Sie sind auf Seite 1von 2
 
Diego Morante Parra100349014
The Importance of Leadership in Cartel Parties
As we have observed in previous readings and in classic literature on party organization,cartel party is nowadays one of the most adequate ways of classifying party activity in relation withthe state and civil society. According to this category, firstly developed by Katz and Mair, partieshave now developed stronger ties with the state mainly through subventions and the benefitsderived from influence in state-regulated media. Besides, politics is seen now as a profession bymany citizens and politicians, meaning that relevant politicians are expected to be in power or atleast in an influence position even after fulfilling their representative functions. Taking thesecharacteristics into account, in this paper we will argue that leadership has a fundamental role inmaintaining the stability of cartel parties, that is, their ties with the state, and that it is possible toobserve that role in that leaders are not usually chosen by mass membership but by party congressor by parliamentary party instead.Firstly, we should distinguish between what a candidate and what a leader is. Although inmany cases the leadership of a party is occupied by the same person that is going to be candidate for  prime minister, in cases such as small parties' organization that is not so common. Leadershipselection, as we saw in Oliver's lectures, is a more centralized process where procedures are limitedto majoritarian ones and parliamentary party group has a more important role that in the selection of candidates. Following that, we can deduce that leadership is not only about launching an attractivecandidate for elections, but also about maintaining stability within the party and perhapsmaintaining party elite in their privileged position. Regarding this last reflexion it is possible to findsome evidence in Scarrow et Al. reading, where we find that: a/ In only 22 per cent of the studiedcases leadership is elected by party members in primary elections, and b/ although the selection process has experimented a democratization, it is still less democratic than the process for theselection of candidates. Also, if we compare these two observations with Whitley's reading about party membership, we observe that, with the exception of the US, in those countries wheremembership rates are higher (Austria, Norway, Canada and New Zealand) election of leaders arenot carried through primary elections in any party.
 
Diego Morante Parra100349014
By combining these three observations, one could think that party elites (parliamentary party, national committees…) follow some kind of strategy that allows them to have a leader thatdoes not compromise their position within the party, and therefore guarantees a large and stable presence and relevance in many party decisions (policy-making, congresses…). In this regard, wealso found some evidence in Scarrow et Al. hypothesis P1 and P3. One should also argue that thedifference in the extent of democratization of candidates and leader selection allows elite tomaintain a feeling of legitimacy while controlling the political path of the party and therefore theradical sub-leaders within the party (May, 1973). Altogether, we obtain a perspective from wherewe observe the continued attempt of party elite to maintain their position and become “professional politicians”. This image fits even better with the description of a cartel party when we observe thatin those countries where membership is more extended among the political culture, neither right or left parties entrust mass membership the capacity to elect leaders. On the contrary, one example thatcould also serve us to illustrate these reflexions is the case of the PSOE in Spain, where leaders areelected by primary elections since 2014 but even here we observe an obvious strategy of the partyelite, which presented their own “irrelevant” candidate (Pedro Sánchez) to avoid the victory of acandidate that was closer to the sub-leaders.As a conclusion, we may consider party mechanisms and party organization in the “new”cartel parties just as a tool of the “professional politicians” to assure their position, no matter the place of their parties in the ideological scale. In that scenario, membership could be used toelaborate a democratic picture within those party mechanisms by the candidate election process and party sub-leaders could be seen as a fuel to the equilibrium of forces but not as potential leaders.
Bibliography
Katz, R.S. and Mair, P., 1995. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: theemergence of the cartel party.
 Party politics
,
1
(1), pp.5-28.May, J.D., 1973. Opinion structure of political parties: the special law of curvilinear disparity.
 Political studies
,
21
(2), pp.135-151.Scarrow, S.E., Webb, P. and Farrell, D.M., 2002. From social integration to electoral contestation.
 Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies
, pp.343-61.Whiteley, P.F., 2011. Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across thedemocratic world.
 Party Politics
,
17 
(1), pp.21-44.

Ihre Neugier belohnen

Alles, was Sie lesen wollen.
Jederzeit. Überall. Auf jedem Gerät.
Keine Verpflichtung. Jederzeit kündbar.
576648e32a3d8b82ca71961b7a986505