1. GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
He
205357, September 2, 2014
FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put
in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom of the press,
impairs the peoples right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to the exercise
of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections.
Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total
airtime instead of the previous per station
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements,
and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates television and radio guestings and
appearances.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the
press.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule
on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts
and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified
leveling the playing field does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such
a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical
to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the
Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and
dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to
really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he
conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may
more readily understand and relate to. To add all
of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself a form of suppression of his
political speech.
2. Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013,
July 10, 2003
FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a
taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189).
questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already
considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident
of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments
are correct.
HELD: No. There can be no absentee voting if the
absentee voters are required to physically reside
in the Philippines within the period required for
non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of
his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one
has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant
who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident
as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit, then he
is not qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could
not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still
lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred
to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
3. Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456,
September 10, 2009
FACTS: On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA
9369 amending the first automated election law,
RA 8436. Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369, which amendment took effect on 10
February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in
the same election in different provinces, whether
paper-based or a direct recording automated
election system as it may deem appropriate and
practical for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation and
transmittal of results of electoral exercises:
Provided, that for the regular national and local
election, which shall be held immediately after
effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at
least two highly urbanized cities and two
provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao,
to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In
succeeding regular national or local elections, the
AES shall be implemented nationwide.
The COMELEC did not use any automated election
system in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national
and local elections held after RA 9369 took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand,
and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other,
signed the Contract for the automated tallying
and recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10
May 2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the
COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010
elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related
equipment) and hired ancillary services of the
Provider.
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and
citizens, filed this petition [4] to enjoin the signing
of the Contract or its implementation and to
compel disclosure of the terms of the Contract
and other agreements between the Provider and
its subcontractors. [5] Petitioners sought the
Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with
the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as
amended, mandating the partial use of an
automated election system before deploying it
nationwide. To further support their claim on the
Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1)
the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do
not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities"
under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider
not only failed to submit relevant documents
during the bidding but also failed to show
"community of interest" among its constituent
corporations as required in Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC (Infotech).
ISSUE: Whether or not, the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion when it entered to contract
with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to
an automated election.
RULING: Court finds the project award to have
complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms
and conditions of the corresponding automation
contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse
of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the
doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely,
the winning joint venture should not be faulted
for having a foreign company as partner.
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional
body with a distinct and pivotal role in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its
awesome functions as overseer of fair elections,
administrator and lead implementer of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not
be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps
be justified in the case of an organization of
lesser responsibility.
It should be afforded ample elbow room and
enough wherewithal in devising means and
initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the
great objective for which it was created--to
promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to
preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past,
the Court has steered away from interfering with
the COMELECs exercise of its power which, by
law and by the nature of its office properly
pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on comelecs part, as
here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the
corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone
nullify, the acts of that body.
There are no ready-made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the
ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of the laws relative to the conduct
of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the comelec the initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to it. Due regard to the
independent character of the Commission x x x
requires that the power of this court to review the
acts of that body should, as a general proposition,
be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.
This independent constitutional commission, it is
true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys
a considerable latitude in the discharge of its
functions. The road, however, towards successful
2010 automation elections would certainly be
rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring under
very tight timelines. It would accordingly need
the help of all advocates of orderly and honest
elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to
smoothen the way and assist comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of
the system. Like anyone else, the Court would
like and wish automated elections to succeed,
credibly.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
4. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 177508,
August 7, 2009;
FACTS: This is a petition for Prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party
List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) and enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing the statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231
and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on
7 December 2006 and the House of
Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23
January 2007, less than four months before the
14 May 2007 local elections.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited
multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for
prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner
also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34,
37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner,
these provisions are of questionable application
and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution.
Petitioner argues the following:
1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it
speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual
canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also
alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are
neither embraced in the title nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369.
2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by
impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET). According to petitioner, under the
amended provisions, Congress as the National
Board of Canvassers for the election of President
and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC
en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
(COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators
may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the
election of the President, Vice President, and
Senators. Petitioner concludes that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress
and the COMELEC en banc undermine the
independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the PET and the SET.
3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives
the other prosecuting arms of the government
concurrent power with the COMELEC to
investigate and prosecute election offenses.
4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll
watchers of the dominant majority and dominant
minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner
argues that this violates the freedom of the
parties to contract and their right to fix the terms
and conditions of the contract they see as fair,
equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a
purely private contract using private funds which
cannot be regulated by law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 9369 is
unconstitutional.
2. Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17,
Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution;
3. Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-
C of the Constitution
4. Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of
the Constitution
HELD: The petition is denied.RA 9369 is
constitutional.
1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use
an Automated Election System in the May 11,
1998 National or Local Elections and in
Subsequent National and Local Electoral
Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility,
Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for
the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other
Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor
and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject
matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA
8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),Republic
Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election
laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy
in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369
assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to
specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881,
specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend
Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively;
and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section
265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369
which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others.
2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments
introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the
adoption and application of the procedures on
pre-proclamation controversies in case of any
discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or
alteration in the certificates of canvass. The
COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide
that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may
now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national
elective posts.
3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices. COMELEC has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigations and
prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes
the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government. In the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority
of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and
explained.
4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously
invoked the non-impairment clause because this
only applies to previously perfected contracts. In
this case, there is no perfected contact and,
therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the
COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a
proper exercise of police power and it will prevail
over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll
watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an
agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the
sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is
vested with public interest which can be
regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police
power. The OSG further argues that the
assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair
and equitable compensation promotes the
general welfare. The OSG also states that this
was a reasonable regulation considering that the
dominant majority and minority parties will
secure a copy of the election returns and are
given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
5. CenPEG v. COMELEC, September 21,
2010, G.R. No. 189546, September 21,
2010;
FACTS:
6. Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113,
September 3, 1991;
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in
Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent does not possess
the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
HELD: In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure
of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent
has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing,
the petition is DISMISSED.
7. Brillante v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358;
FACTS: In December 1989, a coup attempt
occurred prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by
Hilario Davide. Consequently, he has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by
then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary
substitute, in short, she was appointed in an
acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then
questioned such appointment urging that under
Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any
member of the COMELEC be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the
acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the president violates
the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by
the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting
chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
ruled that although all constitutional commissions
are essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the president in the
discharge of their functions. The designation
made by the president has dubious justification
as it was merely grounded on the quote
administrative expediency to present the
functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on
statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who
should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting
chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally
do that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of
Yorac as acting president is void, the members of
COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their
acting chairman the point here is that, it is the
members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional
commissions are independent bodies.
8. Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335,
December 13, 2000;
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the
Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. She assumed office on June 22,
1993, after taking an oath of office. On
September 07, 1993, the Commission on
Appointment, Congress of the Philippines
confirmed the appointment. However, on
February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification
from the Office of the President as to the expiry
date of her term of office. In reply to her request,
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter
dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioners
term of office would expire on February 02, 2000,
not on February 02, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02,
1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting
opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma
P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid
their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of
their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel,
Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the
term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on
February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment
conformably with the constitutional
intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC
Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice
of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing
in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining
to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective
February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner
appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit
issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety
of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioners term of office may be properly
addressed by mere reference to her appointment
paper which set the expiration date on February
02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of
power to recognize an extension of her term, not
even with the implied acquiescence of the Office
of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration;
however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on
Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term
of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which
she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by
her.
RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P.
Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to
her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993.
Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she
served as de facto Officer in good faith until
February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual
service rendered. Consequently, the Commission
on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary
and other emoluments, including that of her co-
terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court
REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on
Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and
emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde
and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de
facto officer from February 02, 1999, until
February 02, 2000.
9. Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465,
May 27, 2004;
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation.
FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner
in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His
opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional
Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which
consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation
and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor
and eventually issued writ of execution. While
Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to
the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for
inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a
Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However,
Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited
himself and designated another Commissioner to
substitute him. The Second Division, with the new
judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC
decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected
mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En
Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may
not participate in the Division deliberations, he
will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC
En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who
inhibited himself in Division deliberations may
participate in its En Banc deliberation
HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated
November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En
Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantions
voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules
does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit
with reservation. To allow him to participate in the
En Banc proceedings when he previously
inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially
unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate
and vote in the issuance of the questioned order,
thus leaving three (3) members concurring
therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or
majority of the members of the COMELEC was not
attained. The order thus failed to comply with the
number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order.
10. Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-
53, April 20, 2001;
FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent
Bernal were rival candidates for the position in
Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998
synchronized elections. During the canvassing by
the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of
election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay
Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism,
intimidation and coercion committed in said
precincts during the casting and counting of
votes. The MBC denied petitioners objections and
proceeded with the canvass which showed
respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the
petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second
Division which excluded election returns from 3
precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and
finish the canvass of the remaining or
uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the
winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent
Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision
of the Second Division with the COMELEC en
banc.
The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the
election. Private respondent Bernal filed an
urgent motion to declare void petitioners
proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor
Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n
action for quo warranto against petitioner before
the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en
banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for
reconsideration and motion declare void
petitioners proclamation on the ground that
respondent Bernal should be deemed to have
abandoned said motion when he filed quo
warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of
the Second Division, annulled the petitioner
Dumayas proclamation; and constituted a new
MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the
newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor
of the Municipality.
Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to
set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC was correct in
including in the canvass the election returns of
the contested precincts?
HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
The only evidence presented by the petitioner to
prove the alleged irregularities were the self-
serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors.
Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations
that the returns are manufactured or fictitious
when the returns on their face appear to be
regular and without any physical signs of
tampering. The election irregularities cited by the
petitioner would require the presentation of
evidence which cannot be done in a pre-
proclamation controversy which is summary in
nature.
11. Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
202833, March 10, 2013;
FACTS: Mamerto and Renato were opponents in
the 2010 Barangay Elections for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City.
After the voting, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed Mamerto as winner, which Renato
contested thru an election protest filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court. The latter dismissed the
election protest of Mamerto after the recount.
Instead of filing a notice of appeal, Renato filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC
denied, ruling it was a prohibited pleading under
Sec. 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No 07-04-15-SC. Renato
then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Comelec which the latters Second Division
granted, ruling that MeTCs decision amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The
Comelec En Banc, voting 3-3, affirmed the
Second Divisions ruling. Mamerto thus filed a
petition for review on certiorari of the En Banc
decision. Mamerto asserts that Renato resorted to
a wrong remedy hence the Comelec should not
have entertained the petition for certiorari. He
also asserts that the dismissal of the election
protest was proper. In his Comment, Renato
asserts that the petition was filed prematurely
since the En Banc decision was not a majority
decision since the Chairman had yet to be
appointed by the President when the decision was
rendered. Since it was not a majority decision, it
should be remanded to the Comelec for rehearing
by a full and complete Commission.
The Courts ruling:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having
been prematurely filed with this Court, and
remand the case to the COMELEC for its
appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en bancs
Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority
decision required by the Constitution and by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires
that [e]ach Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. Pursuant to this Constitutional
mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5(a),
Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the
votes required for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling when the
Comelec sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When
sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the
Commission shall constitute a quorum for the
purpose of transacting business. The concurrence
of a majority of the Members of the Commission
shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
We have previously ruled that a majority vote
requires a vote of four members of the Comelec
en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,
we declared that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the Comelec
[en banc], and not only those who participated
and took part in the deliberations, is necessary
for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution,
order or ruling.
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to
have affirmed the Comelec Second Divisions
Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevillas motion
for reconsideration, the equally divided voting
between three Commissioners concurring and
three Commissioners dissenting is not the
majority vote that the Constitution and the
Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec
en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second
Divisions findings on the basis of the three
concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco
and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn
the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the
three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes,
Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim,
as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain
a majority decision. Recall that under Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote of
all the members of the Commission en banc is
necessary to arrive at a ruling. In other words, the
vote of four (4) members must always be
attained in order to decide, irrespective of the
number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus,
for all intents and purposes, the assailed October
6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had
no legal effect whatsoever except to convey that
the Comelec failed to reach a decision and that
further action is required.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en bancs
Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is
equally divided among the members of the
Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a
rehearing where parties are given the opportunity
anew to strengthen their respective positions or
arguments and convince the members of the
Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.
When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if
on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed
cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied.
In Juliano v. Commission on Elections, only three
members of the Comelec en banc voted in favor
of granting Estrelita Julianos motion for
reconsideration (from the Decision of the
Comelec Second Division dismissing her petition
for annulment of proclamation of Muslimin Sema
as the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City), three
members dissented, and one member took no
part. In ruling that the Comelec acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to order a
rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Court ruled:
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of
the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case
shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that
the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February
10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted
was a mere re-consultation.
A re-consultation is definitely not the same as a
rehearing.
A consultation is a deliberation of persons on
some subject; hence, a re-consultation means a
second deliberation of persons on some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a second consideration
of cause for purpose of calling to courts or
administrative boards attention any error,
omission, or oversight in first consideration. A
retrial of issues presumes notice to parties
entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be
heard[.] But as held in Samalio v. Court of
Appeals,
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side
of the controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the
participation of the opposing parties for the
purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any,
and further clarifying and amplifying their
arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a
re- evaluation of the issues and arguments
already on hand only by the members of the
tribunal, without the participation of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the
Comelec En Banc on therein petitioners motion
for reconsideration was equally divided, the
Comelec En Banc first issued an order setting the
case for hearing and allowed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda before voting
anew on therein petitioners motion for
reconsideration. This should have been the
proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration
when the first voting was equally divided. Its own
Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the
parties would have the opportunity to strengthen
their respective positions or arguments and
convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of
the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec
En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing
required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said
body acted with grave abuse of discretion.
To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on
Elections. the Court ruled that the Comelec en
banc did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
ordered a rehearing of its November 6, 2007
Resolution for failing to muster the required
majority voting. The court held:
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of
three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of
the First Division, cannot do away with a
rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such
a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous
review of the controversy before it. A rehearing
clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting
additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying
and amplifying their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters
can claim a majority .in the En Banc Resolution of
November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no
more than a record of votes, lacking in legal
effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of
the First Division Resolution. Accordingly the
Comelec did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in ordering a rehearing.
In the present case, it appears from the records
that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order
for a rehearing of the case in view of filing in the
interim of the present petition for certiorari by
Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and
Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases
to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the
required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we
thus find that a remind of this case is necessary
for the Comelec en banc to comply with the
rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
12. Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527,
March 1, 2001;
FACTS: On May 12, 1997, petitioner was
proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doa
Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while
his opponent, private respondent Abad-
Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private
respondent filed an election protest claiming
irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation
of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors.
After petitioner answered and the issues were
joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the
reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten
contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its
decision that private respondent won the
election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner
got 550 votes after the recount.
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC
ruled that private respondent won over petitioner.
Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for
Execution pending appeal which petitioner
opposed. Both petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondents Motion
for Execution pending appeal were submitted for
resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the
Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the
decision of the Second Division. It granted the
Motion for Execution pending appeal.
Petitioner brought before the Court this petition
for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC when:
(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;
(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for
Execution pending appeal; and
(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision
that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Election contests involving
municipal and barangay officials shall be final,
executory and not appealable.
HELD: We agree with petitioner that election
cases pertaining to barangay elections may be
appealed by way of a special civil action for
certiorari. But this recourse is available only when
the COMELECs factual determinations are marred
by grave abuse of discretion. We find no such
abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and
the records, we observed that the lower court and
the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots
reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and
its knowledge derived from actual experience, the
COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position
to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual
questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the
allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness
marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As
previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC
based on its own assessments and duly
supported by evidence, are conclusive on this
Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in
the questioned resolutions. Unless any of these
causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will
not interfere with the COMELECs findings of fact.
13. Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307;
14. Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154796-
97, October 23, 2003;
15. Kamarudin Ibrahim v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 192289, January 14, 2013;
FACTS: Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim)
filed his certificate of candidacy to run as
municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent
Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election
Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the
COMELECs Law Department (Law Department)
the names of candidates who were not registered
voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution dated December 22, 2009
disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered
voter of the municipality where he seeks to be
elected without prejudice to his filing of an
opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file
Petition/Opposition but was denied by the
COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated
May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC
declared that the Resolution dated December 22,
2009 was anchored on the certification, which
was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B.
Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered
voter of the municipality where he seeks to be
elected.
On the day of the election, during which time the
Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet
attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest
number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race.
However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas,
suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed resolutions.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to
disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the position
of Vice-Mayor.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through
the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahims
disqualification even when no complaint or
petition was filed against him yet. Let it be
stressed that if filed before the conduct of the
elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel
a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
OEC is the appropriate petition which should have
been instituted against Ibrahim considering that
his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his
municipality disqualified him from running as
Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an
eligible candidate was an act falling within the
purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even
if we were to assume that a proper petition had
been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance
of a matter, which by both constitutional
prescription and jurisprudential declaration,
instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
16. Abad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128877,
December 10, 1999;
17. Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853,
September 5, 2000;
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent
(Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the
May 11,1998 elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of
canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition
with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
Later, private respondent filed an election protest
against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC
dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by
private respondent, while the RTC denied
petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari contending that respondent RTC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
private respondents election protest. The
COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners suit.
Petitioner now questions this decision of the
COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the
authority to decide on the case.
HELD: The SC has ruled in previous cases that
the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide election
cases including pre-proclamation controversies in
the first instance. This power pertains to the
divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
In the SCs view, the authority to resolve petition
for certiorari involving incidental issues of
election protest, like the questioned order of the
trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
18. Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096,
November 19, 1999;
FACTS: Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK
Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate
who garnered 45 votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the
Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an
election protest before the Municipal Trial Court
stating that three or more votes that read JL
should not have been credited in favor of Lallave.
Zarate further stated that the votes bearing JL
were stray votes and that there was no candidate
with the name or nickname of JL.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in
favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the
original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections
theorizing that the votes reading JL should be
credited in his favour considering that such
initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate
and that the votes bearing Julian, Jr de Real,
Notno Lallave, and Nono de Real should have
been credited as well being his nickname and
middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a
division of the Commission but was, instead,
submitted to the Commission en banc.The
COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the
elected SK chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on
Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
HELD: Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without
jurisdiction without first referring the case to any
of its division. The petition for annulling the
COMELECs decision was granted and was set
aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the
case to a division.
Ratio: The recourse of respondent Lallave
transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the
Constitution which provides that ...election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided
that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
19. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717,
October 23, 2003;
FACTS: Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla
both ran for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 14 May 2001 elections. On
16 May 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates
for the offices of Mayor, Vice Mayor and 8
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
shows the following results and ranking with
respect to the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, to wit: (1) RAGUCOS, Ma. Luisa Laxamana
(6,324); (2) ABAYA, Juan Jr., Andaquig (6,013); (3)
GINES, Fidel Cudiamat (5,789); (4) QUILOP,
Renato Avila (5,227); (5) BILIGAN, Osias
Depdepen (5,130); (6) RUIZ, Agustin Turgano
(4,972); (7) JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno (4,815);
and (8)CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807). In the
tabulated results issued by the Election Officer
and Chairpersonof the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat
obtained 4,779 votes and wasranked 9. Upon
review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was
credited with only 23 votes per Election Return
from Precinct 34A1.
However, when the figures were forwarded to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla was
credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50
votes more than what heactually obtained. If the
entry were to be corrected, the affected
candidates would be ranked as follows:(7)
CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807); (8) SUYAT,
Antonio (4,779); and (9) JARAMILLA,
Alberto(4,765). On 13 June 2001, Suyat filed
before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the
latter treated as a Petition for Correction of
Manifest Error. Jaramill acountered in his Answer
that said petition should be dismissed for having
been filed out of time and for lack of the required
certification of non-forum shopping. On 24
October 2002, COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution, annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla
and creating a new Municipal Board of
Canvassers Jaramilla filed the petition for
certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction ascribing grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections en
banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over
the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors.
HELD: Article IX-C of the Constitution states in
part that "The Commission on Elections may sit
en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc."
As stated in the provision, and in line with the
Courts recent pronouncement in Milla v.
Balmores- Laxa, election cases including pre-
proclamation controversies should first be heard
anddecided by a division of the COMELEC, and
then by the commission en banc if a motion for
reconsideration of the division is filed. It must be
noted however that this provision applies only
cases where the COMELEC exercises its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not
when it merely exercises purely administrative
functions. This doctrine was laid out in
Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in
subsequent cases.
Accordingly, when the case demands only the
exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions, such as the correction of a manifest
mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous
tabulation in the statement of votes, the
COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the
exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections. Herein, the Petition
for Correction of Manifest Errors alleges an
erroneous copying of figures from the election
return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such
an error in the tabulation of the results, which
merely requires a clerical correction without the
necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining
ballots, demands only theexercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the
Commission en banc properlyassumed original
jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
20. Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359,
March 5, 2010;
FACTS:
21. Matura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 493;
Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private
respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were
congressional candidates for the first district of
Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In
the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to
the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the
Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the
same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the
objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered
the production and examination of the election
returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the
course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes
were produced and opened. Upon examination
and comparison of the copies of the election
returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the
COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the
Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of
Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently,
the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein
assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the
Certificate of Canvass of Matanog.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the
canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
there exists a discrepancy between the various
copies of election returns from the disputed
voting centers.
Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled
jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the
canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
there exists a discrepancy between the various
copies of election returns from the disputed
voting centers. Corollarily, once the election
returns were found to be falsified or tampered
with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass
and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene
and proclaim the winners on the basis of the
genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the
members of the board or proclaim the winners
itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the
Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a
factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any
showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from
reviewing the same, and must accord it instead
the respect it deserves. The rule that factual
findings of administrative bodies will not be
disturbed by courts of justice except when there
is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be
applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC - created and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution
itself - on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by
the rules of evidence.
22. Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945,
February 4, 2003;
FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo
Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to
register for the May 1998 elections when they
met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto
Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City,
who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of
Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their residence
is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28
not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to
Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered
anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to
former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director
Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to
cancel their previous registration. Petitioners
Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V.
Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently,
recommended filing an information for double
registration against petitioners. The COMELEC
affirmed Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, which, was denied by
COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it recommended the
prosecution of petitioners for double registration
despite lack of intent and substantial compliance
with the requirement of cancellation of previous
registration.
HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners
registered twice on different days and in different
precincts without canceling their previous
registration. Since "double registration" is malum
prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to
violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the
letter to Joson an application to cancel their
previous registration. This letter was sent after
their second registration was accomplished and
after the election officer of Cavite City had
already reported their act of double registration
to a higher official.
Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake,
good faith and substantial compliance with the
Election Codes requirement of cancellation of
previous registration are matters of defense best
ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the
preliminary investigation. The established rule is
that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence. It is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
23. Municipal Board of Canvassers v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 150946;
24. Villarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212953,
August 5, 2014;
25. Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900,
April 22, 2014;
26. Barot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149147,
June 18, 2003;
FACTS: Petitioner Felix Barot and private
respondent Rolando Tabaloc were candidates for
councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental in the
May 14, 2001 elections. The Board of Canvassers
(BOC) proclaimed the winning candidates for
mayor, vice-mayor, and ten councilors including
Barot who was proclaimed the 10th. Then, BOC
Chair Nochefranca requested the COMELEC En
Banc for authority to correct the erroneous
entries in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of the Winning Candidates, and to
proclaim Tabaloc in place of Barot. The COMELEC
En Banc granted the request and annulled the
proclamation of Barot. Hence, this petition. Barot
contends that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the petition for the same has been filed beyond
the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has
jurisdiction acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
HELD: As to the claim that the petition was not
filed within the reglementary period, it should be
noted that the 5-day period to file a petition for
correction may be done after proclamation as
provided under paragraph (b), Section 5, Rule 27
of the COMELEC Rules. The petition may also be
made before proclamation as provided in Section
34 of Resolution No. 3848 which furnishes
instructions for the Municipal, City, District and
Provincial Boards of Canvassers in connection
with the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections. At all events, Section 4, Rule 1 of the
COMELEC Rules provides that in the interest of
justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition
of all the matters pending before the
Commission, these rules or any portion thereof
may be suspended by the Commission. The
COMELEC thus has the discretion to suspend its
rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice such that even if the petition was filed 12
days after the proclamation, the COMELEC may,
in the interest of justice, disregard the
reglementary periods provided by the rules and
resolve the matter filed before it.
27. Reyes v. Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 44;
28. Cayetano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193846,
April 12, 2011;
FACTS: In the automated national and local
elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and
private respondent were candidates for the
position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was
proclaimed the winner thereof, receiving a total of
95,865 votes as against the 93,445 votes
received by private respondent.
The private respondent filed an Election Protest
against petitioner before the COMELEC for
allegedly committing election frauds and
irregularities which translated to the latters
ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the
whole, private respondent claims that he is the
actual winner of the mayoralty elections in Taguig
City.
In the petitioners Answer with Counter-Protest
and Counterclaim, she raised, among others, the
affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and
content of the Election Protest and prayed for the
immediate dismissal thereof. However, it was
denied by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the
protest of private respondent for insufficiency in
form and content.
HELD: The petition is denied.
POLITICAL LAW : Decisions of the COMELEC
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a
COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to
this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to
reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division shall be resolved by the division which
issued the interlocutory order, except when all
the members of the division decide to refer the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a
COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can
they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
This does not mean that the aggrieved party is
without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies
the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved
party can still assign as error the interlocutory
order if in the course of the proceedings he
decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC
En Banc. The exception enunciated is when the
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a
patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction
to issue the interlocutory order, as where a
COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, or where a COMELEC
Division admitted an answer with counter-protest
which was filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order,
whether final or interlocutory, even a final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari
a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc. In short, the final order of the COMELEC
(Second Division) denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned
before this Court even via a petition for certiorari.
Although the rule admits of exceptions as when
the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is
a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. However, none of
the circumstances permitting an exception to the
rule occurs in this instance.
In addition to that, certiorari will not lie in this
case. The issuance of a special writ of certiorari
has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Although it is not the duty of the Court to point
petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the
appropriate remedy which she should have taken.
The aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case
to the COMELEC En Banc. moreover, the protest
filed by private respondent and the counter-
protest filed by petitioner remain pending before
the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner
ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances.
Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these
cases with dispatch.
29. Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, 398 Phil. 257;
FACTS: Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for
the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during
the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor,
Eastern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether the Comelec First Division, in
scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: We find the petition without merit. The
case at bar is an election protest involving the
position of Governor, Eastern Samar. It is within
the original jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did
not ask for a reconsideration of the divisions
resolution or final decision.
In likemanner, a decision, order or resolution of a
division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final en banc decision may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-
requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party
to an election case within the jurisdiction of the
Comelec in division cannot dispense with the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the case
would not reach the Comelec en banc without
such motion for reconsideration having been filed
and resolved by the Division. The instant case
does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior
to the filing of a petition.
In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the
case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for
prematurity. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and
a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount
to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the
petition for prematurity.
30. Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 639;
31. Blanco v. COMELEC, 577 Phil. 622;
32. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780;
FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving
the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS
CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit surveys.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec
allegedly upon "information from a reliable source
that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and
Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately. The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998,
the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec
was directed to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued
pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls
were actually conducted and reported by media
without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its
powers, can absolutely ban exit polls
ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the
nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the
press
COMELEC:
1) The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its
constitutional and statutory powers to promote a
clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998
elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2) It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys
might unduly confuse and influence the voters,"
and that the surveys were designed "to condition
the minds of people and cause confusion as to
who are the winners and the losers in the
election," which in turn may result in "violence
and anarchy."
3) "exit surveys indirectly violate the
constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of
the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the
contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution and relevant
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It
submits that the constitutionally protected
freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune
to regulation by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power," such as in the
present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the
exercise thereof creates a clear and present
danger to the community or it has a dangerous
tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has
the tendency to sow confusion considering the
randomness of selecting interviewees, which
further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may
not be in harmony with the official count made by
the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words,
the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the
electoral process."
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on
exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.
1) Clear and present danger of destroying
the integrity of electoral processes
Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very
nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the
results will as much as possible be representative
or reflective of the general sentiment or view of
the community or group polled. Second, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par
with the official Comelec count. It consists merely
of the opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which
are exercises that are separate and independent
from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting
of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only
part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can
only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible
noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder
and confusion in the voting centers -- does not
justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the
assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since
its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not.
Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
disruptive behavior around the voting centers.
There is no showing, however, that exit polls or
the means to interview voters cause chaos in
voting centers. Neither has any evidence been
presented proving that the presence of exit poll
reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover,
the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection
of exit poll data and their use for any purpose.
The valuable information and ideas that could be
derived from them, based on the voters' answers
to the survey questions will forever remain
unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is
restrained, candidates, researchers, social
scientists and the electorate in general would be
deprived of studies on the impact of current
events and of election-day and other factors on
voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit
polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the
secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real
issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the
ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of
voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy
is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from
exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to
other persons, from making copies thereof, or
from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as
to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the
contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters
who have been assisted. Clearly, what is
forbidden is the association of voters with their
respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that
the votes have been cast in accordance with the
instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
however, be achieved merely through the voters'
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are
not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation
of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed,
narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or
suppress incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental
rights of our people.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey
conducted by qualified individuals or groups of
individuals for the purpose of determining the
probable result of an election by confidentially
asking randomly selected voters whom they have
voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are
announced to the public, usually through the
mass media, to give an advance overview of how,
in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. In our
electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted
to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
33. Garces v. CA, 259 SCRA 99;
FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election
Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent
Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in
turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon
assumption of office. Concepcion, however,
refused to transfer post as he did not request for
it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac
post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that
prohibited her from assuming office as the same
is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager,
Finance Service Department, with an enclosed
check to cover for the expenses on construction
of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita
Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the
deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion
continued occupying the Gutalac office, the
COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to
Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for
mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and damages against
Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar
of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of
Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for
mandamus alleging that the same was rendered
moot and academic by the said COMELEC
Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only
by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the
matter should be raised only on certiorari before
the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else
the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc
COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two
grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper
remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
referred under the constitution pertain only to
those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is cognizable by
the Supreme Court.
HELD: No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of
the commission or by the commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no
case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the
contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that
triggered this Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the
constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain
to an election dispute. The settled rule is that
decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that
may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that
relate to the COMELECs exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the
COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the
Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done
for the operational set-up of an agency. The
controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court
with trivial administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law
vests with the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
34. Diocese of Bacolod, rep. Bishop Navarra
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205720, January 21,
2015;
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted
two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by
ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH
Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote
and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team
Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team
Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners
as comprising Team Patay, while those who
voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was
neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates
for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its
reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the
ambit of the Supreme Courts power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the
principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate
expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and
letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to
freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the
tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of
petitioners right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its
message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not
call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted
upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of
the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there
are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting
the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost
deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the
picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech,
given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing
of the election offense against petitioners is
already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However,
the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised
by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression
with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the
tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party,
or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal
opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech.
Political speech refers to speech both intended
and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation. On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined
as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar
is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used
the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There
is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is
readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it
is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction
that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it encompasses even
the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied
upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its
members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely
on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on
the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as
to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and
not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account
not to promote the governments favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or
institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government
may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and
3. It does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.
35. Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo. 218 SCRA
253;
36. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265,
February 24, 2004;
Facts: Prior to the MAy 2004 elections, the LAban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided
because of a struggle of authority between Party
Chair Edgardo Angara and Part Secretary General
Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two
differentsets of candidates under the same party,
LDP.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The
Commission in its resolution, has recognized the
factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara
Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two
sets of nominations and endosements by the
same party.
Held: The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only
those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by
the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly
authorized representative/s shall be recognized.
37. Luis Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808;
FACTS: Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-
sectoral party registered under Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List
System Act. As stated in its constitution and
bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and
corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the
countrys public service. Under the leadership of
the National Council, its highest policymaking and
governing body, the party participated in the
2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November
2009, two different entities, both purporting to
represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-
List System of Representation in the May 10,
2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia
B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting
secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day,
another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein
respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia
Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-
general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs
Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the
determination which of the two factions of the
registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations
of intent to participate is the official
representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by
President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of
Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by
Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March
2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of
Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin
and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla
affixed to the certification her signature as acting
secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin,
Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From
The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking
to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had
misrepresented herself as acting secretary-
general, when she was not even a member of
CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and
other documents she submitted were
unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid;
and that it was Villanueva who was duly
authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on
its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC
First Division granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the
records, and declared respondents faction as the
true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse
parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in
accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General
Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of
Nomination is an intra-corporate matter,
exclusively cognizable by special commercial
courts, and over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the
Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees
of CIBAC party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the
petition for being filed outside the requisite
period. The review by this Court of judgments and
final orders of the COMELEC is governed
specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
COA
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order
or resolution of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter
provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule
refers precisely to the immediately succeeding
provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for
the allowable period within which to file petitions
for certiorari from judgments of both the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus,
while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of
certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they
cannot be equated, as they provide for different
reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a
period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought
to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while
Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be
filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules
of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed
Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July
2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the second
assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per
curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on
1 September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3
above, deducting the three days it took
petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration,
they had a remaining period of 27 days or until
28 September 2010 within which to file the
Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition
only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the
required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-
party disputes
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on
Elections, it was expressly settled that the
COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve
intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
constitutionally mandated power to enforce
election laws and register political parties. The
Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections and Palmares v. Commission on
Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELECs
jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
leadership disputes has already been settled by
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission
on Elections that the COMELECs powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs
power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a
proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of
party-list representatives, as well as their
individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-
List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.
Each registered party, organization or coalition
shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-
five (45) days before the election a list of names,
not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or a
person who has lost his bid for an elective office
in the immediately preceding election. No change
of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where
the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case
the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives
who are nominated in the party-list system shall
not be considered resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No
person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-
List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction
over the nomination of party-list representatives
and prescribing the qualifications of each
nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-
List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10
May 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of
party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must
submit documentary evidence in consonance with
the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly
prove that the nominees truly belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent, which may
include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization
showing active participation of the nominee/s in
the undertakings of the party-list
group/organization for the advancement of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations
(prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and
such other positive actions on the part of the
nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona
fide member of the party-list group/ organization
for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election;
and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization
seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the
nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-
list/organization but is/are also a bona fide
member/s of said marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group
and nominees to submit the foregoing
documentary evidence if not complied with prior
to the effectivity of this resolution not later than
three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list
of nominees.
Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas
alleged authority as acting secretary-general was
an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any
supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit
any documentary evidence that Derla was a
member of CIBAC, let alone the representative
authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of
Nomination.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is
DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of
the COMELEC expunging from its records the
Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010
by Pia B. Derla.
38. AKLAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162203,
april 14, 2004;
FACTS: Aklat-Asosasyon para sa kaunlaran ng
Lipunan at Adhikain para sa Tao Inc. (Aklat) filed a
re-qualification to the Comelec for party-list
representative accusing the latter with grave
abuse of discretion. The former was found guilty
of failure to comply with the 8-point guidelines
given and was filing beyond the period given.
Aklat re-organization was said to be a
representation of marginalized and
underrepresented groups. However, after
investigation, it was found to be a nothing but a
company of book publishing.
Issue: Whether or not the petition of Aklat has
content and Comelec is found to be guilty of
grave abuse of discretion.
Held: Petition is dismissed. The claims of Aklat
against the Comelec is found to be of no grounds
of grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the
contention of Comelec against Aklats party-list is
in order. Aklat is found nothing to be more than a
group of book publishers and do not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups. The
guidelines and the date of the filing is also found
to be a failure in the past of Aklat.
39. Buac v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155855,
January 26, 2004;
Facts: Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista
filed a petition questioning COMELECs resolution
stating that it has no jurisdiction over plebiscite
controversies.
COMELEC contends that the rules and regulations
it has only covers election protests. The quasi-
judicial jurisdiction of the Commission extends to
those enumerated in Section 2(2).
Issues: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite
andthe annulment of its result.
Held: YES. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over
controversies involving the conduct of plebiscites.
One must first look at the nature of the case.
Such controversy could not be attended by the
judiciary because it is not within its jurisdiction to
settle such type of controversy it does not fit
the usage of judicial power. If the RTC would be
given jurisdiction over such case, there would be
a confusion regarding the settlement of justice.
The judiciary, based on the Constitution, has
jurisdiction only on elections, returns and
qualifications of elected officials.
40. Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185,
October 25, 2013;
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the
first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with
Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative
the second legislative district of the same
province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a
bill creating the province of Davao Occidental.
H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act
No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the
Province of Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date
of the holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao
Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this
Charter, upon approval by the majority of the
votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty
(60) days from the date of the effectivity of this
Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a
matter of policy and in view of the preparations
for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the
creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with
the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save
on expenses. Cagas filed a petition for
prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is
without authority to amend or modify section 46
of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only
Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of
suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite
for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous
with the Barangay Elections.
HELD: No. The petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. The COMELECs power to administer
elections includes the power to conduct a
plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the
creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of
Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create
special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject
to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof.
The component cities and municipalities shall
retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled
to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan
authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
of
emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of
their sovereignty. After the legislative branchs
enactment of a law to create, divide, merge or
alter the boundaries of a local government unit or
units, the people in the local government unit or
units directly affected vote in a plebiscite to
register their approval or disapproval of the
change.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to
when plebiscites should be held. This is in
contrast with its provisions for the election of
members of the legislature in Section 8, 4, Article
VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to
fix date of elections is legislative in nature, which
is shown by the exceptions in previously
mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in
the election of local government officials.
41. National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207
SCRA 1;
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of
representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the
coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and
voters who claim that their right to be informed of
election Issue and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that
the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b)
amounts to censorship, because it selects and
singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election
or political propaganda during the election period
of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information
and public opinion relevant to election Issue.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and
television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and Issue in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic
Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the
provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be
seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period i.e., "during the election
period." In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to the level of financial resources
that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies
given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26
of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that
"the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the
assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act
has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. The Court considers
that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time
to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news
or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs
of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not
reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs
and so forth, so long at least as such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly
paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. Section 11
(b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the
right to free speech of the candidates themselves
is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
42. Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712;
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166
and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the
resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The
following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals. Provided,
that decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election
propaganda. It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or
publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections, assails
the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers in mobile
places like cars and other moving vehicles.
According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit
the posting of decals and stickers on mobile
places, public or private, and limit their location
or publication to the authorized posting areas
that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The
portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of
the COMELEC providing that decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The
COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for
by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizens fundamental right of
free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4,
Article III). Significantly, the freedom of
expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition
is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the
statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for over breadth. The restriction
as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizens private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include
the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of
ones living room or bedroom.) In consequence of
this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1,
Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. (The right to property may be
subject to a greater degree of regulation but
when this right is joined by a liberty interest,
the burden of justification on the part of the
Government must be exceptionally convincing
and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this
case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a
rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article
IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated
that the posting of decals and stickers on cars,
calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated
by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
43. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777,
August 31, 2004;
Facts: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates,
entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products.
Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards
were set up showing petitioner promoting the
products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as
posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image,
or name of a person, and all advertisements on
print, in radio or on television showing the image
or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and
radio station, print media or television station
within 3 days after the effectivity of these
implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio
station, print media or television station shall be
presumed to have conducted premature
campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to
comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's
Law Department. He replied, by requesting the
COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may
have violated the assailed provision. He sent
another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that
he be exempted from the application of Section
32, considering that the billboards adverted to
are mere product endorsements and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove
or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover
them from public view pending the approval of
his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a
petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that
the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the
assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare
the assailed provision unconstitutional as the
same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of
police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto
law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5)
invalid due to overbreadth.
Issue: Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520 unconstitutional?

Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they
exhibit his name and image, do not at all
announce his candidacy for any public office nor
solicit support for such candidacy from the
electorate. They are, he claims, mere product
endorsements and not election propaganda.
Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the
public is not within the scope of the powers of the
COMELEC.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, or safety, and the general welfare of
the people. To determine the validity of a police
measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does
the interest of the public in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are
the means employed reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision
reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing
field for candidates of public office, to equalize
the situation between popular or rich candidates,
on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer
candidates, on the other, by preventing the
former from enjoying undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject
billboards are purely product endorsements and
do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code,
election campaign or partisan political activity is
defined as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office. It includes directly
or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support
for or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the
contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had
all the right to lend his name and image to these
products. However, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his
name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same indirectly promoted
his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was
acting well within its scope of powers when it
required petitioner to discontinue the display of
the subject billboards. If the subject billboards
were to be allowed, candidates for public office
whose name and image are used to advertise
commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of
lending their faces and names to endorse popular
commercial products as image models. Similarly,
an individual intending to run for public office
within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model
with the intention of familiarizing the public with
his name and image even before the start of the
campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be
a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning.
Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of
the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity
to proffer oneself for public office, without regard
to the level of financial resources one may have
at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the
public. The State has the duty to enact and
implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time
and again, this Court has said that contracts
affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of
the existing legal order. This power can be
activated at any time to change the provisions of
the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare.
Such an act will not militate against the
impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
Ex post facto law
Petitioner argued that the assailed provision
makes an individual criminally liable for an
election offense for not removing such
advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was
clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose
name or image is featured in any such
advertisement, liable for premature campaigning
under the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines
an offense and prescribes a penalty for said
offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to
the accused. It should be noted, however, that
the offense defined in the assailed provision is
not the putting up of propaganda materials such
as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on
walls and other materials showing the picture,
image or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense
the entering of contracts for such propaganda
materials by an individual who subsequently
becomes a candidate for public office. One
definitely does not commit an offense by entering
into a contract with private parties to use his
name and image to endorse certain products
prior to his becoming a candidate for public
office.
The offense, as expressly prescribed in the
assailed provision, is the non-removal of the
described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520. If the candidate for public office fails to
remove such propaganda materials after the
given period, he shall be liable under Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code for premature
campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in
the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto
law in this case.
Fair Elections Act
Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a
violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to
him, under this law, billboards are already
permitted as lawful election propaganda. He
claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in
effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a
form of election propaganda through the assailed
provision, violated the Fair Elections Act.
Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor
General rightly points out that the assailed
provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful
election propaganda. It only regulates their use to
prevent premature campaigning and to equalize,
as much as practicable, the situation of all
candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating
the use of such election propaganda materials,
the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the
law.
Overbreadth
A statute or regulation is considered void for
overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
State regulations may not be achieved by means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its
operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a persons
propaganda materials and advertisements after
he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before
the start of the campaign period. Said materials
and advertisements must also show his name and
image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of
propaganda materials and advertisements.
During the campaign period, these may be used
subject only to reasonable limitations necessary
and incidental to achieving the purpose of
preventing premature campaigning and
promoting equality of opportunities among all
candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid
on the ground of overbreadth.
44. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC,
244 SCRA 272;
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated
Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to
provide free Comelec space of not less than one-
half page for the common use of political parties
and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public
Issue and their platforms of government. The
Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a
non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over
the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No.
2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution
as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print
media companies to donate Comelec space
amounts to taking of private personal property
without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the
element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering
that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property
for public use is authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation.
Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. In
the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
45. SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May
5, 2001;
Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it
wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the
restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting
the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass
media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is
invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.
46. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act
providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The
plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The
Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP
881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of
Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19
(Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which
provides During the plebiscite campaign period,
on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from
expressing their opinions, or should be under
Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that
what was granted to the Comelec was the power
to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information
to the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured.
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section
11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a
candidate for any elective office is required to
take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that
the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom
expression during plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167
has no statutory basis.
47. Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096,
March 3, 1999;
Facts: It appears that while the election returns
were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board
of Canvassers but before the winning candidates
were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit
before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking
to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a
failure of elections. The said petition was
supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and
orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto
which occurred after the voting and during the
preparation of election returns and in the custody
or canvass thereof, which resulted in afailure to
elect."
While the petition was pending before the
COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon
City, including the winning candidate for the post
of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing
the petition before it on the ground (1) that the
allegations therein were not supported by
sufficient evidence, and (2) the grounds recited
were not among the pre-proclamation issues set
forth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166.
Issue: WON the grounds are valid?
Ruling: Under the pertinent codal provision of the
Omnibus Election Code, there are only three(3)
instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election
in any polling place had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the
voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof such election result in
a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous
causes.
We have painstakingly examined petitioners
petition before the COMELEC but found nothing
therein that could support an action for
declaration of failure of elections. He never
alleged at all that elections were either not held
or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of
failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft
of any substantive support to describe just
exactly how the failure to elect came about.
of
48. Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54;
All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast.
Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in
the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected.
Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and
private respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT
were among the candidates for the mayoralty
position of Lumba-Bayabao. Voter turnout for the
election was very low. Only 2,330 out of 9,830
registered voters therein cast their votes.
Dagalangit won. Other candidates filed separate
petition for the declaration of failure of election in
some or all precincts in Lumba-Bayabao.
Issue: WON COMELEC should declare a failure of
election on the ground of massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged
terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts.
Held. No. before COMELEC can act on a verified
petition seeking to declare a failure of election,
two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting
has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the
date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect;
and, second, the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election. In the case before us, it is
indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely
affect the outcome of the election. But, the first
requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting
took place, or even if there is, the results thereon
will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since
actual voting and election by the registered
voters in the questioned precincts have taken
place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded
and excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit
any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in
denying the petitions outright. There was no basis
for the petitions since the facts alleged therein
did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant
the relief sought. For, the language of the law
expressly requires the concurrence of these
conditions to justify the calling of a special
election.
There can be failure of election in a political unit
only if the will of the majority has been defiled
and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be
determined, it must be accorded respect. After
all, there is no provision in our election laws
which requires that a majority of registered voters
must cast their votes. All the law requires is that
a winning candidate must be elected by a
plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than
25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts
cast their votes, the same must still be respected.
There is prima facie showing that private
respondent was elected through a plurality of
valid votes of a valid constituency.
49. Soliva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723,
April 20, 2001;
50. Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415;
Facts: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo,
representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads
for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no.
2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte,
on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban
and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd
district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba,
Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro,
Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was
made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section
spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval
and all the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect
and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular
province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular
province was approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the
conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further
consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five
municipalities (underlined above) with a total
population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the
distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings
with the incumbent representatives of the
province and other interested parties and on
December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed
resolution where, among others, it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and
the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to
the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue: Whether the unprecedented exercise by
the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
Held: Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled
and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC
was denied the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power.
Regarding the first elections after the enactment
of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who
did the reapportionment of the legislative districts
and for the subsequent elections, the power was
given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the
ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as
the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to
make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby
empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.
Section 3: Any province that may hereafter be
createdThe number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has
so increases, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the
election.
Minor adjustments do not involve change in the
allocations per district. Examples include error in
the correct name of a particular municipality or
when a municipality in between which is still in
the territory of one assigned district is forgotten.
And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the
Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district.
The power granted by section 3 to the respondent
is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities.)
51. Brillantes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193,
June 15, 2004;
FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections. On April 28, 2004,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6712 which
was captioned as GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND
CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE
MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS.
However, the petitioner assails that there is no
provision under Rep. Act No. 8436 which
authorizes the COMELEC to engage in the
biometrics/computerized system of validation of
voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic
transmission of election results (Phase III). Even
assuming for the nonce that all the three (3)
phases are duly authorized, they must
complement each other as they are not distinct
and separate programs but mere stages of one
whole scheme. Consequently, considering the
failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is
no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to still
push through and pursue with Phase III. The
petitioner essentially posits that the counting and
consolidation of votes contemplated under
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436 refers to the
official COMELEC count under the fully automated
system and not any kind of unofficial count via
electronic transmission of advanced results as
now provided under the assailed resolution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner and the
petitioners-intervenors have standing to
sue;
2. Assuming that they have standing,
whether the issues they raise are political
in nature over which the Court has no
jurisdiction;
3. Assuming the issues are not political,
whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:
i. for preempting the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4
of the 1987 Constitution to canvass the
votes for the election of President and
Vice-President;
ii. for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of
the 1987 Constitution that no money
shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by
law;
iii. for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173,
8436 and 7166 which authorize only the
citizens arm to use an election return for
an unofficial count;
iv. for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less
than thirty (30) days notice of the use of
new technological and electronic devices;
and,
v. for lack of constitutional or statutory
basis.
HELD:
First: The implementation of the assailed
resolution obviously involves the expenditure of
funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite
standing to question its validity as they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In
essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where
there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or where the petitioners
seek to restrain the respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.
Second: The Court does not agree with the
posture of the respondent COMELEC that the
issue involved in the present petition is a political
question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
review. As the leading case of Taada vs. Cuenco
put it, political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The issue raised in the present petition does not
merely concern the wisdom of the assailed
resolution but focuses on its alleged disregard for
applicable statutory and constitutional provisions.
In other words, the petitioner and the petitioners-
in-intervention are questioning the legality of the
respondent COMELECs administrative issuance
will not preclude this Court from exercising its
power of judicial review to determine whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing
Resolution No. 6712.
Third: The Court rules in the affirmative.
I. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise
of an unofficial tabulation of election results
based on a copy of the election returns, the sole
and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution
II. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes
the constitutional provision that no money shall
be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law. (Par. 1, Section
29, Article VI of the Constitution.)
III. The assailed resolution disregards existing
laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited
citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberlys
of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated
in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited
citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is
exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an unofficial
counting of the votes, whether for the national or
the local elections. No other entity, including the
respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a
copy of the election returns for purposes of
conducting an unofficial count.
IV. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory
basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover
the use of the latest technological and election
devices for unofficial tabulations of votes.
Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political
parties and all candidates in areas affected by the
use or adoption of technological and electronic
devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices.
V. The assailed resolution has no constitutional
and statutory basis. That respondent COMELEC is
the sole body tasked to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall (Section 2(1), Article IX.) and to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections (Section 2(4), Article IX.) is beyond
cavil. That it possesses the power to promulgate
rules and regulations in the performance of its
constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed.
However, the duties of the COMELEC under the
Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other
election laws are carried out, at all times, in its
official capacity. There is no constitutional and
statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to
undertake a separate and an unofficial
tabulation of results, whether manually or
electronically.
52. Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136,
December 2, 2014;
COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
FACTS: On October 2012, Kimberly filed her
certificate of candidacy (COC) for Councilor, City
of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated
that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that
she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of
the elections, in contravention of the requirement
that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years
of age on the day of the elections. As such,
Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory
hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of
attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a
sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC.
Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a
substitute of Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a
COC, and the denial of the substitution of
Kimberly by Olivia.
COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute
Kimberly as the latter was never an official
candidate because she was not eligible for the
post by reason of her age, and that; moreover,
the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating
to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be
elected to. Olivia countered that although
Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election
because of her age, it cannot be denied that she
still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official
candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or
deny Kimberlys COC on the ground of lack of
qualification and material misrepresentation
because she did not misrepresent her birth date
to qualify for the position of councilor, and as
there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the
electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew
her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
ISSUE: Was there a valid substitution?
RULING: Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being
under age, could not be considered to have filed
a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly
substituted by Olivia, we find that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion. Firstly, subject to its
authority over nuisance candidates and its power
to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec.
78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC
has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
The next question then is whether Olivia complied
with all of the requirements for a valid
substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First,
there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC
after the last day for the filing of COCs; second,
Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same
political party to which Kimberly belongs; and
third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day
of election day.

53. Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
147066, March 26, 2001;
FACTS: Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
conduct a special registration before May 2001
General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million
youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001 was passed but it was denied by the
COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and
that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can compel
respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELECs imposed December 27,
2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general
elections.
HELD: The Supreme Court could not compel
Comelec to conduct a special registration of new
voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and
must be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed
to register, thus missed their chance. However,
court took judicial notice of the fact that the
President issued a proclamation calling Congress
to a Special Session to allow the conduct of
special registration for new voters and that bills
had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act
No. 8189.
54. Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC, G.R. No.
212584, November 25, 2014;
55. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
192474, 192704, June 26, 2012;
FACTS: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr.,
petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While
serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a
residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated
and furnished the same. In September 2008 he
began occupying the house.
After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos
applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB)
of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his
voters registration record to Precinct 0051F of
Barangay Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr.,
respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the
application. After due proceedings, the ERB
approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos
opposition.
Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude
Jalosjos from the list of registered voter. After
hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding
Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in
question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not
abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he
continued even then to serve as its Mayor.
Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed the
MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari with
an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction which was granted. On
November 26, 2009 the CA granted his
application and enjoined the courts below from
enforcing their decisions, with the result that his
name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans
Village voters list pending the resolution of the
petition.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010
National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a
petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC
before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. But the Second Division of the COMELEC
issued a joint resolution, dismissing Erasmos
petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.
While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was
pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May
10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos
winning the elections for Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the
voters exclusion case before it, holding that the
lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the
voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil
since he was qualified under the Constitution and
Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place. Erasmo
filed a petition for review of the CA decision
before this Court in G.R. 193566.
Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En
Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration
and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not
satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be
deemed not to have transferred his residence
from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question
of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for
the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that
he has been proclaimed winner in the election
and has assumed the discharge of that office.
HELD:
POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the
COMELEC
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
power to decide all questions affecting elections,
such power is not without limitation. It does not
extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The
Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of
the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of
when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and
when that of the HRET begins. The Proclamation
of a congressional candidate following the
election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in
favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its
order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already
been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in
the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of
his qualification and declared him ineligible for
the office of Representative of the Second District
of Zamboanga Sibugay.
It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law
department insisted, that the proclamation of
Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated
rule. Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible
to run for that office, necessarily, his
proclamation was void following the ruling in
Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the
COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3,
2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act
6646.Section 6 provides:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of
2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve
Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions
dismissal of the disqualification case against
Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final
judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of
candidates for the congressional seat he sought.
The last standing official action in his case before
election day was the ruling of the COMELEC's
Second Division that allowed his name to stay on
that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not
issue any order suspending his proclamation
pending its final resolution of his case. With the
fact of his proclamation and assumption of office,
any issue regarding his qualification for the same,
like his alleged lack of the required residence,
was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474
that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its
jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the
position of representative for the Second District
of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction
over his case. Necessarily, Erasmos petitions
(G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the
validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter
and the COMELEC's failure to annul his
proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the
power vested by the Constitution solely on the
HRET.
56. Tanada, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199,
October 22, 2013;
57. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
June 25, 2013;
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections and affirmed the March
27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is:
Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district
of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives, all
questions regarding her qualifications are outside
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within
the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to
the correctness of petitioner submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could
be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on May 18, 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May
18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution
dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner
certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which
petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without
any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to
the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC
First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013
COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact
of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of
due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and
the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends
that there was a violation of her right to due
process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not
bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition
to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the
"newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process
in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself
of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due
process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the
case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should
be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of
due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of
a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty
to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and has not lost the same, or that she has re-
acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof
as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
58. Sahali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796,
January 15, 2013;
FACTS: During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A.
Sahali (Sadikul) and private respondent Rashidin
H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates
who ran for the position of governor in the
Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private
respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the
position of Vice-Governor.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the
duly elected governor and vice-governor,
respectively.
Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested
the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts
that functioned in the province of TawiTawi.
Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer with counter
protest.
The COMELEC First Division directed its Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to
conduct a technical examination of the said
election paraphernalia by comparing the
signature and thumbmarks appearing on the
EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs
and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and Ruby jointly
filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong
Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for
Reconsideration.
The COMELEC First Division issued the herein
assailed Order which denied the said motion for
reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby.
Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition
asserting that the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sadikul and Rubys resort
to the remedy of certiorari to assail an
interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC
first division is proper?
2. Whether or not Sadikul and Ruby were
denied due process when the COMELEC
granted the motion for technical
examination filed by Matba and Usman
without giving them the opportunity to
oppose the said motion?
HELD:
POLITICAL LAW:
FIRST ISSUE: The power of the Supreme Court to
review election cases falling within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only
extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders
issued by a Division thereof.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court

elucidated on the import of Section 7, Art IX of
the Constitution in this wise: We have interpreted
this provision to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. This decision must be a final decision or
resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of

the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders
since they only disposed of an incident in the
main case i.e. the propriety of the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia.
Thus, the proper recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is
to await the decision of the COMELEC First
Division in the election protests filed by Matba
and Usman, and should they be aggrieved
thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en
banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

SECOND ISSUE: The Supreme Court cannot see

how due process was denied to the petitioners in
the issuance of the COMELEC First Divisions
Order.

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election

disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a
party therein to file an opposition to a motion
filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the
party concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to
file an opposition to a motion within five days
from receipt of a copy of the same without
awaiting for the COMELEC's directive to do so.

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their

opposition to the said motion for technical
examination in their manifestation and motion for
reconsideration which they filed with the
COMELEC First Division. Indeed, their objections
to the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the
COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having filed a
motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First
Divisions Order, their claim of denial of due
process is clearly unfounded.

The petitioners should be reminded that due

process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard.