Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years
and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-
five (25) years at SUNVARs exclusive option.[9]
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as
successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to
renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate
and a renewal period of another 25 years. [14]On even date, it also wrote to the
Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the
subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.[15]
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General
Counsel notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of lease.
[19]
In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPCs decision.[20]
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired,
petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised
respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30)
days.[24] The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,
[25]
but failed to vacate and remained on the property.[26]
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property
and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful
detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them. [31] In the alternative, it
also argued that petitioners cause of action was more properly an accion
publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
considering that the petitioners supposed dispossession of the subject property by
respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint.
[32]
The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration [33] filed by
respondent.[34] Respondent later on filed its Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment,
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati
City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.
[39]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [40] which was subsequently
denied by the RTC.[41] Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent
proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits
of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the
MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.
[43]
The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer
case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
I
Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are
procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[51]
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the
present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or,
more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and
granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves
the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the
instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that
it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this
relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed
RTC Decision is annulled.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against
Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his
property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the
MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary
tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the
reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days
after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take
cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land.
When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for
Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted
tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog,
the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a
summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his
Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief
from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice,
since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from judgment
(Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding
petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively.
These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section
19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules
of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief
from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the
mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with
a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the
resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in
the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving
the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party
appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a
summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the
hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed
the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment
suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the
MTCCs erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
xxxxxxxxx
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether
the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC.
At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement
for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within
one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it
was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period
should be counted from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03 February 2009 of the
Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year
period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the
reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or
sublease agreement, then petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by
virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful
deprivation bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and
costs.[60] Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only
after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the
person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15
days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature
and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint
for ejectment.[63]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and
that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03
February 2009.
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the
date of the last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking
through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the
unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25 February 1997 from the latest demand
letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July
1995:
xxxxxxxxx
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired
(01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the
subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement
or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed
to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on
03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and
without any contract between them, respondent is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. [70] Upon service of the final notice of
demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently,
petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the
summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was
filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on
22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing
an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their
right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation
of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later
gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as
occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a
summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the
latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the
nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year
period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period
will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. [71] If the subsequent
demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-
year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first
demand.[72] However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below
this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is
now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate
was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this
factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is
limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual
issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of
the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this
Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade
has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant
Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court
emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for
all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located
in the countrys business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain
public revenues from the property.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed
the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property
having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971
Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a
Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand
One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said
dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the
case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the
appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. [4] It noted that
his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to
petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor
of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents
was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their
execution.[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, [6] resulted in
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of
petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not
annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.[7]
Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of
the sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz,
petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to
respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus,
in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of the
property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but was
in the exercise of ownership.[8]
The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the properties to
respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner
failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject
properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered owner
of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to
the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the
same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of
the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents unregistered deed.
[10]
In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents possession was not
... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for ejectment must fail. [11] The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in
Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER
ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who
between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties --
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents,
who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
properties?
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property
is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court.
[14]
In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is
entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not
final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.[16]
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the
disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they
cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and
are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this
claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his
name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that,
having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of
property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is correct
that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner
and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate
court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents
was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In
fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property
for more than 30 years up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and legal
issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful
detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens
title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property claimed
ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue
was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the subject
property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who
had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the following
justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful
detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an
ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by
the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the
Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally
resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of
Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is
the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely
showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the
name of petitioner.
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued possession
of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere
allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents
possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite for a valid cause of action
in an unlawful detainer case.
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint
against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the
entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since
their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the
courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the
better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the
subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be
ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we
cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which
he hath.
The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999 Decision and the July
16, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which
reversed the Decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in
Civil Case No. 98-89174, and reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the
subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.[1]
The Facts
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at
No. 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc,
Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees, and she religiously
paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire
struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioners dwelling. After the
fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective
houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the
remaining lessees, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not
comply. On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a written demand to vacate
said lot but refused to leave.Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate
court proceedings against any of the lessees.
On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent
Melba Tan Te by virtue of the November 26, 1996 Deed of Absolute
Sale. Respondent bought the lot in question for residential purposes. Despite the
sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the lot.
On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the
premises which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute
by offering financial assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for
her house. Respondent rejected the counter offer which she considered
unconscionable. As a result, a certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC
as more than one year had elapsed from petitioners forcible entry; (2) she was a
rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20; [2] (3) her lease constituted a legal
encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was subject of expropriation.
1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to vacate
the premises situated at 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street),
Sampaloc, Manila and peacefully return possession thereof to plaintiff;
SO ORDERED.[3]
Unconvinced, petitioner Dela Cruz appealed the Decision of the MeTC in the
Manila RTC and the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-89174. On
September 1, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment setting aside the April 3, 1998
Decision of the Manila MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan Tes Complaint on the
ground that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The RTC believed that since Tan Tes predecessor-in-
interest learned of petitioners intrusion into the lot as early as February 21, 1994,
the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year prescriptive period
which expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the ejectment suit
and respondent Tan Te filed the action only on September 8, 1997, then the suit had
become an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
Petitioner tried to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted in its July
16, 1999 Resolution.
Unyielding to the CA Decision and the denial of her request for reconsideration,
petitioner Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2) reversible errors on the part of the
appellate court, to wit:
Discussion on Rule 45
Before we dwell on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be
resolved.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the findings of facts of the CA, a
course of action proscribed by Section 1, Rule 45. Firm is the rule that findings of
fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this
Court provided they are supported by evidence on record or substantial
evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will be liberal with her petition considering
that the CAs factual findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was an
asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case. Indeed, these
grounds were considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.
The actual threshold issue is which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC,
has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit. Once the jurisdictional issue is
settled, the heart of the dispute is whether or not respondent is entitled to the
ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz from the premises.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will
prefer an ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
which allows immediate execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule 70
unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the RTC and complies with the
requirements to stay execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial to the
interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional
Trial Courts provides:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall
under the jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the
real right of possession (accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year or when the action was filed more than one (1) year from date
of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) an action for the
recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of
possession.
These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and
adjudication takes a longer period than the summary ejectment suit.
Let us refer to the allegations of the complaint filed in the Manila MeTC in
Civil Case No. 98-89174, which we quote verbatim:
4. That plaintiff purchased the above-said parcel of land together with its
improvements from the legal heirs of the late EMERLINDA DIMAYUGA
REYES on November 26, 1996, under and by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale x x x;
5. That pursuant to the said deed of sale, the title to the land and all its
improvements was transferred in plaintiffs name as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 233273 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila
on April 22, 1997 x x x;
6. That prior to said sale, the previous owners, represented by Mr. Lino
Reyes, husband of the said deceased Emerlinda D. Reyes and the
administrator of her estate, was in possession and control of the property
subject of this complaint;
7. That also prior to said sale, defendant, without the knowledge and
consent of Mr. Lino Reyes, surreptitiously and by means of stealth and
strategy entered, used and occupied the said premises thus depriving the
former of rightful possession thereof;
8. That on February 21, 1994, Mr. Lino Reyes, through Atty. Alejo Sedico,
his lawyer, furnished the defendants a letter formally demanding that
defendant vacate the premises x x x;
9. That, however, defendant failed and refused to vacate despite just and
legal demand by Mr. Lino Reyes;
10. That after the sale to plaintiff of said premises, plaintiff has several
times demanded of defendants to vacate the premises, the last demand
having been made on them personally and in writing on January 14, 1997 x
x x;
11. That defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate the
premises without legal cause or justifiable reason whatsoever;[11]
4. The Court has no jurisdiction over the case, having been filed by plaintiff
more than the reglementary one year period to commence forcible entry
case, which is reckoned from the date of the alleged unlawful entry of
defendant by the use of stealth and strategy into the premises;
5. For more than four decades now, defendant has been and still is a rent-
paying tenant of the subject land occupied by their residential house, dating
back to the original owner-lessor, the Dimayuga family. Her lease with no
definite duration, commenced with a rent at P60.00 per month until it was
gradually increased in the ensuing years. As of November 1996, it stood at
P300.00 a month;
7. Throughout the years of her tenancy, defendant has been updated in her
rental payment until the collector of the original owner-lessor no longer
came around as she has done theretofore;
7.1. As a result, she was compelled to file a petition for
consignation of rent before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila;
8. A bona fide tenant within the ambit if [sic] P.D. 20 and the subsequent
rental control status, including B.P. Blg. 25, under its terms, cannot be
ousted on a plea of expiration of her monthly lease;
11. Plaintiff being a married woman cannot sue or be sued without being
joined by her husband;[12]
Undeniably, the aforequoted allegations of the complaint are vague and iffy
in revealing the nature of the action for ejectment.
The allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes,
representing the estate of his wife Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and
control of the subject lot but were deprived of said possession when petitioner, by
means of stealth and strategy, entered and occupied the same lot. These
circumstances imply that he had prior physical possession of the subject lot and
can make up a forcible entry complaint.
On the other hand, the allegation that petitioner Dela Cruz was served
several demands to leave the premises but refused to do so would seem to indicate
an action for unlawful detainer since a written demand is not necessary in an action
for forcible entry. It is a fact that the MeTC complaint was filed on September 8,
1997 within one (1) year from the date of the last written demand upon petitioner
Dela Cruz on January 14, 1997.
Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te
ejectment complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted
that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4)
decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot
by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the Reyeses
considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to
the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the
owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by
petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the
Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan
Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject
the latter by sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of
demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the
action was instituted well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14,
1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the
Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Where despite the lessees failure to pay rent after the first demand, the
lessor did not choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to
continue occupying the land for nearly two years, after which the lessor
made a second demand, the one-year period for bringing the detainer case in
the justice of the peace court should be counted not from the day the lessee
refused the first demand for payment of rent but from the time the second
demand for rents and surrender of possession was not complied with.[15]
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in subsequent decisions on
ejectment, the concept of possession by tolerance was further elucidated as
follows:
Even if we concede that it is the RTC and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction
over the Tan Te complaint, following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her
predecessor-in-interest filed an ejectment suit within one (1) year from February
21, 1994 when the Reyeses knew of the unlawful entry of petitioner, and hence, the
complaint is transformed into an accion publiciana, the Court deems it fair and just
to suspend its rules in order to render efficient, effective, and expeditious justice
considering the nine (9) year pendency of the ejectment suit. More importantly, if
there was uncertainty on the issue of jurisdiction that arose from the averments of
the complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent Tan Te but to
hercounsel who could have been confused as to the actual nature of the ejectment
suit. The lawyers apparent imprecise language used in the preparation of the
complaint without any participation on the part of Tan Te is sufficient special or
compelling reason for the grant of relief.
The case of Barnes v. Padilla[17] elucidates the rationale behind the exercise
by this Court of the power to relax, or even suspend, the application of the rules of
procedure:
At the heart of every ejectment suit is the issue of who is entitled to physical
possession of the lot or possession de facto.
1. Petitioner admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant of the
Reyeses, predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te. As such, she recognized
the ownership of the lot by respondent, which includes the right of possession.
2. After the fire raged over the structures on the subject lot in late 1989 the
contracts of lease expired, as a result of which Lino Reyes demanded that all
occupants, including petitioner, vacate the lot but the latter refused to abandon the
premises. During the duration of the lease, petitioners possession was legal but it
became unlawful after the fire when the lease contracts were deemed terminated
and demands were made for the tenants to return possession of the lot.
Petitioner raises the ancillary issue that on March 15, 1998, the Manila City
Council passed and approved Ordinance No. 7951:
[a]uthorizing the Manila City Mayor to acquire either by negotiation or
expropriation certain parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 233273, 175106 and 140471, containing an area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Five (1,425) square meters, located at
Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila, for low cost
housing and award to actual bonafide residents thereat and further
authorizing the City Mayor to avail for that purpose any available funds of
the city and other existing funding facilities from other government
agencies x x x.[19]
It readily appears that this issue was not presented before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 despite the fact that the respondents petition
was filed on September 25, 1998, six months after the ordinance was passed. Thus,
this issue is proscribed as are all issues raised for the first time before the Court are
proscribed.
Even granting for the sake of argument that we entertain the issue, we rule
that the intended expropriation of respondents lot (TCT No. 233273) by the city
government of Manilawill not affect the resolution of this petition. For one thing,
the issue can be raised by petitioner in the appropriate legal proceeding. Secondly,
the intended expropriation might not even be implemented since it is clear from the
ordinance that the City Mayor will still locate available funds for project, meaning
the said expense is not a regular item in the budget.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The April 30,
1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 156730-CV and the July 16, 1999 Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 49097 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
DECISION
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of
1
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the Decision dated August 22, 2011 of the
2
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision dated
3
October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in
Civil Case No. 862.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer
4
filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C.
Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household.
Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine
(769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo
L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section 2(a),
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus
the case was returned to the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of defendants Victoria
Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and
Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with
damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an
action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents
occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand
letter sent by petitioners counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy,
and in petitioners own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry
which should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner
was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint
was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy considering
that she merely tolerated respondents stay in the premises after demand to vacate was made upon
them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action
when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the period
agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful
possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but
respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one
for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after
she allowed them to stay there for one year.
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that respondents
occupation ofthe property without petitioners consent can be converted to a contract, such
agreement not being prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the
requisites for an unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that petitioners complaint was filed within
the prescribed one-year period counted from the time the final demand to vacate was received by
the respondents on July 24, 2008.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-
Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
ordering the defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and
surrender possession and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008 until
the same is paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos, as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. 7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above
decision became final and executory. 8
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing
heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a period of ten days within which to file their
comment. At the next scheduled hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents counsel appeared and
submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court that on the same day
they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies ofwhich were
served to petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6,
2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending
motion" and thus gave petitioners counsel a period of ten (10) days within which to fileher Reply and
thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution.
9
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 10
The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for
filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for
unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for
respondents to vacate the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject
property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an
accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and
executory. She argues that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be
justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents as to supposed non-receipt of documents
concerning this case.
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings before the RTC and
were not furnished a copy of the said courts adverse decision. They also stress that resort to
certiorari was proper and the suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling
circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by respondents who
are indigent, respondents lack of awareness of unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the
RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful
detainer, lack of showing that resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being
no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the parties submissions, we find neither reversible error
nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint
11
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give
12
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is either forcibleentry or
13
unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any
contract, express or implied. 14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioners complaint make out a case for
forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
15
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination ofthe latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.16
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an
area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is
hereto attached as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to
Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested for
time toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject
property by the end of May, 2008;
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible
conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the
said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached
as Annex "D";
xxxx 17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe
possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became
illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioners insistence that she
actually tolerated respondents continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the
subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondentsoccupation in May
2007. Such possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or
consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession
ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.
18
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the
19
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be
made.
If right at the incipiencydefendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that
the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of
Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed,
to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry into
the land is an open challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the
speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in
the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against
the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of
the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere
tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-
32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their
mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land
the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action fails. The appellate
court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother
and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot
and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them,
their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the
knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible
entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216
(1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
xxxx
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of
title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between
the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this
Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction
over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the
MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly
erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory judgment of
the RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Indeed, a void judgment for
20
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. AND MARILOU P. EMBOY
DELANTAR, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on
May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for
Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou EmboyDelantar (Marilou) (respondents),
seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, 5 and Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB
33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the
MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer
instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907A2
(subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The
subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among the
heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents
claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to
become her share in Lot No. 1907A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after
inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion. 11
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate
the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907A5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused
to comply insisting that Claudias inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907A2. 12
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencitas counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja),
a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed
that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the formers relatives.
However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the
subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a
series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of
Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs
respective portions of Lot No. 1907A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for
unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from
Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the
respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successorininterest, she claimed her
entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the
same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencitas claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents
were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built
thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorneys fees. 17
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. 18
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review 19 filed before the
CA.
The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several
decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property
despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lots title. Even her complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents institution on August 13, 2004 of a
petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20the respondents emphasized that even if
one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in
the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of
ejectment.21 The respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the
pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit
involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of
possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership
would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the
complaint for unlawful detainer, bore telltale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Parejas demand letter
sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who
now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of
sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the
vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a codefendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only
registered the following year after its supposed execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had
never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencitas claim that the
respondents possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old
wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an Agreement,23dated
February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot
No. 1907A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot
No. 1907A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been
executed in order to be fair to Vicentes siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer
had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencitas complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to file
an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencitas
brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim
over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made
upon the respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally
defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the oneyear period within which the
suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would
be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of Lot
No. 1907A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the
event that the latters complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the formers ancestral house
demolished.
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a
quo and dismissing Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita]
is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry.
In Carmencitas Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited
by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is
properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed
that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each
others relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the
complainant is not necessary.27 Instead, what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the MTCC
cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencitas Motion for Reconsideration.
Whether or not Carmencitas complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause
of action for unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907A and
for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencitas ejectment suit.
Carmencitas Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of
Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and
Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencitas behalf, demanded that they
vacate the property. The respondents refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants
unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse
was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack 28 and the issue
of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of
ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the
same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs. 29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered
owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the
occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the formers tolerance, and
the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for
ejectment would be proper.32
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencitas complaint for unlawful
detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how
possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that
the respondents possessed the property by mere tolerance with the understanding that they would
voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners.34
In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are
inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencitas complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious
title, which is already the subject of the respondents petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907A.
Our Disquisition
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property, viz: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while
in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at
the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff
out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible
entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. 39 (Citations
omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as
to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to
parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear
on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of
Lot No. 1907A can abate Carmencitas suit for unlawful detainer.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify
the suspension of ejectment proceedings. The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the
actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few
occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved.
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such
exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await
the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where
there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject
of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondents suit is one of unlawful detainer
and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their
house, a matter that is likely to create the confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses
mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole
gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly,
the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondents claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated
contract of lease, but allegedly on mere tolerance. Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the
quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment
case.45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by
Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CAG.R. No. 43611SP, from which the Amagan case sprang: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that
petitioners possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his
demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him,
verbal or written, asserting that they are owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street,
San Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that
is involved in this case.[]
TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG
1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this
action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of
the premises in question.[]
THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of
the petitioners house [from] the lot in question.[]
To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners house prior to
the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.46 (Citation omitted)
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed
hereunder.
Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have
been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand,
raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB30548,
a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of
Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencitas complaint be granted, the respondents
house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The
foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general
rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencitas complaint for unlawful
detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners
had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the
ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the
purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished
pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907A, where ownership
over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009
and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 29, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 which granted herein respondent's Petition for Review, reversed the
December 11, 2009 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) in SCA No. 3144, and
reinstated the said RTC's April 29, 2009 Decision.4
Factual Antecedents
The parties herein - petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent
Engracia Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-square
meter piece of property (the subject property) located at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600) (23937) 845-R5 (TCT 845-R) which was issued in 1953.
It appears that petitioners and other siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual occupants of the
subject property, having stayed there with their parents since birth. On the other hand, respondent took up
residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997. 6
On June 7, 2006, TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new certificate of title -Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12575-R7 or 125758 (TCT 12575) - was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed
of Sale"9 ostensibly executed on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers, and
respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were then already deceased.
Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the subject property,
under pain of litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint 10 against respondent and the Register of
Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale,
reconveyance, and damages, on the claim that the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario and
Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they were entitled to a reconveyance of the same. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898-SJ and assigned to Branch 160 of the RTC of Pasig City.
On September 26, 2006, respondent filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioners and her brothers
Rafael and Ramon before the MeTC of San Juan City. Docketed as Civil Case No. 9534 and assigned to MeTC
Branch 58, respondent in her Complaint11 sought to evict her siblings from the subject property on the claim
that she is the owner of the same; that her siblings' stay therein was merely tolerated; and that she now
needed the premises to serve as her daughters' residence. Thus, she prayed that her siblings be ordered to
vacate the premises and pay monthly rent of P2,000.00 from date of demand until they vacate the
premises, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.
In their Answer,12 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a forgery,
and no certificate of title in her name could be issued; that they thus remained co-owners of the subject
property, and respondent had no right to evict them; and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 70898-SJ bars
the ejectment suit against them.
After proceedings or on September 17, 2007, the MeTC rendered a Decision, 13 decreeing as follows:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Anent the first issue of jurisdiction, the Court answers in the affirmative xxx.
xxxx
From the above-quoted verse, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over this case. Moreover, in the case of Hilario vs. Court of
Appeals, (260 SCRA 420,426 citing: Refugia, Et al[.] vs. Court of Appeals, Et al[.,] G.R. No. 118284, July 4,
1996) the Supreme Court held: 'xxx inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject
to the caveat that the issue raised as to ownership be resolved by the Trial Court for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession x x x.' Thus, even where the defendants assert in their Answer,
ownership of or Title to the property, the inferior Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction, xxx
xxxx
As to the second issue as to whether or not plaintiff may validly eject the defendants, again this Court
answers in the affirmative, since the plaintiff is a holder of a Torrens Title which is a right in rem. The
defendants in their defense that they have filed a case before the Regional Trial Court questioning the Title
of the plaintiff is their right and prerogative, unless however restrained by higher court, this Court will
proceed as mandated by law and jurisprudence. This action for unlawful detainer is sanctioned by Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
xxxx
While the defendants claim that their parents are still the owner[s] of the subject property in litigation and
during their lifetime have not awarded nor alienated said property to anybody, why then has plaintiff the
Title of said property? If it was secured fraudulently, the same is of no moment since it has its own forum to
address to [sic]. Moreover, the pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the property does not
bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein xxx. As
correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, 'ownership may be exercised over things or rights,' Art. 427 of the New
Civil Code. Likewise, Art. 428 of the same code provides that: 'the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.' Further, Art. 434 states that 'in an
action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his Title and
not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.' The defendants therefore can be validly ejected from the
premises in question since this is not accion publiciana as claimed by the defendants.
Finally, on the third issue of damages and the side issue of reasonable compensation for the use of the
subject premises, the Supreme Court in the case of Balanon-Anicete vs. Balano, 402 SCRA 514 held: 'xxx
persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between
them [are] necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.' Hence, upon demand, plaintiff is
entitled to collect reasonable compensation for the actual occupation of the subject property which is
P2,000.00 per month and the payment of attorney's fees. Since no evidence was presented relative to
damages, the Court cannot award the same.
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the subject property known
as No. 127 F. Sevilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila and to surrender peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff
in this case;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 per month for the actual use and
occupation of the subject property reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which is August 7, 2006,
until defendants shall have finally vacated the premises;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
In an appeal before the RTC docketed as SCA Case No. 3144, petitioners and their co-defendants argued
that the MeTC erred in not resolving the issue of ownership, in ordering them to vacate the premises, in
deciding issues which were not framed by the parties, and in not granting them damages and awarding the
same instead to respondent.
On April, 29, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,15 pronouncing as follows:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Stripped of its non-essentials, the appeal primarily hinges on the lower court's failure to rule upon the issue
on the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575 of the lot, subject of the ejectment suit.
Upon a judicious consideration of the arguments raised by the parties in their respective memorandum vis-
a-vis the decision of the court a quo, this court opines and so holds that the said court did not err in its
findings. The validity of a transfer certificate of title cannot be raised in the said ejectment suit as it partakes
of a collateral attack against the said title. This is not allowed under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. The issue on the validity of title i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Raymundo and Perla De Guzman vs. Praxides J. Agbagala,
G.R. No. 163566, February 19, 2008 is revelatory, thus:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
'Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be
attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one year from the date of their issuance. Such an
attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The rationale is this:
xxx [The] public should be able to rely on the registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.'
For reasons aforestated, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered affirming in toto in [sic] the decision of the
lower court dated September 17, 2007.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself. Thus, in a December 11, 2009 Order,17 it
held that -
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
2. This Court's Findings
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the court a quo should have dismissed the complaint outright for
failure to comply with a condition precedent under Section 10, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
parties being siblings and there being no allegations in the complaint as regards efforts at compromise
having been exerted, a matter that was raised in the answer of defendants Consolation Romero and Rosario
D. Domingo.
The court a quo is correct in ruling that it has jurisdiction over this case, the allegations in the complaint
being so phrased as to present one apparently for unlawful detainer. It did not matter that after answers
were filed and further proceedings were had, what emerged were issues of ownership and possession being
intricately interwoven, the court being clothed with jurisdiction to provisionally adjudicate the issue of
ownership, it being necessary in resolving the question of possession.
In Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals, et al., it was held that one of the features of an unlawful detainer case is
possession of property by defendant being at the start legal, becoming illegal by reason of the termination of
right to possess based on his contract or other arrangement with plaintiff.
hi this case, the legal possession of subject premises by defendants-appellants, they being the heirs of
original owners Macario and Felicidad Domingo, has not ceased. The basis for the claimed ownership by
plaintiff-appellee is a deed of absolute sale dated 06 June 2006 (Exhibit "2") showing the signatures of
vendor Sps. Domingo whose respective death certificates indicate that Macario died on 22 February 1981
and Felicidad on 14 September 1997. It is clear that the deed of sale became the basis for the transfer of
subject property in plaintiff-appellee's name under TCT No. 12575 (Exhibit "A"), a fact that prompted herein
defendants-appellants to file a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of ownership, docketed as
Civil Case No. 70898-SJ earlier than this subject case.
It appearing that defendants-appellants' occupancy of subject property is premised on their right thereto as
co-owners, being compulsory heirs of their parents, and it not being established that they had alienated
such right in favor of their sister, herein plaintiff-appellee, the latter cannot eject them therefrom.
While defendants Rafael and Ramon Domingo allege and pray for actual and moral damages and attorney's
fees in their answer and all [the] defendants do so in their position paper, the court can award only the last,
it being established that they were compelled to litigate to protect their right, and such award being just and
equitable. As for actual and moral damages, there is no sufficient basis for a grant thereof. It is noted that
not a single affidavit of any of the four defendants is attached to their position paper, as required under
Section 10, Rule 70, Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 9, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the court hereby grants the motion for reconsideration of its
decision on appeal affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan City.
Consequently, it hereby reverses said decision by decreeing that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action
against herein defendants-appellants who are entitled to possession of the subject premises, rendering the
complaint dismissible and hereby dismisses it. Corrolarily, plaintiff-appellee's motion for execution is hereby
denied. Plaintiff-appellee is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants P8,000.00 each in attorney's fees.
Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the RTC denied in a subsequent Order 20dated May 17,
2010. The trial court held:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
In essence, plaintiff argues that possession and not ownership should have been the central issue in this
appealed ejectment suit. As the subject property is titled in plaintiffs name, necessarily, she has better right
of possession than defendants.
The court is not persuaded. Germane is Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Having determined the ownership issue in resolving defendants' right of possession pursuant to the
aforestated rule, the court hereby finds no cogent reason or sufficient justification to reconsider its previous
ruling dated 11 December 2009.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondent filed a Petition for Review22 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114363. On February 29,
2012, the CA rendered judgment, as follows:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the assailed Orders since the RTC allegedly erred:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
'I.
IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PREMISES, THEIR
OCCUPANCY BEING PREMISED ON THEIR RIGHT AS CO-OWNERS, BEING COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
[PETITIONER] PARENTS AND IT NOT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THEY HAD ALIENATED SUCH RIGHT IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
II.
IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.'
This Court's Ruling
Contending that the RTC erred when it held that respondents cannot be ejected from the subject lot because
they are co-owners thereof and heirs of their deceased parents, petitioner points out that the only issue that
should be tackled in an unlawfol detainer case is the right of a plaintiff to possession de facto over the
property in question.
For their part, respondents argue that they have legal and actual possession of the subject lot as they are
the heirs of their deceased parents who are the registered owners of said subject lot. On the other hand, the
title to the subject lot that was registered under petitioner's name is null and void for it was issued based on
a forged deed of absolute sale.
In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession of a property becomes illegal when he is demanded
by the plaintiff to vacate therefrom due to the expiration or termination of his right to possess the same
under the contract but the defendant refuses to heed such demand. Thus, the sole issue to be resolved is
who between the parties have [sic] a right to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independently of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the rule in Sec. 16, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court is explicit:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In other words, while only possession de facto is the issue to be determined in an ejectment case, the issue
of ownership may be tackled if raised by any of the parties and only for the purpose of reaching a conclusion
on the issue of possession. Thus, in Esmaquel vs. Coprada, the Supreme Court had the occasion to once
again hold that:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
'The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in
the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves
more weight.'
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondents are claiming ownership over the subject lot. On the part
of petitioner, she maintains that she has a right to possession because she is the registered owner thereof,
as evidenced by TCT No. 12575-R which was issued in her name in 2006. On the other hand, respondents
maintain that they cannot be ejected from the subject lot because they are the compulsory heirs of their
deceased parents under whose names the subject lot was registered, as shown in TCT No. 845-R.
As between the two parties, this Court rules in favor of petitioner for she holds a more recently-issued
certificate of title, i.e., 2006, than that of their deceased parents whose certificate of title was issued in
1953. The issuance of the certificate of title in 2006 may be traced from TCT No. 845-R wherein at the last
page of its Memorandum of [E]ncumbrances is an entry which explicitly states that the title was transferred
to the name of petitioner on June 6, 2006 for a consideration of Php1,000.000.00. Clearly, the certificate of
title of the deceased parents was effectively cancelled in favor of petitioner. Hence, petitioner has a better
right to the possession de facto of the subject lot for, as held in Asuncion Urieta Vda. de Aguilar vs. Alfaro,
'the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.'
Respondents' insistence that the Torrens Certificate of petitioner should not be given any probative weight
because it is null and void is of no moment. The validity of a certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked. Rather, the attack should be made in an action instituted mainly for that purpose, x x x
xxxx
In short, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of the indefeasibility of the title to the property and the person
whose name appears therein is entitled to the possession of the property unless and until his title is nullified.
The reason being that the Torrens System was adopted as it is the most effective measure that will
guarantee the integrity of land titles and protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. Hence, the age-old rule that 'the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.'
Unless there is already a judgment declaring petitioner's certificate of title as null and void, the presumption
of its validity must prevail, x x x
xxxx
All said, petitioner's right to possession over the subject lot must be respected in view of the certificate of
title thereto issued in her name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch
160 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated April 29, 2009 affirming the Decision dated
September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, San Juan City, Branch 58 is REINSTATED.
In a July 10, 2013 Resolution,24 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition. chanroble slaw
Issues
THE COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION) OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEX H) BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT REQUIRED BY LAW (SEC.
3, RULE 8, REVISED RULE OF COURT).
THE DECISION GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IN HER
EJECTMENT COMPLAINT (ANNEX H) IS INDISPENSABLY INTERTWINED WITH THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
RAISED BY PETITIONERS' DEFENSE, THUS RENDERING SAID COMPLAINT NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
CASE OVER WHICH THE MeTC HAS JURISDICTION, AS DECIDED IN THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 9, 2009
(ANNEX X).
C
THE DECISION IS SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN IN NOT HAVING UPHELD THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BY JUDGE
MYRNA Y. LM-VERANO IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST RESPONDENT WHO OBVIOUSLY OBAINED
HER TITLE (ANNEX F) USING AN UNDISPUTABLY FRAUDULENT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (ANNEX G).
THE DECISION INCORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS IN RAISING OWNERSHIP AS THEIR DEFENSE
(SEC. 16 IN RELATION TO SEC. 18, RULE 70, REVISED RULES OF COURT) CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT OBVIOUSLY AND UNDENIABLY PROCURED THRU FRAUD. 25 cralawla wlibrary
Petitioners' Arguments
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In their Petition and Reply26 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and reinstatement of the RTC's
December 11, 2009 Order dismissing respondent's ejectment case, petitioners essentially argue that since
the parties to the case are siblings and no attempt at compromise was made by the respondent prior to the
filing of Civil Case No. 9534, then it should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure27 in relation to Article 151 of the Family Code28 and Article 222 of the Civil
Code;29 that they could not be evicted from the subject property since they are co-owners of the same,
having inherited it from their deceased parents; that respondent's title was derived from a forged deed of
sale, which does not make her the sole owner of the subject property; that as co-owners and since
respondent's title is void, they have a right of possession over the subject property and they may not be
evicted therefrom; that their defense that respondent obtained her title through a forged deed of sale does
not constitute a collateral attack on such title, but is allowed in order to prove their legal right of possession
and ownership over the subject property.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment30 seeking denial of the Petition, respondent claims that the Petition should have been
dismissed since only two of the respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 filed the Petition before this Court;
that the findings of the CA do not merit review and modification, the same being correct; and that the
Petition is a mere reiteration of issues and arguments already passed upon exhaustively below. chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in respondent's favor. True, no
suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to
comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such
defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. 31
hi arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership, which both parties
raised. While the procedure taken is allowed -under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,32 the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession - the CA
nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on respondent's TCT 12575
issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to
possession thereof- pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof."33 Such provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in
petitioners' favor.
When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by the parties thereto and notarized
on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad,
were forged. They could not have signed the same, because both were by then long deceased: Macario died
on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September 14, 1997. This makes the June 6, 2006
deed of sale null and void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."34
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject property, she
nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed. "Verily,
when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property."35
In sum, the fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of title is of no moment; her title cannot be
used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale. As has been held in the past:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the
property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration
would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole
world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the
land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original
registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus
became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise
all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession - whether de facto or dejure; respondent
thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void, the matter of direct or collateral
attack is a foregone conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and
is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;"37 petitioners were not precluded from questioning
the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.
It does not appear either that petitioners are claiming exclusive ownership or possession of the subject
property. Quite the contrary, they acknowledge all this time that the property belongs to all the Domingo
siblings in co-ownership. In the absence of an allegation - or evidence - that petitioners are claiming
exclusive ownership over the co-owned property, respondent has no alternative cause of action for
ejectment which should prevent the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9534. The pronouncement in a previous case
applies here:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code,38 a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears
stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive
ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in
possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner thereof.
As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. 39 cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, it is respondent who is claiming exclusive ownership of the subject property owned in common.
Thus, left with no cause of action for ejectment against petitioners, respondent's ejectment case must be
dismissed.
There is likewise no merit to respondent's argument that since only two of the defendants in the ejectment
case filed the instant Petition, the same must necessarily be dismissed. There is no rule which requires that
all the parties in the proceedings before the CA must jointly take recourse with this Court or else such
recourse would be dismissible. The fact that Ramon and Rafael did not join in the instant Petition does not
bar petitioners from pursuing their case before this Court. Moreover, since petitioners, Ramon and Rafael are
siblings, co-heirs, co-owners, and occupants of the subject property, they all have common interests, and
their rights and liabilities are identical and so interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable. The reversal
of the assailed CA judgment should therefore inure to the benefit of Ramon and Rafael as well. The
December 11, 2009 Order of the RTC decreeing dismissal as against petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael, as
well as the payment of attorney's fees to all of them - may be reinstated in all respects.
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
xxx This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the
judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the
benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists,
however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his
co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other
as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception,
which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction. x x x 40
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. SP No. 114363 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the possession is
deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. But the
action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in the complaint that the entry
of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
Antecedents
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late Bibiano
Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-188
of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790 square meters, more or less. 1 On April 23,
1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square
meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent), with the affected portion being described in the
deed of absolute sale Eliseo executed in the following manner: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A portion of a parcel of land located at the back of the Pleasant Homes Subdivision and also at the back of
Don Bosco Seminary, Punta Princesa, Cebu City, to be taken from my share of the whole lot; the portion sold
to Atty. Amante is only 600 square meters which is the area near the boundary facing the Pleasant Homes
Subdivision, Cebu City.2 chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share in the
property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of
Eliseo's siblings, and describing the portion subject of the sale as: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the portion covered under this transaction is Specifically located right at the back of the seminary
facing Japer Memorial School and where the fence and house of Atty. Amante is located. 3 chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their
father's estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves. 4Pursuant to the deed
extrajudicial partition, OCT No. 0-188 was cancelled, and on July 12, 1994 the Register of Deeds issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 6558 5 to the
petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to
the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. 6
Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that
the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the last of which was by the letter dated November 4,
1994,7 the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file agamst him on February 14, 1995 a
complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (MTCC), docketed as
Civil Case No. R-34426.8 She alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 6555, a portion of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a
residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had
inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them; and that the
respondent's occupation had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He
even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from
Eliseo; that the petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in his favor because they
could plainly see his house from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the sale to
him was with their approval, and that they had already known that his house and fence were existing; that
before he purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that he and his co-heirs had already orally partitioned
the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was Eliseo's share; and that with his having
already purchased the property before the petitioner acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition,
she should respect his ownership and possession of it.9
On February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner,10 ruling that the deeds of sale
executed by Eliseo in favor of the respondent did not have the effect of conveying the disputed property to
him inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their father, which included the disputed
property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had
no right to dispose of a definite portion thereof; that as a co-owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the
respondent only the portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the property would be subdivided;
that because the disputed property was adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition, she was its owner with the consequent right of possession; and that, as such, she
had the right to demand that the respondent vacate the land.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, and on the basis thereof, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the defendant; to:
1) vacate from the portion, presently occupied by him and whereon his building stands, of that parcel of
land located in Cebu City covered by TCT No. 6555 and registered in the name of the plaintiff; and to
remove and/or demolish the building and all the structures that may have been built on said portion; chanrobleslaw
2) pay the plaintiff the rental of P1,000.00 a month for the portion in litigation from November 21, 1994
until such time that the defendant shall have vacated, and have removed all structures from said portion,
and have completely restored possession thereof to the plaintiff; and
3) pay unto the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the sum of P5,000.00 for litigation
expenses; and
SO ORDERED.11
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the
complaint,12 holding that the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious
question of ownership of the disputed property was involved, viz: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Eliseo Quijano, one of the co-heirs of
Fe Quijano, in 1990 and 1991, the defendant Atty. Amante took possession of the portion in question and
built his residential house thereat. It was only in 1992 that the heirs of Bibiano Quijano executed the deed of
extrajudicial partition, and instead of giving to Eliseo Quijano the portion that he already sold to the
defendant, the same was adjudicated to plaintiff, Fe Quijano to the great prejudice of the defendant herein
who had been in possession of the portion in question since 1990 and which possession is not possession de
facto but possession de jure because it is based on 2 deeds of conveyances executed by Eliseo Quijano.
There is, therefore, a serious question of ownership involved which cannot be determined in a summary
proceeding for ejectment. Since the defendant is in possession of the portion in question where his
residential house is built for several years, and before the extrajudicial partition, the possession of the
defendant, to repeat, is one of possession de jure and the plaintiff cannot eject the defendant in a summary
proceeding for ejectment involving only possession de facto. What the plaintiff should have done was to file
an action publiciana or action reinvindicatoria before the appropriate court for recovery of possession and
ownership. However, since there is a pending complaint for quieting of title filed by the defendant against
the plaintiff herein before the Regional Trial Court, the matter of ownership should be finally resolved in said
proceedings.13chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied her motion on November 13,
1996.14
Decision of the CA
On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,15 affirming the decision of the RTC, and dismissing the
case for ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the
right of possession over the disputed property.
The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed the ejectment case because a question of ownership over
the disputed property was raised; that the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of ownership to
determine the question of possession was well settled; that the institution of a separate action for quieting
of title by the respondent did not divest the MTCC of its authority to decide the ejectment case; that Eliseo,
as a co-owner, had no right to sell a definite portion of the undivided estate; that the deeds of sale Eliseo
executed in favor of the respondent were valid only with respect to the alienation of Eliseo's undivided
share; that after the execution of the deeds of sale, the respondent became a co-owner along with Eliseo
and his co-heirs, giving him the right to participate in the partition of the estate owned in common by them;
that because the respondent was not given any notice of the project of partition or of the intention to effect
the partition, the partition made by the petitioner and her co-heirs did not bind him; and that, as to him, the
entire estate was still co-owned by the heirs, giving him the right to the co-possession of the estate,
including the disputed portion.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court on appeal by certiorari,16 contending that the CA grossly erred in
holding that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee with the right of possession over the
disputed property.17
The petitioner explains that the respondent, being a lawyer, knew that Eliseo could not validly transfer the
ownership of the disputed property to him because the disputed property was then still a part of the
undivided estate co-owned by all the heirs of the late Bibiano Quijano; that the respondent's knowledge of
the defect in Eliseo's title and his failure to get the co-heirs' consent to the sale in a registrable document
tainted his acquisition with bad faith; that being a buyer in bad faith, the respondent necessarily became a
possessor and builder in bad faith; that she was not aware of the sale to the respondent, and it was her
ignorance of the sale that led her to believe that the respondent was occupying the disputed property by the
mere tolerance of Eliseo; that the partition was clearly done in good faith; and that she was entitled to the
possession of the disputed property as its owner, consequently giving her the right to recover it from the
respondent.18
To be resolved is the issue of who between the petitioner and the respondent had the better right to the
possession of the disputed property.
Ruling
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed
to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved.19 The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession (possession de
facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an
averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of
the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass
upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is
inseparably linked with the question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely
provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the
property.21
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property, the CA properly ruled on
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between them had the better right to
possess the disputed property.
The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and passed on to his
heirs by operation of law upon his death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common by the
heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. 23 In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right
belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her rights
over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that
he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is actually
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.24
Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus
merely inchoate, Article 49325 of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.
cralawred
Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-
owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent
but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-
owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.26
As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under Article 497 of
the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his
consent.27 Article 497 states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in
common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition
already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property he was buying was not
exclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an oral agreement of partition
vis-a-vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the complaint, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter that the
portion sold to him was his share already; that they have orally partitioned the whole lot before defendant
acquired the portion from him.28 chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
His knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it
appear to the respondent that the partition had already been completed and finalized, the co-heirs had not
taken possession yet of their respective shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement, if any. For
sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo
and the petitioner herself.29 In that sense, it would have been easy for him to ascertain whether the
representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement among
the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition
because it did not conform to what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in
protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him by law, particularly the
right to take an active part in the partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to. It was only on
September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time of the first sale transaction, and a year
and two months from the time of the second sale transaction, that the co-heirs executed the deed of
extrajudicial partition. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or to object to the
partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos.
There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property thereby covered
and is entitled to its possession.30 However, the Court cannot ignore that the statements in the petitioner's
complaint about the respondent's possession of the disputed property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo
could be the basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the defendant's withholding of the
possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's
right to hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of
action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. With the averment here that the respondent's possession was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the
petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her predecessor's tolerance, or her co-heirs'
permission for him to occupy the disputed property.31 But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she
appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely
tolerated by Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for review indicates: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularly the petitioner, as they were not
duly informed by the vendor-co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano, [led] them to believe that the
respondent's occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon
partition of the whole property, said occupancy continued to be under tolerance of the petitioner when
the subject premises became a part of the land adjudicated to the latter; 32 (emphasis supplied) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion that his possession of the disputed
property was in the concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and actually presented the
deeds of sale transferring ownership of the property to him. 33
Considering that the allegation of the petitioner's tolerance of the respondent's possession of the disputed
property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the beginning. In that
case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat this
ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint contained no allegation that his entry in the
property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To finally resolve such issue, they
should review their options and decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for the Court to
leave the door open to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 26, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer action is dismissed for being an improper remedy;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
VIEGELY SAMELO, represented G.R. No. 170509
by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA
SAMELO,
Present:
Petitioner,
BRION,
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by
Viegely Samelo (petitioner), represented by her attorney-in-fact
Cristina Samelo, to challenge the decision dated June 21,
2005[2] and the resolution dated November 10, 2005 [3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.
Background Facts
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
Estoppel of tenant
Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the
formers title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by
the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement.
As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial
whether the lessor has a valid title or any title at all at the time the
relationship was entered into. [citations omitted]
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
FIRST DIVISION
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------
--------x
COMPANY,
Present:
Petitioner,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
GOLDEN HORIZON REALTY
BERSAMIN, and
CORPORATION,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
DECISION
PUP also demanded that GHRC vacate the premises, insisting that
the latters lease contract had already expired. Its demand letter
unheeded by GHRC, PUP filed an ejectment case (Civil Case No.
134416) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila on
January 14, 1991.[11]
SO ORDERED.[16]
The RTC resumed the proceedings and when mediation and pre-
trial failed to settle the case amicably, trial on the merits ensued.
[17]
SO ORDERED.[18]
NDC and PUP separately appealed the decision to the CA. [19] By
Decision of June 25, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC.[20]
Both the RTC and the CA applied this Courts ruling in Polytechnic
University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (supra),
considering that GHRC is similarly situated as a lessee of NDC
whose right of first refusal under the lease contract was violated
by the sale of the property to PUP without NDC having first offered
to sell the same to GHRC despite the latters request for the
renewal of the lease and/or to purchase the leased premises prior
to the expiration of the second lease contract. The CA further
agreed with the RTCs finding that there was an implied renewal of
the lease upon the failure of NDC to act on GHRCs repeated
requests for renewal of the lease contract, both verbal and
written, and continuing to accept monthly rental payments from
GHRC which was allowed to continue in possession of the leased
premises.
The CA also rejected the argument of NDC and PUP that even
assuming that GHRC had the right of first refusal, said right
pertained only to the second lease contract, C-12-78 covering
3,222.80 square meters, and not to the first lease contract, C-33-
77 covering 2,407 square meters, which had already expired. It
sustained the RTCs finding that the two (2) lease contracts were
interrelated because each formed part of GHRCs industrial
complex, such that business operations would be rendered
useless and inoperative if the first contract were to be detached
from the other, as similarly held in the afore-mentioned case
of Polytechnic University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.
Perusal of the letter dated August 12, 1988, however, belies such
claim of petitioner NDC that it was merely informative, thus:
Dear Sir:
We have further stressed that not even the avowed public welfare
or the constitutional priority accorded to education, invoked by
petitioner PUP in the Firestone case, would serve as license for us,
and any party for that matter, to destroy the sanctity of binding
obligations. While education may be prioritized for legislative and
budgetary purposes, it is doubtful if such importance can be used
to confiscate private property such as the right of first refusal
granted to a lessee of petitioner NDC. [42] Clearly, no reversible
error was committed by the CA in sustaining respondents
contractual right of first refusal and ordering the reconveyance of
the leased portion of petitioner NDCs property in its favor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Promulgated:
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the June 19, 2007 Decision and the 1
October 11, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
2
79325. The assailed CA Decision affirmed with modification the Decision dated 3
March 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224, in
Civil Case No. Q-98-34395, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
In December 1990, MIAA issued Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, which
revised the rates of dues, charges, fees or assessments for the use of its properties,
facilities and services within the airport complex. The Administrative Order was made
effective on December 1, 1990. As a consequence, the monthly rentals due from AFIC
was increased to P15,996.50. Nonetheless, MIAA did not require AFIC to pay the new
rental fee. Thus, it continued to pay the original fee of P6,580.00.
After the expiration of the contract, AFIC continued to use and occupy the leased
premises giving rise to an implied lease contract on a monthly basis. AFIC kept on
paying the original rental fee without protest on the part of MIAA.
Three years after the expiration of the original contract of lease, MIAA informed
AFIC, through a billing statement dated October 6, 1994, that the monthly rental over
the subject premises was increased to P15,966.50 beginning September 1, 1991,
which is the date immediately following the expiration of the original contract of
lease. MIAA sought recovery of the difference between the increased rental rate and
the original rental fee amounting to a total of P347,300.50 covering thirty-seven (37)
months between September 1, 1991 and September 31, 1994. Beginning October
1994, AFIC paid the increased rental fee. However, it refused to pay the lump sum
of P347,300.50 sought to be recovered by MIAA. For the continued refusal of AFIC
to pay the said lump sum, its employees were denied access to the leased premises
from July 1, 1997 until March 11, 1998. This, notwithstanding, AFIC continued
paying its rentals. Subsequently, AFIC was granted temporary access to the leased
premises.
AFIC then filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint for damages with
injunction against MIAA and its General Manager seeking uninterrupted access to the
leased premises, recovery of actual and exemplary damages, refund of its monthly
rentals with interest at the time that it was denied access to the area being rented as
well as attorney's fees.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, MIAA contended that under its lease contract with
AFIC, MIAA is allowed to either increase or decrease the monthly rental; AFIC has
rental arrears in the amount of P347,300.50; AFIC was wrong in claiming that MIAA
took the law into its own hands in denying AFIC and its employees access to the
leased premises, because under the lease contract, in case of failure on the part of
AFIC to pay rentals for at least two (2) months, the contract shall become
automatically terminated and canceled without need of judicial action or process and
it shall be lawful for MIAA or any person or persons duly authorized on its behalf to
take possession of the property either by padlocking the premises or posting its guards
to prevent the entry of any person. MIAA prayed for the award of exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
On March 21, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
MIAA filed an appeal with the CA contending that the RTC erred in: (1) finding that
MIAA is not entitled to apply the increase in rentals as against AFIC; (2) finding that
MIAA is not entitled to padlock the leased premises or post guards to prevent entry of
AFIC therein; and (3) awarding actual and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On June 19, 2007, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads, thus:
SO ORDERED. 5
MIAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution
dated October 11, 2007.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues:
Lastly, petitioner avers that respondent is not entitled to attorney's fees, considering
that it was not compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect its interest by reason
of any unjustified act on the part of petitioner. Petitioner reiterates that it was merely
exercising its right as the owner and administrator of the leased property and, as such,
its acts may not be deemed unwarranted.
Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that [t]he contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
Moreover, Article 1374 of the Civil Code clearly provides that [t]he various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. Indeed, in construing a
contract, the provisions thereof should not be read in isolation, but in relation to each
other and in their entirety so as to render them effective, having in mind the intention
of the parties and the purpose to be achieved. In other words, the stipulations in a
7
contract and other contract documents should be interpreted together with the end in
view of giving effect to all.
8
In the present case, the Court finds nothing repugnant to law with respect to the
questioned provisions of the contract of lease between petitioner and respondent. It is
true that Article II, Paragraph 2.04 of the Contract of Lease states that
[a]ny subsequent amendment to Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1982, which
will effect a decrease or escalation of the monthly rental or impose new and additional
fees and charges, including but not limited to government/MIAA circulars, rules and
regulation to this effect, shall be deemed incorporated herein and shall automatically
amend this Contract insofar as the monthly rental is concerned. However, the Court
9
agrees with the CA that the abovequoted provision of the lease contract should not be
read in isolation. Rather, it should be read together with the provisions of Article VIII,
Paragraph 8.13, which provide that [a]ny amendment, alteration or modification
of th[e] Contract shall not be valid and binding, unless and until made in writing and
signed by the parties thereto. It is clear from the foregoing that the intention of the
10
The situation is different with respect to the payments of the increased rental fee made
by respondent beginning October 1994 because by then the amendment to the contract
was made in writing through a bill sent by petitioner to respondent. The fact that
11
respondent subsequently settled the said bill proves that he acceded to the increase in
rental fee. The same may not be said with respect to the questioned rental fees sought
to be recovered by petitioner between September 1991 and September 1994 because
no bill was made and forwarded to respondent on the basis of which it could have
given or withheld its conformity thereto.
It may not be amiss to point out that during the abovementioned period, respondent
continued to pay and petitioner kept on receiving the original rental fee
of P6,580.00 without any reservations or protests from the latter. Neither did
12
petitioner indicate in the official receipts it issued that the payments made by
respondent constitute only partial fulfillment of the latter's obligations. Article 1235 of
the Civil Code clearly states that [w]hen the obligee accepts the performance knowing
its incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection, the
obligation is deemed fully complied with. For failing to make any protest or objection,
petitioner is already estopped from seeking recovery of the amount claimed.
Anent the second issue, since it has been established that petitioner has no legal basis
in requiring respondent to pay additional rental fees from September 1, 1991 to
September 30, 1994, it, thus, follows that petitioner's act of denying respondent and its
employees access to the leased premises from July 1, 1997 until March 11, 1998, by
reason of respondent's non-payment of the said additional fees, is likewise unjustified.
Under Paragraph 3, Article 1654 of the Civil Code, the lessor is obliged [t]o maintain
the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration
of the contract.
Moreover, Article 1658 of the same Code provides that [t]he lessee may suspend the
payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to
maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased.
Furthermore, as correctly cited by the RTC, Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that
[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 22 of the same Code also states that [e]very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him. In accordance with jurisprudence, there is unjust enrichment when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment
13
when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it.
14
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner failed to maintain respondent in the
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises by unjustifiably preventing
the latter access thereto. Consequently, in accordance with Article 1658 of the Civil
Code, respondent had no duty to make rent payments. Despite that, respondent still
continued to pay the rental fees agreed upon in the original contract. Thus, it would be
the height of inequity and injustice as well as unjust enrichment on the part of
petitioner if the rental fees paid by respondent during the time that it was denied
access to and prevented from using the leased premises be not returned to it.
With respect to attorney's fees, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in
sustaining such award on the ground that petitioner's act of denying respondent and
its employees access to the leased premises has compelled respondent to litigate and
incur expenses to protect its interest. The Court likewise agrees with the CA that,
15
under the circumstances prevailing in the present case, attorney's fees may be granted
on grounds of justice and equity.16
Finally, the Court deems it proper to reiterate the provisions of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 which enjoins all judges of lower courts to
observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of
execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local
government units.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 19, 2007 Decision and
October 11, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79325
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224
is ORDERED to comply with the directives of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 10-2000.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143675. June 9, 2003]
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
"1. This lease agreement shall be for a period of one (1) year commencing on May 15,
1987 up to and until May 14, 1988, it may thereafter be renewed subject to LESSORS
discretion, provided however, that if LESSORS do not exercise their right to terminate
this lease at least thirty (30) days before the said expiration date, this agreement shall
be deemed renewed on a monthly basis. [1]
And in -
x x x the event the Lessors shall desire to sell the leased premises, the LESSEES shall
be given the first option to buy the said premises, if they could meet the desired price
of the LESSORS, otherwise, the LESSEES shall vacate the leased premises within
thirty (30) days upon notice given to them by the new owner." [2]
It must be clarified that even if the Contract of Lease was renewed upon the failure of
the defendants Manuel and Haydee Peralta to exercise their right to terminate the
lease within the period of thirty (30) days prior to the expiration date, May 14, 1988,
such renewal was clearly qualified to be on a `monthly basis. This means that the
lease was converted into a `month-to-month lease, expiring at the end of each
month and renewable also every month. Otherwise, there is no definite period for the
contract of lease after such expiration date. Thus it has been ruled in a number of
cases that a lease on a month-to-month basis is, under Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, a
lease with a definite period, upon the expiration of which upon demand by the lessor
on the lessee to vacate, the ejectment of the lessee may be ordered. (Labastida vs.
Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 662; De Vera vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA
396.) Clearly, such lease is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon notice to
vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee. (Paterno vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA
770.)[3]
The contract of lease allowed the lessees to continue with their occupancy of the
leased premises on a month-to-month basis after its termination on 14 May 1988 if no
notice of such termination were given by the lessor at least thirty days before the expiry
date. The renewal clause is valid but the contract itself is not deemed renewed until
after notice or positive act is made to indicate its exercise by the parties. Meanwhile, the
juridical relation between the parties, constrained by the continued enjoyment of the
leased premises, is one of an implied lease based on the principle of tacita
reconduccion. Article 1670 of the Civil Code is thus apropos; it provides:
"If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for
fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by
either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new
lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in articles
1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
The terms of the original contract that are carried over to the implied new lease, as so
aptly ruled in Dizon vs. Magsaysay, cover only those terms that are germane to the
[4]
lessees enjoyment of the premises, such as the rent and terms of payment,
a dictum that has been reiterated in Dizon vs. Court of Appeals thusly:
[5]
"If the presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of possession the
presumption covers the other terms of the contract related to such possession, such as
the amount of rental, the date when it must be paid, the care of the property, the
responsibility for repairs, etc. But no such presumption may be indulged in with
respect to special agreements which by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or
enjoyment inherent in a contract of lease."[6]
Quite significantly, the option granted to petitioners would appear to have, in fact,
been abrogated when the 1987 contract of lease was ultimately superseded by an
agreement executed on 22 April 1991. The Court of Appeals found and elaborated:
The written agreement dated April 22, 1991 is a new lease agreement and not a
renewal of the original Contract of Lease between the parties. It is also a clear
evidence of plaintiffs-appellees knowledge about the expected sale of the property to a
third party. Indeed, plaintiffs-appellees cannot close their eyes to the fact that their
extended stay in the premises was allowed by the lessors with the understanding that
they shall vacate the premises within a months notice upon its sale to a third
party. Plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda who was actually the one who always dealt with
defendant-appellant Haydee Peralta, expressed her understanding and agreement to
the lessors desire to sell the property to Haydee Peraltas sibling in a letter written
shortly after their agreement of April 22, 1991, as follows:
With the Contract of Lease dated May 8, 1987 having been validly terminated and
superseded by a new written agreement dated April 22, 1991 which also reiterated a
month-to-month lease in force between the parties, the trial court thus erred in
declaring that defendants-appellants Manuel and Haydee Peralta violated the
provisions of the Contract of Lease in selling the leased property to defendant-
appellant Alan A. Leynes. [7]
All considered, the Court finds no sufficient justification to reverse the holding of the
appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and
set aside the decision of the Court of appeals in CA-C.R, SF No. 27979, which dismissed petitioner's
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 20086. The decision of the trial
court affirmed the decision of the municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 228(89),
ordering the ejectment of petitioner.
The operative facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner is one of the lessees of Lot No, 180-I located at corner Iznart and Ledesma
Streets, Iloilo City and formerly owned by and registered in the names of Lourdes
Locsin, Manuel Locsin, Ester Locsin Jarandilla, Maria Locsin Vda. de Araneta and
Jose Locsin under TCT No, T-46841 (later, TCT No. T-83230). It appears that
petitioner had been leasing Said property since 1938 by virtue of a written lease
contract which had been continuously renewed for a two-year term per renewal. The
latest written contract of lease covered the period from September 1, 1987 to August
30, 1989.
Meanwhile the Locsin executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 18, 1989
conveying the subject premises to the herein private respondent Star Group
Resources and Development, Subsequently, petitioner admittedly received private
respondent to file a complaint of Unlawful Detainer on the ground of expiration of
termination of the lease, before the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch I in
Civil Case No. 228 989) petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim.
"The case was tried under the regular procedure since the amount demanded
exceed P20,000.00. Trial ensued. After the parties presented their evidence in
support of their respective claims, the MTC-Iloilo City, Branch I rendered a Decision
dated October 10, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
Defendant's counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit (Rollo, pp. 43-45).
The pivotal issue is whether the lease contract has been renewed in accordance with the terms
thereof. The lease contract provides:
Term the term of this contract shall be for a period of Two (2) Years, beginning
September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1989
Renewal LESSEE agrees to give LESSOR thirty (30) days prior written notice, in
advance, of its intention to terminate or renew this contract. If no written notice is
received from LESSEE of its intention to renew the contract, LESSOR shall consider
the Contract to be terminated on the date the lease period ends. During the 30 days
period notice, unless LESSEE has given LESSOR its intention to renew lease ,
LESSOR may bring in the leased premises prospective tenants provided the same
be done during reasonable hours.
Termination LESSEE may terminate this Contract at any time giving LESSOR
thirty (30) days written notice in advance of its intention.
Upon termination of the period of lease unless LESSEE has indicated its intentions to
renew the contract, LESSEE shall return and surrender the leased premises in as
good a condition as reasonable wear and tear may permit without any delay
whatsoever, . . .
(Rollo, p. 56).
The contract is.emphatic that if "no written notice is received from LESSEE of its intention to renew
the contract," the contract terminates at the end of the lease period. It is also stipulated therein that
upon termination of the period of lease and "unless LESSEE has indicated its intention to renew the
contract," the lessee has to surrender the leased premises to the lessor.
The notice must be given 30 days before the expiration of the lease period, which was on August 30,
1989. The notice to renew dated August 18, 1989 sent by petitioner and received by the lessor on
August 22, 1989 cannot be treated.
The act of the lessor in renewing a leas even without the prior notice to renew on the part of the
lessee, is not a waiver as to a notice for renewal as required by a subsequent lease contract. For
such a result, there must be such conduct on the part of the lessor as to make the lessee reasonably
believe that said requirement of notice for renewal prior to the termination of the lease will not be
insisted on in the future. Some other acts or representations were needed to show that the lessor
had waived the notice requirement stipulated in each of the series of lease contracts The
circumstances attendant to the instant case are not enough, standing alone, to induce such a belief
(cf. 3A Corbin, Ibid., 493-498).
An essential element of estoppel is that the party sought to be concluded by it Should have intended
that his words or conduct would be relied upon by others and influence their action, or that he should
have known or had reason to believe that said words or conduct would have such an effect (28 Am.
Jur. 26. 647-648).
There is a difference between a waiver of the right to enforce a condition stipulated in the contract
and a waiver of the stipulation itself. As found by the Court of Appeals, the renewals of the lease
contract, inspite of the lack of or tardiness in giving the written notices, were mere acts of tolerance
on the part of the lessor. The renewals were mere exercises of the right of ownership of the lessor
which withholding the property (V Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 241 [1992]; Co Tiamco, v.
Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 [1946])
Assuming that the provision Article 1670 is applicable to petitioner's case still that law does not
require that the notice to vacate be given before the lease expires. The notice required under said
provision is the one given after the expiration of the lease period for the purpose of aborting an
implied renewal of the lease (Gamboa's Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 131 [1976]). The
predecessor-in-interest of private respondent a Notice to Vacate an August 23, 1989 and private
respondent sent another notice to petitioner to vacate in November, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 44-50).
Assuming further that an implied lease arose, the lease would only be month-to-month since the
rentals were paid monthly and not for the period of the original contract (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1670 in relation to Art. 1687). A month-to-month lease under Article 1687 is a lease
with a definite period and is terminable at the end of each month upon demand to vacate by the
lessor (Palanca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 119 [1989]; Bondoc v. Court of Appeals,
177 SCRA 588 [1989]);
Petitioner claims that the provision of the lease contract on renewal is ambiguous because it does
not state the reference points as to when the 30-day notice to renew should be reckoned from unlike
the provision on termination of the lease, which specifically requires the sending of the notice to
terminate 30 days in advance of the expiry date (Rollo, pp. 22-24).
We do not find any ambiguity in the wording of the provision an termination of the lease. The
reference point sought by petitioner is the "date the lease period ends." The notice to renew must be
given 30 days before that date and if no such notice is given, the "LESSOR shall consider the
Contract to be terminated on the date the lease period ends."
There being no ambiguity in the applicable provision of the lease contract, there is no basis to allow
oral testimony whether under the Statute of Frauds (Civil Case of the Philippines, Art. 1403, par. 2
[5]) or the Parol Evidence Rule (Rules on Evidence, Rule 130', Sec. 9; Syquia v. Court of Appeals,
151 SCRA 505 [1987]), to prove that petitioner was given verbal assurance of a renewal of the lease
and "first priority to buy in case of sale of the leased premises" (Rollo, pp. 31-34).
The lease contract expressly reserves to the lessor the light to sell or mortgage the property. The
only obligation of the lessor was to inform the lessee of the plan to sell the property and to require
the purchaser or mortgagee to respect the terms of the lease contract.
Finally, the different considerations which petitioner claims entitle him to stay in the lessed premises
either involve questions of fact (e.g. the fraud and deceit after the expiration of the right of
possession (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1).
As to the valuable improvements which petitioner claims to have introduced on the premises, he can
invoke Article 1678 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which allows a lessee to remove the
improvements made in good faith should the lessor not elect to retain them by paying the amounts
fixed by law for their value at the time the lease is terminated (Syquia v. Court of Appeals, supra).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.