of the circuit court; guberniya instance, in
the form of special departments of circuit courts; and, finally, the central instance,
the First Department of the Ruling Senate, which will unite all the functions of
supervision over the legality of administration. The work of this commission was
completed at the Ministry of Justice, where a special conference was arranged for
this purpose. It was there, too, that the law on the staff of administrative courts
was worked out (approved June 14, No. 817, Sobranie Uzakonenii).
5. The Commission on the Working Out of a Bill on the Commissars of the
Provisional Government, proceeding from the basic assumptions of the reform
on the transfer of all local government, beginning with cultural-economic tasks
and ending with the militia in the introduction of zemstvo and municipal dumas,
and taking into consideration the overriding necessity to combine wide self-gov-
emment with national interests, has constructed special local organs of the central
government. Such organs should be the guberniya and uezd commissars, whose
chief responsibility, along with supervision over the activity of government in
stitutions, is supervision over the legality of resolutions and actions of zemstvos
and municipal boards, inasmuch as conformity to law is a guarantee of a stable
combination of state and local interests.
This does not establish a trusteeship over self-government since the commissar
is not a judge, and the right of supervision allows him only, on clarifying the case,
to appeal with a protest to the appropriate administrative court, which, according
to the idea of the entire local reform, is the sole organ that decides in essence all
disputes on administrative violations of law where the commissar and the local
self-government are parties possessing equal rights.
In addition, the Commission has worked out a draft statute on municipal com
missars in large centers who will be called upon to replace the prefects [gradona-
chaVniki]; also, a temporary statute on peace mediators to complete the land
organization of peasants and to supervise the legality of the action of village
organizations on land matters. The Commission has also worked out materials
on the civil administration in the Turkestan Govemor-Generalship; on the exist
ing administration in the oblasts of Steshnyi, Irkutsk, and Priamur Govemor-
Generalship; on the administrative division of Tomsk guberniya into two, Tomsk
and Altaisk, and on forming four new uezds; on establishing in the Priamur
region local economic and industrial committees with a view to developing the
commercial-industrial life of the region, and on approving a central committee
on matters dealing with the Far East; on militia in large centers (for the dis
cussion of this question a special conference was organized of representatives of
departments and local municipal self-governments); on places declared to be on

16 See Doc. 213.

 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 311

a military status, in place of the laws in effect now; on reforms of local gubemiya
and uezd boards dealing with matters of military conscription; and, finally, on
establishing a special committee in the Provisional Government to decide the
questions relating to all sorts of dwellings seized for public and state purposes.
6. The Commission on Local Finances worked out drafts of statutes regu
lating volost, large village, and municipal finances, as well as a draft of urgent
measures on finding means to pay for the pressing expenses of zemstvos and mu
nicipalities, and the Commission began to prepare a proposal for the improvement
of zemstvo finances. The Commission had to make the financial system of the
organs of self-government conform to the new principles upon which the organi
zation of the state order is based, namely: the democratic principle, with the
widening of the activity of the organs of self-government and with the inclusion
of them in the sphere of state organs. Therefore, it proved necessary, without the
introduction, with few exceptions, of new taxes, to afford the greatest freedom
to the organs of local self-government in the matter of selecting subjects for taxa
tion and to establish the norms of such. At the same time, in order to ensure
uniformity of taxation, the principles of limitation of norms of taxation and of
parallelism between the rates of some taxes were adopted.
With respect to industrial enterprises, a number of measures are being intro
duced, the aim of which is to increase the incomes placed at the disposal of the
organs of local self-government from the taxes on large industrial enterprises, and
also as far as possible to attain uniformity of local taxation. As for special
measures on financing cities and zemstvos, the Commission worked out general
bases of communal loans; it also took an active part in working out a statute on
the reorganization of the funds of municipal and zemstvo credit in an appropriate
bank in order to finance local self-governments, as well as rules on the treasury
guarantee for zemstvo and municipal self-governments.
7. The Commission for the Working Out of Regulations on Administration
and Self-Government in nonzemstvo guberniyas had to be guided by the basic
principles of the reform in zemstvo guberniyas, to create anew organs of self-
government over a tremendous distance and to transfer into their hands affairs
of local administration. Moreover, it was necessary to take into consideration
the tremendous diversity of peculiarities of various localities. The Commission
worked out proposals of zemstvo reform in the guberniya of Arkhangelsk, in
Siberia, in steppe oblasts, in Turkestan, in the inorodtsy territories of the Stav
ropol5gubemiya, in Kalmyk steppe and Kirghiz Inner Horde of Astrakhan guber
niya, and in parts of Vilna and Kovno guberniyas unoccupied by the enemy.
These proposals were approved by the Provisional Government. Partly completed
and in part about to be completed are the working out of proposals on zemstvos in
the Don, Kuban, and Terek oblasts, in Zakavkaz, and in Izmailskii uezd of Bes
sarabia gubemiya.
8. Worked out also and approved by the Provisional Government are the
proposals 1) on putting into effect the law of the Provisional Government, March
30, 1917, on the temporary organization of administration and local self-govern-
ment of Estland gubemiya, 2) on the temporary organization of administration
and local self-government of Lifland and Kurland guberniyas, and 3) on putting
into effect the temporary administration in Lifland gubemiya as indicated in
point 2.
Thus, to sum up, the above-mentioned activity of the commissions took the
312 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

following form [there follows a list of laws, regulations, and directives issued by
the Government as a result of the work and recommendations of the Council to
date]. . . .

270. T h e S e c o n d C o n f e r e n c e o f G u b e r n iy a C o m m is s a r s
[Rech% No. 182, A u gu st 5, 1917, p. 4]
The Conference of Guberniya Commissars and representatives of the commit-
tees of united public organizations met on August 4 in the Ministry of the Interior.
One hundred and forty representatives from the various localities were assembled.
Arriving for the opening of the Conference were N. D. Avksentev, Minister of
the Interior; all of his assistant [Ministers]; A. S. Zarudnyi, Minister of Justice;
and others.

Speech by A. F. Kerensky
A. F. Kerensky opened the Conference with the following address to the
assembly:
Five months have already elapsed since the Russian people cast off the
yoke of autocracy and began building their life on the foundations they won
through revolutionthe foundations of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. And
we have spent all of these five months in a difficult struggle to overcome the
devastation of the State machinery and economic life inherited from the old
regime. This struggle we must wage under the conditions of an unprecedented
world war, with grave internal complications. Of all the organs of the old regime,
the organs of local administration suffered most. They disappeared without a
trace. At the very outset, during the storm and stress of revolutionary and mili
tary warfare, the revolutionary regime was forced to create some forms of local
organization. And at the present time, perhaps the time of the greatest tension
of military and revolutionary strife, the time when all the gains of the Russian
revolution and even the future of the Russian State are at stake, we have reached
the point, gentlemen, when the words the country is in danger are employed
so frequently that they have ceased to affect us and our nerves. But as the head
of the Provisional Government I deem it my duty, particularly in addressing this
assembly as an assembly of local representatives, to tell you in all conscience and
bearing full responsibility for my words, to tell you quite definitely and with
profound grief and sorrow but quite frankly, that it is true that not only the
Russian revolution but the Russian State lives in and perhaps will live through,
in the very near future, the greatest trials and deadly dangers.
. . . I cannot say that there turned out to be not enough of reason and con
science, but I can say one thing with absolute certainty, [namely,] that in ques
tions of State administration there turned out to be too much ignorance and too
little experience among the free people, or among those free peoples who are now
called upon to forge their destiny under the blows of a formidable and irrecon
cilable external foe. There is no greater, more vital task for the Russian State,
for the future of the Russian people and the peoples of Russia, as well as for the
future of the Revolution than the creation, at all cost, of a stable, resolute, and
single revolutionary authority.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 313

Therefore all interests must be subordinated to the sole purpose of saving the
State.
Therefore, gentlemen, at the present exceptional moment in the history of the
Russian State, I say to you without hesitation and frankly that there is no way
out for us and no salvation unless we form locally as well [as in the center] an
apparatus of genuine authority which will be able to arouse the population to
consciousness and force those who have neither mind, nor conscience, nor enough
understanding to submit to the will of the people and the will of the revolutionary
Provisional Government.
I call upon you, comrades, for intensive, self-sacrificing work in the name of
the State. Therefore everything that interferes with this work I definitely call
reaction and counterrevolution, no matter what words, what slogans, what dema
gogic views this counterrevolution employs, consciously or unconsciously, to dis
guise itself. I am convinced that the Minister of the Interior also shares my point
of view. And I trust that you, gentlemen, do also.
Permit me to greet you once more and to wish you the most necessary and
fruitful results [in your work] for Russia and for freedom. (Prolonged applause.)
Following the address by A. F. Kerensky, N. D. Avksentev, Minister of the
Interior, delivered a long speech on matters of program.
Speech by N. D. Avksentev
The Minister of the Interior, N. D. Avksentev, emphasized the difficulty of
the task that fell to his lot and also to that of the Government and pointed out that
the entire question of the organization of local authority should be discussed by
the Conference.
Further, the Minister appealed for public organization, for self-discipline, for
confidence in the authority selected by the people, and for the granting of plenary
authority to the Government and its organs. In organizing local authority, chief
attention should be directed toward strengthening it in the persons of the com
missars who carry out the will of the central Government, toward conformity to
the laws of all local institutions, both old and newly formed, and toward the
establishment of organs to guarantee the security of the population.
Address by N . M. Kishkin
In his response to the Minister-President and in the name of a group of com
missars, N. M. Kishkin, representative from the city of Moscow, welcomed the
speech of the Minister-President, which was filled with such faith in the people
and which [emphasized] that only a single stable authority can save Russia.
N. M. Kishkin then announced the following theses [formulated] by the group
of commissars who share the point of view of the State about establishing a stable
authority:
The initiative for a single stable authority must come from above.
In order that a stable state authority be established in the country, it is neces
sary for it to be embodied in the Provisional Government, national and indi
visible; also that it be independent of any party or class organizations.
The salvation of the country and the building of the state on new foundations,
and the preservation of liberty gained through national revolution, are unthink
able without the creation of such an authority.
In the first stage of the revolution the authority of the Provisional Govern-
314 TUWAKU A U& M U L KAlit, UKU&K

ment was the fruit of the peoples revolutionary creation with the support of the
revolutionary interparty organizations, unifying all local forces.
Executive organs of these organizations were the sole local authorities. The
commissars elected by them, on being approved by the Provisional Government,
were at first the connecting link between the local authority and the Provisional
Government and gradually, by virtue of events, were transformed into its agents.
In the second stage of the revolution, in which we are now, as new democratic
self-governments are elected and as public organizations split into class and party
organizations, it is necessary that the Provisional Government have support for
its authority in the organs of self-government. From this time on, all executive
committees must be closed and all Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants
Deputies must remain only as professional organizations assisting the Govern
ment, each in the sphere of its competency.
The commissars of the Provisional Government must from this moment on
become only the arms of the law and, as organs of supervision, must be inde
pendent of any organization. The competencies [of the commissars] and the
organs of self-government must be strictly delimited. The latter should enjoy
broad rights in the organization of local life.
Every violation of law, no matter by whom committed, must be unflinchingly
prosecuted by law. In the event that a certain violation of the law is a threat to
public safety, the commissar of the Provisional Government must have the right
to take decisive measures toward the restoration of a lawful order, including the
calling out of armed forces.
A commissar must be a representative of the entire Provisional Government
and not only of the Minister of the Interior. He must unite all the departmental
commissars in the guberniya as well as be a permanent member of all state com
mittees in the guberniya. But inasmuch as the leading role must emanate for the
commissar from the Ministry of the Interior, this Ministry must be above all sus
picion of party [favoritism], and its membership must be made up of representa
tives of all political currents.

Address by V. V. Khizhniakov
V. V. Khizhniakov, Assistant Minister of the Interior, made a report to the
Conference on the question of the relations of the commissars to the existing public
organizations and outlined new regulations on this question. He stated that the
Conference may not, however, agree with the central department, but that local
reactions will be valuable.
The proposal of the Ministry, making the present organs of authority and
public organizations uniform, will continue in effect up to the time of the estab
lishment of organs of local self-government on new conditions.

Local Reactions
M. A. Sukovkin, representative from Kiev guberniya, thought that the pro
posal of the Ministry strengthened the existing situation. Although the commis
sars try to gain the support of committees, there is no unanimity either in the
public organizations themselves or among the local government organizations.
Therefore M. A. Sukovkin proposed the establishment of a special council attached
to the guberniya commissar with the participation of representatives from all de
partments. Further, M. A. Sukovkin directed the attention of the Ministry of
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 315

Justice to the fact that court verdicts are frequently not carried out and that,
generally speaking, the legal civil rights of the population are insufficently guarded.
And finally, he would have the militia under the jurisdiction of the council pro
posed by him, since under the present conditions it acts with hesitation and un
satisfactorily.

271. C ommissars and Co m m it t e e s

[Editorial in Novoe Vremia, No. 14845, August 5, 1917, p. 3.]
Yesterday we pointed out a considerable difference between the opinions of
the Minister-President and those of the Minister of Agriculture. Today a yet
greater divergence is revealed between the views of the Minister-President and
those of the Minister of the Interior.
The Conference of Guberniya Commissars testified unanimously to complete
disruption of authority in various places. The Minister-President defined the
cause of this disruption with complete frankness: The free people proved to be
too ignorant and too inexperienced in matters of governing a state.
This ignorance and lack of experience were responsible among other things
for the complete breakdown of the local organs of state authority. Owing to this,
national tasks were neglected because of local problems. Complete anarchy fol
lowed.
The Minister-President considers continuation of the situation intolerable and
appeals for the formation of a revolutionary, strong, and single authorityan
apparatus capable of bringing the population to its senses and forcing those who
have neither conscience nor reason to submit to the will of the Provisional Gov
ernment.
It is most regrettable that these simple truths are realized only in the sixth
month of the revolution. But it is good that they have after all finally been realized.
The Minister of the Interior has not accepted this point of view yet. He thinks
it is necessary to create local organs which execute the will of the all-national
government. But at the same time he thinks it is their duty to exercise their
plenary power in union with the existing local public organizations.
But the need of empowering the commissars with great plenary powers is called
forth precisely by the fact that the local committees disregard the national interests
and recognize the national government in so far as.7
If you are for a union of the commissars with the local committees, be ready
for the further development of anarchy, as described by the Minister-President.
If you want to see a revolutionary, strong, and single authority, which protects
the national interests from local autocrats, cease employing touching words about
the union of commissars and committees.
How these two obviously diverging points of view are reconciled we do not
undertake to judge.

272. S e l f -Gov ern m en t and G o vernm en t

[Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 128, August 9, 1917, p. 1.]
At the Conference of Gubemiya Commissars and Public Executive Commit-
tees, which is currently meeting, the sharpest question is the age-old argument
316 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

concerning the rights and. competence of local organs of self-government and of

their relation to the central government.
We have pointed out more than once the struggle which the local public or
ganizations waged from the very first days of the revolution against the Kadet
officials of the Ministry of the Interior, and against bureaucratic encroachments
of the commissars. This struggle was reflected also at the All-Russian Congress
of the Soviets [of Workers and Soldiers Deputies], where a resolution was
adopted on the necessity of unifying the functions of self-government and of
government.
Indeed, there should be no distinction between the tasks of those two in a
democratic state. The local organs of self-government must be at the same time
also the organs of all-State power in localities. Their activity must be determined
only by all-State laws, and needs no other supervision than the supervision of
judicial powers which observe the enforcement of the laws.
In addition, the local militia must be subordinated to them. Of course, such
an arrangement can be realized only in normal times, with the proper functioning
of democratic organs of self-government.
During the period of transition, one may allow the centralized apparatus of
government commissars. But in order that they do not clash with local forces,
as has very often happened heretofore, and in order that the hated old bureau
cratic mechanism not be restored in their persons, it is necessary, as far as pos
sible, to make the office of commissars elective.
And experience has shown that everywhere where the Government approved,
without especial friction, the commissars elected by local organizations, the revo
lutionary order was violated least of all, and public life proceeded in the most
normal way.

We are certain that, despite all the resistance of the Kadets, as long as the
revolutionary energy is preserved among the masses of the population, the demo
cratic principle of organization of administration locally will prevail. This is the
most substantial guarantee of the security of the gains of the revolution.
 I

CHAPTER 7

The Nationalities Problem

GENERAL1

273. T h e K a d e t P o l ic y on t h e N a t io n a l Q u e s t io n
[From the report of P. N. Miliukov to the Eighth Congress of the Party of the Peoples
Freedom (Kadets), Rech\ No. 108, May 1 0 ,1 9 1 7 , p. 3.]
In connection with regional reform, which is linked to the national aspirations
of the peoples who live in Russia, the Party of the Peoples Freedom introduces
important modifications into its program; and here again these modifications
represent not so much a change of position as the deepening and consistent de
veloping of those principles that were laid down in our Partys original program
at the very [moment of its] creation. The Party of the Peoples Freedom will
endeavor to find a solution that, while giving an opportunity to the various regions
of Russia to create their local autonomy on the principle of local legislation, will
not at the same time destroy the unity of the Russian State. The preservation of
the unity of the Russian State is the limiting factor conditioning the decisions of
the Party. The division of the country into sovereign, independent units is con
sidered by the Party as absolutely inadmissible. This way of putting the question
may not entirely conform to the aspirations of some of the nationalities of Russia.
We are well aware that some of the nationalities seem to be going further, that
they are endeavoring to create for themselves a state-territorial organization, the
competence of which would be broader than visualized by the Central Committee
of the Party.
. . . However, we believe that there is nothing mutually exclusive or incom
patible between the solution that the Party of the Peoples Freedom suggests for
the current moment and the aspirations of the various national groups, even if
these aspirations are going further [than our program]. The solution suggested
by our Party does not exclude the possibility of further combinations tending
toward the goals that these nationalities have fixed for themselves. At the present
moment the Party of the Peoples Freedom does not consider that the creation of
state-territorial organizations would be the right solution. It proceeds from the
historical territorial divisions, now in existence, granting to precisely these exist
ing divisions the rights and the competence based on local legislation, which would
solve the problem of decentralization. But it does not exclude for the existing
1 The operative policies and attitudes of the Provisional Government were reflected in its
statements and actions on specific aspects of this issue. General pronouncements are to be
found 'within the Government's Declarations of July 8, 1917, and September 25, 1917, which
are found in Volume TTT. Attention is also directed to the relevancy of the reform in local self-
government and particularly its extension to the non-Russian regions of the State, which is
covered in Chapter 6. For a brief summary of party programs on the national problem, see
Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 29-49. Dimanshtein, Parts I and H,
gives a number of party pronouncements on the question.
318 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

territorial divisions the possibility of subsequently seeking for themselves a way

toward their unification [in places] where the adjacent territorial units are popu
lated by the same nationalities, or even to seek a like modification of their bound
aries. Thus further creation of state-territorial units is not being excluded. But
to advance this issue at the present time would mean to repeat the errors of the
revolution of 1848 when the attempts [to achieve] territorial decentralization
clashed with the far-reaching demands of the nationalities, causing in the long
run the failure of that revolution.

274. S o v ie t R e s o l u t io n o n t h e N a t io n a l Q u e s t io n
[The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies, Session of
June 20,1917. Izvestiia, No. 99, June 23,1917, p. 6.]
1) The settlement of the national question in Russia is inseparable from the
consolidation of the gains of the Russian revolution on a national scale. That is
why, in the name of the interest of the State as well as the national interest, all
the peoples of Russia must first of all direct their efforts to assure the earliest
possible convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Only the Constituent Assembly,
by establishing the foundations of the new democratic Russia, will create condi
tions guaranteeing the inviolability of the rights of all nationalities.
2) At the same time, in the interest of consolidating the gains of the revolu
tion and [achieving] the solidarity of the toilers democracy of all nationalities,
revolutionary Russia must enter immediately on the path of governmental de
centralization, opening up broad areas for the initiative of the democracy, and
developing all the popular forces of the nationalities.
3) In order to guarantee the rights of the nationalities of free Russia, the
revolutionary democracy will strive in the Constituent Assembly to obtain broad
political autonomy for regions that differ by virtue of their ethnographic or socio
economic characteristics, guaranteeing them national rights, [to be prescribed]
by fundamental laws, by establishing preliminary local organs which are national
in character.
4) Pending the final settlement of the nationality question by the Constituent
Assembly, the Congress asks the Provisional Government to proceed immediately
to the realization of the following measures:
a) Publish a declaration of the Provisional Government on the recognition
of the right of self-determination of all peoples, including separation, to be realized
by a covenant with the national Constituent Assembly;
b) Issue a decree on the equal rights [of nationalities in the use] of their
languages, retaining the Russian language as the [official] state language, and
on the rights and opportunities of citizens of all nationalities to use their native
tongue in exercising their civil and political rights in the schools, courts, organs
of self-government, and in communicating with the [central] State Power, etc.
c) Establish councils on nationalities affairs attached to the Provisional
Government, composed of representatives of all nationalities in Russia, with the
aim of preparing material on the nationality question for the All-Russian Con
stituent Assembly and with the aim of working out methods for regulating national
relations and forms, thus affording to the nationalities the possibility of settling
their own questions of internal life.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 319

5) [The Congress] calls upon the whole democracy of the country for ener
getic support of the nationality program during the resolution of the nationality
question and, insisting on more vigorous action by the Provisional Government
than was the case before in satisfying the demands of the nationalities, the Con
gress declares itself opposed to attempts to resolve nationality questions prior
to the Constituent Assembly by way of a fait accompli, by way of separating
from Russia her individual parts, etc. All such steps, which disunite the forces
of the revolution, give rise to endless disputes within every national group and,
by setting off one national group against other groups, reduce the scope of the
revolution, undermining the economic and military strength of Russia, and
thereby lessen the possibility of consolidating free Russia and, in particular,
jeopardize the triumph of the principles of national self-determination-

275. T h e O r g a n iz a t io n of a S p e c ia l C o u n c il U n d e r t h e P r o v is io n a l
G overnm ent to W o r k O u t a R e g io n a l R e f o r m
[Soft. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1144. No evidence was found to indicate that this Council ever
functioned effectively or prepared any materials for submission to the Constituent As
sembly.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. A Special Council shall be established under the Provisional Government
to work out a regional reform for submission to the Constituent Assembly.
2. Maxim Antonovich Slavinskii shall be appointed chairman of the Special
Council to work out the regional reform. He shall be authorized, in agreement
with the Deputy Minister-President, to submit the statute of this council for the
approval of the Provisional Government.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
N . N e k r a so v , Deputy Minister-President
July 10,1917

276. A D r a f t P r o j e c t f o r t h e A r t ic l e s o f t h e N e w F u n d a m e n t a l
La w s C o n c e r n in g A u t o n o m y a n d F e d e r a t io n
[N. Rubinshtein, Vremennoe Pravitelstvo i Uchrediternoe Sobranie, KA, XXVIII
(1928), 131-32. This was drawn up in October 1917 by the Special Commission for the
Working Out of a Project for the Fundamental Laws, established by the Provisional
Government and authorized to present its proposals for consideration to the Constituent
Assembly.]
A. The Russian state is one and indivisible.
B. Within the framework of the Russian state, Finland enjoys independence
on the basis and within the limits established by the law governing the mutual
relations between Russia and Finland, approved by the Constituent Assembly (on
such a date) and the form of government sanctioned (by such and such, on such
a date).
C. Regional autonomy shall be introduced in the Russian state.
D. The organization of local institutions and their competence in matters of
local legislation and administration shall be established by the laws issued by the
central legislative power (it is possible to say simplyby the legislative institu
tions created by the existing fundamental laws).
320 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

E. The laws issued by the regional authorities shall not be valid if they are
inconsistent with these laws, with the laws issued by the central authority of the
state (i.e., by the legislative institutions created by the actual fundamenal laws) ,
or are not founded on the laws establishing the organization and the competence
of the regional institutions.
F. The governmental institutions of the guberniyas and the uezds shall be
directly subordinate to the regional institutions.
G. The participation of the organs of local self-government in the selection
of judges is being determined in the status of judicial institutions (Code of Laws,
Vol. XVI).

POLAND

277. A D is p a t c h f r o m t h e P o l e s
[Izvestiia, No. 13, March 12,1917, p. 4.]
Polish representatives in both Russian legislative chambers and the Polish
National Committee have issued the following statement in elucidating their views
on the situation that has arisen as a result of the revolution in Russia:
It is with a feeling of deep joy that we welcome the emancipation of our
Russian brothers from the chains of autocracy as the victory of freedom and the
triumph of the principle of self-determination of peoples. We are impelled toward
this not only by the centuries-old tradition of our struggle for freedom, but also
by [aspirations for] the highest good of our people.
In taking the side of Russia and the anti-German coalition, the Poles under
stood it to mean that the victory of these nations, which have proclaimed the
unification of Poland and the principle of the equal right of all peoples to an
independent existence, would necessarily result in the realization of the cherished
aspirations of the Polish peoplethe restoration of a unified and independent
fatherland.
The former Russian Government placed great obstacles along this course. . . .
It understood neither the demands of the time nor even the demands of its own
people: it made it difficult for both Russia herself and her allies to effect a timely
and fitting formulation of the Polish question; by its reactionary policy it under
mined the faith in the sincerity of those principles of freedom for which the
Russian people and its allies are fighting in the present war.
However, in the due course of events, it became increasingly clear that the
unification of Poland must become one of the principal bases for the future
stability of Europe. Realizing this, Polish representatives in the Russian legis
lative chambers and the Polish National Committee firmly adhered to their posi
tion despite all the obstacles raised by the old political regime of Russia. Their
aim was to prevent a conflict between the Polish and the Russian peoples based
on the contradiction between Polish aspirations for freedom and the reactionary
nature of the overthrown government and to establish, on the contrary, a funda
mental agreement between the aims and aspirations of Russia and her allies and
the goals of the Polish people.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 321

The logic of events compelled even the former Russian Government to declare
solemnly that the restoration of a free, unified Poland is in the interest of Russia.

However, the actions of this government continued constantly to contradict

the principles it had proclaimed and to cast a shadow of distrust on the mutual
relations of two great Slavic peoples.
Now, when freedom has triumphed in Russia, the unity between Poland and
Russia on their objectives in the present World War is being consolidated. The
ascendancy of violence, the unilateral imposition of laws and forms of social order
which have hitherto impaired this unity have now collapsed.
The new relations that are beginning to form between Russia and Poland are
based on the principles of mutual respect for freedom and the right of peoples
to an independent existence. By a free decision of the Polish and Russian peoples,
the consonance of their international interests will assume a form that will estab
lish [their relations] [on a basis of] a free [people] toward a free [people].
With a deep awareness of its own interests, which are always bound up with
the cause of universal freedom, the Polish people cannot but passionately desire
that the newly won freedom in Russia will be made secure and become a source
of great strength both for herself and for all the coalition which has now become
a union of free peoples who have risen in arms against aggressive German im
perialism.
Aspiring to the unification and independence of Poland, we perceive a new
factor in the reborn Russia which brings us closer to this great goal.

278. T h e P etr o g r a d S o v ie t S e n d s G r e e t in g s to t h e P o l is h P e o p l e
[.Izvestiia, No. 15, M arch 15,1917, p. 2.]
(A Resolution, adopted unanimously at the meeting of March 14, of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.)
The Tsarist regime, which in the course of one and a half centuries oppressed
the Polish and the Russian people at the same time, has been overthrown by the
combined forces of the proletariat and the army.
Notifying the Polish people of this victory of freedom over the All-Russian
gendarme, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies declares that
Russian democracy stands for the recognition of national-political self-determi
nation of peoples, and proclaims that Poland has the right to complete independ
ence in national and international affairs.
We send our fraternal greetings to the Polish people and wish it success in
the forthcoming struggle for the establishment of a democratic, republican order
in independent Poland.
T h e P etr o g r a d S o v ie t of W o rkers and S o l d ie r s D e p u t ie s

279. T h e P r o c l a m a t io n o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t to t h e
P o l e s , M a r c h 16, 1917
[VVP, No. 11, March 17,1917, p. 1. In his Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsn, I, vypusk 1,
pp. 64-65, P. N. Miliukov wrote: At the initiative of P. N. Miliukov, the Provisional
322 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Government immediately took a definite stand in favor of the complete independence of

Poland and the unification of her three ethnographic parts. Obviously, in view of the
German-Austrian occupation of Russian Poland, the revolutionary government could
not realize its intentions immediately. Instead of a manifesto regarding the indepen
dence of Poland, we had to issue a proclamation to the Poles which did not speak in the
precise juridical language of the Finnish document but in words of an inspired and
ardent appealto fight for the common cause. . . . The Provisional Government made
a reservation only with regard to the rights of the Russian Constituent Assembly.]

P o le s !
The old regime of Russia, the source of your and our enslavement and dis
unity, has now been overthrown forever. Liberated Russia, represented by its
Provisional Government, which is vested with plenary powers, hastens to extend
its fraternal greetings and invites you to a new life, to freedom.
The old regime made hypocritical promises to you which it could, but did not
wish to, fulfill. The Central Powers took advantage of its errors in order to occupy
and devastate your territory. With the sole object of fighting against Russia and
her allies, they gave you chimerical state rights, which, moreover, did not [extend]
to the whole Polish people, but only to the one section of Poland temporarily
occupied by the enemies. At this price they wanted to buy the blood of a people
who had never fought for the preservation of despotism. And now again the
Polish army will not fight for the cause of suppressing freedom, for disuniting its
native land under the command of its centuries-old enemy.
Brother Poles! The hour of great decisions will strike for you, too. Free
Russia calls on you [to join] the ranks of fighters for the freedom of peoples.
Having thrown off the yoke, the Russian people recognize the full right of the
fraternal Polish people to decide their fate also by their own will. True to its
agreements with the Allies, true to the plan they have in common of fighting
against militant Germanism, the Provisional Government considers that the crea
tion of an independent Polish state, comprised of all the lands in which the Polish
people constitute the majority of the population, would be a reliable guarantee
for lasting peace in the new Europe of the future. United with Russia by a free
military alliance, the Polish state will become a firm bulwark of Slavdom against
the pressure of the Central Powers.
The liberated and united Polish people can themselves determine their state
order by expressing their will through the Constituent Assembly, convoked in the
capital of Poland and elected by universal suffrage. Russia believes that the people
tied to Poland by centuries of common history will thereby be firmly guaranteed
their civil and national existence.
The Russian Constituent Assembly will give binding strength to the new fra
ternal alliance and give its consent to those territorial changes of the Russian State
which are necessary for the creation of a free Poland out of all her three, now
separated, parts.
Then accept the fraternal hand, Brother Poles, which free Russia is extending
to you. Loyal guardians of the great traditions of the past, stand up now to meet
the new bright day in your history, the day of the resurrection of Poland. Let the
union of our hearts and feelings anticipate the future union of our states, and let
the old appeal of the prophets of your liberation resound with renewed and irre
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 323

sistible force: forward, to the struggle, shoulder to shoulder and arm in arm, for
your freedom and ours.
P r in c e L v o v , M in is te r -P r e sid e n t
[a n d a ll o th er m in is te r s ]

280. Novoe Vremia o n t h e P o l i s h P r o c la m a t io n

[Editorial, No. 14735, March 25, 1917, p. 5. The Daily Review of the Foreign Press,
Ser. 3, No. 15, April 23, 1917, p. 123, confirmed that German censorship held up the
news of the Proclamation for several days and then only permitted summaries with
unfavorable commentaries. It took some time for the authentic text to become available
in Poland.]
Free Russia, through the peoples government, has proclaimed freedom and
unity for long-suffering Poland. The forced bonds with which a part of the Polish
people were tied down to Russia have been broken once and for all. It will be up
to the Polish people themselves, in gaining their unity through the great war, to
determine their future.
The German government did not fear the pronouncements about Poland which
had been issued by representatives of the now-defunct Russian regime. That
regime commanded faith neither in Poland nor even in Russia herself. Therefore
the German military censorship did not prevent publication of the appeal of the
former supreme commander, and the declarations concerning Poland by our
former ministersSazonov and Goremykin. Everyone knew from experience
that a whim of autocracy could overturn the most solemn obligations.
The German government treated differently the publication of the act con
cerning Poland issued by our present government. The Germans postponed its
publication in order to issue it with an accompaniment of myriad derogatory
remarks.
The most venomous of them is the one saying that the act of voluntary sepa
ration from Poland and the pronouncement of her indivisibility and independ
ence were issued by the Provisional Government and not by the Constituent
Assembly. It is implied that the Constituent Assembly may not honor the act of
the Provisional Government.
The German press is wasting its efforts. In the Polish question, the Provi
sional Government expresses not its own will but the will of the entire Russian
people. Throughout the whole expanse of the Russian state there is not one person
who would not welcome from the bottom of his heart the proclamation of inde
pendence and unity for the Polish people. During the war the Polish people have
performed unforgettable services for the Russian people. In the days of severe
trial, both peoples came to know each other and settled their ancient mutual ac
counts once and for all. The Russian people, together with all the democracies
of Europe, Australia, and America, decided to restore the unified national exist
ence of Poland, and this decision is irrevocable because it is inspired in equal
parts by the sense of justice, international agreement, and mutual benefit.
Germany, on the other hand, even now plans to preserve under her power the
Polish lands that she had received during three partitions, and to deprive the
Polish state of access to the sea. She regards the Poles as her future vassals and
not as an independent nation.
Under such circumstances, the attempt of the German press to bring disrepute
324 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

upon the act of the Russian Government concerning Polish freedom does not
disturb us in the least. The Polish people are not as myopic as the German gov
ernment supposes.

281. F r e e R u ssia a n d t h e P o l i s h Q u e s t io n
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 61, March 17,1917, p. 3.]

The free Russian people cannot help but recognize for the Polish people the
right to an independent political existence. This right is indisputable. It was given
to the Poles both in the past and in the present. It has been sanctified by the great
sufferings and sacrifices of Poland in the unprecedented world struggle.
Political freedom must be received not by only a part of the Polish people,
which is the solution offered by our enemies, who are generous with Poland at
the expense of the national territory of Russia but who, at the same time, suggest
that the Poles renounce once and for all those basic Polish lands which are within
the confines of their States.
The future Polish State must be composed of all parts of ethnic Poland, all
the lands where the Poles constitute the majority of the population. Such an in
tegral Poland can be created only by Russia and her allies. Our enemies promise
to create only a dismembered Poland, only half-redeemed.
. . . The creation of an independent democratic Polish State and its military
alliance with Russia on the principle of an international pactthat is the goal
toward which our aspirations and efforts must be directed.
It is self-evident that these aspirations cannot be realized without the sympathy
and cooperation of the Polish people. We know well that even before the great
revolution which took place in Russia, the Poles treated with great reserve the
attempt of Germany to use their forces for the struggle against us and our allies.
The liberation of the Russian people should steel them further in their refusal to
shed Polish blood for the German cause. To fight against the liberated fraternal
people for the victory of the Hohenzollems, for the triumph of the country which
aspires to dismember Poland and to Germanize the Poles within its borders, would
be an unnatural and fratricidal act for every Pole, and we are firm in the belief
that the Polish people will not tolerate such a deal. We believe that the great
moment has arrivedthe moment for reconciliation and for forgetting the old
disputes and transgressions. The common enslavement had disunited the Russian
and the Polish peoples. Liberty, breaking away the bond of chains, will replace
it with the bond of hearts.

282. P o l is h F r e e d o m
[Den9, No. 12, March 18,1917, p. 3.]
The Proclamation on the freedom of Poland promulgated by the Provisional
Government is one of the most important of a number of very important docu
ments of the revolutionary period; once more the Provisional Government has
proved its extraordinary energy, its great civic courage, the sincerity of its en
deavor to bring about a really radical reform of Russia.

Those golden words [of the Proclamation] will be the charter of freedom for
Poland and a glorious achievement for the Provisional Government.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 325

We well remember the ambiguous and actually, as very correctly stated in the
Provisional Governments Proclamation, hypocritical position assumed by the
[Imperial] Russian Government in respect of Poland,

At the same time, Germany and Austria, while in possession of Russian Poland,
have granted it a national university, then municipal self-government (very un
satisfactory, but nevertheless better than previously), and, finally, on October 23
[November 5, 1916, N.S.] they promulgated a manifesto regarding the creation
of an independent state out of Russian Poland. [This state would be] ruled by
a constitutional hereditary monarchy, but [would] be compelled to [maintain] a
close alliance with, and actually be dependent on, Germany and Austria.
. . . This should have been answered by a frank and honest declaration of
the Russian Governments desire to re-create after the end of the war a united
Poland, completely free and democratic.
If that had occurred, it would have been possible to hope that the ingratiating
[tactics] of Germany and Austria toward the Poles would be paralyzed, that the
friendly feelings of the Polish people would not weaken but, on the contrary, be
strengthened and spread also into German and Austrian Poland. But the old
Government was quite incapable of such action. At last, this action has been taken
by the new revolutionary Russian Government. It will inevitably strengthen the
friendly feelings for Russia in Russian Poland, and also in German and even in
Austrian Poland. Perhaps, through this act the Provisional Government will
contribute to the hastening of the German revolution, or at least a revolution in
the Polish regions of Germany. Even if it were not so, then, in any case, it intro
duces [elements of] disintegration into Germany and Austria, raises the military
might of Russia, and brings nearer the moment when peace may be concluded
on the basis of the freedom of nationalities.

Two of the three slogans which the more radical elements of Russian society
constantly advanced in regard to Poland are acknowledged in full in the Provi
sional Governments Proclamation. A Constituent Assembly will be held in War
saw, and it will be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. This popular Con
stituent Assembly will determine the fate of Poland. It is possible that it will
express the desire to maintain federal connections between Poland and Russia,
which would be entirely to the advantage of both sides.
Poland not being Finland, the Polish question presents one great difficulty.
Finland has strictly defined borders, which were drawn long ago and which
nobody contests. . . . Poland on the contrary does not possess definite, clear-cut
borders. The Lithuanianswho also endeavor, if not to separate from Russia
(of this there is no question), then to form an autonomous regioncontend with
the Poles the eastern part of the guberniya of Suvalki. The Ukrainians claim
from the Poles the guberniya of Kholm. Finally, also in western Prussia and in
Silesia the borderline cannot be drawn on the basis of German statistical data
alone. Therefore, [it becomes] necessary to consult the local population, i.e., [to
organize] a plebiscite, which would decide the question of the annexation to
Poland of the various disputed areas.
The Proclamation of the Provisional Government does not say anything, and
perhaps quite rightly, about the plebiscite. This issue will be raised by the deputies
826 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

be necessary to forestall the emergence in free Poland of a new Ulster, which

would have reason to be dissatisfied and to protest.
To conclude, we can welcome with complete enthusiasm the new step [taken]
by the Government, which brings us closer to a peace concluded on the basis of
a genuine acknowledgment of the rights and wishes of nationalities, and which
corrects the secular crime of old Russia toward Poland.

283. T h e A n s w e r o f t h e T e m p o r a r y C o u n c il o f S t a t e in W a r s a w to
t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t s P r o c l a m a t io n to t h e
P o l e s , A p r il 13, 1917 (N.S.)
[Z Dok. Chwili, XXVII, 6-7. The Temporary Council of State was appointed by the
occupying Central Powers under the terms of the act of November 5, 1916 (N.S.). Its
actions were subject to the approval of the occupying powers.]
The European war brought the Polish question into the world arena as a great
problem of international politics. Our nation felt that its everlasting longings
could be fulfilled, and that the sacrificing struggle of the Legions, which spon
taneously took to arms in the fight for Polands independence, was a vivid ex
pression of these longings.
The Polish question could have been solved through the creation of a Polish
state. This historical necessity was first recognized by the governments of the
Central Powers. The act of November 5,1916 [N.S.], brought back into existence
an independent Polish state, although this act did not establish the boundaries
of its territory.
Now also the Russian Provisional Government recognizes the independence
of our fatherland, and by doing so it affirms that the re-establishment of Poland
is an inevitable historical necessity. But the new Russian government offers to
the Poles some lands which are not under its jurisdiction. It leaves the delimita
tion of the frontiers of the Polish state to the Russian Constitutent Assembly and,
in addition, foresees in advance a military alliance between the two states. Any
connection imposed upon us by compulsion limits the essence of independence
and does not agree with the honor of a free nation. In general, we must object
to any conditions that fetter our national will.
The Temporary State Council, the only existing Polish state organ, welcomes
with appreciation the flash of liberty which illuminates the twilight of slavery of
the peoples inhabiting the Russian state. It also acknowledges with delight the
fact of recognition of the independence of Poland by the new Russian govern
ment. But at the same time it emphasizes that the centuries-old Polish-Russian
conflict concerning the broad lands situated between ethnographic Poland and
Russia, lands which were for centuries tied to the destinies of Poland, was not
solved by the proclamation of the Russian Government. We cannot leave the
solution of this conflict to the one-sided decision of the Russian Constituent As
sembly. The destiny of these lands should be decided in the spirit of the state
interests of independent Poland and with consideration for the desires of the
people inhabiting these lands.
The Temporary State Council sees its aims clearly: a constitutional monarchy,
a strong government, and a strong armythese are the tasks that we intend to
accomplish. Particularly the creation of strong armed forces of our own, as a
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 327

factual guarantee of our independent statehood, is a duty that nothing will prevent
us from fulfilling.
It is our desire to have good neighborly relations with the Russian state, but
we must make it clear that we will oppose any influence that would push us in the
direction of war against the Central Powers, whose monarchs guaranteed our
independence.
Not the continuation of the war, but peace is the desire of the peoples of
Europe. The independent Polish state, proclaimed by the act of November 5, and
recognized now by the government of a Russia that is now being reborn, ought
to become a base for starting peace negotiations, and for the stabilization of
normal conditions of life in Europe.

284. E d it o r ia l in Dziennik Polski o n t h e P r o c l a m a t io n t o t h e P o l e s

[From the issue of March 17,1917, as quoted in the Daily Review of the Foreign Press,
Ser. 3, No. 2, April 3, 1917, p. 15. This was the Petrograd organ of Roman Dmowskis
group, the National Democrats, which hoped to achieve Polish independence in col
laboration with Russia and the Allies.]
Now at last in very truth the dreams of our fathers have come to fulfilment.
In the light of the acts which, from a quarter that only a few weeks ago seemed
to hold out no better prospect than sullen resistance to the idea of the complete
liberation of Poland, proclaim the real liberty and political independence of our
nation, the sugared pill of German military and economic enslavement loses
whatever attraction it may have had, even for these weaker minds who allowed
themselves to be tempted by the possibility of organising some sort of Polish
political life under the guidance of Prussian teachers of the ancient regime.
Real and unconditional independence, as recognised by Free Russia and her
Western Allies, must henceforth be the watchword and programme for the whole
of Polish national life. Henceforth we will not tolerate the double-faced game of
pro-German propaganda, which aims at subjecting Poland to the moth-eaten
structure of the military and police despotisms of Central Europe.

285. T h e S t a t u t e s o f t h e L iq u id a t io n C o m m is s io n on M atters
P e r t a in in g t o t h e K in g d o m o f P o l a n d
[S o6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 742. The membership of the Commission was enlarged by the
law of April 10, 1917, ibid., No. 743. A. R. Lednicki was appointed Chairman of the
Commission.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of March 15, 1917
[No. 19]:
To approve the draft statutes prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
the Liquidation Commission on matters pertaining to the Kingdom of Poland,
which shall read as follows:
1. A Liquidation Commission shall be set up under the chairmanship of a
person appointed by the Provisional Government, consisting of representatives
of the following ministries: Interior and Foreign Affairs, War, Education, and
Justice, one from each appointed by the respective ministers, and representatives
of the Council of Congresses of Polish Organizations, the Central Civic Commit
tee, the Polish Society for assistance to war victims, and the Polish Committee
in Moscow, one from each organization to be chosen by its executive organ.
328 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2. The Liquidation Commission shall be responsible for: (a) ascertaining

the location and condition of state properties and public institutions of the King
dom of Poland and determining the procedure for their custody and administra
tion pending their transfer to the Polish state; (b) determining, by agreement
with the appropriate departments, the procedure for liquidating state institutions
that functioned in the Kingdom of Poland; (c) : 1. preparing a draft governing
the relations of the state and the Roman Catholic Church; 2. preparing rules de
fining the status of persons of Polish nationality who are liable to military service
or prisoners of war and subjects of enemy powers.
3. The chairman of the Commission shall submit its decisions to the Provi
sional Government for approval and shall report in person on the affairs of the
Commission.

286. T h e W o r k o f t h e L iq u id a t io n C o m m is s io n
[Sprawozdanie z dzicdalnosci Komisji Likwidacyjnej do Spraw Krolestwa Polskiego za
czas od 15-go czerwca do 1-go sierpnia 1917 r., p. 1.]
After the publication of the decree of the Provisional Government on March
15, 1917 [sic], which created the Liquidation Commission for the Affairs of the
Polish Kingdom, and after the preparatory work for the completion of its per
sonal composition, the Commission started its work in the first days of April of
this year. It was confronted with a maze of problems, with a vague definition of
its tasks, and with [the necessity of applying] procedures which were new and
without precedent. The nature of the historical moment through which we were
living, requiring feverish work that could not keep pace with the events which
followed each other with lightning speed, did not allow the Provisional Govern
ment to elaborate on detailed and systematic norms and rules governing the
activities of this new institution. Only the basic idea [of this Commission] has
been outlined: the realization of this idea, the definition of the tasks [of the
Commission] which could only be surmised, the internal and external competence
[of the Commission]all this had been entrusted to the newly created institu
tion. Not only are we proceeding to the liquidation of old institutions and old
affairs, but we are proceeding to the liquidation of all age-old strifes and mis
understandings between the Polish and Russian nationssaid the Minister-Presi
dent, Prince Lvov, opening the first meeting of the Commission. From this very
generally outlined concept was to be worked out the permanent organizational
framework; amidst the indefinite horizons traced by the bold vigor of the revo
lution was to be established a stable plan of activities. Thus, the newly created
Liquidation Commission was forced to conduct its work in several completely
different directions simultaneously. Determining its own nature, establishing its
own rights, tasks, and competence, it organized itself internally in consideration
of the distribution and methods of its work, of how much and what kind of
personnel was needed, of necessary funds, etc. At the same time, current require
ments imposed upon the Commission many petty affairs, sometimes of a purely
private character, which, owing to their tragic reality, demanded immediate at
tention and assistance for their final solution. Thus, reality itself imposed upon
the Liquidation Commission four basic directions along which its work had to
be divided from the very beginning: the self-determination of its rights and com-
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 329

petence; the organization of its internal work; the handling of thousands of cur
rent matters which were increasing from day to day; and, finally, the principal
job of liquidating, which demanded many preparatory efforts.

287. U k a s e E x e m p t in g f r o m T r ia l a n d P u n i s h m e n t R u ssl ^n S u b j e c t s
of P o l is h N a t io n a l it y C a p t u r e d B e a r in g A r m s B e f o r e t h e
P u b l ic a t io n o f t h e P r o c l a m a t io n R e c o g n iz in g
t h e In d e p e n d e n c e o f P o land

[So6. Uzak., I, 2, N o . 885.]

TO THE RULING SENATE
Russian subjects of Polish nationality captured bearing arms before the pub
lication of the Proclamation of March 16, 1917, recognizing the independence
of Poland, whether convicted by verdicts of military courts or awaiting trial, are
exempted from trial and punishment and are treated as prisoners of war.
The Ruling Senate shall not fail to issue appropriate instructions to this effect.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
P . P e r e v e r z e v , Minister of Justice
June 17,1917

288. T h e P a r d o n in g of C e r t a in C o n d e m n e d P o l e s
[Sob.Uzak.,1,2, No. 1256.]
t o t h e r u l in g s e n a t e

Poles convicted under articles 102 and 108 of the Penal Code (Code of Laws,
Vol. XV, edit. 1909) for state treason, the substance of which was an aspiration
to the independence of Poland, are granted a pardon.
N . N e k r a so v , Deputy Minister-President
Z a r u d n y i , Minister of Justice
July 26,1917

289. T h e P o l is h D iv is io n
[Razlozhenie armii, p. 39. This division of the Russian army had been organized orig
inally as the Polish Rifle Brigade. A smaller Polish unit, the Legion of Pulawy, had also
been formed on the Russian side in 1914.]
TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER
The Commander of the 7th Army has inspected the 1st and 4th Regiments of
the Polish Division; drive for offensive is lacking; the delegates of the First Regi
ment have declared that they will start the offensive when it is decided by the
Polish Petrograd Conference;2 in view of this, they request not to be transferred
from the sector which they now occupy until the results of this Conference are
known. The decision is expected by June 1.
Gutor [Commander in Chief,
28/v. 1917, N52817 Southwestern Front]
2 See following document.
330 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

290. K erensk y on t h e P o l is h A r m y

[Z Dok. Chwili, XLV, 61-62. This Conference tried to promote the formation of a
separate Polish military organization out of the Poles serving in the Russian army. For
the reasons stated below, the Provisional Government opposed the plan, as did a num
ber of Poles in Russia. However, three special Polish army corps were later created,
which fought in Belorussia and the Ukraine. They were eventually disarmed by the
Germans.]
The Polish News Bureau reports: The negotiations conducted by the All-
Russian Conference of Polish Soldiers, which recently took place at Petersburg,
showed that, owing to the opposition of the Minister of War, Kerensky, and the
Polish democrats [Lednicki group], the intention to create a separate Polish army
in Russia can be considered thwarted. In a letter to this Conference, Kerensky
declared that at present, when democratic Russia has assumed the obligation to
defend the freedom and independence of peoples, the great task of liberating
Poland and Russia can be accomplished only if the organization of the Russian
army is not weakened. The separation of national military units from the Russian
army would disrupt its organic unity and at this moment would be disastrous for
the revolution and for the freedom of Russia and Poland.

291. T h e P o l i s h C o n g r e s s in Moscow
[Article in Vlas? Naroda, No. 78, July 28, 1917, p. 1. This Congress, held at the end
of July, was organized by the Polish National Committee, established by Roman Dmow-
ski and Count Wielopolski, in which the majority of the pro-Ally Polish elements in
Russia were grouped. The Congress refused to recognize the German settlement of
November 5, 1917 [N.S.] and the Temporary Council of State established in Warsaw.
The news from Poland to which the writer refers was the resignation of Joseph Pilsudski
from the Council of State in protest against the Austro-German demand that his Polish
Legions take an oath committing them to the cause of the Central Powers, and his arrest
by the Germans on July 22, 1917 [N.S.]]
The Polish Congress in Moscow coincided with very important information
received from Poland. This news confirmed the correctness of the position taken
by the Congress, and its political importance rose in the eyes of those Polish
organizations who refused to participate in it. Ekho PoFskoe, the organ of that
part of the Polish democracy which did not participate in the Congress, bids fare
well to the Congress with words far from those with which it greeted it.
In order that the Russian reader may understand the struggle of opinions
waged around the Polish Congress, it is necessary to make a small excursion into
the past, to the source of the contemporary split in Polish society.
The split stems from the declaration by Austria and Germany of an inde
pendent Polish state on October 23 (November 5) of last year. This step, taken
by Germany at the moment when things were getting apparently most hopeless
in Russia and a putrid smell of decomposing tsarism hung over the country,
was responsible for the split in that part of Polish society which was both foreign
to Austrophilism and infinitely far from Germanophilism. History is not squeam
ish, wrote Herzen, and if it is impossible to make way through France and
England, it will go through Austria and Prussia. And such was the point of view
of the Polish democracy. It thought that history went through Austria and Ger
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 331

many to the independence of Poland. The accomplished obvious fact is the pro
claiming of the Polish state by the powers which can actually create this state.
It already exists as a fact, even if in an embryonic form. And the Warsaw State
Council is the embryo of the Polish national government.
And because of this national government the struggle flared up between the
National Democrats and the left-wing Polish parties of Russia.
The National Democratic [Party] was the only one that did not vacillate in
its attitude toward Germany. It continued to say: The road to the liberation of
Poland leads through the destruction of Germany. It refused to recognize the
Warsaw State Council as the Polish government, but only as the henchman of
Germany. It refused to recognize the Polish state formed only from Russian
Poland.
The Russian revolution occurred. The Polish democracy in Russia hailed it
loudly and sincerely. But at the same time it did not want to abandon its cult of
the State Council. The latter, bound with the Central Powers, responded in a
more than restrained manner to the appeal by the Russian Provisional Govern
ment to the Poles* Placed in this difficult and contradictory situation, the Polish
democracy saw the only way out in Polands neutrality. While wishing Russia
success and victory, it was at the same time opposed to active action on the part
of Poland, be it in the form of creating a Polish army in Russia or in the form of
a revolt in Poland.
This point of view of the Polish democrats in Russia coincided with the line
of conduct of the democracy inside Poland. Sympathizing with free Russia, this
democracy, first, as I have already pointed out in a previous article, had no
assurance whatsoever that Russia would wage a war with Germany, and, second,
it tried in every way possible to support and strengthen the authority of the State
Council, as the Polish national government. And one needs to know the centuries-
old longing of the Poles for their government in order to understand this cautious
attitude toward the authority of their state council.
Thus the majority of the Polish public was inclined toward neutrality; a desire
to preserve it at any cost was increased by the consideration that both in the
Russian and in the Austr o-German army there were many Poles, and that war
for them inevitably takes on an internecine character.
Against the majority of neutralists, on the one hand, were activists of the
Austro-German orientation, who were for war with Russia with a view to seizing
from Russia the western guberniyas and forming a large state composed of Poland,
Latvia, and the Ukraine. On the other hand, there were the anti-German activists,
National Democrats who favored war with Germany down to its total destruction,
seizing from Germany not only Russian but also Prussian Poland and creating
a state of the ethnographic lands of Poland with an outlet to the sea. And the
recent news from Poland speaks eloquently of the fact that the Germanophile
activism has no foundation in the land and that neutrality is impossible.
Germany needs, not a neutral Poland, but an obedient tool in her hands. But
the Polish people do not wish to be a tool in the hands of Germany. And when
the State Council proved to be too compromising with respect to the German
authorities, it immediately lost its popularity. It has reached the point where the
German soldiers had to hold back the mob that broke the window of the State
Council building. The excitement in Poland is so great that it indicates the pos
sibility of a revolt.
332 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

It is still too early to judge whether or not this news is exaggerated. But one
thing is certain: there is general irritation against the Germans in the country
and dissatisfaction with the policy of the State Council.
It is clear how this news had to increase the importance and influence of the
political congress, called under the banner of an irreconcilable struggle with Ger
many for a free and united Poland.
The resolution of the Congress says that the Poles are called upon to join
the ranks of Russia in the difficult struggle she wages for her existence with mili
tant Germanism, as well as to create a new internal order based on law and
liberty.
This declaration is the more significant because: 1) it was made at the moment
of heavy reverses that have befallen Russia, and 2) it was not limited to a platonic
expression of sympathy, for, to help Russia in her struggle with Germany, the
Congress envisages the creation of a Polish army.
L . K o z l o v s k ii 3

292. A. R . L e d n ic k i s S t a t e m e n t
[Rech\ No. 202, August 29,1917, p. 4.]
S t o c k h o l m , August 25.Lednicki made the following statement to the cor
respondent of the Petrograd Telegraphic Agency:
My trip to Stockholm was not induced by political matters, as was stated in
certain foreign newspapers, but solely by circumstances connected with the Liqui
dation Commission on the Affairs of the Kingdom of Poland. We hoped, with
the help of negotiations with Poles in Warsaw, to hasten the settlement of the
question of the return to occupied areas of those Poles who have been permitted
by the Russian Government to leave Russia. We hoped that the Governments of
the Central Powers would take into consideration the difficult position of Polish
refugees who have been torn away from their native land for more than two years.
The Government has announced that it is prepared to release all the peaceful resi
dents who were taken into captivity during the Galician campaign, with the ex
ception of reservists and persons of German and Hungarian nationality.4 The
fulfillment of this promise is dependent upon the Austro-Hungarian Government,
which, by releasing the Russian civilian prisoners, could obtain the return of in
fluential persons. The establishment of the status of this matter as well as the
collection of statistical data for the Liquidation Commission served as the purpose
of my trip to Stockholm with my colleagues, Alfred Tyshkevich and Professor
Fedorovich. In addition the [following] members of the Liquidation Commis
sion are now in Stockholm: Prince Chetvertinski, Grabski, Meishtovich, Ravich,
Sherbo, and Shebeko.
Rastvorovski, member of the Temporary State Council in Warsaw, and Vit-
kevich, the Stockholm representative of the same State Council, also participated
in the conference, which did not broach political matters. Other persons who
were expected from Warsaw were unable to come. My view on the status of the
Polish question in Russia is the following: the Russian Provisional Government,

8A Polish historian resident in Russia. Later became Minister of Agriculture and Prime
Minister (1934-35) of Poland.
4This was granted July 28,1917. Sob. Uzak., 1,2, No. 1183.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 333

having recognized, in its memorable Proclamation, the independence of the Polish

state, is striving consistently for the complete realization of this demand. Al
though Poles who live in Russia adhere to different views on political tactics,
they are absolutely united in their attitude toward the principles of the national
program.
They demand the establishment of a unified, independent country, with access
to the sea. Polish emigrants are patiently enduring suffering in expectation that
the war will fulfill their national aspirations.
You ask about the prospects for peace. There is strong aspiration for peace
in all countries. However, the present moment is particularly unfavorable for the
realization of this desire. The latest events on the Russian front have made it
extremely difficult for Russia to end the war, [but,] in spite of her failures, Russia
will have enough strength to fulfill the obligations she has assumed. The Russian
revolution is such a great historical event that it must be judged on a scale that
separates it from the everyday situation. The Russian people find themselves in
a difficult position. However, they realize that the retention of the freedom they
have won in Russia is not only a domestic problem of Russia but a matter of
principle for all of Europe. (PTA)

2 9 3 . A N e w D e c l a r a t io n o f t h e A l l ie s on t h e Independence of
U n it e d P o l a n d
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14887, October 3, 1917, p. 4.]
Yesterday evening in the large theater auditorium of the Conservatory, during
the solemn commemoration in honor of Kosciuszko by all the Polish organizations
in Russia, an act of great historic significance and unusual importance took place.
Following the speeches of greeting by Bishop Tsepliaka, Honorary President,
and A. R. Lednicki, President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko,
delivered an address on behalf of the Provisional Government and the Govern
ments of the Allied Powers.
After paying due tribute in his speech to the memory of the national hero of
Poland and his loyalty to the ideals of liberty, independence, and lofty patriotism,
M. I. Tereshchenko recalled to the audience, which filled the theater to capacity,
the democratic declaration made by the Russian Revolutionary Government on
March 17 [sic] of this year on one of the henceforth immovable principles of
Russian international policythe right of peoples to self-determination.
Later all the Allied governments subscribed to this policy and are now all
together fighting for the triumph of the principles proclaimed by the Provisional
Government.
Today, in the name of the Provisional Government and all the Allied govern
ments, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko, is authorized to
declare that the Allies will not conclude peace with Germany and Austro-Hungary
as long as they do not recognize the same principles, and, first of all, the complete
independence of united Poland.
It is hard to imagine the storm of ovations that fell to the lot of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, as well as the ambassadors of our noble AlliesEngland, Italy,
America, and Francewho reaffirmed in their speeches the henceforth historic
declaration of M. I. Tereshchenko.
334 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

FINLAND

294. F ir st A c ts C o n c e r n in g F i n n i s h A f f a ir s
[Izvestiia, No. 7, March 6, 1917, p. 3. The Provisional Government placed Governor
General F. Seyn under arrest and appointed M. A. Stakhovich to the office. F. I. Rodi-
chev was named Minister State Secretary for Finland, but his appointment was almost
immediately revoked as it did not conform to the Constitution of Finland, according
to which the State Secretary had to be a citizen of Finland. He was replaced by Karl
Enckell. The Senate, formerly dominated by Russians, was reorganized by the appoint
ment of twelve new memberssix Social Democrats and six from other parties.
P. E. Svinhufvud was a nationalist leader, President of the Sejm from 1907 to 1913,
who had been arrested and banished to Siberia by the Imperial Government in 1914
as a precautionary measure.]
On March 5 two assistants to the Commissar on Finnish Affairs, I. M. Ramot
and D. D. Protopopov, representing the Provisional Government, arrived at the
building of the State Secretariat for Finland. In their address to those serving
in the State Secretariat they pointed out the Provisional Governments firm de
cision to restore the fundamental laws of the region. In view of the fact that the
laws provide that posts in the State Secretariat can be filled only by Finnish sub
jects, the Commissar on Finnish Affairs and his assistants, as well as those for
merly in the service of the State Secretariat, not being subjects of Finland, will
perform their duties on a stricdy temporary basis. The current work in the State
Secretariat is to continue in its normal course.
General Markov and his assistant, P. I. Ivanov, in addition to the Minister
State Secretary for Finland, have been dismissed from service.
The Commissar on Finnish Affairs, F. I. Rodichev, is expected tomorrow from
Helsingfors.

In accordance with instructions from A. F. Kerensky, Minister of Justice, the

prosecutor of the Tobolsk circuit court is ordered to take immediate steps for the
release of Svinhufvud, President [talman] of the Finnish Sejm, and to arrange
for his arrival in Petrograd with the observance of all the honors due his distin
guished rank. The prosecutor is requested to report to the Minister of Justice
on all steps taken in this direction.

295. M a n if e s t o C o n f ir m in g t h e C o n s t it u t io n o f t h e G r an d D u c h y
o f F in l a n d a n d I t s F u l l I m p l e m e n t a t io n

[VVP, No. 3, March 8,1917, p. 1.]

Vested with plenary power, we hereby reaffirm and acknowledge the religion,
the fundamental laws, [and the] rights and privileges which citizens of the Grand
Duchy of Finland, from the lowest to the highest, exercise in accordance with the
constitution of the country, pledging to preserve their inviolable and irrevocable
force and action.
At the same time we consider it necessary to adopt the following measures in
order that this Constitution be implemented in its full scope.
We herewith repeal the fundamental statutes proclaimed under the Imperial
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 335

Manifesto of February 3/15, 1899; the protocols [zhurnaly] of the Council of

Ministers of May 26 (June 8), 1908, which received Imperial confirmation, on
the procedure of reporting on Finnish affairs; the law of June 17/30, 1910, issued
without the consent of the Sejm of Finland, on the procedure for issuing laws
pertaining to Finland and decrees of general significance to the state; and all laws
and administrative decrees issued on the basis of the above.
The Imperial decree of May 20 (June 2), 1904, on the application to Finland
of the Statute on the field administration of troops, on the administration of
fortresses, and regulations for localities declared to be under martial law, and,
equally, all regulations issued relating to the World War which are incompatible
with Finnish laws, must be repealed upon the termination of the war. In addition,
the manifesto of May 31 (June 12), 1890, regarding postal services in the Grand
Duchy of Finland and the temporary regulations, which received Imperial con
firmation on September 30, 1909, on the procedure for supervising Finnish rail
roads by the Ministry of Transport, must also be repealed.
For the sake of making necessary amendments to various other statutes issued
during the past years which are inconsistent with Finnish laws, we are enjoining
the Finnish Senate to come to us with appropriate bills.
All persons who have committed political or religious crimes or have violated
the law of January 20, 1912, on equalizing the rights of other Russian citizens
with Finnish citizens, or, in general, who have been imprisoned or exiled beyond
the boundaries of Finland for their political convictions and activities, are granted
full amnesty and are exempted from punishment and prosecution and, if they are
under guard, are subject to immediate release.
Drafts of the new Form of Government for the Grand Duchy of Finland will
be submitted to the Finnish Sejm, which we have decided to convoke at the earliest
possible moment, and, if circumstances shall so require, drafts of individual funda
mental laws for developing the Constitution of Finland will be preliminarily
submitted to it. In particular, these drafts will clarify and expand the rights of
the Sejm with respect to the right of legislative initiative, and [the right] to de
termine the revenue and the expenditure of the Treasury, including the inherent
right of self-taxation of the Finnish people as it applies to customs tariffs. Pro
visions shall be made also for expediting confirmation of bills passed by the Sejm.
In the same manner, bills will be submitted to the Sejm on investing the Sejm
with the right to verify official orders issued by members of the Finnish Govern
ment, as well as bills on an independent supreme court, on the freedom of the
press, and on associations.
By this act, we solemnly affirm to the Finnish people, on the basis of its Con
stitution, the steadfast preservation of their internal independence and their rights
to their national culture and languages. We wish to express our firm conviction
that Russia and Finland will henceforth be bound together by their respect for
law, for the sake of mutual friendship and the prosperity of both free peoples.

G. L v o v , Minister of the Interior

P r in c e
[and all other ministers]
Countersigned: D. P r o t o p o p o v , Assistant to the Commissar
on the Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland
March 7, 1917
336 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

296. T h e T ransfer of C e r t a in J u d ic ia l a n d L a w E n f o r c e m e n t
F u n c t io n s to the F i n n i s h A u t h o r it ie s
[Zhurnaly, No. 22, March 17, 1917. The question of Finland assuming the frontier
guard was first raised in the Council of Ministers on March 9. Ibid., No. 12.]

Resolved;
To transfer to the Finnish judicial institutions the investigation of cases con
cerning persons investigated or prosecuted in Finland accused of national trea
son. To transfer to the Finnish authorities the guard of the frontier of Finland
against the penetration of enemy agents into the region, requesting the Minister
of Foreign Affairs to send the representatives of the Ministry to points bordering
Sweden, in order to assist the local Finnish institutions in controlling, together
with the frontier guards, the Russian emigres returning to Russia from abroad.

297. I n t e r v ie w w it h G o v e r n o r G e n e r a l S t a k h o v ic h
[Interview by the Petrograd representative of the Wireless Press, Daily Review of the
Foreign Press, Ser. 3, No. 5, April 11, 1917, p. 41.]
I have always been an opponent of the iniquitous Nationalist system of
Stolypin, who, in spite of the undertakings twice given by Alexander I., and
endorsed by Alexander II., wished to abolish Finnish autonomy.
I return to Finland with the ideas which I expounded and defended seven years
ago, and I am very happy to be charged by the Provisional Government to render
to Finland her Constitution and to apply it as broadly as possiblethat is to say
until complete autonomy is attained.
We cannot do more, because we have not the right, before the Constituent
Assembly takes action, to grant powers which properly belong to the Russian
people. I therefore wish to regard Finland as a Grand Duchy belonging to the
Empire. I note with pleasure that the Finns support this idea. The Finns have
in all circumstances shown themselves very law abiding and loyal. I have met
with the greatest eagerness to co-operate and the most effectual assistance from
them.
You may know that, exasperated by the old regime, three thousand Finns
passed into Germany during the present war, and have been fighting in the enemy
ranks.
Some of these were an undesirable element of the population. It has been
found that profiting by the trouble caused by the lack of police and gendarmery
they have been returning to Finland since the beginning of the Revolution. Con
scious of the danger and desirous of proving their devotion to Russia, the authori
ties immediately organised a system of surveillance and effected numerous arrests.
When the amnesty was proclaimed, the Finnish Senate readily agreed with me
as to measures to preserve civil order and to place under arrest all persons sus
pected of espionage. In a word, the Finns have come to a firm resolution to
defend their frontiers energetically.
All pilots, fishermen, and the whole population on the banks of the Gulf of
Finland will be placed under the orders of the Commander of the Russian Fleet
in order to prevent espionage and the conveyance of contraband. They will cer
tainly make an exemplary police, and I am even convinced that they would not
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 337

hesitate, in the improbable event of the Germans attempting to land, to aid the
Finnish Army to reinforce the powerful Russian Army which is defending their
territory.
I shall return to Finland on Wednesday next for the opening of the Diet
[Sejm] whose labours will last for three months. I shall go with full powers from
the Russian Government, and I hope to assure the Finns that the promises made
to them are this time serious and reliable.

298. Novoe Vremia o n F i n n i s h C l a im s

[No. 14751, April 14,1917, p. 4.]
M. A. Stakhovich, on assuming the post of Governor General of Finland,
declared that he is a representative of the sovereign power of the Russian govern
ment in Finland.
The Finnish politicians treated that pronouncement totally in the negative.
They made it clear that the sovereign power in Finland belongs to the Russian
monarch as the Grand Duke of Finland, and not at all to the sovereign Russian
people. Therefore, in their eyes, Mr. Stakhovich is the successor to the supreme
rights of Nicholas II as the Finnish monarch, and not at all a representative of
Russia herself.
This point of view was supported yesterday by Rech\ In a leading article on
Finland, it proclaimed that the Russian governor general is the bearer of local
supreme power. Not a local representative of all-State supreme power, but the
bearer of precisely the local sovereignty.
From an autonomous domain constituting a component part of the indivisible
Russian State, Finland, by one stroke of the pen, is elevated to the status of an
independent sovereign state, in which M. A. Stakhovich is successor to the rights
of the former Finnish Grand Duke and the bearer of his local sovereign power.
Mr. Stakhovich is thus given an opportunity to take this declaration at its face
value and to proclaim himself the legitimate successor to the rights of Nicholas II
in Finlanda hereditary monarch of the Grand Duchy of Finland.
What a joyous prospect! Recti is carving out of the provinces of the Russian
State an independent sovereign monarchy! The stem and inflexible republicans
establish a grand-ducal throne! Here it is, the unfathomable depth of the mystical
Slavic soul.
In the course of centuries, generation upon generation of Russian people,
guided by creative, statesmanlike instinct, were building a unified State and
establishing its borders. In one bright moment the self-denying work of the
ancestors is erased, at a single stroke, like an erroneous entry from a slate. The
highly esteemed citizens of the Russian land from the editorial offices of Rech%
following the even more esteemed representatives of the great Russian people such
as Yu. Kamenev, Steklov, and other pseudonyms, are turning the history of the
Russian people backward to its embryonic sources.
The Russian land in all its grandeur and sorrow has been built by anonymous
toilers. Today, the fruits of the age-old suffering of the builder anonyms are cap
tured by pseudonyms, and they intend to fritter away to the four winds the prop
erty of the Russian people, gained at the expense of blood, sweat, and tears.
They will not succeed.
338 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

299. F in l a n d and R u s s ia

[Editorial in Den\ No. 30, April 11, 1917, p. 1.]

In the very first business meeting of the Finnish Sejm, the head of the Finnish
Government, Tokoi [President of the Senate], considered it necessary to clarify
the views of the Finnish Government on the relationship between Russia and
Finland. Justice must be rendered to the Finnish premier: for clarity and accu
racy his speech left nothing to be desired. The basic aspirations of the Finnish
Government and of the Finnish Sejmfor at the present time the Finnish Gov
ernment is a parliamentary government and enjoys the confidence of the Sejm
were outlined with a definitiveness that almost defies comment.
Senator Tokoi spoke not only of the future but also of the past, and the truths
which Tokoi deemed it necessary to state show the abyss which a continuance of
the domination of Nicolas IPs Government was preparing for Russia. In the
words of Tokoi, a victory of Russia under the domination of the old regime would
have been a calamity for Finland. As we have now learned, Finnish youths com
posed entire units within the ranks of the German army, and Finland was plan
ning on the downfall of the Russian state and its forthcoming division to liberate
itself from the yoke.
All this nightmare, and with it the nightmarish future which the old regime
was perpetrating for us, have become things of the past. The Russian people,
having received their freedom, immediately extended a brotherly hand to the
subjugated nationalities, and first of all to Finland.
How does free Finland intend to build its relationship with free Russia? This
question finds the following answer in Tokois speech: The development of our
nation, its past, and the history which it has lived clearly stand witness that the
Finnish people have developed and matured sufficiently to become an independent
nation, determining their own laws, affairs, and plans. All our cultural develop
ment took place within our own milieu; also our economic development is so
original and all our social order differs so greatly from that of Russia that there
cannot be any question of a complete fusion of our two peoples . . . And I am
convinced that free RussiaI would say, our respected neighbor; I would like
also to add, our highly honored allymust also be a free nation, because a free
nation should not tolerate slavery or subjugate neighbors or allies.
Does this declaration of Tokoi signify a desire for complete separation of
Finland from Russia, for the transformation of Finland into an independent sov
ereign state, which would be connected with Russia only through the ties of a
treaty of alliance, which could be canceled by one of the contracting parts? Or
does Senator Tokoi intend to preserve also some other link between Russia and
Finland? Judging by the context of the speech and the information that reaches
us regarding the attitude of Finnish political circles, it can be assumed that Sena
tor Tokoi had in view a complete separation of Finland from Russia. It is no
secret that the point of view of a considerable number of Finnish jurists is that
with the disappearance of the Grand Duke of Finland the link that existed between
Russia and Finland in the person of the monarch has been broken, and that the
rights of the Grand Duke with regard to Finland have been transferred, not to
the Provisional Government, but to the Finnish Senate. The Provisional Govern
ment cannot share this point of view, and we believe that in this respect it has the
Russian public on its side, irrespective of party views. The rights of the Grand
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 339

Duke of Finland, as well as all the rights of the former Emperor, have been trans
ferred until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, complete and insepa
rably, to the Provisional Government. The sovereignty of Russia over all the lands
that compose the Russian state, and among them Finland, belongs to the Provi
sional Government, for the Provisional Government, and the Provisional Govern
ment alone, possesses at the present moment that plenitude of power that charac
terizes sovereignty. The Provisional Government cannot yield the sovereign
rights of the Russian people, because it is not empowered to do so. These sov
ereign rights belong to [it] only temporarily; it is their temporary bearer and,
what is much more important, their guardian until the Constituent Assembly,
exercising the plenitude of power, shall establish one or another kind of relation
ship with the lands composing the Russian state. Therefore, the issue of further
relations between Russia and Finland is subject to the decision of the Constituent
Assembly in agreement with the Sejm; neither the Sejm nor any other authority
can decide them [sfc] unilaterally.

300. L e n in o n t h e F i n n i s h Q u e s t io n
[An article in Pravda, No. 46, May 2,1917, p. 2, as translated in the Collected Works of
V. /. Lenin: The Revolution of 19179XX, Bk, II, 26-28. For an interesting description
of Bolshevik activities in Finland, see V. N. Zalezhskii, Helsingfors vesnoi i letom
1917 g . PR, V (1923), 117-89.]
The relation of Finland to Russia is the question of the hour. The Provisional
Government has not been able to satisfy the Finnish people. The latter do not
as yet demand separation; all they want is a wider autonomy.

The party of the proletariat (the Bolsheviks) has once more passed a resolu
tion relating to national problems, wherein it has affirmed the right of separation.
The grouping of classes and parties is obvious.
The petty bourgeoisie allows itself to be frightened by the phantom of a fright
ened bourgeoisie,herein is the gist of the whole policy of the Social-Democratic
Mensheviks and the Socialists-Revolutionists. They fear separation. Class
conscious proletarians do not fear it. Both Norway and Sweden were the gainers
after Norway freely separated from Sweden in 1905. The gain was in the in
creased mutual confidence of the two nations, in their closer voluntary rapproche
ment, in the disappearance of absurd and harmful friction between them, in the
strengthening of economic, political, and cultural attractions of the two nations
for each other, in the consolidation of the fraternal union between the workers
of the two countries.
Comrades, workers and peasants! Do not be carried away by the annexa
tionist policy of the Russian capitalists, Guchkov, Miliukov, and the Provisional
Government, with regard to Finland, Courland, Ukraine, etc.! Do not fear to
recognise the right of these nations to separation. It is not by violence that we
should draw these people into a union with the Great-Russians, but by a truly
voluntary, truly free agreement which is impossible without freedom of separation.
The greater the freedom in Russia, the more decidedly our republic recognises
the right of non-Great-Russian nations to separate, the more powerfully will other
nations be drawn into a union with us, the less friction will there be, the more
340 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

rarely will actual separation occur, the shorter the period of separation of some
nations from us, the closer, the more permanentin the long runthe brotherly
union of the workers and peasants5 republic of Russia with the republic of any
other nation.

301. C o m m e n t o f E. V. T a r l e o n t h e F i n n i s h S it u a t io n and
K e r e n s k y s S p e e c h in H e l s in g f o r s
[The First Warning. Den9, No. 57, May 12, 1917, p. 1.]
The words which Kerensky spoke two days ago at Helsingfors and which have
been loudly acclaimed by the soldiers and sailors who were listening to the Min
ister are a symptom that should give Finnish society much food for thought. . . .
How often people wish to take an unfair advantage of our candor, of the open
heartedness of the Russian people! And here in Finland (the Minister raised his
voice) we must be especially cautious, because not only the Germans may interpret
our generosity and our love as weakness and impotence.
Perhaps in Finland they do not realize exactly the very great significance of
the fact that these words were spoken by Kerensky. . . . When he was making
his speech, when he was saying the words quoted above, his voice above all
resounded [with] a very understandable resentment; he spoke not only as the
Minister of War and Navy, who knows quite definitely that the Provisional Gov
ernment shall in no case deprive its people of their rights to the national territory,
but also as a political fighter, who has all his life served a definite ideal and who
sees that there are those who wish to endanger it, taking advantage of its very
nobility. As a matter of fact, what a few weeks ago could be mentioned only as
a conjecture is now becoming clear. There are important circles in Finland which
quite openly aspire to a complete separation from Russia and which imagine that
it will be accomplished in the same way as the separation of Norway from Sweden,
i.e., quite painlessly. A. F. Kerensky, therefore, warns that this view is absolutely
mistaken; that Russia at the present moment is still sufficiently strong to defend
the integrity of the remaining territory against anyone.
And once again we are perplexed: what kind of intoxication has seized these
reserved, quiet people? Do they not see that they have not and shall not have the
slightest chance of defeating Russia by force, and that any attempt to use violence
might lead to irreparable calamities, for in these uneasy and threatening times
navy guns might start firing by themselves, even without orders from Petrograd?
But, above all, what is the purpose of all this? In what way does the Provisional
Government hinder Finlands activities? For whose sake is the ghost of chaos
invoked? An attempt to take advantage of the momentary weakness of revolu
tionary Russia, which has just liberated Finland, can by itself sow for many years
ahead the seeds of bitterness and irritation; moreover, the words of Kerensky
stress also the essential fallaciousness of such a reliance on Russian weakness.
For the time being, Kerensky, as well as the navy and the army, which are
subordinate to him and which are acclaiming him, are not the enemies but the
friends of Finland. Probably this first warning was provoked by the inexplicable
tone of condescending impatience and a sort of haughty intolerance, which part
of the Finnish press and society, particularly during these recent weeks, has
assumed. For the sake of Finland itself, it is to be hoped that this warning will
be estimated at its true value.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 341

302. K e r e n s k y s E x p l a n a t io n o f H is F i n n i s h P o l ic y to t h e S o v ie t
o f W o r k e r s a n d S o l d ie r s D e p u t ie s

[Izvestiia, No. 78, May 30,1917, p. 4.]

c h a ir m a n : Comrades, in view of the fact that Comrade Kerensky has no time,
I propose that we hear his explanations right away.
m i n is t e r o f w a r a n d n a v y a . f . k e r e n s k y : I apologize for having disrupted
the agenda, but I have to leave today. Please ask me questions.
I. G. t s e r e t e l l i : Let Comrade Kerensky answer the questions that were raised
in his absence.
A. F. k e r e n s k y : I was asked three questions. One was o f a general political
[nature]concerning Finland . . .

I was declared to be almost a second Bobrikov5 in Finland. But even on the

day of the declaration of war, when the Senoren konvent of the State Duma asked
us what should be done, I answered: restore the autonomy of Finland. But now
there is one point about which I have warned others: until the peoples will has
been expressed in the Constituent Assembly, the Russian Provisional Government
cannot proclaim the independence of Finland because we do not consider our
selves as having autocratic power. I cannot compromise on this point. The same
point of view is shared by the Russian workers and soldiers organizations in
Finland.

303. T h e S p e e c h o f t h e F i n n i s h S o c ia l D e m o c r a t ic P a r t y R e p r e s e n t a t iv e
K h u t t u n e n a t t h e S e s s io n o f t h e A l l - R u s s ia n C o n g r e s s o f
S o v ie t s o f W o r k e r s a n d S o l d ie r s D e p u t i e s o n J u n e 2 0
[Izvestiia, No. 99, June 23, 1917, p. 6.]
Esteemed Comrades, workers and soldiers!

As you know, the Congress of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, having
discussed a few days ago the question of the political situation of Finland, decided
to approve the resolution with which you are probably already acquainted, and
which expresses the demand of the right to complete self-determination for Fin
landin other words, the recognition by the Russian Government of Finnish
independence.
This point of view, which was accepted unanimously by the Party at a con
ference, is in no way a fantastic idea and is not the outcome of a sudden decision.
Some of your political workers may declare, and have already declared outside
the walls of the Congress, that until quite recently no mention was made by the
Finns of political independence, but that they spoke only of the extension of their
rights in the management of their own internal affairs and of the increase of the
power of the Sejm, etc. This is quite true . . .
The crystallization of opinion now shared by the Social Democratic Party of
Finland has undoubtedly been speeded up by the events that have taken place
during the last two to three months. Allow me as a representative of the Finnish

6 N. I. Bobrikov, Governor General of Finland, 1898-1904; notorious for his repressive

policies; assassinated by a Finnish patriot.
342 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Social Democratic Party to disclose to you quite frankly the opinion of a large
number of Finnish people.
According to this opinion, which we venture to announce, the Provisional
Government has aroused the distrust of part of the Finns by delaying settlement
of the question put forward by the Senate, namely, that of increasing the right of
the Senate and the Finnish Sejm.

Some Russian statesmen have asked recently, What do you Finns actually
want? Have you not already been given legal rights, and has not your legal status
been re-established which was formerly annulled by the predatory Imperial
government?
We do not deny that this is the actual situation. The legal status has been re
established in accord with the manifesto of March last, which assured us that our
autonomy was secured. But this does not satisfy us. The Finnish people have
been developed culturally, and the Finnish working class has become educated and
class-conscious to such an extent that it cannot be satisfied with this declaration;
it cannot be satisfied with having achieved a legal status within the limits that have
already existed one hundred years, which is based upon the constitution and the
form of government resulting from the overturn successfully achieved by the
Swedish king, Gustav III, in 1772. The autonomy which is now offered to Fin
land is simply a bad form of the Swedish liberal constitution which has already
been in force 150 years. Finland does not wish any longer to remain under
Russias protection and in the position of Russias stepdaughter.
Comrades! Although we knew that the idea of the independence of Finland
appeared to be clear and indisputable in the eyes of every honest citizen of every
free country, we were aware, at the same time, that the principle of the independ
ence of Finland and its declaration finally by the Finnish Social Democratic Party
would be misrepresented. We were not mistaken. As soon as the declaration was
made known, many bourgeois papers in Petrograd, without printing the declara
tion in its original form, hastened to attack our party. We found in the articles
published in these papers a number of accusations which have already been
directed against Finland during the last few years.

Those who ignominiously wish to bring to naught the achievements of the

Russian revolution and those who declare that the proclamation of Finnish inde
pendence was a criminal act on the part of the Social Democratic Party have
played their role very cleverly by resorting to calumny and by assuring the Rus
sian public that the Finnish Social Democratic Party would not have thought of
the independence of Finland had not the Central European Powers already given
their assurances of the support of the principle of Finnish independence.

This accusation, as can be easily understood, has no ground whatever. The

Finnish people desire to be given die complete right of self-determination and,
therefore, do not wish a Russian or English or German or any other imperialistic
master.

In reply to those who think that the independence of Finland will be dangerous
to Russia in view of its proximity to Finland, it can simply be stated that Switzer-
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 343

land, for example, did not prove to be a danger to Italy or France; Denmark did
not threaten Germany; Serbia was not formidable to Austria, etc. In fact, we
have never heard that the small nations represented a danger to the existence of
great ones, but we know of reverse cases. *\11 that the small nations wish, as far
as we understand the idea, is to be allowed to live in peace, to work and to develop
their own culture and their own economic prosperity, every nation to do it in its
own way and for its own happiness and, in this way, for the happiness of man
kind in general.
When the Social Democrats of Finland are accused of deviation from the
program of our party and the principles of internationalism by supporting the
principle of self-determination of Finland, it appears that a notion is propounded
which only proves that these circles, which are accustomed to approve of violence,
are at the same time not very particular as to the means they choose, when they
are confronted with the desire of the people for freedom and independence, after
centuries of political guardianship. The viewpoint of the Finnish Social Demo
cratic Party, as it is expressed in the already mentioned Congress of the Party, is
such that every Social Democrat, if he wishes to be honest and just, without con
sidering whether he belongs to the party of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, or Socialist-
Revolutionaries, cannot but approve of it. Therefore, the Social Democratic Party
of Finland appeals to the representatives of the proletariat of Russia and expects
their support of its program. It depends to a great extent on your influence and
your decision whether the Finnish people will be granted the full right of self-
determination or whether they are to remain under the government of the capi
talist classes and bourgeoisie of Russia. . . . Did not Russian revolutionary de
mocracy declare through its Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers9Deputies,
as well as through its Provisional Government, the independence of Poland? . . .
You cannot make an exception of Finland only on the ground that she was
destined for more than one hundred years to be plundered and oppressed by the
ruling classes of Russia. You yourselves could not allow Germany to dictate the
conditions of peace to Russia or permit the future democratic legislation of Russia
in her internal and foreign policies to be determined by Berlin. You would not
stand the slightest hint of such a supposition. You just would not allow it. On
the contrary, as one man you would rise against it and, if it was necessary, you
would prefer death to such humiliation. But if that is the situation and if you are
just, how can you refuse Finland the right of self-determination and how can you
demand or even make a supposition that Finland is to be subordinated to the
Petrograd government, and that it is to be left to the mercy of the Russian bour
geoisie? Having already recognized the independence of Poland, Albania, Serbia,
and Belgium, if you are at all considerate, you must recognize the right of Finland
also. Do not deprive Finland of this right for the simple reason that it is weak,
but recognize this right in principle because the Finnish people have reached
their political adolescence. Finland does not represent any longer a borderland
incapable of self-government. Admit this because the Finnish people, in spite of
the fact that they are a small nation, have a full right to enter the family of peoples
on an equal footing and to enjoy an independent development of their country.

304. T h e R u s s ia n R e q u e s t f o r a F i n n i s h L o a n
[Finnish Socialism and the Russian Telegraph, by E. Tarle, in Den\ No. 95, June
27, 1917, p. 1. After considerable bargaining during the next month of strained
344 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

political relations between the Provisional Government and Finland, the Bank of Fin
land agreed to issue to Russia 400 500 million Finnish marks in exchange for British
and American currency to be deposited in foreign banks to the account of the Bank of
Finland, and to exchange 100 million marks for rubles at the current rate of exchange,
which was extremely disadvantageous to Russia. Rech, No. 170, July 22, 1917, p. 3.]
The Finnish Social Democrats have presented a proposal to the Russian
Socialists who came to see them for the purpose of convincing them that a rela
tively small loan not only was necessary for Russia, but would be useful and to
the advantage of Finland itself: the pawning of the Russian telegraph and govern
ment-owned buildings. Turkey, China, Persia, Mexico, and the Republic of Hon
duras often had to cope with such proposals; other non-European countries had
to cope with them seldom; the European countries almost never had occasion to
cope with them. . . . The Finnish Social-Democrats are observing their doctrine
so unswervingly that they do not want to help the Russian bourgeois government
to carry on an imperialistic war. Incidentally, they might, nevertheless, give
some help, but [only] provided there was a solid guarantee; thus the circle of
the fraternal conference was completed harmoniously and naturally: from protest
against a bourgeois war to a proposal to pawn the telegraph. You could be a kind,
small, extremely bourgeois patriot for yourself, and an intransigent social revo
lutionary when you speak with guests from Petrograd. Especially when there is
the hope of acquiring, under the guise of such intransigency, somebody elses tele
graph at a cheap price.

But what has socialism, the fraternity of peoples, the bourgeois war, to do with
all this? Do what everyone does around Russia nowruin her, acquire her for
possessions, demand her telegraph, but do not conceal these manipulations under
words for which generations of martyrs have perished.
One should never have an exaggerated idea of the stupidity of the people one
is negotiating with; the Finns this time have forgotten this old advice. Russia is
in a difficult situation, she is weak; she cannot immediately repel many things.
But Russia is not stupid; she understands everything and she understands with
deep sorrow more than with hatred those marauders who swarm around her and
endeavor to profit at her expense. But if anything can transform this pity into
anger, it is precisely an abuse of those slogans that are dear to her. Therefore, it
would be more sensible when speaking of pawning the telegraph to keep silent
with regard to socialism.

305. T h e L aw of the S e j m on t h e S u pr e m e P ow er in F in l a n d ,
J u l y 5, 1917
[Reck9, No. 164, July 15,1917, pp. 3-4; Dimanshtein, p. 211.]
It is hereby decreed: With the cessation of the rights of the monarch, in ac
cordance with the decision of the Sejm of Finland, the following becomes effective:
Article 1. The Sejm of Finland alone decides, affirms, and decrees on the
implemention of all Finnish laws, among them those dealing with finances, taxa
tion, and customs.
The Sejm also decides definitely on all other Finnish affairs which were, in
accordance with the statutes in force up to this time, subject to the decision of the
Tsar-Emperor and the Grand Duke.
 THE NATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 345

The provisions of this law do not extend to matters of external policy or to

military legislation and administration.
Article 2. The Sejm meets in regular session without special convocation and
sets the time of closing of the session. Pending the publication of a new form of
government in Finland, the Sejm exercises, in accordance with Article 18 of the
Sejm statute, the right to decide on the conducting of new elections and the disso
lution of the Sejm.
Article 3. The Sejm shall designate the executive power of Finland. The
Supreme Executive Power is temporarily executed by the economic department
of the Finnish Senate, whose members are appointed and dismissed by the Sejm.

306. T h e A d d re ss o f t h e S e jm t o t h e P r o v is i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t
A c c o m p a n y in g t h e T r a n sm issio n t o I t o f t h e
L a w o n t h e S u p re m e P o w e r
[Rech\ No. 164, July 15, 1917, p. 3; Dimanshtein, pp. 21114.]
To the Provisional Government of Russia: The Finnish Sejm, in accordance
with the procedure for publishing the basic laws of the country, established by
Article 60 of the Sejm statute, adopted and published on July 18 (new style) of
this year the law attached herewith on the exercise of the supreme power in Fin
land. This law is based on the legal principle that with the deposition of the
monarchy, the national representation of Finland has the right to enter upon the
exercise of supreme state power on domestic matters of the country.
Thus the internal political freedom of Finland on the strength of clear law
and right will rest upon a firm foundation of popular government and will depend
upon the personal will of the Finnish people.
According to her constitution, Finland had been in the past also a free state
in internal affairs, independent of Russian organs of administration and legisla
tion, although in some local affairs authority belonged to Russia as well.6 How
ever, Finlands right to internal independence was easily violated in practice as
long as Russia was ruled by the Tsar, who was simultaneously also the monarch
of Finland.
Juridically, as the monarch of Finland he exercised Finnish state authority
and was bound by the Finnish fundamental laws. In practice, however, he not
infrequently and systematically attempted to transfer the right of the Finnish
monarch and even the right of the Finnish Senate to the government and legis
lative institutions of Russia.
The functions and democratic development of the Sejm were suppressed, and,
finally, the development of the entire legislation of the country was chained.
Hanging over our people was the unbearable scourge of arbitrary rule, oppression,
compulsory taxation, as well as hatred and grief. The lawful relations between
Russia and Finland were turning into an enslavement of the Finnish people. The
deposition of the monarchy by the Russian revolution saved Finland from this.
Moreover, it fell to the lot of the Finnish Sejm to protect and defend, in ac
cordance with the fundamental laws, the rights of the supreme power of Finland,
formerly belonging to the monarch, and the freedom of the country.
The Sejm could not, under the changed state of affairs, leave the government
authority to Russia, because now, as before, this would be tantamount to limita
6Unclear in text, though this appears to be the meaning intended.
346 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

tion of the constituent rights of Finland and would be a serious undermining of

the countrys political position. The preservation of the internal independence of
Finland called for the transfer of the supreme state power in internal matters of
the country to the Finnish people in order that it be exercised by her own national
organs and her highest instance, the popular representation.
The form of the countrys government, operative since the period of Swedish
rule, and the even more ancient legislation naturally do not give specific instruc
tions with respect to the present state of affairs. But, in spite of their monarchical
spirit, they do make provision for the independent power of the institution of
national representation in those cases where the lawful monarch does not exist.
In view of the fact that the exercise of the supreme power by Finland during the
period of interregnum, which has reigned for the past few months, was not regu
lated by law, the administration of the most basic matters suffered greatly and
could be exercised only with great effort.
However, the Sejm cherished the hope that the lawful conception of the right
to self-determination of the Finnish people would soon awaken and find expres
sion in the wide strata of the Russian people. Then the straightforward word was
spoken by the revolutionary democracy of Russia. The All-Russian Congress of
representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies expressed its
willingness to support and demand the right of Finlands complete self-determi-
nation down to political independence. Thus, the Russian revolutionary democ
racy, itself intolerant of oppression, nobly took under its patronage the hopes of
our people to achieve political independence.
However, this congress of representatives thought that the solution of the Fin
nish question in its entirety could be approved, on the part of Russia, only by the
All-Russian Constituent Assembly. But for all immediate and practical purposes,
while the congress of representatives enjoined the Provisional Government to take
the necessary measures without delay for the realization of Finlands complete
self-government, it demanded the recognition of the right of the Sejm to publish
and finally approve all the laws dealing with Finland, except those concerning
foreign relations and military legislation and administration; also to decide the
questions on the convening and dissolution of the Sejm as well as recognition of
Finlands right to decide independently upon its executive power.

The Finnish Sejm does not wish to violate the rights of the Russian citizens
and institutions now present in Finland. On the contrary, the Sejm intends to
approve and implement at the earliest opportunity the laws that it adopted earlier
and that extend to Russian citizens in Finland equal rights with those of the Fin
nish citizens, both civil and commercial, as well as laws abolishing the special
restrictions now existing with respect to Jews.
Likewise the Sejm will see to it that the Russian citizens [residing] in Finland
enjoy the right to freedom of unions, assembly, and speech without any obstacles.
In the event of an actual need for a change in the status of Russians and of Rus
sian institutions present in Finland, Finland will request permission for a pre
liminary conference with the government authority in Russia about them, as well
as about the question of regulating mutual agreements on the manifold mutual
economic relations between Russia and Finland.
Peaceful and free cooperation with the Russian people is an important condi
tion for the prosperity of the Finnish people, and, firmly counting on the right-
 THE NATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 347

thinking Russian democracy, the Finnish Sejm cherishes the hope that the Pro
visional Government will find it possible to grant to Finland and her Sejm, in the
name of Russia, the rights, established by law, to exercise supreme power in
Finland.
July 12,1917

307. Russkiia Vedomosti o n t h e A c t io n o f t h e S e jm

[No. 148, July 1, 1917, p. 1. Written just before the final passage of the act.]
When the old order was overthrown by the revolutionary forces of Russia,
the young Russian democracy declared that the country would be ruled on the
basis of new principles. Russia repudiated the policy of oppression of the peoples
who form her; she is prepared to satisfy all their aspirations for the fullest de
velopment of their national strength. All that Russia asks is that the very exist
ence of the state as a historically formed economic and cultural whole not be
endangered. And hence the following three considerations: First, there must be
internal reorganization on the basis of national freedom but not a governmental
breakdown. Second, the new order must not undermine the military might of the
country at a moment when, straining all of its remaining strength, it wages a
struggle with the external enemy. And, third, the question of the future organi
zation of the state and its parts must be solved not by means of local revolutions
against the over-all Russian revolution, but by harmonizing the interests of the
parts with those of the whole at the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.
. . . Whenever Finnish rights were encroached upon, the Russian democracy
raised its voice in defense of the small nation whose political future is bound with
Russia. To be sure, up to 1917 this voice was too weak to defend Finland. But
nevertheless it was the Russian and not the Finnish revolution that restored to
Finland her rights and freedom.

The political situation should be regarded as extremely tense. Part of the

ministers think apparently that there is no hope for a peaceful solution of the
Finnish question. The other part considers that not all of the methods of exerting
influence by word and persuasion have been exhausted. At any rate, the conflict
is developing with unusual rapidity. Even if the news is correct that the third
reading of the secretly drafted bill on the supreme rights of the Sejm is postponed
from Saturday to Tuesday, the question must be resolved within the next few days.
The passing of the bill, declaring the independence of Finland in spite of the
unequivocal statement of the Provisional Government that it has no right to settle
the Finnish question in its final form prior to the convening of the Constituent
Assembly, is an aggressive act toward Russia, and we can react to it only as such.
No conflicts of interest exist between Russia and Finland that would make
accord impossible. In the present instance it is not economic considerations nor
political ideals that thrust [Finland] upon the road of conflict. It is thrust upon
this road by a totally unjustified adventurism from which Finland can actually
gain nothing but can lose much. But the Finnish politicians do not give it any
thought. If, on the one hand, they do not value the preservation of the strength
of the Russian revolution, they apparently overestimate, on the other hand, the
weakness of Russia.
In vain! To be sure, the revolution has not as yet created order and a strong
348 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

government. There are unquestionably in Russia many centrifugal forces, many

manifestations of anarchy and disorganization in all spheres of our national life.
But the national tie is still strong, and the people are still capable of demonstrat
ing unexpected energy. The Russian army, which our enemies and perhaps our
allies were ready to consider nonexistent, was able to inflict blows on the Aus-
trians near Zlochev, Brzeshany, Galich, and Stanislavogo, which proved that our
strength has not as yet been exhausted. Democratic Russia yearns for peace, and
a solution of any questions by means of violence is repugnant to her. But the
moment it is revealed that absolutely all [other] means are exhausted, she knows
how to show her will.

308. Den9 o n t h e F in n is h E n a c t m e n t
[No. 103, July 7,1917, p. 1.]
The Finnish Sejm, led by the socialists, has carried out its intention and has
passed a bill regarding the autonomy of Finland. It has passed it in a most
emphatic and intransigent form, having declined the amendment of the Young
Finn Volas regarding the transmission of the law to the Provisional Government
for approval.
There was a time when the Young Finns were considered to be the most ex
treme representatives of Finnish nationalism. They broke away from the tradi
tions of conciliation and moderation, which distinguished the Old Finn Party.
In respect of all the issues that agitated the country they carried on resolutely and
persistently the point of view of Finnish nationalism. This phenomenon was quite
natural. In the second half of the nineteenth century, among all the oppressed
nationalities, there emerged, together with the development of capitalism, bour
geois parties. Whatever their name, the Young Finns, Young Czechs, or others
were marching everywhere under banners of chauvinistic nationalism.
. . . Contemporary Finland has decided to show the world a wonder, up to
now unknown, of narrow-minded nationalism [wearing] the garment of socialism.
And, therefore, it was not the votes of the Young Finns, but those of the socialistic
majority that rejected an amendment, whose meaning was not to ignore the
Government of revolutionary Russia, while creating the conditions for a new
internal order in Finland. Finland wishes to establish the limits and the substance
of her autonomy, not through the will of two contracting parties, not by a mutual
agreement, but by means of a unilateral declaration.
The Finnish Sejm decides, and the Russian nation and its Government are
left to take note of the decision.
Nothing else. Suomi locuta, causa finita.
Finland has said her word, and the question is solved.

. . . The Finnish politicians do not believe in the Russian revolution; they

do not trust Russian democracy and hasten to achieve autonomy in a manner
that actually represents already a superautonomy.
In order to take such a course, the Finnish Sejm had to adopt the point of
view that now Finland has no ties whatsoever with Russia and that at the present
time the Russian Government has no rights whatsoever in respect of Finland.
In order to take such a position, the socialistic majority of the Sejm had to
turn into orthodox monarchists.
 THE N ATIO NALITIES PROBLEM 349

The Finnish Sejm has passed a bill inspired by distrust toward the revolution,
a project permeated with narrow-minded national egotism, and. in order to
achieve this, the socialists have not disdained to put on an ugly monarchist
disguise.

309. T h e A c t o f t h e F in n is h S e j m
[Editorial in Volia Naroda, No. 67, July 16, 1917, p. l.j
The address of the Finnish Sejm to the Provisional Government and the text
of the law published by the Finnish Sejm on the realization of the supreme power
in Finland are published. What is one to say about this, and how should these
acts be evaluated?
Let us say, first of all, that much in the text of the law and the text of the
address is not clear. Moreover, the law and the address contradict each other in
many respects. On the whole, the address is softer and more pliable than the
text of the law. . . .

The question arises: is the act of the Sejm tantamount to complete independ
ence for Finland?
No. Such an answer forces us to mention that point in the law that excludes
from the competence of the Sejm questions of foreign policy and military legis
lation.
This point gives the act of the Finnish Sejm the character not of an act de
claring the independence of Finland, but rather the character of an act declaring
complete autonomy for this country.
This makes our attitude toward the given act not entirely negative. But does
it mean that we hail this act in its entirety and recommend that the Provisional
Government sanction it in its entirety?
No, it does not mean this. We have nothing against wide autonomy for Fin
land. We are in agreement on many points of the address and the law.
But first, are we sure that the act does not contain some diplomacy ? Is it
not the first step toward a complete break of Finland from Russia? If so, if its
content is too wide, which is not excluded by the text, we are emphatically against
such a policy.
Second, no matter what the Finnish Sejm undertakes, we regard every one of
its decisions as conditional prior to its approval by the Constituent Assembly.
Third, under the circumstances, we reserve to the Provisional Government
the right to accept and the right to reject any measures adopted by the Finnish
Sejm in so far as they go beyond the bounds permitted by autonomy and become
measures the publication of which is the right only of a sovereign state. Finland
was not one of them. Likewise, the Provisional Government, both de jure and
de facto, has the right to place its veto on all decisions of the Sejm that are ob
viously detrimental to the interests of the Russian state. This condition has a
tremendous significance now during wartime, when Russias enemy through the
intercession of Finland, taking advantage of its proximity to the capital, its ter
ritorial position, and the tendency on the part of some Finns toward hostile
coalition, can make excellent use of these conditions to the detriment of our
motherland.
350 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Fourth, in view of the above, we think that the scope of the imperial govern
ment outlined in the act of the Sejm is narrow. According to the latter, this sphere
is limited only to foreign policy and military legislation. Let us remind our
readers that in any of the contemporary federations, be it Switzerland or the
United States of North America, the scope of the central government is much
broader than the one outlined in the Sejm. In view of this we see no reason,
especially at the present time, to narrow the rights of the central Provisional
Government to the extent done by the Sejm.
We are not especially well impressed either by the fact that in order to pass
its act, the Sejm deliberately chose a time of discord, the most difficult moment
in the life of our motherland. This fact involuntarily suggests sad thoughts and
inspires us with particular caution concerning the Sejms desires.
The result of the above is clear. We recognize Finlands right to broad au
tonomy, the right to build its internal life independently. But in so far as this
autonomy passes into a sovereign independence, in so far as the decisions of the
Sejm contradict the interests of the Russian state and are to its detriment, we
oppose and repudiate such attempts. In this case we shall be emphatically at odds
with the Finnish democracy. In this case we shall insist before the Provisional
Government that the interests of the Russian state be protected and shall put all
the responsibility upon the Sejm for the possible sad consequences of its policy.

310. Izvestiia o n t h e F in n is h E n a c t m e n t
[No. 106, July 1,1917, p. 6. Written just before the Sejm approved the law.]
The Finnish question has become the news of the day. The Finnish Social
Democrats have drawn up a bill on the new polity of Finland and have submitted
it to the Sejm. The bourgeois newspapers are filled with indignation on this score.
The new polity of Finland, drafted by Social Democrats, boils down to a
return to the old system which prevailed in Finland prior to the epoch of Alex
ander III. . . . It stands to reason that with the overthrow of the monarchy all
the inherent rights of the Grand Duke of Finlandwho was considered to be the
Russian Tsarare now transferred to the Finnish people themselves as personi
fied by the Sejm, which represents them.
Generally speaking, the terms of the autonomy outlined by Finnish comrades
coincide as a whole with those formulated in the resolution of the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. Therefore, by the very
nature of the matter, the revolutionary democracy of Russia must vigorously
uphold the new polity of Finland, which our Finnish comrades are trying to secure.

But for the very reason that Finlands autonomy and freedom constitute a
common cause of the Russian and Finnish democracies, the All-Russian Congress
has outlined the course that must be followed in order to settle the Finnish ques
tion. The Congress pointed out that the final decision on this matter must be left
up to the National Constituent Assembly by agreement with the Finns. In out
lining a series of measures that are subject to immediate implementation, the
Congress concluded that these measures must be carried out by the revolutionary
Provisional Government of Russia.
It goes without saying that it was not with the object of obtaining any form
of trusteeship over Finlands democracy that the Congress adopted these resolu
tions. It was motivated by one idea: to make Finlands freedom and autonomy
 THE N ATIO NALITIES PROBLEM 351

serve as an instrument not of weakening, but of strengthening the Russian revo

lution, the triumph of which is essential to Finns no less than to Great Russians,
Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Jews, or any other people who are con
nected historically with the Russian State.

That is why it would be a gross mistake should the new bill be passed uni
laterally by the Finnish Sejm, giving the appearance of a premeditated boycott
of the Provisional Government of Russia and its Constituent Assembly. And that
is why, without waiting for any conflicts to arise, the Provisional Government
must publish an act that would satisfy the legitimate demands of the Finnish
people during the transitional epoch that separates us from the Constituent
Assembly.

311. M a n if e s t o o f J u ly 18/31, 1917, o n t h e D i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e

S e jm a n d o n t h e H o ld in g o f N e w E l e c t i o n s
[VVP, No. 110, July 21, 1917, p. 1; Dimanshtein, pp. 68-69. It was necessary for the
Finnish Senate to sanction the dissolution. The vote was a tie, six to six, forcing the
Governor General, Stakhovich, to cast the deciding vote. The Sejm received the deci
sion of the Senate and dissolved on July 21 after a session of exactly two minutes.
Reck, No. 170, July 22, 1917.]
The Provisional Government received the Address of the Sejm, dated July 12
(25) of this year, together with the text of its independently adopted decisions
on the achievement of Finnish sovereignty.
On the basis of the constitution, Finland enjoys independence in internal
affairs only within the established framework of the legal relationship between
Finland and Russia; it has always been considered that the basic underlying
principle of these relations was their common bearer of the supreme power of the
state. With the abdication of the last emperor, the full powers which inhered in
him, as well as the rights of the Grand Duke of Finland, could pass only to the
Provisional Government, which was vested with supreme power by the people of
Russia. Otherwise the rights of the Grand Duke would have to have been con
sidered as belonging to him even to this very day.
The Provisional Government, having publicly sworn to preserve the rights
of the people of the Russian State, cannot surrender these rights prior to the de
cision of the Constituent Assembly.
Continuing to consider it its duty and its concern to defend and expand the
rights of Finnish independence in internal affairs in accordance with a Manifesto
issued on March 7 (20) of this year, the Provisional Government cannot at the
same time recognize the right of the Finnish Sejm to predetermine of its own
accord the will of the forthcoming Russian Constituent Assembly and abolish the
authority of the Russian Government in matters of Finnish legislation and
government.
In the meantime, the decisions adopted by the Sejm alter the very essence of
the mutual legal relationship between Russia and Finland and constitute a funda
mental violation of the present constitution of Finland.
Let the people of Finland weigh their fate. It must be decided only in agree
ment with the people of Russia.
352 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Having ordered, accordingly, that new elections be held at the earliest date,
on October 1 and 2 (new style) of this year, the Provisional Government con
sidered it to be in the best general interest to dissolve the regular Sejm, which it
convoked on March 22 (April 14) of this year, and to set [a date], no later than
November 1 of this year, for the convocation of the new Sejm. Therefore, all
persons who will be elected as deputies to the Sejm are to arrive in the town of
Helsingfors by a date that will be specially set for the discharge of their duties
in accordance with the Statute of the Sejm.
In accordance with existing laws, at the opening of the Sejm the Government
will submit a bill for consideration by the Sejm on the procedure for settling the
internal affairs of Finland.
Issued on July 18 (31), 1917, in Petrograd.
A. K erensk y, Minister-President
Countersigned: K . E n c k e l l , Minister
State Secretary for Finland

312. Russkiia Vedomosti o n t h e D is s o lu t i o n o f t h e S e jm

[No. 165, July 21, 1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government has dissolved the Finnish Sejm. In this instance
it demonstrated a firm resolution to defend the national interests of Russia. And
of course it will find active support from the Russian public. The dissolution of
the Sejm is the most correct, perhaps the only correct answer to Finlands aspi
rations to decide the question of the future nature of Russo-Finnish relationsto
solve it without awaiting the convening of the Constituent Assembly and without
submitting the appropriate resolutions of the Sejm for confirmation by the Pro
visional Government. By its resolutions the Finnish Sejm has cut off all alterna
tives for an accord with Russia, from whom she demanded a simple silent accept
ance of the accomplished fact. To this the Provisional Government of course
could not and should not have agreed. Moreover, the Finnish Sejm cut off all
roads of retreat, for the possibility of adopting a less aggressive policy with regard
to Russia was already excluded.
. . . Some doubts are natural . . . as to whether or not the implacable posi
tion of the Sejm corresponds to the wishes of the entire population of Finland.
Also natural is the desire to test the will of the population by means of elections,
because in previous elections the question of radical re-examination of relations
between Russia and Finland was not raised, and the country did not express an
opinion on it. However, it is so crucial that to decide it without questioning the
entire country would hardly be admissible.
. . . The Russo-Finnish question enters now upon a new phase of develop
ment, and it is possible that we shall have to suffer not a few grave complications
on the road to its solution. But the responsibility for these complications falls
wholly on the Finnish Sejm and its implacable policy toward Russia.

313. Vlas? Naroda o n t h e D is s o lu t i o n o f t h e F in n is h S e jm

[No. 72, July 21, 1917, p. 1.]
By a manifesto of the Provisional Government the Finnish Sejm is dissolved.
There is no doubt that the Provisional Government had the right to dissolve
 THE N ATIO NALITIES PROBLEM 353

the Sejm on the basis of the constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which
is still in effect, because the rights of supreme authority in Finland passed on to
the Provisional Government from the moment of the revolution.

Under new elections the electoral struggle will be waged precisely on the
question of the relationship with Russia. And if the new Sejm approves the
decision of the preceding one, it will then be obvious that we deal with the will
of the majority of the Finnish people.
But could there be any doubts here? Could we suppose that the newly elected
Sejm will take a different position toward Russia?
In expressing our opinion on the Finnish question in the c o lu m n s of Vlast9
Naroda, we have already not infrequently said that it is not a question of Fin
lands right to independence. The Russian democracy cannot deny this right to
the Finnish people. The crux of the matter is in the tactics of the Finnish Sejm.
The fact is that the question of relations between Finland and Russia is being
decided in a one-sided manner, without consulting Russia. And the moment
chosen for this decision is during the war and the grave internal crisis which
Russia is experiencing.
The Russian democracy regarded the attempt of the Finnish people to solve
the Russo-Finnish question by taking advantage of the grave situation in Russia,
and without consulting her, as a hostile and insulting act on the part of Finland.
And we know that not all the Finnish people were unanimous in this decision
of the question. We know that in the session of the Sejm on this historic night of
July 6, a considerable minority supported the proposition to submit the resolu
tion of the Sejm for approval to the Provisional Government. This suggestion
was voted down by 104 to 86.
It is not unlikely that this minority will prove to be the majority in the new
Sejm. We know that the vacillations in the sentiments of the Finnish people
toward Russia are intimately related to the internal events in Russia. The sepa
ratist tendencies grew in Finland to the extent that her faith dropped in the power
of revolutionary government and stability of freedom in Russia. And the Finnish
Sejm voted on its resolution under the direct influence of the disintegration of
the coalition government and the Petrograd [July] rebellion.
And if Russia, as we firmly believe, enters upon the road of strong revolu
tionary government, supported by all the creative forces of the nation, one of the
consequences of this victory of the revolution will be a different attitude of Fin
land toward Russia.

314. Rabochaia Gazeta o n t h e D is s o lu t i o n o f t h e S e jm

[No. 112, July 21, 1917, p. 1.]

This is a legal act from the point of view of the Government. It does not rec
ognize the complete autonomy of Finland. Rather, it considers itself the supreme
authority with respect to her and wishes to appeal to the population. But this is
an illegal act from the point of view of the Finnish people, who have just declared
their independence and consequently do not recognize the supreme authority
of the Russian Government.
We have always been at a loss to understand the speed and vigor with which
354 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

the majority of the Finnish Sejm, taking advantage of the difficult situation of
the Provisional Government and the critical foreign and domestic state of affairs
of the entire Russian democracy, moved in the direction of a rupture with the
Government of the revolution and almost toward a complete separation from
Russia.
The recent resolution of the Government arouses every bit as much bewilder
ment in us.
Is it possible that it expects to resolve or at least soften the present conflict
by appeals to the Finnish people and by announcing new elections?
On the contrary, the conflict may deepen, the new Sejm may grow even more
irreconcilable, and the revolutionary Government of Russia even less popular in
Finland.
If, however, by the dissolution of the Sejm the Government intended to dis
claim any responsibility for the final solution of the Finnish question, to postpone
it until the Constituent Assembly, the question arisesis it wise to aggravate the
legacy, grave as it is, that it will pass on to the Constituent Assembly? Is it wise
to deepen and sharpen the conflicts that the future Russian convention will have
to deal with?
We await with impatience and concern a full explanation of the motives that
guided the Government in the dissolution of the Sejm.

315. Izvestiia o n t h e D i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e F in n ish S e jm

[No. 123, July 21, 1917, p. 2.]

In complete unison with the Russian revolutionary democracy, the Govern

ment of the Russian revolution recognized, from the very first days of the revo
lution, the right of Finland to political self-determination. It restored all the
rights of Finland that were trampled by Russian Tsars; it eagerly promoted the
further expansion of these rights, and was willing to adopt any measures as long
as these did not conflict with the interests of the revolution, because the whole
future of both Russia and Finland depends equally on the outcome of the revo
lution.
But the leaders of the Finnish Sejm did not want to understand the sincerity
of the Provisional Governments stand, they did not want to entrust the future of
Finland to the Russian revolution, and they preferred to affirm the sovereign
rights of Finland by an independent course without stopping at an official rupture
with the Russian democracy.
When confronted with the fait accompli of a law that the Sejm passed on the
actual separation of Finland, the Provisional Government did not succumb to
the propagandists appeals of our bourgeois elements, which demanded the use
of armed force in compelling the Finns to alter their position.
The Government of the Russian Revolution, the banner of which carries the
slogan of the right of nations to self-determination, could not deny this right
to Finland.
But knowing the disastrous repercussions on the revolution that the policy
adopted by the Finnish Sejm would entail, the Government considered it necessary
to appeal to all the Finnish people, who must now decide for themselves whether
 THE NATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 355

or not they want to assist the Russian revolution, which was called upon to re
generate not only our native land but perhaps the whole world as well.
This may be the last time that the revolutionary democracy of Russia extends
its fraternal hand to the Finnish people.
And one wants to believe that this hand will find a similar fraternal greeting,
and that the leaders of the Finnish Sejm will find within themselves sufficient
political wisdom and devotion to the common cause of world democracy to refrain
from resorting to measures that may inflict long-lasting damage on the friendly
relations between the Russian and Finnish people.

316. Novaia Zhizn o n t h e D is s o lu t i o n o f t h e S e jm

[No. 80, July 21, 1917, p. 1.]

As yet we do not know how the Finns will react to the Manifesto of the
Provisional Government. Should the Sejm refuse to consider itself dissolved,
the Provisional Government would have to withdraw its Manifesto, which would
certainly not help to increase its authority. Or it would have to employ material
force, which would spell death to its democratic and socialist prestige alto
gether. But in the event the Finns agree to the re-election of the Sejm, this too
would not improve matters in any way. Because, considering the state of mind
in Finland, the present majority of the Sejm would no doubt be returned
strengthened and in an even more determined mood.
Thus nothing can be expected as a result of the dissolution of the Sejm but
the widening and deepening of the conflict with Finland. And the negative
reaction abroad to this bold measure of our firm authority will be even greater.
. . . The dissolution of the Sejm will be received as a new, heavy blow to the
new, reviving internationalism.
How can this lamentable divergence of the Provisional Government from its
own program be explained? Since the sincerity of Ministers Kerensky and Tsere-
telli cannot be doubted, there remains the supposition that in their haste to put
out the revolutionary fires, together with their diplomatic negotiations with
the vital forces of counterrevolutionary groups, the Ministers have little time
left to weigh the alternatives offered them and have unwittingly cut off the branch
on which they sat.

317. R e s o lu t io n o f t h e H e l s i n g f o r s O r g a n iz a tio n s D o m in a te d b y
R u ssia n M i l i t a r y a n d N a v a l P e r s o n n e l
[.Rech% No. 170, July 22, 1917, p. 3.]
July 21.The joint conference of the Helsingfors Soviet of
H e ls in g fo r s ,
Workers and Soldiers Deputies and the company, ships company, regiment, and
division committees ended at 12:00 oclock at night. Present at the conference
were: Governor General Stakhovich; the commander of the fleet; Tokoi, the Vice-
President of the Senate [the Governor General was nominally President]; and
Khuttunen, the leader of the Finnish Social Democratic Party. The Governor
General gave a lengthy report on the Finnish question. Tokoi and Khuttunen
defended the standpoint of the Finnish Social Democrats. The heated debates
resulted in the adoption of the following resolution:
356 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Having heard Citizen Stakhovichs announcement of the Manifesto on

the dissolution of the Sejm of the Government to Save the Revolution, and,
taking into consideration that in case of conflict it would be necessary to
resort to force of arms, which would undoubtedly produce the most grievous
repercussions within the country and, especially, outside of the Russian State, the
joint conference of the Helsingfors Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies,
the Regional [oblastnoi] Committee of Finland, the Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers Deputies, and the regiment, company, ships company, and
division committees of the Sveaborg region believe [that]:
1) Submission to decrees of the Russian revolutionary government as the
competent organ of the Russian revolutionary democracy, especially in the alarm
ing times of the present, is an unconditional duty of all Russian citizens.
2) The Finnish democracy has undoubtedly committed an error in carrying
out its autonomy without an agreement with the Russian revolutionary de
mocracy.
3) At the present time the natural way out of the situation that has de
veloped, a way out that would not violate the rights of either people, is to create
a special commission with the participation of an equal number of representatives
from the Finnish democracy and from the Central Committee of the Soviet of
Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies; this commission would undoubtedly
be able to settle the present conflict to the satisfaction of both sides.

318. S t a t e m e n t b t t h e C o u n c il o f t h e F in n is h S o c ia l D e m o c r a t ic
P a r t y and t h e S o c i a l D e m o c r a t ic F a c t io n in t h e S e jm
[Rech\ No. 178, August 1, 1917, p. 3; Dimanshtein, p. 214.]
1. The dissolution of the Sejm is illegal and the Russian Government is not
entitled to the right of interference in Finnish affairs in matters other than those
enumerated in the law adopted by the Sejm on the exercise of the supreme power
in Finland.
2. The Social Democratic Party is to begin preparatory work on the elections
to the Sejm, in the event that these elections take place on October 1 and 2 [N.S.],
However, taking into consideration the fact that these elections are not scheduled
lawfully, we cannot expect that the Sejm, elected in this fashion, will confine
itself on all questions to legislative decisions.
On the contrary, the Party proposes to its electors to grant plenary powers
to the Sejm, which will be elected by means of these revolutionary elections. In
accordance with these powers the Sejm will have the right, should it recognize
that basic interests demand it, to make decisions on fundamental laws and taxes
by a simple majority vote, and in general to act as a plenipotentiary national
assembly that issues the basic laws of Finland.
Inasmuch as it has come to the knowledge of the Council of the Party that,
following the present brief recess, it is proposed again to continue the work of
the Sejm for a lawful regulation of financial and other questions of vital impor
tance to the people, the Council of the Party deems this action entirely correct
and in keeping with the wishes of the wide masses of the population.
Inasmuch as the solution to the question of Senate membership is within the
scope of the Sejm, it seems natural, in the opinion of the Council of the Party,
that members of the Party do not leave the Senate during the work of the Sejm.
 THE N ATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 357

319. D e m a n d s S u b m it t e d b y t h e H e l s in g f o r s S t r ik e C o m m i t t e e
to G o v er n o r G e n e r a l S t a k h o v ic h
[ D im a n s h t e in , p . 2 1 5 .]
1. That the Finnish Sejm convene as soon as possible . - .
2. That the Russian Provisional Government, the Finnish Governor General,
the troops stationed in Finland, and other authorities should not deliberately
hinder the immediate convocation and the work of the Sejm.
3. That the Finnish Sejm organize the administration of our country in the
manner prescribed by the law [of the Sejm], published on July 18 [N.S.], On
the exercise of the Supreme Power in Finland, in order to achieve the most
expedient course in its creative work of rescuing the people from disaster and
assuring their future welfare, also to implement the results of its work.
4. That the Russian Provisional Government recognize this law passed ac
cording to the Finnish national law and permit the administration of Finnish
affairs on the basis of this law.

320. D e c is io n o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t E m p o w e r in g t h e G o v e r n o r
G eneral to T ak e F o r c e fu l M easu res If N ecessa ry
to M a in ta in O r d e r
[Reck%No. 182, A u g u s t 5 , 1917, p. 3; D i m a n s h t e i n , pp. 69-70.]
Having heard the report of M. A. Stakhovich, Governor General of Finland,
and bearing in mind that intense propaganda is being conducted in favor of an
illegal convocation of the Sejm, the Provisional Government has authorized the
Governor General of Finland to prevent, in every possible way, [any] open dis
regard of Russias interests, or [any] breach of peace and order in the state, and,
if necessary, to stop at nothing to restore the same. Similarly, no strikes must be
permitted that may affect or undermine the military interests of Russia should
the movement of trains and military supplies be stopped, or should the border
land [okraina] be reduced to [a state of] national disaster.
It must be explained to the Finnish masses that the dissolution of the Sejm
is not some kind of counterrevolutionary act on the part of the Provisional Gov
ernment, but a legitimate way of re-establishing the law, which was violated by
the dissolved Sejm.

321. R u s s ia n P r e s s R e a c t io n t o t h e F in n is h G e n e r a l S t r ik e a n d
th e A tt e m pt to R eco nv ene t h e S e jm
[Den9, No. 126, August 3, 1917, p. 1. Similar opinions were expressed in Russkiia
Vedomosti, No. 182, August 10, 1917, p. 1; Izvestiia, No. 142, August 12, 1917, p. 2;
and Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 126, August 6, 1917, p. 2.]
The Finnish Social Democrats have brought their unintelligent and dangerous
game up to the most critical moment. At one time it seemed that they had gained
control of themselves and realized the blunders they had committed. The Sejm
had dissolved itself peacefully and had only declined to publish the ukase of its
dissolution as a demonstration. But the ukase was later on published in a legal
form by the Senate. Thus everything returned to normal and Finland could
calmly begin preparations for new elections.
But instead of lawfully appealing to the people, the Finnish Socialists have
358 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

suggested appealing to the rebellious instincts of the ignorant mob. They called
on the workers [to start] a general strike, while the city mobs were solving the
food question by attacking the warehouses and compelling the Minister of Food,
who is a member of the Social Democratic Party, to retire.
While creating chaos, the Finnish Social Democrats do not try to appreciate
its possible consequences and do not ponder the question of whether they would
remain the masters of this senseless movement which they have called to life and
from which they can themselves perish.
In comparison with the general strike, the other venture of the Finnish
Socialiststhat is, the calling of the Sejm dissolved by the Governmentis but
a miserable sham. The authors of the sham wish thereby to demonstrate the
unlawfulness of the dissolution and to repeat the historic gesture of Mirabeau:
We will yield only to the force of bayonets. But historical gestures are not made
on a deferred basis. They do not suffer delays. Sometimes one does not yield to
bayonets, but when one yields, then it is ridiculous to return after a certain period
of meditation in order to take a heroic pose.
The deputies of the Sejm may provoke the use of bayonets, but because of that
their gesture will not become historical and will not create for them heroic fame.
To speak of the unlawfulness of the dissolution would be absolutely out of the
question. The partisans of such views have attempted to advance some kind of
juridical arguments, but the latter proved unable to hold up under any criticism.
If the President of the Sejm kept silent about the ukase of the dissolution and
declared the postponement of the meetings without making it public, he did not
thereby destroy the validity of the ukase. According to the bylaws of the Finnish
Sejm, it is not at all required that the ukase of dissolution be made public during
the session of the Sejm. The ukase should be merely published according to the
general procedure required for the publication of laws. And this order in this
case has been observed: the Senate has made public the ukase under the form
prescribed by the bylaws of the Sejm. After this, the Sejm ceased to exist and a
meeting of the deputies would be a private conference.
A similar conference, namely, the Vyborg Conference of the First State Duma
[in 1906, following its dissolution by the Tsar], took place on Finnish territory.
Maybe its example has inspired the Finnish deputies. But [the deputies] were
elected by the Russian people in order to protest against Tsarist despotism.
Against whom do the Finnish Socialists intend to protest? Against the most
democratic government on earth? Against the desire of the Russian people to
define its attitude toward Finland at the Constituent Assembly, which would be
as universal as the Finnish Sejm?
If, in the last minute, the Finnish Socialists do not realize the absurdity of the
campaign they have undertaken against the Russian democracy, then the Russian
Government will find the means to compel them to respect its will. But we hope
that these thoughtless politicians will stop and will not reach the fateful line.

322. R e s o lu t io n o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e o f t h e R e g io n a l (O b la s t ) C o m m itte e
o f t h e A rm y , F l e e t , an d F in n is h W o r k e r s , t h e E x e c u tiv e C o m m itte e
o f t h e H e l s i n g f o r s S o v i e t o f D e p u tie s , A ll- F i n n is h C o m m itte e o f
t h e S o v ie t o f P e a s a n t s D e p u tie s , a n d t h e G a rr iso n C o m m itte e
[Dimanshtein, p. 216. The vote for this Resolution was 50 to 32. The Bolshevik and
left Socialist-Revolutionary representatives left the Conference.]
 THE N ATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 359

Having heard the debates on the Finnish question, the conference resolved:
to send a delegation from the present conference to the Finnish S. D. Party with
the request to insist, in the interests of maintaining unity of action in the future
between the Finnish and Russian democracies, that the Sejm not convene on
August 16, the date of convening of the Sejm to be left to the decision of the joint
commission of representatives from the Finnish and Russian revolutionary de
mocracies, which will assemble in Petrograd following the Moscow Conference;
to consider the decision of this commission obligatory for all organs of both the
Finnish and the Russian revolutionary democracies. In order to maintain order,
on August 16 to form a committee composed of representatives of the army, fleet,
and workers, with two invited representatives from the Finnish S. D. Party. But
if, in spite of the measures taken, no agreement with regard to the postponement
of the Sejm is reached, the decision of the Provisional Government goes into legal
effect.

323. T h e A t t e m p t t o R e c o n v e n e t h e S e jm
[Izvestiia, No. 146, August 17, 1917, p. 3.]
Late at night we were informed that the attempt to convoke the Sejm had
evidently suffered final collapse.
The session of the Sejm took place, but out of the 200 members of the Sejm,
of whom 102 are Social Democrats, only 79 persons attended the session. The
very first voting on recognizing the Sejm as having legally convened revealed a
complete split even among this insignificant group. Forty-four deputies voted in
favor [and] 35 against [this motion].
It was known earlier that the bourgeois parties have refused to participate,
but the fact that the Social Democrats did not succeed in uniting [their forces]
probably came as a surprise to the President himself.
The session took place in the old building . . . of the Sejm.
There was no disruption of order throughout the day in Helsingfors. . . .

324. A R e s c r ip t o f t h e P r o v is i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t E x te n d in g t h e
J u r is d ic tio n o f t h e F in n is h S e n a t e
[Volia Naroda, No. 108, September 2, 1917, p. 4. RusskUa Vedomosti, No. 203, Sep
tember 5, 1917, p. 4, reported that Kerensky received a delegation from the Finnish
Senate on September 2, which expressed its gratitude for the Rescript and its belief
that the Rescript would greatly improve the relations between Russia and Finland.]
By its Manifesto of July 18, 1917, the Provisional Government announced
that a proposal would be submitted to Finlands Sejm, which is to be elected on
October 1 and 2, on the procedure [to be followed] in arriving at decisions con
cerning Finlands internal affairs. Thinking it desirable, however, to expedite
decisions on these matters, in so far as administrative legislation permits, the
Provisional Government agreed that it would be beneficial to promulgate the fol
lowing law on transferring some matters for decision to the Finnish Senate:
1. In addition to matters that were enumerated in the law on the establish
ment of the Senate, dated September 13, 1892, and the law of July 23, 1896, on
granting the Senate the right of final decision in some matters, the Economic De
partment of the Senate, which has charge of the entire administration of Finland,
360 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

has the right, with the exceptions stated below, of finally determining and passing
decision on other matters that formerly were decided upon personally by the
Emperor and the Grand Duke without the participation of Finlands Sejm.
2. On the basis of the fundamental laws of Finland and other laws imple
mented with the participation of the Sejm, and on the basis of other considera
tions, the following cases, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, are to be
excepted:
a. The convening, postponing, closing, or dissolution of the Sejm; the sched
uling of new elections; the submission of proposals and other projects to the
Sejm; the consideration and approval of those decisions by the Sejm which, in
order to be implemented, require the approval of superior authority.
b. The consideration and approval of the Treasurys budget.
c. Pardons, in so far as, by way of exception, they have not been within the
jurisdiction of the Senate.
d. The appointment of Finlands Governor General and his assistant; the
Minister State Secretary and his Deputy; the Vice-President, members and Proc
urator of the Senate, as well as the staff of the Chancellery of the Governor General.
e. The settlement of matters bearing on mutual legal relations between Russia
and Finland, or matters related to them, or matters dealing with relations between
Russian citizens and Finlands institutions. In all these matters, laws that were
in effect up to this date remain in force.
3. In accordance with the present law, the decision of the Senate on all matters
is subject to final approval by the Governor General if he is not present at the
time they are considered by the Senate. Should the Governor General disagree
with the opinion of the majority of the Senate, or should the Governor General
deem it necessary to do so because of the gravity of the matter, the case must be
transmitted for consideration to the supreme government authority.
The Provisional Government reaffirms its firm will, announced in the Mani
festo of July 18, 1917, to submit to the Sejm the proposal about the procedure in
deciding the internal affairs of Finland. A preliminary discussion of such a
proposal has already begun.
K e r e n s k t , Minister-President
Countersigned: K . E n c k e l l , State Secretary
August 30, 1917

325. A n I n t e r v ie w w i t h N . V. N e k r a s o v , N e w l y A p p o in te d
G o v e r n o r G e n e r a l o f F in la n d
[Rech\ No. 215, September 13,1917, p. 3.]
N. V. Nekrasov, the new Governor General of Finland, stated the following
during an interview with press correspondents:
My program with respect to Finland is determined by the fact that I was a
member of every composition of the Provisional Government and, consequently,
I was in full agreement with its entire policy toward Finland. This circumstance
has already been noted by the Finnish press.
The Finnish policy of the Provisional Government is one of the few spheres
of its activity that met with general sympathy. This policy is characterized by a
firm and consistent line of upholding the rights of Russia with unimpeachable
good will toward the interests and rights of Finland.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 361

On leaving now for Helsingfors, I see that my actions as Governor General

find support not only in the policy of the Provisional Government but also in the
attitudes of vast public circles. The only dissonant [voice] in the publics attitude
on the Finnish question was the well-known resolution of the All-Russian Congress
of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which gave rise to highly regret
table misunderstandings, because the political and legal terminology it contained
was given too literal an interpretation by certain Finnish circles. However, we
have every reason to believe that this resolution, which was adopted in a hurry,
does not reflect the opinions of those democratic circles in the name of which it
was approved.

326. A n o t h e r A t t e m p t o f t h e S e jm t o C o n v e n e

[Rech\ No. 215, September 13, 1917, p. 3. Nekrasov forbade the meeting of the dis
solved Sejm and ordered the doors of the building sealed. The President and some
80 Social Democratic members broke the seals and sat for almost two hours passing
several controversial acts, including one making the Senate responsible to the Sejm.]
The Provisional Government is informed by an announcement published in
Finnish newspapers on September 10 that the President of the Finnish Sejm is
convening the Sejm at 12:00 noon, September 28 (15).
The September 10 issue of Toumies, the official organ of the Finnish Social
Democratic Party, published an article entided The Finnish Sejm Will Convene,
which defined the tasks of the Sejm: to introduce a law on village administration,
to regulate the questions of food, unemployment, the eight-hour working day,
and so forth.
The Finnish Social Democrats addressed an extensive appeal to the repre
sentatives of the socialist parties in Russia asking for their support.
N. V. Nekrasov, the Governor General of Finland, visited Minister-President
A. F. Kerensky in the evening of September 12 and had a discussion with him
on the situation in Finland and, in particular, on the contemplated unauthorized
convocation of the Sejm. In the course of this discussion it was learned that the
Minister-President fully supports the program announced to press representatives
on September 12 by the new Governor General of Finland.
The convocation of the Sejm on September 15 is considered in government
circles to be completely inadmissible and illegal. Now, as before, the Provisional
Government adheres to the view that the convocation of the Sejm must not be
permitted, even should this require resort to drastic measures.
The government circles, incidentally, reacted extremely negatively to the dis
patch to Finland by organs of the revolutionary democracy of persons such as
A. V. Lunacharskii, V. M. Chernov, and Pozern, a Bolshevik from Minsk. There
are misgivings in government circles that this deputation will worsen, rather than
improve, Russo-Finnish relations.

327. U k a s e f o r t h e C o n v o c a tio n o f t h e S e jm o n N o v e m b e r 1
(O c to ber 1 9 )

[VVP, No. 166, October 1,1917, p. 1. In the elections held on September 18-19, the
Social Democrats received 92 seats, as opposed to 103 in the previous Sejm, giving the
nonsocialists a majority.]
362 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Granted in the town of Petrograd on September 30 (October 13), 1917.

The Provisional Government announces to all citizens of Finland that, in ac
cordance with the Code of Sejm Regulations of July 7 (20), 1906, it has deemed
it advisable to enjoin the Sejm to meet in the town of Helsingfors for [its] regular
session on November 1 (October 19), 1917, and therefore, all persons elected as
Sejm deputies are to arrive in Helsingfors on the given date for the discharge of
their duties in accordance with the Code of Sejm Regulations.
A . K o n o v a lo v , Deputy Minister-President
[and other ministers]
Countersigned: K. E n c k e l l , Minister
State Secretary for Finland

328. A Sum m ary o f t h e D r a f t L a w o n t h e F o r m o f G o v e r n m e n t in

F in la n d P r o p o se d b y t h e J u r id ic a l C o m m issio n o f
t h e F in n is h S e n a t e
[Dimanshtein, p. 219. All dates are New Style.]
Finland is a republic. The legislative power is exercised by the Sejm, together
with the president of the republic. The supreme executive power is vested in the
president in collaboration with the council of ministers. The president is elected
by national voting, by means of direct elections, for a period of six years. Elec
tions are conducted on the 15th and 16th of January, and in the event they are
inconclusive, the re-election takes place on February 15 and 16. The president
takes office on April 15.
The president every year calls the regular Sejm and, in case of necessity, an
extraordinary Sejm. He schedules new elections and opens and closes the sessions
of the Sejm.
In peacetime the president is commander in chief of Finlands armed forces.
Questions bearing upon the relations with the Russian government are de
cided by the president in agreement with the council of ministers. Members of
the council of ministers are appointed by the president.
Members of the council of ministers are responsible to the Sejm: all conjointly
for the general direction of administration and each individually for his official
decisions.
The attorney general who participates in the council of ministers is obliged
to see that the legality of action is observed not only by the ministers but by the
president as well. If the attorney general or the council of ministers finds that
the president is guilty of a crime against the supreme power, or is guilty of state
treason, the case must be reported to the Sejm, and, in the event the decision of
the Sejm by a majority of three-quarters of the votes cast is in favor of making
the president responsible, the attorney general brings the case to the supreme
court, and the president is released from his post pending the decision of the court.
In order to defend the country, every Finnish citizen is a reservist.
The procedure for military service in the army and military institutions is
established in a special law. The president announces the mobilization of the
Finnish troops in agreement with the council of ministers.
The present form of government is the fundamental law. This law invalidates:
the Form of Government of August 21, 1772, the Act of Union and Safety of
 THE N ATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 363

February 21 and April 3, 1789, as well as all instructions of new laws and regu
lations that contradict the present new form of government.

329. Su m m ary o f t h e D r a f t L a w o n t h e L e g a l R e l a t i o n s B e t w e e n
R u ssia an d F in la n d , S u b m itte d b y t h e J u r id ic a l C o m m issio n
o f t h e F in n ish S e n a t e
[ D im a n s h t e in , p . 2 2 0 .]

It is pointed out in the introduction to the draft law that it is prompted by the
urgent need to cement, by means of a special law obligatory to Russia and Fin
land, the mutual legal relations of both countries for the good and satisfaction
of their united peoples. And on adoption of said law in the same form by the
Russian national Constituent Assembly and the Sejm of Finland, it should be fol
lowed as an inviolable fundamental law.
The draft law establishes that, irrespective of the introduction of a new form
of government, Finland remains united with Russia but has its own constitution
and government independent of the legislative and government power of Russia.
The questions of war and peace . . . , which are equally obligatory to both sides,
are treated in accordance with the basic laws of Russia.
Treaties with foreign powers, besides questions of war and peace, are con
cluded by the government of Russia, unless the right to conclude such treaties is
granted to the government of Finland by Russia.
Russian troops enjoy in Finland equal rights with Finnish troops with respect
to billeting, transport, and requisition of vessels and horses in accordance with
the Finnish laws and with the assistance from the Finnish authorities.
As long as Russia deems it necessary to maintain its own telegraph in Finland,
the telegraph is administered according to the rules published by the Russian
government. But the presence of the Russian telegraph constitutes no obstacle
to the development of the network of the Finnish railway and telegraph or the
establishment of new Finnish telegraph lines.
The Russian Ministry of Finance is not prohibited from maintaining offices
in Finland for the monetary operations of the Russian treasury, and the Russian
State Bank is not prohibited from maintaining offices for the conduct, in accord
ance with the statute of the bank, of banking operations that are not in contra
diction to the laws of Finland.
The procedure for military service of Finnish citizens, on the basis of uni
versal military service, as well as the statute on Finnish troops, is established by
Finnish legislation. Moreover, army officers and civilian functionaries must be
Finnish citizens.
In wartime these troops are under the general command of Russian troops.
The erection of new fortresses and the building of military ports require the per
mission of the Russian government.
The purpose of the armed forces of Finland is to defend the country and thus
assist in the defense of the Russian State.
The courts, management, administration, and, in general, public authority are
exercised in accordance with the constitution and the law of this country by the
Finnish authorities.
Finlands territory remains as of the present time and her frontiers cannot be
changed without the consent of the Sejm.
364 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Wherever it deems it necessary, the government of Finland may have its own
trade agents abroad.
The Orthodox Church in Finland obeys its own ecclesiastical administration
on matters of ecclesiastical affairs.
In wartime Russia has the right to maintain in Finland the necessary num
ber of troops and to undertake necessary military measures. In peacetime,
prior to the formation of Finnish troops, Russia may keep troops in garrisons
in fortresses and military ports, but after that, only Finnish troops may be sta
tioned in Finland.
Finland is obligated to maintain her troops in such number that expenditure
for them in peacetime amounts to 10 marks per inhabitant of the country.
The Russian government has the right to issue enactments on the inspection
of Finnish troops and to make suggestions to the Finnish government as a result
of inspections, also to demand the placing of these troops on a war footing.
For purposes of trade and navigation the Russian government may have its
agents in various places in Finland, and the Finnish government in Russia.
Provision is made for the extradition of criminal offenders.
Recommendations and communications of the Russian to the Finnish govern
ment are transmitted through the highest representative of Russia in Finland or
through the Minister State Secretary for Finland. Transmission of recommen
dations of the Finnish government to the Russian is conducted in the same way.
Should differences of opinion arise between Russia and Finland about the
exact interpretation of the provisions of the present law, the question is trans
mitted to the reconciling commission to which the governments of both sides
appoint three members each. If no agreement is reached by this means, the dispute
is transferred to the decision of the International Court of Arbitration in The
Hague, which will also pass on whether or not the said dispute is within its
jurisdiction.
The present law in all respects is regarded as an inviolable fundamental law
which cannot be changed or repealed in any other way but in accordance with
the resolutions of the organs of legislative authority of both sides according to
the procedure established for fundamental laws.

330. R e c o r d o f t h e S e ss io n s o f O c t o b e r 13 a n d 17,1917, o f t h e
J u r id ic a l C o u n c il o f t h e P r o v is i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t
[Iz istorii natsionalnoi politiki Vremennogo Pravitelstva, KA, XXX (1928), 56-71.]

No. 117, October 13

Projects transmitted by the Finnish Senate regarding the legal relations of
Russia and Finland and the new form of government were under discussion.
Following the opening of the session, the Chairman of the Council gave an
account of the history of the discussions concerning the bills in question and
pointed out that the projects under discussion had been amended by the Finnish
Senate, on the basis of deliberations that took place at the joint conference of the
members of the Juridical Council and the members of the Commission on Funda
mental Laws created by the Finnish Senate. Now the Juridical Council has to
give its final decision on the aforementioned projects. At the same time, N. I.
 THE N ATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 365

Lazarevskii proposed that the Council hear the considerations of the Governor
General of Finland on the internal situation of the country and the relationship
between the local political parties.
The Governor General of Finland stated that in Finland on November 1, N.S.,
the newly elected Finnish Sejm would be opened. The first two days will be
devoted to preliminary activities, but by the third day, i.e., November 3, or Oc
tober 21 old style, the projects under study will have to be introduced in the Sejm.
Moreover, N. V. Nekrasov noted that the Sejm would contain a very strong and
disciplined group of 92 socialists, all of whom stood for the complete independ
ence of Finland. At the same time, neither in the country nor among the bourgeois
parties are more moderate tendencies noticeable. Not more than 40 Old Finns
would declare themselves for the preservation of ties between Russia and Finland.
The Young Finns and the Swedes also stand for independence. However, at the
same time, the distribution of the parties in the Sejm is such that it would be
unable to enact any kind of measures relating to fundamental legislation, since,
according to the Sejm Statute, a majority of two-thirds is required to decide such
questions. And with the party grouping in the Sejm, such a majority cannot be
expected. The Finnish politicians have already found a way out of this situation;
they intend to avail themselves of 38 of the Form of Government, which, in case
of cessation of the dynasty, prescribes the convocation within 100 days of govern
ment officials who would acquire constituent powers.
For a constituent Sejm the Sejm Statute does not apply, and, as a consequence,
an amendment of the fundamental legislation may be carried out by a majority
smaller than two-thirds of the members.
Turning to the eventual membership of the Senate, the Governor General o
Finland stated that the membership as it exists now was accused of cringing before
Russia, as manifested by its making public the Provisional Government Mani
festo dissolving the Sejm. In view of this, there is no reason to expect that it
would be possible to preserve the Senate membership as it now exists. At the
same time, it cannot be expected that it would be formed again of bourgeois ele
ments. There is in Finland a definite attitude of hostility against the bourgeoisie,
and, therefore, the socialists and the radicals who join them in the Sejm will most
probably make every effort to have a Senate willing to adopt an aggressive line
toward the Provisional Government and the bourgeoisie. It follows that there
exists no possibility of forming a working Senate. In the opinion of the Gov
ernor General of Finland, under the circumstances it would be to the better
advantage of the Russian Government to conclude an alliance with the socialists
and at the same time to attempt to postpone the issue on the mutual rights of
Russia and Finland until a more favorable time. Moreover, such an attempt might
be facilitated by the line of behavior of the radical and socialist circles, which
take into due consideration the stationing of considerable Russian armed forces
in Finland and do not consider that, under such circumstances, it is possible to
put the question of Finlands separation from Russia in a sharp manner.
In the meantime, the internal situation in Finland is such that the Russian
Government ought to abandon its passive attitude and propose definite projects
to the Sejm. However, the introduction in the Sejm of the bills under discussion
[in the Juridical Council] would unavoidably provoke a conflict with the Finnish
people. In the opinion of the Governor General of Finland, this circumstance
also should induce [us] to defer for as long as possible the discussion of these
366 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

bills, all the more because N. V. Nekrasov is urging the Government to replace the
unreliable troops in Finland and to unify the High Command of the territory.
On the other hand, the Governor General of Finland believes that an open rebel
lion is not likely in Finland, but that the conflict would take the course of passive
resistance, so dear to the heart of the Finns. The Senate would not obey the orders
of the Russian Government and would execute the will of the Sejm. Nevertheless,
under the present circumstances, such passive resistance would represent a rather
serious danger to Russian interests. Therefore, in the opinion of the Governor
General of Finland, some sort of compromise should be found which, while giving
satisfaction to the Finns would, at the same time, give certain advantages to us
also; at this point the Finnish Governor General added that the bourgeois parties
of Finland are also unwilling to start a conflict, and it has been ascertained through
negotiations that they are prepared to make some sort of agreement. It was pre
cisely the bourgeois parties that suggested that the Russian Government should
transfer by way of a grant the plenitude of power in the internal affairs of Finland
to a person elected by the Sejm, while leaving, as before, military and interna
tional matters in the hands of the Russian Government. Such a grant should be
a unilateral act on the part of the Provisional Government. While having no
objections to the substance of such a measure, the Governor General of Finland
nevertheless pointed out that such a grant would bind only Russia, while Finland
would remain, as heretofore, free from any obligations. On the other hand, it
would be advisable that the plenitude of power be transmitted to the Finnish
person chosen by the Sejm, with precise reservations to the effect that such a grant
would be operative only until the Constituent Assembly takes another decision
on the matter and provided that the Finns engage themselves to acknowledge
Russias plenitude of power in respect of military and international affairs.
Therefore, in the opinion of N. V. Nekrasov, it would seem preferable to pass
through the Sejm the aforesaid suggestions of the Finnish bourgeois parties. It
is true that there is very little hope [that they would be passed], but it might be
possible to act by presenting to the Finns a sort of ultimatum: if the Sejm con
siders it possible to approve the aforementioned suggestion, Russia would agree
to maintain peaceful relations with Finland; if not, Russia would act in Finland
according to the laws of war. Also the tendencies that may be observed among
the socialist parties are to a certain degree in conformity with the suggestions of
the bourgeois parties. These parties would consent to forget the act of July 18,
1917 [N.S.], approved by the Sejm unilaterally, and, at the same time, would
leave to the Russian Government the right to maintain the status quo until the
end of the war. Furthermore, if all hope of the Sejm approving the proposal of
the bourgeois parties were to be lost, the Governor General of Finland considered
it possible to agree to a unilateral act on the part of the Russian Government
granting the plenitude of power to the person chosen by the Sejm, provided that,
before the publication of such an act, the political parties of Finland would agree
to sign a special protocol expressing their willingness to recognize the rights of
Russia in the sphere of so-called general affairs.

N. I. Lazarevskii, Chairman of the Juridical Council, directed the attention of

the council to the extreme importance of the bilateral pledge in the act proposed
for publication, because of the impossibility of taking back anything that would
be conceded to Finland, which would remain in their hands forever. Therefore,
 THE N ATIO N ALITIES PROBLEM 367

the Chairman of the Juridical Council believed that in order to avoid unfavorable
consequences for Russia, some kind of guarantee should be obtained from the
Finns.

Baron B. E. Nolde, member of the Juridical Council, thought . . . it neces

sary to defer somewhat the final solution of the controversial issues with Finland.
In his opinion, it would be wiser to follow the course outlined by the bourgeois
parties. This course might postpone the fundamental issue of the legal relations
between Russia and Finland until the end of the war, when, beyond any doubt,
the international situation would be favorable to Russia.
The Governor General of Finland explained that, among other things, the
Finns believe that at the international [peace] conference their demands will be
supported by France and England. They were convinced of it especially after
the passage through Helsingfors of Weill, a representative of Alsace, who came
there with some kind of mission from [Albert] Thomas.
The Chairman of the Juridical Council believed that the best and most expe
dient solution of the issue raised by the Governor General of Finland would be
to introduce into the Sejm a bill corresponding to the measure suggested by the
bourgeois parties of Finland; the acceptance of such a bill would be sufficiently
binding for Finland in her relations with Russia, whereas the protocol suggested
by the Governor General of Finland would in effect bind no one.

No. 120, October 17

After the opening of the session, N. I. Lazarevskii, Chairman, proposed that
the Council hear the explanation of the Governor General of Finland concerning
the political situation in Finland.
The Governor General of Finland noted that the political situation in Finland
has become quite clear. It is clear that the Finns have decided to stop at nothing;
this will be expressed by the refusal to examine the proposals, which were to be
introduced into the Sejm on behalf of the Provisional Government. It is true
that the moderate parties make every effort to soften the conflict, but their efforts
bring no results, as the manifesto dissolving the Sejm has created a definitely
hostile attitude toward Russia among the population. . . .

Turning to the bills under discussion, the Governor General of Finland stated
that he is unable to affirm positively that the respective proposals would be heard
by the Sejm. On the other hand, a refusal to hear these proposals would mean
an open rupture between Finland and Russia. At the same time the Governor
General of Finland believed that the political situation suggests that the Russian
Government protract as long as possible the matter of giving a final solution on
the mutual legal relationship between Russia and Finland. For these reasons
N. V- Nekrasov considered it possible to urge the approval of his original sug
gestions. In his estimation, the best solution would be the publication, in the form
of a manifesto from the Provisional Government, of a special unilateral act con
cerning the exercise of supreme power in Finland. This act should state unequivo
cally that it is being published [to remain in force] until another decision is
made on the subject by the Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, it should contain
368 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

the following stipulations. The exercise of the Finnish legislative and executive
authority is vested in the President of the Finnish Senate, and in the legislative
realm he exercises this authority together with the Sejm, while in the executive
realm he exercises it together with the Senate. To the President of the Senate
belongs the initiative in all legislative matters, excepting the form of government
and the mutual legal relationship between Russia and Finland. The President of
the Senate possesses the right to pardon, the right to convene and to dissolve the
Sejm, the right to appoint all the officials in Finland, and so forth. However, at
the same time, the right of dissolving the Sejm is retained also by the Provisional
Government. Likewise, until the end of the war, Finland does not possess the
right to have its troops returned [to its control], while the conduct of inter
national relations remains, as heretofore, in the hands of Russia. The Russian
Governor General is relieved from the presidency of the Senate, but retains the
administration of the Russian institutions in Finland; the Orthodox Church
retains its independence of the Finnish authorities.
While explaining the contents of the bill drawn by him, the Governor General
of Finland noted at the same time that he fully realized the discrepancies between
the manner of its publication and the Finnish law; he believed that prior to its
publication it should be insisted that all the political parties of Finland sign a
special protocol [stipulating] that this act, although published in violation of
the Finnish constitution as a unilateral manifesto of the Provisional Government,
would be recognized by them. . . .
Baron B. E. NoPde, member of the Juridical Council, declared that he did not
understand how a unilateral act of the Russian Government could be binding for
the Sejm. In his opinion, it would be more expedient to leave all the initiative
to the Finns themselves. It should not be forgotten that a unilateral act does not
have any legal significance. Therefore, in the opinion of Baron B. E. Nolde, it
was necessary that the Russian Government should obtain from the Sejm clear-cut
guarantees; in order that the act, which the Governor General of Finland pro
posed to publish, be officially equivalent to a law, the Sejm should confirm
through its own law [those rights] that Russia through this act retains for itself.
On the other hand, the other solution proposed by the Governor General of Fin
land, of sanctioning the act of July 18, 1917 [N.S.], was quite unacceptable on
moral grounds. In the opinion of Baron B. E. Nolde, it would be far more expe
dient to deal with the bourgeois than with the socialist parties, because from a
political standpoint the latter were utterly unreliable, being composed exclusively
of ignorant people. Therefore, Baron B. E. Nolde considered it more expedient
to publish a special act transferring the plenitude of power to the Finnish organs,
provided, however, that within the Sejm the political parties were bound by an
engagement to recognize such an act. Let them conclude this agreement in any
manner they find possible, but it is essential that Russia insist that this agreement
have a compulsory legal force in Finland. On the other hand, Baron B. E. Nolde
believed it possible to leave to the head of the Finnish executive authority the
exclusive right of dissolving the Sejm, since this measure related exclusively to
the internal affairs of Finland. For Russia it was essential to retain the decisions
on general matters, the right of control, and the regulation of the rights of Russian
citizens. Therefore, Baron B. E. Nolde believed that the most important issue
was precisely the issue of the agreement which would be binding not only for
Russia but also for Finland; such an agreement could be realized by leaving the
initiative to Finnish legislation.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 369

D. D. Grimm, member of the Juridical Council, stated that the project of the
Governor General of Finland actually altered all the existing structure, and at the
same time transformed the rights of Russia into something nominal and precari
ous, which was a great danger. The vital interests of Russia were set in the project
as the items of a bargain between Russia and Finland, with the bargain depending
essentially on the good will of the latter. As may be concluded from the explana
tions of the Governor General of Finland, his project took shape only because,
standing on the ground of the Sejm Statute, the Finns found it difficult to form a
majority required for approving the regulations that would amend the funda
mental laws of the land. However, in the opinion of D. D. Grimm., this circum
stance was all in favor of Russia, and the Provisional Government should not
lose the opportunity it presented. Russia must tell Finland that, on the one hand,
the Provisional Government cannot predetermine the will of the Constituent
Assembly, and, on the other hand, it cannot alleviate the internal situation of
Finland through a violation of the Finnish constitution. D. D. Grimm acknowl
edged that the situation of the Finns was very complicated, but there was no sense
in Russia improving this situation by means of concessions which anyway it
would be quite impossible to retract. Therefore, D. D. Grimm considered that
it would be more expedient to face a conflict with Finland. If, as a result of the
actual correlation of forces, Finland seized the whole plenitude of power, it would
represent only seizure de facto, which would not be binding for anybody. If
Russia were to collapse, the Finnish question would [lose] all significance in the
general destruction; if, on the contrary, Russia were to succeed in saving herself,
then the de facto seizure by the Finns could be liquidated and normal relations
with this borderland could be re-established. The Finns realize this situation
perfectly well. Therefore, the Russian statesmen should leave the Finns to do
whatever they like, with the reservation that Russia does not recognize any de facto
seizures. D. D. Grimm pointed out, at the same time, that economic conditions
in Finland were a powerful trump in the hands of Russia. In case of the slightest
rebellion in Finland, Russia might stop supplying this country with consumer
goods and thereby compel the Finns to submission. Therefore, D. D. Grimm
believed that everything should remain as heretofore. In accordance with the
promises contained in the acts and manifestoes of the Provisional Government,
Russia should introduce into the Sejm proposals regarding the legal relationship
between Russia and Finland, and proposals regarding the new form of govern
ment, with stipulations containing everything she deems necessary for the safe
guarding of her own interests. Thereafter let Finland do with these proposals
whatever she pleases.

N. I. Lazarevskii, Chairman of the Juridical Council, noted that two points of

view had been expressed at the Juridical Council. According to the first, sup
ported by Baron B. E. Nolde, certain concessions should be made with regard to
Finland and a certain compromise should be established with the Finnish politi
cians. This point of view had been justified by the consideration that a compro
mise concluded with the Finns may protect Russia from a rebellion in Finland.
But, on the other hand, such a compromise would, in its essence, predetermine
the decision of the Constituent Assembly. On the contrary, according to the
second point of view, expressed by M. S. Adzhemov and D. D. Grimm, Russia,
should not give way to a compromise on the grounds of expediency. This point
370 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

of view, while it did not predetermine the decision of the Constituent Assembly,
seemed at the same time to correspond better to the interests of Russia. The
Chairman of the Juridical Council noted that an approval of the proposal of the
Governor General of Finland would actually [also] predetermine the question of
the extent of autonomy of the other borderlands of Russia, because, on the basis
of the Finnish policy of the Provisional Government, these other borderlands
would demand for themselves the rights granted by the Provisional Government
to Finland.7

THE UKRAINE

331. T elegram s fr o m the U k r a in ia n C e n t r a l R ada to P r in c e L v o v and

K e r e n s k y , M a r c h 6,1917
[Dimanshtein, p. 132. The Ukrainian Central Rada was formed in Kiev on March 4,
1917, by Ukrainian socialists and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, and elected
the historian Mikhail Hrushevskii President.]
To the President of the Council of Ministers, Prince Uvov; We hail in your
name the first ministry of free Russia. We wish you complete success in the
struggle for democracy. We are confident that the just demands of the Ukrainian
people and her democratic intelligentsia will be fully satisfied.
To the Minister of Justice, A . F. Kerensky: In your name, dear comrade, we
warmly hail the dawn of the fulfillment of the national hopes. To you who from
the tribune of the State Duma proclaimed the slogan of Ukrainian autonomy, we
entrust the guarding of the just demands of the Ukrainian people and her demo
cratic intelligentsia. We have faith that henceforth there shall be no disinherited
peoples and that the time is not far distant when our ancient aspirations for a
free federation of free peoples will be fulfilled.
E f r e m o v , M a t u s h e v s k i i , and C h ik a l e n k o
Commissioned by the Union of the Ukrainian Progressives

332. T h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t A u t h o r iz e s t h e U se o f U k r a in ia n
i n t h e U k r a in ia n S c h o o l s

[Zhurnaly, No. 18, March 14, 1917.]

Resolved:
To authorize [the use of] the Ukrainian language in teaching in the schools
of the Kiev school district, provided measures are taken to guarantee the interests
of the minority of the students.

333. R e s o l u t io n o f t h e U k r a in ia n D e m o n s t r a t io n i n K ie v
[Dimanshtein, pp. 133-34. This mass meeting was sponsored by the Society of
Ukrainian Progressives.]

7 Before any action could be taken on the Finnish and Russian proposals and counter
proposals, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd. On November 2/15,1917, the Sejm voted
to assume supreme power in Finland under the provisions of 38 of the Fonn of Government.
On November 23/December 6,1917, the Sejm passed an act that declared Finnish independence.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 371

We Ukrainians, having gathered in Kiev on March 19, for the first Ukrainian
celebration of freedom, hail the rebirth of democracy and the overthrow of
Tsarist despotism and, at the same time, resolve: to support the central govern
ment; to aid it with all our strength in defending the new regime against all
hostile designs upon it, firmly convinced that it will exert all of its efforts in the
future to consolidate freedom and democracy; to affirm to it our expectation
for an immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly, on the basis of universal,
equal, direct, and secret election, which will confirm the autonomy of the Ukraine.
We request the Provisional Government to relate intimately the question of the
Ukraines autonomy to the interests of the new order and to arouse the population
of the Ukraine to every sacrifice by publishing immediately a declaration stressing
the need of broad autonomy for the Ukrainian land; to implement immediately
all measures in order to give a national Ukrainian character to public institutions
of the Ukraine, with the preservation of the rights of national minorities. The
Central Rada of the Ukraine is commissioned to arrive at an understanding with
the Provisional Government on the question of implementation of said resolutions.

334. R e s o l u t io n o n t h e N a t io n a l Q u e s t io n o f t h e C o n g r e ss o f the
U k r a in ia n S o c ia l ist R e v o l u t io n a r y P a r t y , A p r i l 4-5, 1917
[Dimanshtein, p. 137.]
The realization of the Russian federated republic, toward which the Party will
strive with every means possible, urgently calls for a free expression of the will
of the Ukrainian people at the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which must out
line the principles of the future political order. Moreover, the Congress expressed
itself in favor of the quickest possible implementation of the national and terri
torial autonomy of the Ukraine, with the guarantee of rights to the national
minorities.

335. F rom the R e s o l u t io n o n t h e N a t io n a l Q u e s t io n o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e

of th e U k r a in ia n S o c ia l D e m o c r a t ic P a r t y , A p r il 1917
pp. 134-35.]
[D im anshtein ,
1. On the autonomy of the Ukraine. Inasmuch as the need for the fullest
development of the Ukraines productive forces calls for her widest economic and
political self-determination; in consideration of the fact that the federated
organization of the Russian State as a union of autonomous national territories
or simply territorial units not only cannot hamper the development of the pro
letariat of all Russia, especially the Ukrainian [proletariat], but is to its advan
tage; taking into consideration the fact that the federation of autonomous national
or regional units is the best guarantee of the democratic and national-political
rights of each nation or regionthe conference of the Ukrainian Social Demo
cratic Workers Party with unequivocal resolution advances the ancient demand
of the Partythe autonomy of the Ukraineas the foremost, pressing, burning
problem of the contemporary moment of the Ukrainian proletariat and all of
the Ukraine.
At the same time, acting outside the framework of the party program declared
at the Congress of 1905 and taking into consideration the uniqueness of the events
and demands of life, the Conference thinks it possible to take upon itself the right
372 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

to permit the comrades of the Party to support the principle of a federated organ
ization of the Russian democratic republic and to support the autonomous aspira
tions of the democracy of other nations.
The Conference leaves the final decision on the question of introducing the
demands for federation into the party program to the party congress.
2. On the relation to the central government. The Conference of the Ukrai
nian S.D. Workers Party deems it necessary to support the Provisional Govern
ment inasmuch at it complies with the demands of the revolutionary peoples of
all of Russia. At the same time the Conference thinks it indispensable to exercise
the most careful control over the actions of the Provisional Government and its
local representatives with a view to forcing it to carry out consistently the social,
political, and national demands of the Ukrainian democracy.

336. F rom the R e s o l u t io n s o f t h e U k r a in ia n N a t io n a l C o n g r e s s ,

A p r il 5-8, 1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 136-37. The Congress, called by the Rada, also increased the mem
bership of the Rada and broadened the base of its representation.]
1. The Ukrainian National Congress, recognizing the right of the Russian
Constituent Assembly to sanction the new state order of Russia, also the autonomy
of the Ukraine and the federated organization of the Russian republic, believes,
however, that prior to the convening of the Russian Constituent Assembly the
adherents of a new order in the Ukraine cannot remain passive but should, in
cooperation with the smaller nationalities, immediately lay the foundations of its
autonomous existence.
Meeting the wishes of the Provisional Government in the matter of organiza
tion and consolidation of social forces, it recognizes as a pressing need the organ
ization of a regional council [composed] of representatives from Ukrainian dis
tricts and towns, nationalities, and social strata, the initiative for this to be taken
by the Ukrainian Central Rada.
2. The Ukrainian Congress, recognizing the right of all nations to political
self-determination, believes: a) that the frontiers between states must be estab
lished in accordance with the will of the borderland populations; b) that to
guarantee this it is necessary to admit to the peace conference, in addition to the
representatives from the belligerent powers, representatives from those peoples on
whose territory the war is being waged, and among them the Ukrainians.
3. In connection with the declaration of the Temporary Polish State Coun
cil, in response to the appeal to the Polish people by the Russian Provisional
Government to unite with the free Russian state, the First All-Ukrainian National
Congress vigorously protests against all claims to non-Polish lands. The Ukrai
nian people will not tolerate any attempts to seize the rights to the territory of
the Ukraine covered with her sweat and blood.

5. The Ukrainian National Congress commissions the Central Rada to mani

fest as soon as possible its initiative in forming a strong union of those people
of Russia who, like the Ukrainians, demand national and territorial autonomy
on the principles of the democratic Russian republic.
6. The Ukrainian National Congress resolves: to commission the Central
Rada to organize a committee composed of its delegates and representatives of
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 373

national minorities in order to work out a draft on the autonomous status of the
Ukraine, whereupon this statute will be submitted for approval to the Congress
of the Ukraine, organized in such a way as to reflect the will of the population
of the entire territory of the Ukraine. The sanction of the autonomous regime for
the Ukraine is reserved to the Russian Constituent Assembly.
7. The Congress considers it necessary that in those regions of the Federated
Russian Republic where the Ukrainian people constitute a minority of the popu
lation, the Ukrainian people be guaranteed the same minority rights as the non-
Ukrainian minority enjoys in the Ukraine.

337. F rom the R e s o l u t io n s of the F ir s t U k r a in ia n M il it a r y C o n g r e s s ,

M ay 5-8, 1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 139-41.]
On the Autonomy of the Ukraine
The First Ukrainian Military Congress of delegates from the fronts, the rear,
and the fleets constituting approximately 90,000 organized armed Ukrainian
people, resolves: In the interests of easing the national conflicts in the Ukraine
and at the front which may bring great harm to the general cause of the revolu
tion, in the interests of the greatest unification and harmony of all the democratic
masses in the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Military Congress considers it most urgent
to demand that the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers9 and
Soldiers Deputies declare immediately by a special act the principle of the na
tional and territorial autonomy of the Ukraine as the best guarantee of all the
national and political rights of the Ukrainian people and of the entire region.
As the first step toward the actual realization of this act the Congress thinks it is
necessary to appoint immediately a minister on Ukrainian affairs in the Provi
sional Government.

On the Central Rada

. . . The Congress recognizes the Ukrainian Central Rada as the only com
petent organ called upon to solve all questions bearing upon the Ukraine as a
whole and upon its attitude toward the Provisional Government.

On the Ukrainian Army

The best means of maintaining conscious discipline, which only now is possible
in the peoples army, is to rely not on fear but on confidence and mutual under
standing between soldiers and officers, as well as on high military morale. The
latter in turn can only be raised by some great common, uniting idea. One such
idea for the Ukrainians is the idea of national rebirth. The Congress [conse
quently] believes in the immediate consolidation of all Ukrainians [now serving]
in the armies into one national army. . . .
II. The First Ukrainian Military Congress resolves: a) taking into considera
tion, on the one hand, that the accepted system under the old despotic regime of
forming armies [composed of] various nationalities is based on antidemocratic
principles and involves an altogether unnecessary expenditure of national funds
and the disintegration of the moral strength of nationalities; b) taking into
374 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

consideration, on the other hand, the fact that the armies at the front, weary from
three years of war, have no longer their former military might, that discipline
and the spirit of resistance are on the decline, that therefore great danger threat
ens the cause of defense, the Ukrainian Military Congress deems it necessary to
launch immediately a struggle against such a decline of the spiritual and actual
strength of the army. One of the most effective and powerful means of raising
the morale, of molding the military parts into one whole, mighty body the Con
gress believes is the immediate [creation of a] national army on the national and
territorial principle. In particular, the Congress declares the need of a Ukrainian
national army. In this matter the Congress recognizes:
a) that all Ukrainian men, both officers and soldiers, [now serving] in the
present military units in the rear areas, must immediately be detached into
separate units;
b) in military units at the front the detachment must be organized grad
ually, depending on tactical and other military conditions in so far as such
detachment will not cause disorganization at the fronts.
So far as the Fleet is concerned, the Congress considers it possible and neces
sary for the same reasons:
a) to recruit in the Baltic Fleet some ships with a crew composed only of
Ukrainian nationals;
b) in view of the fact that the Black Sea Fleet at the present time is composed
overwhelmingly of Ukrainians, the Congress deems it necessary in the future also
to replenish it only with Ukrainians.
For the practical realization of the resolutions adopted, the Ukrainian Mili
tary Congress decided to form a Temporary Ukrainian Military Committee in
connection with the Central Ukrainian Rada, which will have charge of Ukrainian
military affairs and work in close contact with the Russian general staff.

3 3 8 . M e m o r a n d u m o f t h e D e l e g a t io n o f t h e U k r a in ia n R a d a to the
P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e
o f t h e S o v ie t s

[Dimanshtein, pp. 143-49. The response of the Provisional Government is shown in

the documents following. The Soviet reception was cool and it refused to commit itself.]
For the special attention of the Provisional Government and the Russian
democracy.
The growth of the Ukrainian movement, revealed so intensively in the days
of the revolution, calls for new methods of appraisal and new means of approach,
not to mention actual familiarity with its expression. Nevertheless all remains
as of old in this sphere, and the Russian public circles for the most part assume
the old, vague positions.
This is already sadly reflected now in the mutual relations between the two
brotherly peoples, and it portends very undesirable complications, the settlement
and prevention of which call for measures of state and public importance to be
undertaken by both sides.

The reborn Ukrainian press daily brings news that public and national aware
ness grows ever greater among the Ukrainian masses. The Ukrainian village
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 375

organizes under the slogan put forward by the Ukrainian movement. The same
thing is said in numerous and crowded congresses that take place now in the
Ukraine: cooperative, peasant union, military, national in the wide sense of the
word, pedagogical, party, and other congresses. These congresses represented
on the whole a million-strong mass of people (the Military Congress alone in
Kiev represented 993,400 organized soldiers), and in the solution of national
problems they revealed one spirit, common to all.
In spite of the different composition of the participants in them, all of the
said congresses are unanimous in national demands, both political (autonomy
and federation) and cultural (the Ukrainization of the schools, public institu
tions, etc.). And they recognize as their supreme national organ the Ukrainian
Central Rada in Kiev. The Central Rada was formed from the first days of the
revolution to give organizational forms to the spontaneous movement in the
Ukraine.

Down to very recent times the Ukrainian Central Rada found it possible to
refrain from making any sort of demands upon the Government, [demands] that
were declared a long time ago by a series of resolutions of the congresses of the
Ukrainian people. But the ever-increasing misunderstanding of the aims and pur
poses of the Ukrainian democracy by the Russian public, also its hostility toward
the Ukrainian movement, and, on the other hand, the increasing distrust by the
Ukrainian democracy of the Russian public and the growing pressure put upon
us by this democracy, led us to the firm conviction that the only correct way out
of the situation is immediate compliance with the demands that the Ukrainian
democracy, represented by the Ukrainian Central Rada, submits to the Provi
sional Government and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which we
briefly outline here:
1. Taking into consideration the unanimous demand for an autonomous
Ukraine advanced by the Ukrainian democracy, we hope that the Provisional
Government will express in some act its sympathetic attitude, in principle, toward
this slogan.
2. The inevitability of submitting the Ukrainian question at the international
conference in connection with the future of Galicia and the part of the Ukrainian
land occupied by the Germans forces us to solve in principle and immediately the
question of the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian people in such
a conference, because such participation calls for immediate preliminary practical
steps on the Ukraine beyond the border.
3. In order to familiarize the government thoroughly with the attitudes in
the Ukraine and with the demands of the Ukrainian population, also to render
the government practical assistance in introducing various measures called for
by the unique life of the region, the creation of the post of special Commissar on
Ukrainian Affairs in the Provisional Government is urgently needed.
4. The post of special commissar with a regional council assisting him is
necessary in order to consolidate the government measures in all guberniyas in
accordance with [the wishes of] the population.
5. In order to raise the fighting strength of the army and restore discipline,
it is necessary to carry out the measure of separating the Ukrainians into separate
army units in the rear as well as, so far as possible, at the front.
6. The Ukrainization of the elementary schools, approved by the Provisional
376 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Government, should also he applied to the secondary and higher schools, in the
language used as well as the subjects of instruction.
7. [Officials in] responsible administrative posts in the Ukraine, both civil
and clerical, should be replaced with people who enjoy the confidence of the
population, who speak their language and are familiar with their way of life.
8. To satisfy national needs which were suppressed under the old regime,
appropriate sums should be allocated from the state treasury to be used at the
discretion of the Central Rada.
9. It is necessary to permit those Ukrainians now residing beyond the border
who were unjustly deported from their places of permanent residence to return
to their motherland, also to improve the lot of the prisonersUkrainians and
Galiciansby resettling them in Ukrainian guberniyas.
M em b ers o f th e d e le g a tio n o f th e U k r a in ia n C en tral R a d a : V . V i n n i
c h e n k o , D. K o r b e n k o , P is m e n n y i , D. R o v in s k i , I. K o v a l e v s k i , 0.
P il k e v i c h , A. C h e r n ia v s k ii , S. E f r e m o v , I. S n iz h n y i , G. O d in e t s .

339. O ffic ia l Communique on t h e R e je c t io n of the

U krainian D emands
[Dimanshtein, p. 59.]
Petrograd, June 3
The Central Ukrainian Rada presented its resolutions on the future [national]
organization of the Ukraine to the Government. . . .
A special conference for discussing these desires was held under the chair
manship of Deputy Minister of the Interior Shchepkin; having heard the report
of the latter, the Government decided to publish a special act defining its position
and resolved that the wording of the text be assigned to the Juridical Council.
In establishing the basic premises of the act, the Government directed atten
tion to the consideration of the following questions of principle:
Is it possible to recognize the authority of the Central Ukrainian Rada with
respect to its competence in expressing the will of all the local population in the
twelve provinces that the Rada wishes to include in the territory of the future
autonomous Ukraine? Inasmuch as this Rada has not been elected by popular
vote, the Government could hardly recognize it as the spokesman for the true will
of all the Ukrainian people. Therefore, the Government considers that from the
formal as well as the tactical point of view, the question of establishing the
autonomy of the Ukraine can be decided only by the Constituent Assembly.
For this reason, the publication of an act on this question would present dif
ficulties to the Government, as this would imply prejudgment. In addition, with
out a precise definition of what constitutes the concept of Ukrainian autonomy,
the publication of such an act would lead to misunderstandings in territorial and
other relations. A negative decision on the question of publishing an act on
Ukrainian autonomy was adopted unanimously by the Government.
In exactly the same manner the Government recognized that it had no right
to organize a new administrative system in the Ukraine, or to establish special
commissars, since this lies wholly within the competence of the Constituent
Assembly.
On the question of independent Ukrainian forces, the Government recognized
the possibility of a temporary solution to this question, [but] only within the
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 377

framework indicated by the Minister of War to the Ukrainian organizations

in Kiev.
At the same time, the Government wishes to emphasize that it recognizes the
national peculiarities, the unique conditions of life in the Ukraine, and the neces
sity to resolve the question of the future organization of the Ukraine, which
belongs to the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly.

340. T h e O p in io n of th eJ u r id ic a l C o u n c il on t h e U k r a in ia n
M em o randum
[Dimanshtein, p. 60. The matter was referred to the Council on May 30, 1917. Zhur
naly, No. 94. The deliberations of the Council can be found in Iz istorii natsionaTnoi
politiki Vremennogo Pravitelstva, KA, XXX (1928), 51-55.]
Petrograd, June 14
Having examined the demands of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Juridical
Council of the Provisional Government expressed the opinion that the Provisional
Government does not have the right to settle questions regarding the autonomy
of the Ukraine; [such questions] lie wholly within the competence of the Con
stituent Assembly.
Consequently, the question of establishing a Commissar on Ukrainian Affairs
and a Special Regional [oblastnyi] Ukrainian Commissar likewise cannot be
settled.
On the question of Ukrainian participation in the international conference,
the Council declared itself opposed, since participants in international conferences
are states, and not peoples.
The formation of separate military units was recognized by the Council as a
matter lying within the competence of the Minister of War.
On the question of the Ukrainization of secondary schools, the Council pointed
out that this is a complex matter since the student contingent consists in large part
of urban residents of non-Ukrainian origin.
[The Council] recognized that questions regarding filling offices with persons
comm finding confidence are not subject to discussion, since the principle which
is being proclaimed must apply to the whole population of the state.
The Council declared that funds for national-cultural needs must be allocated
by organs of local self-government and not by the state.
The Council recognized that the question of illegal deportation of Ukrainians,
being closely connected to wartime questions, does not lie within its competence.

341. Russkiia Vedomosti o n t h e U k r a in ia n M e m o r a n d u m

[No. 122, June 1, 1917, p. 1. Representative of the Russian press reaction, including
socialist organs.]
The Ukrainian question has grown quite acute in recent times. And some
groups are already making demands for an immediate and complete separation
of the Ukraine from Russia. Moreover [they suggest that] the Central Rada must
declare itself the Provisional Government of the Ukraine. We shall not dwell at
this time on the demands made by the Ukrainians. But we cannot help but protest
against the maimer of disposing of this question as suggested by the more extreme
of the Ukrainian groups. For the immediate separation of the Ukraine from
378 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Russia presupposes the solution of the Ukrainian question without the opinion
of the entire population of Russia, without the approval of the Constituent As
sembly. As a matter of fact, the same position is maintained by those groups
that, while they do not demand complete separation of the Ukraine from Russia,
nevertheless insist that the Provisional Government commit itself immediately
to definite obligations on the future disposition of the Ukraine and carry out a
number of measures in this direction. This demand, however, also presupposes
the solution of the Ukrainian question without the Constituent Assembly, without
the consent of the entire population of Russia. Such assumption is basically false.
A one-sided decision of the question is intolerable: it is impossible to allow any
one part of the country to decide independently its relation to the whole, dis
regarding the opinions and interests of the population of the entire country. The
Ukraine and the rest of Russia did not unite yesterday. They shared the same life
for many centuries; they bore national hardships together. And not the Ukraine
alone, but the rest of Russia as well, is interested in the nature, whatever it may
be, of their future relations. A shared national life, mutual age-long work in
building the country gave both sides certain rights toward each other and at the
same time imposed on both sides certain obligations. And both sides should be
consulted before deciding the question of the nature of their future mutual
relations.

In view of this, under no circumstances should we disregard either the interest

of all of Russia in the solution of the Ukrainian question or certain claims of all
of Russia upon the Ukraine. To be sure, there may be differences of opinion
about the extent of these claims and the character of desirable relations between
the Ukraine and the rest of Russia. We can talk about the right of the Ukraine
to full autonomy; we can even go quite far in this direction and yet retain an
objective point of view, which will not prevent a calm discussion of the question.
But obviously we cannot decide the question of the Ukraine without canvassing
the opinion of all of Russia, without awaiting the convening of the Constituent
Assembly. Such treatment of the question is inadmissible, because, we repeat, all
of Russia contributed its labor and energy to the creation of the present-day
Ukraine. Therefore, all of Russia claims rights to the Ukraine, and not only those
people who inhabit it at the present moment. We are confident that a solution of
the question is possible that will satisfy the lawful national aspirations of the
Ukrainians and at the same time be compatible with the preservation of the state
interests of all the rest of Russia. But this decision can be arrived at only by the
Constituent Assembly, where the will of all Russia will find its expression.

342. R e s o l u t io n o f P u b l ic a n d S o v ie t O r g a n iz a t io n s in K ie v on
t h e A n s w e r o f t h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t

[Dimanshtein, p. 154. Reflective of the views of the principal non-Ukrainian parties

and groups, including also the Jewish Bund.]
Having heard the telegram of the Provisional Government in reply to the
declaration of the Ukrainian Rada, and having discussed the question in general
as well as in connection with the objective of the declaration, the joint conference
of the Executive Committees of Public Organizations, of the Soviet of Workers
Deputies and the Soviets of Deputies of the Troops of the Kiev Military District,
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 379

and of the associated student body resolved: that, standing quite definitely on
the platform of the organization of Russia on the principles of decentralization
and wide autonomy, we join completely and are prepared to support the point of
view of the Government with all the force of our authority; that this question,
in the light of general principles of autonomy, its extent and actual content, can
be decided only by the Constituent Assembly.

3 4 3 . F r o m t h e R e s o lu t io n s o n U k r a in ia n A u to n o m y of t h e A l l -
U k r a in ia n P e a s a n t C o n g r e ss, M a y 2 9 -J u n e 2 , 1 9 1 7
[D im anshtein , pp. 1 5 0 -5 1 .]
Having heard the report on the negotiations between the delegation of the
Ukrainian Central Rada and the Russian Provisional Government, the First All-
Ukrainian Peasant Congress acted as follows:
1. It resolved to join the Ukrainian Central Rada in its solicitation stated in
its declaration and to demand of the Provisional Government the immediate satis
faction of these solicitations.
2. Taking into consideration the fact that the region can be saved from ruin
only by the establishment in Russia of a federative-democratic republic with the
national and territorial autonomy of the Ukraine and a guarantee of rights to
national minorities, the Congress commissioned the Ukrainian Central Rada in
conjunction with the All-Ukrainian Rada of Peasants Deputies: a) to work out
immediately a proposal for a statute on the autonomy of the Ukraine and a
federative-democratic organization of the Russian republic; b) to convene im
mediately a congress of representatives from other peoples and regions who aspire
to a federative-democratic order; c) to exert all efforts to hasten the organization
of a Ukrainian territorial assembly.
3. The Congress resolved that all self-governments and institutions in our
Ukraine be immediately Ukrainized. Consequently it invites all public (peasant,
zemstvo, and other) organizations and administrative institutions, as well as mili
tary organizations of the Ukraine, to come to the aid of the Ukrainian Central
Rada and the All-Ukrainian Rada of Peasants9 Deputies in the preliminary work
for the autonomous order in the Ukraine.

3 4 4 . K e r e n s k y s P r o h i b i t i o n of the U k r a in ia n M il it a r y C o n g r e s s
[Dimanshtein, p. 58.]
To the Kiev Military District in the Theater of War:
Kiev, June 2, 1917
The Minister of War informed me by telegram No. 201, May 28, 1917:
Owing to military conditions, I consider the Ukrainian Congress to be untimely,
in view of the impossibility, at the present time, of diverting soldiers and officers
from the performance of their direct duty to the fatherland. The question of
national troops is being urgently submitted for consideration by the Provisional
Government. This order was transmitted by me to the representatives of the
Ukrainian Military Central Committee for appropriate action, but, in view of the
aforesaid committees intense petitioning to the Minister of War for the cancel
380 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

lation of the order about the participation of soldiers and officers in the Congress,
I requested the Minister of War to give urgent instructions concerning this
solicitation. To this petition of mine, the Minister of War replied with the fol
lowing telegram, [dated] June 1: Every soldier and officer may exercise all the
rights of a free citizen, in so far as they do not interfere with the duty of service.
At the present time I consider it to be the duty of every soldier to remain in the
ranks of the army. Therefore I am obliged to reject all requests for permitting
congresses that are not within the framework of the general military organi
zation.9
The above is announced for information and execution.
C o l o n e l O b e r u c h e v , R e t.
[Commander, Kiev Military District]

345. R e s o l u t io n b y t h e S e c o n d U k r a in ia n M il it a r y C o n g r e ss
[J u n e 5 - 1 0 ] C o n c e r n in g t h e A c t io n o f K e r e n s k y
[Dimanshtein, pp. 140-44.]
The Ukrainian people, equal to any cultured peoples of the world, have [ac
quired] from the time of the overthrow of Russian tsarism the full rights of a
free people, and they will defend them. The right of assemblies and congresses
belongs to the Ukrainians just as it does to other free peoples. The All-Ukrainian
Military Congress consequently resolved: to brand as illegal the ban of the War
Minister on the Congress and to carry out its resolutions without fail.

346. Speech by V . V in n ic h e n k o a t t h e S e c o n d U k r a in ia n
M il it a r y C o n g r ess
[Dimanshtein, pp. 157-59.]
We are being reproached for not waiting for the Constituent Assembly. And
why do we want to create our life now without waiting? Any organized authority
is desirable at the present moment of total disorganization. Everything is dis
organized now. . . . There is no authority, in spite of the fact that Kerensky
talks about it everywhere. The Russian revolution is in such a state that repre
sentatives of the revolutionary government have no challenge that would rouse
people to face death. As for us, we are still in a process of revolution. We are
creating our national revolution ourselves. Rebuff inspires us to greater effort.
Were we to treat Kerenskys ban on the Congress humorously, we could say that
we can only be thankful for this ban. It only aroused our energy and inspiration.
Further, we no longer have any classes with which democracy could not work.
To be sure, this is abnormal. But the conditions of our life have crippled us. We
have a bourgeoisie in the Ukraine, but it is not ours; it is that of South Russians.
The Ukrainian movement marches on. Consequently, we are known now, and we
are being reckoned with, as an existing authority, if perhaps not as a competent
or juridical authority. We must at the present time carry out our ideals in a
friendly fashion and without dissipating our strength. Reactionary ideas are
already appearing among us. Among us there are probably monarchists and
adherents of a hetmanate, etc. But monarchy could never return to the Ukraine.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 381

Even our ancestors, the Cossacks, long ago were republicans because they fought
against their hetmans and colonels for freedom.
Consequently, our national idea, consolidating us, places us in a more favor
able position than the Russian democracy. They have nothing to create (all they
need is to effect social revolution), but we still have something to createto create
our own selves. Therefore, with such an organizing force in our hands, we need
not wait for, perhaps, a breakdown. Already there is talk about dictatorship
instead of a Constituent Assembly. Without deciding the question beforehand
as to what will occur later, we must launch upon creative organizational work.
But what shall we create? Some daycomplete independence (self-depend
ence) . . . . Perhaps conditions will change some day, if we see that there can
be no brotherly coexistence with Russia. At the present moment, however, we
see no reasons for this. Willy-nilly, for the past 200-300 years, we got used to
each other; we have grown closely knit with Russia. Closely knit also is our
political, economic, and cultural life. . . . I openly declare: the fact of the matter
is that the road of insurrection is not open to us. Should a revolt occur, our large
cities would not follow us. In two or three years they will be ours. We would
carry weight in the villages, but we would lead the land to anarchy and to slaugh
ter. This we are not willing to do. We will not follow this course in order to gain
a year sooner what will be gained eventually. Because if we lose, it will mean
more than one year. . . .
And so, we must organize our life immediately. The autonomy of the Ukraine
is not the only act that will change our life. But we do know that the unsound
heads, on publication of this act, ceased to commit all sorts of outrages against us.
And after we come to an understanding, the matter of the organization of au
tonomy will move vigorously and joyously. We shall present the Constituent
Assembly with a ready-made autonomy and nothing will be left for it to do but
to say: uHail, Autonomous Ukraine!

347. A gainst t h e U n it y o f F orces o f t h e R ev o lutio n

[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 81, June 2, 1917, p. 2.]
The All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, convening currentiy in Kiev, has fallen
under the control of forces [advocating] disunity and national separatism which
are pernicious to the revolution.
The Congress not only disregarded the telegram from A. F. Kerensky regard
ing the inopportune time for convening the second Ukrainian Military Congress,
but declared this telegram of the Minister a violation of the freedom of assembly
as applied to Ukrainians. The Congress issued a firm protest against the order
from the Minister of War and declared that it released itself of all responsibility
for the possible consequences of this order.
The Russian revolutionary democracy must raise its voice and point out to
the Ukrainians that in declaring his opposition to the propitiousness of the
Ukrainian Military Congress, A. F. Kerensky was expressing the adamant will of
the revolutionary and democratic masses of the population, [and,] in particular,
the will of the army.
A united Russian revolution must have a united army. Its ranks are made up
of Great Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Jews, Armenians, Tar
tarsall the peoples of Russia have equal rights and equal duties. They all stand
382 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

guard over the gains of the revolution, [they all] stand guard over freedom. And
in the face of the great danger menacing the revolution and freedom, not one has
the right to leave the ranks of the revolutionary army.
And it is this step that the Ukrainian comrades are planning to take. They
want to create special Ukrainian military organizations. They want to lay a firm
foundation for setting themselves apart in that manner at the All-Ukrainian Mili
tary Congress.

The will of the democracy regarding this question has been expressed in reso
lutions adopted by innumerable councils and congresses. And it was on the
strength of this will that A. F. Kerensky announced the untimeliness of convening
national military congresses.
. . . The Congress resolved to call together immediately a new congress of
representatives of all nationalities and regions that have been trying to secure a
federal-democratic form of government in Russia and to solicit the Provisional
Government for the immediate gratification of all earlier demands.
Thus, the Ukrainian Peasant Congress, opposing the Provisional Government,
which reflects the overwhelming majority of the Russian democracy, is address
ing itself to other national groups and is awaiting their support for its solicitations.

. . . We are sure that the plan of the Ukrainian Congress to unite the various
regions and nationalities in a struggle against the common will of the Russian
democracy will suffer defeat. It will not be as a result of any prohibitive measures
on the part of the Government that this plan will suffer defeat. There will be no
such measures; the revolutionary government of revolutionary Russia will not
resort to such measures. But it will be from the lips of the very nationalities to
whom the Kiev Congress has addressed itself that [this] reply will resound.
We will speak about our rights at the Constituent Assembly and we will obtain
full satisfaction of all our desires, but prior to the meeting of the Constituent
Assembly we have, as all Russia has, [but] one aimnot to permit disunity or
the dispersion of the forces of the revolution. Prior to the Constituent Assembly
we will not undertake any steps to seize national rights by way of a fait accompli,
for every such step would mean a step against the interests of the revolution, i.e.,
a step against our very selves.

348. L e n in on t h e B an A gainst t h e U krain ian M ilitary C ongress

[It is not Democratic, Citizen Kerensky, Pravda, No. 71, June 2,1917, p. 2, as trans
lated in the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 184-
85.]

The War Minister deems the congress of Ukrainians untimely, and prohibits
it on his own authority! Not so very long ago citizen Kerensky was trying to
discipline Finland; he has now decided to do the same with the Ukrainians. And
it is all done in the name of democracy.
A. I. Herzen once said that when one beholds the antics of the ruling classes
of Russia, one begins to feel ashamed of being a Russian. This was said when
Russia was groaning under the yoke of serfdom, when the knout and the rod held
sway over our land.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 383

Now in Russia tsarism is no more. Now in the name of Russia speak the
Kerenskys and the Lvovs. And the treatment which Russia of the Kerenskys and
the Lvovs accords to her subject nationalities brings back to mind the bitter words
of A. I. Herzen.
It is not our wish to stress the point that Kerensky with his great-nation
policy manages to inflame and to strengthen the very separatist aspirations
which the Kerenskys and the Lvovs are endeavouring to crush.
But we do ask whether such treatment of oppressed nationalities is compatible
with the dignity, let alone of Socialism, but even of simple democracy? We ask:
Are there any limits to the mischief5 of Kerensky and his backers?
We ask the party of the Socialists-Revolutionists whether it subscribes to the
step taken by its honourable member, citizen Kerensky, in forbidding the Ukrain
ian congress?
We are informed that the Executive Committees of the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies decided yesterday to invite citizen Kerensky to a conference
on the question of self-determination of nations, as well as on other questions of
national policy.
And still there is talk about the demise of the contact commission. Not
at all, gentlemen! Dual power is still with us. There is no other escape from the
present situation, except through the transfer of all power to the Soviets of Work
ers and Soldiers Deputies.

3 4 9 . T h e F irst U niversal o f t h e C en tr al R ada , J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 1 7

[D im an sh tein , pp . 1 6 1 -6 4 .]

People of the Ukraine, nation of peasants, workers, and toilers:

By your will you placed us, the Ukrainian Central Rada, as the guardians of
the rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian land.
Your best sons, elected by people from the villages, from factories, from
soldiers barracks, from all the large bodies and groups in the Ukraine, have
elected us, the Ukrainian Central Rada, and entrusted us to defend these rights
and freedoms.
Your elected men expressed their will thus:
Let there be a free Ukraine. Without separating from all of Russia, without
breaking away from the Russian State, let the Ukrainian people on their own
territory have the right to manage their own life. Let a National Ukrainian
Assembly (Sejm), elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, establish
order and a regime in the Ukraine. Only our Ukrainian assembly is to have the
right to issue all laws which are to establish this regime.
Those laws which will establish the regime throughout the entire Russian State
must be issued by the All-Russian Parliament.
No one knows better than we what we need and which laws are best for us.
No one can know better than our peasants how to manage our own land. There
fore we desire that, after all lands throughout Russia are confiscated as national
property, pomeshchik, state, crown, monastic, and other lands, when a law is
passed about this in the Constituent Assembly, the right to have control of our
Ukrainian lands, the right to use them, belongs to us, to our Ukrainian Assembly
(Sejm).
Thus spoke those elected from the entire Ukrainian land.
384 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Having spoken thus, they elected from their midst the Ukrainian Central Rada
and told us to stand at the head of our people, to guard their rights, and to create
a new order of a free autonomous Ukraine.
And we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, fulfilled the wish of our people; we took
upon ourselves the heavy burden of building a new life, and we have launched
upon this work.
We had hoped that the central Russian Provisional Government would lend
us a hand in this work in order that, jointly with it, we the Ukrainian Central
Rada might organize our land.
But the Russian Provisional Government rejected all of our demands; it
refused the outstretched hand of the Ukrainian people.
We sent our delegates to Petrograd to present to the Russian Provisional
Government our demands.
And the chief demands were as follows:
That the Russian government publicly, by a special act, declare that it is not
against the national freedom of the Ukraine, against the right of the people to
autonomy.
That the central Russian government have in its cabinet our commissar on
Ukrainian affairs for all matters related to the Ukraine.
That local authority in the Ukraine be united in one representative from the
central Russian government, that is, by a commissar in the Ukraine elected by us.
That a certain portion of money collected by the central treasury from our
people be returned to us, the representatives of this people, for their national and
cultural needs.
All these demands of ours the central Russian government rejected.
It did not wish to say whether or not it recognizes the right of our people to
autonomy, the right to rule their own life. It evaded the answer and referred us
to the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.
The central Russian government did not wish to have in its cabinet our com
missar; it did not wish to build jointly with us a new regime.
Likewise it did not want to recognize a commissar for all of the Ukraine in
order that we might, together with it, lead our land to organization and order.
And it refused to return the money collected from our land for the needs of
our schools, culture, and organization.
And now, people of the Ukraine, we are forced to create our own destiny.
We cannot allow our land to be ruined and to collapse. If the Russian Provisional
Government cannot introduce order in our land, if it does not want to initiate
with us a great work, we must undertake it ourselves. It is our duty to our region
and to the people who dwell upon our land.
And therefore we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, publish this Universal to all
of our people and declare that from now on we shall build our own life.
Therefore let each member of our nation, each citizen of a village or city know
henceforth that the hour of great work has struck.
From this time on, each village, each volost, each board, whether city or
zemstvo, that defends the interests of the Ukrainian people must have the most
intimate organizational relations with the Central Rada.
Wherever, for some reason, administrative authority remains in the hands
of people hostile to Ukrainization, we prescribe that our citizens launch upon a
broad and mighty [campaign of] organization and information of the people and,
after that, re-elect the administration.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 385

In towns and those places where the Ukrainian population lives together with
other nationalities, we suggest that our citizens immediately establish relations
and understandings with the democracy of those nationalities and jointly with
them begin preparations for a new and correct life.
The Central Rada expresses the hope that the non-Ukrainian peoples who live
in our land will also be concerned about peace and order in our territory and
during this trying time of national disorganization will, in the spirit of friendship,
together with us begin the organization of autonomy in the Ukraine.
And after we complete this preparatory organizational work, we shall call
representatives from all peoples of the Ukrainian land and will work out laws
for her. Those laws, that entire order which we shall prepare, the All-Russian
Constituent Assembly must approve by its law.
People of the Ukraine, your electoral organ, the Ukrainian Central Rada, faces
a great and high wall which it must demolish in order to lead its people out upon
the road of freedom.
We need strength for this. We need strong and brave hands. We need the
peoples hard work. And for the success of this work we need, first of all, great
means (money). Up to this time the Ukrainian people have turned all of their
means into the All-Russian central treasury. And the people themselves never had,
and have not now, anything in return for it.
The Ukrainian Central Rada consequently orders all organized citizens of
villages and towns, all Ukrainian public boards and institutions, beginning with
the 1st of July, to tax the population with a special tax for their own affairs and
accurately and immediately transmit this tax regularly to the treasury of the
Ukrainian Rada.
Ukrainian people! Your future is in your own hands. In this hour of trial,
of total disorder and collapse, prove by your unanimity and statesmanship that
you, a nation of grain producers, can proudly and with dignity take your place
as the equal of any organized powerful nation.

3 5 0 . A p p e a l of t h e P rovisional G overnm ent to t h e

U krainian P eo ple
[VVPy No. 82, June 17, 1917, p. 1.]
Ukrainian citizens!
In [these] days of great trials the Provisional Government is turning to you
in the name of all free Russia.
Russia is passing through grave ordeals to secure the freedom that will bring
well-being to the people and the restoration of rights to all the nationalities.
The gains of the revolution are in danger.
If the external foe crushes Russia, or if the enemies of freedom emerge tri
umphantthen the common cause of all the peoples of Russia will be lost.
The Governmentthe temporary bearer of revolutionary powerhas set for
itself the task of leading the country through all dangers, and of convoking the
National Constituent Assembly, at which all the peoples of Russia will express
their will openly and firmly through universal and equal suffrage.
This is your task also, Ukrainian citizens. Are you not a part of free Russia?
Is not the fate of the Ukraine inextricably bound up with the fate of all liberated
Russia?
Who can doubt that Russia, standing beneath the banner of full popular
386 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

sovereignty, will assure the rights of all the nationalities that form her compo
nent parts?
Through their representatives at the Constituent Assembly, the peoples will
be able to forge such forms of political and economic organization as will fully
answer their national aspirations.
With respect to all nationalities of Russia, the Provisional Government has
already started to advance the rights of cultural self-determination, and, imbued
with deep affection for the Ukrainian people and conscious of its duty to them,
it is striving to erase all traces of the oppression to which this people has been
subjected.
The Provisional Government considers it its duty, now as in the past, to come
to an agreement with the public-democratic organizations of the Ukraine regard
ing those intermediary measures, which in the future may and should be adopted,
for assuring the rights of the Ukrainian people in local government and self-
government, in the schools and in the courts. These measures pave the way for
the transition to that final free form of government that the Ukraine must receive
from ihe National Constituent Assembly.
But a complete reorganization of Russian polity and of the structure of the
all-Russian army is impossible under the fire of external foes and with the enor
mous dangers inside the country threatening the cause of freedom.
Brother Ukrainians! Do not take the perilous course of splitting up the forces
of emancipated Russia. Do not divorce yourself from our common native land.
Do not break up our common army at a time of grave danger. Do not introduce
fratricidal dissent in the ranks of the people at the very time when all the strength
of the people must be concentrated on defending the country against military
defeat and on overcoming internal obstacles. In your impatience to secure im
mediately the [desired] form of government for the Ukraine, do not inflict a fatal
blow on the whole State and on yourselves, for the ruination of Russia will spell
the ruination of your cause as well.
Let all the peoples of Russia stand closer in serried ranks in the fight against
the external and internal dangers threatening the country. And let the final de
cision on all fundamental questions be left to the Constituent Assembly, which is
already not far removed in time and where the peoples themselves will decide the
fate of their common native land, Russia, and the fate of all her individual regions.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President

.
351. Rech9 on t h e F irst U niversal
[No. 137, June 14, 1917, p. 1 For a somewhat milder editorial from the liberal camp,
see Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 137, June 18, 1917, p. 3.]
Yet another link in the German plan to dismember Russia . . . the Central
Ukrainian Rada has announced the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. It
is true that the Universal57of the Rada declared that the Ukrainian people are
not breaking away from the Russian state. In the words of the Universal
the all-Russian Constituent Assembly must approve by its law those laws, that
entire order which we shall prepare, by the organizers of the Ukraine. But these
reservations do not change in the least the main significance of the basic fact that
the Rada has refused for itself and for the Ukrainian peoplemore precisely, for
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 387

all the organized citizens of villages and townsobedience to the Provisional

Government and has declared itself the Government of the Ukraine. This deed
finds its explanation in the fact that the Provisional Government has refused to
submit to the demands of the Ukrainian Rada.
It must be admitted that the Ukrainian gentlemen are playing a nasty game
with Russia. Their haste shall be unanimously condemned by all the civic or
ganizations with, perhaps, the exception of the most extreme partisans of dis-
annexationsthe Bolsheviks . . .
. . . To establish international relations with a seceded Ukraine would mean
to recognize the dismemberment of the Russian state.
However, can a Government, which proved to be helpless in its struggle against
an insignificant group of Bolsheviks, preserve Russia from falling into pieces?
Who shall support the Government in its absolutely necessary reaction against the
Ukrainians, a reaction that should take place without fail if the Government is a
Government?

352. Volia Naroda on t h e F irst U niversal

[No. 42, June 17, 1917, p. 2.]
The demands made upon the Provisional Government by the Central Ukrain
ian Rada and its published Universal merit the full attention of all the citizens
of the Russian state. However, attention alone is not enough in this case. What
is needed in addition is an appraisal and quite a definite attitude toward these
acts of the Rada. In so far as one can judge now, this attitude will and should
be the same throughout the entire democracy of Russia. It will and should be
definitely negative. The democracy of Russia must brand the steps of the Central
Ukrainian Rada as illegal, mistaken, and dangerous. It must exert all of its in
fluence and all of its authority in order to make the Rada revoke the Universal
which it has published.
We deliberately formulate our evaluation in sharp terms, and we think that
such sharpness in the present case is necessary. It is necessary because the leaders
of the Rada, whether consciously or unconsciously, are engaged in work that not
only portends great danger to the cause of the revolution and the fate of the
Russian state, but threatens first of all the Ukrainian people themselves with ruin.
But what has happened?
What has happened is nothing more or less than this: the Rada proclaimed
herself as the Supreme Provisional Government of the Ukraine, declared complete
and immediate autonomy for the Ukraine, requested the convening of a Ukrainian
Constituent Assembly. In short, [what has happened] is an almost complete
separation of the Ukraine from Russia.
To be sure, the text of the Universal is drawn up too diplomatically and
verbosely. But in spite of its perhaps deliberate diffuseness, its meaning, content,
and purpose are entirely clear.
Without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, and by way of an accomplished
fact, the Central Rada proclaimed autonomy, thus confronting the Constituent
Assembly with an accomplished fact and leaving to it merely the matter of sanc
tioning it. . . .
Further, the Rada introduces compulsory taxation. This again is an act that
388 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

only the Government is authorized to pass. Nobody is prohibited from intro

ducing voluntary collections for cultural needs. But voluntary dues are one thing,
and compulsory revenue of 10 kopeks per desiatina is quite another matter. . . .
That the Universal is fraught with danger goes without saying. It is a stab
in the back to the revolution. It dissipates its strength. It provokes national ani
mosity, and, let us face it, it threatens complications that are frightening. . . .

358. Izvestiia on t h e F irst U niversal

[No. 93, June 16,1917, p. 4.]
By a special manifesto, the Central Ukrainian Rada proclaimed the broad
autonomy of the Ukraine. This autonomy is established in defiance of the Pro
visional Governments demands to postpone the question of the scope and form
of Ukrainian autonomy pending the decision of the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly.
The revolutionary democracy of Russia stands for the indivisibility of the
State. To split up a great state, created by a thousand years of historical develop
ment, means taking a big step backward. Splitting up a large state into a series
of small [ones], each with its own peculiar laws, would retard the development
of industry, disunite the great workers army, and thereby worsen the conditions
of the workers struggle for economic and political emancipation.
Regardless of the language the workers speak, [or] their ethnic affiliations,
once they become aware of their interests they cannot [help] but stand for the
indivisibility of the State. As their awareness increases, they necessarily free
themselves from the powerful hold of nationalism which the bourgeoisie readily
implants [in their minds] in order to weaken their power of resistance to ex
ploitation.
But a stand for the indivisibility of a country does not signify a stand for
barracks-like centralization, as the nationalists assure us. On the contrary. The
workers are demanding the most extensive regional and national autonomy. Their
party is the socialist partythey inscribe this demand on their banner, because
they know well that the great national yoke only binds more strongly the ex
ploited to the exploiters by the illusion of a common national cause.
From this point of view, no objections in principles can be raised to the
demands of autonomy, advanced by the Rada. . . .
But the question as to whether it is timely, right now, to carry out a unilateral
decision on autonomy, as the Central Rada wants to do, is an entirely different
matter.
To this question we answer categorically in the negative.
In the first place, it has not been proved that the opinion of the Rada is, in
reality, the opinion of the majority of the Ukrainian people. It has not been
proved that the plans of the Rada are, in reality, the plans of the Ukrainian
workers and peasants and not only of its ruling classes.
And in the second placeand this is the most importantthe Rada wants to
proceed to the establishment of Ukrainian autonomy at a time when the very
foundation of revolutionary law and order has not as yet been made secure. There
is still the necessity of gigantic and concerted efforts on the part of ethnic groups
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 389

and regions in Russia in order to clean up all the abominations of the old regime
and to assure the permanence of revolutionary gains.

One can and must demand the immediate abolition of all national restrictions
that stand in the way of national self-determination. One can and must demand
the immediate recognition of the right [to use] the national language in order
that national masses will be able to take active part in government life and to
defend their interests. But, to demand the immediate realization of all the points
of the national program indicates the inability to make intelligent use of the . . -
revolution . . . with the result that the country will be no better off than at the
start.
In such a transitional period, one should fear more than anything else a split
ting up of the revolutionary forces.
That is why the Provisional Government was right when it insisted on post
poning the decision on the scope and form of Ukrainian autonomy until the
national Constituent Assembly, at which time the revolutionary gains will be
firmly secured and it will be possible to take into account the actual will of the
Ukrainian national masses.
The Ukrainian workers and peasants will, of course, understand and will
place the common interests of the revolution above everything else. They will go
arm in arm with the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia, knowing well that
the revolution is striving for victory, not in order to oppress the people of Russia,
but in order to make it impossible for oppression to recur, in order to really satisfy
all the political, economic, and national demands of the working masses!

354. T h e A g reem ent R e a ch ed B et w ee n t h e C en tr al R ada and

t h e P ro visional G o ver nm en t

[Rech, No. 154, July 4, 1917, p. 1; Dimanshtein, pp. 62-63. Shortly after the publi
cation of the First Universal, the Central Rada took a further step toward independent
action by establishing a General Secretariat, headed by Vinnichenko, which assumed
to some degree the functions of an executive organ for the Ukraine. The anomaly of
the situation (acknowledged by the Secretariat itself; see Dimanshtein, pp. 164-66)
and the increasing tension over the entire issue of Ukrainian autonomy were respon
sible for the arrival in Kiev, on June 28, of a delegation from the Provisional Govern
ment composed of Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and Tseretelli. After several days of nego
tiation with the Rada leaders, the delegates returned to Petrograd with an agreement
which was approved by a majority of the Government.]
On the evening of July 2 . . . the Provisional Government resolved to inform
the Ukrainian Rada of the following declaration:
Having heard the report of Ministers Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and Tseretelli
on the Ukrainian question, the Provisional Government has adopted the following
decision: To appoint a special organ, the General Secretariat, in the capacity of
a higher organ for the administration of regional affairs in the Ukraine; the
membership of which shall be determined by the Government in agreement with
the Central Ukrainian Rada, augmented on an equitable basis with democratic
organizations representing other nationalities inhabiting the Ukraine. The Gov
ernment shall work through the designated organ in carrying out measures dealing
with the life and administration of the region. Considering that questions such
390 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

as the national and political organization of the Ukraine and the methods of
resolving the land question in the Ukraine within the framework of the general
principle of transfer of land to the workers must be settled by the Constituent
Assembly, the Provisional Government shall respond favorably to the elaboration
of bills by the Ukrainian Rada, in such forms as the Rada itself finds correspond
most closely to the interests of the region, regarding the national and political
status of the Ukraine, and, also, regarding the methods of settling the land ques
tion in the Ukraine, for the purpose of submitting these bills to the Constituent
Assembly. Considering that it is imperative to preserve the combat unity of the
army during the war, the Provisional Government shall not tolerate measures
that might break up the unity of the [army] organization and [its] command,
as, for example, the present [contemplated] change in the general plan of mobi
lization to an immediate adoption of a system of territorial recruitment of mili
tary units, or [the proposal] to endow some public organizations with the rights
of command. At the same time, the Government considers it possible to continue
to contribute to a closer national unity of Ukrainians in the ranks of the army
itself, by means of recruiting Ukrainians exclusively in individual units, in so far
as such a measure, in the judgment of the Minister of War, appears feasible from
a technical point of view and will not damage the combat potential of the army.
At the present time, in order to assure success and systematic planning in achiev
ing this goal, the Provisional Government finds it possible to draw upon Ukrain
ian military representatives themselves to participate in the accomplishment of
this task, for which purpose, by agreement with the Central Rada, special Ukrain
ian delegates may be commissioned to be attached to the War Cabinet, the General
Staff, and the Supreme Commander. As far as local Ukrainian military com
mittees are concerned, these shall perform their functions on a general basis, but
their activities must be coordinated with the activities of other public military
organizations.
This declaration was telegraphed immediately to Kiev.8

355. T h e R esig natio n o f t h e K adet M inist er s in P rotest A gainst

t h e U k rain ian A g reem ent
[Rech9, No. 154, July 4, 1917, p. 1. This was the first event in the July political and
governmental crises, which are covered in detail in Volume III.]
After the publication by the Ukrainian Rada of [its] Universal, which came
as a complete surprise to the Provisional Government, negotiations of a purely
informative character took place between the latter and the Commissar of the
Kiev guberniya.
However, these negotiations did not bring any definite results, and the
Government delegated the Minister of Post and Telegraph, I. G. Tseretelli, and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko, to negotiate in Kiev with
Ukrainian political leaders. In addition, the Minister of War, A. F. Kerensky,
and the Minister of Transport, N. V. Nekrasov, were present in Kiev; however,
N. V. Nekrasov left Kiev before the end of the negotiations.
The negotiations with the Ukrainians were of an urgent nature. The draft
of a law, determining the position of the Ukraine, to be issued on behalf of the

8Telegram signed by Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and Tseretelli.

 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 391

Provisional Government, has been worked out. The Rada has decided to declare
that the members of the Ukrainian General Secretariat are responsible to it. The
ministers who were in Kiev summoned all the members of the Provisional Govern
ment to the main telegraph office in order to ascertain by telegraph the attitude of
the Provisional Government. The representatives of the Party of the Peoples
Freedom declared that this question was too serious to be solved by telegraph, and,
therefore, the Provisional Government decided to postpone the final solution
of this matter until the return of the ministers from Kiev.
On July 2, M. I. Tereshchenko, A. F. Kerensky, and I. G. Tseretelli returned
from Kiev. A meeting of the Provisional Government was arranged on that day
in Prince G. E. Lvovs home, where the ministers gave a detailed report of all the
negotiations that took place in Kiev. At the same time [they] read the draft of a
Provisional Government law regarding the Ukraine. It was pointed out that its
wording should be accepted without any alterations. The only thing they conceded
was [the possibility] of substituting a declaration of the Provisional Government
regarding the Ukrainian question for the publication of a law.
The Kadet ministers declared that the wording of the agreement did not
satisfy them: it was neither clear nor complete. At the same time they pointed out
that I. G. Tseretelli and M. I. Tereshchenko had been delegated by the Provisional
Government to the Ukraine for the sole purpose of working out an agreement with
the Ukrainians. They were not empowered to issue any kind of official statement.
The general character of the agreement proved to be absolutely unacceptable
to the minister members of the Party of the Peoples Freedom, because, in their
opinion, it abolished all authority of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine.
In the opinion of the ministers belonging to the Party of the Peoples Freedom,
only the Constituent Assembly can determine the future form of government of
the Ukraine, whereas according to the meaning of the agreement [accepted by]
I. G. Tseretelli and M. I. Tereshchenko it turns out that the Ukraine itself has
established her future form of government.
Furthermore, the ministers pointed out a number of inaccuracies in respect to
the agrarian question, national and social [problems], etc.
I. G. Tseretelli and M. I. Tereshchenko, supported by all the socialist min
isters, once more confirmed that the agreement reached in Kiev was final and
could not be subject to any alterations. Tseretelli and Tereshchenko argued that
the achievement of this agreement was very laborious, that one should not dwell
on particulars, that the point in question was not a law but a mere declaration,
which, moreover, did not solve the Ukrainian problem in its entirety but con
cerned only the limits of [the Ukrainian] autonomy, etc.
The minister members of the Party of the Peoples Freedom insisted that the
solution of this question belonged to the Constituent Assembly.
Finally, the ministers proceeded to vote.
The socialist ministers, Minister-President Prince Lvov, and Ober-Procurator
of the Synod V. N. Lvov voted for the acceptance of the text of the agreement
on the Ukrainian question, drafted in Kiev by Tseretelli and Tereshchenko, as a
whole, without amendment.
Minister of Welfare Prince Shakhovskoi, Minister of Education Manuilov,
Acting Minister of Trade and Industry Stepanov, and State Controller Godnev
voted against [the text of the agreement, and] declared that, pending the convo
cation of the Constituent Assembly, they did not object to provisionally estab
392 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

lishing a special regional administration of the Ukraine, but that they could not
agree to the publication of [this] law of the Provisional Government without
amendment.
The proposal of the minister members of the Party of the Peoples Freedom
was voted down, and Ministers Shingarev, Shakhovskoi, and Manuilov declared
that the acceptance by the Government of the law concerning the Ukrainian ques
tion introduced chaos into [the relations] between the Provisional Government
and the organ governing the Ukraine, that it opened to the Ukrainian Rada an
almost legal way to the realization . . . [two words unclear in text] of Ukrainian
autonomy, that such a responsibility they could not take, and that, therefore, they
withdrew from the ranks of the Provisional Government.
The Minister of Transport, N. V. Nekrasov, who at first announced his with
drawal from the Government, later notified the Central Committee of the Party
of the Peoples Freedom of his withdrawal from the Party.
After midnight the minister members of the Party of the Peoples Freedom
left, and the meeting of the members of the Provisional Government proceeded
without them.

356. T h e S econd U niversal o f t h e Central R ada

[Rech9, No. 156, July 6,1917, p. 3; Dimanshtein, pp. 166-67. Issued as a result of the
agreement with the Provisional Government.]
Citizens of the Ukrainian land! Representatives of the Provisional Govern
ment have informed us of the concrete measures that the Provisional Government
proposes to introduce in the matter of the administration of the Ukraine prior to
the Constituent Assembly. Watching over the freedom gained by the revolu
tionary people, recognizing the right of everybody to self-determination, and
leaving the establishment of its final forms to the Constituent Assembly, the Pro
visional Government proffers its hand to the representatives of Ukrainian de
mocracythe Central Radaand jointly with them calls on them to build a new
life in the Ukraine for the welfare of all of revolutionary Russia.
Always in favor of not separating the Ukraine from Russia, but of striving,
together with all of her peoples, toward the well-being and development of all of
Russia and toward the unity of her democratic forces, we, the Central Rada,
accept with satisfaction the call of the Government to unity and notify all citizens
of the Ukraine: the Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the Ukrainian people in
the name of its revolutionary organizations, will soon be expanded on just prin
ciples by representatives of other peoples living in the Ukraine in the name of
their revolutionary organizations; it will then become that united, higher organ
of the revolutionary democracy of the Ukraine which will represent the interests,
of the entire population of our territory.
The expanded Rada will select anew from its own midst a special organ re
sponsible to itthe General Secretariatwhich will be submitted for approval
to the Provisional Government as the bearer of the higher regional authority of
the Provisional Government in the Ukraine. Within this organ will be concen
trated all the rights and means in order that, as representative of the democracy
of all of the Ukraine and at the same time as the higher regional organ of admin
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 393

istration, it can fulfill the difficult work of the organization and arrangement of
the life of the entire territory with the consent of all of revolutionary Russia.
With the consent of other nationalities of the Ukraine and acting in the sphere
of state government as an organ of the Provisional Government, the General
Secretariat of the Central Rada will firmly follow the course of strengthening the
new order created by the revolution.
Striving toward an autonomous order for the Ukraine, the Central Rada, with
the consent of the national minorities of the Ukraine, will prepare draft laws on
the autonomous organization of the Ukraine to be submitted for approval to the
Constituent Assembly.
Believing that the formation of a territorial organ of the Provisional Govern
ment in the Ukraine guarantees the desired compliance of the administration of
the Ukraine with the needs of the local population, within the proper limits, prior
to the Constituent Assembly, and believing that the fate of all the peoples of
Russia is intimately related to the total achievements of the revolution, we repudi
ate emphatically all attempts at the arbitrary establishment of autonomy in the
Ukraine prior to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
As to the recruitment of the Ukrainian military units, the Central Rada will
have its representatives in the office of the Minister of War, at the General Staff,
and with the Supreme Commander in order to participate in the recruitment of
various units composed exclusively of Ukrainians in so far as such measure will,
at the discretion of the Minister of War, be from the technical point of view pos
sible, without violating the safety of the army.
Notifying the citizens of the Ukraine of this, we firmly believe that the Ukrain
ian democracy, whose will we represent, together with the revolutionary democ
racy of all Russia and her revolutionary government, will exert all efforts to bring
the entire country, and the Ukraine in particular, to the final triumph of the
revolution.

357. Den9 o n t h e S e c o n d U n iv e r s a l
[No. 102, July 6, 1917, p. 1.]
The Central Ukrainian Rada has published a new Universal. It expounds the
results of the negotiations of the Rada with the representatives of the Provisional
Government and those concrete measures that were brought about by these nego
tiations, which are already known to us through the declaration of the Govern
ment on the Ukrainian question. It is necessary to know these measures in the
context of the new message of the Rada to the Ukrainian people, in order to be
convinced of the soundness of the decision made by the ministers. Only after
comparing the first Universalwhich caused such legitimate alarm among the
Russian democracywith the second can one realize the importance of the success
achieved in Kiev by Tseretelli and Tereshchenko. There is no trace left of the
aggressiveness of the first message, which aimed at letting the Constituent Assem
bly face the fact of an almost seceded Ukraine, [and] of the egotistic preoccupa
tion with only ones own people, while ignoring the interests of the all-Russian
revolution.
While aspiring to an autonomous organization of the Ukraine, the Rada now
acknowledges, nevertheless, that the final decision on this issue belongs to the
Constituent Assembly. It realizes that the fate of all the peoples of Russia is
394 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

intimately related to the total achievements of the revolution, and, therefore, it

rejects all attempts at the arbitrary establishment of autonomy in the Ukraine,
prior to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. How well it would be if this
decision of the Rada were heard in the latitudes to the north, where an issue of
national autonomy of no lesser acuteness is now being decided, and where there
was a readiness to see in the aspirations of the Ukrainians a support for their own
separatism. In any case, the new Universal inflicts a severe blow on the Ukrainian
separatists. While outlining correctly the course of events, the Rada realizes that
only the joint efforts of the whole revolutionary democracy, only the centraliza
tion of the revolution can bring about the decentralization of the country. The
revolutionary democracy, which has written on its banners the slogan of the
peoples5self-determination, obviously cannot deny this blessing to the peoples of
its own country.

But the message of the Rada contains another, no less valuable, sidethe
abandonment of the narrowly nationalistic policy of local patriotism, of uncon
cernedly standing aside, which permeated the first Universal. In the new Uni
versal may be heard the alarm not only for the fate of the Ukraine, but also for
the fate of the whole entity to which the Ukraine belongs. . . .

358. D raft P ro po sal o f t h e S m a l l R ada on t h e A dm in istra tio n

o f t h e U k rain e

[Dimanshtein, pp. 173-75. Approved on July 16, 1917, and taken to Petrograd by a
delegation headed by Vinnichenko for the consideration of the Provisional Government.
The Small Rada was formed along with the General Secretariat in the latter part of
June. It was a representative committee of the Rada which met permanently and func
tioned as a legislative organ when the Rada was not in session.]
In consideration of the agreement with the Provisional Government of July 3,
1917, a General Secretariat, which is the higher organ of administration in the
Ukraine, is established by the organ of revolutionary democracy of all the peoples
of the Ukrainethe Ukrainian Central Rada. The latter is to prepare the Ukraine
for a final implementation of the autonomous order and is to bring her to the
Ukrainian Constituent National Assembly as well as the Russian Constituent
Assembly. The function of the General Secretariat is temporarily defined by the
following main principles:
1. The General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada is the higher terri
torial organ of administration in the Ukraine. It is formed by the Central Rada
and is responsible to it, and it is approved by the Provisional Government.
2. The Central Rada shall form die General Secretariat through its Committee.
3. The Central Rada shall approve the General Secretariat and express its
entire confidence in it.
4. The General Secretariat shall consist of 14 General Secretaries, as follows:
secretaries for interior, finance, military, food, land, justice, education, nationali
ties, trade and commerce, telegraph, labor, transport; controller general, and
general clerk.
Note: In the Secretariat for Nationalities, three assistant secretaries shall be
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 395

appointed: from Great Russians, Jews, and Poles. Assistants to the Secretary
have the right to make reports and have a decisive voice in the General Secre
tariat on matters concerning their nationality. Assistants to the Secretary for
Nationalities shall be approved by the Committee of the Rada.
5. The Secretariat shall exercise its authority throughout all the government
organs in the Ukraine.
6. All government organs in the Ukraine shall be subject to the authority of
the General Secretariat.
Note: The General Secretariat shall determine what organs, within what limits
and under what circumstances, may contact the Provisional Government directly.
7. All government posts in the Ukraine, in the event they are not elective, shall
be refilled by the General Secretariat or by its subordinate organs.
8. There shall be a State Secretary for Ukrainian Affairs in the Provisional
Government, appointed by the Provisional Government with the approval of the
Central Rada.
9. The State Secretary shall protect the interests of the Ukraine in the entire
work of the Provisional Government and, in case of need, transmit draft laws
through the General Secretariat for consideration by the Central Rada.
10. The General Secretariat shall transmit for sanction by the Provisional
Government those draft laws that the Central Rada has studied and approved.
11. The General Secretariat shall submit for approval by the Provisional
Government financial statements of expenditures for the needs of the Ukraine
that the Central Rada has examined and approved to be passed.
12. The General Secretariat shall dispose of the funds in the Central Rada
in accordance with the budget, approved by the Central Rada.
13. On matters that it regards as most important, the General Secretariat shall
consult the Committee of the Rada.
14. The work of the General Secretariat, responsible to the Central Rada, shall
be controlled by means of interpolation on all matters.

15. During recesses between sessions of the Central Rada, the General Secre
tariat shall be responsible to the Committee of the Central Rada, which fulfills all
functions except the o nt mentioned in paragraph 3.
16. In the event of disagreement of the General Secretariat on a decree of
the Committee, the decree shall be submitted for examination to the Central Rada,
which shall convene immediately.
17. In the event the Central Rada expresses lack of confidence in the General
Secretariat, the latter shall resign.
18. All acts of the Central Rada and the Committee shall be countersigned
by the General Secretariat.
19. All laws of the Provisional Government shall go into effect in the Ukraine
from the day of their publication in the Kraevoi PraviteVstvennyi Vestnik in the
Ukrainian language.

20. All laws, administrative rules, and decisions, announced in the Ukrainian
language, shall be published in the Russian, Jewish, and Polish languages.
396 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

21. On questions of the internal schedule of work, the General Secretariat

itself shall work out its procedure.

359. T h e T em po rary I nstructions o f t h e P ro visio nal Go ver nm en t

to t h e G eneral S ecretariat
[Zhurnaly, No. 147, August 4, 1917. The Government refused to accept the draft
proposal of the Rada, objecting to the degree of autonomy claimed, the wide scope of
activity reflected in the number and designations of the secretaries, and the extent of
the territorial jurisdiction claimed by the General Secretariat. In its place, the Gov
ernment issued the Temporary Instructions, which were drafted by two members of
the Juridical Council, Baron B. E. NolMe and A. Ia. Galperin.]
1. Until the Constituent Assembly settles the question of local governments,
the General Secretariat, appointed by the Provisional Government from recom
mendations submitted by the Central Rada, shall be the highest organ of the Pro
visional Government with jurisdiction over matters of local government in the
Ukraine.
2. The authority of the General Secretariat shall extend to the provinces of
Kiev, Volyn5, Podolsk, Poltava, and Chernigov, with the exception of the uezds
of Mglinsk, Surazh, Starodub, and Novozybkovo. The General Secretariat may
also extend its jurisdiction over other provinces or parts thereof, should the zem
stvo institutions, formed in such provinces in accordance with the laws of the
Provisional Government, declare themselves in favor of such jurisdiction.
3. The General Secretariat shall consist of General Secretaries of the Depart
ments of (1) the Interior, (2) Finance, (3) Agriculture, (4) Education, (5)
Commerce and Industry, and (6) Labor, and, also, the Secretary of Nationalities
and the General Clerk; in addition, the General Secretariat shall include a Con
troller General for the purpose of supervising its business, who shall participate
in the meetings of the General Secretariat with the right of a deciding vote.
No fewer than three of the offices of Secretary must be filled by persons of
non-Ukrainian nationality.9
Three posts of Undersecretary must be established in the Secretariat of Na
tionalities, with the provision that each of the four largest nationalities of the
Ukraine will have its representative in the person of the sSecretary, or one of his
Undersecretaries.
4. The General Secretariat shall examine, work out, and submit bills pertain
ing to the life of the region and regional administration for approval by the Pro
visional Government. These bills may be submitted to the Central Rada for dis
cussion prior to being presented to the Provisional Government.
5. The authority of the Provisional Government over matters of local govern
ment that lie within the competence of the Departments listed in article 3 shall be
exercised through the General Secretaries. A special supplement defining these
matters shall be issued in the near future.
6. All matters designated in preceding articles shall be referred by the local
regional authorities to the General Secretariat, which, on communicating with the
Provisional Government, shall relay the orders and instructions of the latter to
the local authorities.
9 The Instructions as published in the Zhurnaly read no fewer than three, but in VVPy
No. 123, August 5,1917, p. 3, they read no fewer than four. See also point 7 in Doc. 361.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 397

7. The General Secretariat shall recommend candidates for government offices

whose jurisdiction is within the range of matters designated in article 5; the offices
shall be filled by appointment of the Provisional Government.
8. Relations between the higher government institutions and individual civil
departments, [on the one hand,] and the General Secretariat and individual secre
taries pertaining thereto, [on the other,] and, similarly, relations between the
latter and the higher government institutions and departments shall be conducted
through a special Commissar of the Ukraine in Petrograd, appointed by the Pro
visional Government; the same procedure shall apply to the submission of bills
and drafts, whether these concern local affairs of the Ukraine alone or whether
these are measures of national importance which originate in individual depart
ments or are in the process of being discussed by departmental and interdepart
mental commissions and which, owing to their special relevance to the Ukraine,
require the participation of a representative from the administration of the Com
missar in the aforesaid commissions.
9. In pressing and urgent matters the higher government institutions and de
partments shall communicate their decisions directly to the local authorities, in
forming the General Secretariat of such instructions at the same time.
A. K e r en sk y , Minister-President
Zarudnyi , Minister of Justice
August 4, 1917

360. T h e R efu sa l of t h e S enate to P u b l ish t h e T em po r a r y

I nstructions
[Dimanshtein, pp. 65-66, 65 n. Although the decision of the Senate was based on
technical grounds, apparently it was influenced by the conviction of many of the mem
bers that in issuing the Instructions the Provisional Government had overreached its
powers and usurped rights reserved to the Constituent Assembly. See Russkiia Vedo
mosti, No. 227, October 5, 1917, p. 1. It is noteworthy that the only other instance of
the Senate taking such action during this period was in regard to the Proclamation
of the Republic of September 1, 1917, which it rejected as determining the form of
government before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.]
October 2,1917. In accordance with a ukase of the Provisional Government,
the Senate heard the proposal of the Minister of Justice, No. 10377, dated Sep
tember 23, 1917, that the Provisional Government should publish its Instructions
to the General Secretariat in the Ukraine, and ordered:
Having heard the statement of the Prosecutor and having taken into consid
eration, first, that the act submitted for the approval of the Ruling Senate must
be regarded as a directive issued by the Provisional Government to its General
Secretariat in the Ukraine at the instigation of die Central Rada; second, that in
the meantime no laws have as yet been submitted either on the establishment of
the aforesaid General Secretariat, to whom the present instructions are directed*
or on the establishment of the Central Rada, mentioned in these instructions, on
whom it devolves to reimburse, by a resolution, the personal staff of the Secre
tariat, or, in general, on the separation of the Rada into an independent body;
third, that under these circumstances the publication of the instructions to the
General Secretariat in the Ukraine, as proposed by the Ministry of the Provisional
Government, is a premature [action]the Ruling Senate has decided to reject
398 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

[the proposal] to publish the Instructions, which fact it brings to the attention
of the Minister of Justice, returning to him the original copy of the Instructions
and transmitting a copy of the present decision to the Prosecutor of the First
Department of the Senate.
R av sk ii , Presiding Senator

3 6 1 . R e s o l u t io n of the Ra d a on t h e I n s t r u c t io n of A u g u st 4
[D im anshtein , pp. 1 7 9 -8 0 .]
Having heard the report of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central
Rada on negotiations with the Provisional Government on the question of ap
proving the General Secretariat, and having heard the Instruction by the Provi
sional Government published on August 4 to the General Secretariat of the Ukrain
ian Central Rada, recognizing that the Instruction:
1) is dictated by distrust toward the aspirations of the entire democracy of
the Ukraine;
2) is imbued with the imperialist tendencies of the Russian bourgeoisie
toward the Ukraine;
3) violates the agreement of the Ukrainian Central Rada with the Provisional
Government of July 3;
4) does not give an opportunity to the democracy of the Ukraine to establish
authority over the entire territory populated by the Ukrainian people;
5) limits and weakens the importance of the authority of the General Secre
tariat by failing to embrace all the territorial matters and needs of the population
of the Ukraine (supply, military affairs, judicial, transport, post and telegraph);
6) interferes with the creation and work of a stable revolutionary territorial
authority (paragraphs 6 and 9) ;
7) by establishing, in spite of an agreement of the Ukrainian and non-Ukrain-
ian democracy, the ratio of nationalities in the territory by the number (four)
of General Secretariats for the non-Ukrainian nationalities represented in the
Ukrainian Central Rada, intends to destroy the unity of the Ukrainian and non-
Ukrainian democracy;
8) completely fails to serve the needs and wishes not only of the Ukrainian
people but of the national minorities as well who live in the Ukraine; the
Ukrainian Central Rada considers it urgent to point out to the Provisional Gov
ernment firmly and emphatically :
a) that the Instruction of August 4 is in contradiction to the agreement of
the UCR with the Provisional Government of July 3 , by which only the UCR can
and must act in the preparation of the entire Ukraine for an autonomous order
for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and the All-Russian Constituent As
sembly;
b) that the Instruction will be an obstacle to the real work of organizing the
territory, provoking superfluous and unnecessary strains and weakening the
strength and firmness of the revolutionary territorial authority;
c) that in the interests of friendly relations between the Ukraine and Russia
it is necessary to take steps at the earliest possible moment to implement the
standards of relations between the Provisional Government and the General Secre
tariat, responsible to the central authority, in accordance with the agreement of
July 3.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 399

II
In the interests of the earliest establishment of a stable order, of the strength
ening and deepening of the gains of the revolution in the Ukraine, and the reali
zation of measures necessary for this, the UCR considers it necessary:
a) to submit, from the 14 secretaries of the Rada, 9 General Secretaries, men
tioned in the Temporary Instruction, for approval by the Provisional Government;
b) to commission the committee of the UCR and the General Secretariat to
work out a statute that will define the relations between the Ukrainian Central
Rada and her General Secretariat;
c) to delegate the General Secretariat to work out a number of draft laws to
satisfy the needs of the toiling masses in a systematic way, on questions of labor,
land, food, and education;
d) to raise with the Provisional Government the question of war and peace,
the death penalty, and other repressions;
e) to initiate immediately the preparatory work in connection with the con
vening of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly;
f ) to appeal to all nationalities of the Ukraine, pointing out to them the short
comings of the Temporary Instruction and calling upon the toiling masses of the
population of the entire Ukraine to organize the struggle in defense of their in
terests and to rally round the Ukrainian Central Rada.

362. R eport o f t h e G en er al S ecretariat to t h e R ada ,

S e p t e m b e r 28, 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 189-95. On September 25, 1917, the General Secretariat issued a
Third Universal, which was principally a plea for order and for cooperation with the
Rada in creating a new regime in the Ukraine. Ibid., pp. 196-97.]
The General Secretariat, created by the will of the Ukrainian democracy, de
pending for its strength and support upon it, will be guided in its action by the
principles and directives, worked out by the democracy of the Ukraine, repre
sented by the Central Rada and will be responsible for its actions to this its revo
lutionary democratic parliament.
At the same time, the General Secretariat, recognized and confirmed by the
Provisional Government as the higher organ of authority in the Ukraine, is
thereby placed in intimate state-legal relations with the higher organs of authority
of the all-Russian republic. In the Instruction to the General Secretariat these
relations are not defined clearly. Therefore, the General Secretariat is working
out first of all, for all the secretaries, those standards which must define the limits
of competency of each secretariat and of the entire Secretariat.

The Form of Government

The basis of the new life is that each nationality has the right to its national
self-determination. Ukrainian democracy through the voice of its congresses,
organizations, and revolutionary parliamentthe Central Radaclearly defines
its future national-political order as a state body with equal rights in the Federated
Russian Republic. Firmly maintaining this position, the goal of which is a united
400 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Russian Federated Republic, the General Secretariat in its national-political work

m il aim to guarantee to the Ukrainian people state rights on their territory.

The first condition of the future state order of the Ukraine must be the con
solidation of the entire Ukrainian land and the entire Ukrainian people into one
autonomous unit.
The Peace Conference
In order to guarantee the just rights of our entire people, who wish peace on
the basis of the self-determination of nations, the Secretariat will use all means
to have representatives from the Ukrainian people included in the delegation to
the peace conference, which will discuss the consequences of war.
The Rights of Nationalities
Guarding the rights of the Ukrainian people, the General Secretariat will treat
with equal justice and attention the national rights and aspirations of all na
tionalities inhabiting the territory of the Ukraine. No coercion, no suppression
of the rights to self-determination of nations in the Ukraine will be tolerated.
The Ukrainian Constituent Assembly
For a most just expression of the will of the democracy of the Ukraine a
National Ukrainian Constituent Assembly must be convoked. And the General
Secretariat will begin immediately the preparation of an appropriate draft law.

Question of Education
In the field of public education a proposal should be worked out and, if pos
sible, carried out during the present academic year on the schools in the Ukraine,
new in content and form, and based on national and democratic principles. More
over, the cultural needs of each nationality will be appropriately fulfilled by trans
ferring the administration of education of the national minorities to assistants
to the General Secretary of Nationalities under an over-all control by the General
Secretariat of Education . . .

The Ukrainization of the Army

The organization of the Ukrainian military units proceeds unflinchingly. As
an organic necessity of the regenerated Ukrainian nation, the organization of
Ukrainian military units has grown to be a positive factor in questions of defense
at the front as well as the guarding of the revolution in the country. The General
Secretariat, aiming at the greatest possible planning in forming the Ukrainian
military units, considers it urgent to establish a secretariat for military affairs.
Recognizing that the commanding authority as well as the system of defense must
be united, recognizing that the supreme command and the system of defense must
be united, and granting the jurisdiction over these to the supreme command and
the Ministry of War, the General Secretariat at the same time thinks that the
Secretariat should have transferred to it the authority and responsible right in
organizing and forming Ukrainian military units and particularly the right to
-submit to the supreme military authority for confirmation [the appointment] or
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 401

dismissal of military personnel in military districts on the territory of the Ukraine

and in all Ukrainian military units.
The General Secretariat will work out and put through in a legal form all of
the above-mentioned proposals on appointing new secretaries. [In addition to a
general secretariat for military affairs, the General Secretariat recommended else
where in the report the creation of general secretariats of justice, supply, post and
telegraph, and transport.]
The Territory of the Ukraine
On the strength of the Instruction to the General Secretariat, only five guber
niyas of the Ukrainian land fall under the jurisdiction of the General Secretariat.
This artificial and unhealthy division of the Ukrainian national body is a con
siderable additional obstacle to the planned and systematic work of the General
Secretariat of the Ukraine. It must be eliminated as soon as possible. There are
sufficiently good reasons for this in the Instruction itself, and firm steps will be
taken in accordance with it. Fully aware of all the difficulties and obstacles, and
giving, nevertheless, all of its strength in laying the foundation of the Ukraines
state life, the General Secretariat must at this historic moment, more than at any
other time, draw its strength from the very source of strengththe will of the
people. As the organ of authority of the revolutionary democracy in the Ukraine,
represented in her revolutionary parliament, the Central Rada, the General Secre
tariat is deeply convinced that its work can be carried on only in complete union
with these revolutionary-democratic forces, and the success of its work can be
based only on their confidence, sympathy, and cooperation.

363. V in n ic h en k o and O t h e r M em bers o f t h e Gen er al S ecretariat

O rdered to P etrograd
[Dimanshtein, p. 66. The other two addressees were A. N. Zarubin and I. M. Steshenko.
The telegram was sent in the middle of October. The Bolshevik Revolution took place
before any action was taken. The tone of the telegram reflected the strained relations
between the Government and the Secretariat.]
At the direction of the Minister-President I request that you come to Petro
grad without delay for personal explanations with regard to reports on agitation
in the Ukraine in favor of convoking a sovereign Constituent Assembly.
H ead o f Ch a n c eller y o f t h e
P rovisional G o ver nm en t

364. R esolutio n o f t h e T h ir d U k rainian M ilitary C ongress o n t h e

A p p o in t m e n t s of t h e P rovisional G o v er nm en t , O ctober 19,1917
[Dimanshtein, p. 20S. Another evidence of Ukrainian hostility toward the Provisional
Government on the eve of the October Revolution. The situation created by that event
is discussed in the studies cited in the introduction to Part H.]
The Ukrainian Military Congress, having discussed the demonstrative ap
pointment by the Provisional Government of persons to responsible posts in the
Ukraine without the consent of the Central Rada, has resolved: 1) to ignore com
pletely the appointment of Mr. K. Vasilenko as Commissar of the city of Kiev and
not to recognize him as a Commissar; 2) to consider the appointment of a person
402 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

without the knowledge of the Central Rada to the very responsible post of Com
missar of the Kiev District as an act unquestionably detrimental and inadmissible.
In view of this, the Ukrainian Military Congress suggests that all military units
and persons do not carry out the orders of the head of the district until he is
appointed with the approval of the Central Rada.

BELORUSSIA

365. T h e D eclaration o f t h e B elorussian N a tio n al Co n feren ce

[Reck?, No. 74, March 29, 1917, p. 4; Dimanshtein, p. 267. This conference created
the Belorussian National Committee, which represented a wide range of ethnic and
political elements in the Belorussian area.]
Minsk, March 27.The Belorussian National Congress of representatives of
all political parties and classes of Belorussia, convoked in Minsk on March 25,
hails the Great Russian Revolution, which has brought us freedom and the ap
proaching realization of an autonomous regime in Belorussia. The Congress ex
presses complete readiness to support the Russian Provisional Government in its
struggle with the external enemy as well as with the cringing servants of the old
regime in order to achieve freedom for Russia and her peoples, and it passes its
executive functions to the Belorussian National Committee. The latter must, in
cooperation with the Provisional Government, organize the administration of
Belorussia. Sincerely desirous of participating in the great work of [organizing]
a Russian state of free peoples, the Belorussian National Congress feels sure that
its national leading organ will strive to improve the condition of its native land
and, with the support of the entire population of Belorussia, will contribute to
the development of Russia on the principles of a federated democratic-republican
order. To achieve the said aim, the Congress commissions its delegates to contact
the Provisional Government.

366. S ta te m e n t o f t h e B elor ussia n N atio n al C o m m itt ee

[Dimanshtein, pp. 271-72.]
Elected by the Congress of Belorussian Public Leaders on March 25, the Belo
russian National Committee has as its aim the cultural-national regeneration of
the Belorussian people as expressed by the gradual mobility of the historic de
velopment of various nationalities and the need of all mankind for culture and
progress.

1. Recognizing that a federated-democratic republic is the best form of na

tional government for Russia, populated by scores of nationalities, the Committee
thinks that an autonomous order is necessary for Belorussia within the borders
of Russia in order to guarantee a free development of the Belorussian people and
full rights to other peoples inhabiting Belorussia. Economic ties and those wide
opportunities that, with the revolution, opened to democratic Russia bind us to
the Russian federated-democratic republic. Consequently, the Belorussian Na
tional Committee deems it necessary to warn against those people who, disguised
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 403

by Belorussian names, advocate joining Poland or any other state. Such people,
in so far as they act in its name, the Belorussian National Committee declares
agents provocateurs.

3 . Recognizing that the agrarian question in its general outlines will be

resolved by the Russian Constituent Assembly, the Belorussian National Com
mittee thinks that a detailed solution of this question in Belorussia is up to a
Regional Belorussian Rada, called on the principle of equal, universal, direct, and
secret suffrage.
4. The Belorussian National Committee considers nationalization of the
schools necessary.

367. R esolution of th e C onference of t h e Organizations of the

B elorussian S ocialist H romada ( in Early A pril )
[Dimanshtein, p. 269. The Hromada had the support of most of the Belorussian
refugees in Russia proper and the Ukraine. It demanded territorial autonomy, whereas
the National Committee emphasized cultural autonomy.]
1. Inasmuch as the struggle with the old regime is not completely ended, the
Conference considers it urgent to support the Provisional Government in the
struggle with the old regime in order to strengthen the new one.
2. While supporting the Provisional Government in the struggle to strengthen
the new order, the Conference of the BSH deems it extremely urgent to prepare
energetically for the Constituent Assembly by propagandizing for a federated
republic and an autonomous Belorussia; the turning over of all lands for com
mon use; the eight-hour workday; minimum wages; equal rights for all na
tionalities, etc.

6. Expressing itself in favor of an autonomous Belorussia in the Federated

Russian Republic, the Conference resolved to begin a careful elaboration of this
question, establishing the frontiers of autonomous Belorussia in agreement with
her neighbors: Lithuanians, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and others.

368. T h e P o l it ic a l P l a t f o r m o f t h e B e l o r u s s ia n C e n t r a l R a d a
[ D im a n s h t e in , p . 2 7 6 . D u r i n g t h e s u m m e r t h e H r o m a d a g a i n e d c o n t r o l o f t h e N a t i o n a l
C o m m it t e e , r e m o v e d t h e m o r e c o n s e r v a t iv e e le m e n t s f r o m i t s r a n k s , a n d f o r m e d t h e
C e n t r a l R a d a . M e a n t im e o t h e r B e l o r u s s i a n g r o u p s h a d b e e n o r g a n iz e d , i n c l u d i n g a
B e l o r u s s i a n B o ls h e v i k p a r t y , w h i c h g r e w r a p i d l y , a n d t h e R a d a s p r o g r a m w a s c h a l
le n g e d fr o m se v e r a l s id e s . T h e P r o v is io n a l G o v e r n m e n t a p p a r e n tly g a v e lit t le a tte n
t i o n t o a n y o f t h i s a c t i v i t y .]

Representatives of the Belorussian Rada worked out [early in October] the

following principal points of [their] political platform: a Russian federated-
democratic republic, with the guarantee of rights to the minority; a council of
nationalities, electing from its members the Minister of Nationalities; equal rights
to all languages in court, school, government, and self-government; the right of
all peoples of Russia to convoke their national constituent assemblies; nationali
zation of armies and coalition with the bourgeoisie not to be tolerated; founding
of a pre-parliament to which the government is to be responsible; abolition of
404 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

capital punishment; dissolution of the State Duma and the State Council; labor
conscription; the confiscation of war profits; the transfer of land to land com
mittees; the undertaking of energetic measures in order to conclude a democratic
peace.

ESTONIA

369. T he R esolution of the E stonian N ational A ssembly on t h e

S tatus of E stonia , July 3 , 1 9 1 7
[Dimanshtein, p. 255. The election of this Assembly, which took place in the end of
June, would seem to have been based on the provisions of the law of March 30, 1917
(see Doc. 262), which provided for local self-government and the election of zemstvo
institutions, including a guberniya zemstvo assembly, in the Guberniya of Estland.
Because of the predominantly Estonian population of the guberniya, however, the
legislation and the election of the Assembly had more far-reaching implications than
would otherwise have been the case. Earlier, the Provisional Government had ap
pointed Jaan Poska, the Mayor of Revel, its Commissar for the guberniya. Later in
the fall, the Estonians received permission to organize the Estonian troops of the
Russian army under the command of Estonian officers and, still later, to form first a
regiment and then a division.]

After deliberating on the national-political ideal of the Estonian people, the

Estonian National Assembly approves the following resolution:
In the interest of the well-being of the state and the various nationalities
inhabiting it, each nationality should enjoy the unhampered right to free self-
determination. The Estonian National Assembly regards the democratic feder
ated republic as the only acceptable form of government for the nationalities of
Russia, [said democratic federated republic] to be composed of all nationalities
as members with full rights, and among them also Estonia, with the cities of Narva
and Valk to be included within her boundaries. The Estonian National Assembly
relegates to the Russian Constituent Assembly the right to enforce the national
forms. While insisting on the idea of federalism for all nationalities and among
them for the Estonian federation, with full rights, the Assembly thinks it inex
pedient to leave the matter of implementing this idea to the good will of the
Constituent Assembly alone. Rather, it thinks it necessary to march forward, step
by step and hand in hand with the Russian nationalities, with a view to establish
ing a federation, making use in the preliminary work of the resolution on tempo
rary local self-government. In this struggle the people must close their ranks to
be able, in case of need, to defend with deliberate might their state-political
demands.
Prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Govern
ment must make public the principle of autonomy of the Russian nationalities
and must introduce immediately the Estonian language in the institutions of
Estonian self-government in accordance with the proposal of the Zemstvo As
sembly.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 405

LATVIA

370. R e s o lu tio n o f t h e Land A ssem b ly o f t h e L a tv ia n P a r t o f

V idzem e (L iv o n ia ), M a rch 12-13,1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 226-27. This territory comprised about 35 per cent of the subse
quent state of Latvia. Similar assemblies met for Kurzeme (part of Kurland) and
Latgale. They appointed commissars for their regions, who were approved by the
Provisional Government. By the law of June 22, 1917 (Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 954),
zemstvo institutions were promised to Livonia and Kurland.]
1. Bearing in mind the national and historic characteristics of the Lettish
people, the Congress recognizes that it is urgently necessary to unite into one
administrative whole the entire territory inhabited by the Letts, [namely,] the
provinces of Vidzeme (Lifland), Vitebsk, and Kurzeme (Kurland), under one
name of Latvia.
2. Latvia must be an autonomous and indivisible province of Russia with
broad rights to self-determination.

371. T h e D ecisio n s o f t h e L atvian N a tio n a l P o l i t i c a l C o n fe r e n c e ,

J u ly 30, 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 247-48. Called on the initiative of the Land Assembly of Vidzeme,
the Conference included representatives of all the significant political parties and
organizations in unoccupied Latvia.]
1. The peoples of Latvia, on an equal basis with other peoples, have the right
to complete self-determination.
2. Latvia must be indivisible, uniting Lifland [Vidzeme], Kurland, and
Latgale.
Note: The inhabitants along the borders decide themselves whether they
belong to Latvia or to some other state or region.
3. Latgale as a unique component part of Latvia enjoys independence on
questions of local self-government, language, school, and church.
4. Latvia joins the Russian republic, based on democratic principles, as a
politically autonomous unit.
5. The legislative and executive power, as well as the court and local self-
government, are in the hands of the people of Latvia and her parliament [con
stituent assembly], elected on the basis of universal, direct, secret, equal, and
proportionate suffrage, with no distinction as to sex.
6. The assembly protests against annexations and in general against any
attempt to establish the national-legal position of Latvia and her frontiers without
the people of Latvia and their decision on this question.
406 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

LITHUANIA

372. T h e R esolution of the L ithuanian N ational Council ,

M arch 13, 1917
[VVP, No. 13, March 19, 1917, p. 3; Dimanshtein, pp. 261-62. Organized by the
Lithuanian deputies in the Duma, the Council included representatives of the Lithu
anian National Catholic Union, Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, the Party of
National Progress, the Party of the Democratic Union of National Freedom, the Demo
cratic Party of Lithuania (Popular-Socialists), and the Social Democratic Party of
Lithuania. Although almost all of Lithuania was occupied by the Germans, the mem
bers of the Council hoped for an eventual Allied victory and the grant by Russia to
Lithuania of political autonomy. The decisions of the Council were considered by the
Provisional Government and its Juridical Council, but no action was taken. See
Zhurnaly, No. 24, March 19, 1917.]
The Lithuanian National Council, having discussed the situation, recognized:
that in ethnographic, cultural, and economic respects Lithuania is an indivisible
political whole; that in organizing the life of Lithuania all of the nationalities
inhabiting her must enjoy equal rights and all of them must be guaranteed a free
development and participation in the government of Lithuania; that Lithuania
must constitute an independent administrative unit. Moreover, the government
of Lithuania must be entrusted to organs and persons chosen from the population
of Lithuania.
In order to implement the above-mentioned decisions, the Lithuanian National
Council resolved to form a temporary committee to govern Lithuania, composed
of twelve persons elected by the Lithuanian National Council; to suggest to other
nationalities inhabiting Lithuaniathe Belorussians, Poles, Russians, and Jews
to send their representatives to the Temporary Committee to Govern Lithuania:
six from the Belorussians, three from the Jews, two from the Poles, and one from
the Russians; to bring to the attention of the Provisional Government and the
Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies the fact of the formation of the Tem
porary Committee to govern Lithuania, which must be entrusted with the govern
ment of Lithuania and the preparation for the convening of the Constituent As
sembly of Lithuania on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret voting
with no discrimination as to sex. The Constituent Assembly is to enforce the form
of government for Lithuania, as well as Lithuanian relations with the neighboring
nationalities.

373. T h e R esolution of t h e General L ithuanian C onference (S e j m )

in P etrograd, June 1917
[Rech, No. 131, June 7,1917, p. 4; Dimanshtein, p. 262.]
The Sejm resolved: 1) all of ethnographic Lithuania must become an inde
pendent state, permanently neutralized; 2) its neutrality must be guaranteed at
the international peace conference; 3) representatives from the Lithuanian popu
lation must also participate in this congress; and, finally, 4) the form of gov
ernment in the newly organized Lithuania and her internal organization must be
implemented by the Constituent Assembly of Lithuania convened on the basis of
universal, equal, direct, and secret election.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 407

374. A German V iew of t h e F uture of L ithuania

[Matthias Erzberger to the Imperial Chancellor, July 18, 1917 (N.S.), GFO, File 1499,
fr. D628040-046.]

His Excellency
The Imperial Chancellor Dr. Michaelis
Your Excellency:
After the adoption by the Reichstag, by a large majority, of the peace reso
lutions with whose basic ideas Your Excellency declared himself in agreement,
I hold it to be my first duty to pursue the path already trodden with unflinching
consistency and full knowledge of our goal in order to attain soon an honorable
peace. The prime prerequisite for this is that all obstacles thereto be set aside,
in so far as lies within the power of the Empire. In this connection the obstacles
both in the East and in the West are to be considered.

As regards the East, and quite apart from Poland, the immediate settlement
of the Lithuanian question is most urgently needed. The Lithuanians living in
Russia have demanded a completely neutral Lithuania. The desires of the Lithu
anians living in Switzerland tend in the same direction. The German Empire must
create the independent State of Lithuania within the next few months. A National
Council must meet and promulgate constitutional forms. I have in mind an inde
pendent Duchy of Lithuania, with the German Emperor to be Duke of Lithuania.
The country itself would not enter the German Federation but would conclude a
customs union and a series of other treaties. This Duchy of Lithuania should be
made as extensive as possible; the governments of ViFna and Kovno, the majority
of whose population is Lithuanian, should be included. The Lithuanian people
will be happy to take this road, according to many conversations I have had for
some time with prominent Lithuanians. The country is wholly Catholic and for
that reason is already inclined toward the West. The early conclusion of a con
cordat with Rome will further increase this inclination. I am firmly convinced
that this entire State can be created if the matter is entrusted to a person who can
pursue the above goal with complete freedom and independence. Should Lith
uania become an independent State, Russia cannot protest against this. We shall
thus have secured our Eastern frontier on a basis of amicable agreement. It is
not a question of forcible acquisition of territory, but rather of the best pro
tection for our Eastern provinces. The sooner the setting up of the State is accom
plished, the sooner shall we attain peace, since another important obstacle will
have been removed and our wishes satisfied.
During my stay in Switzerland I had full opportunity to speak with highly
respected Lithuanians and to win them over to this plan, in so far as they them
selves did not already share the idea. This settlement of the Lithuanian question
is of infinitely more worth to us Germans than any new strategic frontier and
brings a people of 4-5 million as friends and allies to us.
408 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

THE MOSLEM MOVEMENTS

375. T h e Call for an A ll -Russian M oslem Congress

[Dimanshtein, pp. 292-93. Issued by the Moslem Conference held in Petrograd from
March 15 to 17, 1917, by the members of the Moslem faction in the Duma and other
invited local representatives. Moslems throughout Russia responded by choosing dele
gates for the Congress.]
1. Resolved: to organize in Petrograd a Provisional Central Bureau of Rus
sian Moslems.
This new Bureau is to be recruited in the following manner: included in it
are the members of the Moslem faction [of the Duma], the members of the Bureau
attached to it, and Moslem delegates, specially commissioned from various places
for work in the Bureau. The Provisional Central Bureau enjoys the right of
co-optation.
The Bureau is charged with the following duties: 1) calling of the All-Russian
Moslem Congress; 2) execution of preparatory work for the Congress; 3) exe
cuting the decisions of an organizational character adopted at the Conference;
4) keeping the population informed of its activity; 5) [handling] current affairs
dictated by the course of events.
2. Realizing the need of calling at the earliest possible moment the All-Russian
Congress of Moslems, the Conference outlined the following general principles
by which to be guided in calling the Congress: 1) all Moslem peoples must be
invited to participate in the forthcoming Congress; 2) the Congress should adhere,
in so far as possible, to proportional representation; 3) representatives of Moslem
public organizations must be invited: cultural and educational and philanthropic
organizations, cooperatives, small credit organizations, student organizations, etc.
With respect to the program of the Congress, the Conference, having left its
elaboration and completion to the Provisional Central Bureau, for its own part
expresses the wish that the following questions be discussed at the Congress:
A. Of a general political character: 1) form of state government, 2) coloni
zation policy, 3) agrarian question, 4) labor question, 5) organization of the
countrys armed forces, 6) attitude toward the war.
B. Of a cultural national character: 7) cultural and national self-determi-
nation.
C. Religious organization, education, organization of the court, local self-
government, and the right to language, etc.
3. The Congress must be called not later than May 1.
4. It was recognized as necessary that the Provisional Central Bureau publish
nonperiodic bulletins entitled Izvestiia Vremennogo TsentraVnogo Buro Rossii-
skikh MusuFman in order to acquaint the population and the Russian press with
its activity and the activity of the Moslem faction, as well as the course of pre
paratory work for the Congress and other matters and measures prompted by the
course of events.
In addition to these decisions, the Conference expressed the wish that the fol
lowing be invited to participate in the Congress: 1) representatives from Moslem
soldiers both from the Petrograd Garrison and from various Moslem military units
(the Crimean Regiment, the Caucasian Division, the Osetin Regiments, the Turk-
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 409

men Regiment, and others); 2) women Moslems, as individuals and as repre

sentatives of Moslem womens organizations.

376. T h e R e so lu tio n s o f t h e F ir s t A ll-R u ssia n M o slem C ongress,

M o s c o w , M ay 1-11,1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 294-304. At the conclusion of the Congress an appeal was issued
for unity among Russian Moslems. Ibid., pp. 3 0 6 -7 .]

The Form of Government

The All-Russian Moslem Congress, having discussed the question about the
form of government in Russia, resolved: [a] to recognize that the form of gov
ernment in Russia that guards best the interests of the Moslem peoples is a demo
cratic republic on national territorial-federal principles; moreover, the nationali
ties that do not possess definite territory enjoy national cultural autonomy;
b) to regulate the general spiritual-cultural questions of the Moslem peoples of
Russia and their common affairs by organizing a central general Moslem organ
for all Russia, with legislative functions in this sphere.
The form, composition, and function of this organ are to be defined by the
first constituent congress of representatives from all autonomous units.

On Military Organizations
1. Military conscription must be abolished. In the event, however, that the
need should arise for the existence of a regular army, because of a struggle with
any kind of militarism, the army must be national.
2. Should the need for a regular army be recognized after the close of the
war, separate Moslem units should be created.

Cultural and Educational Matters

1. Control over educational and cultural matters must be in the hands of
individual nationalities, who exercise their right through specially elected organs
of each nationality.
2. Teaching in elementary schools must be conducted in the mother tongue
of each group of the Turkic peoples. Teaching of the general Turkic language
must be compulsory in the secondary schools. Teaching in higher schools is in
the general Turkic language.
3. Universal, compulsory, and free elementary education must be introduced.
4. All elementary schools must be of one type without division into secular
and ecclesiastical.
5. The system of schools must permit the free passing from the lower to the
higher schools without examinations.
6. The Russian language must be taught in schools as a separate subject.
7. Teachers and students of all nationalities in Russia should enjoy equal
rights in every respect.

11. Depending on local conditions, it is desirable that boys and girls be taught
together.
410 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

12. In the event that the number of Moslem boys reaches three in schools of
other nationalities, they must be taught their mother tongue and religion at the
expense of the state.

1 8 . In order to prepare a teaching personnel for secondary schools, special

Turkic departments must be introduced in Russian higher schools and in [teacher-
training] courses.
1 9 . With the opening of the 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 academic year, teachers of national
schools must be granted equal rights with the teachers of Russian schools and the
same compensation.
20. Persons educated abroad should not be prohibited from teaching in Mos
lem schools.

The Temporary Religious Organization of the Moslems

Having discussed in several sessions the question of the religious organization
of the Moslems, and having taken into consideration that the question of sepa
ration of the church from the state must be resolved at a special conference, the
section on religious matters came to the following decisions:
1. It is necessary to organize a temporary religious administration to satisfy
the spiritual needs of the Moslem population subject to the jurisdiction of the
Orenburg Religious Council, and for the Kirghiz population should they express
the wish to recognize the spiritual leadership of this administration.
Note: Delegates from the Turgai, Ural, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk oblasts,
present at the Congress, declared that the Kirghiz of these oblasts are ready to
join the Orenburg Mufti.
2. Irrespective of the question of separation or nonseparation of the church
from the state, it is nevertheless necessary to outline the form and location of
religious organizations.
Temporary organization and function of the religious
administration [Dukhovnoe Upravlenie]
1. Ordinary current affairs.
2. Supervision over all Moslem religious matters (approval of imams and
muezzins, establishment of parishes, permission to build mosques, control over
the teaching of religion in medres and Russian schools, looking after the needs
of the Moslem soldiers, and supervision over military mullahs).
3. Undertaking all necessary measures with regard to persons wishing to
embrace Islam.
4. Strengthening of vakufs.10
5. Taking care that the Moslem population observe Fridays, as well as other
religious holidays, as days of rest.
6. All business correspondence within the religious administration and in its
relations with the Moslems must be carried on in the Turko-Tartar language.
Papers addressed to the Russian institutions, however, must be in the Russian
language.
7. Immediate organization of parishes.11
10 Lands held in usufruct by the Moslem clergy.
11 The Congress ignored the traditional and officially sanctioned authority of the Mufti of
Orenburg, and appointed a new Mufti for Russian Moslems, Alimdzhan Barudi.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 411

The National Central Council [Shura]

Deeming it desirable for all Russian Moslems to unite under one political flag,
the Congress passes the following resolution:
1. The All-Russian Moslem Congress deems it necessary to establish a general
line of conduct and solidarity of action for all political parties and organizations
that have a place among the Russian Moslems.
2. In order to realize the above-mentioned, the Congress thinks it is necessary
to elect a Central National Council with representatives of both various peoples
and various classes.
3 . The National Council will guide the Moslems prior to the Constituent
Assembly.
4. All local organizations, prior to the Constituent Assembly, must obey all
those resolutions of the National Council that will be in harmony with the reso
lutions of the Congress.

377. T h e S e c o n d A l l - R u s s i a n M o s l e m C o n g r e s s , K a z a n ,
J uly 2 1 -3 1 , 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 312-20. A Congress of Moslem Clergy and a Moslem Military

Congress met in Kazan at the same time. The latter convened despite the objections
of Minister of War Kerensky (Rech\ No. 153, July 2, 1917, p. 3), who considered it
untimely in view of the seriousness of current operations on the front.]

Resolution of the Moslem Military Congress

The organization of the army
For the purpose of organizing the Moslem army, it was resolved to create an
All-Russian Central Military Shura (council).
A. The composition of the Shura. 1) The Shura is recruited from repre
sentatives of the army, the district troops, the fleet, and various army units elected
at the Congress, and of twelve members also elected at the Congress irrespective
of their affiliation with any particular army unit. District troops and units that
are not represented may send their local delegates. The armies, district troops,
and other units reserve the right to replace their deputies in the Shura.

B. Headquarters and branches of the Shura. The Shura will be located in

Kazan. In Petrograd and at the National Council it was resolved to open
branches, whose membership is left to the discretion of the Shura. Representa
tives of the Shura must be present at Stavka, and at the front as commissars of
the Shura,
C. Rights and responsibilities of the Shura. The Shura is the supreme organ
of the Moslem army men. It possesses plenary authority within the limits of the
resolutions of the Congress. In urgent cases the Shura may call conferences com
posed of representatives of military and district committees.

The organization in the rear. Moslem soldiers dispersed in small groups

through various garrisons must be brought together [and stationed] in cities with
a Moslem population. Military garrison committees must be organized in gar
412 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

risons where there are Moslem army men. And in military districts, committees
[should be organized].
The organization at the front. Moslem soldiers of a division must be brought
together in one of the regiments of said division where division and army com
mittees are to be organized. If there are no committees in points of location of
the fleet, artillery, combat engineering, cavalry, and other units, they must be
organized and must establish contact with army and district committees.

From the Resolutions of the Second All-Russian Moslem Congress

The Second All-Russian Moslem Congress, bearing in mind the interests of
the Moslem democracy and wishing to have as many representatives from the
Moslem population as possible in the Constituent Assembly, resolved to adopt the
following platform for the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia:
1) Wide national and cultural autonomy for the Moslems of Inner Russia
and Siberia.
2) The resolution of the question on the form of government of Turkestan,
Kirghiz, the Caucasus, and the Crimea is left to the populations of these regions
themselves.
In the solution of this question representatives of the Moslems of Inner Russia
and Siberia must support the proposal of the representatives of the above-named
regions.
3) Udel, Kabinet, church, monastery, and privately owned lands must be
transferred into the hands of the toiling people without redemption.
4) The eight-hour working day, compulsory insurance of workers at the
expense of the state, and, on the labor question, the realization of the program-
minimum of socialist parties.
5) The persons who passed this platform are obliged to join the Moslem
faction at the Constituent Assembly.

Tactics and the pre-election campaign

1) The Moslems who adopt the present platform during elections to the Con
stituent Assembly shall constitute one list.
2) If the system of merging lists proves to be profitable to the Moslems, it is
permissible to form a bloc with other socialist parties.

On the recommendation of the womens faction the following addendum is

approved:
During elections to the Constituent Assembly women must act together with
men; consequently, places for women must be reserved in the pre-election or
ganizations.

Decisions of the Joint Session of the Moslem Congresses

The joint session of the Congresses, All-Russian Moslem, Military and Mul
lahs, having heard the information in the statements by the delegations of the
EastTurkish, Egyptian, Indian, and Persianaddressed to the Stockholm Con
ference, resolved: to apprise the Provisional Government of the necessity of
launching a vigorous and consistent national policy in recognizing the right of
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 413

complete national self-determination not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa
as well.
Free Russia must be emphatic on this question.
Therein lies the greatness of her universal historic mission and pledge of
enforcing the new regime inside the country.

The joint session of the three Congressesclergy, military, and general Mos
lemhaving discussed the question of the cultural and national self-determina
tion of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia, and taking into consideration
the resolutions of the First All-Russian Congress of Moslems, resolved:
1) To begin immediately, without awaiting the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly, the implementation of cultural and national self-determination;
2) To authorize the Second All-Russian Congress of Moslems, now in session
in Kazan, to draw up a detailed proposal on the organization of organs of self-
determination.

378. A ppeal of the N ational Central Council to th e P rovisional

Government on M oslem N ational and Cultural A utonomy
[Dimanshtein, pp. 318-20. The Moslem National Assembly met in Ufa on November
20, 1917.]
The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Moslem [National Central]
Council made the following presentation to the Provisional Government:
Forwarding herewith the presentation of the National Administration of the
Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia, of September 30 of this year, for the atten
tion of the Provisional Government, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian
Moslem Council, as the general Moslem representative central organ, agrees fully
with the resolution adopted at the joint session of three congresses (Second All-
Russian Moslem, First All-Russian Military, and All-Russian Congress of Mul
lahs) held on July 22 of this year in the city of Kazan, which proclaimed the
cultural and national autonomy of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia. It
does not doubt that the revolutionary government will satisfy all the petitions
outlined in the attached presentation of said Administration as those based on
the great principles gained by the revolution of national self-determination and
freedom of conscience.
A detailed elaboration of the draft law on the cultural and national life of the
Russian Moslems, which, following the study and approval of it by the Constituent
Assembly, will have to change sharply and fundamentally the legislation in the
code of laws in question, will follow in the very near future during the sessions
of the National Assembly which are to be called.
A k h m ed T salikov , President of the Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Moslem Council
S ham il , Acting Secretary

At the joint session of the three Congressesthe Second All-Russian Moslem,

the First All-Russian Military, and the All-Russian Congress of Mullahson July
22, 1917, in Kazan, cultural and national autonomy was proclaimed and it was
resolved to begin its implementation immediately.
414 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

For this purpose, in accordance with the resolution of the Congresses, and
prior to the calling of the National Assembly, a Provisional National Adminis
tration was formed, consisting of three departments: religious, educational, and
financial, with appropriate local organs.
The religious department was formed from the Orenburg Moslem Ecclesiastic
Assembly, which had existed formerly, by changing it into a Religious Depart
ment of the National Administration of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia,
while preserving the membership as well as the competence of the institution as
established at the First All-Russian Congress of the Moslems in Moscow.
A memorandum on the subsequent changes in the membership and compe
tence of the Ecclesiastic Assembly, following the revolution, was submitted at one
time to the Minister of the Interior by the Commissar of the Provisional Govern
ment and Member of the State Duma, I. A. Akhtiamov. Moreover, the wishes of
the Moslems regarding the reorganization of their spiritual institutions were
brought to the attention of the Provisional Government in the form of resolutions
of the First All-Russian Moslem Congress, May 1-12, 1917.
The Department of Education of the National Administration has charge of
and administers the teaching-training of the Moslems under the jurisdiction of
the Orenburg Muftiat in all educational institutions opened for them by both the
Moslems and the government and local organs of self-government.
The function of the Department of Finance, in addition to having charge of
the funds of the institutions under the jurisdiction of the National Administration,
consists, to the extent that local organs are formed, in proposing to the state insti
tutions and organs of local self-government that the sums assigned to the educa
tional needs of the Moslems, on coming to the Financial Department, be spent
according to the direction and leadership of the latter.
In addition, a special Collegium on Implementing Cultural and National
Autonomy of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia is formed, whose chief
responsibility is the calling of the First National Assembly in accordance with
the statute specially worked out and adopted at the Congress.
Bringing the above to the attention of the Provisional Government, the Na
tional Administration of Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia requests the fol
lowing:
1) With respect to the Religious Department of the National Administration
of the Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia, to give appropriate orders that in
the future all government institutions, in particular the guberniya commissariats,
refer matters dealing with the spiritual-religious needs of the Moslems to the
Religious Department and that they get in touch with said departments instead
of with the former Orenburg Moslem Ecclesiastic Assembly (city of U fa).
2) Recognizing that the Department of Education of the National Adminis
tration of Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia is the highest organ of supervision
and leadership in the matter of teaching-training work of the Moslems, to grant it
the right to open and close all Moslem institutions of learning, to appoint and
dismiss teachers of these institutions, and to issue certificates to teach in all Mos
lem schools.
With this, all the enumerated functions must be taken out of the jurisdiction
of regional administrations.
Having abolished the laws regulating the teaching-training work in the Mos
lem schools, to grant the right to said schools to use the native tongue.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 415

To notify all government institutions and organs of local self-government of

all the enumerated changes in order that the latter may communicate in the future
directly with the Department of Education of the National Administration of the
Moslems of Inner Russia and Siberia on all matters of teaching-training work.
M uftii Galiev , Chairman of the Religious Department
S adrii M aksudov , Chairman of the Collegium on Implementing
Cultural and National Autonomy
A. Shinasi, Acting Chairman of the Department of Education
Sh . Alkin, Acting Chairman of the Department of Finances
City of Ufa. September 30,1917

379. T h e P rogram of th e Crimean T artars

[From an editorial in Golos Tatar, No. 1, in Dimanshtein, pp. 329-30.]
. . . At the present time the Tartar democracy can openly declare in its own
organ what constitutes its political program and for whom it is dangerous.
1. Jointly with all political groups, the Tartar democracy deems it its duty to
prepare the Tartar people for the moment when the master of the Russian land,
the Constituent Assembly, convenes.
2. In the Constituent Assembly the Tartar people will strive to establish a
federated democratic republic.
3. In harmony with other peoples inhabiting the Crimea, the Tartar people
will not demand political autonomy for themselves. But they will not tolerate
the establishment in the Crimea of a political hegemony of any one nation that
has neither cultural, historic, nor ethnographic rights to it.
4. In the Constituent Assembly the Tartar democracy will demand the transfer
of all land to the toiling peoples.
5. The Tartar people demand the return into the vakuf fund of all plundered
lands and vakuf capital appropriated by the old regime.
6. The Tartar people demand for ihemselves national cultural autonomy as
a necessary factor for a free development of the national self-consciousness.
7. The toiling Tartar people demand the abolition of the class privileges that
exist for some Tartars (Murzaks). The latter, as a matter of fact, had been up
to this time dreadful leeches and the cause of much suffering.
8. The Tartar democracy sets itself the aim of guarding the general national
interests. Consequently it supports wholeheartedly the creative work of the Pro
visional Government in so far as it does not contradict the ideology of the revolu
tionary party.
9. The Tartar people insist that the Tartar soldiers in the rear be formed into
special military units to serve at the front in defending the country from the cruel
enemy.

Such, in general outlines, is our program. Such are our aims.

The implementation of this program is carried out unflinchingly and vigor
ously by the organized will characteristic of the revolutionary Tartar democracy.
The people feel that their salvation lies in the realization of these tasks.
Centuries of suffering have failed to shake their faith in a better future. Slowly
and steadily in solid ranks they move toward their ideal. No rude name-callings
416 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

emanating from the disgracefully behaving ignorant Tartar bourgeoisie will stop
this onward march. The Tartar people are simply not their fellow travelers. And
everyone who stands in the way of the peoples elemental force will be swept aside
like a heavy log obstructing the road to the kingdom of freedom and human
happiness.

380. T h e S econ d K azak h -K irgh iz C on gress in O renburg, J u ly 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 362-63. The Kazakh-Kirghiz, following a decade of growing re
sentment over Russian colonization of their grazing lands, rose against the tsarist
government in 1916 when their traditional exemption from military service was
rescinded in order to draft them for noncombatant duties. In the suppression of the
revolt many of them lost their lives, lands, and livestock. The draft was discontinued
by the Provisional Government. See Doc. 383.
As a result of the Second Congress, a Kazakh-Kirghiz political party was formed,
the Alash-Orda, which was to work for an autonomous status for the Kirghiz.]
The Congress acknowledged that Russia must be a democratic federated
parliamentary republic and that the Kirghiz oblasts must be granted autonomy.
On the land question a resolution was passed, the chief points of which were as
follows:
Prior to the land administration by the Kirghiz themselves, confiscation of
Kirghiz lands must stop immediately.
Because of the shortage of good lands in the Kirghiz steppe, plots that were
confiscated from the Kirghiz must be returned to them . . .
In Turkestan the Kirghiz must be supplied not only with land, but also with
water in sufficient quantity.
Land utilization among the Kirghiz must be on an obshchina basis (two repre
sentatives from Ferghana oblast voted for homestead ownership).

In accordance with the law passed by the Provisional Government, the volost
zemstvo is introduced only in sedentary volosts, and in nomadic [only] at the
discretion of the future oblast zemstvo assembly. The Congress, however, thinks
it necessary at this time to introduce the volost zemstvo immediately in nomadic
volosts.
The Kirghiz must have their uezd and oblast zemstvos in common with the
Russians.

In conclusion, the Congress named candidates to the Constituent Assembly

and commissioned representatives from the Kirghiz in the All-Russian Moslem
[National] Council to draw up a program for a Kirghiz political party, which
must be based on the demand for a democratic federated parliamentary republic.

381. T h e F ir s t B a sh k ir C ongress in O renburg, J u ly 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 328-29. The Bashkir delegates to the First All-Russian Moslem
Congress had withdrawn because of the refusal of the Congress to recognize their
claims for Bashkir autonomy.]
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 417

On the Question of Autonomy

The native land of the Bashkirs, the Ural region, has from time immemorial
been the cradle of the Bashkir people. The Bashkirs have not forgotten yet the
gifts of their motherland with which they are bound materially and spiritually,
which they glorify in their literature, and which helped them live in semi-inde
pendence both before they became Russian subjects and after, until the middle
of the eighteenth century, that is, up to the intensified colonization of Bashkiriia.
Now in free republican Russia this Bashkir land must free itself from the
wardship of other peoples.
The elimination of grievous consequences of material, political, and moral
oppression, the preservation of the unity of Bashkirs living among other Turkic
peoples, the prosperity of the Bashkir region within the bounds of its national
frontiersall this depends absolutely upon the ownership by the Bashkirs of
their motherland and the receipt of national and political autonomy simultane
ously with the autonomy of other adjoining Turkic peoples to the east and
southeast.
On the Question of Administration
In the character of their language Bashkirs differ from other Moslems inhabit
ing the Bashkir region. Possessing lands and waters, they do not enjoy a fair
share of the means that the zemstvo boards receive from taxes collected from the
population of the region.
Surrounded by various other nationalities, the Bashkirs were prevented from
developing their national economy as other peoples did. Consequently special
regional zemstvo boards must be established to serve the needs of the Bashkir
volosts, in the event that the general boards fail to defend the interests of the
Bashkirs in a sufficient degree. Thus it is necessary to organize independent
Bashkir volosts and regions, to act in the future independently in conducting
elections to the government organs and in the field of all other measures, etc.

In conclusion and in order to implement the resolutions it approved, the

Congress elected a Bashkir Central Shura (council) composed of thirteen persons,
which must create Tubek-Shura (regional councils) and with the aid of these try
to implement the resolutions of the Congress.

382. T h e Caucasian M oslem Congress in B aku , A pril 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 337-39. The most influential party in the Congress was the Mus-
savat.]
On the National and Political Ideals of the Caucasian Moslems
a) Having discussed the question of the national and political ideals of the
Caucasian Moslems, the Caucasian Moslem Congress resolved: to recognize that
the form of state government of Russia that would best protect the interests of
the Moslem peoples is a democratic republic on territorial federated principles.
b) Recognizing that all peoples who profess Islam are indissolubly bound
with regard to spiritual and cultural questions, the Moslem Congress deems it
necessary to form one central general Moslem organ for all of Russia with legis
lative functions to serve the indicated interests.
418 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

On the Question of Relations with the Provisional Government

The Caucasian Moslem Congress deems it necessary to support as far as
possible all the initiatives of the Provisional Government of Russia in so far as
it consistently and steadfastly carries out the principles of the declaration of
March 612 of this year, proclaimed by it with the approval of the Soviet of Soldiers
and Workers Deputies.

On the Question of Relations to Other Nationalities

The Caucasian Moslem Congress, having discussed the question of relations
to other peoples of the Russian state, resolved to support in every possible way all
the nationalities of the Russian state in their attempt to realize their national
and political ideals based on democratic principles; in particular, with the peoples
of the Caucasus, the Congress recognizes the necessity of the closest rapprochement
with the view to realizing the common democratic ideas on the principles of
mutual respect.

On the Question of the Organization of the [Military] Forces of the

Caucasian Moslems
Having heard the report of the section on the organization of the forces of the
Caucasian Moslems, the Caucasian Moslem Congress passed the following reso
lution:
1) In order to organize the forces of the Caucasian Moslems, it is necessary
first of all to take a general census of the Moslem population of the region.
2) To consolidate the forces of the Moslems of the Caucasus, two temporary
central committees must be organized: one for the northern Caucasus with Dages
tan and another for Transcaucasia.
In view of the fact that such a temporary committee has already been formed
in the northern Caucasus, it is necessary to form immediately a temporary central
committee, located in the city of Baku for the Moslems of Transcaucasia. . . .
3) In order to consolidate the actions of the Caucasian Moslems, a special
bureau of Caucasian Moslems should be formed composed of delegates of both
central committees. The bureau would meet periodically, electing from its mem
bership a permanently acting presidium. The city of Baku is designated as the
permanent location of the bureau.
4) Both temporary central committees must be obligated to form immediately
Moslem city, guberniya, okrug, uchastok9 raiion9 and village committees on broad
democratic principles; and where such committees already exist, to reorganize
them on the same principles. . . .

6) Recognizing that the representation of the Moslems in the Special Trans

caucasian Committee does not correspond to the numerical strength of the Moslem
population of the region, and in order to protect the interests of the Transcau
casian Moslems, the Caucasian Moslem Congress deems it necessary to strengthen
the composition of the Special Transcaucasian Committee by introducing new

See Doc. 134.

 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 419

Moslem members, with equal rights, and in proportion to the numerical strength
of the population.13

383. T he P rovisional G overnment D iscontinues t h e D rafting o f N on -

R ussians (Inorodtsy) and D ecides to I ntroduce a N ew A dministrative
O rder in T urkestan
[Zhurnaly, No. 13, March 9, 1917.]
Resolved:
To permit the Minister of War: 1) to issue the necessary orders for discon
tinuing the drafting of non-Russians [inorodtsy] and 2) to create a special local
commission for the purpose of working out a new system of administration in
the Turkestan Krai, publishing the decisions of the Provisional Government for
general information.

384. T h e A rrest of General K uropatkin by th e Tash kent S oviet

[Iz Dnevnika A. N. Kuropatkina, KA, XX (1927), 61-62. Kuropatkin was subse
quently recalled and replaced by the Turkestan Committee. See Doc. 385 below. G. I.
Broido, a Russian Socialist Revolutionary, was the leader of the Soviet, the great
majority of which were Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.]
March 31
I have been notified that I am under house arrest. The Soviet of Soldiers*
Deputies appointed Colonel Cherkess, the military administrative officer of the city
of Tashkent, Commander of Armies. Subjected to house arrest together with me
are the Chief of Staff of the District, Major General Sivers, a man of crystal [char
acter], and General Erofeev, who was very strict and even rude with the troops.
The reason for the arrest: they had to take power into their hands. Cause: ship
ment of rifles in order to arm the Russian population. No documents were exam
ined. The decision was made in advance. In charge of all matters was a Jewish
soldier, Broido, a lawyer. The intelligent members of the Executive Committee
were opposed to this decision. They saw a considerable portion of the documents.
They were convinced of the complete soundness [<sc] of the orders, but could do
nothing: the revolutionary wave has reached me also. For a whole month I fought
to introduce the new order of free Russia, with no upheavals, with no bloodshed.
And I have achieved great results: in five oblasts of the Turkestan region not one
drop of blood was shed during the entire month of March.

385. T h e E stablishm ent of t h e T urkestan Comm ittee

[So6. Uzak,, I, 1, No. 462. Five members were Russian and four were Moslem. See
Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 89.]
I. For the purpose of establishing stable order and organizing [the internal
administration] of the Turkestan Krai on the basis publicly proclaimed by the
Provisional Government on March 6, 1917,14 and for the local settlement of all

See Doc. 390.

14 See Doc. 134.
420 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

questions that may arise concerning the administration of the Krai, a Turkestan
Committee shall be appointed consisting of member of the State Duma Nikolai
Nikolaevich Shchepkin, member of the First State Duma Bukeikhanov, member
of the Second State Duma Mikhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, member of the Third
State Duma Sadri Niazamovich Maksutov, Vladimir Sergeevich Elpatevskii,
Aleksandr Lavrentevich Lipovskii, Pavel Ivanovich Preobrazhenskii, Orest
Avenirovich Shkapskii, and Major General AbdelAzis Azisovich Davletshin.
II. The authority of the Chairman of the above-mentioned Committee shall
be vested in member of the State Duma Nikolai Nikolaevich Shchepkin.
III. The above Committee shall be empowered to act on behalf of the Provi
sional Government within the boundaries of the three ancient oblasts of the
Turkestan Krai (Samarkand, Syr Darya, Ferghana), the Transcaspian and
Semirechensk oblasts, as well as Khiva and Bukhara.

P rince L V ov, Minister-President

[and other ministers]
April 7,1917

386. T h e T urkestan M oslem Congress, A pril 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 345-46. The Turkestan Moslem Central Council, organized by the
Congress, established local units throughout the territory. The movement for autonomy
was weaker here than in other Moslem areas, but the overwhelming Moslem majority
was concerned about various schemes of the Russian minority to put limitations upon
their suffrage in local and national elections. The Russian population, on the other
hand, was alarmed by the possibility of being decisively outvoted in any unrestricted
balloting. On his return to Petrograd, Kuropatkin expressed this fear to Prince Lvov
and Kerensky, pointing out the backwardness of the natives and placing the blame on
tsarist policies. According to Kuropatkin, Kerensky agreed that the natives could not
yet be given equality of rights. Iz Dnevnika A. N. Kuropatkina, KA, XX (1927),
65-66.]
The first day of the Congress was devoted to the elaboration of the program
of the Congress. The following agenda was worked out: 1) the attitude toward
the new government; 2) the future political regime of Russia; 3) preparation
for the Constituent Assembly; 4) the establishment of the means for governing
Turkestan: a) organs of self-government, legislature, court procedures, etc.,
b) ecclesiastic administration, medres and vakuf, c) the administration of
finances, d) the organization of public education (school and out-of-school edu
cation) , e) the system of election to organs of civic and clerical administration,
f) the liquidation of the old organs of administration and the introduction in
their place of temporary new organs, g) the establishment of a central Moslem
ecclesiastic administration for Turkestan and native courts of general regional
character; 5) land and water questions; 6) the food question; 7) the question
of war and of drafting the Moslems of Turkestan for defense work; 8) the estab
lishment of means of acquainting the Turkestan Moslems with the events of the
day; 9) the creation of a central general regional Moslem Council; 10) the
definition of the relations of the Moslem councils already functioning with other
general local public and political organizations; 11) the question of delegating
Turkestan representatives to the All-Russian Congress of Moslems; 12) current
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 421

questions [arising in connection with] the report of the participants of the

Congress.
With regard to the first point, a resolution was passed to the effect that the
Provisional Government should be under the supervision of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies and the people. On the second point the Congress adopted
a resolution on the need of establishing in Russia a democratic republic on feder
ated principles.
During the first day of the session the Congress discussed the question of
clarifying its attitude toward the events in Bukhara in connection with the con
stitution announced by the Bukhara Emir. The Congress decided to send a tele
gram to the executive committee in Bukhara and to the Emir sharply condemning
the action of the reactionaries and expressing its readiness to defend to its best
ability the actions of the Young Bukharists.

387. T h e Jurisdiction and D uties of the Commissar General of t h e

P rovisional Government for t he A dministration of t h e T urkestan
K rai and of the T urkestan Committee of the P rovisional G overnment
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1514. On the same day the post of Commissar for Turkestan
Affairs attached to the Provisional Government was created. The Commissar was to
act as the representative in Petrograd of the Commissar General and the Turkestan
Committee, and all relations between central government institutions and the Turkestan
authorities were to be conducted through his office. Ibid., No. 1513.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The administration of the Turkestan Krai is entrusted to the Commissar
General of the Provisional Government for the administration of the Turkestan
Krai, who is the representative of the Provisional Government for all affairs of
the Krai.
II. The following are attached to the Commissar General to assist him in the
administration of the Krai: 1) two assistantsone for civil and one for military
affairs, who are appointed by the Provisional Government, but who are directly
subordinate to the Commissar General, and 2) the Turkestan Committee of the
Provisional Government, consisting, under the chairmanship of the Commissar
General, of his assistants and members as appointed by the Provisional Govern
ment.
Note: The assistant of the Commissar General for military affairs is ex officio
Commander in Chief of the Turkestan Military District and enjoys all rights
attached to that office with respect to appointment and dismissal of military ranks.

V. In particular, the duties of the Commissar General include: 1) the admin

istration of the frontier affairs of the Krai and direct relations with the Emir of
Bukhara and with the Khan of Khiva;15 2) the appointment and dismissal of

15These principalities had been Russian protectorates since 1868 and 1873, respectively.
During the tenure of the Provisional Government, efforts were made by the liberal Moslem
parties in each, and by the Provisional Government in both, to institute political reforms, but
with very limited success. See the Bibliography in Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet
Union, pp. 309-10; Iz istorii natsionalnoi politiki Vremennogo Pravitelstva, KA, XXX
(1928), 71-79, for the proposed constitution for Khiva drafted by the Turkestan Committee;
and Bukhara v 1917 godu, ibid., XX (1927), pp. 78-122, for materials on Bukhara.
422 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

officials in the Krai, according to section VIII of the present Statute; 3) proposals
to the Provisional Government for the appointment and dismissal of oblast com
missars ; 4) the supervision of all government and public institutions and officials
within the Turkestan Krai, with the exception of institutions and officers of the
State Control, the State Bank, and the judicial department. The Commissar
General has the right to request of institutions and persons information and
original records possessed by them and, in cases which brook of no delay, to
remove from office any officials of the Krai both in government and public service,
with the exceptions mentioned above.

IX. The terms of reference of the Turkestan Committee include: 1) considera

tion of legislative bills concerning the Turkestan Krai originating within the
Krai, and preparation of opinions on all legislative bills of the Provisional
Government relating specially to the Turkestan Krai; 2) reporting to the Provi
sional Government concerning the difficulties of applying particular measures
laid down by law in the Krai, because of local conditions; 3) preparing compul
sory ordinances on the matter of ensuring public peace, order, and safety, cover
ing the entire Turkestan Krai, and considering, from the point of view of expe
diency, and, if necessary, amending and abrogating, compulsory ordinances on
all subjects promulgated within the Krai, as well as amending, suspending, and
abrogating the general orders and circulars . . . ; 4) working out measures to
unify the activity of local government and public institutions and persons on
matters concerning the entire Krai, and 5) considering other matters submitted
to the Committee by the Commissar General.
Note: In important cases, when the application of a new statute may involve
especially important consequences for the Krai, the Commissar General is author
ized, by agreement with the Committee, and without carrying out the measures
mentioned in the law, to bring the obstacles encountered to the knowledge of the
Provisional Government.
X. Copies of all general enactments for the various departments which are
subject to execution by local institutions in the Turkestan Krai are, simultaneously
with the dispatch of the orders of these institutions, forwarded by the respective
ministers and chief directors to the Commissar General of the Provisional Govern
ment for the administration of the Turkestan Krai, which after consideration of
such in the Turkestan Committee, in case difficulties are encountered in their
execution, so informs the respective ministers, and in especially important cases
suspends the execution of the enactment pending receipt of further instructions.
If the Minister disagrees with the opinion of the Commissar General, the matter
is submitted to the Provisional Government for settlement.
A. K erensky, Minister-President
A. D em ianov, for the Minister of Justice
August 26, 1917

388. T h e A ttempt of the S oviet and O ther R evolutionary F orces in

T ashkent to Overthrow t h e A uthority of t h e P rovisional Government
[VVP, No. 156, September 19, 1917, p. 4. The uprising was instigated by Bolshevik
and Left Socialist-Revolutionary activity among the Russian workers and influenced
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 423

by the supply difficulties noted in the article. It was also related to the growing tension
between the native population and the Russian residents, who, alarmed at the prospect
of submersion by the Moslem Turkestan majority, turned against them.]
The following information was received by the Provisional Government from
Turkestan:
Recently in connection with the food crisis, brought about by a very bad
harvest in the region and the poor supply of grain from the interior of Russia,
some irresponsible persons, by appealing to the dark instincts of the mob,
attempted to disrupt railway transport in various cities of Turkestan, chiefly
along the Tashkent and middle-Asian railway. By arbitrary acts against railway
officials and inhabitants they attempted to reduce the economic and administra
tive life of the region to complete ruin. In the city of Tashkent, on the eve of the
Moslem holidays, September 10 and 11, soldiers of the 1st and 2nd Siberian
Regiments, instigated by unknown persons, committed a number of unlawful
acts on the Tashkent railway. The soldiers, in a mob, removed Moslem passengers
from the trains, seized their hand baggage, and held up the trains. At a meeting,
called in the Alexandrovskii Park on September 12, a group of persons was
designated as a temporary revolutionary committee. Its aim was to seize power
in the Krai.
At a large meeting called for this purpose by the newly elected Tashkent
Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies, with the participation of outsiders, an
executive committee was organized. The latter decided, together with the above-
mentioned revolutionary committee, to take power into their hands.
A further meeting of the Tashkent Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
was held, with the executive committee present, which had been organized without
proper representation under the influence of demagogic pressure by irresponsible
persons from the revolutionary committee. This meeting was presided over by
Chemevskii. General Cherkes, elected by the troops and confirmed by the Pro
visional Government as Commander of Troops and appointed Assistant to the
Commissar General of the Provisional Government [March 1917], reported that
the entire membership of the committee elected at the meeting [September 12]
had been arrested by him and the Krai Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
He was thereupon subjected to wild violence and a severe beating.
On being released, the committee of the meeting, together with the above-
mentioned executive committee of the Tashkent Soviet, arrested the Commander
of Troops, Cherkes; the Commander of the Ensigns School, Colonel Savitskii;
Captain Frolov, and the Chief of Military Communications, Lieutenant Colonel
Mikhailov.
The above-mentioned revolutionary and executive [of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies] committees, taking advantage of the trusting character
of the soldiers of the units of the local garrison and proclaiming themselves the
supreme power in Tashkent, have held the city for the past days in a state of alarm.
They made night searches of private homes and did not stop at entering and
searching the quarters of the Turkestan Provisional Governments Committee.
In spite of the order from the Turkestan Committee through the prosecutor of
the Tashkent court to release the above-mentioned military persons, they continue
to keep them under arrest.
On being notified of the state of affairs, the Provisional Government took
424 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

measures for the immediate restoration of order in the Krai. It appointed the-
Commander of Troops of the Kazan5 Military District, Major General B. A.
Korovnichenko, Commissar General, and placed at his disposal the military units,
necessary to suppress the revolt by armed force.

389. T h e S uppression of the T ashkent U prising by General

K orovnichenko
[Izvestiia, No. 183, September 28, 1917, p. 4. The Turkestan Moslem Central Council
took advantage of the situation to submit to General Korovnichenko a list of demands,
for self-rule as the price of its support against the revolutionary elements. Before any
action was taken, the October Revolution occurred.]
Tashkent, September 26.
Upon their arrival, General Korovnichenko, the troops, and the armored cars
occupied the House of Freedom. The Bureau of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies
was searched and its funds and documents were taken. Ensign Grinevich, the
commandant of the town appointed by the Soviet of Workers Deputies, was
placed under arrest. PerfiPev and Chemevskii, members of the revolutionary
committee, disappeared. A general strike went into effect on September 21 in
which forty trade unions participated. The strike committee has not been dis
covered. There have been no newspapers issued for two weeks. The town has
noticeably quieted down; there is unrest, however, among the local forces. Martial
law has not yet been lifted. The Soviet of Workers Deputies is negatively dis
posed toward the events in Tashkent. A regional [kraevoi] congress of demo
cratic organizations is about to take place.

THE CAUCASUS

390. T h e S pecial T ranscaucasian Committee (Ozakom)

[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1575. The Committee was established on March 9, 1917, with
Member of the State Duma V. A. Kharlamov as Chairman, to replace the Imperial
Viceroy Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and with special instructions to establish civil
administrations in areas occupied in the course of the war on the Caucasian front*
VVP, No. 5, March 10, 1917, p. 1. Commissars were appointed for the Terek and
Kuban oblasts, and these as well as the Committee were to carry on relations with
central government institutions through a Commissar for Caucasian Affairs in Petro
grad attached to the Provisional Government. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, Nos. 963, 1276. Soviets
also sprang up throughout the area and, in time, organized an influential Regional
Center at Tiflis. See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 98-99.
Because of the loyalty to the Provisional Government of the Armenians, the Russian
national political orientation of the Georgian Menshevik leaders (Jordania, Chkheidze,
Tseretelli, etc.), the presence of the army, and the willingness of the Committee gen
erally to carry out the wishes of the Center, the situation in the Transcaucasus was
relatively calm during this period. For the position of the Caucasian Moslems, see
Doc. 382.]
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 425

INSTRUCTION TO THE SPECIAL TRANSCAUCASIAN COMMITTEE ORGANIZED

BY THE LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF MARCH 9, 1917
1. In its activities the Special Committee is directly subordinate to the Pro
visional Government.
2. The higher local administration of all civil affairs of the Transcaucasian
Krai is concentrated in the Special Committee.
3. The nature of the power conferred upon the Committee belongs solely
to the executive sphere; no new law may be established, or an existing one abro
gated, by authority of the Special Committee.
4. The range of the rights and duties of the Special Committee for the admin
istration of the Krai is defined by the laws on the Caucasian Vice-Regency, with
the restrictions required by the fact that the authority of the Special Committee
extends only to the guberniyas, oblasts, and districts of the Transcaucasian Krai.
5. Officials who were appointed by nomination of the Viceroy are, if the
scope of their activity extends not only to the Transcaucasus but also to other
guberniyas and oblasts, appointed by presentation of the appropriate ministers,
in consultation with the Special Committee.
6. In the matter of expenditure of monies, the Special Committee manages
the funds allocated to it under the established procedure; in case of shortage of
funds which were allocated to the Viceroy for the Transcaucasian Krai, the Spe
cial Committee is to make special presentations to the Provisional Government.
7. The sums allocated for the maintenance of guberniya, oblast, and uezd
(okrug) establishments that have been abolished may be used only for the mainte
nance of such organs and individual officials who, by order of the Provisional
Government or the Special Committee, are performing the functions of the afore
said abolished establishments, and the maintenance of party, professional or other
public organizations and officials not mentioned in the present article cannot be
covered by funds of the State Treasury.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
V lad. N abokov , Commissar for Caucasian Affairs in Petrograd
September 3, 1917

391. R esolution on the N ational Question by the Caucasian K rai Congress

of W orkers and P easants D eputies in T iflis , M ay 1917

[Dimanshtein, pp. 392-93.]

Complete democratization of the state is the basic demand of the entire Russian
democracy, which has made it politically possible for the first time in history to
solve the nationalities question on a state-wide scale.
Within such a political order the development of the national culture can be
assured, provided each nationality inhabiting Russia is granted complete internal
self-government.
Such self-government shall have the right to found local organs which will
perform the public and legal functions required of them by the state to implement
definite matters of state administration. However, the self-governing unit has
its own cultural, economic, and legal interests. In this sphere it functions, with
the aid of local organs, completely independently . . . the state has the right
426 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

of supervision only with regard to violations of the limits of the jurisdiction of

self-government.
In areas of mixed population which make it impossible to form a national
territorial self-governing unit, territorial self-governments are formed for matters
common to all, and national self-governments to satisfy the national and cultural
needs of each nationality individually.
With such a combination of territorial and cultural principles, possible con
flicts between nationalities in mixed self-governments on the basis of national
culture can be reduced to a minimum.

392. E ditorial on t h e N atio n al Q uestio n in t h e

A r m e n ia n D a sh n a k N ew spa pe r Origon
[Dimanshtein, pp. 400-401.]
The nationality question was one of the sorest spots of Russian life under the
tsarist regime. For decades and centuries Russian absolutism adhered to the
policy of divide et impera, the essence of which was oppression and prevention
of the natural development of national cultures, pogroms, and conflicts between
nationalities.
Party and all-national congresses of recent days have demonstrated that there
is practically no difference of opinion in the solution of the nationality question
within the democracy up to this time, or among the dependent peoples. Both, on
the whole, maintain the same point of view, that all nationalities of Russia have
the right to self-government. But the concrete content and the juridical forms
must be finally decided upon in the Constituent Assembly.
To be sure, attempts have been made on the part of some nationalities to
determine the form of national self-government. For example, the Ukrainians
propose the principle of territorial autonomy, viewing Russia as a federation of
nationalities. However, with but a few exceptions, they too recognize that it is
impossible to satisfy their national demands immediately and by their own means
and that the solution of this question should be left to the Constituent Assembly.
We are of the same opinion. The solution of the nationality question, as well
as of a number of other social questions, could lead to misunderstanding, arouse
passions, and cause disunity in the revolutionary ranks.
And it is for this reason that we think it extremely incorrect and undesirable
for the nationalities to attempt to realize their demands by their own means. We
must have implicit confidence in the magnanimity of the Russian democracy. If
it crushed the hydra of autocracy, it can also solve the nationality question in
keeping with the interests of each of the individual nationalities.

393. T h e S econd C ongress o f t h e M o u n t a in P eo ples o f t h e

Caucasus and t h e U n io n o f t h e M o un t a in P eo ples
[Dimanshtein, pp. 376-77. The First Congress of the peoples of the Caucasian moun
tains had been called in May by the nationalist leaders among the inhabitants, but had
confined itself to general statements on educational aims and support of the Provisional
Government. The Second Congress, meeting in September at Vladikavkaz, approved
a proposal for a union of the mountain peoples to form a federative unit within the
Russian state.]
. . . The Second Congress of the Mountain Peoples resolved on September 25
to elect immediately a commission of seven persons to work out, prior to the
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 427

convocation of the Constituent Assembly, a draft of the Union Constitution of the

Caucasian Mountain Peoples, as a federative part of the Russian united states.

The Constitution of the Union of the Mountain Peoples

Article I. The Union of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples unites all the moun
tain tribes of the Caucasus, as well as the Nogai and the Turks of StavropoP
Guberniya. It is a member of the Caucasian Moslem Union. Its aim is to ensure
the peaceful coexistence of all of the peoples of the Caucasus and Russia by rallying
the mountain peoples to defend and consolidate the freedoms they have won by
the revolution, to implement democratic principles, and to uphold the political,
social, and national-cultural interests common to all the mountain tribes.

394. T h e T erek C ossacks U n it e w it h t h e U n io n o f M o untain P e o pl e s ,

V ladikavkaz , O ctober 20, 1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 379-81. The Terek-Dagestan Government, which was the product
of this agreement, was to form part of the Southwestern Union, including the Don and
Kuban Cossacks. But the Government, unable to overcome the long-standing enmity
of the Chechen and Ingush toward the Cossacks, which erupted into open hostilities in
December, was short-lived. For details, see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet
Union, pp. 93-98.]
We, the undersigned, Cossack troops, Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and
Free Peoples of the steppes, hereby enter into a union for the purpose of aiding
in the establishment of the best state order, [for maintaining] external security
in the Russian state, as well as to guarantee the members of the Union their
inviolability, to maintain internal peace, to raise the general well-being, and thus
consolidate the blessings of liberty won by the revolution.

II. Aims of the Union

Article 5. The Union sets for itself the following aims: a) to achieve as soon
as possible the establishment of the Russian democratic federated republic with
the recognition of the members of the Union as individual states; b) to render
all possible support to other nationalities and regions that aim to establish the
Russian state on a federative basis by establishing contact and agreements with
them; c) to strive to form a firm and authoritative democratic state government,
supported by all the viable forces of the nationalities and territories of the country
and freed from oppression by irresponsible organization; d) to assist the central
state government in its struggle with the external enemy and to conclude an
honorable peace on the principle of the self-determination of peoples, to establish
order in the country and to struggle with anarchy and counterrevolution; e) to
guarantee the complete self-sufficiency and independence of the members of the
Union with regard to their internal life; f) to assist members of the Union in the
preparation and reorganization of their internal life as states of the future Russian
federation; g) to defend the rights of the members of the Unionpolitical, land,
cultural, economic, and nationalas well as to regulate land relations among the
members of the Union; h) to coordinate and unify measures for guaranteeing
peace and order on the territory of the members of the Union; i) to improve the
428 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

well-being of the members of the Union and to assist them in the matter of assuring
the population essential commodities. . . .

VII. Time When the Present Agreement Goes Into Effect

Article 18. The present agreement goes into effect after it is approved by the
organs of the executive authority of all members of the Union.

THE JEWS
395. T h e R esolutio n of t h e T e n t h C o nfe ren ce o f t h e B und , A pr il 1917
[Dimanshtein, pp. 277-78.]
On the National Question in Russia
Inasmuch as in a multi-national state such as Russia the question of the type
of democratic republic that will best provide for the normal coexistence of various
nationalities will come up before the Constituent Assembly with particular acute
ness;
Inasmuch as, under the circumstances, consideration should be given, on the
one hand, to the class interests of the proletariat of the country as a whole and the
general interests of the revolutionary movement and, on the other hand, to the
historic conditions of the evolution of nationalities and the aspiration of many
of them to national self-determination;
The Conference of the Bund deems it necessary to form a special commission
which will work out this question in connection with the total program of the
RSDWP and the program of the Bund on the national question, together with the
representatives of the RSDWP and the socialist parties of other nationalities.

On Cultural-National Autonomy
1) In complete accord with the program on the national question approved by
the Sixth Congress of the Bund, the Tenth Conference proposes an immediate
realization of national-cultural autonomy as the urgent political slogan of the day.
2) By special statute the Constituent Assembly must establish legal public
institutions, local, oblast, and national, elected on the basis of universal, equal,
direct, and secret electoral right, with no distinction as to sex, for the organization
and guidance of the cultural life of the Jewish nation in Russia on the following
basis:
a) Anyone who declares himself a Jew by nationality is considered a member
of this legal public institution;
b) The national cultural organizations include within the sphere of their
competency the entire field of the nations cultural life: the school work, the
development of literature, art, also scientific and technical knowledge.
All institutions of the national-cultural organization and the schools that
they create must have a purely secular character.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 429

3) The language of the national-cultural organization is Hebrew.

The national-cultural organization through its budget guarantees the right to
national minorities to have a school in another, non-Jewish language.
Note, The whole area of religions and religious-ritual life is outside the
jurisdiction of the national-cultural organization. To satisfy their religious needs,
that part of the Jewish nation that has such needs may build their religious com
mune as a private, legally established institution, under the protection of the
general laws of the Russian democratic republic.
4) An appropriate part of the budget is allocated to the national-cultural
organization from private and national funds; [the organization has also] the
right of compulsory authority toward its members within its competency, and
in particular the right of supplementary dues.

On the Realization of National-Cultural Autonomy

The Tenth Conference of the Bund thinks that, even before the convening of
the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, work must proceed immediately to found
local organs of cultural-national autonomy of the Jewish nation on the basis of
universal, equal, direct, and secret electoral right with the participation of all
citizens of both sexes above the age of twenty who consider themselves as belong
ing to the Jewish nation. The administration of the existing Jewish schools, as
well as further expansion of the Jewish school network, devolves upon these
organs. At the same time the Provisional Government must publish a decree on
including the Jewish schools in the general network of schools and the introduc
tion of the Jewish language as the language of instruction in these schools. To
help wage the struggle for the creation of the organization of cultural-national
autonomy, the Conference is in favor of participating in the general Jewish Con
gress, should such be called on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret
electoral right. Moreover, the Conference thinks it necessary to state that it looks
upon the participation of Jewish workers in this Congress as a means of discuss
ing concretely the question of cultural-national autonomy and it hopes that repre
sentatives of the Bund will combat vigorously all attempts to bring up any other
national or political problems. The Conference declares that the decisions of this
Jewish Congress cannot be compulsory for the working class and that the final
decision on questions within the competency of the Congress will belong to the
National Constituent Assembly where representatives of the Jewish proletariat
will wage their campaign together with representatives of the entire working
class of Russia. The internal organization of the cultural-national organization
will be determined in the Jewish Constituent Assembly, within the limits of com
petency, established by the National Constituent Assembly in the basic laws.

396. T h e R eso lutio n of t h e Zio n ist C ongress in P etrograd , M ay 1917

[Dimanshtein, p. 279.]
Resolution on the Cultural Question
Recognizing the Hebrew language as the only national language of the Jewish
people, which must become the language of education, culture, and everyday
speech of all Jewry, the Seventh All-Russian Zionist Congress submits the follow
ing demands:
430 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

a) The Hebrew language is the language of instruction in all subjects, with

the exception of the national, regional, and other languages, in all communal
schools and training institutions.
b) The Hebrew language is the official language of all public institutions of
the Jewish people.
c) The Congress makes it obligatory upon all members of the Zionist organ
izations to carry out these principles in Jewish communes, in all of their educa
tional training institutions, and in other institutions fulfilling the public needs.
General Resolution on Palestine
Inasmuch as, 1) the Jewish people, deprived of their territory and scattered
throughout the world, can again create for themselves conditions for the normal
development of national-cultural and economic life only upon re-creating an auton
omous national center in the historic motherland, Palestine, 2) the Jewish people
never broke their ties with their historic motherland, but always aspired to it, and
their moral and historic rights to Palestine are indisputable and inalienable,
3) the success of the Jewish colonization work in recent decades, under such
difficult conditions and obstacles, showed convincingly the strong will and ability
of the people to revive culturally a country for centuries neglected, 4) the centuries-
old aspiration of the Jewish people, so concretely revealed, fully coincides with
the great principles of national self-determination, freedom, and independent
development of all people, proclaimed by the democracies and governments of all
countries
The Seventh All-Russian Zionist Congress unanimously expresses its strong
conviction that the peoples, in laying the foundations for the future national and
political life, recognize and will take into consideration the clearly revealed will
of the Jewish people to repopulate and revive Palestine as their national center and
that they will create conditions that will guarantee the unimpeded and successful
development of the work of concentration of the Jewish forces and the rebirth of
Palestine.
For a concrete and complete expression of this will of the Jewish people the
Congress recognizes it as urgent:
1) to organize among the Jewish people a referendum on Palestine; 2) to
submit to the All-Russian Jewish Congress the question of the demands of the
Jewish people in Palestine; 3) to strive for the admission of representatives from
the Jewish people at the forthcoming peace congress at the conclusion of the war
in order to express fully the aspirations of the Jewish people and to secure the
protection of its historic and natural rights and interests.

397. T h e B lo odstained S pe c t e r
[.Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 178, October 5, 1917, p. 1.]
Jewish pogroms . . . It seemed that this dreadful nightmare of tsarist Russia
had disappeared forever. It seemed that there was no place in our country for
this horror and disgrace. But now, in the eighth month of revolution, the blood
stained specter of the Middle Ages hovers again over our land.
Once more the Jewish population lives through anxious days. Side by side
with the growing anarchy in the country, reaction raises its head; it grasps at its
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 431

favorite means of duping the masses, at the poisoned weapon of an anti-Semitic

campaign.
*

It should be firmly and clearly understood that several months of revolution

are not enough to re-educate at once the masses who lived for centuries in dark
ness, under the yoke of lawlessness. This truth is forgotten by the Bolsheviks
who throw demagogic slogans at the masses, unconcerned about the consequences
of their propaganda. They do not take into consideration that the aroused masses
interpret and act upon their slogans in their own way.
It was noted during the days of July 3-5 that among the masses who followed
the Bolsheviks, anti-Semitic speeches enjoyed no small success- And now the
Bolshevik agitation creates a pogrom mood which can easily degenerate into
Jewish pogroms.
They ought to reflect upon this danger. But are they capable of reflecting on
anything?

SIBERIA
398. T h e O bje c t iv e s o f t h e S iberian F ederalists
[Irkutsk Suobodnaia Sibir (n.d.), as quoted in Novoe Vremia, No. 14745, April 7,
1917, p. 7.]

Siberia is a distinct region within the Russian State. The consciousness of

this distinctness can never be obliterated in the Siberian population, which has
become naturalized in Siberia and is cemented together by a common historical
past. Ethnographically, the Russian element has become mixed with nationalities
of Ugro-Finnish and Turko-Mongolian stock and has formed a distinct cultural
type. The general aspect of Siberian life is entirely different from that in Euro
pean Russia. In the economic field, Siberia is conscious of a sharp contradiction
between its own interests and those of Russia. Russia has been exploiting the
natural wealth of Siberia, including her soil. Therefore, it is the conviction of the
Siberian federalists that Siberia can gain the path of progress only through
extensive political autonomy. A Siberian duma must stand at the head of the
administration. Its jurisdiction must include:
(1) Legislation for Siberia.
(2) The choice of the executive power responsible totheSiberianduma.
(3) The use and disposal of all the land of the region, including forests,
waters, and underground wealth.
(4) Questions of industrial and agricultural development.
(5) Defining the extent and methods of colonization.
(6) Full administration of public education.
(7) Participation in the fixing of Russian tariffs.
(8) Zemstvo self-government.
(9) Legislation concerning national minorities.
(10) Supervision of the [regional] budget.
432 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

399. T h e A t t itu d es o f S everal R ussian L eaders T oward

S iberian A u t o n o m y

[I. I. Serebrennikov, Vospominaniia (1917-22), ms. in the Hoover Institution on

War, Revolution, and Peace. Serebrennikov was a conservative Siberian regionalist.
A meeting of Siberian federalists took place in Tomsk in August to prepare a plan for
autonomy. The Bolshevik seizure of power and the subsequent civil war radically
changed the complexion of the Siberian situation.]
In June 1917,1 initiated the circulation of a questionnaire among some well-
known political leaders of Russia on the subject of Siberian autonomy. It included
three questions:
1. Considering the distance of Siberia from the metropolis and the peculiarity
of its local conditions, do you consider Siberian autonomy necessary?
2. If you consider it necessary, how extensive do you consider that autonomy
should be?
3. How would you view the plan of establishing Russia on federative prin
ciples, and, in particular, do you admit the possibility of organizing Siberia as
a federation of her provinces?
I regret to say that I received very few replies to my questionnaire.
The well-known Russian historian, Social Democrat, and Assistant Minister
of Post and Telegraph in the Kerensky cabinet, N. A. Rozhkov, answered as
follows:
6C1. I consider the autonomy of Siberia, or of any other part of Russia, as
harmful. Any peculiar local conditions can be adequately served by comprehen
sive local self-government. Distances are not an important factor in a time of
telegraphs and railways.
2. I consider federation harmful in general, since it disperses the class
struggle of the democracy and thereby strengthens the bourgeoisie; it leads to
the two-house parliamentary system, which is always harmful to democracy; and
it may lead to an elemental movement of protest by the Great Russian peasantry
against a federative dismemberment of Russia, and the same protest might then
be turned against the revolution which produced such a dispersion.
The above answer could perhaps be considered as typical of those left Social
Democrats of whom Rozhkov was one.
The well-known Lev Deutsch, a satellite of Plekhanov, a Social Democrat
of the Edinstvo groups, answered as follows:
In reply to the first and second questions I may say that, within limits, I am
willing to agree to considerable autonomy for Siberia, but the extent of those
limits is for the time being difficult to define. Possibly Siberia, like Canada, would
have to have a parliament of her own, remaining at the same time closely con
nected with European Russia as well as with the other Russian Asiatic possessions.
Perhaps at the beginning Siberia would have to be content with administrative,
rather than legislative autonomy. . . .
A member of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Kerenskys Minister of
Transport, N. V. Nekrasov, gave the following answer:
1. I do not recognize it as necessary.
2. As a first step, I think an extensive decentralization is necessary, up to the
point of establishing a special organ to deliberate on questions of local legislation.
3. I think of Russia in the future as a federation based partly on a territorial
and partly on a national-territorial scheme.
 THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM 433

A worker of the cooperatives . . . V. Zelgeim, answered:

1. Administrative autonomy for Siberia is desirable.
2. Autonomy must not spread to the domain of economic relations (tariffs,
customs, labor legislation).
3. I fear that a too strict adherence to federative principles, considering our
lack of cultural and public forces and traditions, would create a problem to which
we, and especially Siberia, would not yet be equal.

400. T h e B uriat C o nferen ce

[VVP, No. 32, April 15, 1917, p. 4.]
The Buriat Conference, which was held at Irkutsk and closed on April 11,
approved a resolution stating that the Buriats would strive to obtain their national
autonomy through the establishment of a Sejm which would possess legislative
functions with regard to the following issues: civil relations, national health,
religious matters; the autonomy should include the Buriats of Irkutsk and those
of Transbaikal. As for tarasun (native alcoholic beverage) and its brewing, it
has been decided to authorize shamanist Buriats to brew tarasun for religious
requirements under the supervision of local committees; at the same time the
brewing of tarasun for other purposes was strictly forbidden and would be prose
cuted. The fight against drunkenness should be left to the care of local committees
and to the Buriat section attached to the Irkutsk executive committee.
 C H A P TE R 8

The Constituent Assembly

THE PREPARATION OF ELECTORAL LEGISLATION AND SCHEDULES

401. C o n c e r n in g t h e C o n v o c a tio n o f t h e C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b ly
[.Izvestiia, No. 14, March 14, 1917, p. 2.]
During the discussions that took place on March 13 between the delegates of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and
the Provisional Government, one of the subjects discussed concerned the convo
cation of the Constituent Assembly.
Representatives of the Executive Committee insisted on the necessity of the
earliest possible convocation, pointing out that any delay, under the present cir
cumstances, might have a damaging effect on democracy.
Members of the Provisional Government agreed in principle with the indicated
points [and] definitely confirmed that the place of the convocation would be
Petrograd and that the time of the convocation must be the earliest possible.
They definitely stated that under no circumstances should the war interfere
with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The only interference with
opening the meeting of the Constituent Assembly could come from intensified
military activities.
In any event, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, as anticipated by
the Provisional Government, shall take place no later than the middle of summer.
The delegates of the Executive Committee found that even this date was too far
removed.
Discussions of this question will still continue. But it can now be considered
firmly established that the army will participate in the elections to the Constituent
Assembly. On the other hand, it has been established that the exact date of the
convocation of the Constituent Assembly, as well as conditions [regulating] its
elections and its work, will be determined by agreement between the Provisional
Government and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.

402. T h e E st a b l is h m e n t o f a S pe c ia l C o u n c il f o r t h e D rafting o f t h e
S ta tu te on E lectio ns to t h e C o n st it u e n t A sse m bly
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 406. The Juridical Council had been given the task of drafting
this law on March 8. Zhurnaly, No. 11.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. A Special Council shall be established for the Drafting of the Statute on
Elections to the Constituent Assembly, consisting of a chairman and vice-chairman
appointed by the Provisional Government and members appointed or invited to
participate in the Councils work.
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 435

II. Specialists on questions of public law, a statistician, and other experts

shall be appointed to the Council, and political and public leaders, representing
the main political and national-minority political groups of Russia, shall be in
vited to participate in the Councils work.
III. A Drafting Commission, elected by the Council from among its members,
shall be established for the preliminary technical study of questions falling within
the Councils competence and for drawing up the final version of the drafts to be
prepared by it,
IV. The Council may also elect other commissions, if necessary, for the study
of various questions of electoral law.
V. The Council and its commissions are authorized to invite experts to their
meetings with the right of advisory vote.
VI. The reports of the Council and the drafts annexed thereto, together with
explanations of the considerations on which they are based, shall be submitted by
the chairman of the Council to the Provisional Government.
VII. In case of disagreement among members of the Council, the minority as
well as individual members shall be entitled to request the inclusion of their dis
senting opinions in the report to the Provisional Government.
P rince L vov ,Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 25,1917

403. T h e D if f ic u l t ie s F acing t h e S pe c ia l Co u nc il
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 70, March 29, 1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government has already started the preliminary work on the
convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and first of all it formed a Special Coun
cil for the Drafting of the Statute on Elections. This is the first step on the road to
convocation of the Assembly which will finally decide the question of the form
of government for Russia and whose decisions will determine the further course
of development of our fatherland for many years to come. The extraordinary im
portance of decisions that will be made at the Constituent Assembly imperatively
demands that it be convoked under conditions that guarantee to the utmost the
completeness of popular representation and freedom for the expression of the
popular will. And this circumstance makes the tasks imposed on the Special Coun
cil very difficult and responsible.
Many very weighty considerations demand that the Constituent Assembly be
convoked as soon as possible. At the present time, we are in a state of transition;
we have only a provisional government, which has undertaken the solution of
only circumscribed tasks, and which considers itself empowered to deal only with
them. . . .
To draw up the electoral law is both very easy and very difficult. It is very
easy, if one lim its oneself only to the framework of the solution of the question
in principle, i.e., to approximately those guiding directions that are usually in
cluded in the texts of constitutions or fundamental laws. It is very difficult if
as is required in the present caseit is necessary to present the draft of the law
worked out in detail, anticipating all the details of elections and their technique.
The general principles of the electoral law have been predetermined. At its basis
436 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

should he laid the universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot. Equally predeter
mined is the question of participation by women and military personnel in the
elections. There remain to be decided such less vital questions as the voting age
and the number of delegates; then, the general principles of the electoral law will
be settled; but precisely here will begin technical difficulties which will require a
great deal of time to overcome. . . .
Indeed, the question merely of the electoral districts presents enormous diffi
culties. In the interests of the preservation of equal representation of the popu
lation of all localities, it is impossible to use as electoral districts the existing
administrative divisions such as uezds. We cannot, of course, grant the equal
right to send one delegate each, for example, to Yelisavetgrad uezd, which has
more than 600,000 inhabitants, and Maloyaroslavetz uezd, with its population of
40,000 (according to the census of 1897), not to speak of certain border uezds, in
which the number of inhabitants does not even reach 10,000. . . .
Apparently, proportional representation will be the basis of the new electoral
lawthe most perfect and fair system of representation. But it is, at the same
time, also the most complex and technically difficult system. . . . Anyone who is
at all familiar with the operation of the proportional system, let us say in Belgium
or Finland, will understand without further explanations what thoughtful, careful,
and painstaking work will be required for the drawing up of the proper articles
of the electoral law.
Finally, there is the participation of the fighting forces in the elections, which,
again, is considered predetermined. Perhaps not everyone has a clear idea of the
technical difficulties connected with this participation. . . .
We think that we have said enough to give an idea of how difficult and com
plex is the task with which the Special Council is charged. It would be naive to
imagine that this task could be discharged satisfactorily within several days or
even weeks. The drawing up of the electoral law for the Constituent Assembly will
require a great deal of time, and this, after all, is only the first step toward con
voking the Assembly itself.

404. T h e D elay in t h e F o rm ation of t h e S pecial Co unc il

[Den9, No. 56, May 11, 1917, p. 1.]
At the conference of the Constitutional Democratic Party N. V. Nekrasov,
Minister of Transport, said:
I am of the opinion that the first Provisional Government has made a mistake
[and] has made it together with the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies,
which has delayed its reply to our proposal to elect [members to] the Council to
work out the problem of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Thus the Minister of Transport, a member of both the first and second Provi
sional Government, makes the former Provisional Government and the Soviet of
Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies share the responsibility for the slowness of the
preliminary work in connection with the convening of the Constituent Assembly,
Nekrasov is quite right. If in March the Provisional Government had hastened
to work out a law regarding the elections to the Constituent Assembly, its project,
with all possible technical shortcomings due to haste, would have been thankfully
accepted by everybody; by this time an electoral campaign, which in the present
circumstances would be an organizing force, would be under way, and by August 1
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 437

the Constituent Assembly might have convened. Unfortunately it did not do it.
Later on, the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies inordinately protracted
its negotiations with the Government regarding the number of seats in the Council.
At the present time the nationalities are still more to blame: up to now they have
been unable to appoint their representatives in the Council for the convocation of
the Constituent Assembly, although in the middle of April they were asked to
name their representatives.
In the meantime, it is acutely felt that the Council ought to begin its work as
soon as possible. If work begins on May 15and at the present moment an earlier
start is out of the questionthen, owing to the size of its membership (not fewer
than 60 persons) and its heterogeneous tendencies and interests, one cannot expect
the Council to close its proceedings in less than six weeks, i.e., by July 1. There
fore, the Constituent Assembly cannot convene earlier than November 1.

It should be borne in mind that the general situation in Russia is most alarm
ing, and that only the Constituent Assembly can lead the country upon its normal
course. One can and one should make every sacrifice in order to hasten the con
vening of the Constituent Assembly.

405. M easures fo r A dvancing t h e D ate of t h e C onvocation

o f t h e C o n st it u e n t A sse m bly

[VVP, No. 52, M ay 11, 1917, p. 1.]

With the object of convoking the Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible
moment, the Provisional Government has decreed:
I. To adopt measures for expediting the convocation of the [Special] Council,
which, according to the law already issued by the Government, shall be responsible
for drafting the Statute on Elections to the Constituent Assembly, whose final
establishment has been delayed by the fact that not all of the organizations, politi
cal parties, and national groups invited to participate in it have nominated their
representatives to it.
II. To undertake immediately the work of drafting the Statute on Elections to
the Constituent Assembly which does not require decisions on questions of prin
ciple, and to assign this work temporarily to the Judicial Council of the Provi
sional Government.

IV. To send out requests immediately to those organizations that have already
received invitations but have not as yet given their replies as well as to organiza
tions that are being invited once again to participate through their representa
tives in the Council, urging them to nominate their representatives to the Con
ference.
V. To fix the first meeting of the Council . . . for May 25 of this year.

Minister-President
P rince Lvov ,
[and other ministers]
May 10, 1917
438 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

406. T h e N ecessity fo r an E arly Co nvocation o f t h e

C o nstituent A sse m b l y
[Izvestiia, No. 70, May 19, 1917, p. 3. Part of a commentary on the Provisional Gov
ernments Declaration of May 5, 1917.]
Owing to the precipitate development of the revolution in the country, the
earliest convocation of the Constituent Assembly has become the immediate task
of the democracy.
The problem of strict enforcement of law and order, based on the authoritative
decision of all the people, is becoming increasingly acute.
Until such time as this law and order are established, all the gains of the
revolution are threatened; they can all be drowned in a sea of anarchy.
The Provisional Government can only issue temporary laws. Its decrees, of
necessity, bear the character of transitional legislation. As a consequence, all
administrative organs and organs of self-government created by the Provisional
Government likewise acquire a temporary, transitional character.
Great dangers are concealed in this situation. The stream of national life
cannot, under these circumstances, follow its normal course.
Meanwhile, in order to restore the economic strength of the country, it is
essential that the legal framework within which the country lives possess a certain
stability so that it will not be subjected constantly to change and fluctuation. No
less essential is the establishment of uniform legal stipulations in all parts of the
country.

This constitutes the general problem of the Constituent Assembly.

But the Constituent Assembly is faced with two other problems which it alone
can resolve and which, for the sake of saving the Russian revolution, must be
resolved as soon as possible. These problems are the land and nationality ques
tions.

But neither the nationality question nor the land question can be postponed.
A delay in bringing up and settling these questions threatens Russia with disin
tegration. Consequently, this point of view, too, points to the necessity of applying
every effort to convoke the Constituent Assembly at the earliest moment.

407. T h e O p e n in g o f t h e S pe c ia l Co u nc il fo r t h e D rafting o f t h e
S ta tu te on E lections to t h e C o nst it u e n t A ssem bly
[Stenograficheskii otchet osobago soveshchaniia dlia izgotovleniia proekta polozheniia
o vyborakh v UchrediteFnoe Sobranie, I, 1-3. The Council was dissolved on Septem
ber 23, 1917, following the completion of its work. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1681.]
Minister-President, Prince Lvov. Permit me to declare the session of the
Special Council open. Permit me to greet you, gentlemen, and congratulate you
on the commencement of work of the greatest state importancethe preparation
for the Russian Constituent Assembly. We all realize the tremendous complexity
of this work. It calls for the [exercise] of the greatest justice with respect to all
parts and groups of the heterogeneous population of our vast Russian state. The
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 439

Constituent Assembly, the supreme organ of the peopled state, must crown the
great Russian revolution. It must lay all the vital foundations for the future order
of the free democratic state. It will bear the responsibility for the entire future of
Russia, and naturally its members must rise to this greatest of all responsibilities.
The Constituent Assembly must be the essence of all the spiritual and mental forces
of the people. It must be the spokesman of their mind and heart. You, members
of the Council, must constantly bear in mind these great problems that the Constit
uent Assembly is about to solve and must put forth all of your efforts to prepare
the course upon which, from the center of the state organism, its best vital forces
can flow. There, where the application of the greatest justice is called for, where
we must respect and combine the most diverse interests, where a perfect and com
plex apparatus must be worked out to represent the force guiding the entire com
plex body of the tremendous state organismthere we must forget and abandon
private interests and rise to the over-all, national level, where all private interests
are sacrificed for the good of the whole, for the sake of the general welfare of the
entire state. I have no doubt that you, gentlemen, will rise to this national level;
that the greatest objectivity and the highest sense of justice will combine in your
work with the concept of the state in your attitude toward the greatest tasks ahead
of you. I do not doubt that all the technical difficulties of your work will be imbued
with a deep love of the motherland and that you will overcome all of its com
plexity. You are in a position to sense the innermost wishes of the people. Revo
lutionary Russia is at the moment in a process of working out and formulating its
wishes, a process of inner self-determination. And in intimate relation with the
people, you, their representatives of all the currents of national thought, can
combine here and unite the results of their work with all the work of the internal
state life. Your work is difficult and responsible. It is open to the judgment and
criticism of the entire population, of all the people. But this criticism will help
you. It will point the way you must follow. All the people are interested to see
how their will is realized. They themselves will help you solve your state problems.
In the name of the Provisional Government, permit me to wish you, gentlemen,
success in the entire work and to turn over the chair to F. F. Kokoshkin, appointed
Chairman by the Provisional Government. (Applause.) . . .
Chairman [F. F. Kokoshkin], Members of the Council for the Drafting of
the Statute on Elections to the Constituent Assembly: The institution which you
form bears a temporary character and occupies a modest place in national life.
. . . But our modest institution is to take a hand in one of the greatest acts of
Russian history. Our modest work is fanned by the sublimity of the present
historic moment, I would even say, by the majestic sublimity of the present
historic moment. And this is no slip of the tongue. I would not take these words
back. We must not close our eyes to the difficulties and dangers that confront the
newborn Russian freedom at the moment. We know that the affirmation and
consolidation of freedom gained is a thorny road for all peoples. And if in the
early moments of our revolution we consoled ourselves with the hope that perhaps
we were destined to escape those dangers and difficulties encountered on this
road by other peoples who had overtaken us in political development, now, if this
hope has not vanished altogether, it is nevertheless shaken. . . . We are entrusted
with the drawing up of a draft statute of the law that will govern the election of
members to the Constituent Assembly.
Our task is simple and at the same time difficult. It is simple from the political
440 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

point of view, from the point of view of political principles. Unlike other similar
institutions that worked in other countries, we do not have to and have no need
to go into a discussion of the political bases which will be placed as a foundation
of the law we are called upon to elaborate. These bases are predetermined; they
have been decided beforehand by the will of the people, and they are proclaimed
in the declarations of the Provisional Government. The Constituent Assembly
must be elected on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, and,
moreover, suffrage without distinction of sex. Only a few months ago in one of
his talks with the womens delegation, the Minister-President explained that the
Provisional Government, in proclaiming the formula of universal electoral right,
had in mind under the word universal the participation in it of persons of the
female sex.1 Thus, all these vital foundations of democratic electoral law, in
defense of which a battle is still being waged in some countries, in defense of
which a battle was waged only recently in our country, which at one time seemed
unattainable and distantall these bases are already proclaimed. They are firmly
established and we have to prepare the electoral law on the basis of these
principles.
Here is where our difficulties begin. . . . We are faced with a whole series of
problems to be solvedproblems essentially technical in character, but problems
of tremendous importance, upon the proper decision of which will depend the
outcome of the elections which touch upon the basic interests of the various ele
ments of the population. We are faced with the solution of the problemI shall
mention the most importantconcerning the system of elections itself: Will we
preserve the system of majority elections prevalent up to this time in most of the
countries, or will we adopt a proportional system? If we preserve the system of
majority elections, are we going to adopt the system of elections of individual
candidates in each district or elections by lists of many candidates? In both in
stances we shall have to answer the very difficult question of what should constitute
electoral districts in Russia, the question of division into electoral districts, of
making the existing administrative divisions serve as electoral districts. Perhaps
this is the easiest technical aspect of our problem. We shall have to define with
accuracy the conditions of active and passive electoral right, because in voting
under universal electoral right certain limitations on participation in elections
exist and must exist. But we are confronted with yet another situation of tremen
dous complexity and importance, one in which we must be pioneers, where we
have no predecessors, where we cannot follow the steps of other peoples, but will
overtake them. We must solve the problem of the armys participation in elections.
And the technical solution of how to guarantee the members of the army full
political rights in accordance with the principles of justice will present a difficult
problem where we shall have no available example [to follow].
There is another part of our total problem which in its complexity surpasses
all other parts. That is the question of organizing elections in the borderlands,
particularly in distant ones, as for example in Asiatic Russia, in those places where
the population is sparse, where it fives on a different level of culture and [often]
is nomadic. This is one of the most intricate and difficult questions in Russia.
. . . We shall have to accomplish a very difficult task to establish the modifications
of the general system of elections accepted by us and to adapt the general principles

1 See Zhurnaly, No. 24, March 19,1917.

 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 441

to various local conditions in the borderlands. Strictly speaking, the quickest

way, of course, to work out the electoral law would have been (and this seems to
many the most expedient) to create a small commission of specialists who would
be entrusted by the Provisional Government with the working out of an electoral
law. Then of course this work would have been accomplished in the quickest way.
But the Provisional Government did not find it possible to follow this course.
I believe it was right. It took into consideration the fact that it is not merely a
matter of technical or theoretical perfection of the electoral law. The important
thing is that the law conform to the wishes and interests of various parts of the
population, to the various conditions of different parts of Russia which may not
be exactly known to the specialists. The Provisional Government had to bear in
mind that the electoral law must represent a unique historic fact in the history of
Russia; that the assembly that must convene on the basis of this electoral law will
perhaps decide the question of the future of Russia for decades, or centuries;
that this electoral law, not only in its electoral principles but also in its details
and particulars, interests various groups of the population of Russia and touches
upon various interests. For all these reasons the Provisional Government deemed
it just that the Council which will work out this electoral law should include not
only specialists, jurists-specialists on the question of electoral law, but also repre
sentatives of the most prominent political currents prevalent in Russia.
Therefore, included in the Council are representatives of the leading demo
cratic organizations existing at the present time and bearing no party character,
such as the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the Soviet of Peasants Dep
uties, and the Council of the All-Russian Cooperative Congress. Included here are
representatives of zemstvo organizations. Included also are representatives of the
leading existing political parties in Russia. Included, first, are representatives of
those political parties that are represented in the Executive Committee of the State
Duma and that were represented in the State Duma, and in addition the most
important political parties existing outside of the Duma. Further, in working out
an electoral law, it is impossible to get along without the participation also of
representatives of the most important, most prominent and politically organized
nationalities of Russia. Naturally it was impossible to invite into the membership
of the Council representatives of all national groups in existence in Russiathey
number over 100 in Russia. This would have made the Council so crowded that
it would lose the character of a commission and become something of a parliament.
However, it was decided to include representatives of the most important national
groups, and they were invited.2

408. T h e D ecision of t h e E lectoral C o m m issio n o f t h e S pe c ia l C o unc il

in F avor o f t h e S y stem of P roportional R e pr esen t a t io n f o r t h e
E lections to t h e Co n st it u e n t A sse m b l y
[Izvestiia Osobago Soveshchaniia dlia Izgotovleniia Proekta Polozheniia o Vyborakh
v UchrediteFnoe Sobranie, No. 9, June 2, 1917, pp. 2-4, and No. 10, June 3,1917, pp.

2 Vladimir Nabokov comments on the difficulties inherent in the size and composition of
the Council in his Vremennoe Praviterstvo, ARR, I (1921), 71-72. Apparently absenteeism,
caused no doubt by the political activities of many of the members, was a major problem in the
Special Council. See Izvestiia Osobago Soveshchaniia dlia Izgotovleniia Proekta Polozheniia o
Vyborakh v UchrediteFnoe Sobranie, No. 24, June 17,1917, p. 1, and No. 34, June 27,1917, p. 1.
442 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

2-4. For the formal dissenting opinion signed by V. Vodovozov, V. Gessen, V. Miakotin,
and, with a reservation, V. Maklakov, see ibid., No. 35, June 28, 1917, pp. 2-3. A tre
mendous amount of important and revealing material on the deliberations of the Special
Council is available in the issues of this publication.]
Not a single one of the existing electoral systems can be considered to be
essentially free of shortcomings and inconveniences in its practical application.
Therefore, having subjected all the existing electoral systems to a thorough
examination, and having evaluated their relative merits and shortcomings, the
Commission has set for itself the aim of selecting one of them which, possessing
the most qualities of principle, would at the same time fit best into the framework
of the Russian reality with all the diversity of its territorial, ethnic, and cultural
conditions of life.
In addition, the Commission has adopted as a point of departure in making
its further judgments the fundamental condition that the only acceptable electoral
system must, on the one hand, thoroughly guarantee the representation at the
future Constituent Assembly of all political, national, professional, and other
groups existing in Russia even though they may not appear to be particularly
significant in terms of their numerical strength; according to the thinking of the
Commission, the future Constituent Assembly must be an institution that achieves
the most near-perfect reflection of the most important trends existing in the coun
try with all its diverse aspects. On the other hand, the Commission had in mind
the necessity for Russia of an electoral law that, being technically uncomplicated,
would provide the possibility of proceeding to the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly within the shortest possible time.
The subsequent opinions of the Commission were concentrated on two systems
of electoral franchise: the single-name [odnoimennoi] majority [system] and
the multiple-name [mnogoimennoi] proportional system.
The supporters of the majority system (which comprised the minority opinion
in the Commission) pointed out that the single-name majority system must be
recognized as being the only acceptable one in view of the low cultural level of
the population of Russia, the weak development of the party principles in the
country, and the political illiteracy of the masses. The basic advantages of the
majority system are, first of all, the technical simplicity and the low cost of elec
tions according to this system, as well as the fact that it can be readily compre
hended even by the least educated elements of the population. The practical
[experience] of foreign states in which the majority system is definitely the pre
vailing one also speaks in favor of the majority system. The proportional system
is applied only in a few states (for example, Belgium, the Swiss cantons), in states
that are small, both territorially and in terms of their population, and that, in
addition, have had long experience in parliamentary struggles.
Under such conditions, the application of the proportional system of elections
in Russia would be a highly undesirable and, perhaps, dangerous experiment,
with a people who find themselves in a major war and in the midst of a no less
serious internal crisis.
Further, the supporters of the majority system pointed out a highly important
advantage of this system . . . [namely], that most of the voters know the candi
date not only as a representative of a given political platform, but also as a per
sonality. This personal connection between the voter and the candidate increases
the authority of the latter and assures him the confidence of the population; the
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 443

elected representative retains his ties with the locality and does not forfeit his
local imprint or, so to speak, [his] geographical physiognomy. Whereas, with
elections according to the proportional system, according to multiple-name lists,
the elected representatives turn out to he persons who were put forward by party
committees, who are frequently not well known to the local population, who are
alien to it and, therefore, carry little authority; voters elect persons whom they
do not know, and whom they would not have elected, perhaps, had they known
them.

Similarly, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the majority system is condu
cive to the consolidation of parties, whereas the proportional system leads to an
excessive number [of political groups] and splinter groups, which would signifi
cantly weaken the Constituent Assembly and hamper the speed and productivity
of its work.

All the above-mentioned considerations and conclusions lead the supporters

of the majority system to have very serious misgivings that with elections carried
out according to the proportional system, the Constituent Assembly might turn
out to have little competence in the eyes of the population; the population might
develop an attitude of distrust toward the Constituent Assembly, with all the grave
consequences that follow from this.
The supporters of the proportional system (a significant majority of the
members of the Commission), without denying some of its shortcomings, pointed
out at the same time that only objections that are either purely technical in nature
or are essentially of secondary importance can be, and are being, raised against
this system. It remains indisputable, however, that the shortcomings of this system
in comparison with the majority system are at any rate less significant and lend
themselves more easily to correction. If, in addition, one takes into consideration
the circumstance that the basic quality of the proportional system is its political
justicewhich is not disputed even by the opponents of this systemit would
seem that one cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that this advantage alone of
the proportional system more than makes up for its shortcomings, which are almost
exclusively formal in character. While the majority system provides represen
tation only to the majority of the voters within the bounds of every electoral dis
trict, annulling completely the voice of the minority regardless of the degree of its
numerical strength, the proportional system allows also for the representation
of the minority in proportion to its numerical strength. In connection with the
distribution of voters according to districts under the majority system, it turns
out to be entirely possible that the majority in the country becomes a minority
in the parliament. This means that elections according to the majority system
far from reflect those political, national, local, and other trends that are actually
present in the country. Quite the opposite result is achieved under the propor
tional system. . . . The extreme importance of this result for the Constituent
Assembly of Russiaa country with an extremely vast territory, with diverse
interests of the individual sections of the country, and with the various peoples
[inhabiting her territory]appears self-evident.
The second factor that speaks equally in favor of the proportional system con
cerns the technical aspects and consists in the fact that we have ready-made
444 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

electoral districts in the form of the existing administrative division of Russia

into guberniyas and oblasts [which may be used] for elections held according to
this system. Under the majority system, one would have to divide the whole
country again into electoral districts, which, with the meagerness and unreliability
of our statistical data, could hardly be accomplished in a proper manner and,
consequently, would give rise to unfavorable criticism in the provinces and to
reproaches of artificiality and tendentiousness. Reproaches of such a nature
appear to be particularly possible on the part of small national groups which are
interspersed among other, more important nationalities. Similarly, one cannot
fail to take into account that the establishment of electoral districts, numbering,
approximately, 800, would require considerable time and, undoubtedly, would
cause a significant delay in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

It cannot be denied that under the proportional system of elections, the entire
election campaign is carried out under the banner of organized parties and groups
which represent only a very small part of the population of Russia. However, it
would hardly be sound to regard this as a defect of the system: in all countries
and under any electoral system, the election campaign is directed by the more
active minority of the population. At the same time, one cannot fail to consider
the important circumstance that an energetic party struggle is highly conducive
to the organization of the country and to the growth of political awareness among
the people, and therefore, it protects the country to a large extent against unor
ganized, anarchistic excesses.
As concerns the excessive splintering of parties under the system being ex
amined, this phenomenon is not always evident in practice; thus, .for example,
there are no such center [groups] in Belgium, but, essentially, the splintering of
parties has also a positive aspect [since] it contributes to the crystallization of
parties.
To the positive aspects of the proportional system should also be added the
toning down of the political struggle under this system: being placed on a plane
of common interest and broad slogans, the election struggle is less frequently
held on the plane of personal interests and the private lives of the candidates.

With reference to . . . the populations unfamiliarity with the proportional

system of elections and its incomprehensibility, one cannot fail to take into
account that the growth process of political awareness of the population of Russia
is developing with extraordinary rapidity and that, furthermore, prior to the
elections to the Constituent Assembly, elections to town and zemstvo local govern
ments based on the proportional system will be held throughout Russia, which,
no doubt, will give the population sufficient practical experience in this respect.

The fact that the majority system happens to be the commonly accepted one
in most of the European states does not spring from the attributes of this system
and the shortcomings of proportional representation, but, rather, from the party
interests of the ruling majority in the parliaments in these countries; the intro
duction of the system of proportional representation seems like a very dangerous
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 445

experiment for the parties that occupy a dominant position in these countries,
[one] that could well result in the complete downfall of these parties.
On the basis of the above considerations, the majority of the Commission
came to the conclusion that it would be most expedient of all to use the system of
proportional representation for the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
The voting revealed that the system of multiple-name, separate-ballot propor
tional elections was adopted by the Commission by a majority of 16 votes to 4
(M. S. Adzhemov, V. V. Vodovozov, V. M. Gessen, and Miakotin).

409. L aw o f t h e P rovisional G o ver nm en t S etting t h e D a t es fo r E le c t io n s

to t h e C o nstituent A sse m bly and fo r t h e C onvocation o f t h e A sse m b l y
[VVP, No. 80, June 15, 1917, p. 1.]
I. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly is set for September 30,1917.
II. Elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on September 17,1917.
III. Organs of volost and municipal local self-government, elected on the
basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall be responsible for
compiling the registers of voters.
IV. The Minister of the Interior is directed to submit bills for coordinating
the dates provided by the laws on elections to the organs mentioned in the fore
going (III) section with the dates indicated in Sections I and II.
V. The present law shall be carried into effect prior to its promulgation by
the Ruling Senate.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
P ereverzev , Minister of Justice
June 14,1917

410. A n O p in io n of a M em b e r of t h e S pe c ia l C ounc il P ro testing t h e D ate

S et fo r E lections to t h e C o nst it ue nt A ssem bly
[Izvestiia Osobago Soveshchaniia dlia Izgotovleniia Proekta Polozheniia o Vyborakh
v UchrediteUnoe Sobranie, Nos. 42-43, July 5-6, 1917, pp. 1-2.]
In accordance with the law of the Provisional Government, dated June 15
[sic], 1917, the date for the elections to the Constituent Assembly has been set for
September 17, 1917.
This decree was issued in spite of the fact that the Special Council for the
Drafting of the Statute on Elections to the Constituent Assembly believed that
such a date could be set only for the middle of November.
In this connection the Special Council was proceeding from a twofold con
sideration: 1) it considered that to proceed to the final compilation of registers
of voters would be possible only upon the introduction of institutions of zemstvo
and municipal self-government, based on universal suffrage with a direct, equal,
and secret ballot, which, according to the information of the Ministry of the
Interior, could be expected around the middle of September, and 2) that it would
require a period of around 50 to 60 days to compile the registers and [examine]
the complaints [lodged] against them, and that a shortening of this period would
increase the danger of irregularities and abuses.
446 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

The Provisional Government has judged it possible to proceed to the final

compilation of registers of voters after waiting only for the municipal and volost
self-government [institutions] to be established on a new basis, but without
waiting for the establishment of guberniya and uezd self-government institutions.
Moreover, in order to make the Provisional Governments intention realizable in
practice under this condition, the Special Council had to reduce considerably
the initially designated period for appealing the registers, and, in addition, it had
to admit the possibility of closing the registers without waiting for the decisions
of circuit courts, even if the registers were appealed in court. It stands to reason
that the guarantees for properly conducted elections to the Constituent Assembly
have thereby been considerably reduced.
However, inasmuch as this reduction of time for compiling the registers was
precipitated by the date of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly fixed by
the Provisional Government, this modification of the original assumptions of the
Special Council must be regarded as having been called forth by sheer necessity.
At the same time, one cannot help but foresee the possibility that later
either because of some political consideration or from the pressure of evidence
indicating the practical impossibility of holding the elections by, precisely, Sep
tember 17the Provisional Government will postpone this date. In such a case,
there would no longer be any justification for the damage done to the original
project of the Special Council on grounds of advancing the date of the elections.
Therefore, in the event that the Provisional Government subsequently decides
for any reason to postpone the date for the elections to the Constituent Assembly,
it would seem expedient to restore (if there is but the slightest possibility of so
doing) the periods designated at the outset by the Special Council for compiling
the registers of voters and [examining] the appeals [filed] against them.

N. L azarevsky
July 3,1917

411. T h e P rovisional G o vernm ent O rders t h e H astening o f L o cal

E lectio ns to F acilitate E arly E lectio ns to t h e C o n stituent A sse m bly
[Circular of the Central Administration for Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior,
to Guberniya Commissars, No. 38, June 22, 1917. Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 48-50.]

In view of the fact that the elections to the Constituent Assembly have been
set for September 17, kindly point out to the zemstvo boards the urgent necessity
to hasten the drawing up of the registers for the elections to the volost zemstvos.
According to the decision of the Provisional Government, the terms fixed under
Articles 18-20 are, for the same purpose, reduced: from seven to four days for
presenting the first complaints with regard to the registers, from five to four days
for the study of these complaints, and from fourteen to seven days from the second
publication [of the registers] to the day of the electionsin all, to thirty-one days
instead of six weeks. [The term for] the presentation of the register of servicemen
is reduced from fourteen to seven days. Telegraph the day set for the elections.
According to the decision of the Provisional Government, a loan of approxi
mately five hundred rubles per volost may be granted on the responsibility of the
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 447

uezd zemstvos for the holding of volost elections. An immediate transfer to the
gubemiya of the sums may be effected through the guberniya zemstvo and the
guberniya commissar, such sums to be entered without fail in the estimates of
the uezd zemstvos and, later on, in case of a respective agreement, in the estimates
of the volost. In connection with the reduction of terms for the volost elections,
it is necessary to reduce from six weeks to thirty-one days the terms for the elec
tions of the uezd deputies of the rural and municipal populations: from five to
four days [the term] under Article 14, from five to four days [the term] for the
study by the commissions and the boards, from fourteen to seven days [the term]
from the second publishing [of the list].

412. T he Last Chance

[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti., No. 135, June 16,1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government is exerting strenuous efforts to speed up the con
vocation of the Constituent Assembly. On the night of June 14 a decision was
reached to set the election to the Constituent Assembly for September 17, and
its opening for September 30. At the very moment of its formation, the Provisional
Government assumed an obligation to organize the election to the Constituent
Assembly in the shortest possible time, and to convoke it at the first possible
moment; it later took a formal oath to carry out this obligation. From the very
first days of the revolution, all political conditions pointed to the fact that the
speediest possible convocation of the Constituent Assembly is for Russia the
most crying necessity, for the Constituent Assembly alone can command that
political and legal authority that is indispensable for the establishment and con
solidation of the new governmental order. And thereforeexcept for the Bolshe
viks who are possessed by the idea of the dictatorship of the minorityall political
parties were desirous of seeing a correctly organized all-peoples representation
as soon as possible.
But the technical difficulties in working out the electoral law, in organizing
those local organs upon which the arrangement of elections will be placed, in
compiling registers of voters, and so forth, proved so great that the hope of con
voking the Constituent Assembly immediately following the revolution had to
be abandoned. More than three months have passed since the preparatory work
began, and a conviction prevailed in government circles even recently that at
least five or six months would pass before the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly. In the Special Council on drafting a statute for the Constituent Assem
bly, a point of view has been adopted that all conditions that guarantee the full
and exact expression of popular will must be observed at any cost. But the attain
ment of this goal delays the elections; the more perfect their organization, the
greater expenditure of time and effort it requires.
. . . Two principles are struggling here: the principle of the greatest possible
perfection and the principle of the greatest possible speed. Two months ago the
first principle was undoubtedly prevailing. Now the prevalence, apparently, is
leaning toward the second one.
. . . No matter who the representatives of the revolutionary government are,
they must now think this way about the elections: even if they are imperfect, let
them take place as soon as possible. . . .
448 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

413. O b je c t io n o f RecK to t h e D ates S e t fo r t h e E lection and

C o nvocation of t h e C o nst it ue nt A sse m b l y
[Editorial, No. 139, June 16, 1917, p. 1.]
Yesterday the Provisional Government announced the date for the convening
of the Constituent Assembly, which up to this time still seemed to be in the indef
inite future.
Simultaneously with the setting of September 30 as the date for the convening
of the Constituent Assembly, there appeared in the newspapers a report on the
sitting of the Council for the drafting of the statute on the Constituent Assembly.
It is obvious from this report that in connection with the estimates of the date of
the forthcoming introduction of the new organs of local self-government, the
Council approved by a considerable majority of votes [the view] that the Constit
uent Assembly could not convene before approximately December 1. The minor
ity thought it possible to hasten the convening without waiting for the introduc
tion of new organs of self-government, entrusting the supervision of the elections
to the self-appointed existing organizations. The Provisional Government agreed
with the minority. Nevertheless, it did not think it possible to depend on self-
appointed organizations, because that would place the elections in the hands of
certain political parties and lead to the falsification of the peoples will. The
Government found a solution in that it entrusted the Minister of the Interior with
the responsibility of coordinating with this law the dates of putting into effect
the new local institutions, which, however, according to the statement of the
representative of the Ministry of the Interior, is impossible.
How, then, asks one of the socialist papers, are we to reconcile these two
decisions of the Council and the Provisional Government? This is by no means
an idle question and the answer to it is far from simple. Unquestionably the
Council is right in all of its estimates which lead it to set December 1 as the
date for the convening of the Assembly. But . . . the Congress of the Soviets
of Workers Deputies put a demand to its ministers for an earlier date of convoca
tion. The order is an ultimatum, and the socialist ministers had nothing left to
do but obey it incontestably. Why did the other ministers find it necessary to
follow them and form a majority with the socialists? Why? This question could
be raised with regard to many other recent decisions. The explanation apparently
lies not in the sphere of logic but in that of pyschology.
This attitude, dangerous in every respect, increases daily. Appetites grow.
The most sober-minded people succumb to the hypnosis and forget that the weak
ness of the Government is temporary. Because of this, the Provisional Govern'
ment, growing weaker, in its indecision was forced to hasten at all cost the con
vening of the Constituent Assembly. Such extreme urgency could only force it
to shorten the time two months rather than [accept] the date considered by the
Council as the deadline, disregarding those entirely indisputable facts submitted
by the Council.

414. Volia Naroda C onsiders t h e E arly C onvocation J u st ifie d

[No. 41, June 16, 1917, p. 1.]
The date for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly has been set. This
date is September 30,1917, Elections are scheduled for September 17, 1917.
Such haste, under normal conditions, would undoubtedly be detrimental and
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 449

undesirable. There is no doubt also that under such circumstances the elections
will be conducted not without great shortcomings. Undoubtedly the scheduled
date, too, comes at a time that is not convenient, for a number of reasons, for our
peasantry. Nor could one dispute the fact that haste in the preparation of registers
of voters, as well as in challenging them, will unavoidably lead to great defects
and serious errors.
But at the same time there is no other way out. The condition of the state
is a serious one. Ever more often the question arises: Will the ship of state reach
the port of the Constituent Assembly? Will the Provisional Government, together
with the democracy, succeed in maintaining somehow the unity of the state before
the arrival of the master55? The more often misgivings arise, and the more justi
fied they are, the more necessary it is to hurry and hasten the date of the convening.
The members of the Special Council on the drafting of a Statute on the Constit
uent Assembly understood all of the [above-] mentioned defects. But at the same
time they also understood the critical situation of the country and could not but
agree with the indicated motives for haste. And that was the reason why most of
them voted for this date and why the Provisional Government sanctioned this
decision.
Briefly, the situation is as follows: better a Constituent Assembly called and
elected with partial defects than its absence or postponement to an indefinite and
perhaps too distant future.

415. Izvestiia Considers t h e D ecision of t h e G o vernm ent a V ictory fo r t h e

D em ocracy
[No. 93, June 16, 1917, p. 4.]
By a decree of the Provisional Government, the date for the convocation of
the Constituent Assembly has been set for September 30, and the elections for
the 17th.
The strongly expressed desire of the all-Russian revolutionary democracy to
hasten and to establish exactly the beginning of the work of the plenary organ of
the Russian democracy, whose task is to definitively consolidate, legalize, and
create normal conditions for expanding the gains of the Russian revolution, is
now being concretely realized.
The democratic forces have the right to regard the last enactment of the
Provisional Government as their victory.
But every victory carries its commitments.
And the enactment on the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on Septem
ber 30 poses new, difficult, and complicated problems to the organizations of the
revolutionary democracy.
Not only will the Constituent Assembly act as the supreme body of national
sovereignty, establish all the laws of the Russian State, resolve the basic issues of
our social, political, and economic lifethe questions of land, labor, and the form
of governmentbut [it] will also [act] as the authoritative body, recognized by
all, around which all the revolutionary forces of the democracy will gather and
to which all its energies will be directed.
How many times, since the revolution, has the democracy experienced difficult
moments of crisis, how many times have the open and concealed enemies of the
revolution attempted to inflict heavy blows on the cause of the revolution. . . .
450 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Until now, these blows against the unity of strength of the revolutionary democ
racy have been successfully repelled . . .
But the danger of disuniting the forces still exists and will continue to exist
until we have an institution whose authority is unquestionable for all classes
of people [and] to whose will all the enemies of the revolution will have to submit.
The All-Russian Constituent Assembly elected freely on the basis of universal,
equal, direct, and proportional representation will be just such an institution.

Only three months separate us from the elections. During this time an enor
mous [amount] of work must be performedthe technical work of drawing up
the registers of voters and the political work of preparing all the citizens for this
most important time of the revolution.
The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies must get to work
immediately.
They must come to the aid of the organs of local self-government, [and]
strengthen them, for it is precisely to these organs that the Government has
assigned the task of carrying out the elections.
They must establish their control over all the preparations for the elections,
in order [to ensure] that elections take place under normal democratic conditions,
[and] that the peoples will receives free expression.
And if they fulfill this task, if, through the efforts of all the organs of the
Russian revolutionary democracy, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, repre
senting all the desires and all the forces of the peoples of Russia, becomes an accom
plished fact on September 30,1917, then that day will in truth become the day of
the greatest victory of the Russian revolution.

416. T h e I m po ssib il it y o f H olding t h e E lectio ns on S e p t e m b e r 17

[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 170, July 27, 1917, p. 1.]

The Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva published section one, the most im

portant one, of the Statute on the elections to the Constituent Assembly.8 We
have thus moved forward on this question and made the first step toward the
Constituent Assembly. But we should not imagine that the rest of the road is short
and that elections to the Constituent Assembly can actually be conducted on
September 17, as announced by the Provisional Government in its declaration
of June 14. Much as it would like to fulfill the obligation assumed, the Provi
sional Government will be unable to do so. As a matter of fact, in accordance with
the Statute, the electoral lists must be made public not later than forty days prior
to the elections. Consequently, elections could be conducted on September 17 only
if the election lists were published not later than August 7. But this is obviously
an unrealizable condition. Nowhere have they begun to prepare registers of
voters. Moreover, in the overwhelming majority of cases there are no institutions
to prepare these registers. According to the Statute, such institutions are munici
pal, settlement, and volost zemstvo boards. However, boards do not exist in all
municipalities. As for volosts, elections of deputies have not begun there as yet.
Elections to the boards must then follow. And only then can the work of preparing

3 See Doc. 421 bdow.

 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 451

the registers for the Constituent Assembly begin. Obviously, in the ten remaining
days before August 7 it is undoubtedly impossible to complete this complex
preparatory work. Registers of voters for the Constituent Assembly will not be
published by August 7. Consequently elections will, under no circumstances, take
place on September 17. It is difficult to say for how long they will be postponed.
This will depend upon the progress of the formation of volost zemstvos.

417. Izvestiia A ssesses t h e B la m e fo r D elays in t h e M ee tin g o f t h e

C o n st it u e n t A sse m bly
[No. 131, July 30,1917, pp. 1-2. Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 122, August 2, 1917, p. 1, ran
an editorial, similar in tone, but also accusing the moderate socialist elements of negli-
gence in not pressing more energetically for speed in the preparations for the As
sembly.]

The convocation has been greatly delayed for a variety of reasons.

The bourgeois parties, of course, played a role in this by their cool attitude
toward this question. They believed that there were no grounds for hurrying
with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and were calmly biding their
time until the raging sea of the revolution would calm down somewhat and assume
its normal contours. It is precisely owing to this attitude that the first Provisional
Government did so little in the way of preparing for the convocation of the Con
stituent Assembly.
But no less significant was the role of the continual government crises,
especially the events of July 3-5, which systematically disrupted all the work of
the government machinery and distracted the attention of both the popular masses
and the Government from this most vital matter. As is well known, the Bolshevik
Party announced that the Constituent Assembly was totally unnecessary, and
proposed to substitute for a democratic republic based on general elections some
kind of fantastic Soviet Republic, based on the existing organs of workers,
peasants, and soldiers democratic organizations, eliminating all the other strata
of the population as well as the unorganized strata of the democracy itself.
As a consequence of all this, the preparatory work was greatly delayed, and
reports have seeped into the press to the effect that under no circumstances will it
be possible to complete the work by the date set by the Government (September
17). All kinds of obstacles of an organizational and technical character are inter
fering with the punctual observance of the date set.

418. RecK A nsw ers t h e Ch arg es o f K adet R e spo n sib il it y f o r t h e

D elay in C alling t h e Co n st it u e n t A sse m bly
[Editorial, No. 181, August 4,1917, p. 1.]
During the last days the socialist press has been much occupied with the
question of the calling of the Constituent Assembly. This press asserts that it is
necessary to postpone the convocation because the elections cannot, under the
circumstances, be completed by the appointed date.
Inasmuch as this is so, and the fact is indisputably established that the elections
cannot be completed, the question resolves itself quite simply. If the elections
452 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

cannot be completed, they should be postponed. And that is all there is to it. But
the socialist papers spare no eloquence to prove what is clear to everybody.
In the words of the above-mentioned papers this is explained by the fact that
the revolutionary democracy fears that news about the postponement of the
elections might provoke an alarm, etc. To what extent these fears are justified
it is hard to say. At any rate, the same newspapers point out, day in and day out,
that revolutionary sentiments are progressively on the decline. This decline is
also reflected, incidentally, in the fact that the sittings of the Council on the
Constituent Assembly convene with difficulty; that the work is carried on drowsily,
in spite of the fact that the revolutionary democracy is so concerned about the
outcome of this question. At any rate, even the Novaia Zhizn\ which thinks that
we have not shed enough blood yet, admits that we have entered upon a phase
of decline, that the revolution is experiencing a crisis.
But let us assume that the revolutionary democracy might really get excited
on learning of the postponement of the Constituent Assembly and that it must be
prepared with caution for the inevitable blow to the faith. What, then, are the
distinguished socialist organs, which aspire to the leadership of the revolutionary
democracy, doing? In our reviews of the press we had occasion to observe many
times that the whole thing is nothing more than an attempt to shift the blame
onto the shoulders of the bourgeoisie.
For, as no one can deny any longer, if the elections are set for September 17,
they unquestionably cannot be carried out. But Messrs. the socialists were
emphatic in their demand that the Provisional Government set the date not later
than September 30. And after that, in the famous program of July 8, about which
so much had been said and written, requests for an earlier convening of the Con
stituent Assembly occupied first place [on the agenda]. It must be clear now that
setting the date for September 17 was ill-considered, to say the least.
Instead, the leaders of the revolutionary democracy quite unceremoniously
assert that the Kadets are to blame; that the bourgeoisie has nothing to expect from
the Constituent Assembly; that it must try to delay it, and that consequently it is
necessary to be on guard and not permit one extra day of [further] delay. The
official organ Izvestia resembles the hyperborean lights. It discredits ahead pf
time the authority of the Constituent Assembly, which will be determined not by
the correctness of its elections but by its deeds, and by its deeds it will be judged.
We do not know whether Messrs. the [socialist] leaders hope by these tactics
to raise the declining morale. In so far as these organs still command some influ
ence, they unquestionably only increase mutual animosity and irritation and thus
jeopardize the revolution. Unquestionably they also definitely interfere with the
countrys desire for law and order and push the masses, unbridled as they are,
on the course of anarchy and irresponsibility . . .

419. T h e P o s t p o n e m e n t o f t h e C o n v o c a t io n of the
C o n s t it u e n t A s s e m b l y
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1269.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Striving to ensure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly as soon as
possible, the Provisional Government set September 17 for the elections, at the
same time placing the entire burden of the work of drawing up the registers of
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 453

voters on the municipal administrations and the newly created volost zemstvos.
The enormous work involved in holding elections to local institutions has required
time. Now, in accordance with the timetable for the organization of local institu
tions on the basis of direct, universal, equal, and secret suffrage established by the
Government, the Provisional Government has decreed:
The elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on November 12,1917,
and the Constituent Assembly shall convene on November 28, 1917.
A. K er en sk y , Minister-President
Z arudnyi , Minister of Justice
August 9,1917

420. Izvestiia on t h e P o st po n e m e n t o f E lectio ns

[No. 140, August 10, 1917, p. 3. Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 130, August 11, 1917, p. 1,
acknowledged the need for a postponement, but objected to its length.]
Performing the sacred duty that it had taken upon itself, the Provisional
Government of the second composition, by decree of June 14, set the date of
September 17 for elections to the Constituent Assembly.
The All-Russian Central Executive Committee did everything that was re
quired of it in order that the elections might take place on the date set.

But at a time when utmost energy and persistence should have been applied to
the preparatory work for the elections, the whole course of the work was retarded
by the impact of the July events in the rear, the tragedy on the front, and the
drawn-out crisis in the Government. Under these conditions, the most important
preparatory work that determines the success of the whole electoral campaign
the drawing up of the registers of votershas not made an inch of progress.
The chief obstacle is the absence of new organs of municipal self-government
and volost zemstvos, to which are assigned, according to the Statute on Elections,
the compilation of the registers. . . . Elections to volost zemstvos in 43 guber
niyas will end in the second half of August; in many places the last day of elections
will fall on September 10; in Bessarabia, Siberia, the Steppes Region, and Turke
stan, the elections will be protracted beyond September 20, In most of the towns
elections to the organs of municipal self-government will end by August 13.
If one considers that, in order to assure the population of a proper realization
of its right to vote, it is necessary according to all the technical requirements in
the organization of elections to have an interval of 50 days between the compilation
of the registers and the day of the electionsthen it will become obvious that the
postponement of elections to the Constituent Assembly was inevitable. Further
more, it should be borne in mind that according to information from the Ministry
of the Interior, the paper that is necessary for the elections will be at the disposal
of the proper institutions no sooner than August 20, and the envelopes no sooner
than September 20.
After a detailed discussion of the question with the participation of the left-
wing members of the Special Council for the Drafting of the Statute on Elections
to the Constituent Assembly, the Bureau of the Executive Committee was forced
to recognize the necessity of postponing the convocation of the Constituent Assem
454 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

bly for a 35-40-day period. (For the resolution of the Central Committee, see
the August 6 issue of Izvestiia.)
But, having accepted the unavoidable postponement of the elections, the organs
of the revolutionary democracy must remember that every additional day increases
the dangerous threat which the country is experiencing and multiplies the forces
of the counterrevolution.
Having commenced its activities, the All-Russian Commission on Elections
to the Constituent Assembly is adopting every measure to prevent the slightest
delay in the forthcoming work on the elections.

THE ELECTORAL LAW4

421. S uffrage , E lectio n Co m m issio n s , R egistration o f V o ters , an d

L ist o f Candidates
[5o6. U z a k I, 2, No. 916, For other sections of Part I of the Statute on Elections to
the Constituent Assembly, their implementation and amendment, see Doc. 422 and
Sob. Uzak., I, 2, Nos. 1308, 1309, 1310, 1386, 1683, 1788-91, and 1802. Some of these
acts established alternate methods of compiling registers of voters and of organizing
election commissions where elections to local institutions of self-government were
delayed.]

LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Recognizing the urgency of enacting forthwith those rules for the elections
to the Constituent Assembly that are necessary in order to proceed immediately
with elections among the civilian population, the Provisional Government, acting
on a report of the Special Council for the Drafting of the Statute on Elections to
the Constituent Assembly, has decreed:
I. To approve Part 1 (Chapters I-V) of the Statute on Elections to the
Constituent Assembly, with the proviso that the Chairman of the Special Council
for the Drafting of the Statute on Elections to the Constituent Assembly is author
ized to submit to the Provisional Government the remaining drafts of other parts
of this Statute as well as the rules for elections in the Army and Navy and for
exceptions to the provisions set forth in Chapters IIIV of the aforesaid Statute
with respect to individual localities in the State.

V. The elections of members of the Constituent Assembly from the guberniyas

occupied by the enemy, with the exception of the territory to be included within
the future Polish state, shall be carried out immediately after the guberniya
concerned has been cleared of the enemy, with the proviso that the schedule of
election districts [okrugi], indicating the number of members of the Constituent

4 Sections of the Statute on Elections to the Constituent Assembly were promulgated as

they were approved by the Provisional Government through the summer and fall of 1917. The
major provisions are included in the order in which they appeared.
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 455

Assembly in each district, shall be established by special legislation of the Provi

sional Government.
VI. The following provisional rules are established:
1. Pending the establishment of institutions of guberniya and uezd zem
stvo and municipal and settlement self-government, on the basis of legislation of
the Provisional Government, the members of the election commissions for the
Constituent Assembly and of precinct [uchastkovyi] election commissions,
elected by these institutions (Statute, articles 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21), are to be
temporarily replaced by persons chosen by local public institutions and organiza
tions indicated by the Provisional Government.

VII. The present Law is to be put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
Iv. Y e f r e m o v , Minister of Justice
July 20,1917

STATUTE ON ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Part I
Chapter I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The Constituent Assembly shall be formed of members of the population
on the basis of universal and equal suffrage without distinction as to sex, by
means of direct elections and secret ballot, using the principle of proportional
representation.

Chapter II
ON SUFFRAGE
3. The right to participate in elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be
enjoyed by citizens of Russia of both sexes who have reached the age of twenty
by the day of the elections.

4. Persons who have been certified insane under the procedure established by
law, as well as deaf-mutes under guardianship, shall not participate in the elections.
5. The following persons are disfranchised:
1) unless their civil rights are restored to them earlier, persons who have
been condemned by judicial sentences, which have taken legal effect, to
a) hard laboruntil the expiration of ten years after such sentence at
hard labor has been served;
b) to deportation, to detention in a correctional section or in a house of
correction, prison, or fortress, with forfeiture or limitation of civil rightsuntil
the expiration of five years after sentence has been served;
2) persons convicted for theft . . . fraud, misappropriation or embez
zlement of property entrusted to them . . . receiving stolen goods, purchasing
or taking on pledge as a regular occupation property known to be stolen, forgery,
400

usury, extortion and bribery, as well as procurement and connivance at obscenity

. . . as well as for acts intended to interfere with the freedom and regularity of
elections to legislative institutions and organs of self-governmentuntil three
years after sentence has been served;
3) insolvent debtors, recognized as willful bankrupts on the basis of
judicial decisions which have taken legal effectuntil three years after such
recognition, and
4) military personnel who have left their units without leave . . . with the
exception of those who, before the expiration of the period for appealing election
lists (article 32), shall submit proper certification concerning either the valida
tion of their leave, the expiation of their guilt by subsequent courageous service,
or a court verdict of acquittal or sentencing to a penalty that does not involve loss
of rights.
6. Military personnel, regardless of the cases mentioned in the preceding (5)
article, shall also be disfranchised in those cases where they have been found
guilty, by verdicts that have taken legal effect, of criminal acts provided for by
[certain specified articles of] the Military Code of Penalties . . . [and] the
Naval Code of Penalties . . .
Those military personnel whose sentences have been deferred by court order
until the end of the war are not to be disfranchised.
7. The right to participate in the elections in each election precinct shall be
enjoyed only by those persons who are registered in the election lists of the pre
cinct.
8. The right to be elected in each election district shall belong to each person
who enjoys the right to participate in the elections (articles 3-6), even though he
may be registered in an election list in a different district or may not be registered
at all in the election lists.
9. Persons registered in election lists shall be barred from participation in
the elections if, by the time of the election, they have lost their election rights
(articles 4-6), or if they have been imprisoned by that time, either on the basis
of judicial sentences which have taken legal effect or as a result of prosecution
by the judicial authorities as defendants in a criminal case, in which they have
been detained under preventive custody.
10. Members of the former ruling house in Russia may neither elect nor be
elected to the Constituent Assembly.

Chapter III
ON THE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
HOLDING ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

11. The responsibility for holding the elections is entrusted to:

1) the all-Russian, district, capital, uezd, and municipal commissions
for the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the precinct election commis
sions, and
2) municipal and settlement boards and volost zemstvo boards.
12. The All-Russian Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly is
attached to the Provisional Government. It shall consist of: a Chairman, appointed
by the Provisional Government, and fifteen members appointed by the Provisional
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 457

Government on nomination of the Special Council for the Drafting of the Statute
on Elections to the Constituent Assembly.

13. The All-Russian Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly is

responsible for:
1) general supervision of the progress of the elections to the Constituent
Assembly and the discussion of measures required to expedite these elections;
2) the preparation of general instructions to be approved by the Provi
sional Government supplementing and elaborating both the present Statute and
the Regulation for the application of the present Statute;
3) the preparation of the list of persons elected as members of the Con
stituent Assembly, and
4) the adoption of measures for the processing of statistical and other
data on the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
14. The All-Russian Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly shall
hand over to the Constituent Assembly, upon its opening, the election proceed
ings received from district and capital election commissions for the Constituent
Assembly.5
15. A District Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly shall be
formed in each election district and shall consist, under the chairmanship of the
chairman of the guberniya (oblast) zemstvo assembly or his deputy, of the as
sistant presiding judge of the administrative division of the circuit court or his
deputy, two members chosen by the municipal board of the gubemiya (oblast)
capital, and two members chosen by the guberniya (oblast) zemstvo board.
In addition, the Commission shall admit to membership, after the beginning
of the period mentioned in article 52, one person from each group of voters that
has submitted a list of candidates (article 45).
16. The District Election Commissions for the Constituent Assembly shall
be responsible for: 1) supervision of the prompt establishment and beginning of
operations of the uezd and municipal election commissions for the Constituent
Assembly, 2) approval of the division of election precincts, as proposed by the
uezd and municipal election commissions for the Constituent Assembly and con
sideration of all claims submitted concerning irregularities committed during
such division, 3) determination and public announcement of the day on which
municipal and settlement boards and volost zemstvo boards shall proceed to the
compilation of registers of voters, supervision of the prompt compilation of these
registers and their display for public examination, 4) receipt and consideration of
lists of candidates, numbering of these lists and their display for public examina
tion, and communication of the lists to uezd and municipal election commissions
for the Constituent Assembly, to municipal and settlement boards and volost
zemstvo boards and precinct election commissions, as well as public announce
ment of subsequent mergers of lists, 5) arrangements for procurement of election
envelopes, ballots, and so forth, or entrusting this to uezd and municipal election
commissions for the Constituent Assembly, 6) counting votes in the district,
determining the results of the elections and making them public, 7) issuing proper

5 The work of this Commission was reported in the issues of the Izvestiia Vserossiiskoi po
Delam o Vyborakh v UchrediteVnoe Sobranie Komissii, the most interesting of which cover the
period of the elections, following the Bolshevik seizure of power.
458 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

certification to members of the Constituent Assembly concerning their election,

8) transferral of all election proceedings received by them to the All-Russian
Elections Commission for the Constituent Assembly, and 9) administration of
funds allocated for holding the elections in the given district.

18. In the guberniya (oblast) capitals and cities with a population of more
than 50,000 inhabitants, special municipal election commissions for the Constit
uent Assembly shall be formed. . . .

19. The uezd and municipal election commissions for the Constituent Assem
bly are responsible for: . . . [the same duties in their jurisdiction as the District
Election Commission, and] 7) transferral of the election proceedings to the Dis
trict Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly.
20. In Petrograd and Moscow, capital election commissions for the Constit
uent Assembly shall be formed. . . .

The capital election commissions for the Constituent Assembly shall have the
rights and duties conferred by the present statute on both district and municipal
election commissions for the Constituent Assembly.
21. A precinct election commission shall consist of four members, including
a chairman and secretary, elected by the municipal or settlement board or by the
volost zemstvo board.
In addition, the commission shall admit to membership one person from each
group of voters that has submitted a list of candidates and indicated a representa
tive eligible for inclusion in the given commission (article 45).
22. The precinct election commission is responsible for the receipt and original
count of election ballots in the given election precinct.
23. Institutions of local administration and self-government are required to
furnish assistance to the election commissions for the Constituent Assembly and
to the precinct election commissions in the fulfillment by the latter of the duties
entrusted to them by the present Statute.
24. All documents and papers drawn up on matters concerning the elections
to the Constituent Assembly, both those submitted to government, judicial, admin
istrative, and public establishments and officials of all departments and institu
tions, and those issued by all these establishments and officials, shall be exempted
from stamp duty and other taxes.

Chapter IV
ON REGISTERS OF VOTERS
25. For the holding of elections to the Constituent Assembly, registers of
voters shall be drawn up separately in each election precinct.
No one may be included in registers of voters in more than one precinct.
26. The compilation of registers of voters is entrusted to the municipal and
settlement boards and to the volost zemstvo boards, respectively.
27. The day on which the aforesaid boards (article 26) undertake the com
pilation of the registers of voters shall be determined for the entire district by
order of the district election commission for the Constituent Assembly and made
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

public in such a way as will best ensure that the population is thoroughly informed
thereof.
28. Persons who are entitled to participate in the elections shall be registered
in the registers of voters, provided they reside in the precinct by the day on which
the compilation of the register begins, even though they may be temporarily
absent from this precinct.
29. Persons who have arrived in the election precinct after the day on which
the compilation of the register of voters was begun (article 27) may be registered
in the register of the precinct only after submission of an application to that effect
to the municipal or settlement board or the volost zemstvo board during the entire
period of compilation of the register and the five days that follow the day of
publication of the register. . . .

31. The register of voters shall be made public immediately after its com
pilation, and in any case not later than forty days before the day of the elections,
in such a way as will best ensure the availability of this register for examination.
32. In the course of the ten days after the publication of the register, a repre
sentative of the local administrative authorities may enter protests, and persons
eligible to participate in the elections may submit complaints concerning the
irregularity or incompleteness of this register.
The aforesaid protests and complaints shall be submitted to the municipal or
settlement board or to the volost zemstvo board.

35. If the protest or complaint challenges the election rights of any person,
the latter shall be informed of this by the municipal or settlement board or the
volost zemstvo board.
36. Not later than three days before the end of the period mentioned in
article 32, a supplementary register shall be made public.

37. Protests and complaints concerning the supplementary register shall be

submitted . . . before the end of the period mentioned in article 32.
38. Protests and complaints shall be considered within a period of five days
by the uezd and municipal election commissions for the Constituent Assembly
at an open meeting under the procedure laid down for the consideration of cases
by administrative judges. . . . In addition to the person who has submitted the
protest or complaint and a representative of the board who drew up the register
which has been challenged, those persons whose election rights are under chal
lenge in the given case shall also have the right to participate in the case.
39. The decisions of the uezd and municipal election commissions for the
Constituent Assembly may be challenged within a period of ten days and appealed
to the administrative division of the circuit court. However, the submission of
such protests and complaints shall not hold up the election proceedings.
40. The administrative division of the circuit court shall consider the afore
said protests and complaints within a period of five days.
41. The registers of voters, after correction within a period of five days on
the basis of the decisions reached by the uezd and municipal election commissions
for the Constituent Assembly, and in appropriate cases by the administrative
460 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

division of the circuit court, shall again be made public, not later than ten days
before the day of the elections, in such a way as will best ensure the availability of
these registers for examination.

Chapter V
ON LISTS OF CANDIDATES

42. The elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be carried out by the
casting of votes for one of the lists of candidates submitted.
43. The lists of candidates shall be submitted to the district election commis
sion for the Constituent Assembly by groups of voters not later than thirty days
before the day of elections.
44. Each of the lists of candidates must be signed in their own hand by not
fewer than 100 persons eligible to participate in the elections in the given district.
The list must show the surname, first name, patronymic, and place of residence
of each of the candidates proposed. Statements of all candidates concerning their
willingness to stand for election in the given district on that list must be annexed
to the list. The list must be accompanied by the name of the organization that
has proposed it.

46. Each voter may sign only one list of candidates; if one and the same voter
signs two or more lists, his signature shall be considered valid only on the list
submitted first to the district election commission for the Constituent Assembly.
47. The number of candidates proposed in the lists may be less than the
number of members of the Constituent Assembly eligible for election in the given
election district, but must not exceed that number by more than half.6
48. The same candidate may be nominated in several election districts, but
in not more than five.
49. The inclusion of the same candidate in different lists in the same election
district is not allowed.

52. Lists of candidates submitted in compliance with the conditions mentioned

. . . shall be numbered by the district election commission for the Constituent
Assembly in the order of their receipt. The lists of candidates with this numbering
as well as with the names of organizations, if the lists are accompanied by such
(article 44), shall be displayed in the commissions premises not later than
twenty-three days before the day of the elections and shall then be communicated
without delay by the district election commission for the Constituent Assembly to
the uezd and municipal election commissions for the Constituent Assembly, to
the municipal and settlement boards and volost zemstvo boards, as well as to the
precinct election commissions, and shall be published for general information.
53. Groups of voters who have submitted lists of candidates may, not later
than fifteen days before the day of elections, submit to the district election com
mission for the Constituent Assembly applications for the merger of the lists of
candidates proposed by them. . . .

6 The number of members to be elected from each election district was established by the
law of September 23. Sob. Uzak., 1,2, No. 1697.
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMULX *dtUJL

The district election commission for the Constituent Assembly shall make such
mergers public not later than the next day after receipt of such an application.
54. The same list cannot be the subject of more than one merger.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
Iv. Y e frem o v , Minister of Justice
July 20,1917

422. T h e C onduct o f E lections and t h e D eter m in atio n o f t h e

C andidates E lected
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, 1801.]
Part I
Chapter VI
on casting and counting election ballots

55. Voting shall be carried out by casting election ballots.

56. Election ballots must be uniform in their external appearance. A sample
election ballot shall be established for the given election district by the district
election commission for the Constituent Assembly and shall be made public by
it no later than thirty days before the day of election.

82. A record must be kept of everything that occurs in the precinct election
commission from the opening until the closing of its meeting. . . .
83. The record of the precinct election commission shall be forwarded to the
uezd or municipal election commission for the Constituent Assembly- . . .

Chapter VII
on dete r m in in g t h e results o f t h e elections

87. The district election commission for the Constituent Assembly, on the
basis of records of meetings of uezd and municipal commissions, shall carry out
a total count of the votes cast throughout the entire election district for each of
the declared lists of candidates, and then the total number of members of the
Constituent Assembly eligible for election in the given district shall be divided
among the declared lists proportionately to the number of votes cast in the entire
district for each of these lists.

90. If in carrying out the distribution . . . a number of members of the Con

stituent Assembly is allotted to any of the lists of candidates in excess of the num
ber of candidates included in that list, a corresponding number of members seats
in the Constituent Assembly shall remain vacant.
91. If there are candidates lists in the district whose merger was properly
reported (article 53), in distributing the number of members of the Constituent
Assembly among lists, all votes cast for lists included in the same merger shall be
pooled, and the distribution shall be carried out first between these lists and other
lists. . . . After this the number of members of the Constituent Assembly allotted
to each merger shall be distributed among the individual merged lists. . . .
92. The candidates named in each list shall be entered as members of the
462 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

Constituent Assembly in the order of their entry in the list, beginning with the
first.
93. The All-Russian Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly, on
being informed of the election of the same person in several election districts,
shall propose to him, within a period of three days after notification by the Com
mission, to state in which district he wishes to accept election. In case the person
concerned does not make the corresponding statement in the period indicated, he
shall be considered elected in the district where he received the largest number of
votes.

Chapter IX
ON PROTECTING THE FREEDOM AND REGULARITY OF THE ELECTIONS

[There follows a detailed list of acts that interfere with the freedom and regularity
of elections, and the punishments for them.]

Part II
ON EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR
HOLDING ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Chapter I
ON ELECTIONS BY A MAJORITY VOTE

125. In holding elections to the Constituent Assembly in the election districts

of Amu-Darya, Arkhangelsk, Transcaspia, Kamchatka, the district of the Chinese
Eastern Railway, Olonetsk, Ordynsk, Prikaspia, and Yakutsk, as well as in the
Finnish election district and the election districts of Russian troops serving in
France and in the Balkan Peninsula (Part I II ) , candidates who have received the
largest number of votes shall be considered elected.
126. In the districts mentioned in the preceding (125) article, the elections
shall be carried out by casting votes for candidates declared in the lists of candi
dates, and the general rules of Part I of the present Statute shall apply, with the
following amendments:
1) the number of candidates nominated in the lists must not exceed the
number of members of the Constituent Assembly eligible for election in the given
election district.
2) each voter either may vote for one of the declared lists of candidates
without making any changes in it, or may vote for several candidates of one of
the declared lists, or may combine candidates from various lists in his election
ballot.

M. T e r e s h c h e n k o , Deputy Minister-President
A. D e m ia n o v , Acting Minister o f Justice
September 11, 1917
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY wo

423. E lection P rocedure in t h e A r m y and N avy

[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1810. See also ibid., Nos. 1684,1812, 1915, 1979, and, for special
provisions concerning Cossack units, No. 1977.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

I. Part III, annexed hereto, of the Statute on Elections to the Constituent

Assembly concerning election procedure in the army and navy is approved.
II. The determination of the number of members of the Constituent Assembly
eligible for election from each of the election districts on the front and in the fleet
shall be postponed until the period immediately preceding the first day of the
elections, in accordance with the number of personnel in the army and navy in
each election district at that time.
III. The Supreme Commander is authorized to prepare and submit rules
for the approval of the Provisional Government defining, in connection with the
conditions of the military situation, the period and procedure for the election
campaign in combat zones of the army and in the navy.

STATUTE ON ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Part III
ON ELECTION PROCEDURE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY

207. Elections in the army and navy shall be held on the general basis laid
down by Part I of the present Statute, with the exceptions mentioned in the present
(III) part.
208. In the combat zone as well as in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, [the
following] shall participate in the elections to the Constituent Assembly separately
from the remaining population, voting for special lists of candidates: [troops,
naval personnel, civilians employed by the services or serving with them].

209. Throughout the rest of the Russian State, military personnel belonging
to military units and institutions and organizations serving the troops, as well as
crews of ships and shore units of the navy and employees in organizations of the
naval department, shall take part in the elections together with the population of
those election districts within whose boundaries these units, crews, institutions,
and organizations are located, voting for the same lists of candidates as these
districts. . . .

Chapter I
ON ELECTION PROCEDURE IN THE COMBAT ZONE

211. A front election district shall be made up of troop units and institutions
and organizations serving the troops (article 208, paras. 1 and 3), stationed in
combat zones subordinate to commanders of armies of the fronts. Units, institu
tions, and organizations that are not subordinate to commanders of armies of the
fronts, or that are stationed outside of the frontiers of the State, shall vote within
the appropriate front election districts.
212. For the holding of elections at the front, five front election districts
shall be formed: Northern Front (including the troops stationed in Finland and
464 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

not subordinate to the commander of the Baltic Fleet), Western Front, South
western Front, Rumanian Front, and Caucasian Front.
In addition, election districts shall be formed among the Russian troops serving
in France and the Russian troops serving in the Balkan Peninsula. In these two
districts elections shall be held by a majority vote (article 125), and in case a
member elected in one of these districts leaves the Constituent Assembly, the
vacant seat shall not be filled.
213. For the casting of votes, voters in the front election districts shall be
divided into election precincts, formed by decisions of the front election commis
sions for the Constituent Assembly, consisting of troop units, their subdivisions,
and institutions and organizations serving the troops.

223. Not later than twenty-three days before the beginning of the elections
in each front election district (article 242), the clerical office of regimental or
other military units or institutions or organizations serving the troops, under the
supervision of regimental or equivalent election commissions for the Constituent
Assembly, shall undertake the compilation of registers of voters [which shall be
open to challenge and appeal in approximately the same manner as civilian lists].

236. Lists of candidates shall be announced (article 43) not later than fifteen
days before the beginning of the elections in each front election district (article
242).
237. Applications for the merger of lists of candidates shall be submitted to
the front election commission not later than seven days before the beginning of
the elections in each front election district (articles 53 and 242).

Chapter II
ON ELECTION PROCEDURE IN THE NAVY

244. For the holding of elections in the navy, two naval election districts shall
be formed, the Baltic and the Black Sea, which shall be made up of the crews of
ships and shore units of the navy, as well as of troop units, employees, and workers
in naval institutions (article 208, paras. 2 and 3), subordinate to the commanders
of the Baltic or Black Sea fleets. In naval election districts elections shall be held
by majority vote (article 125).

257. In the Baltic and Black Sea election districts the elections shall begin
eleven days before the first day of elections set by the Provisional Government
for the entire Russian State and shall last fourteen days.

A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
A. D e m ia n o v , Acting Minister of Justice
E. S h o l t s , for the Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
September 23,1917
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 465

THE PRELIMINARIES TO ELECTION AND CONVOCATION7

4 2 4 . T h e D elay in t h e D elivery o f B allots and E n v el o pe s

[Izvestiia, N o. 185, Septem ber 30, 1917, p. 3.]
The question of adopting measures in connection with the paper mill strike
was discussed at the last session of the All-Russian Election Commission for the
Constituent Assembly. It was decided to organize a meeting with the participation
of representatives of the Strike Committee in order to eliminate the delay in
the supply of paper and envelopes required for the election to the Constituent
Assembly.
Later on, however, a telephoned telegram was received from the Strike Com
mittee of the Union of Paper Production Workers, which stated that the Commit
tee, having discussed the question of the paper supply ordered by the All-Russian
Election Commission for the Constituent Assembly, had arrived at the following
conclusions: the delivery of the paper will, unquestionably, greatly weaken the
position of the strikers, but, in spite of this, taking into consideration the election
committees need for the paper and not wishing to delay the convocation of the
Constituent Assembly for a single hour, the Strike Committee has resolved to
deliver all the paper ordered by the All-Russian Committee provided there is super
vision of the delivery [to make certain] that the paper is issued only for the needs
of the election.

425. P u b lic A p a t h y C o n c e r n in g t h e E l e c t i o n s
[E d itorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, N o. 236, O ctober 15, 1917, p . 3 .]

The nearer the approaching day of elections to the Constituent Assembly, the
greater the misgivings about the correctness of the elections and their true reflec
tion of the will of the people. As soon as the election Statutes were released, it
immediately became obvious that it would be impossible to publish, check, chal
lenge, and correct the registers of voters everywhere within the time prescribed by
the Statutes. But inasmuch as the Provisional Government did not find it possible
to postpone to some later date the elections scheduled to be held on November 12,
considerable deviations from the law had to be made, extending the date of publi
cation of the lists and at the same time reducing the time for their correction. . . .
Some important deviations had to be permitted also, for the sake of expediency, on
the question of membership in the electoral commissions, which again cannot
but affect the correctness of the elections.
However, it is not these deviations from the guarantees of the correctness of
elections as established by law which are the source of alarm about the favorable
outcome of the elections. Rather, it is the unpreparedness for them by the popula
tion itself. This unpreparedness is revealed equally in the lower strata of the dark
people and the upper strata of the intelligentsia. Our parties and public organiza
tions, having abandoned themselves completely to the current political struggle
and to questions of the day, almost forgot, in the true sense of the word, about
the main problem of the revolution, about the Constituent Assembly. The day of

TPolitical activity preliminary to the election and convocation of the Constituent Assembly
is covered in Volume HL
466 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

elections is separated from the day of the revolution by more than eight months,
and yet this period has been very poorly utilized to prepare the people for the most
responsible balloting in their history. Moreover, the parties themselves and the
public organizations, as if caught unaware by the approaching day of elections,
hurried to make responsible decisions, some of them already too late. . . .

And if such is the case in the party upper strata, what can we expect of the
popular lower strata? The most striking thing here is a profound indifference to
elections. And this may be said with equal justice of the uninformed and isolated
villages and of the large cities, even of the capitals. Speaking of Petrograd, the
Izvestiia T sentraVnago IspolniteVnago Komiteta Sovetov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh
Deputatov states that complete absenteeism prevails among the population.
There is no enthusiasm and no interest in the elections to the Constituent Assem
bly among the workers, etc. And who will dare to assert that this appraisal is
too subjective and that it is not just as true of Moscow and any other large city
as it is of Petrograd? In addition to the profound indifference to elections, we
are faced with the political ignorance of the masses, who are frequently unable
to differentiate between Kadets and Bolsheviks and who nevertheless are forced
to vote for strictly party lists.
But it is too late now to weep over old mistakes, too late to grieve over lost
time, too late even to talk about the shortcomings of our electoral system. Elec
tions to the Constituent Assembly must be conducted and they will be conducted.
And our chief problem now should be to strive to have the few remaining weeks
before elections used most productively. We must at least now make up for lost
time and break through the wall of the publics ignorance and narrow indifference.
Let at least the last weeks before elections reflect the seriousness and solemnity
of the decision that the country will make on November 12.

426. T h e P ropo sals o f t h e J uridical C o uncil C oncerning

P rocedure fo r t h e C o nst it ue nt A sse m bly
[N. Rubinshtein, Vremennoe Pravitelstvo i Uchrediternoe Sobranie, KA, XXVIII
(1928), 110-15, 117-19. By the law of July 26, the Juridical Council was assigned
responsibility for the preparatory organizational work connected with the opening of
the assembly. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1244.]
The Conclusions of the Juridical Council with Regard to the Procedure of the
Opening of the Constituent Assembly and the Juridical Position of the Provisional
Government After the Opening of the Constituent Assembly
In connection with the preparatory work related to the opening of the Con
stituent Assembly, which has been entrusted to it by the Provisional Government,
the Juridical Council, in its session of September 21,1917, has studied the question
of the procedure for the opening of the sessions of the Constituent Assembly.
As may be noted from the historic reference attached herewith, there arises
in this regard a series of issues of principle connected with the nature itself of the
authority belonging to the Constituent Assembly. From this point of view it is
necessary to study: a) the question of procedure as such of the opening of the
Constituent Assembly, b) the question of the moment at which the Provisional
Government would lay down its powers and of the consequences of this act of
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 467

deposition, c) the question of the proposals to be introduced in the Constituent

Assembly by the Provisional Government.

[There follows a discussion of the circumstances and lessons of the French

Constituent Assemblies of 1848 and 1871.]
On the basis of the foregoing the Juridical Council considers:
I. That the first session of the Constituent Assembly should be opened by
a speech by the Minister-President of the Provisional Government.
II. That in concluding this speech the Minister-President: 1) should announce
that the session of the Constituent Assembly is open, 2) should declare that the
Provisional Government is handing over to the Constituent [Assembly] all the
powers with which it was invested, but that it remains at its post, as the organ of
current administration, subordinated to and responsible before the Constituent
Assembly, until [the moment when] the Constituent Assembly takes its first
decision with regard to the organization of its executive authority, 3) should
propose that the Assembly recognize its oldest deputy as its temporary president
and, provided there were no objections in this respect, ask this deputy to take over
the chair.

IV. The legislative proposals that the Provisional Government wishes to intro
duce in the Constituent Assembly should be communicated to the chancery of the
Constituent Assembly before its opening, as proposals [for its consideration].
N. L azarevskii, President
N. M azarakii , Secretary
Project of the Law Regarding the Organization of a Temporary Executive Author
ity of the Constituent Assembly, and Also a Project for the Procedure for the
Issuing of Laws by the Constituent Assembly [Prepared by the Juridical Council,
October 9 , 1917]
On behalf of the Russian people the Constituent Assembly of the Russian
Republic
orders:

The establishment on the following bases, prior to the enactment of the funda
mental laws of the Russian Republic, of a temporary procedure for the adminis
tration of the executive authority of the Russian Republic:
1. The administration of the executive authority in the Russian Republic is
to be vested in the temporary president of the Russian Republic.
2. The temporary president is to administer his authority under the super
vision of the Constituent Assembly and with the assistance of a Council of Ministers
enjoying the confidence of the Assembly.
3. The temporary president is to be elected by the Constituent Assembly by
secret ballot.
4. The temporary president is to retain his powers until [the moment when]
his re-election is decreed by the Constituent Assembly, but in no case for longer
than one year.
468 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

5. The temporary president is to possess the right of the initiative in matters

of legislation. All the legislative bills of the Government, following their discus
sion by the Council of Ministers, are to be introduced in the Constituent Assembly
not otherwise than by order and on behalf of the temporary president.
6. The temporary president is to maintain communication with the Constit
uent Assembly by means of written messages. He is also to be entitled to present
oral explanations at a session of the Constituent Assembly, provided he declares
[his intention] in advance to the president of the Assembly. Upon receiving
such a communication, the president of the Assembly is to notify the Assembly
of it immediately. The explanations of the temporary president are to be heard
at the next meeting following the one at which the aforesaid communication has
been received.
7. All the laws approved by the Constituent Assembly are to be communicated
to the temporary president, who is to forward them immediately for enactment
through the Ruling Senate, in accordance with the established procedure.
8. The temporary president is to supervise the execution of the laws, and
to give instructions to this effect.
9. The temporary president is to issue ukases regarding the organization, the
composition, and the procedures of action of the governmental institutions, except
ing the institutions of the Ministry of Justice, requesting the necessary credits
from the Constituent Assembly, in cases when they are required.
10. The temporary president is to decide on all matters of administration,
which, in accordance with the existing legislation, are to be decided by the supreme
executive authority.
11. The temporary president is to direct the external relations of the Russian
Republic with foreign powers. In matters of declaration of war, of concluding
peace [or] armistice, and also for other treaties with foreign powers, the tempo
rary president is to introduce respective resolutions in the Constituent Assembly.
12. The temporary president is to exercise the supreme command over all the
armed forces of the Russian Republic.
13. The temporary president is to appoint and to discharge the president of
the Council of Ministers and the ministers, and also those officials of the civil or
military administration, who, in accordance with the existing legislation, are to
be appointed or discharged by the supreme authority.
14. The ukases and the orders of the temporary president are to be counter
signed by the president of the Council of Ministers or by one of the ministers, and,
failing such a countersign, they are not to be put into effect. The ukases and the
orders of the temporary president, which are to be announced for general informa
tion, are to be promulgated by the Ruling Senate.
15. The preliminary discussion of the affairs that are subject to the decision
of the temporary president and also the direction and the unification of the
activity of the various ministers are to be entrusted to the Council of Ministers.

19. The president of the Council of Ministers and all the ministers are to be
conjointly responsible before the Constituent Assembly for the general course of
the administration of the State. Each of them individually is to be responsible
before the Assembly for his own actions and orders, and also for the decrees and
orders of the temporary president, which have been countersigned by him.
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 469

427. E xcerpts fr o m t h e R ecords o f t h e S pecial C o m m issio n o f t h e

P rovisional G o vernm ent to P repare a D raft o f t h e F u n d a m en t a l L aws
(C o nst it ut io na l ) fo r t h e C onsideration o f t h e Co n st it u e n t A sse m b l y
[N. Rubinshtein, Vremennoe Pravitelstvo i UchreditePnoe Sobranie, KA, XXVIII
(1 9 2 8 ), 1 1 9 -2 2 , 1 3 2 -3 8 .]

Session of October 11,1917

No. 1

The [draft] program presented by the Special Commission of the Provisional

Government for the fundamental laws which have to be worked out was under
discussion.

. . . With regard to the question of the working out of a [draft] program

for fundamental laws, the Special Commission considers it necessary first of all
to state that the main task before the Special Commission is by no means a pre
determination or an indication of the road that would be taken by the Constituent
Assembly, but merely the clarification of the issues that the Constituent Assembly
will have to decide upon. This task should be considered accomplished if, thanks
to the working out of one single legislative project, submitted to the Constituent
Assembly at the time of its opening, it were to prove easier for its members to
find their way among the number of issues that might arise.

On the question of drafting, the Special Commission has decided to entrust one
[of its] members with the summary of all the [available] materials, and also
to elect a presidium and a bureau in the form of a drafting committee. In par
ticular, with regard to the size of the projected constitution, the Special Commis
sion has found it desirable to compile a voluminous bill [containing] approxi
mately 200 articles.
Furthermore, the Special Commission distributed the various items of the
program among the members of the Council who were present, and planned to
invite several new persons who are specialists in the problems in question. Without
predetermining the final distribution, the Special Commission has charged the
following members to work out the various problems.
An approximate program of the problems to be worked out by the Commission
for elaboration of a project of fundamental laws, with the indication of the
Commission members who have undertaken to carry out this task:
1. Declaration on civil liberties.
The principles that may be used as the foundation of the constitution (the
monarchic principle, the principle of the popular sovereignty, the complete self-
determination of nationalities).
2. Guarantees of civil liberties.
Emergency situations.
V. M. Gessen
3. The principles of federalism, autonomy, self-determination, and unity of
the state.
N. I. Lazarevskii
470 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

4. The language of the state and the local languages.

N. A. Lenskii
5. National representation.
N. I. Lazarevskii
The two-chamber system.
A. M. Kulisher
The organization and the secretarial work of the chambers.
Immunity, remuneration of members of the chambers, compatibility with
civil service.
Sessions, dissolution, procedure, public hearings.
A. E. Nolde
6. The President of the Republic. Process of election, functions, responsi
bility.
A. A. Bogolepov
7. The organization of the courts, their independence and irremovability.
Military and special courts. Administrative courts.
F. F. Deriuginskii and
I. D. Mordukhai-Boltovskoi
8. The army.
B. E. Nolde
9. The organization of the administration. Ministers, their importance. The
responsibility of the ministers. Their relations with the chambers.
K.N. Sokolov
10. The Senate, its relation to administrative and judicial institutions.
V. F. Deriuginskii and
I. D. Mordukhai-Boltovskoi
11. The Council of Ministers.
K.N. Sokolov
12. The budget, loans, taxes.
V. N. Maievskii
13. Financial control.
V. N. Maievskii
14. International relations, treaties.
S. A. Kotliarevskii
15. The competence of the legislative institutions.
N. I. Lazarevskii
16. Procedure for the amendment of the constitution. Constitutional guar
antee.
E. E. Pontovich
17. The seal, the arms, the banner.
S. N. Troinitskii
18. Citizenship, naturalization.
V. M. Gessen
N. Lazarevskii , Chairman
N. M azaraktt, Secretary
 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 471

Session of October 20,1917

No. 4

The report, submitted by A. M. Kulisher and B. E. Shatskii, on the one- and

two-chamber systems was under discussion.

Having heard the opinions [expressed] and before summing them up, V. M.
Gessen, who was presiding, stated his own opinion of the one-chamber system,
of which he declared himself to be a convinced supporter. According to his views,
the upper chamber was historically obsolete, lacking practical political signifi
cance. The existence of two democratic chambers represented a purposeless
political institution, as was proved by the experience of the American coun
tries. . .
a

Returning to the basic issue of the report, whether the principle of one or of
two chambers should be adopted, the acting chairman, on the basis of the fore
going discussion, noted that among the members of the Special Commission for
the working out of a project of fundamental laws there were supporters of three
opinions: 1) of the classical two-chamber system, 2) of the British governmental
system subsequent to 1911, i.e., of the right of suspensive veto, 3) of the one-
chamber system.
For the purpose of complete impartiality and of a comprehensive clarification,
all the three aforesaid opinions might be submitted to the Constituent Assembly in
the form of legislative bills accompanied by an explanatory note.
. . . V. M. Gessen put to vote the issue of the one-chamber and two-chamber
systems.
Among those present, eleven proved to be supporters of the two-chamber
system, and seven of the one-chamber system.
Further, the question of the equality or inequality of rights of the upper and
lower chambers was put to vote, with seven members expressing themselves for
the equality of rights and four for the inequality. Finally, the vote on the issue
of a democratic upper chamber based on the representation of [class] interests
and of [professional] groups received seven votes for and nine against.
After a proposal of V. M. Gessen regarding the advisability of presenting brief
drafts on the issues, the working out of which was entrusted to the members of
the Special Commission, the session was declared closed.
C h a ir m a n
S ecretary

428. K e r e n sk y O rders t h e P reparation o f a C o m p l e t e R epo r t o n t h e

W ork o f t h e P rovisional G o v er nm en t fo r S u b m issio n to t h e
C o n st it u e n t A sse m b l y
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 233, October 12, 1917, p. 2.]
A.F. Kerensky, Minister-President, appealed to all members of the Provisional
Government with the following circular letter:
November 28 is the date set for the convening of the Constituent Assembly,
472 TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC ORDER

to which the Provisional Government will have to give an exhaustive report of

its activity in all spheres of state life with complete objectivity and impartiality,
leaving nothing unsaid about the favorable facts and concealing nothing about
the negative side of the actual state of affairs. On the basis of these, the Constit
uent Assembly can move immediately toward a final solution of the crucial ques
tions of the Russian state.
The preparation of this report must be completed in order that a summary
of the activity of the Provisional Government can be distributed among the
members of the Constituent Assembly on the day of its opening. In view of this,
I respectfully request that you take immediate steps to prepare a report on the
department of which you are in charge and plan to complete this work by Novem
ber 1 of this year.
I would expect, the letter continues, each departmental report to give a
complete list of all measures introduced by the department with an explanation of
the extent to which the realization of these measures fulfills the program the
Provisional Government announced in its declaration and the causes for the
nonfulfillment or partial fulfillment of this program in some of the branches of
state construction.
Irrespective of the reports on the work of different departments, the total
report of the activity of the Provisional Government must illuminate also some
general question to which the Constituent Assembly undoubtedly will give special
attention.
Among such questions, the following should be pointed out first of all:
1) strategic work in the office of the supreme commander and the general strategic
position of our army; 2) international relations in general and the relations
between Russia and foreign powers in particular; 3) the work of zemstvo self-
governments, as well as the work of revolutionary democratic organizations.
 Source Abbreviations

Adamov, Evropeiskie derzhavy i Gretsiia E. A. Adamov (ed.), Evropeiskie dershavy

i Gretsiia v epokhu Mirovoi Voiny po sekretnym dokumentam b. ministerstva ino-
strannykh del
Adamov, Konst. i prolivy E. A. Adamov (ed.), KonstantinopoF i prolivy po sekret
nym dokumentam b. ministerstva inostrannykh del
Adamov, Razdel E. A. Adamov (ed.), Razdel Asiatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym doku
mentam b. ministerstva inostrannykh del
ARR Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii
Avdeev N. Avdeev and others, Revoliutsiia 1917 goda (Khronika sobytii)
Dimanshtein S. M. Dimanshtein (ed.), Revoliutsiia i natsionaFnyi vopros
Ekon. Polozhenie Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii Nakanune Velikoi Oktia.br9skoi
Sotsialisticheskoi R evoliutsii
For. Rel. of U.S. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
GFO Records of the German Foreign Office received by the Department of State
Golder Frank Alfred Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917
Gos. Sov. M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v dokumentakh i
materialakh. Vol. DC: Gosudarstvennoe Soveshchanie
KA Krasnyi Arkhiv
Kresfianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.),
1917 god v dokumentakh i materialakh. Vol. V: Kresfianskoe dvizhenie v 1917
godu
Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika Z. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika Vre-
mennago PraviteFstva
Nikolaevskii B. I. Nikolaevskii (ed.), A Collection of Extracts from Menshevik
Newspapers, 1917-1920
Osobyi Zhurnal Osobyi Zhumal Zasedanii Vremennago PraviteFstva
Padenie Padenie tsarskogo rezhima
PR Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia
Protokoly M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v dokumentakh i
materialakh. Vol. I: Petrogradskii Sovet Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov; Pro
tokoly zasedanii IspolniteFnogo Komiteta i Biuro IK .
Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917
god v dokumentakh i materialakh. Vol. VII: Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu
Razlozhenie armii M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v doku
mentakh i materialakh. Vol. VI: Razlozhenie armii v 1917 godu
Reports to the Department of State North Winship, U.S. Consulate Reports: Petro
grad Revolution, Mar-July, 1917
474 SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS

Sb. Tsirk. MVD. Sbornik Tsirkuliarov Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del za period Mart-
Hurt 1917 goda
Sbor. Ukaz. Sbornik Ukazov i Postanovlenii Vremennago PraviteVstva
Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov iz arkhiva byv-
shago ministerstva inostrannykh del
Sob. Uzak. Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii PraviteVstva
VVP Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva
Z Dok. Chwili Z Dokumentow Chwili
Zhurnaly Zhurnaly Zasedanii Vremennago PraviteVstva
 Glossary

Appanage lands See udel lands.

Chin Rank or grade in the Table of Ranks established by Peter the
Great. All offices in the military or civil service were arranged
in a hierarchical order of 14 classes. The first eight grades in
the civil service conferred hereditary nobility, which was grant
ed with the attainment of lowest commissioned rank in the
military service.
Dessiatine A Russian unit of area equal to 2.7 acres.
Duma The Imperial State Duma was the national assembly created
in 1906, and elected by limited suffrage. Four Dumas were
elected before the February revolution. The municipal dumas
were town councils, also chosen by limited suffrage. In the
larger cities there were district dumas as well.
Gendarme Corps A special police corps directly under and responsible to the
Ministry of the Interior at the call of civil authorities for main
taining order. Also investigated political crimes, acted as rail
road police, and supervised political prisons.
GradonachaVrdk Town governor, or prefect, principally in charge of police
matters, appointed only to the capitals and several other cities
or areas.
Guberniya A major administrative division of the Empire. Subdivided
into uezds.
Hectare A unit of area equal to 2.471 acres.
Inorodtsy Russian subjects belonging to the following groups: the moun
tain peoples of the northern Caucasus, all Jews, the Siberian
nomads, the Samoeds, the nomads of Stavropol guberniya,
natives of the Komandorskie Islands, the Kalmyks, and the
Ordynsty of the Transcaspian oblast.
Kabinet His Imperial Majestys Kabinet. A section of the Ministry of
the Imperial Court that was in charge of the Emperors prop
erty, including lands, thus, Kabinet lands.
KJD.s Constitutional Democrats.
Khutor Settlement on self-contained enclosed holdings, including the
house and farm buildings of the peasant. The final step in the
Stolypin agrarian program to abolish the commune in favor of
individual farms.
476 GLOSSARY

Krai A large administrative unit on the borderlands, composed of

several guberniyas or oblasts and headed by a Governor Gen
eral, as, for example, the Turkestan Krai.
Krug Elected council of the Cossack Voisko.
Mezhduraionyi The Mezhduraionyi Komitet was an autonomous organization
of workers and professional revolutionaries in Petrograd,
which included Trotsky, Lunacharskii, and Riazanov and
which joined the Bolsheviks in July.
Oblast A large administrative division, in the Caucasus, Central Asia,
and the Far Eastern territory.
Obshchina The peasant commune, sometimes called the mir.
Okhrana The tsarist secret police.
Order of St. George Founded by Catherine II for military service on land and sea.
Had four classes, including one for noncommissioned officers,
the St. George Cross.
Otrub The consolidation of the individual strips belonging to a peas
ant, with the exception of his village plot and house. A step in
the Stolypin reform to abolish the commune and establish in
dividual peasant farms.
Pomeshckik Originally a person granted land by the Tsar in return for
service to the state. By 1917 used loosely to denote any land
owner of the gentry class.
Pood A Russian weight equivalent to 36.1 pounds avoirdupois.
Possessional lands Term used to designate Tsars lands in the western part of
Russia (Poland and Belorussia) which were rented.
P.S.R. Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries.
S.D.s Social Democrats. The two main branches of the Social Demo
cratic Workers Party were the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks.
Senoren konvent The Council of Elders or steering committee of the State Duma
and later of the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic.
Composed of the leaders of each of the parliamentary factions.
Sosloviia Social classes or estates, see p. 210n.
S.R.s Socialist Revolutionaries.
State Control A ministry which checked all ministerial estimates and aud
ited the books of government institutions, with some few ex
ceptions.
Stavka The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander.
 GLOSSARY 477

Trudoviks The Trudovik Group was organized in the First Duma and
included peasant deputies, radical intelligentsia, members of
the Peasant Union, and the Socialist Revolutionaries. Had a
definite agrarian program. Kerensky was the leader of the
Group in the Fourth Duma.
Tsenzovyi From izbirateVnyi tsenz, literally electoral qualification. See
p. lSln.
Udel lands Lands which provided financial support for members of the
Imperial family other than the immediate family of the Tsar.
Administered by a department under the Ministry of the Im
perial Court.
Uezd An administrative subdivision of the guberniya.
Verst A Russian measure of distance, about two-thirds of a mile.
Voinskii nachaVnik An officer in charge of the district military administrative
office.
Voisko A Cossack army or host, included civil as well as military in
stitutions.
Volost A peasant administrative division of the uezd, which usually
included several communes.

VTsIK All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of

Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies.

Zemgor The joint Committee of the Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns

for the Supply of the Army, organized in July 1915.

Zemskie nackaTniki Agents of the central government, appointed from the gentry
class, with judiciary and administrative authority over the
peasants.
Zemsoiuz The Union of Zemstvos.

Zemstvo The elective assembly of the guberniya and uezd in which all
classes were to some extent represented. It elected an execu
tive board (uprava). Created by the local government reform
of 1864.