DE GUZMAN, JR. VS.

PEOPLE

G.R. No. 178512 | November 26, 2014

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Intent to kill may be established
through overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during, and after the assault, or by
the nature, location, and number of wounds inflicted on the victim.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: ALEXANDER FLOJO was fetching water below his rented house when suddenly ALFREDO
DE GUZMAN, JR., the brother of his landlady, hit him on the nape. FLOJO told his landlady about
the incident, but the latter only asked him to forgive his brother. Two hours later, when FLOJO
continued fetching water, DE GUZMAN, JR. appeared and stabbed him on the left side of his face
and chest.

The son-in-law of FLOJO saw him bleeding, and so he immediately took him to a medical hospital.
The stab wound he sustained on his chest was fatal and would have caused FLOJOs death were it
not for the timely medical intervention.

ISSUES:
Whether DE GUZMAN, JR. may be held liable for frustrated homicide.

HELD:

DE GUZMAN, JR. may be held liable for frustrated homicide.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific
criminal intent that the State must allege in the information and then prove, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony. Intent to kill, being a
state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts of the
accused at the time of the assault or immediately thereafter.

In this case, DE GUZMAN, JR. wielded and used a knife in his assault on FLOJO. His attack was
unprovoked and, by using a knife and causing such wounds, his submission that he had no intent to
kill FLOJO is belied. Further, there is no doubt that the wound on FLOJOs chest would have been
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.

Therefore, as it is clearly shown that DE GUZMAN, JR. performed all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce the same by reason
independent of his will (i.e., the timely medical intervention), he was properly found guilty of
frustrated homicide.
 RIVERA, et al VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 166326 | July 25, 2006

Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by
the malefactor, the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after killing the victim, the circumstances under which
the crime was committed, and the motives of the accused.

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS: RUBEN RODIL used to work as a taxi driver before he stopped in April 1998. One day,
when RODIL was walking to a nearby store, EDGARDO RIVERA started mocking him for being
jobless and relying on his wife for support. RODIL resented RIVERA for his mockery, and so a heated
exchange of words occurred.

The following day, RODIL was going to a store to buy some food with his daughter when RIVERA
and his two brothers emerged from their house and ganged up on RODIL. ESMERALDO and
ISMAEL RIVERA started punching RODIL, which caused him to fall to the ground. In that helpless
position, EDGARDO RIVERA hit RODIL with a hollow block on the parietal area. When the police
came, the RIVERA brothers fled the scene.

ISSUES:
1. Whether intent to kill on the part of the RIVERA brothers was established.
2. Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery was proved by the prosecution in this
case.

HELD:

Intent to kill on the part of the RIVERA brothers was established.

The essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated, or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist,
inter alia, in the means used by the malefactor, the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
killing the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed, and the motives of the
accused.

ESMERALDO and ISMAEL RIVERA pummeled the RODIL with fistblows. Thereafter, when RODIL
fell to the ground and was unable to defend himself, EDGARDO RIVERA hit him three times with a
hollow block. Their intent to kill RODIL is manifest in their actions and the wounds that they
inflicted. That the head wounds sustained by RODIL were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate their criminal liability for attempted murder.

Existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was proved by the prosecution.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexplained attack of the victim. Even if the attack is
frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself, there would be treachery.

The RIVERA siblings attacked RODIL in a sudden and unexpected manner as the latter was
walking with his daughter. He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed
by the synchronized assault of the three siblings. It is also clear that they assaulted RODIL because
of the altercation between him and EDGARDO RIVERA the day before. There being a conspiracy.
treachery is considered against all of them.
VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258 | February 1, 2012

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.

SERENO, J.

FACTS: LENNY VILLA was among the freshmen law students of Ateneo de Manila School of Law
who signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity. Before the initiation rites
started, the neophytes were briefed that the rites would include, among others, physical beatings,
and that they may withdraw at anytime. The neophytes consented to the initiation rites.

The neophytes were subjected to the traditional forms of Aquilian initiation rites on the first day of
hazing. On the second day, they were subjected to similar forms of hazing which they endured the
previous day. The rites for the second day were supposed to have ended when the non-resident or
alumni fraternity members, FIDELITO DIZON and ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, insisted that the rites
be reopened. The head of the initiation rites initially refused but later on complied with their orders.
Thus, the neophytes were subjected to additional rounds of beatings. During the beatings, VILLA
complained that he experienced some difficulty in breathing and that he could no longer walk.

Later that night, the neophytes were suddenly roused by VILLAs shivering and incoherent
mumblings. They tried to help him and rushed him to the hospital. He was announced dead on
arrival.

ISSUES:
1 Whether the existence of intent to kill was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2 Whether VILLAREAL and his co-accused may be held guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

HELD:

The existence of intent to kill was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional
felony.

Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person,
so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. The mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony. Malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the
accused.

In this case, VILLA died during the Aquila fraternity initiation rites. The rites were performed with
the consent of the neophytes. Before the commencement of such rites, they were briefed that there
would be physical beatings during the rites and that they may quit at anytime. All those who wished
to join the fraternity went through the same process of traditional initiation, and there was no
proof that VILLA was specifically targeted or given different treatment.

Therefore, the Court ruled that the specific animus injuriandi was not present in the case. Even if
the specific acts of punching, kicking, and paddling were done voluntarily, freely, and with
intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence, the fundamental element of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. All that was proven was that the acts were
done pursuant to tradition.

VILLAREAL and his co-accused may be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault or culpa.
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a
voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury, or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or inadvertence on the part of the
person committing it.

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of VILLA. The collective acts of the fraternity members
in beating VILLA were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of VILLA a
culpable felony. Organizations owe their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process. Therefore, VILLAREAL and his co-accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

U.S. VS. AH CHONG

G.R. No. 5272 | March 19, 1910

As a general rule, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negate a particular intent that under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged, cancels
the presumption of intent and works in an acquittal.

CARSON, J.
FACTS: AH CHONG and PASCUAL GUALBERTO worked as a cook and a houseboy respectively at
the Officers quarters at Fort McKinley. Both were living in the same room. One night, AH CHONG
was awakened by someone trying to force open the door. He called out twice, asking the intruder who
he is and, fearful that it might be a robber, threatened, If you enter the room, I will kill you.

He was struck by the chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he had been
attacked by the intruder, he grabbed the knife he hid under the pillow of his bed and stabbed the
intruder in the stomach.

The intruder ran out and fell down on the steps. Under the moonlight, AH CHONG immediately
recognized the person he stabbed as GUALBERTO, his roommate, and not an intruder as he feared.

He called out for help and, at the scene of the crime, admitted that he was the one who attacked
GUALBERTO. However, he claimed that, because of the several robberies that have taken place
nearby, his fear was justified. This was the same reason why he kept a knife under his pillow.

ISSUES:
Whether AH CHONG is criminally liable for his actions.

HELD:

AH CHONG is not criminally liable for his actions.

Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negate a particular
intent that under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged, cancels the presumption of
intent and works in an acquittal, except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence, and in cases where one voluntarily
committing a crime incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, although it be
different from that which he intended. Under these circumstances, there can be no criminal liability
because criminal intent is wanting.

AH CHONG struck GUALBERTO in the firm belief that he was a robber, from whose assault he was
in imminent peril. In view of these circumstances, he acted in good faith, without malice or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right to self-defense.
Had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability. Therefore, AH CHONG cannot be held criminally liable for his actions.
 LONEY, et al VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 152644 | February 10, 2006

A mala in se felony cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. What makes the former a felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID, and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation. The company had been storing tailings
from its operatives in a pit in Mount Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage
tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. Marcoppel had placed a stopper at the end of the
tunnel. As a result of this, the tailings gushed out of the tunnels end and Mount Tapian had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makulapnit rivers, causing it to be polluted.

LONEY, REID, and HERNANDEZ were charged with violations of the Water Code of the
Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree, the Philippine Mining Act, as well as Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.

REID and his co-accused contended that they should be charged only for the charge of reckless
imprudence because, according to them, such crime absorbs the crimes under the special law.

ISSUES:
 Whether the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges under the
special laws.

HELD:

The charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC does not absorb the charges under the
special laws.

The offenses punished by the special laws are mala prohibita in contrast whith those punished by the
RPC, which are mala in se. A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating the Water Code of the
Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree, and the Philippine Mining Act). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the
special laws enacting them.

Therefore, the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC cannot absorb the charges under the
special laws.

URBANO VS. IAC and PEOPLE

G.R. No. L-72964 | January 7, 1988

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The proof that the accused caused the victims death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS: On October 23, 1980, FILOMENO URBANO went to the rice fields where he found that the
place where he stored his palay was flooded with water coming out of the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. When asked MARCELO JAVIER and Emilio Erfe about this, JAVIER
admitted that he was the one responsible for opening the irrigation canal. Driven by anger, URBANO
hacked JAVIER using his bolo, hitting him on the right palm of his hand and again on the leg with
the back of the bolo.
JAVIER was brought to a rural health physician and, later on, to Dr. Mario Meneses to be treated.
URBANO and JAVIER agreed to settle their differences amicably, with URBANO promising to pay
for JAVIERs medical expenses.

On November 14, 1980, 23 days after the attack, JAVIER was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, JAVIER had lockjaw and was having convulsions. It was
found that his serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noted that the healing
wound on JAVIERs palm could have been infected by the tetanus. The next day, JAVIER died in the
hospital. URBANO was charged with the crime of homicide for the death of JAVIER.

Captain Menardo Soliven, the barrio captain, testified that he saw JAVIER catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals with some companions a few days prior to his death.

ISSUES:
Whether URBANO is criminally liable for JAVIERs death.

HELD:

URBANO is not criminally liable for JAVIERs death.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous consequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The proof that the accused caused the victims
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

As JAVIER died on the second day from the onset time, the more credible conclusion is that at the
time URBANO attacked JAVIER, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, JAVIER could not have been inflicted with the tetanus after the hacking incident. It is
more probable that he had been infected two or three but not 20 to 23 days before he died. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Tetanus may have been the proximate
cause of JAVIERs death, to which URBANO had nothing to do.
 PEOPLE VS. VILLACORTA

G.R. No. 186412 | September 7, 2011

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous consequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred.

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: On January 23, 2002, at two oclock in the morning, DANILO CRUZ went to Cristina
Mendejas store to buy bread. As he was buying bread, ORLITO VILLACORTA suddenly appeared
and, without uttering a word, stabbed CRUZ at the left side of his body with a sharpened bamboo
stick. The stick broke and was left inside his body. CRUZ was rushed to a medical center that night
where he was treated as an out-patient. On February 14, 2002, or 23 days after the attack, CRUZ
was brought to a hospital where he died of tetanus infection the following day.

VILLACORTA contends that he did not cause the death of CRUZ and that he should be found liable
only of slight physical injuries.

ISSUES:
1 Whether accused VILLACORTAs attack was the proximate cause of CRUZs death.
2 Whether accused VILLACORTA may be found liable for slight physical injuries.
3 Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in this case.

HELD:

VILLACORTAs attack was not the proximate cause of CRUZs death.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous consequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred.

There was an interval of more than 20 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when
CRUZ was rushed to the hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If CRUZ had
acquired such infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot earlier.
Therefore, CRUZs stab wound was merely the remote cause and its subsequent infection with
tetanus might have been the proximate cause of CRUZs death.

VILLACORTA may be found liable for slight physical injuries.

A finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that such
offense is necessarily included in murder, since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.

VILLACORTA may not be found liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the prosecution
failed to prove his intent to kill. The intent must proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude
every possible doubt as to the homicidal or murderous intent of the aggressor. When such intent is
lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.

The aggravating circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in this case .

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense that the party might make. The essence of such circumstance is the
suddenness, surprise, and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the
victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without
risk to the aggressor.

Treachery was present in this case. CRUZ was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two oclock in the morning when CRUZ, who was unarmed and out buying bread
at Mendejas store, was attacked. He had his guard down and was totally unprepared for the attack
against his person. VILLACORTAs treacherous mode of attack left CRUZ with no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate.

PEOPLE VS. SALES

G.R. No. 177218 | October 3, 2011

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: NOEMAR SALES and NOEL SALES, JR. are both legitimate sons of NOEL SALES. One
night, both of them left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.

Their mother found them the following day and urged them to go home. At first, they did not want to
go home for hey feared their fathers rage but, upon their mothers insistence, they followed their
mother home.

SALES was furious with his children when they arrived home. He whipped them with a stick and,
once it broke, he took them outside, tied their hands and feet to a coconut tree and continued beating
them with a piece of wood. SALES wife did not do anything for fear of her life.

After the beating, NOEMAR lost consciousness. The quack doctor who they consulted informed them
that NOEMAR was already dead. His body was never autopsied nor examined by a medical doctor.
NOEMARs brother, on the other hand, sustained only physical injuries that would heal in a week.

SALES contends that he did not intent to kill NOEMAR, but only wished to discipline him.

ISSUES:
1. Whether accused SALES may be held criminally liable for NOEMARs death.
 2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated.

HELD:

SALES is criminally liable for NOEMARs death.

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

SALES, in beating his son and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, the latter died. SALES criminal liability for the
death of his son, NOEMAR, is therefore clear.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may not be
appreciated.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually
perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient
to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.

In this case, SALES adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied
their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict
as much pain as possible. As a result of such battering, NOEMAR died. As the battering of SALES
was sufficient to produce and actually did produce the death of NOEMAR, such mitigating
circumstance may not be appreciated in favor of SALES.

INTOD VS. CA and PEOPLE

G.R. No. 103119 | October 21, 1992

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

CAMPOS, JR., J.
FACTS: SULPICIO INTOD along with three others were asked to go to the house of Aniceto
Dumalagan. In that meeting, Dumalagan informed them that he wanted BERNARDINA
PALANGPANGAN killed because of a land dispute. Salvador Mandaya was also ordered to
accompany the four men, else, he would be killed.

Upon arriving at the house of PALANGPANGAN, INTOD and his companions, armed with firearms,
started firing at PALANGPANGANs bedroom. However, it turned out that PALANGPANGAN was in
another city and the room that they fired upon was unoccupied. No one was hit by the gunfire.

INTOD contends that he should be found liable only for an impossible crime, rather than the
attempted murder.

ISSUES:
Whether INTOD is liable for an impossible crime.

HELD:

INTOD is liable for an impossible crime.

To be considered an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the act
intended by the offender must be, by its nature, one impossible of accomplishment. It must include
either the (1) legal impossibility or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual or physical impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible to accomplish. INTOD started shooting at the place where he thought
PALANGPANGAN would be, although in reality, PALANGPANGAN was not present in such place.
There exists, therefore, an impossible crime. JACINTO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162540 | July 13, 2009

The personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain from the thing stolen.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Gemma Jacinto is an employee of MEGAFOAM INTERNATIONAL INC. working

as a collector in said company. In the month of 1997, Baby Aquino handed petitioner a check
postdated in July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000 as payment for the purchases to the company.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land bank account of Generoso Capitle, a brother in law of
the petitioner and not to the said company.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank who was looking for Generoso Capitle informing that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a
former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the
phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the
cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foams accountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyechangco, herein representative of Mega Foam, talked to Baby Aquino
regarding the bounced check and was confirmed that she issued the said check sometime in June
1997. However, she said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked
out an entrapment operation with its agents.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

2 Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information.

HELD:
Worthless check cannot be the object of theft.

The personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain from the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to
Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus,
the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. There can be no
question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she
had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.

Petitioners act of receiving the cash replacement, which is not included in the allegations, should not
be considered as a continuation of the theft.

The fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer
is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioners act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the
theft.

PEOPLE VS. LIZADA

G.R. Nos. 14346871| January 24, 2003

Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts
which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end.

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS: Rose Orillosa and her husband native from Bohol decided to part ways and live separately.
Together with her three children, namely: Analia, Jepsy, and Rosell, Rose settled in Manila and met
accused appellant and decided to live together as husband and wife.

Analia, private complainant, testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until
1998, for two times a week, accused appellant, her step father, used to place himself on top of her and
despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted his finger and
penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accusedappellant threatened to kill her if she
divulged to anyone what he did to her. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accusedappellant
sexually abused private complainant two times a week.

Then on November 5, 1998, Analia, knowing her brother was around and did not locked the door,
then accusedappellant who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up, entered the
bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her
breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door
and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep.
Accusedappellant then left the room of the private complainant.

When her mother learned about these, they immediately proceeded to the Western Police District
where Analia gave her AffidavitComplaint.

On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused appellant finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph,
no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of four (4) counts
fof rape despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes, it did.

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and of accusedappellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to
the documentary evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution, accusedappellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each
count.

To avert further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their
merits considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been
elevated to the Court.

Findings of the Court: In CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99171392 and 99171393 (covering the crime of
rape committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or about September 15, 1998) it was held that
accused-appellant is only guilty of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record
shows that accusedappellant is the commonlaw husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant.
Although, it is a special qualifying circumstance, said circumstance was not alleged in the
Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Hence,
even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant
and relationship, the accusedappellant being the commonlaw husband of her mother, accused-
appellant is guilty only of simple rape.

Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99171390 and 99171391 (covering the crime committed on or about August
1998 and November 5, 1998) it was held that he is not criminally liable of rape. In light of the
evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of accusedappellant into the
aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused appellant is
not criminally liable for consummated rape.

In light of the facts established by the prosecution, the Court believe that accusedappellant intended
to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony
should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures
necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end.

The overt acts of accusedappellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the
series of his overt acts, accusedappellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his
spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accusedappellant desisted from
performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled
to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accusedappellant is
guilty only of attempted rape.

BALEROS, JR. VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 138033 | January 30, 2007

Malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation.

FACTS: This a motion for partial consideration wherein the Court acquitted Baleros in the crime of
attempted rape in a case where he forcefully covered the face of his classmate Martina Lourdes
Albano (MALOU) with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, which after the
incident, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack, but the
Supreme Court adjudge him guilty only of light coercion.

Petitioner argues, however, that the said Information, does not allege that the complained act of
covering the face of MALOU with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress and disturbance.

It is now Balreos submission that he cannot be convicted of unjust vexation since the elements of
unjust vexation do not form part of the crime rape.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not he can be convicted for unjust vexation even though it is not alleged in the
information.
HELD: The Court stressed that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an
Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person.

PEOPLE VS. LABIAGA

G.R. No 202867 | July 15,2013

In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it
not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained
would have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the accused should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

Carpio, J.

FACTS:

The victim in the case, Gregorio Conde stepped out of his house and was shot by the Labiaga. Shortly
thereafter, the daughters of Gregorio, Glenelyn and Jude rushed for the aid of Gregorio. Labiaga
then shot Judy. Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced
dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.

Labiaga claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. He alleged that Gregorio is armed with a
shotgun, challenged him to a fight and attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed.
Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He
claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.

RTC convicted accused of murder and frustrated murder, which the CA affirmed. On appeal, the SC
upheld the conviction of murder but found Labiaga guilty not of frustrated murder, but attempted
murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labiaga should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder.

HELD:
Labiaga should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution, which should have
produced the felony as a consequence, but did not for some reason independent of the offenders will.
In an attempted felony, the offender merely begins the commission of the crime by some overt acts
but does not perform all acts of execution due to some cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.

To classify the attempted murder from frustrated murder, the Supreme Court held:
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it
not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the accused should
be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This
was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident.

VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 160188 | June 21, 2007

There is no crime of frustrated theft. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen
is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft.

FACTS: The case stems from an Information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner)
and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, petitioner and Calderon were
sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket.

Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching
Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well known Tide brand. Petitioner
unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then
returned inside the supermarketemerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded
these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle.

All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted
by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.

RTC convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Petitioner filed a
brief before the Court of Appeals petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen. However, in its Decision dated 19 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rejected this
contention and affirmed petitioners conviction.

ISSUE: Whether the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.

HELD: There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft can only be consummated or frustrated.

The petitioner is guilty of consummated theft. The Court conclude that inder the Revised Penal
Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. It is immaterial to the product of the felony of that offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.

PEOPLE VS. QUIANOLA

G.R. No. 126148 | May 5, 1999

There is no such crime as frustrated rape.

FACTS: Catalina Carciller, Rufo Ginto and another male companion named Richard Diaz, went to
attend a dance at around ten oclock in the evening of 05 March 1994 in Sitio Bangag, Tangil,
Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina was just then fifteen (15) years old.

About an hour later, they left the party and were soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting
youngsters stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School.
Accused Agapito Quianola a.k.a. Petoy, and accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. Botiquil who were
both armed with guns suddenly turned up.
 Quianola beaming his flashlight at the trio while Escuadro stood by focused his attention on
Catalina. Quianola announced that he and Escuadro were members of the New Peoples Army
(NPA).

Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area who were later on able to escape.

Meanwhile, Quianola, with his gun pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby
school. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the
path towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quianola forced Catalina to sit on
the ground. She resisted but Quianola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she would not
accede to what he wanted, he would kill her.

Catalina started to cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her denim pants until ultimately
succeeded in undressing her. Quianola unzipped his pants and laid on top of her while Escuadro
held her legs. Quianola and Escuadro took turn and started to pump, to push and pull even as
Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from them. She felt their organ on the lips of (her)
genitalia.

Escuadro and Quianola scampered immediately after Catalinas ordeal. Catalina was left wearing
only her Tshirt and brassieres until she finally started to run home fearing that she might be
followed.

When her family knew about the incident they promptly repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug
to report the crime.

The RTC convicted the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated rape.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the inconsistencies and testimonies of
the witnesses.

2. Whether or nor the trial court erred in convicting them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated rape then imposing each of the accused the penalty of 40 years of reclusion perpetua.

HELD: 1. The Court is convinced of the sexual assault made against the victim.

The positive identification of the accused effaces their alibi. Also, the medical examination merely
stated that the smallness of the vaginal orifice only precludes complete penetration. This does not
mean that rape has not been committed.

2. As the Revised of the Penal Code presently so stands, there is no such crime of frustrated rape.

The trial court, in convicting appellants only of frustrated rape, ruled that there was no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party in that (a) Catalina had admitted
that she did not spread her legs and (b) the medicolegal officers findings showed she did not sustain
any extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average size penis would
not have completely penetrated it without causing laceration. However, the trial court failed to
consider Catalinas testimony in its entirety. Her testimony would indicate that Catalina, considering
her struggle to free herself, understandably failed to notice whether her legs were spread apart or
close together during her ordeal.

The Court reiterated that Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender,
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. (People v. Quianola, G.R. No. 126148, May 5, 1999)

PEOPLE VS. ORANDE

G.R. Nos. 141724-27 | November 12, 2003

The uniform rule is that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction.

CORONA, J.

FACTS: The present case is an appeal to the ruling of the Regional Trial Court convicting the
appellant for two counts of simple rape, one count of statutory rape and one count of frustrated rape
for having carnal knowledge of the daughter of his common law wife, a minor below 12 years old,
with the use of force, threat and intimidation.

At first, the victim did not report to the police. But with the help of her teacher who was able to
extract the truth from her, and the victims aunt, they were able to report the rape incidents. The
victim was subjected to a medical examination wherein traces of lacerations were found in her
private organ.

According to the testimony of the victim, the rape incidents occurred between January 1994 and
November 1996, whenever her mother is in the public market to work. That the appellant, with the
use of a knife would always threaten to kill her and her family if she refuse to give in to the latters
immoral acts.

In his defense, Orande alleged that the complainants testimony against him is rooted to the fact that
the latter does not consent Orandes relationship with her mother.

In the ruling by the RTC, it gave credence to the testimony of the victim. The truthfulness of the
complainants words can further be strengthened by the fact that the trial had to be postponed for a
few months because she had to undergo therapy as a result of the psychological and emotional
trauma she suffered by reason of the commission of such crime.

ISSUES:

1 Whether appellant Orande is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of

statutory rape, one count of frustrated rape and two counts of simple rape.

2. Whether the court erred in convicting the appellant for the crime of frustrated rape
despite the fact that under prevailing jurisprudence, there is no such crime.

HELD:

ORANDE is guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the crimes charged, with minor
modifications including the portion of the judgement on frustrated rape.

Regardless of the testimony of the victims mother supporting the alibi of the appellant during the
specified time wherein such crimes were committed, the Court gave more weight to the testimony of
the victim. It has been a standing belief that no young woman would allow an examination of her
private part and subject herself to the humiliation and rigor of a public trial if the accusations were
untrue, or if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
On the other hand, delay, even of three years, in reporting the crime does not necessarily detract
from the witness credibility as long as it is satisfactorily explained. Unlike a mature woman, a young
girl like the victim, cannot be expected to have the courage or confidence to immediately report a
sexual assault on her, specially when death threat hangs over the head.

Lastly, the Court held that the trial court erred on holding the appellant guilty of frustrated rape. In
the prevailing jurisprudence, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. The charge of frustrated
rape is therefore converted into statutory rape.

PEOPLE VS. PAREJA

G.R. No. 188979 | September 5, 2012

In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot
be convicted of consummated rape.

FACTS:

At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two year old nephew, BBB, on the
floor of her sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.

AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket.
The appellant removed AAAs
clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.

The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her
legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.

The appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder. The appellant put his clothes back on, and
threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left
the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.

When her siblings found out the incident, AAA and her two (2) siblings went to the Women and
Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident.

During the trial, AAA stated that appellant tried to insert his sexual organ and touched her private
part. Afterwards, the RTC convicted appellant the crime of rape to which was affirmed by the CA.
The CA explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute
rape and held that a slight penetration took place when the appellants touched AAAs vagina as he
was trying to insert it.

ISSUE: 1. Did the touching by the appellants penis of the victims private part amount to carnal
knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?

HELD: The Court held that there was nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion and that the
appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.

Rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora, or penundum or female
organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape or acts or lasciviousness.

Here, the carnal knowledge has not been proven with moral certainty. AAA stated that he tried to
insert his sexual organ but he was not able to do so. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-
examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis to her vagina. The victims
attempt to demonstrate what she meant by idinidikit ang ari was unavailing to prove that rape has
been consummated. The Court reiterated that when the touching of the vagina by the penis is
coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed. The prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape. The Court convicts him
instead of the crime of attempted rape.

CRUZ VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 166441 | October 8, 2014

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: CRUZ and his wife were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different
municipalities around the country. They employed AAA and BBB, both minors, to help them in
selling in Bangar, La Union.
Upon arrival in the municipality, they fixed the wares in order for display. CRUZs wife proceeded to
Manila to get more goods to be sold while CRUZ prepared the tents for them to sleep. Less than an
hour of sleeping, AAA was awakened when she felt someone on top her. CRUZ was mashing her
breast and touching her private part, her being totally naked. She was ordered not to scream or shell
be killed. She fought back and was able to prevent CRUZ in pursuing his lustful desires.

When AAA returned to the tent after seeking help from the other worker named Jess whom she
failed to wake up she saw CRUZ touching the private parts of BBB. BBB was awake and her hands
were shaking. When AAA finally entered the tent, CRUZ left.

Later that day after narrating the whole story to Jess and were on their way to fetch some water
AAA and BBB was able to ask the people around where the municipal building is. After reporting
the incident, CRUZ was summoned to the police station. However, CRUZ and his wife were still able
to bring the girls home with them and work for them days after the incident before they were sent
home. Later on, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn
statements against CRUZ.

CRUZ was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness after
the joint trial of the two criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court in Balaoan, La Union.

The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction for attempted rape but acquitted him of the acts of
lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether accused CRUZ is guilty of attempted rape.

HELD:

DULAY is not guilty of attempted rape.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. The basic element of
rape then and now is carnal knowledge of female. In other words, rape is consummated once the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.

If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the
offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which
the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a casual relation to the rape as the
intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent,
being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts
directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female.

CRUZ embracing AAA and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie
with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when
he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.

PEOPLE VS. PAGALASAN

G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991 | June 18, 2003.

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates. It continues until the object is
attained.

Callejo Sr., J.

FACTS: The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young children, one of whom was 10 -
yearold Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City. On
September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., while the couples housemaid, Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen she
heard knocks on the kitchen door. Thinking that it was Ferdinand, the security guard, she opened
the door.

However, four men were firmed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of them had
masks over their faces barged into the kitchen.

They gained entry into the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and
Julita by tying their hands behind their backs. One of the masked men remained in the sala, while
the three others barged into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his ten-
yearold son Christopher. They left a handwritten note to Julita stating they should never disclose nor
coordinate to the authority. The appellant, Mike, and his cohorts forced then the father and son to
board Georges car.

Mike drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George
in the car towards the direction of Maasim. However, police officer were already on the lookout for the
two victims and when police officers approached them they asked the names of the passengers.
George gave false name in fear that he might be shot if he tells his real name. But the police noticed
that Georges hands were trembling. Policemen pulled him out of the vehicle and then he identified
himself as one of the kidnapped victims.

Mike confessed to the police officers and was arrested and detained. The next day the policemen
rescued Christopher without any ransom being paid.

In the meantime, on September 6, 1994, George received another handwritten letter, ordering the
release of Michael because they were innocent, and demanding P3,000,000 for Christophers release.
Then a third letter came informing him and his wife that the kidnappers did not want the military to
be involved nor innocent people to be prejudiced.

The trial court rendered judgment convicting Mike of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced him to
double death on its finding that he and his cohorts kidnapped George and Christopher for the
purpose of extorting ransom.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom.

2. Whether the trial court erred in in convicting accused-appellant for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom for one George Lim without any basis in fact and in law.

1. The appellant is guilty of kidnapping Christopher under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in
the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was
not intended as part of the original design.

In this case, the collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts before,
during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant and his three
companions conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to kidnap George and
Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the
kidnapping of the two victims.

However, the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping George and Christopher, the appellant and
his cohorts intended to extort ransom.
Even though it was proven that there was conspiracy, the prosecution failed to prove that he had
knowledge of and concurred with the said demand.

It failed to prove that they intended to extort ransom from the victims themselves or from some other
person, with a view to obtaining the latters release. The kidnapping by itself does not give rise to the
presumption that the appellant and his co conspirators purpose are to extort ransom from the
victims or any other person.

The said demand for ransom was a new and independent project of the appellants coconspirators,
growing out of their own malice, without any a priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his
post facto concurrence therewith.

2. The appellant is also guilty of slight illegal detention of George under Article 268 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The prosecution may have failed to prove that the appellant and his co-conspirators intended to
extort ransom for Georges release, however, as a matter of substantive la, the appellant may be held
guilty of two separate crimes although he and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and Christopher
on the same occasion and from the same situs.

PEOPLE VS LARRAAGA
G.R.Nos.138874-75 | February 03, 2004

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may
be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community
of interest. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose
of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended.

PER CURIAM.
FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, MARIJOY and JACQUELINE CHIONG failed to come home
on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants
were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck
were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was
identified as MARIJOY. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted
before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified LARRANAGA,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James
Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court: 1)
That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Following them were LARRANAGA, James Anthony and James Andrew who
were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters
MARIJOY and JACQUELINE were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their
mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly. 2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group
thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white
van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South
Bus Terminal. 3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot
session. Later, they started to rape MARIJOY inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped
JACQUELINE. 4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring MARIJOY to the cliff and push
her into the ravine.

The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and
became a state witness. Still, the body of JACQUELINE was never found.

ISSUES:
1 Whether conspiracy can be established in the instant case

HELD:

Yes, conspiracy is established in the instant case.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may
be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. The actions of LARRANAGA and his cohorts showed that they had the same
objective to kidnap and detain the CHIONG sisters. The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that
conspiracy is present in the commission of the crime.

The concerted actions of LARRANAGA and his cohorts point to their joint purpose and community of
intent. They have the same objective to kidnap and detain the CHIONG sisters. Well settled is the
rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and community of interest.
Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime.

Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the conspiracy as they
were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is
bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended. As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely
present at the scene of the crime.

PEOPLE VS GARCHITORENA

G.R.No.175605 | August 28, 2009

Direct prof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during
or subsequent to the incident. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and
the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: The RTC of Bian City found GARCHITORENA, GARCIA and PAMPLONA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder for killing MAURO BIAY. The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1)
Dulce Boreroelder sister of the victim MAURO and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; (2) Dr.
Rolando Pobleteconducted the autopsy; (3) Amelia Biayvictims widow.

Dulce testified that on September 22, 1995 at around 9:00 pm, she was selling balut and that
MAURO was also in the area, 7 arms length away from her. She was then called by GARCIA. When
her brother MAURO approached GARCIA, the latter twisted the hand of her brother behind his back
and GARCIAS companionsGARCHITORENA and PAMPLONAbegan stabbing her brother with
a shiny bladed instrument until her brother slumped face down on the ground. Dulce wanted to
shout for help but nothing came out from her mouth. Instead, she went home to call her older brother
Redoro Biay but when they returned to the scene, the victim was no longer there and had already
been brought to the hospital where he was later pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Rolando Poblete conducted an autopsy on Mauro and testified that the victims death was caused
by hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds. GARCHITORENA, GARCIA and
PAMPLONA denied the charges against them. GARCIA argues that there was no conspiracy as there
was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two or that he participated in their criminal
designs.

ISSUE:
1 Whether there is conspiracy between GARCHITORENA, GARCIA and PAMPLONA in killing
the victim

HELD:

Yes, there is conspiracy between GARCHITORENA, GARCIA and PAMPLONA.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint
purpose, concert of action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by
each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.

In this case, conspiracy was shown because GARCHITORENA, GARCIA and PAMPLONA were
together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. GARCIA grabbed the
victims hands and twisted his arms; in turn, PAMPLONA, together with GARCHITORENA,
strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free
himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through which the victim could escape were
blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. Their prior act of waiting for the victim
outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is
not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.

PEOPLE VS. CARANDANG

G.R.No.175926 | July 6, 2011

Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived
plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient.
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,J.

FACTS: MILAN, CHUA and CARANDANG were convicted by RTC for two counts of murder and one
count of frustrated murder. Only MILAN and CHUA appealed to the Supreme Court; CARANDANG
presented a letter that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal.

MILANS sister requested for assistance regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her
house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red formed a team
composed of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo. The team then proceeded to
Calavite Street.

When the team reached the place, the door to MILANS room was open, enabling the police officers to
see CARANDANG, CHUA and MILAN inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the people inside the
room would not put up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. But the
team said they were police officers, MILAN immediately shut the door.

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the
room. PO2 Alonzo shouted Walang gagalaw! Suddenly gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and
SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of
gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the
assailants when CARANDANG shot and hit him. SPO1 Estores heard CHUA say to MILAN
Sugurin mo na! MILAN lunged towards Montecalvo but Montecalvo was able to fire his gun and hit
MILAN. Estores went inside the house and pulled Montecalvo out. Montecalvo and MILAN was
brought to the Chinese General Hospital. CARANDANG and CHUA remained holed up inside the
house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation until their surrender.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not there is conspiracy among CHUA, MILAN and CARANDANG

HELD:

Yes, there is conspiracy among CHUA, MILAN and CARANDANG

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the
conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and
objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the
degree of participation of each.

The conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1)
before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to
Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan following such instruction). These facts are not meant
to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo
was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing
circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all
three are considered principals by direct participation.

PEOPLE VS. DADAO

G.R.No.201860|January 22, 2014

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: DADAO, SULINDAO AND MALOGSI brothers were charged of the murder of YACAPIN
through the use of guns and bolos. According to Dacion, the first witness and step-son of the victim,
on July 1993 at 7:30 pm in Bukidnon, DADAO, SULINDAO AND MALOGSI brothers shot to death
YACAPIN in their house. This statement was corroborated by his brother, Edgar and mother, Nenita.

The MALOGSI brothers were the ones who held firearms while DADAO and SULINDAO held bolos.
The cause of death of the victim was primarily the gunshots hitting his back and left leg.

They all interposed alibis as defense during the time of the commission of the crime. MALOGSI
brothers were on the farm of certain Boyle; SULINDAO said that he was in the house of his father-in-
law; while DADAO said that he was at home and never left it the whole evening and this can be
testified by certain Saplina and Dumalig.

ISSUES:
 1 Whether or not DADAO, SULINDAO and MALOGSI brothers were in conspiracy in killing
YACAPIN

HELD:

Yes, DADAO, SULINDAO and MALOGSI brothers were in conspiracy in killing YACAPIN

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every
one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them.
In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the
act of all.

Based from the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses which served as the evidence of the case, it
was established that all 4 of them shared a community of criminal design by mutually helping each
other in shooting and/or attacking YACAPIN. And since that their act is a concerted action, they
should suffer the same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act.

In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, they put forward the defense of alibi
which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in
jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated
and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.

PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO

G.R.No.196735 | May 5, 2014

Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of
attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation

LEONEN, J.
FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of
them, VENTURINA, died from his injuries.

According to Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when VENTURINA shouted,
and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them. The men were armed with baseball bats and
lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. Within a few seconds,
five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes. During the attack, he
recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.

ISSUES:
1 Whether there is conspiracy among the several masked men in killing VENTURINA
2 Whether the constitutional rights of the masked men who attacked the members of Sigma
Rho fraternity were violated when the information against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that
the masks fell off

HELD:

Yes, there is conspiracy among the several masked men in killing VENTURINA.

Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused had
been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some
of them might not have done so.

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their
degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of
the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.

The liabilities of the several masked men in this case arose from a single incident wherein they were
armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage
possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at
the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the masked men alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is,
therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers.

The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information does NOT violate their constitutional rights.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were
being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

PEOPLE VS. MORILLA

G.R.No.189833 | February 5, 2014

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design.

PEREZ, J.
FACTS: On October 13, 2011 two vehicles, Starex Van driven by Mayor MITRA and an ambulance
driven by MORILLA with Dequilla and Yang as passengers were caught by the police in a checkpoint
in Real, Quezon with a sack of shabu inside the two vehicles. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance
driven by MORILLA was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police
officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, MORILLA replied that the
sacks contained narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced, the police officers requested MORILLA to open the
rear door of the car for further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white
crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request MORILLA to open the
sacks.

At this moment, MORILLA told the police officers that he was with Mayor MITRA in an attempt to
persuade them to let him pass. His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection,
the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride. This discovery
prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor MITRA. The police officers were able to
overtake the van and Mayor MITRA was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew
MORILLA. Mayor MITRA was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this
instance, Mayor MITRA offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination,
the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not there is conspiracy established between MORILLA and Mayor MITRA
2 Whether the prosecution was able to prove MORILLAS culpability as alleged in the
Information.

HELD:

Yes, conspiracy is present between MORILLA and Mayor MITRA.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.

MORILLA argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that MORILLA conspired with Mayor MITRA in a common
desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs,
were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor MITRA was able to drive through the checkpoint set
up by the police operatives. When it was MORILLAs turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was
requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor,
the police officers requested MORILLA to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy
with Mayor MITRA, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.

Prosecution was able to prove MORILLAS culpability as alleged in the Information.

MORILLA and Mayor MITRA were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means
"to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that MORILLA
was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor MITRA, who was driving a Starex van going
to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since
it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

PEOPLE VS. BOKINGO

G.R.No.187536 | August 10, 2011

In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second,
the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: PASION and his wife resides in a house along McArthur Highway in Angeles City. They
owned a pawnshop which formed part of their house and two rows of apartment units at the back of
their house. The first had 6 units, one of which was being leased to Vitalicio, his brother-in-law while
the other row was still in construction. BOKINGO and COL were staying in Apartment No. 3 as they
were construction workers employed by him.
At 1 am, Feb29, Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes when he saw PASION came from the front door,
and passed by him and went out of the back door. Then he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3.
As he checked on what was happening, he peeped through a screen door and saw BOKINGO hitting
something on the floor. He was seen by BOKINGO and was also attacked. BOKINGO tried to chase
Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. When he proceeded to his house and was told
by his wife that PASION was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. He went back to
Apartment No. 3 and saw PASION's body lying flat on the kitchen floor. PASION and Vitalicio were
brought to the hospital. After a few hours, PASION died.

Elsa while in their Masters bedroom (2 nd flr of the house), heard banging sounds and her husband's
moans. When she went down, she was blocked by COL. When she asked him why he was on his
house, he sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a knife on her chin. COL then asked her to open
the vault of their pawnshop. As she didnt know the combination lock, she just offered money to him.
But before they reached the door, she saw BOKINGO open the screen door and heard him tell COL :
"tara, patay na siya." COL immediately let her go and ran away with BOKINGO. Elsa proceeded to
Apartment No. 3 where she saw the dead body of her husband.

Police officers conducted an investigation and saw a claw hammer with a green lead pipe handle
approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel
were also found in the nearby construction site. Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor
Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that BOKINGO
admitted that he conspired with COL to kill PASION and that they planned the killing several days
before because they got "fed up" with PASION.
COL insisted that he doesn't know BOKINGO very well.

ISSUES:
1 Whether COL is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
2 Whether the qualifying/aggravating circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
BOKINGO of murder

HELD:

No, COL is not guilty as a co-conspirator and thereby acquitted

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
There is no proof that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves,
at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to
escape from the crimes they separately committed. Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that
is to kill PASION.

Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or
declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the
admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

The aggravating circumstances charged to BOKINGO and his alleged co-conspirator

cannot be appreciated so the conviction of Murder shall be downgraded to Homicide

Treachery cannot be appreciated because the prosecution failed to present evidence pointing that at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in the position to defend himself, and that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.

According to BOKINGO he attacked and killed PASION because PASION had hit him first. This
manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant evident premeditation,
the prosecution must establish the ff. requisites:

(a) the time the offender was determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination
(c) sufficient time interval between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act

However, in this case there was no sufficient evidence to show as to how and when the plan to kill
was devised. And again, though BOKINGO admitted that he and COL planned and conspired to kill
PASION, such confessions were not recognized and inadmissible so his second testimonywhich is a
totally different story prevailed.

The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption
that there was evident premeditation. To put it simply the respondents supposedly had planned
already that they shall commit the crime at nighttime. But, it was established that premeditation
was not proved so the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. The
commission of the crime during nighttime is therefore mere coincidental to PASIONs act of coming
to BOKINGOs room

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because even
though that BOKINGO being an employee of PASION, enjoyed his trust and confidence, there was no
evidence showing that the respondent had took advantage of this trust to facilitate the commission of
the crime.

PEOPLE VS. CASTILLO

G.R.No.132895 | March 10, 2004

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken
chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without
any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Conspiracy is established by
the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful
objective.

PER CURIAM.

FACTS: On March 1, 1995, Rossana Baria the yaya of Luis Cebrero IV aka ROCKY, was informed by
Fernie another maid of the household, that someone else would fetch ROCKY. A tricycle arrived with
Evangeline PADAYHAG who fetched ROCKY. They went to Mc Donalds were they met Elizabeth
CASTILLO. Then, the three of them went to the house of Imelda, sister of Elizabeth. About 5:30 pm,
the father of ROCKY reported to the police that his son was missing. About 7:30 pm, the father
received a phone call from the kidnapper wanting ransom amounting to 1 million. Mrs. Cebrero
withdrew 800,000.00 from the bank which gave them the serial numbers of the said money. The
kidnapper called again stating the address where the father would leave the money. It was in a
church in Paco, Obando, Bulacan. Major Ronnie Eleazar of the Intelligence Security Group (ISG)
with his officers watched the vicinity of the money drop off area. After 40 minutes, 2 women arrived
and took the money bag. March 5, 1995, ROCKY was returned to his father. Acquiring the addresses
of the accused in the Employment Agency, the ISG went to Navotas to locate PADAYHAG.
PADAYHAG went willingly with the ISG. No money was found with her. Another ISG team was
dispatched to Dipolog where CASTILLO was located. The ISG found the black bag containing
277,000.00 with the same serial numbers.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not there was conspiracy to extort ransom
HELD:

No, conspiracy is not established.

SC affirmed the judgement on CASTILLO but acquitted PADAYHAG. CASTILLO herself admitted to
the fact that ROCKY was with her for nights and that she found the money bag in the church in
Obando. Her claims that she only wanted to visit ROCKY and that no harm was done to him do not
absolve her of the crime of kidnapping.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that PADAYHAG acted in concert with CASTILLO to
commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must
be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the
commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter
through. Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in
execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to
the goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been
motivated by a common design.

PADAYHAGs act of fetching ROCKY is not conclusive proof of her complicity with CASTILLOs plan,
a plan PADAYHAG did not even know. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit
PADAYHAGs boyfriend that the two met. When they met, PADAYHAG realized that CASTILLO had
deceived her.

FERNAN JR. VS. PEOPLE

G.R.No.145927 | August 24, 2007

Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. The court categorized two (2) structures of
multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) wheel or circle conspiracy and (2) the chain conspiracy.
VELASCO,JR.,J.

FACTS: Sometime in February, 1977, Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of Ministry of
Public Highways (MPH) Region VII, met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and
hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers. Mangubat had
found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other
documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and
employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the
amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the
Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to
provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or
adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in
excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial
balances submitted to the Regional Office.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his
plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating
or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido on her part
manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to
conceal the illegal disbursements.

On the other hand, FERNAN JR. and TORREVILLAS were both Civil Engineers of the MPH
assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. FERNAN JR. was included among the
accused allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used
as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund releases were
made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers.

They both falsified and/or cause the falsification of several documents. FERNAN JR. was able to
collect P28,000.00 from Cebu I HED while TORREVILLAS was able to collect P48,431.85. Both are
in payment of non-existing deliveries and this amount was not reflected in the monthly trial balance
submitted to the Central Office by Region VII. They were charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents.

ISSUES:
1 Whether Sandiganbayan erred in convicting FERNAN JR. and TORREVILLAS as co-
conspirators despite the prosecution's failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt
the facts and circumstances that would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify their
conviction.

HELD:
No, the Sandiganbyan did not err in convicting the FERNAN JR. and
TORREVILLAS as co-conspirators

The burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution.
Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled
jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence.

In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not
necessary:

After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.

The court categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called
wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain
conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there
is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer.

The conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. The 36 disparate
persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled
by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant
III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the
separate spokes of the conspiracy. FERNAN JR. and TORREVILLAS were among the many
spokes of the wheel.

GO-TAN VS. TAN

G.R.No.168852 | September 30, 2008

While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: On 1999, Sharica Mari GO-TAN and Steven TAN were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born. Barely six years into the marriage, GO-TAN filed a Petition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against TAN and her parents-in-law before
the RTC. She alleged that TAN, in conspiracy with her parents-in-law, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5),
and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.

ISSUES:
1 Whether the parents-in-law of GO- TAN may be included in the petition for the issuance of a
protective order, in accordance with RA 9262 or Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004

HELD:

Yes, the parents-in-law of GO- TAN may be included in the petition.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''violence against women and their children'' as any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus: SEC.5.
Acts of Violence against Women and Their Children. The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts: xxx (h)Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. Xxx

31 40 FILE CANNOT BE OPENED

PEOPLE VS FLORENCIO AGACER, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 177751 | January 7, 2013

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

The victim, CESARIO AGACER, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in
preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his
brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
CESARIO had raised.

Suddenly, FLORENCIO, EDDIE, ELYNOR, FRANKLIN, and ERIC, all surnamed AGACER, came
out of the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of CESARIO. The group of men then
surrounded CESARIO and intimidated him. CESARIO felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But
the accused started fire on CESARIOs harvest which prompted CESARIO to return for his burning
crops. While CESARIO was trying to put the fire out, FLORENCIO ordered to go near CESARIO.
EDDIE did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot
CESARIO on the left portion of his chest. As CESARIO fell, they fired then another shot inflicting
mortal wounds on CESARIO. The gang of men then fled the scene.

FLORENCIO AGACER, ET. AL. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the December 14, 2011 decision
affirming their conviction of the murder of CESARIO. They assert, among others, that the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority should have been appreciated in favor of accused, FRANKLIN
AGACER who was only 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Meanwhile, in a
letter dated June 8, 2012, the officer-in-charge of the New Bilibid Prison informed the Court that
accused FLORENCIO AGACER dies on February 17, 2007 as evidenced by the Death Certificate
indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to status asthmaticus as the cause of death

ISSUES:

1 Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and treachery in
the commission of the crime charged.
2 Whether the mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in favor of accused
FRANKIE.
3 Whether the death of accused FLORENCIO extinguish his criminal and civil liabilities.

HELD:

YES, evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and treachery in the commission
of the crime charged.

In the case at bar, conspiracy is evident in the way FLORENCIO AGACER, ET. AL. surprised,
surrounded, attacked and abandoned the victim, CESARIO together. Proof of previous agreement is
not essential because all acted in union pursuing one goal, which is to kill CESARIO. Distinguishing
the fatal blow is immaterial in indicting accused for criminal liability; all are equally liable for
murder since conspiracy is present.

Treachery was also present, fulfilling the conditions that first, CESARIO was not given the
opportunity to defend himself and second, that the means of execution was deliberate.

FRANKLIN is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstances of minority.

FRANKLINS Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was
merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the
proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and compassion is that because of
his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact
that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the
state, the victim and his heirs.

The death of FLORENCIO prior to our final judgment extinguishes his criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto.

Article 89 of the RPC provides for the extinguishment of criminal liability. It is also settled that
upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action is instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.

In this case, while FLORENCIO died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not
timely relayed to the Court, such that it was not aware of the same when it rendered the December
14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that the Court was informed of FLORENCIOS death through a
letter. Due to this development, it therefore becomes
necessary for us to declare FLORENCIOS criminal liability
as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010

Nachura, J.:

FACTS:

On August 18, 2002, in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused, VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ with intent to
kill his wife ANNA LIZA CAPARAS- DELA CRUZ, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab
the said ANNA LIZA CAPARAS- DELA CRUZ, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her
death.

JOEL SONG, a neighbour who was playing cards near the accused house, saw VICTORIANO
punching and kicking his wife, herein victim ANNA, in front of their house. VICTORIANO then
dragged ANNA inside the house by pulling the latter's hair then slammed the door. JOEL overheard
the couple shouting while they were already inside the house. Suddenly, VICTORIANO and ANNA
came out of the house, together with their young daughter. He asked for JOELs help. JOEL noticed
blood spurting out of ANNAs mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to VICTORIANOs
aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle.
However, ANNA died.

VICTORIANO testified that the death of his wife was the result of an accident; that he consumed
hard liquor at the time of the incident; that ANNA was not immediately treated in the hospital; that
he loved his wife; and that he did not intentionally hurt her. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting
accused-appellant for the crime of Parricide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with
some modifications as to civil indemnity.

ISSUE:

Is VICTORIANO entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident?

HELD:

No, VICTORIANO is not entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident.

Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court considers VICTORIANOs claim that the injury
sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear
that VICTORIANO was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused
may be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC, the
following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For
an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.
VICTORIANO's act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act.

TY VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 149275 | September 27, 2004

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) information for violation of B.P. 22 against TY before
the RTC of Manila. TY drew and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to
Editha L. Vecino several post-dated checks. TY well knowing that at the time of issue she did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, TY failed to pay Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the checks or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. TY
claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She claims
that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release of her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. The trial
court rendered judgment against TY. TY interposed an appeal with the CA and reiterated her
defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or
in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced TY to pay a fine of
sixty thousand pesos P60, 000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from
criminal liability?

HELD:

No, the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability.

For an uncontrollable fear be an exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following

requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought
to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be
speculative, fanciful, or remote.

A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be
of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

The fear harbored by TY was not real and imminent. TY claims that she was compelled to issue the
checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged,
and for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

URBANO VS PEOPLE
 G. R. No. 182750 | January 20, 2009

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

RODEL URBANO testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of
Bugallon for a picnic. He was with TOMELDEN and several others, including DOMINADOR
NAVARRO, Chairperson of Lingayen Water District. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered
goats meat and drank beer. When it was time to depart, NAVARRO asked URBANO to inform
TOMELDEN, then seated in another table, to prepare to leave.

When so informed, TOMELDEN insulted URBANO, telling the latter he had no business stopping
him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, URBANO returned to
his table to report to NAVARRO. At that time, URBANO saw that TOMELDEN had already
consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half hours
before returning to the LIWAD. Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, TOMELDEN allegedly
slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment as
NAVARROs tricycle driver. TOMELDEN allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at
URBANO, a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. URBANO maintained that he only
boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latters blows.

Thereafter, TOMELDEN went to the hospital several times complaining of dizziness, headache, and
other pains. The last time he went to the hospital, things turned for the worst. TOMELDEN died
due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

ORJE SALAZAR, their co-worker, attests to the provocative acts of TOMELDEN and to his being the
aggressor.

ISSUE:

Whether the victims insulting remarks directed at URBANO, and uttered immediately before the
fist fight constitute sufficient provocation.

HELD:

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of
self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or
annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should
immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation
at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3)
when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4)
when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and
immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, TOMELDENs insulting remarks directed at URBANO and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. URBANO was the one
provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

PEOPLE v IGNAS
G.R. No. 140514 | September 30, 2003

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

JUNE IGNAS is an elementary school graduate and operated a bakery. He is married to WILMA,
and they have a minor son. WILMA confided to her close friend, Romenda that she was having an
affair with one NEMESIO LOPATE. From Benguet, WILMA, the close friend, and NEMESIO went
to Manila. They were sending WILMA off at NAIA as she was leaving for Taiwan to work as a
Domestic Helper. The trio checked in at Dangwa hotel and Nemesio and Wilma shared a room.
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan 4 letters written by Wilma on various dates. Although
all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant to be read by her paramour,
NEMESIO. In the other two letters, WILMA instructed Romenda to reveal to JUNE her affair with
NEMESIO. In February 1996, Romenda informed JUNE about the extramarital affair. Romenda
informed him about the hotel incident. JUNE became furious and declared in Ilocano there will be a
day for that NEMESIO. I will kill that NEMESIO. JUNE then got all the letters of WILMA from
Romenda. That same week Alfred Mayamnes had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes was an elder of
the Kankanaey tribe to which appellant and NEMESIO belonged to. He wanted to confirm whether
NEMESIO was having an affair with JUNES spouse. Talk apparently had reached the tribal elders
and they wanted the problem resolved as soon as possible. Mayamnes also testified that he advised
NEMESIO to stay at the Mountain Trail Kankanaey community until things had cooled down. After
their talk, JUNE closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale. Mayamnes saw JUNE
load his bakery equipment on board a hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya. A witness said she
was at the unloading area at the Trading Post, Benguet, when suddenly 2 gunshots shattered the
quiet evening. She turned towards the place where the sound came from where she saw a person
falling to the ground. Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away, was another
person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked away. She caught a glimpse of
the face, it was JUNE IGNAS. She was 5 meters away from the scene and the taillight of a parked
jeepney, plus roof lights from the bagsakan shed, helped her vision. Also at the bagsakan area was
another witness who testified that on hearing gunshots, he saw people converging on a spot where a
bloodied figure was lying on the ground. He saw that the fallen victim was NEMESIO then saw
another person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away and identified the latter as his close
friend and neighbor JUNE. Mona, a bakery worker, testified that at the night after the incident,
JUNE came to her residence at La Trinidad. After being served refreshments, JUNE took out a
handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from the chamber. JUNE then told her to
throw the empty cartridges out of the window. She also said that JUNE disclosed to her that he had
just shot his wifes paramour. JUNE stayed there for 9 hours and left in the morning. According to
witnesses on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim NEMESIO, to the
Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Police investigators,
accompanied by one of Junes brothers, as well as prosecution witness Julio went to Nueva Vizcaya,
to invite JUNE to shed light on the slaying of NEMESIO. The law enforcers found JUNE selling
bread at Kayapa and brought him back to La Trinidad. Julio testified that shortly after they arrived
from Kayapa, JUNE disclosed that he shot and killed NEMESIO. Prosecution witness Pauline
Gumpic, Nemesios sister, testified that she and JUNE had a private talk, while the latter was in
police custody, and JUNE admitted to her that he killed her brother. SPO4 Arthur Bomagao of the
La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the fatal shooting of NEMESIO, declared
on the stand that JUNE voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the victim with a .38 caliber
handgun. Bomagao further testified that JUNE surrendered to him the letters of WILMA, wherein
the latter admitted her affair with NEMESIO.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not the Trial Court committed reversible error when it appreciated the alleged
use of an unlicensed .38 calibre firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime of murder without any factual and legal basis.

2 Whether or not the Trial Court committed reversible error when it did not appreciate in
favour of JUNE IGNAS the Mitigating Circumstances of (a) immediate vindication of a grave
offense, (b) passion and obfuscation and (c) voluntary surrender.

HELD:

1 In the first issue raised, the Supreme Court ruled that:

We find merit in JUNE IGNAS contentions. It is not enough that the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the
matter must be proven with the same quantum of proof as the killing itself. The records
do not show that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that JUNE is not a duly
licensed holder of a calibre .38 firearm. Absent the proper evidentiary proof, this Court
cannot validly declare that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm was satisfactorily established by the Prosecution. Hence, such special
 circumstance cannot be considered for purposes of imposing the penalty in its maximum
period.

2 As for the second issue, however, the Supreme Court ruled that:

a The Solicitor General counters that there was literally no immediate vindication to
speak of in this case. JUNE had sufficient time to recover his serenity following the
discovery of his wifes infidelity.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his
discovery of his wifes infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no
longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient
time for JUNE to have recovered his composure and assuaged the ease of his mind.
The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense
when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we
hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense
cannot be considered in his favor.

b We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation

inexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise
from the same facts or motive. In other words, if JUNE attacked his NEMESIO in
proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath
that passion and obfuscation also blinded him.

c On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. Records show, however, that leaflets and posters
were circulated for information to bring the killer of NEMESIO to justice. A team of
police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya
to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied
the charge of killing the victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither
spontaneous nor voluntary.

And so, there being no aggravating nor was mitigating circumstance, JUNE IGNAS found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime homicide.

BONGALON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 169533 | March 20, 2013

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:

BONGALON was charged for the crime of child abuse under Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610. BONGALON
allegedly physically abused and/or maltreated JAYSON (12 years old) with his palm hitting the latter
at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left check and uttering derogatory remarks to the
latters family. On his part, BONGALON denied having physically abused or maltreated JAYSON
but only confronted him when the latter threw stones at her daughters, calling them as Kimi and
for burning one of his daughters hair. Both the RTC and CA held BONGALON guilty of child abuse.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of BONGALON constituted child abuse within the purview RA7610

HELD:

No. Sec 10 (a), Art. VI of RA 7610 under which BONGALON was charged states:

Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. - (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of
child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.

Child abuse, on the other hand, is defined by Sec. 3 (b) as maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes:

(2.) Any acts by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes child abuse. Only when the laying of
hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth of dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under RPC. In this case, the records showed that the laying of
hands on JAYSON have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just
suffered harm at the hands of JAYSON and his companion. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
the specific database, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. However, considering that JAYSON suffered
physical injury requiring five to seven days of medical attention, BONGALON is liable for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the RPC.

NIZURTADO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
 G.R. No. 107383 | December 7, 1994

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

It appears from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, as well as from the stipulations of the
parties that FELIX NIZURTADO was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo, Malabon, Metro
Manila from 1983 to 1988. NIZURTADO and MANUEL ROMERO, Barangay Treasurer of Panghulo,
attended a seminar at the University of Life, Pasig, Metro Manila. The seminar was about the
Barangay Livelihood Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), and the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). Under the program, the
barangays in Metro Manila could avail of loans of P10,000.00 per barangay to finance viable
livelihood projects which the Barangay Councils would identify from the modules developed by the
KKK Secretariat or which, in the absence of such modules, the Councils would choose subject to the
evaluation/validation of the Secretariat.

After the seminar, NIZURTADO received a check for P10,000.00 intended for Barangay Panghulo
and issued in his name. The check, however, could be en-cashed only upon submission to the
Secretariat of a resolution approved by the Barangay Council identifying the livelihood project in
which the loan would be invested. He entrusted the check to Romero for safekeeping. In one of its
regular sessions, which was on the second Saturday of each month, the Barangay Council of
Panghulo discussed the project in which to invest the P10,000.00. Among the proposals was that of
Romero that a barangay service center be established. But the meeting ended without the
Councilmen agreeing on any livelihood project.

A few days after the meeting, NIZURTADO got back the check from ROMERO, saying that he would
return it because, as admitted by NIZURTADO during the trial, the Councilmen could not agree on
any livelihood project. NIZURTADO signed a receipt dated August 4, 1983, for the check "to be
returned to the Metro Manila Commission." After a few more days, NIZURTADO asked ROMERO to
sign an unaccomplished resolution in mimeograph form. All the blank spaces in the form were
unfilled-up, except those at the bottom which were intended for the names of the Barangay
Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which were already filled-up and signed by Councilmen Marcelo
Sandel, Jose Bautista, Alfredo Aguilar, Alfredo Dalmacio, F.A. Manalang (the alleged Barangay
Secretary), and NIZURTADO. In asking ROMERO to sign, NIZURTADO said that the MMC was
hurrying up the matter and that the livelihood project to be stated in the resolution was that
proposed by ROMERO barangay service center. Trusting NIZURTADO, ROMERO affixed his
signature above his typewritten name. When he did so, the blank resolution did not yet bear the
signatures of Councilmen SANTOS GOMEZ and CEFERINO ROLDAN.
ROMERO and GOMEZ made inquiries. They learned that the check for P10,000.00 was indeed
encashed by NIZURTADO and that the blank resolution which they had signed was filled-up to make
it appear that in a Council meeting where all councilmen were present on August 25, 1983, T-shirt
manufacturing was adopted as the livelihood project of Panghulo. But no such meeting occurred on
that day or on any other day. Neither was NIZURTADO authorized by the Council to submit T-shirt
Manufacturing as the livelihood project of Panghulo.

ISSUE:

Whether NIZURTADO is guilty of complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification
of public document

HELD:

Yes, NIZURTADO is guilty of complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public document.

NIZURTADO was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro
Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he received and later en-cashed a check for P10, 000.00,
specifically intended by way of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood program; and the funds had
come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission and "Kilusang
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."

He was able to en-cash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a resolution of the Barangay
Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that a livelihood project, i.e., "T-shirt
manufacturing," had already been identified by the council. The money, however, instead of its being
used for the project, was later lent to, along with petitioner, the members of the Barangay Council.
Undoubtedly, the act constituted "misappropriation" within the meaning of the law.

MARIANO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178145| July 7, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime, at about 6:30 in the evening, FERDINAND DE LEON was driving his owner type jeep
along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, URBANITA, and their two-year
old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. LUIS DE LEON, an uncle of FERDINAND, also
came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. REYNALDO MARIANO was
driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, REBECCA, and their helper, ROWENA, as passengers.
They had just attended a worship service in Barangay Engkanto.

The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of FERDINAND DE LEON and almost bumped it.
FERDINAND got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. REYNALDO MARIANO stopped
the pick-up behind the jeep. FERDINAND alighted from his jeep and approached REYNALDO.
FERDINAND claimed that he and REYNALDO had an altercation. However, REYNALDO insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while FERDINAND hurled invectives at him.
URBANITA tried to pacify FERDINAND and sought the assistance of LUIS DE LEON. LUIS
intervened and told FERDINAND and REYNALDO "magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at
pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." FERDINAND and REYNALDO heeded the advice of Luis and
they went their separate ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, FERDINAND decided to drop by his mothers
house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his
mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters
away and lost consciousness. Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie" She
identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped FERDINAND as the same red Toyota pick-up driven
by REYNALDO.

On the other hand, REYNALDO and his wife, REBECCA, tried to show that the jeep of
FERDINAND stopped on the road in front of the house of the latters mother about five (5) to six (6)
meters away from their pick-up. REYNALDO stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle,
which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, REYNALDO made a signal and overtook the jeep of
FERDINAND. However, FERDINAND suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was
sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. REYNALDO did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his
way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions
to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, REYNALDO proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in
Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.

FERDINAND was brought to the Sto. Nio Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for two and
a half days and incurred medical expenses. Then, FERDINAND was also transferred to St. Lukes
Medical Center in Quezon City and incurred medical expenses. He suffered multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe
head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Cruz, Jr. of St. Lukes Medical Center.
Urbanita, received the amount of P50,000.00 from REYNALDO by way of financial assistance.

ISSUES:
 1 Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in finding REYNALDO MARIANO guilty of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries.
2 Whether the Court of Appeals should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
3 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing REYNALDO MARIANO the penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

HELD:

1 Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of REYNALDO MARIANO for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

REYNALDO tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of
FERDINAND, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of
FERDINAND. However, the fact that FERDINANDs body was thrown four (4) meters away from his
jeep showed that REYNALDO was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of
FERDINAND.

As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed
and within the control of the drivers hands could have caused FERDINANDs injuries. The very fact
of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive
at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him
or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.

Thus, had REYNALDO not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of FERDINAND,
he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was
no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that FERDINAND alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in
order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.

2 No. Contrary to the REYNALDO MARIANOs insistence, the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor.

Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the
penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

3 Yes, the CA erred in imposing on REYNALDO MARIANO the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.

The error should be avoided because no person should be condemned to suffer a penalty that the law
does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared
guilty of any crime must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and
prescribing the punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed
that allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due
process of law.

PEOPLE VS NAZARENO
G.R. No. 196434 | October 24, 2012

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

This case is about the evidence required for proving conspiracy and the qualifying circumstance of
abuse or superior strength in a murder case. On November 10, 1993, DAVID VALDEZ,
MAGALLANES, and FRANCISCO attended the wake of a friend. While there, they drank liquor
with accused NAZARENO and SALIENDRA. A heated argument ensued between MAGALLANES
and NAZARENO but their companions pacified them.

On the following day, VALDEZ, MAGALLANES, and FRANCSICO returned to the wake.
NAZARENO and SALIENDRA also arrived and told the three not to mind the previous nights
altercation. At around 9:30 in the evening, while VALDEZ, FRANCISCO, and their friend, AIDA
UNOS were walking on the street, NAZARENO and SALIENDRA blocked their path. NAZARENO
boxed FRANCISCO who fled but SALIENDRA went after him with a balisong. FRANCISCO, who
succeeded in hiding, saw NAZARENO hit VALDEZ on the body with a stick while SALIENDRA
struck VALDEZS head with a stone. VALDEZ ran towards a gasoline station but NAZARENO and
SALIENDRA, aided by some barangay tanods, caught up with him. As VALDEZ fell, the barangay
tanods took over the assault. This took place as MAGALLANES stood about five meters across the
highway unable to help his friend. Afterwards, UNOS brought VALDEZ to the hospital. Dr. Rebosa
performed surgery on VALDEZ head but he died 3 days after of massive intra-cranial hemorrhage
secondary to depressed fracture on his right temporal bone in a form of blunt trauma.

In his defense, NAZARENO claimed that he left his house at around 9:30 in the evening on
November 11, 1993 to buy milk. While on a street near his house, he noted a commotion taking place
nearby. He then bumped into SALIENDRA. NAZARENO proceeded home and went to bed. His wife
Isabel supported his testimony, claiming that she asked her husband on that night to buy milk for
their children. When NAZARENO returned home, he informed her of the commotion outside and how
someone bumped into him.
UNOS testified that she saw SALIENDRA chasing VALDEZ as the latter hang on the rear of a
running jeepney. She claimed that she did not see NAZARENO around the place.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NAZARENO took part in a conspiracy to kill DAVID VALDEZ

HELD:

Yes, NAZARENO took part in a conspiracy to kill DAVID VALDEZ.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Actions indicating close personal association and shared sentiment
among the accused can prove its presence. Proof that the perpetrators met beforehand and decided to
commit the crime is not necessary as long as their acts manifest a common design and oneness of
purpose. Here, both the lower courts found conspiracy in attendance. The witnesses, MAGALLANES
and FRANCISCO, testified that accused NAZARENO and SALIENDRA purposely waited for
VALDEZ and his companions out on the street as they came out of the wake. They likewise testified
that NAZARENO and SALIENDRA took concerted steps aimed at killing or causing serious harm to
VALDEZ. NAZARENO repeatedly struck VALDEZ on the area of his neck with a stick; SALIENDRA
hurled a fist-sized stone to VALDEZ head. Even when VALDEZ tried to flee, they still chased him
and together with other barangay tanods, beat him to unconsciousness. Although MAGALLANES
testified that accused SALIENDRA and NAZARENO acted quite differently from each other before
the attack, their actions before and during the incident reveal a common purpose. Although
SALIENDRA appears to have delivered the fatal blow, NAZARENO cannot escape liability because,
in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

FANTASTICO VS MALICSE, SR.

G.R. No. 190912 | January 12, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
A case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
was filed against SALVADOR IGUIRON, TITUS MALICSE IGUIRON, SALINGAN MALICSE
IGUIRON, TOMMY BALLESTEROS, NESTOR BALLESTEROS, EUGENE SURIGAO and
petitioners GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA. The Information reads:

That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts, to
wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of
rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform
all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence,
by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries
inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.

The trial court acquitted TITUS IGUIRON, SALINGAN IGUIRON and TOMMY BALLESTEROS
but found GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Attempted Murder. FANTASTICO and VILLANUEVA appealed the case to the CA, but the latter
court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the inclusion of the phrase not necessarily mortal in the information make it fatal

HELD:

No, FANTASTICO and VILLANUEVA question the inclusion of the phrase not necessarily mortal in
the allegations in the Information.

According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of intent to kill on
their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations. All of these were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase,
what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground
that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court provides: SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

[RULE 112] The preliminary investigation proper, the investigating prosecutor, and ultimately, the
Secretary of the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine
probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. But where the findings of the investigating
prosecutor or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the existence of probable cause are equivalent to a gross
misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to correct these errors.

PEOPLE VS. BOKINGCO

G.R. No. 187536 | August 10, 2011

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

BOKINGCO and COL were found guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder by killing by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence and nighttime,
one NOLI PASION attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and
other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds
on his head and body which caused his death.

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.
The prosecution presented Vitalicio, brother-in-law of Pasion who was one of the residents of the
apartment units which PASION owned at the back of his house, as one of the witnesses of the crime.

The prosecutions evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spin-
drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and
went out of the back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3, where
BOKINGCO AND COL were residing. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen
door and saw BOKINGCO hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, BOKINGCO
allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle
ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. BOKINGCO tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually
subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was
found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw
PASIONs body lying flat on the kitchen floor. PASION and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital.
PASION expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.

Another witness, Elsa (PASIONs wife) testified to seeing BOKINGCO AND COL in the crime scene
and the two even threatened Elsa to open the vault to their pawnshop but Elsa told them that she
did not know the combination lock.

Vitalicio together with Elsa, PASIONs wife, reported the incident to the police and thereafter, the
police went to Apartment No. 3 to investigate. The police found a pool of blood on the cemented floor
of the kitchen, a claw hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the
kitchen sink and a lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby
construction site.

BOKINGCO AND COL testified on their behalf.

BOKINGCO recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 when he was awakened by PASION
who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the
construction site. When BOKINGCO replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day,
PASION suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted BOKINGCO to take a hammer and hit
PASION. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right
after the incident. He was subsequently arrested. During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted
that he harbored ill feelings towards PASION.

COL confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however
resigned because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, where he was
apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw BOKINGCO who pointed
to him as the person who killed PASION. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not the circumstances of the case warrant a BOKINGCOs conviction of murder
rather than homicide

2 Whether or not COL is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of being a co-conspirator

HELD:

BOKINGCO can only be held liable for homicide, not murder.

The circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in the case at bar because of the absence of
proof that, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means or form of attack employed by him. Nobody
witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to
see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.

The circumstance of evident premeditation also cannot be appreciated because no proof was shown
as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. It also runs counter to BOKINGCOs admission in
open court that he killed PASION.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the
trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust
to facilitate the commission of the crime.

Because the qualifying circumstances to prove murder are not present in the case, the conviction of
murder should be downgraded to homicide only.

No, COL cannot be held guilty of being a co-conspirator.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish
the existence of conspiracy.

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants fled together after killing
her husband and the extrajudicial confession of BOKINGCO. However, nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. COL was not seen at the apartment where PASION was being attacked
by BOKINGCO. At the most, Cols actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was
actually the initial Info filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution,
for murder.

Elsa testified that she heard BOKINGCO call out to COL that PASION had been killed and that
they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation
of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they
were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill PASION. BOKINGCO had already killed
PASION even before he sought COL. In as much as BOKINGCOs extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against COL, specifically where he implicated
the latter as a cohort.
As a general rule, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. However, as an exception, it
may be admissible against his co-accused when: (1) the conspiracy is proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; (2) admission relates to the common object; and (3) it has been made while the
accused is engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

In the case at bar, BOKINGCOs judicial admission exculpated COL because BOKINGCO admitted
that he only attacked PASION after the latter hit him in the head.

PEOPLE VS. TABARNERO

G.R. No. 168169 | February 24, 2010
FACTS:

Late at night, GARY TABARNERO went to the house of Ernesto Canatoy where Gary used to reside
as the live-in partner of Ernestos stepdaughter, Mary Jane Acibar. GARY and Ernesto had a
confrontation during which, Ernesto was stabbed 9 times which caused his death. GARY and his
father, ALBERTO TABARNERO were charged with murder and on March 27, 2000, RTC issued
warrants of arrest. On April 22, 2001, GARY surrendered while ALBERTO remained at large.

During the arraignment GARY pleaded not guilty but in the pre-trial conference he admitted killing
Ernesto but in self-defense. When the Reverse trial ensued, GARY testified that he lived with Mary
Jane for 2 years at Ernestos house but left the shortly before the incident because Ernesto stopped
his planned marriage with Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time. Shortly before the incident,
GARY was at his house together with a friend, his brother, his mother, and father, ALBERTO.
Overcome with his emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, he went to Ernestos house but
was not able to enter. He shouted his pleas outside, asking what he did wrong and how much he
loves Mary Jane. When he was about to leave, Ernesto struck him with a lead pipe, the former was
aiming at Garys head, but GARY was able to block the blow with his hands. GARY embraced
Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, GARY took the bladed weapon tucked
at Ernestos back and stabbed him. GARY was stunned and did not notice that his father was
coming. When asked by ALBERTO about what happened, GARY responded: Nasaksak ko po ata si
Ka Erning. Then, both fled out of fear.

On August 5, 2001, ALBERTO was apprehended and denied the accusations. He further said that
they ran away in different directions, he immediately went to Norzagaray, and did not know where
GARY proceeded. Edilberto Alarma, the barangay tanod, testified that while he was on a meeting,
GARY arrived and told him of his intention to surrender and that he was responsible for the
incident. He was brought to the Police Station were the surrender was entered in a blotter report.

The prosecution on the other hand presented as a witness Emerito, brother of Mary Jane, who was
inside their house at the time the incident happened. He testified that he saw his stepfather Ernesto
being held by two persons. Emerito lost count of the number of thrusts made by GARY and
ALBERTO but the last stab was made by the latter. Emerito further confirmed that GARY and Mary
Jane were live-in partners and his father got mad when he knew about their relationship because
they treated GARY as a member of their family.

RTC convicted both GARY and ALBERTO of murder. CA affirmed with modifications as regards the
damages. In an appeal to SC, the two contended that the RTC erred in not considering the justifying
circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender interposed by
Gary.

ISSUES:
1 Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense be considered on the part of GARY
2 2 Is Gary entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

HELD:

NO, the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be considered on the part of GARY.

GARYs contention that the unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto was when the latter struck
him of a lead pipe, his pleas outside their house could not be considered as sufficient provocation, and
that his defense was reasonable, are unmeritorious. His testimony is insufficient and self-serving.
The alleged initial attack on him when he was about to leave seemed to be all-convenient considering
that no one witnessed the start of the fight. The nine stab wounds inflicted on Ernesto indicate
intent to kill and not merely to defend himself.

He further argues that even if he is not qualified to the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he is
still entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1). The court
however, ruled that Gary failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression which is an
indispensable element of self-defense whether complete or incomplete. Hence, he is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance.

NO, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated.

In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited, the following
should be present:

(a) the offender has not actually been arrested;

(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(c) the surrender must be voluntary.

A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous there must be an intent to submit oneself to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble
and expenses in capturing him.

In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed
since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither
shows repentance nor acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender,
there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (PEOPLE vs. TABARNERO, G.R. No. 168169,
February 24, 2010)

PEOPLE VS. VILBAR

G.R. No. 185390 | March 16, 2011

FACTS:

Accused ALEX PALING (PALING), ROY VILBAR (VILBAR) and ERNIE VILBAR (ERNIE) were
charged with the crime of murdering one WALTER NOLASCO (WALTER), by means of treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.

In the evening of July 1, 1996, Richard, Jojo Paling (Jojo), and Rolly Talagtag (Rolly) were in the
house of PALING in Cotabato watching television. At around 9:15 p.m., the group left the said house
and decided to proceed to the other house of PALING situated in the latters farm at Brgy.
Greenhills. This is where the three usually sleep at night.

En route, Jojo and Rolly, along with the victim, Walter Nolasco, were invited by PALING, ERNIE,
and Barangay Kagawad Rene Mondejar to a drinking spree at the house of the latter. Jojo, Rolly, and
WALTER accepted the invitation, while Richard just waited for them outside the house of Paling.
About 15 minutes later, Richard went back to his companions and told them that they had to go
home since they still have to go to school the following morning. The three acceded, but ERNIE
convinced WALTER to stay with them a little longer. Thus, Richard, Jojo, and Rolly went ahead,
while WALTER stayed behind.

At around 10:00 p.m., Francisco, the uncle-in-law of WALTER, was roused from his sleep by the
barking of his dogs. When he went out to find out why the dogs were barking, he saw VILBAR and
ERNIE walking beside WALTER. They were heading towards Brgy. Greenhills where PALINGs
farmhouse was located.
At around 10:30 p.m. that same night, Richard, who was already asleep in the farmhouse of Paling,
was awakened when he heard Jeniline Paling-Bernesto, the daughter of PALING, shout, "Kill him in
a distance. Dont kill him here, kill him away from here." When Richard went outside to find out
what was happening, he saw PALING, VILBAR, and ERNIE assaulting WALTER. VILBAR was
holding WALTER, while PALING AND ERNIE were stabbing him. After Walter was killed, the three
accused warned Richard not to speak about it to anyone; otherwise, they would also kill him.
Thereafter, the three left, bringing with them the cadaver of Walter.

VILBAR AND PALING (ERNIE remained at large) interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Both of
them contended that the decision of the RTC is erroneous because the testimony of Richard was
misappreciated as the judge who rendered the decision was not the same judge who received the
evidence during trial. Also, they claimed that the corroborative witness, Francisco, did not even
mention Paling in his open court testimony, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the credibility of the
other witness, Richard.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not the testimonies of Richard and Francisco were inconsistent with one another
and were misappreciated;

2 Whether or not their defense of alibi is tenable;

3 Whether or not the killing is classified as murder by means of treachery, evident

premeditation and abuse of superior strength

HELD:

No, the testimonies were not inconsistent and were not misappreciated.

The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not
render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its
conclusion. The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard
the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal
of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was
carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the
Court carefully passed upon. The judge "can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common experience,
knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
procedural due process of law."

Richard can also not be faulted for his omission because of the threat that was given to him by
PALING, VILBAR and ERNIE. Franciscos testimony was consistent with the fact that after Walter
was killed, Ernie and Vilbar rushed away from the crime scene. And the fact that Paling was not in
the company of Walter, Ernie, and Vilbar neither shows that Paling could not have been in his house
nor that he did not participate in the killing of Walter.

Their defense of alibi is not tenable

Alibi is an inherently weak defense. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that
he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission. Significantly, the place where Paling claimed to be was just within the immediate
vicinity, if not within the vicinity itself, of the crime scene. Verily, it was not physically impossible for
Paling to be present at the locus criminis at the time the crime was committed.

The killing is classified as murder by means of abuse of superior strength and not by
treachery and evident premeditation.

There was no proof as to the employment of treachery in the case at bar. The essence of treachery is
"the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any real chance to defend oneself, ensuring the attack without risk to the aggressor, and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim."
The eyewitness account of Richard does not establish that the perpetrators suddenly and
unexpectedly attacked the victim, since at the time he went outside to check the commotion. Richard,
therefore, had no way of knowing whether the attack was indeed sudden and unexpected so as to
prevent the victim from defending himself and whether there was indeed not the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. Hence, treachery cannot be appreciated in the instant case.

Evident Premeditation also cannot be appreciated due to lack of proof as to whether the three
planned the attack and had sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to
allow them to reflect.

The essence of abuse of superior strength is the presence of notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressors that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressors and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. In the present
case, the victim, WALTER, while being restrained by VILBAR, was simultaneously stabbed by
PALING and ERNIE. Plainly, not only did the perpetrators outnumber their victim, more
importantly, they secured advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with
impunity. Under these circumstances, it is undeniable that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the three accused therefore, abuse of superior strength was present.

PEOPLE vs. MATIBAG

G.R. No. 206381 | March 25, 2015

FACTS:
At around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just
came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners association of Twin Villa
Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when
MATIBAG confronted Duhan and without warning delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left
cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. MATIBAG then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who
fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, MATIBAG shot him several
more times. A member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on
record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005.

In his defense, MATIBAG alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor
when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners association. Wanting to
settle a previous misunderstanding, MATIBAG approached Duhan and extended his hand as a
gesture of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and refused the gesture thereby provoking
Matibag to punch him in the face. MATIBAG saw Duhan pull something from his waist and fearing
that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, MATIBAG immediately drew his own gun, shot
Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. MATIBAG went to see his police friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to
turn himself in, but the latter was unavailable at the time. As MATIBAG headed back home, he was
stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident. He then readily
admitted his involvement. The RTC convicted MATIBAG of murder and refused to give credence to
his claim of self-defense. The CA likewise sustained his conviction.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the conviction of murder is valid

HELD:
Yes, the conviction of murder is valid.
Treachery attended the killing of Duhan. The prosecution was able to prove that MATIBAG, who was
armed with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the
chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made
rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed. MATIBAG also
failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan
against any impending attack from his assailant. The deliberateness of MATIBAGs act is further
evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of execution.

This finding of treachery further correlates to MATIBAGs plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking
self-defense, MATIBAG, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the
burden of proof shifted to MATIBAG to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following
circumstances:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.

For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack
or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one
claiming self-defense. Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates
unlawful aggression. As mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so sudden
and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibags version
that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his reaction), remained
uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the victim

MATIBAGs allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self defense cannot be
sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds MATIBAGs conviction for the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.

PEOPLE v. FELICIANO, JR.

G.R. No. 196735 | May 5, 2014

FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for Murder was filed against twelve members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity namely
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR L. MEDALLA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, ROBERT
MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, CHRISTOPHER L. SOLIVA, REYNALDO G. ABLANIDA, CARLO
JOLETTE FAJARDO, GEORGE MORANO, RAYMUND E. NARAG, GILBERT MERLE
MAGPANTAY, BENEDICT GUERRERO, AND RODOLFO PENALOSA, JR. with the RTC of
Quezon City. Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of 3
Sigma Rho fraternity members, and the frustrated murder of 2 Sigma Rho fraternity members.
Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused remained at large.

In 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the findings that only 5 of the twelve accused
namely ALVIR, FELICIANO, JR., SOLIVA, MEDALLA, and ZINGAPAN were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo ABLANIDA, Carlo Jolette FAJARDO, Gilbert
MAGPANTAY, George MORANO, and Raymund NARAG. The case against Benedict GUERRERO
was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.

It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the
prosecution should not have included the phrase wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise in
the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were
wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

ISSUES:

1 Whether accused-appellants constitutional rights were violated when the information

against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off

2 Whether or not treachery was present in the case at bar

HELD:

1 No. Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights.
Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was,
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes. The introduction of the
prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks
fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of
identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently appraise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with,
they tried to conceal their identity.

2 Yes, Treachery was present in the commission of the offense.

The victims were eating lunch on campus and were not at a place where they would be reasonably
expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The swiftness and the
suddenness of the attack using lead pipes and baseball bats gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
Further, the information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that the
act of one is the act of all. This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal
their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

PEOPLE vs. GUNDA

G.R. No. 195525 | February 5, 2014
FACTS:

WILFREDO GUNDA was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder by means of
treachery. The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, the victim, Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son,
Eladio Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern
Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10 meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid by
GUNDA and his unidentified companions.
The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon GUNDA stabbed him several times. Fearing for his
life, Eladio Jr. fled. The unidentified assailants pursued him. Fortunately, he was able to outrun
them and was able to reach their house. In the morning of the following day, Eladio Jr. went to the
house of his sister and informed her of the death of their father. They then reported the incident to
the police authorities who eventually arrested GUNDA.

Ambal Jr, brother-in-law of GUNDA also witnessed the incident. While Ambal was at his farm
gathering feeds for his pigs, he saw GUNDA who was armed with a wooden pole position himself at
the back of the victim and strike the latters head with the wood. The companions of GUNDA then
held the victims arms whereupon appellant drew a bolo locally known as depang from his waist and
stabbed the victim several times. Fearing for his life, Ambal likewise left the crime scene.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was
at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles. The RTC found GUNDA guilty of murder
and considered treachery and conspiracy as qualifying circumstances. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modifications with regard to the penalty to be imposed and the application of treachery
as both a generic aggravating circumstance and qualifying circumstance for murder.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not treachery can both be applied as a generic aggravating circumstance and
qualifying circumstance of murder?

HELD:

No, it cannot be applied simultaneously.

There is no doubt that the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed
and had no inkling of the impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home
together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked by GUNDA. In such position, there is no
opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance.
As correctly held by the CA: Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating
circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum
penalty. Since treachery qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this circumstance could no
longer be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty. Furthermore, although there was conspiracy in this case, it is neither a qualifying
circumstance [nor] a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death.

PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. 187683 | February 11, 2010

FACTS:
VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ Y LORENZO (VICTORIANO) was convicted of the crime of Parricide by
killing his wife, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz. The prosecution presented Joel Song as their witness.

Joel testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he and two others, including the
aunt of VICTORIANO, were playing tong-its just three to four arms length away from the latters
house. While playing, Joel saw VICTORIANO punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna, in
front of their house. VICTORIANO then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair,
then slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside the house.
Suddenly, VICTORIANO and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter.
VICTORIANO was behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel
noticed blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a
tricycle. However, Anna died.

Medical reports showed that Anna died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound.

VICTORIANO, on the other hand, testified in his behalf that at the night of the incident, he came
home very drunk from a friends house. Before entering their house, Anna started nagging him.
VICTORIANO then asked her to go inside the house but she refused, and because of this refusal, he
slapped Anna and dragged her inside their house.

Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go out of the house.
However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up,
Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He
brought her outside immediately and asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tong-its
nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his wife to the hospital. At the hospital,
Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for questioning. It was only in the following morning
that Victoriano learned of his wifes passing.

Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he consumed hard liquor at the time of
the incident; that Anna was not immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that
he did not intentionally hurt her. He claims that he should be entitled to the exempting circumstance
of accident under Article 12 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not VICTORIANO is entitled to the exempting circumstance of Accident under

Article 12

HELD:

No, he cannot be exempted from criminal liability.

Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider VICTORIANOs claim that the injury sustained by his
wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that VICTORIANO
was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be exempted from
criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements
must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to
another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to
become an exempting circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful. VICTORIANO 's
act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a
travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on violence against women. Thus, we fully agree with
the apt findings of the CA, to wit:

With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of VICTORIANOs wife was not caused by mere
accident. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by a persons overt acts.

In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that VICTORIANO t started beating his wife outside their
house and was even the one who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that
he only pushed her so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such incongruity
whittles down VICTORIANOs defense that he did not deliberately kill his wife.

PEOPLE vs. NAELGA

G.R. No. 171028 | September 11, 2009

FACTS:

PO2 Noe Sembran testified that upon receiving information from a civilian asset that the accused
ELLY NAELGA was peddling illegal drugs at the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan, Police Chief
Inspector Policarpio Cayabyab, Jr. hatched a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend the
accused. PO2 Sembran was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Danilo Asis, Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 1 Jesus Caspillo, and PO1 Rosauro Valdez as backup operatives.

In his testimony, PO2 Sembran narrated that he was informed by an asset that NAELGA was selling
illegal drugs at the Rosales Public Market in Pangasinan. Thereafter, at about three oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, PO2 Sembran went inside the public market and approached NAELGA.

PO2 Sembran talked to NAELGA and while engaged in this conversation, PO2 Sembran asked
NAELGA what he could use to keep him awake while on duty as a security guard. NAELGA
suggested that he drink Red Bull. PO2 Sembran replied that he already did, but this did not work,
and that he was caught sleeping on his post. NAELGA then declared that he knew something more
effective, as he passed his index finger under his nose as if sniffing something. When asked what he
meant, NAELGA told PO2 Sembran that he was referring to bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he
was willing to try this and to buy Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) worth of shabu. NAELGA told PO2
Sembran to give him the money and committed to return with the shabu. PO2 Sembran gave
appellant four One Hundred Pesos (P400.00) in marked bills. Upon receiving the money, NAELGA
left. PO2 Sembran went back to the police station to plan the arrest of accused-appellant

For his defense, NAELGA denied the accusations against him. He countered that he was an innocent
person selling CDs for a Muslim and knew nothing about shabu. He also testified that it was PO2
Sembran who instigated to buy shabu for him and that he did not know anyone selling shabu. He
just got the payment of Sembran because the money might get lost.

The RTC convicted NAELGA and the CA affirmed the same. NAELGA is now before the SC arguing
that it was the policemen who instigated the sale and it was not a buy-bust operation, thus violative
of the procedures under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not NAELGAs conviction is valid.

HELD:
Yes, it is valid. What the policemen did was a proper buy-bust operation, a form of
entrapment and not violative of RA 9165.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court
has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted. This rule is
consistent with the reality that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.

A successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous/prohibited drugs must establish the
following elements:

(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
 (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

As correctly found by the trial court, NAELGA was caught in a buy-bust operation. He was caught in
flagrante delicto selling a dangerous drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and he himself
confirmed and admitted to the occurrence of said transaction.

We find no instigation in this case. Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential
informant that NAELGA was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of Rosales. Poseur-
buyer PO2 Sembran then pretended to be engaged in the drug trade himself and, with the help of his
fellow buy-bust operatives, arrested accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu to him.

In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces
the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.
Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be
acquitted.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and
effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the idea of
committing a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.

In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by the police officers precisely to test the
veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator.

While NAELGA claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached and asked him to buy shabu for
him, the same cannot be considered as an act of instigation, but an act of "feigned solicitation."

It was NAELGA who suggested to PO2 Sembran to use shabu; and, despite NAELGAs statement
that he did not know anybody selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2 Sembran and directly
went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he returned to the Rosales
public market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.
The records of the case disclose that PO2 Noe Sembran, the designated poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation, positively identified NAELGA as the seller of the confiscated shabu. His testimony was
corroborated by PO1 Rosauro Valdez. The object of the corpus delicti was duly established by the
prosecution. The sachet confiscated from accused-appellant was positively identified, marked and
preserved as evidence, and upon laboratory examination yielded positive for shabu.

PEOPLE vs. DULAY

G.R. No. 193854 | September 24, 2012

FACTS:

AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. It was AAAs sister who introduced DINA
DULAY to AAA. Thereafter, DULAY convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at Paraaque City.
Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for DULAYs boyfriend, but since he was
not there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo. However, DULAY's boyfriend was also not there.

When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw
DULAY's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, DULAY together with her boyfriend proceeded to the
Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, DULAY
suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw
"Speed" give money to DULAY and heard "Speed" tell DULAY to look for a younger girl.

"Speed" thereafter wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands and raped her. AAA asked for DULAY's
help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but DULAY did not
do so. After the rape, "Speed" and DULAY told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else
they would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter
informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San
Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police
station.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not DULAY is liable for Rape under Art. 266-A as a principal by indispensable
cooperation;
2. Whether or not DULAY is guilty under R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Act;

HELD:

No, DULAY is not liable for Rape under Art. 266-A as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.

To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a

conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by DULAY are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of rape.

From the time DULAY convinced AAA to go with her until DULAY received money from the man
who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied
AAA and offered the latters services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped.
Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end
up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the DULAY in the crime of rape.
Yes, DULAY is liable under Ra 7610.

The act of DULAY in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and
thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under section 5(a) of
R.A. No. 7610.

Section 5 (a) of the said law essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under
paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit. As alleged in the Information and proven
through the testimony of AAA, DULAY facilitated or induced child prostitution.

The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A
child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may
appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of
age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition" is
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

PEOPLE vs. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, et.al.

G.R. No. 172707 | October 1, 2013
FACTS:

The following persons Halil Gambao Esmail, Eddie Karim Uso, Edwin Dukilman Suboh, Tony Abao
Sula, Raul Udal Kagui, Teng Mandao Haron, Theng Dilangalen Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol Katol,
Monette Ronas Ampil, Nora Evad Mulok and Thian Perpenian Rafon are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code.

These persons were all identified by the victim Lucia Chan (a fish dealer based in Manila who was
kidnapped on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 pm at Pasay City.

DILANGALEN, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, went to Chans

residence that same evening after his visit to the market where Chan was working. Thereat, the
unidentified companion of DILANGALEN pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the
house companions. As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the
man by grabbing his mothers feet. Seeing this, DILANGALEN pointed his gun at Levys head
forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet. Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police
Headquarters to report the incident.
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. EDWIN DUKILMAN (DUKILMAN) warned Chan not to shout as he had
his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women, later identified in court by
Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (RONAS) and NORA EVAD (EVAD). Chan was brought inside a
house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by RONAS, EVAD, DUKILMAN and Jaman
Macalinbol (MACALINBOL). Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she
paid 20 Million Pesos.

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van.
After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to
a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in
court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (UDAL) and Halil GAMBAO (GAMBAO). Another woman, later
identified as THIAN PERPENIAN (PERPENIAN), arrived. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, a
man who was later identified as TENG MANDAO (MANDAO), entered the room with a handgun and
asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?" Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
EDDIE KARIM (KARIM), ordered MANDAO out of the room. KARIM informed Chan that he was
sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. Chan was instructed to talk to her son
through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the P75, 000.00 she kept in her
cabinet. The group then talked to Chans son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his
mothers release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliverP400,000.00 at the "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.

The police learned of this information and successfully conducted a plan to capture these kidnappers.
The team intercepted a van and arrested 4 men, KARIM, ABAO, GAMBAO and DUKILMAN. The
police team thereafter went to Cottage No. 1 in the resort resulting in the safe capture of Chan and
the apprehension of the other seven kidnappers, DILANGALEN, UDAL, MACALINBOL, MANDAO,
PERPENIAN, EVAD and ROXAS.

During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, KARIM manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." All the others followed suit.

In an appeal to the Supreme Court, DUKILMAN, EVAD and ROXAS argued that conspiracy, insofar
as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. DUKILMAN hinges his argument on the
fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of
Inspector Ouano. On the other hand, RONAS and EVAD base their argument on the fact that they
had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
On the other hand, accused PERPENIAN claimed that she should not be liable as a co-conspirator
since she knew nothing of the ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not DUKILMAN, EVAD and ROXAS are liable as conspirators in the kidnapping
with ransom

2 Whether or not PERPENIAN is liable as a conspirator in the kidnapping with ransom

HELD:

Yes, the three are liable as conspirators.

Although DUKILMAN was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation,
the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people
apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate. 49 Likewise, the
testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that RONAS and EVAD were two of
those who were arrested during the rescue operation. This Court has held before that to be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. Moreover, Chan positively

The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how
they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1)
before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during
the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation
was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among GAMBAO, KARIM, DUKILMAN, ABAO, UDAL, MANDAO,
DILANGALEN, MACALINBOL, RONAS AND EVAD was established beyond reasonable doubt
based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.

No, PERPENIAN is not liable as a conspirator but only as an accomplice to the crime of
Kidnapping with ransom.

PERPENIAN lied about substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times, PERPENIAN claimed she
was scared to be included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of
being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She
knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there.
It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act. However, the
prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal.

Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan
being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would
have reported such incident to the police. PERPENIAN, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to
that, she even spent the night at the cottage.

It has been held before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed
will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the
accused-appellants presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration
of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this Court is
guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.

ONG VS. PEOPLE

 G.R. No. 190475 | April 10, 2013

Fencing is malum prohibitum and P.D 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing
from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS: AZAJAR was the owner of 44 Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He
acquired the same from Philtread Corporation. The said acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice
No. 4565 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their
serial numbers. AZAJAR marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse.

AZANAR learned from CABAL, caretaker of the house, that all 38 truck tires (6 out of 44 tires were
sold prior the robbery) were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened.
AZAJAR, together with caretaker CABAL, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, AZAJAR canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. AZAJAR chanced upon Jongs Marketing, a store selling tires
owned and operated by ONG. AZAJAR inquired if ONG was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14
ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in affirmative.

ONG brought out a tire fitting the description, which AZAJAR recognized as one of the tires stolen
from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. AZAJAR asked
ONG if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in affirmative. AZAJAR
then left the store and reported the matter to the Chief of the Southern Police District. A buy-bust
operation was conducted and the police were able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires. The tires were
confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.

In defense, ONG alleged that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for 24
years and denied that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He
further averred that a certain RAMON GO offered to sell 13 Firestone truck tires for P3,500 each
(total of P45,500) for which he was issued a Sales Invoice with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware &
General Merchandise (Gold Link). He argued that the sales invoice issued by Go is proof of a
legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing.

ISSUES:
1. Whether accused ONG is guilty of violation of P.D 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)

HELD:

ONG is guilty of violating P.D 1612.

All the elements of the crime of fencing are present in this case.

First, AZAJAR and CABAL testified that the crime of robbery had been committed. AZAJAR was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 and an Inventory List.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that 13 tires of AZAJAR were caught in his possession. The Court finds that the
serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ongs possession.

Third, ONG knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. ONG, who was in the business of buy
and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. His experience from the business should have given
him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact
with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong
was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store.

Fencing is malum prohibitum and P.D 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft.
 DIMAT VS.PEOPLE

G.R. No. 181184 | January 25, 2012

Fencing is committed through the following elements: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.

ABAD, J.:

FACTS: On December, 2000, Delgados wife, SONIA, bought from DIMAT a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number
as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001, PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted
the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-
119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on
their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned
that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose MANTEQUILLA.
MANTEQUILLA affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818,
which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May
25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

DIMAT claimed that he did not know MANTEQUILLA. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good
faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number
as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. DIMAT later sold the vehicle to
Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the
police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.
Hence, DIMAT was charged with violation of Anti-Fencing Law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether accused DIMAT is guilty of violation of P.D 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)

HELD:

DIMAT is guilty of violating P.D 1612.

All the elements of the crime of fencing are present in this case.

First, the Nissan Safari DELGADO bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by
the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
MANTEQUILLA. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of vehicles
engine and chassis.

Second, P.D 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum,
requiring no proof of criminal intent.

Evidently, DIMAT knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly
could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show.
That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to DIMAT that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, DIMAT sold the same
to Sonia DELGADO who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That
she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

PEOPLE VS. ARROJADO

 G.R. No. 130492 | January 31, 2001

In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a detention
prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under
preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the RPC.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Prosecutions Version

One early morning, ARROJADO went to the house of his cousin Erlinda Magdaluyo, and reported
that the MARY ANN ARROJADO had committed suicide. As ARROJADO went to the other room
where the victims father stayed, he told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as one
responsible for the victims death. The police noticed that the victims room was very neat as if
nothing happened. The police saw no signs of forcible entry. They made a sketch of the victims
position in relation to the whole house and took pictures of her.

Dr. Roldan conducted the post-mortem examination of MARY ANN and her findings revealed that
the victim sustained the following stab wounds: 10 stab wounds, 5 of which are fatal.

Erlinda Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the MARY ANN and ARROJADO had
been strained as the victim constantly picked on ARROJADO even for the slightest mistake. Erlinda
remembered the scolding that the victim gave ARROJADO over the loss of keys.
Another relative, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlindas testimony that she knew the MARY ANN
to be a snob and overly strict. She testified that the ARROJADO was angry at MARY ANN and in
fact passed by her store thrice complaining to her of the MARY ANNs maltreatment of him.

Accuseds Version/Defense

ARROJADO testified in his behalf. He told that Alberto Arrojado, the victims father, asked him for
food, so ARROJADO went to the kitchen to find out if MARY ANN had already prepared breakfast.
When he found that the victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to her room. From the doorway,
he saw the MARY ANN lying on her bed, bloodied. ARROJADO thought that the MARY ANN had
committed suicide because she had told he that she felt tied down taking care of her father. She in
fact once remarked that, It would be better that my father and I commit suicide.

ARROJADO was charged with the crime of murder where the Regional Trial Court found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a detention
prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under
preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the RPC.

ISSUES:
4 Whether or not the RTC erred in finding that Mary Ann Arrojado was stabbed ten times at
her home
5 Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that Mary Ann Arrojado could not have committed
suicide
6 Whether or not the RTC erred in finding that the house of Mary Ann Arrojado was totally
closed and locked against intruders
7 Whether or not the RTC erred in finding that ARROJADO was abused and oppressed by
Mary Ann Arrojado that led him to kill the victim

HELD:

1. No. The victim indeed sustained ten stab wounds.

ARROJADO claims that most of the victims wounds were inflicted after she had already committed
suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. ARROJADO only saw one wound while Erlinda
Magluyo saw two wonds on the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted
upon the victim afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In
ARROJADOs case, it may be because he did not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a
distance, Dr. Roldan, who conducted a post-mortem examination, testified that the victim actually
sustained ten wounds.

2. No. The victim did not commit suicide

ARROJADO admitted that it did not occur to him that an intruder was in the house the night before
the body of the victim was found because No person could get inside because the windows were
closed and besides the doors were closed. ARROJADO never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was
open that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that it is not possible that somebody would enter the
house as the doors were securely locked with additional barrel bolts, and the windows have grills.

3. No. The house of Mary Ann Arrojado was totally closed and locked against intruders.

The following circumstances point to ARROJADO as the perpetrator of the crime:

1 ARROJADO, the victim, and the latters father were the only ones living in the house in
which the crime was committed.
2 No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the
windows had grills.
3 ARROJADO had access to the victims bedroom because the bedroom doors were left
unlocked so that Mary Ann could check on her fathers condition during the night.
4 The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house.
5 None of the victims belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the
crime was not gain but revenge
6 Judging from the number and severity of the wounds, the killer felt deep-seated resentment
and anger toward the victim. ARROJADO had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Magdaluyo
and Thelma Arrojado
7 Aside from ARROJADO, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.
8 As the Solicitor-General also pointed out, ARROJADOs behavior, in the day the body of the
victim was found, was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and
employer, a person he claims to get along with, dead.

4.

The RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against

ARROJADO.
Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roland testified based on her findings, the victim was not in a position
to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was asleep. As regards the
second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to no other
conclusion that accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which tended directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense; so many wounds, a
total of ten, half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack.

The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the requisites
thereof have not been established in this case.

PEOPLE VS. NELMIDA

G.R. No. 184500 | September 11, 2012

Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

MAYOR TAWAN-TAWAN, together with his security escorts went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan Tawan.

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, NELMIDA together with his other co-accused, brought
SAMUEL to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the
left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by to stay in the
waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road. Then,
NELMIDA and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of MAYOR
TAWAN-TAWAN. A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of MAYOR
TAWAN-TAWAN approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the
yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, NELMIDA and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms.

MAYOR TAWAN-TAWAN ordered Juanito to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle
stopped upon reaching the army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
detachment. The Mayor then asked assistance therefrom.

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of MAYOR TAWAN-TAWAN died, while others
suffered injuries.

During investigation, Samuel was noticed at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation, Samuel
denied any involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious,
hence, the latter was arrested and was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail. Thereafter, Samuel was
released and was utilized as a state witness.

Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying NELMIDA and their co-accused as the persons
responsible for the ambush of MAYOR TAWAN-TAWAN and his companions.

NELMIDA and his co-accused were charged with double murder with multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder to which they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the
Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the previous decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (Complex Crime) is applicable.

HELD:

1. No. Article 48 does not apply in this case.

NELMIDA et al should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this
case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of NELMIDA et. al, thus, making Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code not applicable.

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in
the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime. From its factual backdrop, it can easily
be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of
firearms by NELMIDA et al. and their co-accused. To note, NELMIDA and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-Tawan and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot
wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet
had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims.

As held in People vs. Valdez, each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which
cannot give rise to a complex crime.

NELMIDA and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct
acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 would not apply for it speaks only of a single
act.

PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 199892 | December 10, 2012

PUNZALAN was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single
act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road and ramming through the
navy personnel.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Seaman 1st class (SN1) Andal, SN1 Duclayna, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Domingo, SN1 Cuya and SN1
Bundang were among the members of the Philippine Navy set for schooling at the Naval Education
and Training Command. (NETC). At around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the All-in-
one Canteen to have some drink. Later at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby
videoke bar, Aquarius where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated
argument between SN1 BACOSA and PUNZALAN ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside
Aquarius. When SN1 BACOSA suggested that the light be turned off (patayin ang ilaw),
PUNZALAN who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 BACOSAs statement was
directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 BACOSA and PUNZALAN, while SN1 Buntag
apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 BACOSA. However, PUNZALAN was still visibly angry,
mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave Aquarius and return to NETC camp.
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de
Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by
to give the sentries some barbeque before proceeding to follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala
flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van. The sentries approached the van and
recognized PUNZALAN, who was reeking liquor, as the driver. Even before he was given the go
signal to proceed, PUNZALAN shifted gears and sped away while uttering, papatayin ko yang mga
yan! While F1EN Dimaala was writing the vans plate number and details in the logbook, he
suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the
camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel prompting
him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, Chief, binangga ang tropa! SN1 De Guzman then asked
permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the navy personnel.

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away
towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They lost consciousness. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1
Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van.

SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from the path
of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicles plate number.

SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering CPR on SN1 Duclayna. He also saw the misshapen
body of SN1 Andal lying some 50 meters away, apparently dragged there when the speeding van hit
SN1 Andal. SN1 Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get an ambulance but the car of the officer on
duty at that time arrived and the boarded SN1 Duclaynas injured body to the vehicle to be brought
to the hospital.

A post-mortem exam was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna by Jericho
Cordero of Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Corderos findings were that the injuries sustained by
SN1 Andal were fatal and caused by a hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of the impact was
such that the internal organs were fatally injured. SN1 Andal died of cardio respiratory arrest as a
result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head. SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries to the
head and liver.

As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and different
parts of the body for which he was confined for eighteen days. SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his
knee and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his
right foot.
PUNZALAN was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court for the complex
crime of double murder qualified by treachery with attempted murder attended by aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not PUNZALAN is guilty of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder

HELD:

1. Yes. PUNZALAN is guilty of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder.

PUNZALAN was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single
act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road and ramming through the
navy personnel. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law
attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while
attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of two
indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance, the
higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper
imposable penalty- the higher sanction- is death. However, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346,
prohibiting imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of the killing of each of the two victims
is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua thus imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for the complex crime that he committed
is correct.

PEOPLE VS. DULAY

G.R. No. 194629 | April 21, 2014

It is settled that the Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or
gravely abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the CA.
In the present case, the Court sees no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the courts a
quo.
REYES, J.:

FACTS:

In the evening of December 30, 2002, JUNIOR, a child about six years of age, was outside the kitchen
of their house. His father, the late ORLANDO SR., was also somewhere in the yard and was asking
Junior to hand him a chair.

Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the kitchen
and noticed DULAYs dog in the vicinity. She surmised that its master, DULAY, was also present.
Juniors elder sister, Melanie went out to look for the dogleash to transfer the mutt to another area.

Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, JUNIOR directed a beam
towards the grassy area where he discovered DULAY. Melanie also saw DULAY as he was staring at
ORLANDO SR. Their uncle DULAY suddenly threw something that resembled a ball, towards the
cemented part of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from
where JUNIOR and His Father were. DULAY then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of
his house.

When the grenade exploded, JUNIOR was hurt in his pelvic area, while his FATHER was fatally hit
by shrapnel, causing his death. Melanie rushed to the succor of her bloodied father, barely noticing
Junior who was likewise lying on the ground, but was still conscious and crying. Engracia hollered
for help from the neighborhood. Because of the firecrackers in that New Years Eve, people did not
readily render assistance, until they realized the intensity of the explosion that shook the ground.

ORLANDO SR. was rushed to the hospital but he expired shortly thereafter..

The RTC found DULAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with
attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs decision with modification. DULAY is found
guilty of the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CA correctly ruled that DULAY is guilty of the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder
HELD:

1. Yes. DULAY is guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder.

It is settled that the Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or
gravely abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the
CA. In the present case, the Court sees no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the
courts a quo.

As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CAs conclusion that
Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder.

The requisites of a frustrated felony are:

1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and
2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in throwing the
grenade which could have caused Juniors death as a consequence, but because of immediate medical
assistance, a cause independent of Dulays will, Junior survived.

The Court thus affirms the CA decision, with modification on the awarded indemnities.

SANTIAGO VS. GARCHITORENA

228 SCRA 214 | December 2, 1993

Where only one single criminal act of approving the application for legalization of 32 aliens was
committed on the same period of time, the 32 informations should be consolidated into one. Under the
following circumstances, the thirty-two informations filed by the prosecution should be consolidated
into only one information.
QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago, the then Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
Commissioner, was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the
Alien Legalization Program wherein Santiago, approved the application for legalization of the stay of
about 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines in violation of Executive Order No. 324 which does
not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said SANTIAGO.

She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was
then a presidential candidate. She also moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
GARCHITORENA from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to
inhibit. Her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

SANTIAGO filed a motion for a bill of particulars stating that while the Information alleged that she
had approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to her, unless she was furnished with the
names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

SANTIAGO contended in this case that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations
against her, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one Amended
Information. She also questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended
Informations, the splitting of the original information.

She even claimed that the Amended Informations filed against her did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under E.O. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
Informations.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not there was only one crime that was committed in Santiagos case wherein
there should only be one information to be filed against her.

HELD:

1. Yes. There was only one crime committed in petitioner Santiagos case, and hence, there
should only be one Information to be filed against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime"
and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime.

Where only one single criminal act of approving the application for legalization of 32
aliens was committed on the same period of time, the 32 Informations should be
consolidated into only one. In the case at bench, the original Information charged Santiago with
performing a single criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens
not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e.,
on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application
for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document.

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado consists
of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON

G.R. No. 170236 | August 31, 2006

The aforequoted provision of R.A. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal
law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Information alleged that QUIACHON, by means of force and intimidation, have sexual intercourse
with ROWENA, his daughter, 8 years old, deaf-mute minor, against her will and consent.

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel, son of QUIACHON, saw his father on top of his sister
ROWENA and they were covered by a blanket. His fathers buttocks were moving up and down, and
Rowel could hear ROWENA crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their
father.

Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he told his mothers sister about the incident.
Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what transpired.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied raping
Rowena and alleged that both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a grudge against him
because he abandoned his family and was not able to support him.

A crime of qualified rape was charged to QUIACHON where he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced him to suffer the maximum penalty of death, including its accessory penalties,
and to indemnify the offended party.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the court correctly imposed the penalty of death.

HELD:

1. No. the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.

The RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of rape pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to
appellant warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code

The aforequoted provision of R.A. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal
law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are
given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People
vs. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time
but also the expression of displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

PEOPLE VS. SALOME

G.R. No. 169077 | August 31, 2006

In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.

AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:

Sometime in July of 1997, SALLY, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with her three-year old
brother inside their house when SALOME entered their house. She was awakened by the presence of
the latter who, allegedly, was poking a knife at the base of her neck. While holding the knife with one
hand, SALOME undressed her with his other hand. He threatened her that he would kill her and
her family if she would tell anyone about the incident. After undressing SALLY, SALOME forced her
to lie down. He removed his shorts and underwear. He then spread her legs and inserted his penis
into her vagina.

According to SALLY, she just closed her eyes while SALOME had his way with her. She did not call
for help because she was afraid that nobody would be in the next house which was about 800 meters
away.
She cannot remember how long SALOME remained on top of her but before he left, he reiterated his
threat to kill her and her family if she told anybody of what happened. After that, SALLY would
frequently see SALOME but the latter never spoke to her.

Fearful for her life and for her familys safety, SALLY did not inform anyone of the incident. Although
it entered her mind that she could be pregnant, she left her province to work as a domestic helper in
the house of SPO2 Constantino B. Saret in West Crame, San Juan, Manila.

On November 12, 1997, she had a pelvic ultrasound examination which confirmed her pregnancy.
Upon learning this, she reported the rape incident to the police on November 17, 1997. She executed
a sworn statement and filed a complaint.

During the trial, Salome offered the defense of alibi in court claiming that he went fishing at the
time of the incident.

The RTC convicted SALOME of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, committed inside the dwelling
of the offended party and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The Court of Appeals later on
affirmed the conviction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not death penalty shall be imposed.

HELD:

1. No. The penalty should be modified to reclusion perpetua.

The Court affirmed the Decision of the CA with regard to the conviction of Salome and amount of
damages. The sentence that shall be imposed upon appellant, however, is modified. In view of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without parole.

Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without the
presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified the trial courts imposition of the death penalty.

The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty
shall be applied when an aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is present in the
commission of the offense.

The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial courts imposition of
the death penalty. This is without prejudice, of course, to the provisions of Section 25, R.A. 7659
regarding the possible exercise of the pardoning power of the Office of the President upon the finality
of the death sentence.

In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the evidence by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court sustains
the conviction of appellant, the penalty imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
but appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

COLINARES VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182748 | December 13, 2011

The Probation Law, said the court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appeal- that when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction.
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

RUFINO testified that at around 7 in the evening, he and Jesus went out to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with RUFINO waiting nearby. From
nowhere, COLINARES sneaked behind and struck RUFINO twice on the head with a huge stone,
about 15 inches in diameter. RUFINO fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

ANANIAS testified that he was walking home when he saw RUFINO lying by the roadside.
ANANIAS tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking
him out. He later learned that COLINARES had hit him. Alano testified that he saw the whole
incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod
and they brought RUFINO to the hospital.

COLINARES contended that his act was as a self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home
that evening when he met RUFINO, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. COLINARES
asked RUFINO where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, RUFINO pushed
him, causing his fall. Jesus and ANANIAS then boxed COLINARES several times on the back.
RUFINO tried to stab COLINARES but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself,
struck RUFINO on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards COLINARES and
tried to stab him with a gaff. COLINARES was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the
same stone. COLINARES then fled and hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered.

A crime of frustrated homicide was filed against COLINARES where he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, COLINARES invoked self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent
reduction of the penalty imposed on him, the CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not COLINARES acted in self-defense when he struck RUFINO on the head with a
stone.
2) Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not COLINARES is guilty of frustrated
homicide
3) Given a finding that COLINARES is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court (YES)

HELD:
1) No. COLINARES did not act in self-defense.

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that RUFINO
and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated COLINARES testimony that it was RUFINO
who started it. COLINARES did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he
suffered injuries in the hands of RUFINO and his companions.

2) The Court finds COLINARES liable only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide.

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his victims life.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold COLINARES guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide. Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecutions claim that RUFINO would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the
Court finds COLINARES liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

3) Ordinarily, COLINARES would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having

appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds COLINARES guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds
that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum.
With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand
of the case to the RTC.

While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such
privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court
finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to
apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or
not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the Probation Law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to COLINARES: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the Regional Trial Court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by
the Supreme Court. The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing COLINARES
to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals that the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction."

Here, however, COLINARES did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply
for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow COLINARES to now seek
probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the
option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, COLINARES raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on
him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
COLINARES sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would
allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258 | February 1, 2012

Criminal Liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In
contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final
judgment.

SERENO, J.

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity.

The neophytes, including victim, LENNY VILLA (represented by GERARDA VILLA), were subjected
to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. They survived their first day of initiation and were
also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.

After the second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon (DIZON) and Artemio Villareal (VILLAREAL) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites initially refused. Upon the insistence of DIZON and
VILLAREAL, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including DIZON
and VILLAREAL, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical
pain. LENNY received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their
last session of physical beatings, LENNY could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by LENNYs shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, VILLAREAL and DIZON dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was
just overacting. When they realized, though, that LENNY was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to
keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. LENNY was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members. The trial court found the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
However, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation.
Nineteen of the accused were acquitted, four of the accused were found guilty of slight physical
injuries, and two of the accused (DIZON and VILLAREAL) were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. Accused VILLAREAL petitioned for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 on the grounds that the CA allegedly committed two reversible errors: first, denial of due process;
and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While petition was pending, petitioner
VILLAREAL died on March 13, 2011. Counsel for the petitioner filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10
August 2011.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished by
death.

HELD:

Yes, criminal liability of the accused VILLAREAL is extinguished by death.

The Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party when the same was filed
while the petition was pending resolution.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties
is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. Personal penalties refer to the service of
personal or imprisonment penalties, while pecuniary penalties refers to fines and costs, including
civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of. However, civil liability based on a
source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable
through a separate civil action.

Therefore, the death of petitioner VILLAREAL extinguished his criminal liability for both personal
and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.

SUYAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to
observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege.
SERENO, J.

FACTS: SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. He
pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of
prision correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation
Order covering a period of six years.

While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of Section 16
of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the Chief of the
Parole and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of his probation, citing
recidivism. NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditions of his probation, in view of his incarceration.

The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYANs probation and directed him to serve his sentence.
SUYAN then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not accorded
due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.

The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer SUYAN
showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug
activities despite counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has already
served his sentence on the other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment but did not
dispute the certification.

After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA, but
the same was denied.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.

HELD:

Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of
the Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense
shall render the probation order ineffective.

The Courts discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.

ALMERO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188191 | March 12, 2014

Appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies. The application for probation is an admission
of guilt on the part of the accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. Probation is
not a right, but a mere privilege.

SERENO, J.

FACTS: ALMERO was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and multiple physical injuries. On September 7,
2007, ALMERO filed an Application for Probation, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction
only upon being served the warrant of his arrest. The prosecutor opposed his application for being
uncooperative, habitually absent, and failure to inform the court of his change of address. The MTC
denied his application, prompting ALMERO to file a special civil action with the RTC. He also filed a
Supplemental Petition arguing that his conviction was flawed and premature since the MTC never
ruled upon his formal offer of exhibits.

The RTC ruled in favor of ALMERO, holding that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
deciding the case without first ruling on Enriques formal of exhibits, since technically, he had not yet
rested his case. On reversal, CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to the question of
whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying ALMEROs application for
probation. An application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation.

HELD:

No, the instant petition lacks merit.

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State,
and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
of probation. Appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies. An accused applying for
probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of
guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the
reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from
judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an
acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment,
or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D.
No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.

MORENO VS. COMELEC

 G.R. No. 168550 | August 10, 2006

During the period of probation, the probationer is not disqualified from running for public office
because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

TINGA, J.

FACTS: MEJES filed a petition to disqualify MORENO from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the MORENO was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment by the RTC.

Following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, MORENO filed an answer averring that the petition states
no cause of action because he was already granted probation. The order of the trial court allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction
including the right to vote and be voted for.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor for preliminary hearing.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that MORENO be disqualified from
running. This recommendation was adopted by COMELEC First Division and later affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc on a motion for reconsideration.

According to the COMELEC En Banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. The grant of probation to MORENO merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. Further,
the provisions of the Local Government Code should take precedence over the case of Baclayon v.
Mutia.

MORENO, on the other hand, argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the
Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not MORENO should be disqualified from running for public office.

HELD:

No, MORENO is not disqualified from running for public office.

Moreno applied for and was granted probation within the period specified. He never served a day of
his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
does not apply to him.

At any rate, the phrase within two years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the said Code
should have been interpreted to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment.

During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with
service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. The probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
the probation order.

PEOPLE VS. BAYOT

G.R. No. 200030 | April 18, 2012

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the
accused on his criminal, as well as, civil liability.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: BAYOT was convicted by the RTC for a crime of rape committed against AAA, thus
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award
of indemnity from P 40,000 to 50,000. It also ordered BAYOT to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount of P 50,000. The decision was promulgated on May 9, 2006. However, in a letter dated May
29, 2006, Penal Superintendent Dr. Juanito Leopando of New Bilibid Prison informed the Court of
Appeals that the BAYOT died at the prison hospital on December 4, 2004. Attached in the letter was
the original copy of BAYOTs death certificate.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the death of BAYOT extinguished both his criminal and civil liability.

HELD:

Yes, BAYOTs death during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals,
extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA,
but also his civil liability arising from or based on said crime.

It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal case.

PEOPLE VS. AMISTOSO

G.R. No. 201447 | August 28, 2013

Well-settled is the rule that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
how criminal liability is totally extinguished.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS: AAA is the second of five children of AMISTOSO and BBB. Their family lived in a one-room
shanty. AAA was 12 years old when the rape incident happened. Prior to this, AMISTOSO has
scolded and even whipped AAA because the latter refused to go with him to the forest to get a piece
of wood which AMISTOSO would use as a handle for his bolo. In his fury, AMISTOSO attempted to
hack AAA. BBB and her other children was able to ran away but AAA had no choice but to stay
behind.

On that night, AAA was awakened when an already naked AMISTOSO mounted her. AMISTOSO
reached under AAAs skirt and removed her panties. AAA resisted by shouting but AMISTOSO
managed to insert his penis inside AAAs vagina. After AMISTOSO ejaculated, he stood up and told
AAA not to tell anyone about what happened or else AAA would be killed.

AMISTOSO was charged with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to
Article 266-B, paragraph(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. However, the RTC and CA
convicted him for qualified rape. Insisting upon his innocence, AMISTOSO appealed to the Court. In
a Decision dated January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
against AMISTOSO.

However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, the Officer-in-Charge of the Inmate Documents and
Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that AMISTOSO had died on
December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of the death
report stating that AMISTOSO died on December 11, 2012 of cardio respiratory arrest. The letter
was received by the Court on February 12, 2013.

Penal Institution Supervisor of the NBP wrote another letter dated February 12, 2013, likewise
informing the Court of AMISTOSOs death. Appended to the letter was a mere photocopy of the
death certificate, which was received by the Court on February 18, 2013.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office which represented AMISTOSO and which
was apparently also unaware of its clients demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Courts Decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the death of AMISTOSO extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

HELD:

The death of the AMISTOSO pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.

Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

Undeniably, AMISTOSOs death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its
Decision on January 9, 2013. When AMISTOSO died, his appeal before the Court was still pending
and unresolved. The Court ruled upon AMISTOSOs appeal only because it was not immediately
informed of his death.

AMISTOSOs death pending the Courts resolution renders the Courts Decision, even though
affirming the conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final,
and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

PEOPLE VS. CONSORTE

G.R. No. 194068 | November 26, 2014

The criminal and civil liability ex delicto of a person convicted for murder who moved for
reconsideration of his conviction and died pending resolution will be extinguished.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

CONSORTE was a former conductor of Palmars (victim) jeepney. Palmars residence was robbed and
several personal belongings, including cash, were taken. It was later found out that the TV set was
pawned by the accused. CONSORTE was sued for robbery thereafter. Hearing was set but on the
night before the scheduled hearing, Palmar was murdered.

Palmars husband instructed a certain Rolando Visbe (eyewitness) to haul feeds and deliver them to
their piggery. The victim, along with her daughter and nephew, went with Visbe. On their way back,
Visbe noticed CONSORTE who was wearing a hat. Visbe asked CONSORTE where he was going but
the latter did not reply. Visbe veered to the right to avoid hitting CONSORTE but the jeepney lost its
balance. While struggling to release the vehicle, Visbe heard a gunshot and saw CONSORTE holding
a handgun. Palmar was rushed to the hospital but she died due to the fatal gunshot wound.

CONSORTE was convicted for murder by the RTC and CA. On July 9, 2014, the Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction but modified the civil indemnity and exemplary damages. CONSORTE
assailed the conviction in a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, in a Letter dated September 21,
2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison informed the Court that CONSORTE died on
July 14 2014, as evidenced by the attached Death Certificate issued by NBP Medical Officer.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not death of CONSORTE pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability.

HELD:

Yes, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of CONSORTE is extinguished by his death
prior to final judgment.

As provided in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that: death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed.
CONSORTE died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for reconsideration is still pending
resolution by the Court. As such, his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

PEOPLE VS. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 168641 | April 27, 2007

The filing of the complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the rime the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: GOYENA filed with the City Prosecutor a complaint for slight physical injuries against
BAUTISTA. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor issued a recommendation
for the filing of information against BAUTISTA. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was,
however, filed with the MeTC of Manila only on June 20, 2000. BAUTISTA sought the dismissal of
the case against him on the ground that by the time the information was filed, the 60-day period of
prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already
elapsed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutors
recommendation to file the proper criminal information against BAUTISTA was approved by
the City Prosecutor.

HELD:

No, the crime has not yet prescribed.

The filing of the complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
proceeding against BAUTISTA was not terminated upon the City Prosecutors approval of the
investigating prosecutors recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.

The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake
or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held
in People v. Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part
to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 174654 | August 17, 2011

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: In 1985, ABELLANA extended a loan to SPOUSES DIAGA and SAAPIA ALONTO to which
was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land located in Cebu City.
Subsequently, ABELLANA prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him to which was
signed by the SPOUSES ALONTO in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu without the
presence of SPOUSES ALONTO. An information was filed charging the ABELLANA with Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document.
The trial court rendered the decision finding the ABELLANA guilty of Falsification of a Public
Document by a private individual. He was directed to return the properties to the spouses and to pay
a sum of P 130,000 with legal interests, nominal damages, attorney's fees, litigation expense and
exemplary damages, plus cost of the suit. On appeal, ABELLANA raised the issue whether an
accused acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless convicted of another crime or offense not
specifically charged in the information. CA reversed the decision, ruling that it violated the
constitutional right of the ABELLANA to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. However, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with respect to the civil liability.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not ABELLANA could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.

HELD:

ABELLANA is not civilly liable.

Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
causes damage to another. Hence, for ABELLANA to be civilly liable to SPOUSES ALONTO, it must
be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the
case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the ABELLANA did not cause any damage to
spouses.

The evidence showed that the signature of the spouses was genuine and not forged. The non-
appearance before a notary public does not render the Deed of Absolute Sale void, and is not
sufficient to overcome the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. There must be clear
and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the deed.

Supreme Court finds no basis on the imposition of the actual and other kinds of damages upon the
petitioner. Sentences should not be in the alternative, a judge may have the discretion of imposing
one or another penalty, but he cannot impose both in the alternative.

PEOPLE VS. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 152662 | June 13, 2012

The filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

PEREZ,J

FACTS: On 16 September 1997, VIRGINIA C. MALOLOS filed an affidavit complaint for estafa and
violation of BP Blg. 22 against MA. THERESA PANGILINAN with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of QC. The complaint alleges that PANGILINAN issued 9 checks with an aggregate amount of
P9,658,592.00 in favor of VIRGINIA MALOLOS which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment. On 5 December 1997, PANGILINAN filed a civil case against MALOLOS before the RTC of
Valenzuela City. On 10 December 1997, PANGILINAN filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on
the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the OCP of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of
the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. On 2 March 1998, Assistant City
Prosecutor Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of
the civil action. The recommendation was approved. Aggrieved, MALOLOS raised the matter before
the DOJ.

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor of QC and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
PANGILINAN for 2 of the 9 checks. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the
seven other checks included in the affidavit complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however,
dismissed. The two counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against PANGILINAN on 3 February
2000 before the MeTC. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC. She alleged that her
criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The presiding judge granted the
motion and the case was raffled to the RTC.

The RTC ruled that the criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22 had not yet
prescribed when the same was filed with the OCP on 16 September 1997. On PANGILINANS
appeal, the CA ruled that the action has prescribed. The commencement period started sometime in
the latter part of 1995, and pursuant to Sec. 1 of Act 3326,as amended, MALOLOS had four years
therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against PANGILINAN
before the proper court. Sec 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes the Supreme
Court held that the proceedings referred to in Sec 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that. The information were only filed wit the MeTC
on 3 February 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense?

HELD: Yes. Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4)
years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should
be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 122 SCRA 538 (1983), when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

PANGILINANS contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special law
is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277 (1992), is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, 260 SCRA
207 (1996), Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), Brillante v. CA, 440 SCRA 541
(2004), and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303 (2008), cases involving special laws, this
Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., 567 SCRA 354 (2008), the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), which is in
all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings
for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. In light of all of the
foregoing, the instant petition is granted.

LUMANTAS VS CALAPIZ

G.R. No. 163753 | January 15, 2014

It is axiomatic that every person

criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittalof an accused of the crime
charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.

BERSAMIN,J.

FACTS: Spouses Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, HANZ, to the hospital for an emergency
appendectomy. HANZ was attended to by DR. LUMANTAS, who suggested to the parents that
HANZ also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents consent,
DR. LUMANTAS performed the coronal type of circumcision on HANZ after his appendectomy. On
the following day, HANZ complained of pain in his penis. The parents noticed that the child urinated
abnormally after DR. LUMANTAS forcibly removed the catheter, but the doctor dismissed the
abnormality as normal. But a week later, HANZ was admitted again because of the abscess
formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Dr. Henry Go, a urologist, diagnosed that
HANZ have a damaged urethra. Thus, HANZ underwent cystostomy, and was operated on three
times to repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanzs parents brought a criminal charge against the DR. LUMANTAS for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.

The RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It held
that the Prosecutions evidence did not show the required standard of care to be observed by other
members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the
petitioner was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that
HANZ had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries?
HELD: The CA did not err, acquittal from the crime does not necessarily results in extinguishing the
civil liability from the delict. It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two kinds
of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of
the accused, viz.:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction

against DR. LUMANTAS for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging
his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this
connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that
the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action
for that purpose.

The DR. LUMANTAS contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no
proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his
criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was
preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA both
finding that HANZ had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of DR. LUMANTAS on the
occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court
must concur with their uniform findings.

Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have long advocated
the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of ones body, is
not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages
should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect
estimation of the true value of ones body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the
physical injuries sustained. In HANZS case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed
by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to
repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.
 Many years have gone by since HANZ suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then
be imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not
only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we make the adjustment in the permissible
manner by prescribing legal interest on the award, his sufferings would be unduly compounded. For
that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be from the filing of the criminal information on April
17, 1997, the making of the judicial demand for the liability of DR. LUMANTAS.

DALURAYA VS. OLIVA

G.R. No. 210148 | December 8, 2014

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable; The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.

PERLAS-BERNABE. J.

FACTS: Sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN 172 and traversing EDSA ran her over. While Marina
Oliva was rushed to the hospital, she eventually dies, prompting her daughter MARLA OLIVA, to file
a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against DALURAYA, the purported
driver of the vehicle. During the proceedings, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Serrano,
an eye witness to the incident; MARLA, who testified on the civil damages sustained by her family as
a result of Marinas death; Dr. Ortiz, who presented his findings on the autopsy; PSI Gomez, who
conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the
vehicle being driven by DALURAYA, albeit he did not witness the incident. After the prosecution
rested its case, DALURAYA filed a demurrer asserting that he was not positively identified by any of
the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear
and competent evidence of how the incident transpired. The MeTC granted DALURAYAS demurrer
and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. MARLA moved for reconsideration, which the
MeTC denied, ruling that it will violate DALURAYAS right against double jeopardy. With respect to
the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be
awarded absent any evidence proving that DALURAYA was the person responsible for Marina
Olivas demise. MARLA appealed to the RTC maintaining that DALURAYA should be held civilly
liable for her mothers death. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs
ruling,declaring that "the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist.
Dissatisfied, MARLA elevated the case to the CA via petition for review. The CA ruled in her favour
and reversed the RTC decision, holding DALURAYA civilly liable for actual damages, civil indemnity,
and moral damages. In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTCs Order showed that DALURAYAS
acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As such, DALURAYA was not exonerated from civil liability. Further, pieces of evidence were
considered by the CA in adjudging him civilly liable: the inadmissible sworn statement by
DALURAYA where he admitted driving the vehicle; the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of
one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying DALURAYA as the suspect in the case of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he
brought the victim to the hospital for treatment but was declared dead on arrival; that the person hit
by the Nissan Vanette and the victim were one and the same person; and the fact that the Nissan
Vanette was registered in the name of Antonios aunt who authorised him to claim it from the MTC.
Thus, Antonio filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court to reverse the CA
ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in finding DALURAYA civilly liable for Marina Olivas
death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence?

HELD: The CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC. The petition
filed by DALURAYA is meritorious. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability. In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our
law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
DALURAYAS acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the
author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and they
did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against him."
Furthermore, when MARLA sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting DALURAYA,
said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the
accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no
competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death
of Marina Oliva."

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC,
that DALURAYAS acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of DALURAYAS evidence on the civil aspect.
Records disclose that DALURAYAS acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently
establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability
should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192123 | March 10, 2014
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

BERSAMIN, J
FACTS: GERALD was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth,
GERALD underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out
through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of
his body.
On May 17, 1995, GERALD, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr.
Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and DR. SOLIDUM. During the operation, GERALD experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness
only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her sons helpless and
unexpected condition, Luz lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians. Upon a finding
of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information solely against DR. SOLIDUM. On
July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding DR. SOLIDUM guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On January 20, 2010, the CA applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur affirmed the conviction of DR. SOLIDUM. DR. SOLIDUM filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein?
2 Whether or not DR. SOLIDUM was liable for criminal negligence?
HELD:
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not applicable herein
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The
doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured. In this case although it should be conceded without difficulty that
the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of DR. SOLIDUM, and that the patient, being then
unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first
element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered GERALD to the care, custody and control of his
physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, GERALD was then of sound
body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia
during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the
insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically
termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or
during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the
negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury.
In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack
of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine
to the patient.
DR. SOLIDUM is not liable for criminal negligence
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. DR.
SOLIDUMS conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly
regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on GERALD by overdosing at 100% halothane.
However, Dr. Vertido in his testimony corrected one piece of information regarding the dosage of the
anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100%
halothane and said that based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen. The implication of
Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent. In this case the
Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt. In
litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the
part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the
plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty
owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in
accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the
duty by the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the
causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. In this case Dr.
Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability that other factors related to GERALDS major
operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia,
had caused the hypoxia and had then led GERALD to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly
concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."

GALVANTE VS. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 162808 | April 22, 2008

The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law-what the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches, i.e.,
search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained under Art.
129, and searching domicile without witnesses under Art. 130.

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.

FACTS: CONDE, AVENIDO, DEGRAN, RUFANO, BALOLOT confiscated from GALVANTE one colt
pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated
September 2, 1999. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against GALVANTE an
Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on
Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258 before the RTC. Pending resolution of Criminal Case,
GALVANTE filed against CONDE, AVENIDO, DEGRAN, RUFANO, BALOLOT an administrative
case for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, and a criminal
case, for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. GALVANTE
alleged that CONDE, AVENIDO, DEGRAN, RUFANO, BALOLOT, thinking he was armed with a
gun, pointed their firearms at him and asked for his gun. CONDE went near GALVANTES jeep and
conducted a search without a search warrant. After a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the
floor mat of GALVANTES jeep. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba
for two days having been released only after posing a bail. Consequently, GALVANTE filed an
Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving AVENIDO, DEGRAN,
RUFANO AND BALOLOT, but maintaining CONDE alone be prosecuted in both administrative and
criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding CONDE, AVENIDO, DEGRAN, RUFANO,
BALOLOT guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of
the arrest in line of duty. The RTC dismissed the case against GALVANTE. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman dismissed the charges against CONDE, AVENIDO, DEGRAN, RUFANO, BALOLOT for
lack of probable cause.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the
private respondents?

Held: Yes. The SC ruled that the complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the RPC or any other
special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Search warrants maliciously
obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained and Searching domicile without
witnesses. The GALVANTE did not allege any of the foregoing felonies in his complaint. The remedy
of GALVANTE against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article 32 in
relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code which provides: Art.32: Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another shall be liable to the latter for
damages xxx The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures; xxx The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated. The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed
by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that
(a)the offender is a public officer or employee, (b)the offender detained the complainant, and (c)the
detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged by petitioner. The
GALVANTE himself identified that it it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. For
the complaint of grave threats, the same is merely based on GALVANTES allegation. The public
officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function. Wherefore, the
petition is DENIED.

GEROCHE VS PEOPLE

G.R No. 179080 | November 26, 2014

Under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if
Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of
a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender.

PERALTA,J

FACTS: Petitioners EDIGARDO GEROCHE, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias Tapol were
charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the RPC. The information reads
that at about 10:00 oclock GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs,
hence, persons in authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
garand rifles, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of
BALERIANO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the occupants, search the
effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then mauled and injured one of
the occupant BALERIANO. GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. BALERIANO, his nephew, SP04 Calfoforo and Dr. Cabrera testify and took the witness
stand for the prosecution. GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil denied the crime charged, declaring in
unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening. They alleged, however, that the
night before, they conducted a roving foot patrol, together with other barangay officials, due to the
rampant cattle rustling in the area.

The trial court found GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. According to the RTC, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of Article
128 of the RPC. It held that while it is true that accused were named CVOs and the other as a
barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in open
court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution
to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they
were in fact public officers.

GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the RTCs judgment.
It agreed with both parties that GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil should not be convicted for Less
Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering
their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of GEROCHE) and part of the
CAFGU (in the case of Garde and Marfil). GEROCHE, Garde and Marfils motion for reconsideration
was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil are liable for Violation of Domicile?

HELD: Yes, GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil are liable for Violation of Domicile. The Court adopts the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the open court as well as
in the pleadings they filed, neither GEROCHE denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and
Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as
public officers/employees.

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the
RPC, the penalty shall be prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years,
four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or
if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the
search made by the offender. In this case, GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil barged in the house of
BALERIANO while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his
airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. Thus, applying in this
case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days
to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code
that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. On the other hand, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisin correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). The
foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby sentences
the GEROCHE, Garde and Marfil to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 2 years and 4 months of
prisin correccional, as minimum, to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prisin correccional, as
maximum.

LADLAD VS VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 | June 1, 2007
By its nature, rebellion is a crime
of the masses or the multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.

CARPIO, J.
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
BELTRAN, MAZA AND LADLAD prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of DOJ and
RTC Makati on the investigation and prosecution of their cases. Following the issuance by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a
"State of National Emergency," police officers arrested BELTRAN on 25 February 2006, while he was
en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame. BELTRAN was arrested without a
warrant and the arresting officers did not inform BELTRAN of the crime for which he was arrested.
On that evening, BELTRAN was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for
Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the RPC based on a speech BELTRAN allegedly gave during
a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20 th anniversary of the EDSA
Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to
have been present at the rally. The INQUEST PROSECUTOR indicted BELTRAN and filed the
corresponding information.
The authorities brought back BELTRAN to Camp Crame and was subjected to a second
inquest, this time for Rebellion. On 27 February 2006, the DOJ PANEL OF PROSECUTORS issued
a Resolution finding probable cause to indict BELTRAN and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of
Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. BELTRAN moved that Branch
137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. The case which was re-raffled to
Branch 146 under Judge Moya and sustained the finding of probable cause against BELTRAN.
BELTRAN sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without
resolving BELTRANS motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda, to whom the case was re-raffled, denying
BELTRANS motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is there probable cause to charge BELTRAN with rebellion?
HELD: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS who
conducted the inquest of BELTRAN for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents.
The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public,
executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a
certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23
February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions BELTRAN. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in
the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw BELTRAN and other individuals on board a vehicle which
entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted,
they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of
the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw BELTRAN; (2) he
took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like BELTRAN, who represent
party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict BELTRAN for
taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at
best, is that BELTRAN was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years
earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that BELTRAN
committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ
Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that BELTRAN is a leader of a
rebellion. BELTRAN'S alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make
him a leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to BELTRAN'S petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit,
dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against BELTRAN as Fuentes
provided details in his statement regarding meetings with BELTRAN and the other petitioners
attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were
allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a
case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring
down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under
Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information
against BELTRAN in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The
Information merely alleged that BELTRAN, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical
alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable
cause to try BELTRAN for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

GONZALES vs. ABAYA

 G.R. No. 164007 | August 10, 2006
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and
other persons subject to military law who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil
court, except that, where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried
by a court martial, and with the further exception that, where the President,
in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil court

SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, J
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 Officer Of The AFP, Led By Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, entered
the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments, disarmed the guards, and planted explosives around the
building. Through media, they announced their grievances against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos
government and demanded that she along with her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP
and the PNP resign. The President issued G.O. No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion. Negotiates were
sent to the place and THE SOLDIERS finally laid their arms. The NBI investigated the incident and
recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them. Meanwhile, pursuant to
Article 70 of the Articles of War, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the
arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to
conduct its own separate investigation. They filed a motion with the RTC where the coup detat case
was pending to take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the military tribunal following
the doctrine of absorption. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its investigation report to the
JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat
before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of
War. For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed
and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." When GONZALES ET AL were charged under
Art. 96 of the Articles of War, they filed a petition for prohibition praying that ABAYA and
AFP JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War. GONZALES ET AL maintained that Article 96 is not service
connected, hence, absorbed by coup detat, thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG
contended that under RA 7055, violation of Art. 96 is service-connected, hence, within the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal. GONZALES ET AL further contended that the offense has
already prescribed since they were not arraigned within 2 years from the date of the commission of
the offense.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally
charged of coup dtat before the regular courts?
2. Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable?

HELD:
The court martial may assume jurisdiction
Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second
paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In
short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Hence, there is no merit in GONZALES ET AL argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed
and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC,
in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial
the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court
should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only
through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first
and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to
be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
Doctrine of Absorption is not applicable
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies
to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly,
the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A.
7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the
Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

PEOPLE VS. ESTONILLA

G.R. No. 201565.| October 13, 2014

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing
is not parricide or infanticide.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: In this appeal, EXMAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. (CARLOS, SR.), MAYOR REINARIO
ESTONILO (REY), EDELBRANDO ESTONILO (EDEL), EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES (NONONG),
AND CALVIN DELA CRUZ (BULLDOG) seek liberty from the judgment of conviction rendered by
the RTC which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Direct Assault for killing one FLORO CASAS while in the performance of his duty being the District
Supervisor of public schools in the Municipality of Placer, Masbate. An amended information was
filed charging CARLOS AND REY of inducing their co-accused to kill Casas.

Trial ensued and the prosecution presented several witnesses. The defense tried to discredit
the witnesses by confronting them with facts of pending criminal cases filed against them.
Meanwhile, they relied on the defenses of denial and alibi.

The RTC found EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND BULLDOG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It gave credence to the eyewitness account of
Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were both present at the school grounds
during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of
purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of FLORO. NONOY
AND NEGRO were the gunmen, while EDEL AND NONONG served as backup gunmen.
BULLDOG, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.
The RTC found MAYOR CARLOS, SR. and REY to have ordered their co-accused to kill
FLORO based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill FLOR.
Thus, the RTC concluded that EX-MAYOR CARLOS, SR. is a principal by inducement. And REY
conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident
premeditation among all EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND
BULLDOG. The RTC was convinced that the motive for the murder was due to FLOROS support for
mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero, rival of REY. Since the victim was a district supervisor of public
schools, the RTC convicted the EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND
BULLDOG of the complex crime of murder with direct assault.

They appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the RTC
except that the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellants shall be reclusion perpetua with its
accessory penalties rather than the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND BULLDOG pray for the
reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the ground that some of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not
able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND
BULLDOG are guilty as charged?

HELD: Yes, they are proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with direct
assault. To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) FLORO was killed; (2) EX-
MAYOR CARLOS, SR., REY, EDEL, NONONG, and CALVIN were five of the nine perpetrators who
killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as
testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery ; and (4) the
killing of FLORO was neither parricide nor infanticide.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that
he was present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning to kill FLORO. His
categorical and straightforward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation. Treachery
also attended the killing of FLORO. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. In this
case, NONOY and accused Negro successively fired at FLORO about seven times and the victim
sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no
chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. EDEL and
NONONG were on standby also holding their firearms to insure the success of their mission
without risk to themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their
collective acts point to a clear case of treachery.

There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article
148 of the RPC. EXMAYOR CARLOS, SR., MAYOR REY, EDEL, NONONG, AND BULLDOG
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and
the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority.

In this case, FLORO was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was
direct assault just because FLORO was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of
direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on FLORO was, in reality, made by
reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor. When the assault results in the
killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of
direct assault with murder or homicide. The offense is a complex crime. Hence, with all the foregoing,
the accused-appellants guilt are proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SYDECO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 202692| November 12, 2014

The two (2) key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent
is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the
offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent

VELASCO, JR.,J.

FACTS: On July 20, 2006, separate informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act
No. 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code were filed against
petitioner SYDECO. On the night of the incident, P/INSP. MANUEL AGUILAR (AGUILAR), SPO4
BODINO, PO3 BENEDICT CRUZ III and another police officer were manning a checkpoint
established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty
(20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988
driven by SYDECO. , P/INSP. MANUEL AGUILAR (AGUILAR), SPO4 BODINO, PO3 BENEDICT
CRUZ III, all in uniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alight from the vehicle
so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. SYDECO,
who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage
to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner SYDECO started talking rudely to the policemen and in
fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." At that remark,
P/INSP. AGUILAR, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him swerving and
driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up resistance. Despite
petitioners efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who
was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of
alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issued by that hospital.

Petitioner SYDECO, on the other hand, claimed to be a victim in the incident in question, and
averred that he, the cook and waitress in his restaurant were on the way home when they were
signalled to stop by police officers who asked him to open the vehicles door and alight for a body and
vehicle search. When SYDECO instead opened the vehicle window and insisted on a plain view
search. Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen told him he was drunk, pointing to
three empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. The officers then pulled SYDECO out of the
vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting SYDECO as positive of
alcoholic breath, although no alcohol breath examination was conducted. SYDECO was detained and
released only in the afternoon of the following day when he was allowed to undergo actual medical
examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries
but negative for alcohol breath.

ISSUES: Whether or not SYDECO is criminally liable under Article 151 of the RPC?

HELD: Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off
between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner SYDECO on the other, was the latters refusal
to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view
search only. SYDECOs twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He
may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a
criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or
performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid
the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of
resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in
authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the
offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.

There can be no quibble that P/INSP. AGUILAR and his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely SYDECOS act of
exercising ones right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night
cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of
Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar
circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the
people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.

CESARIO URSUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170|APRIL 10, 1996
BELOSSILO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. The Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman
in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and
giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the DENR.

Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao
City requesting for a copy of the complaint against petitioner. He then asked his client, petitioner
Ursua, to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger,
Oscar Perez had to attend to some personal matters. Before going, Ursua told Perez that he feels
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint since he is the respondent in the said case. Perez
told Ursua that he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.

At the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner registered in the visitors logbook by writing the
name Oscar Perez. Proceeding to the Administrative Division, petitioner handed the letter of Atty.
Palmones to the Chief of the said division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
complaint. Petitioner received and acknowledged the same by writing the name Oscar Perez.
However, Loida learned that the person who signed as Oscar Perez was in fact Cesario Ursua. A
criminal case was then filed against petitioner. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. Upon petitioners appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed for his conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners writing of the name Oscar Perez in the present case considered
a violation within the purview of Sec. 1 C.A. No. 142.

HELD:
No. Petitioners writing of the name Oscar Perez in an isolated transaction is not the act
contemplated under Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142.

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese, who, rightly or
wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of
using an alias unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in
the civil register. An alias is a name or names by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and theses are known as
aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A.
No. 142 as amended.

Petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was
not his own name and in he did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of
the complaint in which the petitioner was a respondent. Hence, the use of Oscar Perez is not an
alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that
name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made
by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally requires to expose his real
identity.

PEOPLE VS. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. Nos. 164368-69|APRIL 2, 2009
BRION, J.

FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Estrada. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed which reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then President of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e,
in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity
as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use
and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his
baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan,
consisted of:

A The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G.
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada
opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C163) with PCIB and signed as Jose
Velarde in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that
Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;

B (1) The testimony of PCIB Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a
certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited
several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160625025 under the account name Jose
Velarde on the several dates1

1 a. 20 October 1999 b. 8 November 1999 c. 22 November 1999 d. 24 November 1999 f. 25 November

1999 g. 20 December 1999 h. 21 December 1999 i. 29 December 1999 j. 4 January 2000 k. 10 May
2000 l. 6 June 2000 m. 25 July 2000
 (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in
the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada
occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account
No. 0160625025.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the People failed to present evidence that proved Estradas
commission of the offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Estradas use of the name Jose Velarde is an act of illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142 as amended.

HELD:
No. Estradas use of the name Jose Velarde lacks the elements of publicity and habituality
to constitute the offense of illegal use of alias.

On Habituality
The several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; They were all made on or about
or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place
only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be
sure, the Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the
alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto
would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on or about already
expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be
denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two
phrases and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase.
Of course, the reading would have been very different had the Information simply used AND
instead of OR to separate the phrases; The intent to refer to various transactions occurring on
various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately
for the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To
act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him; The multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims
would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely
on the single day mentioned in the Information.

On Publicity
The People argues that the rule of libel is applicable in the case, therefore mere
communication to third persons constitute the crime. The Supreme Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayans position that the rule of libel that mere communication to a third person is
publicity does not apply for violations under of C.A. No. 142. In order to be liable for a violation of
CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known
under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust
Account No. C163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to
Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaang where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest
confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended
his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua
were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations
with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of
intention of publicity. The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords
Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a
trust accounta transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.

PEOPLE VS. PABLITO ANDAYA

G.R. No. 183700|OCTOBER 13, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
An asset, who was conducting surveillance of accused Andaya, reported that he had arranged
to buy shabu from the latter. A team of police officers was then constituted to conduct a buy bust.
Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly marked X was given to the asset. Upon reaching the
designated place, the team members occupied different positions where they could see and observe
the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Andayas house. Andaya came out and talked to the asset
briefly. Then the asset gave Andaya the marked money. The asset received something from appellant.
The prearranged signal signifying consummation of the transaction was given. The team members
approached Andaya and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused. The
specimen was positive for Methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, upon
examination. An Information for violation of Sec. 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. 9165
(Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002) was then filed against Andaya. Accused Andaya denied the
crime charged and alleged that the non-presentation of the confidential informant who was the
poseur buyer was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court and the CA found Andaya guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary for the State to present the informant during trial for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs.

HELD:
 As a rule, it is not necessary for the State to present the informant during the trial for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs.

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur-buyer; and (b) that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. A buy-
bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. The justification that
underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in flagrante delicto,
that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the
offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. Proof of the transaction must
be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the
burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt.

However, even though it is not necessary for the State to present the informant during trial
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is not applicable in the present case. The confidential informant
was not a police officer. The confidential informant was also designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned
at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those
instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused.
In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were
one and the same. Without the poseur buyers testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate
Andaya. The members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that
they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave
something to the poseur buyer. Moreover, the arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted
the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction.
Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly
threatened the liberty of Andaya. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the
right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
PEOPLE VS. GERARDO ENUMERABLE
G.R. No. 207993|JANUARY 21, 2015
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
 A deal in shabu between the asset of PO3 Edwalberto Villas and Gerry Enumerable caused
the constitution of a buy bust operation by the Batangas City Police Station on May 27, 2004 at 11:30
oclock in the morning at a gas station. Using two (2) pieces of marked P500.00 bills and boodle
money to make the appearance of about P24,000.00, the asset who posed as a buyer transacted with
the accused upon his arrival at the gas station. After the exchange of the marked money and the
three (3) plastic sachets of shabu placed in a black plastic box, the accused was placed under arrest.

The marked money was recovered as well as the three (3) sachets of shabu. The specimen
shabu were turned over to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory, pursuant to the request for
laboratory examination of Chief of Police of Batangas City PNP on May 27, 2004 at 5:25 p.m.
Batangas Provincial Crime laboratory indorsed the request for examination with the specimens on
June 4, 2004 at 2:30 p.m. to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Calamba City, Laguna. The specimens
were found positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The
authenticity and genuineness of which were admitted by accused during the pretrial.

Accused was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs (Sec. 5 RA 9165) where the trial
court and the Court of Appeals both ruled for the conviction of the accused. Hence this appeal on
which the appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the unbroken chain of custody of
the illegal drug which gravely impairs its identity since based on the testimonies of the police
officers, they failed to identify who had custody over the marked sachets of drug and describe how the
same were transferred from one crime laboratory to another.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to establish the identity and integrity of the confiscated illegal
drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense, transgresses the chain of custody rule.

HELD:
Yes. The prosecutions failure to establish and preserve the identity and integrity of the
confiscated illegal drug is a transgression of the chain of custody rule. It is settled that in
prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only must the essential elements of the offense be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The dangerous
drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from
the accused is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, the prosecution must
sufficiently prove the unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drug. In People v.
Watamama, the Court held:

In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved. The chain of custody rule requires that testimony
be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is
offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is
the same substance seized from the accused. While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to
the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations, not perfect
adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending to drugs cases, still, such officers must
present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items had been preserved.

In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly
transmitted to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly
delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Calamba City on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence
presented how the confiscated sachets of shabu were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had
custody prior to their delivery to the Regional Crime Laboratory and their subsequent presentation
before the trial court. This is evident from the testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated he had no
knowledge on who had custody of the sachets of shabu from 27 May 2004 until 4 June 2004.

Based on his own testimony, PO3 Villas had no personal knowledge on (1) how the illegal
drugs were delivered and who delivered the drugs from the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to
the Regional Crime Laboratory; (2) who received the drugs in the Regional Crime Laboratory; and
(3) who had custody of the drugs from 27 May 2004 to 3 June 2004 until their presentation before the
trial court.

JAIME DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200748|JULY 23, 2014
SERENO, CJ.

FACTS:
Operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office
(NBICEVRO), received a Complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido claiming that Ariel
Escobido, the live in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Office. In the said police office, they met James (Accused Jaime Dela Cruz) who
demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After
the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBICEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the
circumstances of the meeting to the authorities.

While at the NBICEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly from James instructing
her to bring the money as soon as possible. The special investigators at the NBICEVRO verified the
text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an
entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch. The officers were able to nab Jaime
dela Cruz by using a pre-marked P500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of
the amount demanded by James and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBICEVRO where forensic examination was done. Petitioner was required
to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs
as indicated in the confirmatory test result.

Accused testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for
extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to
call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail. Petitioner was then charged and
convicted for violation of Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of Article II of R.A. 9165 both by the trial
court and Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

HELD:
No. Drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence. The drug test in Section 15 of R.A. 9165 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. First ,
[a] person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for
any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section
15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, for
committing unlawful acts2 punishable under Article II of R.A. 9165.To make the provision applicable
to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to
unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.

PEOPLE VS. JAVIER MORILLA

G.R. No. 189833|FEBRUARY 5, 2014
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

2importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation,

manufacture and possession of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals possession thereof during parties, social gatherings or meetings being employees and
visitors of a den, dive or resort maintenance of a den, dive or resort illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential chemicals manufacture or delivery or possession of
equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals possession of dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings
or meetings unnecessary or unlawful prescription thereof cultivation or culture of plants
classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof and maintenance and keeping of original
records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
 Two vehicles were suspected by the police officers to be used for transportation of dangerous
drugs. The Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police
officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped for it was noticed that there were
several sacks inside the van through the untinted window. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla
replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced, the police officers requested
Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection. When it was opened, it was noticed
that white crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to
open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla said that he was with Mayor Mitra to persuade them to let
him pass. His request was rejected and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be
sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Due to such discovery, the operatives chased and stopped the Starex van. On plain view, the
operatives noticed that the Starex van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the
ambulance prompting the police officers to request Mayor Mitra to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, the Mayor offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon
examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Mayor Mitra contends that he did not know the contents of the sacks and that he was
merely requested to transport them to Manila. He explained that he only accommodated the request
of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. Likewise, Morilla contends his lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the contents and insisted that he thought that he was just transporting
wooden tiles and electronic spare parts.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected the defenses presented by both accused as
they were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs (Sec. 5 RA 9165). Moreover,
conspiracy was established between the two. Accused Morilla belies existence of conspiracy between
him and the Mayor for he lacked prior knowledge as to the contents of the sacks and that his mere
act driving of the ambulance van containing the same is not sufficient to convict him of the crime
charged.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the mere act of driving a vehicle containing sacks of dangerous drugs is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal transport of dangerous drugs.
2 Whether or not conspiracy in committing illegal transport of dangerous drugs existed
between Morilla and Mayor Mitra.

HELD:
1 Yes. Mere act of driving is sufficient to convict Morilla of the crime charge.

His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he just
obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle bears no
merit. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means
to carry or convey from one place to another. It was well established during trial that Morilla was
driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to
Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it
is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

2 Yes. Conspiracy in committing illegal transport of dangerous drugs existed between Morilla and
Mayor Mitra.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony. Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not be shown
that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred
from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both
vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor
Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillas
turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check.
Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks.
If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.

PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO LAYLO

G.R. No. 192235|JULY 6, 2011
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Wearing civilian clothes, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, were conducting anti-drug surveillance
operations. While they were in front of a sarisari store, accused Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal,
approached them and asked, Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu? PO1 Reyes replied, Bakit mayroon ka
ba? Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, Dos
(P200.00) ang isa. Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other hand, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up
with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case
which Ritwal was carrying. PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu
recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the PNP Crime Laboratory for forensic
testing. A laboratory examination was conducted and found the recovered items positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
 The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic
sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as
basis the third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. However, during trial, Ritwal jumped bail and was tried in absentia. Thus, Ritwal was deemed
to have waived the presentation of her evidence and the case was submitted for decision without
evidence on her part. The trial court found Laylo guilty for attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs
[Section 26(b) R.A. 9165] while Ritwal was found guilty for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165
and illegally possessing shabu. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a crime committed even though the sale of illegal drugs was not
consummated.

HELD:
Yes. The crime committed was attempted illegal sale of drugs punishable Section 26(b) of RA
9165. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both
positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were
found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution
witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made
known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers
introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal.
Hence, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with
attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt
acts the commission of the intended crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor.
The sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal
under arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there
was an attempt to sell shabu. In addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of
corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence.

FRANCISCO SALVADOR ACEJAS III VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 156643|JUNE 27, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ.

FACTS:
On December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Intelligence Agent
Vladimir Hernandez, served a Mission Order issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against
Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. There were complaints against Aoyagi for being a suspected
Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien. To prove his innocence, Takao gave his
passport to Hernandez as guarantee for his appearance at a BID hearing.
 Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, wife of Takao, called and informed accused Dick Perlas about
the taking of her husbands passport. Perlas referred the problem to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton
Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law Firm. Perlas introduced the
Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario who told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID to which Takao Aoyagi
complied. Instead, Atty. Rufino M. Margate of the same law firm filed with the BID an Entry of
Appearance, requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what the
ground was for the confiscation of Aoyagis passport. Meanwhile, accused Hernandez prepared a
Progress Report submitted to Ponciano Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of
the BID who recommended that that Takao Aoyagi be placed under custodial investigation.

On December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas
III from Lucenario Law Firm who informed them that he would be the one handling their case.
Moreover, in a family reunion, Bethel informed her brother Jun Pelingon about her husbands
passport. Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio and told him of Takao Aoyagis
problem with the BID. Respicio gave his calling card so he could be called up in his office.

A meeting at Aristocrat Restaurant with accused Hernandez was made where the accused
allegedly demanded 1 million pesos for the return of Aoyagis passport. Because of such demand, Jun
Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio and thereafter an entrapment operation was arranged.

On January 12, 1994, accused Hernandez met with the Aoyagis, Atty. Acejas and Dick Perlas
at the Diamond Hotel. Accused Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi. Before handing
out Aoyagis passport, Hernandez reminded the group of their earlier agreement of kaliwaan, i.e.,
that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1 million. Hernandez handed the
passport to Atty. Acejas, who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. Thereafter
Bethel handed to Hernandez the envelope containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused
and motioned that Atty. Acejas be the one to receive it. Atty. Acejas willingly got the envelope and
placed it beside him and Perlas. Hernandez then immediately left after the payment was made. The
NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested the accused. After trial, all the accused,
Hernandez, Atty. Acejas and Perlas were convicted of direct bribery by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the crime of direct bribery was properly established.
2 Whether or not conspiracy is established between Hernandez and Atty. Acejas.

HELD:

1 Yes. The accused committed the second kind of direct bribery. The crime of direct bribery exists
when a public officer:
a) Agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present;
b) Accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or
c) Abstains from the performance of official duties.
 Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements:

a) The offender was a public officer,

b) Who received the gifts or presents personally or through another,
c) In consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and
d) That act related to the exercise of official duties.

Hernandez was a public officer and he claims that he was merely implementing Mission Order
No. 930412, which required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi. The passport was supposed to have
been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee for Aoyagis appearance at the BID office, but he says
that he returned it upon the instruction of his superior (The act of returning the passport does not
constitute a crime and it is related to the accuseds exercise of official duties). The chain of
circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had taken the
passport of Takao Aoyagi and on various dates, he met with spouses Aoyagi regarding the return of
the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he directed
Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Atty. Acejas.

Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his
representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside
the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it
was not a standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations. It
can readily be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some
time despite the absence of any legal purpose.

2 Yes. Conspiracy was established between the all the accused convicted.

Atty. Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his
contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firms legal fees (as he contends that he
thought the contents of the envelope would be payment for his legal fees). That it was given to
Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Atty. Acejas should have kept the amount if he
believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans pronouncement on this point:

If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how come he
passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not
contain the balance of the acceptance fee; Otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover,
the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to Hernandez who
refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance of the
acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez. Acejas defense was further
weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately after the brown envelope was
given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused Victoriano to corroborate his
testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused him to leave their table. This,
he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-accused.

JESUS TORRES VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 175074|AUGUST 31, 2011
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Torres was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School. On April 26,
1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the schools collection and disbursing officer, to prepare the
checks representing the teachers and employees salaries, salary differentials, additional
compensation allowance and personal emergency relief allowance for the months of January to
March, 1994. Lazado prepared three (3) checks in the total amount of P196,654.54, all dated April
26, 1994. The petitioner and Amador Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks.

Upon the instruction of the petitioner, Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them to the
accused. It was the custom in the school for Lazado to endorse the checks representing the teachers
salaries and for the accused to encash them and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to the
teachers. The following day, April 27, 1994, the accused encashed the three (3) checks but he never
returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado.

The petitioner admitted that he encashed the subject checks in the morning of April 27, 1994
but instead of going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport and availed of the flight to Manila
to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two (2) days after, around 4:30 oclock in the morning of
April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were on the road waiting for a ride, three (3) armed men
held them up and took his bag containing his personal effects and the proceeds of the subject checks.
He reported the incident to the police authorities, but he failed to recover the money.

The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public
funds. On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal, where it was indicated that he
was seeking recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals. On
September 6, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the filing of an appeal before the Court of Appeals by petitioner is proper.
2 Whether or not petitioner is a public officer within the contemplation of Article 217 of the
RPC.
3 Whether or not the petitioner may be properly convicted based on the Information which
clearly charged petitioner with intentional malversation and not malversation through
negligence, which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the
trial court.
HELD:
1 No. The proper court for which petitioner should have filed an appeal is before the
Sandiganbayan.

Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which defined the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provides:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

Hence, upon his conviction, petitioners remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of
petitioners appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to appeal.

2 Yes. Petitioner is an accountable public officer within the contemplation of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one
who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. The nature
of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public
money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines
whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school
principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is
entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.

3 Yes. Petitioner may be properly convicted.

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds
or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either
be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that
deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove
the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor.
Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the
offense.

MAJOR JOEL CANTOS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 184908|JULY 3, 2013
VILLARAMA JR., J.

FACTS:
On July 2000, Major Cantos was assigned as the Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the
PSG, Malacaang Park, Manila to supervise the disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to
perform other finance duties as requested by the PSG Commander, Gen. Rodolfo Diaz. On December
19, 2000, he received a check from Director Aguas in the amount of P1,975,000 representing the
Special Allowance of PSG personnel. He encashed the check and placed the money in a duffel bag
and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his office together with the P1,295,000 that was earlier also
entrusted to him by Gen. Diaz. In his testimony, Major Cantos added that as far as he knows, he is
the only one with the keys to his office. Although there was a safety vault in his office, he opted to
place the money inside the steel cabinet because he was previously informed that the safety vault
was defective. He also testified that all personnel of the 22nd FSU had unrestricted access to his
office during office hours.

On December 20, 2000, the money was still there upon checking. On the following day, Major
Cantos reported for work and proceeded with his task of signing vouchers and documents. Between 9
a.m. to 10 a.m., he inspected the steel cabinet and discovered that the duffel bag which contained the
money was missing. He immediately called Capt. Balao to his office and asked if the latter saw
someone enter the room. Capt. Balao replied that he only noticed a Disbursing Officer enter the
room; hence there is no need to worry. In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balaos help
in finding the money. Capt. Balao asked him how the money was lost and why was it not in the vault,
to which he replied that he could not put it there because the vault was defective. Capt. Balao then
suggested that they should make it appear that the money was lost in the safety vault. Capt. Balao
went out of the office and returned with a pair of pliers and a screwdriver to unscrew the vault. At
this point, Major Cantos told him that he will just inform Gen. Diaz about the missing funds.
Thereafter, an investigation of the incident was conducted.

RTC rendered a decision convicting Major Cantos of the crime charged. Upon appeal, the
Sandiganbayan sustained the ruling of the trial court. Major Cantos contends that he could not be
liable for malversation for mere failure to produce the funds does not necessarily mean that he
misappropriated the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mere failure to produce the public funds or property upon demand would
constitute the crime of malversation.

HELD:
Yes. Mere failure to produce the public funds or property by an accountable public officer
upon demand would constitute a presumption that malversation had been committed absent any
evidence to contradict such presumption.

The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.

All the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a public officer occupying
the position of Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center, PSG. By reason of
his position, he was tasked to supervise the disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and other
Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG personnel, which are indubitably public funds for which
he was accountable. Petitioner in fact admitted in his testimony that he had complete control and
custody of these funds. As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut the
legal presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal use.

The presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states that the
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing fund or property to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if
petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he put the funds
or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated. In this case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of
guilt. He failed to explain the missing funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon
demand. His claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and has not been
supported by evidence. In fact, petitioner even tried to unscrew the safety vault to make it appear
that the money was forcibly taken. Furthermore, petitioners explanation that there is a possibility
that the money was taken by another is belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel
cabinet was forcibly opened. In addition, the fact that it was only petitioner who had the keys to the
steel cabinet belies his contention. Thus, the explanation set forth by petitioner is unsatisfactory and
does not overcome the presumption that he has put the missing funds to personal use.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa

present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged
differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received
public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that
he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation
by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage
in his accounts.

LUMAUIG VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 166680 | July 7, 2014
A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an
accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan
examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During the
course of her examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came across
a disbursement voucher for P101, 736.00 prepared for LUMAUIG, a former mayor of the
municipality, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of
motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. Her further investigation of the accounting
records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the
month of August 1994. She likewise claimed that she prepared two letters to inform LUMAUIG of his
unliquidated cash advance but the same were not sent to him because she could not get his exact
address despite efforts exerted. She averred that on June 4, 2001, LUMAUIG paid the subject cash
advance before the treasurer of the municipality.

LUMAUIG admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101, 736.00 during his incumbency as
municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and
insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila.
However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed
that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were
already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive
any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for
separation pay when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not
to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101, 736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.

ISSUE:
1. Whether LUMAUIG can be held liable to the crime of Failure of accountable officer to
render accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

LUMAUIG is liable of the offense under Article 218 of the RPC.

Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 218 consists of the following elements: that the offender is a public officer, whether in
the service or separated therefrom; that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or
to a provincial auditor; and that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts
should be rendered. Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is
provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is
no room for interpretation, but only application.

JAVIER VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 147026-27 | September 11, 2009

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector
representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8047, otherwise known as the Book Publishing Industry Development Act. R.A. No. 8047
provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and supervision
of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by
the President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are chosen
from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry
related activities, students and the private education sector.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an Information dated
February 18, 2000, Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.

The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29,
2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not allege that she is a public official who
is classified as Grade 27 or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the
NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute
which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is
without any administrative or political power to speak of that she is serving the private book
publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant in the governments book development
policy.

On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javiers motion. Javier filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not Javier is a public officer?

HELD:

JAVIER is a public officer.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was
enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the
creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing
Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation.

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of
public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Notwithstanding that Javier came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law
invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of
the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing
industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was
appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does
not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing
Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The
Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for
appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in
the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft
Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a
public office. Javier was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though
her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public function. The
fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides
that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be
authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of ones appointment, and whether the compensation one
receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or
appointed is still considered a public officer.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall
take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall
perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Where, as in this case, Javier performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No.
8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the
government whether as an employee, agent, and subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact,
during her tenure, Javier took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in
Spain.
 AMBIL JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 175457 | July 6, 2011

In order to be found guilty under Sec. 3(e), RA 3019, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS: Atty. David Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) sent a letter to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the
alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco ADALIM, an accused in a criminal case for murder, from
the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of then Governor RUPERTO A. AMBIL, Jr.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed a Report recommended the filing of criminal
charges against Governor AMBIL, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).

Subsequently, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that
the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. RUPERTO AMBIL, JR. and
ALEXARDINO APELADO, SR. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.

Nonetheless, an Information was filed charging petitioners AMBIL, Jr. (Provincial Governor of
Eastern Samar) and APELADO, SR. (Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar) with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. An Amended Information was filed to include the charge of Delivering
Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It was alleged that the
detention prisoner Mayor ADALIM was released from jail and allowed to stay at AMBIL's residence
for a period of 85 days, without any court order authorizing such transfer. Thus AMBIL Jr. and
APELADO Sr., in the performance of official functions, had given unwarranted benefits and
advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco ADALIM to the prejudice of the government.

AMBIL and APELADO admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that
ADALIM's transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers
posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to ADALIM's sister, Atty. Juliana A. ADALIM-
White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor ADALIM was to be held.

The Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision finding AMBIL Jr. guilty of
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving ADALIM to a private
residence, AMBIL Jr and others have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of
more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not
enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released
or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.

ISSUE:
1 Whether AMBIL Jr. is guilty of violating Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019?

HELD:

AMBIL Jr. is guilty of violating Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019.

In order to be found guilty under Sec. 3(e), RA 3019, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. The
word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action."Preference" signifies
priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.

Without a court order, AMBIL transferred ADALIM and detained him in a place other than the
provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television. AMBIL readily extended these
benefits to ADALIM on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor's life would be put in
danger inside the provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, AMBIL were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on ADALIM's safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in
having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan's gesture of raising a closed fist
at ADALIM as a threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling
reason to warrant ADALIM's detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts
within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate ADALIM from the rest
of the prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that ADALIM stayed in AMBIL, Jr.'s house. More importantly, even if ADALIM
could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to AMBIL, a court order was still
indispensable for his transfer.

NAVA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 160211 | August 28, 2006

To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that:
The accused is a public officer; the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

PANGANIBAN, CJ.
FACTS: An audit was conducted by the COA Regional Office of the P9.36 million allotment which
was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its Division Offices.

In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been released to the DECS
Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the 155 heads of the nationalized high schools for the
improvement of their facilities. However VENANCIO NAVA, succeeded in persuading his seven (7)
schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools
and Devices (SLTD) for the calendar year 1990.

In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a
public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-55, series of 1985. NAVA persuaded his schools division
superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the essence in making the purchases
and if not done before the calendar year 1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.
The conduct of a public bidding was not followed, and, instead the purchase was done through
negotiation.

Evidence shows that the prices of the SLTDs as purchased from the sellers exceeded the prevailing
market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation done by the COA
audit team. The report concluded that the government lost P380,013.60.

NAVA was charged in an Information filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan
found NAVA guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
or entering on behalf of government in any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same whether or not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby.

The graft court did not accept the claim of that he signed the checks only after the other signatories
had already signed them. There is testimonial evidence that all the documents pertinent to the
transaction had already been prepared and signed by when the meeting with the superintendents
was called sometime in August 1990.

ISSUE:
1 Whether NAVA is guilty of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019?

HELD:

NAVA is guilty of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that:
(i) the accused is a public officer;
(ii) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(iii) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

The Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented warranted a verdict of
conviction. is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which
thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by
the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury.
Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Indeed, all
the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove the
culpability of the accused. In this case, there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense
are present. Thus, there can be no other conclusion other than conviction.

CAUNAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182001-04 | September 2, 2009

The fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

NACHURA, J.

FACTS: JOEY P. MARQUEZ, City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards,
and OFELIA C. CAUNAN, OIC General Services Office, along with four other local government
officials of Paraaque City and private individual ANTONIO RAZO, were charged under five (5)
Information, for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

It was alleged that the above public officers, conspiring with one another and with Antonio Razo,
owner and proprietor of ZARO Trading, to purchase at various occasions, through personal canvass,
from ZARO Trading, a total of 142,612 pieces of "walis ting-ting at either P25 per piece or P15 per
piece. The purchase was made without complying with requirements on Procurement and Public
Bidding, and the transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the
"walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team.
The overpriced amount totalled P1,302,878.00

The COA issued Notices of Disallowance for the said purchases. MARQUEZ and CAUNAN filed a
request for reconsideration with the audit team which was denied. Both appealed to the COA which
eventually denied the appeal. However, on motion for reconsideration, the COA excluded petitioner
MARQUEZ from liability for the disallowances based on the court's rulings in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan.

On the criminal aspect, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other
local government officials under the Informations. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
finding petitioners CAUNAN and MARQUEZ guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:
1 Whether CAUNAN and MARQUEZ are guilty under Section 3(g) of RA 3019?
HELD:

They are not guilty under Sec 3(g), RA 3019.

The fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the
gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because
the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven.

In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA's finding of overpricing which was, in turn,
based on the special audit team's report. Notably, however, the evidence of the prosecution did not
include a signed price quotation from the walis ting-ting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even
the walis ting-ting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from
the walis ting-ting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular
inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in
order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis ting-ting
purchased in 1996-1998.

The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would
merely indicate the present market price of walis ting-ting of a different specification, purchased
from a non-supplier of Paraaque City, and the price of walis ting-ting purchases in Las Pias City.
Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.

ORGANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 133535 | September 9, 1999

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher.

PARDO, J.

Facts: On August 15, 1997, an Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan against LILIA ORGANO,
an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the crime of "Plunder" or violation of R. A. No.
7080, as amended by R. A. No. 7659.

The accused was charged with opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the
Philippines, West Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and depositing therein money belonging to the government, consisting of revenue tax
payments, then withdrawing therefrom the total sum of P193,565,079.64, between November, 1996 to
February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole
proprietorship firms of certain named private persons.

ORGANO filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash information for lack of jurisdiction,
contending that the Sandiganbayan no longer had jurisdiction over the case under R.A. 8249.

The Sandiganbayan denied ORGANO's motion to quash the information for lack of merit. It also
issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused in the case.

ORGANO filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration. After 140 days from its filing,
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying ORGANO's motion for reconsideration ruling that
she should first surrender to the court before she may file any further pleading with the court.

Hence, this petition.

At issue is whether the Sandiganbayan at the time of the filing of the information on August 15, 1997
had jurisdiction over the case, in view of the enactment on February 5, 1997 of Republic Act No.
8249, vesting in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office where the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

ORGANO contends that since none of the accused holds a position with Salary Grade "27" and
higher, jurisdiction over the case falls with the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, the
Sandiganbayan's position is that Republic Act No. 7080 which defines and penalizes the crime of
"plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof, and since it is a special law, it constitutes
an exception to the general law, Republic Act No. 8249.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction with the crime of plunder?

HELD:

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public
officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher.

The crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by
law."Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that provided for the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their
office.
 ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148965 | February 26, 2002

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units.

PUNO, J.

FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against then President
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, five criminal complaints against the former President and members
of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

One of the Informations filed in the Sandiganabayan was was against JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA
(ESTRADA), then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080.

ESTRADA filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the
Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The
motion as denied.

The Sandiganabayan issued a warrant of arrest for ESTRADA and his co-accused. On its basis,
ESTRADA and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

During arraignment, ESTRADA refused to make his plea prompting the court to enter a plea of "not
guilty" for him.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not ESTRADA should be charged of plunder?

HELD:

ESTRADA should be charged with the crime of plunder.

Petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide
the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." R.A. No. 7080, he
bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused in such case. Petitioner, however, overlooks
that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former
President ESTRADA in committing the crime of plunder. If these allegations are proven, the penalty
of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other.

From the allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President ESTRADA to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to
amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for
the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold
that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related
in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the
former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

The Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history
of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple
informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies.
Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the
acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that
under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the
over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of
multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and
independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A.
No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem.

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in
the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons,
here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions
sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion,
theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy.

PEOPLE VS. DALAG

G.R. No. 129895 | April 30, 2003
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide
of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.

CALLEJO SR., J.

FACTS: PO3 ARMANDO DALAG, a member of the Philippine National Police, was charged with the
crime of parricide for the killing his wife, Leah Nolido Dalag.

On the night of August 15, 1996, the two children of the spouses, Francis and Princess Joy, heard
their parents quarrelling. Leah was admonishing ARMANDO not to drink liquor. They heard their
mother cry and rushed outside the house to see what was happening. They saw ARMANDO pushing
and kicking Leah on the left side of her body. She fell to the ground. He grabbed Leah's hair and
banged her head on the wall. Leah's forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, ARMANDO
stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him "Toy, Toy, I will find
some medicine for your wound. Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, "Tia Feli." ARMANDO
ran after Leah and herded her back to the house. Later on, Princess Joy was awakened when she
heard her mother crying. She saw her mother being pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and
lost consciousness. ARMANDO placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get
some water. She poured water on the face of her mother but the latter did not move. ARMANDO then
tried to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. ARMANDO and Francis
carried Leah to the house.

When they woke up the following day, Francis and Princess Joy noticed that their mother remained
unconscious. When the children came home in the afternoon after their classes, ARMANDO told
them that their mother was brought to the hospital. Leah never regained her consciousness. She died
on August 22, 1996.

ARMANDO vigorously denied killing his wife. He claimed that upon returning from the house of Tia
Feli, Leah stumbled upon a pile of cut bamboos, causing her to fall to the ground. She then hit her
head "in-between the two stones" found in their yard. Leah's left temple and nape hit the stones.

The trial court (RTC) rendered judgment finding ARMANDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
appreciated the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and "one analogous to passion and
obfuscation" in favor of ARMANDO.

ARMANDO raises the present appeal assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
probative weight accorded by the trial court to their respective testimonies.

ISSUE:
1 Whether or not DALAG is guilty of the crime of parricide?
HELD:

DALAG is guilty of parricide.

The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus:

ART. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659.)

The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (a) a person is killed; (b) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (c) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.

The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would
be the marriage certificate. In this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of
parricide.

PEOPLE VS. REBUCAN

G.R. No. 182551 | July 27, 2011

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN was charged with the crime of double murder for the
killing of Felipe Lagera y Obera (65 yrs old) and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera (1 yr old), with the use of a
long bolo (sundang).

Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of Felipe Lagera and sister of Ranil, testified as an
eyewitness and pointed to accused ROSENDO as the "Bata Endong"(Uncle Endong) who hacked her
grandfather and brother.

The accused ROSENDO testified that when he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila, he learned
that his wife went to Manila. Raymond, his stepson, told him that while he (ROSENDO) was still in
Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to place themselves on top of his
wife (Raymond's mother).

On November 6, 2002, ROSENDO went to the house of barangay chairperson Renerio Arminal to
place a call to his wife who was in Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the
same to cut cassava stems in his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was
sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused proceeded to go home, it rained
heavily. He stayed with his friend Erick and drank gin with him for half an hour. Thereafter, he went
to the store of Felipe Lagera to buy kerosene. He confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of
his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at him, but he was able to
parry it with his hand. He then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen.
He followed Felipe inside the house. When he was about to deliver a second hacking blow, Felipe held
up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered suddenly, he was
not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. Thereafter, Felipe ran
outside. He followed Felipe and hacked him again. He then left and surrendered to the barangay
chairperson.

Renerio Arminal, the barangay chairperson, testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused
ROSENDO surrendered to him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he fought with
Felipe Lagera.

The trial court found ROSENDO guilty of the complex crime of double murder and sentenced him to
the penalty of death.

On review, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the lower court's judgment and instead ruled that the
acts of the accused resulted in two separate crimes of murder for which he is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder.

The CA found that the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. As to mitigating circumstances, the CA credited the
circumstance of voluntary surrender but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate
vindication of a grave offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the CA ruled that
the same was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The accused appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court. The accused admits to the killing of
Felipe but denies that the crime was committed with treachery and evident premeditation. He prays
that he should only be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense and intoxication.

ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was present?
2 Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present?

HELD:
Aggravating circumstance of treachery was present.
The evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were
attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another
shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery,
among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is adeliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is
decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.

The RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of
treachery in the manner with which the accused carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil.
Carmela clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between the
accused and Felipe. Without any provocation, the accused suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to
Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of
any opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the
child unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather.

Aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation not present.

For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements:

(i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and
(iii) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.

It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be
considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it
must be "evident premeditation."

In the case at bar, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident
premeditation since the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of the actual commission
of the crime and the events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any evidence
that tended to establish the exact moment when the accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe,
that the latter clung to his determination to carry out the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed
before he carried out his plan.

PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN

G.R. No. 197807 | April 16, 2012

Treachery is the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.

VELASCO JR., J.

FACTS: Donna Maniego recounted that she was seated alongside her mother, Violeta Sicor, inside
the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the CECILIA LAGMAN approached her (Donna) and
punched her face several times. LAGMAN then turned on Vioeta, grabbed her and stabbed her in the
middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Donna got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall
for help. Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not around, Donna went to check on her
common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago at the house of his mother. On her way there, she saw the
LAGMAN stab Jondel four times. Jondel expired from the wounds inflicted by LAGMAN.

While Donna was at the hospital, she saw LAGMAN, who was being treated after an angry crowd
mauled her. Donna informed the policeman who was escorting LAGMAN that it was the latter who
had stabbed and killed Jondel. LAGMAN was then arrested.

CECILIA LAGMAN was charged under two Informations for the Murder of Jondel Santiago and the
Frustrated Murder of Violeta Sicor.

LAGMAN stated that she got angry with Donna when she eloped with Jondel. However, she denied
killing Jondel. She averred that nothing was found on her body when she was frisked and the knife
recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area where it was
found. She added that she had an argument only with Donna, not with Violata or Jondel.

The RTC convicted LAGMAN of Murder (Jondel Santiago) and Less Serious Physical Injuries
(Violeta Sicor). The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC.

Hence, this appeal. The defense points out that the victim Jondel Santiago was 58 in height and of
average built while LAGMAN is only 411. It is, thus, incredible that she could have inflicted fatal
wounds on the victim. Moreover, it is averred that the prosecution was unable to prove that the
killing of Jondel was accompanied by treachery.

ISSUE:
 1 Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present?

HELD:

Qualifying circumstance of treachery present.

Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) LAGMAN consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.

The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.

These elements were present when LAGMAN stabbed Jondel Santiago. As observed by the Court of
Appeals, the victim was caught off guard when the , without warning, stabbed him four times
successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from the
onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that LAGMANS act of suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the
latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery.

Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between LAGMAN and the victim, LAGMANS method
of inflicting harm ensured that she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself.
The perceived advantage of the victim in terms of height was of no use to him as LAGMAN employed
treachery in attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as LAGMAN suddenly
started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.

PEOPLE VS. PAREJA

G.R. No. 188979 | September 5, 2012

Rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the
female organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

BRION, J.
FACTS: AAA, 13 years of age, was the sister of the common law spouse of PAREJA.

AAA was sleeping beside her twoyear old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room, when
PAREJA hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but PAREJA covered her and BBB
with a blanket. PAREJA removed AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his
short pants and briefs. PAREJA went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but PAREJA
parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. PAREJA
stopped when AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked PAREJAS upper thigh as the latter was about to
stand up. PAREAJA put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident
to anyone. Immediately after, PAREJA left the room.

AAA and her two siblings went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police
Station and reported the incident.

ISSUE:

1 Whether the touching by PAREJAS penis of the victims private part amount to carnal
knowledge such that PAREJA should be held guilty of consummated rape.

HELD:

PAREJA is only guilty of attempted rape.

Rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the
female organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

The victim confirmed that PAREJA did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that PAREJA was holding the victims hand
when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance coupled with the victims
declaration that she was resisting the appellants attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes
penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable.
PAREJA commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and
neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and
parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. PAREJA, however, failed to perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his
own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victims loud cries and resistance. The totality of the PAREJAS
acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts.

PEOPLE VS. GUTIEREZ

G.R. No. 208007 | April 2, 2014

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused
has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the
victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse
of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: AAA, a 10-year old girl and a Grade 2 student, went home from school at around 12nn to
have lunch. On the way home, she met GUTIEREZ at his house. He brought her to his room and laid
her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants
and then inserted his penis into her vagina. When he withdrew his penis, white liquid came out. He
then gave her five pesos before she went back to school.

AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser asked her where she came from because she
was tardy. She admitted she came from Uncle Rod. She also admitted that she went there to ask for
money. She was then brought to the principals office and thereafter to the comfort room where her
panty was inspected. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAAs private
organ was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.

AAA also disclosed during trial that GUTIEREZ had done the same thing to her about 10 times on
separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten or five pesos.
ISSUE:

1. Whether GUTIEREZ is guilty of statutory rape.

HELD:

GUTIEREZ is guilty of statutory rape.

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused
has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether
the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave
abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse. AAAs age was proven in trial and was not disputed by the defense. AAA was able to
narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a child victim who has
taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence.

GUTIEREZ asserted that AAAs failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt. However, the law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years;
the childs consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
Whether AAA cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since the law presumes that
such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own.

PEOPLE VS. CRISOSTOMO

G.R. No. 196435 | January 29, 2014

The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: AAA, a six-year old girl, was playing with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the
house of CRISOSTOMO which was just below their house. While AAA was at the house of
CRISOSTOMO, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by
CRISOSTOMO. Her clothes were taken off by CRISOSTOMO who also took his clothes off after
which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal
knowledge of her.

ISSUE:

1. Whether CRISOSTOMO is guilty of statutory rape.

2. Whether CRISOSTOMO is guilty of two counts of sexual assault.

HELD:

CRISOSTOMO is guilty of statutory rape.

When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years. In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the
elements of statutory rape. CRISOSTOMO took off AAAs clothes and made her lie down. He also
removed his clothes, placed himself on top of AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded
to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, AAA was only six years of age. Her birth
certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993.

CRISOSTOMO is guilty of two counts of sexual assault.

Records show that CRISOSTOMO inserted a lit cigarette stick into AAAs genital orifice causing her
labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn and into AAAs anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her
perianal region.

AAAs uncertainty on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her
private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such uncertainty is so inconsequential and does not
diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the
essence of rape by sexual assault. The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another persons genital or anal orifice. In any event, inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do
not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter
the essential fact of the commission of rape.

PEOPLE VS. JASTIVA

G.R. No. 199268 | February 12, 2014

Different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. More to the
point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed
to the lust of an accused. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance.
What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.

LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: AAA, a 67-year-old married woman, was alone fast asleep when her neighbor JASTIVA
covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and told her not to scream because he will have
sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed JASTIVAs hand and felt the blade of the knife he held.
Thereafter, he removed AAAs underwear. However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because
his penis was not yet erected, JASTIVA therefore toyed with AAAs sexual organ by licking it. He
then made his way up and tried to suck AAAs tongue. The latter evaded her JASTIVAs sexual
advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same through her teeth. Once
done, JASTIVA held his penis and inserted it to AAAs vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and
before AAA could stand up, he tapped AAAs shoulder and said Salamat.

ISSUE:

1. Whether JASTIVA is guilty of rape.

2. Whether AAAs claim that JASTIVA indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual
intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to the normal conduct of a rapist.

HELD:

JASTIVA is guilty of rape.

The elements of rape under paragraph 1a are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force,
(threat) or intimidation.

The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size,
and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance
need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal
safety. AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the dark by JASTIVA who was armed
with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such advanced age could only recoil in fear and succumb into
submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to
impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Different people react differently to a given
situation involving a startling occurrence.

A rapist may still leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually
happened in this case.

The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor
the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.

PEOPLE VS. AAA AND COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 183652 | February 25, 2015

The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

PERALTA, J.
FACTS: AAA had a drinking session with OPORTO, CARAMPATANA, ALQUIZOLA, Roda and
other classmates to celebrate their graduation. She consumed more or less five glasses of Emperador
Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on OPORTOs lap. OPORTO then
started kissing her head. Roda also kissed her. They made her drink the remaining liquor. She fell
asleep.

During one of the times that she was conscious, she saw OPORTO on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She cried and tried to resist when she
felt pain in her genitals. She also saw CARAMPATANA and Moises ALQUIZOLA inside the room,
watching as OPORTA abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while CARAMPATANA was inserting
his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. ALQUIZOLA then joined and
started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. She found herself with
her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but
her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt.

ISSUE:

1. Whether OPORTO, CARAMPATANA, and ALQUIZOLA, conspiring with one another,

committed the crime of rape.

HELD:

OPORTO, CARAMPATANA, and ALQUIZOLA are all guilty of rape.

The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

Here, the OPORTA, CARAMPATANA, and ALQUIZOLA intentionally made AAA consume hard
liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already
obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was
clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time they ravished her. AAA positively identified
OPORTAM CARAMPATANA, and ALQUIZOLA as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but
because of the presence of alcohol, they still prevailed.

PEOPLE VS. LAOG

G.R. No. 178321 | October 5, 2011

In rape with homicide, it is immaterial that the person killed is someone other than the woman victim
of the rape.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS: AAA and her friend, Jennifer, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for
work at a canteen. Suddenly, LAOG, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and
forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, LAOG struck
AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but LAOG also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down.
LAOG stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick
grass. LAOG then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and
stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, he pulled down her jogging
pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her
breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, he also covered her with grass. At
that point, AAA passed out.

When AAA regained consciousness, she was able to call for help. Meanwhile, Jennifer died.

ISSUE:

1. Whether LAOG committed the separate crimes of murder and rape.

HELD:
LAOG committed the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

LAOG killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away,
and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of
LAOG. His carnal desire having been satiated, LAOG purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as
he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby.

The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape.

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by LAOG is still rape with homicide. The presence of abuse of superior strength (hitting
the head with a lead pipe and repeated stabbing) therefore is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

PEOPLE VS. VILLAFLORES

G.R. No. 184926 | April 11, 2012

In rape with homicide, homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. The phrase by
reason of the rape conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender
originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The phrase on
the occasion thereof means that offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he
commits homicide, but the principal intent is rape.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Marita, a four-year-old girl, was playing at the rear of their residence in the morning of July
2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from home. Maritas parents searched for
her but did not find her. In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant, wherein the latter hinted
that Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants
direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the comfort
room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. Her face was black
and blue, and bloody. Post mortem examination also revealed multiple deep lacerations at the
hymen.

Two witnesses, Bautista and Solidum, narrated that at about 10:00am of July 2, 1999, they saw
VILLAFLORES, leading Marita by the hand. At about noon time they were at VILLAFLORES
house where they used shabu for a while. Jovie related that about 3:00pm, he heard cries of a child
as he passed by the house of VILLAFLORES. At about 7:00pm, Jovie saw again VILLAFLORES
carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of
Batman.

ISSUE:

1. Whether VILLAFLORES committed the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

HELD:

VILLAFLORES committed the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

In rape with homicide, homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. The phrase by
reason of the rape conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender
originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The phrase on
the occasion thereof means that offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he
commits homicide, but the principal intent is rape.

As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, injuries
that the medicolegal officer who had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver, attributed to the insertion
of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the vaginal and periurethral smears taken from
Marita tested positive for spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As
to the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time of
death as determined by the medicolegal findings was consistent with the recollection of Solidum of
seeing VILLAFLORES going towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying
the yellow sack that was later on found to cover Maritas head.
Finally, the tender age of the victim, which is below seven years old, is considered as an aggravating
circumstance in rape.

PEOPLE VS. SUANSING

G.R. No. 189822 | September 2, 2013

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of
rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be
alleged in the Information since a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the
indictment.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: AAA was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12year old child.

GGG requested FFF to get from SUANSINGs boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. FFF
together with her brother and AAA went to the boarding house of SUANSING. After giving the
requested items, SUANSING ordered FFF and her brother to leave AAA behind.

FFF went back to SUANSINGs boarding house to fetch AAA. The door was closed so she called out
to AAA to go home to avoid being scolded by EEE, AAAs aunt. AAA opened the door and came out
fixing her short pants. FFF then asked AAA if anything happened. AAA replied that after FFF and
her brother left the boarding house, SUANSING pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and
panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent.

ISSUE:

1. Whether SUANSING committed the crime of rape.

2. Whether the SUANSINGs knowledge of themental disability of the victimduring the rape
qualifies the crime.
HELD:

SUANSING committed the crime of rape.

Rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from
mental retardation. A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural
instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual
intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent
to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that the accused used force and
intimidation in committing the act. Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the
victim and the latters mental retardation need to be proved.

AAA positively identified SUANSING as her rapist. AAAs mental retardation was satisfactorily
established. The results of the IQ test conducted on AAA revealed that she is a mental retardate
with a mental age of between 912 years. Notably, the defense did not even impugn AAAs mental
retardation. On the contrary, records show that even SUANSING himself conceded that AAA is a
mental retardate.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victimduring the rape qualifies
the crime.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of
rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. Such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in
the Information. Here, SUANSING admitted that AAA was known to be mentally retarded in their
community.

PEOPLE VS. CATAYTAY

G.R. No. 196315 | October 22, 2014

The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individuals former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1(b), Article266-Aof the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted to include those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.

LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: BBB, mother of AAA, left AAA, 19 years of age age but with a mental age of a 5year old, in
their house to look for BBBs youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her
that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and CATAYTAY were
already at the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her that she was raped. BBB asked her
who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to CATAYTAY.

During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
CATAYTAY, which ended when a certain Mimi knocked at the door. When CATAYTAY answered
the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of
the house and sought help from their neighbors.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the terms retardate and demented, as stated in the Information, are the same.
2. Whether CATAYTAY committed the crime of qualified rape.

HELD:

The terms retardate and demented are different from each other.

The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often
by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. Thus, a person clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.

CATAYTAY committed the crime of qualified rape.

AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental capacity of a sevenyear old
child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that
the mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is
nineteen years old is that of a sevenyear old child. CATAYTAY is therefore criminally liable for rape
under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that knowledge of
the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies it. Here, CATAYTAYs knowledge of AAAs
mental retardation was alleged in the Information and admitted by the former during the trial.

PEOPLE VS. OBOGNE

G.R. No. 199740 | March 24, 2014

Mental disability could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance if the Information failed to
allege that the offender knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: AAA, a 12-year old mentally retarded person, recalled that while she was playing, OBOGNE
saw her and asked her to go with him because he would give her a sugar cane. OBOGNE brought
AAA to his house and while inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her
vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she
went home.

ISSUE:

1. Whether AAAs mental retardation should be considered as a qualifying circumstance

considering that the Information failed to allege that OBOGNE knew of AAAs mental
disability.

HELD:

AAAs mental retardation cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance.

OBOGNE is guilty of simple rape only. AAAs mental disability could not be considered as a
qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such mental
condition at the time of the commission of the crime.

The mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the imposition
of the death penalty. Under Article 266B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of
the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the
rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such this
circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution.

PEOPLE V. JOSON
G.R. 206393 | January 21, 2015

The force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That
it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age, size and
strength should be considered in proving the element of force.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: AAA lives with her brother Joson, and his wife. In the morning of May 14 2009, while
Josons wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but
the latter was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. He
was able to insert his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, he went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. In
the morning, he left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not to tell on
his wife. On the same date, AAA related the incident to appellants wife and on June 2009, AAA,
accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police.
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on
AAA, which states that there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination. The birth
certificate of AAA was also submitted to prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was
committed. Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and
claimed that he was staying in Cavite at the time of the incident and only went back to his house in
Dasmarias on May 26 2009. Appellant denied the accusation against him and speculated that AAA
resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied writing the apology letter
and presented his specimen handwriting in court. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
 Joson maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape as defined under
Article 266-A of the RPC, particularly the elements of force, threat or intimidation. He argues that
AAA did not allege that he threatened her with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did
he say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, he contends that
the Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has moral
ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and intimidation. He further points out that
there was no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joson should be convicted of the crime of rape.

HELD
Yes, Joson should be convicted of the crime of murder.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, the prosecution must
prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act
through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own
brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust.
The force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it need not be overpowering or irresistible.
That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age, size and
strength should be considered in proving the element of force. The degree of force that may not
suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender
age.
Jason employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. AAA was only 14
years old at that time. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to Joson, his
act of pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or
intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result, all
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is unnecessary. Further, the failure of the
victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent.
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and
the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Resistance is not an element of rape and
its absence does not denigrate AAAs claim that Joson consummated his bestial act.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was also proper. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE VS CANDELLADA

GR No. 189293 | July 10, 2013

In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law
spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.

Leonardo De Castro, J.

FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent Vicente Candellada before the RTC charging
him of attempted rape of his 14 year old daughter AAA where it not for AAAs shouting for help,
Candellada had successfully consummated the crime of Rape. He was likewise charged with 8 counts
of consummated rape committed on May 30; June 2 and 12; July 10; August 13; Nov. 5; Dec. 15 and
25, all in year 2004. The nine Information were tried jointly.

According to the prosecution, AAA was born on Davao as the second of the 3 daughters of the
accused. In Davao accused had impregnated AAA and later on brought her to Lanao Del Norte. They
live with an acquaintance of the accused named Gemina in which he introduce to the latter that AAA
is his wife. While in Lanao, Candellada had intercourse with AAA many times but AAA could only
remember the 8 aforementioned dates. AAA gave birth to a baby boy who later died after 4 days of
birth. Germina testified that she saw that the accused had frequently mauled his wife and that on
Dec. 28, 2004 the accused hit AAA with a woodthis was corroborated by the medical examination
conducted by Dr. Magtagad to AAA. He observed hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on the
different part of AAAs body which were caused by a blunt object, possibly a wood. Meanwhile,
accused Candellada denied the allegations saying that AAA was impregnated by someone else and
this prompted him to bring her to Lanao and that it was impossible for him to make an attempt to
rape AAA on Dec. 28, 2004 because he was already in jail on Dec. 23, 2004 after he struck AAA. Also,
he tried to discredit AAAs testimony saying that they were coached, rehearse, and contrived because
AAA could not vividly described how she was molested; AAA merely repeated that on all 8 occasions,
accused had intercourse with her by inserting his penis to her vagina.

RTC ruled that Candellada is guilty of 8 counts of consummated rape but acquitted with the
charged of attempted rape committed on Dec. 28, 2004 because there was no enough evidence to
prove his guilt since the overt acts committed by the accused resulted only to AAAs physical injuries.
RTC sentenced him with death penalty. The records of the 8 rape cases were then forwarded to CA.
CA affirmed judgement of conviction with modification on the sentence (now reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole) and award of damages.

Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of 8 counts of rape

HELD:

Yes, he is guilty; his appeal lacks merit.

For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent, (4) the victim is
under 18 years old at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim). The 4 th and 5th elements, minority and relationship, were
admitted by the accused during the pre-trial conference. While the first 3 element were established
by AAAs testimony.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case
by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly
declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a
story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to
the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.

The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily mean
that her testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAAs failure to mention that
accused-appellant removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not destroy the credibility of
AAAs entire testimony. Rape victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of
the manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, errorless recollection of a harrowing
experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details from an
experience so humiliating and painful as rape. In addition, bearing in mind that AAA had been
repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a period of time (beginning in Davao, which resulted in
AAAs pregnancy). It is not surprising for AAA to recall each incident in much the same way.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIAL

G.R. No. 191362 | October 9, 2013

Del Castillo, J.

FACTS: "AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB"
cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as "Onot"). Appellant and "BBB" have two (2)
children. In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her
family and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. "AAA" calls appellant "Papa."Sometime in December
2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house. Once inside,
appellant took off "AAAs" shorts and panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to
his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girls vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not
try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant
threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, "AAAs"
maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.Unable to
endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAAs" mother did not believe
her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal uncles house. There, she disclosed her
harrowing experience to her mothers siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellants
wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched
her. For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her
aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.

"AAA" was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan, Quezon where she was
physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report which
essentially states that:

1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area, with
normal external genitalia;

2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5oclock positions, introitus admits
one examining finger with ease; and

3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of spermatozoa.

According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means
that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests
during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means
that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little
finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain.

On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women
at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside therein at
the time of her testimony. Appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his own
daughter. He also claimed that "AAAs" aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called her a
thief. The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of qualified rape. The appellate court
affirmed the RTC. The CA disregarded appellants contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in
the presence of "AAAs" grandmother as "lust is no respecter of time and place." Moreover, the
appellate court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established "AAAs" minority as well as the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of "AAAs" mother.

ISSUE: W/N the relationship and minority of AAA has been proven in this case.

HELD:

No. Both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of qualified
rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
attended the commission of the crime.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the prosecution mentioned "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth. Also
attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth showing
that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said
Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of the case. Up until the
prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to testify on "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth.
Records show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr.
Imperial never testified on "AAAs" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified on the witness stand
that she does not know her age the time the crime was committed.

Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of "AAA".

The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution
likewise miserably failed to establish "AAAs" relationship with the appellant. Although the
Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAAs" mother, "AAA" referred to
appellant as her step-father during the trial.

Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAAs"
mother as well as the step-father of "AAA". Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its
reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it
reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAAs" mother or that "AAA" is
his step-daughter.

The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellant's claim that he is married to "AAA's"
mother, it went on to declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant is the common-
law husband of "AAA's" mother.

Given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the qualifying circumstance that
the accused is the common-law husband of the victim's mother may be properly appreciated.

The tems "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For appellant
to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother.

Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the
crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of
the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. LUCENA
G.R. No. 190632 | February 26, 2014

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied.
Perez, J.

FACTS: On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of RTC Paraaque
City, Branch finding appellant Manolito Lucena alias Machete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266A, in relation
to Article 266B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended, thereby sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
On 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, was walking
and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Paraaque City, when two (2)
barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being
apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay. AAAs companions, however,
managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods
to board the tricycle.
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio
Barangay Hall. The appellant told the other tanod that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to
her house. The appellant brought her instead to Kabuboy Bridge. The appellant then took out the
backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA
and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on
the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite the latters plea not to rape her. Three
(3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant
would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA.
Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The
appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened
between them. He then brought AAA in front of a school in Paraaque City and allowed AAA to get
off.
In his defense, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to
resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be
convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration
does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not force or intimidation attended the crime.

HELD:

YES, force and intimidation was attended in the crime.

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it
should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and
vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.

In the case at bench, the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her
while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for
her life and personal safety. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first
made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.
It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the
appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual
intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was
still within appellants reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the
latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is
understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.
As to the number of rapes committed. The Court quotes the observations of the trial
court as approved by CA: The three (3) penetrations which occurred one after the other at intervals
clearly infer that when appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault
upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent. This
Court holds that indeed the three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but
distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellants conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that [w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used
a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495 | April 21, 2014

Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual is rape

Reyes, J.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is the husband of private complainant KKK. He was
charged with two counts of rape, in violation of R.A. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
 On October 16, 1998 after the accused-appellant, KKK and their children went about their
nightly routine, the accused and his wife went to their conjugal bedroom. Once in the bedroom, KKK
changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she refused to lie thereon with the accused
and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her behaviour angered the accused who ordered
her to transfer to the bed. She refused, reasoning that she wasnt feeling well, so accused lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall. Terrified, KKK transferred to the bed wherein accused expressed
his desire to copulate by tapping his fingers on her lap. She resisted his yearning, reiterating that
she wasnt feeling well. She held on to her panties but accused pulled them down so forcefully they
tore on the sides. He raised her daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. He
carried out his carnal desires while KKK continued to protest. MMM, one of the couples children
heard her mothers cries so she went to her parents room, knocked on the door and inquired about
KKK. She helped her mother to get up in order to bring her to the girls bedroom. The accused tried
to prevent KKK from leaving but MMM leaned against the door and embraced her mother tightly as
they pushed their way out. In their bedroom, KKK told her children about what accused-appellant
did. KKK decided to spend the next night in the childrens bedroom but an infuriated accused-
appellant ordered her to go to the conjugal room. She refused so accused lifted her from the bed and
attempted to carry her out. Accused grabbed KKKs short pants causing them to tear apart. The
presence of their children did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled that even in front of them,
he can have sex with their mother because hes the head of the family. He ordered his daughters to
leave the room while he succeeded in pursuing his carnal desires with KKK even if she refused
because she wasnt feeling well. The children in the staircase heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed. When the commotion ceased, the children scurried to their room
where they found their mother crouched on the bed, crying. She then told her children what their
father did. The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on both nights, claiming that he was in
another town, working.
The RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution and convicted the accused of the
two separate charges of rape. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is guilty of the charges of rape.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts finding of guilt and convicted the
accused-appellant of the two charges.
The concept of rape in marriage goes deep into history and is traced to two ancient English
practices of bride capture whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and stealing an heiress
whereby a man abducted a woman and married her. Women were subjugated in laws and society as
objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies: (1) chattel theory, where a
woman was the property of her father until she marries to become the property of her husband; (2)
doctrine of coverture, where a woman lost her identity upon marriage therefore a husband had the
right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved; and (3) marital unity theory, where the
woman becomes one with her husband upon marriage. These gave rise to the marital exemption rule
as conceived by Chief Justice Hale of England when he stated that the husband cannot be guilty of a
rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife has given herself up in the kind unto her husband. Such irrevocable implied
consent theory was observed in common law countries, giving legal immunity to a man who forcibly
sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.
This was challenged by womens movements until the Court of Appeals of New York declared the
same unconstitutional for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape.
In the Philippines, the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hales
irrevocable implied consent theory. As a result of its commitment to the UN Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (UN-CEDAW), however, the Legislature
enacted R.A. 8353 which eradicated the stereotype concept of rape. The law reclassified rape as a
crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. It recognizes the
reality of marital rape and criminalizes its perpetration. The crime of rape is penalized without
regard to the rapists legal relationship with his victim. The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A.
8353 pertains to rape, as traditionally known, sexual assault and marital rape. The single definition
for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in
wedlock and those committed without a marriage. The elements and quantum of proof that support a
moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution was based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies to establish the elements and proof required for a judgment of
conviction. The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her in order to
facilitate he consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse. He employed
sufficient intimidation upon KKK when he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority over her.
He exercised dominance over his wife as husband which cowed KKK into submission. No consent can
be deduced from KKKs act of going to the conjugal bedroom with the accused because at that
juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. Resistance is not
an element of rape and need not be proved by the victim; at any rate, however, KKK put up
persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused to recognize that she seriously did not
assent to the sexual congress. Moreover, it is not the presence or absence of blood on the victims
underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape. Lastly, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts
of sexual intercourse when he raised the irrevocable implied consent theory; therefore, his defense of
alibi should be rejected.

RICHARD RICALDE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

Even men can become victims of rape and rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child
abuse.

Leonen, J.

FACTS: On January 30, 2002, XXX (then a 10 years old boy) requested his mother to pick up Ricalde
at McDonalds Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative
and textmate of XXX. After dinner, XXXs mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it
was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.

It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa,
XXX ran toward his mothers room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde
played with his sexual organ. XXXs mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she
confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked him to leave.

XXXs mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the
incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. The police referred them to the municipal health center for
medical examination. The result yielded a negative result for spermatozoa and found no signs of
recent trauma in his anal orifice.

A criminal complaint filed against Ricalde but he denied the accusations of alleged rape through
sexual assault. Regional Trial Court found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through
sexual assault. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with the modification of lowering the
amounts of damages awarded.

Petitioner Ricalde filed a petition praying for his acquittal. Among the issues he raised were:
 1 The existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. There was no physical evidence to support the
allegation since the medico-legal tested negative.

2 XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a
penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. XXX was also able to immediately
push him away. Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXXs
alleged stomach ache. Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to
aggravate the charge against him.

3 XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing
pants with the zipper open. Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing
pants with an open zipper poses a challenge the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having
pubic hair entangled in the zipper.

Therefore, petitioner contends that the incident only amounts to acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ricalde is guilty of the crime of rape?

HELD:

The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classified rape as a crime against persons and amended the Revised
Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:

Article 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.Rape is Committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

 d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another persons genital or anal orifice.

Likewise, the Court found it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular
instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. To require the rape victim would be contrary
to the fundamental tenets of due process.

Second, petitioners reliance on the medico-legals finding lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in
XXXs anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration.

The positive testimony of XXX should be given weight. The variance doctrine as argued by the
petitioner was not given credit by the Court because no variance exists between what was charged
and what was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements
of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape
through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity and
moral damages.

JOVIT GARINGARAO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192760 | July 20, 2011

A child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will.

Carpio, J.

FACTS: Petitioner, Jovit Garingarao, is charged of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
RA 7610. AAA, a 16 year old girl, was brought to the hospital by her parents BBB and CCC due to
fever and abdominal pain. She was confined for further observation. At the day when the incident
happened, she was left alone because BBB have to fix AAAs medicare and CCC need to attend to
their store. When the time BBB came back to the hospital, AAA insisted that she wanted to go home.
At their house AAA told her parents that she was sexually abused by Garingarao. According to AAA,
that morning, when she was left alone, someone came to her room in white uniform and ask her if
she had taken her medicines and if she is still feeling some pain. After her reply, Garingarao then
lifted her bra and touched her breast, AAA inquire as to what he was doing but he said that he is
just conducting some examination. Afterwards, Garingarao left the room but eventually returned
with a stethoscope. He lifted AAAs shirt and pressed the stethoscope to her stomach and touch her
two nipples. Garingaro then lifted her pajama and underwear then pressed the lower part of her
abdomen then slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA crossed her legs and informed him that
it is her monthly period; however Garingarao continued but only stopped when he saw that AAA
really had her monthly period. He then went inside the bathroom, clean his hands and left.
Garingarao denied the accusations and presented a new version of the story.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garingarao is guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610

HELD:

RTC The trial court gave credence to the positive identification of AAA and ruled that
Garingaraos argument is baseless as it was illogical for BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a
story just to get even over a heated argument. He was convicted of the crime charged.
CA The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as regards the penalty and
damages awarded. It further stated that while Garingarao was charged for acts of lasciviousness in
relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because AAA was 16 years old when the
crime was committed. Under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be charged with rape or
lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code only if the victim is below 12 years old, otherwise
the provision of RA 7610 shall prevail.

SC Garingarao still alleged that it was impossible for him to commit the crime because there are
so many patients and employees in the hospital. He further alleged that assuming the charge was
correct he shall only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. According
to him a single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under said law.

The Court was not persuaded. It affirmed the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court which gave credence to the testimony of AAA. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense
as against the positive identification of the victim.

With regards to Garingaraos contention that he should not be convicted of violation of RA

7610, the Court cited the pertinent provision of RA 7610 particularly Section 5 of Article III:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to

other sexual abuse; and

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is defined as follows:

The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

The Court ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is
the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free
will. In the case, the act of Garingarao of touching AAAs breast and putting his finger to her vagina
is achieved by coercing AAA into submitting to this lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her. The court further explains that it is inconsequential that the abuse under RA 7610
occurred only once because under Section 3(b) of the said law, abuse may be habitual or not.

With the foregoing, the Court holds Jovit Garingarao guilty of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act 7610, imposing the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.

BONGALON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 169533 | March 20, 2013
Not every instance of laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Republic
Act No. 7610.Only when laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

The case began as a simple altercation between the daughter of accused George Bongalon,
Mary Rose Ann, and the son of private complainant Rolando Dela Cruz, Jayson, both minor children.

During a religious procession in Legazpi City, Mary Rose Ann threw stones at Jayson and
called him sissy as he and his brother passed by the front of the Bongalon residence. In the belief
however that it was his daughter who was being harmed, the accused confronted Jayson and struck
him on the back and slapped him on the face.

Outraged by the acts committed against his son, Jaysons father filed a criminal complaint
against Bongalon and the latter was eventually tried and convicted for the crime of child abuse,
which carried a minimum penalty of six years imprisonment. The Court, on appeal, modified the
conviction to Slight Physical Injuries.

According to the Court, the harm inflicted by Bongalon on the person of Jayson did not amount
to child abuse. When Bongalon struck and slapped Jayson, the accused did not do so with the
intention to debase the childs intrinsic worth and dignity or to humiliate or embarrass him.
Rather, said the Court, the accused did so at the spur of the moment and in anger which only
indicated his being overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bongalon is guilty of Child Abuse?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that not every instance of laying of hands on a child constitutes the
crime of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. The Court explained that a person can only be
punished for child abuse when the laying of hands on the minor is shown, beyond reasonable doubt,
to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being. Otherwise, such acts are punishable only as an offense under the Revised
Penal Code.

In deciding this case, the Court referred to the legal definition of child abuse, which means the
maltreatment of the child, whether habitual or not, including any of the following: (1) psychological
and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds
or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4)
failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

The Court reduced the penalty of imprisonment to ten days and ordered the accused to pay
moral damages of P5,000 to Jayson.

ROSALDES V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 173988 | October 8, 2014

Bersamin, J.

FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa.
Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Gonzales to apologize to her; however, Gonzales just proceeded to
his seat. This prompted petitioner to go to Gonzales and pinch him on his thigh. Then, she held him
up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Gonzaless body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. Petitioner nonetheless picked him up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him
down on the floor, causing the boy to cry. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class.
During lunch break, Gonzales, accompanied by two of his classmates, went home crying and told his
mother about the incident. Per advice of the Barangay Captain, Gonzales was brought by his aunt
and a Barangay Councilman to a hospital where he was examined and assessed with physical
injuries secondary to maltreatment. The petitioner was charged with child abuse in the RTC. For her
part, petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by
Gonzales to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity.
She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she, as a school teacher, could
reasonably do towards the development of the child. She justifies her act as under the doctrine of loco
parentis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of laying of hands by petitioner on the victim was intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being;
and thus, constitutes the crime of child abuse.

HELD:
 The facts laid constitute child abuse, a violation of R.A. No. 7610.

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Gonzales as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted
from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the
sake of disciplining him.

Section 3, R.A. No. 7610:

(b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:

XXXX

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

XXXX

To constitute the foregoing, the act need not be habitual. The petitioner went overboard in
disciplining Gonzales. Further, the physical pain inflicted had been aggravated by an emotional
trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his
parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds
that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Gonzales as a human being. It is
worth noting too that the present maltreatment was neither her first nor only maltreatment of a
child. She was then convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City, for maltreatment of another child. Such
shows petitioners propensity for violence.

In fine, the child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated by her being a public
school teacher.

DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707 | December 10, 2014
The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Del Socorro and VAN WILSEM got married in 1990 in Holland. In 1994, they were blessed
with a son. However, in 1995, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. VAN WILSEM made a promise to provide monthly support for their
son. Del Socorro and their son went back to the Philippines. Since the arrival of Del Socorro and
their son to the Philippines, VAN WILSEM never gave support to their son. Consequently, VAN
WILSEM came to the Philippines and remarried. All of the parties are presently living in Cebu City.

Thereafter, Del Socorro sent a letter demanding support to VAN WILSEM, to which the latter
refused to receive. Hence, Del Socorro filed a complaint affidavit against VAN WILSEM for violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child
with Del Socorro.

ISSUES:

1 Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law.
2 Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

HELD:

VAN WILSEM has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, VAN WILSEM hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.

In view of VAN WILSEMs failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.

VAN WILSEM may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262

The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children.
In addition, considering that VAN WILSEM is currently living in the Philippines the Territoriality
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case.

On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of VAN WILSEM in refusing to
support his child with Del Socorro is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged against VAN WILSEM. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over VAN WILSEM
was acquired upon his arrest.

Furthermore, the act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

PEOPLE V. BAYABOS
G.R. No. 171222 | February 18, 2015

In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or
psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an
organization.

SERENO, CJ.

FACTS: Balidoy was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation Period, which was set from 2 May to 1
June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.

After months of investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation, a criminal case against
ALVAREZ, ET AL. charging them as principals to the crime of hazing was filed with the RTC-
Zambales. Likewise, a criminal case against the school authorities BAYABOS, ET AL. charging them
as accomplices to the crime of hazing was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Meanwhile, the RTC-Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal
accuses, ALVAREZ, ET AL. Thereafter, BAYABOS, ET AL. filed a Motion to Quash the Information.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case
against BAYABOS, ET AL.

ISSUES:

1 Whether the prosecution of BAYABOS, ET AL. for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused.
2 Whether the Information filed against BAYABOS, ET AL. contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing
Law.

HELD:

The prosecution of BAYABOS, ET AL. for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed

It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in
the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even
the latters acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.

The Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing

The crime of hazing is committed when the following essential elements are established:

(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or

psychological suffering or injury; and
(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the persons admission or entry into an
organization.

In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or
psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an
organization.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission
or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the
crime of hazing. (People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015)

PEOPLE V. MAMANTAK
G.R. No. 174659 | July 28, 2008

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange
for the victims freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

CORONA, J.

FACTS: On December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a
McDonalds outlet in Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while
Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed
Zenaida to the counter. Thereafter, she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister
frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their
continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police
detachment.

On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller
claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy. Thereafter, the
same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the
Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there,
someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher.

The pay-off was agreed to be conducted in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and PO3 Palafox was designated to act as Teresa's niece.

On the day of the pay-off, while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia,
MAMANTAK and TAURAK came. TAURAK came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them
that she had Christopher. Several hours later, Christopher was handed to Teresa. MAMANTAK and
TAURAK demanded the ransom money. MAMANTAK and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney parked
outside. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to MAMANTAK. At this
juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested
MAMANTAK and TAURAK.
ISSUE: Whether the demand for P30,000 is considered a ransom.

HELD:
The demand for P30,000 is considered a ransom

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange
for the victims freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to
his mother.

PEOPLE V. MUIT
G.R. No. 181043 | October 8, 2008

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.

TINGA, J.

FACTS: Julaton arrived at Ferraers house in Nasugbu, Batangas with PANCHO, SR., PANCHO,
JR., DEQUILLO and four other men. PANCHO, SR. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house
as a safehouse for their visitor. The men told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their
line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared
equally among them. Ferraer and PANCHO, SR. would guard their victim. Later, five other men
came and they were introduced to Ferraer as MUIT, MORALES, ALIAS TONY, ALIAS DAVID and
ALIAS PURI. The next day, PANCHO, JR. introduced their companion as ROMEO. They informed
Ferraer that the following day, they would proceed with their plan. ROMEO would be the informant
since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim.

Subsequently, the group received a call from ROMEO informing them that the victim was already at
the construction site. MUIT, ET AL. went to the construction site in Tanauan, Batangas. MUIT, ET
AL. dragged the victim to the latters Pajero. They forced the victim to order his driver to give them
the keys to the Pajero. Then, they drove away. Thereafter, the Pajero was flagged down by policemen.
A shootout between MUIT, ET AL. and the policemen took place. All the occupants of the Pajero,
including the kidnap victim, except the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died.
MUIT managed to escape, but was later on apprehended.

ISSUE: Whether MUIT, PANCHO, JR., DEQUILLO and ROMEO are all liable for kidnapping for
ransom with homicide.
HELD:
MUIT, PANCHO, JR., DEQUILLO and ROMEO are all liable for kidnapping for ransom
with homicide

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. The totality of the prosecutions evidence
in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

The kidnapping for ransom with was established by the direct testimony of the witnesses.

Even though PANCHO, JR., DEQUILLO and ROMEO did not participate in the actual abduction of
the victim, they should still be held liable because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is established, the
precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since
the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is
immaterial.

PEOPLE V. DIONALDO
G.R. No. 207949 | July 23, 2014

Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Roderick dropped his brother Edwin off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. After
30 minutes, his other brother told him, via text message, that Edwin had been kidnapped. Edwins
kidnappers were identified as ARMANDO and RENATO DIONALDO, and MARIANO GARIGUEZ,
JR. who forcibly dragged Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a green Toyota
car. Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police.
The next day, Roderick received a call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom
money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had
P50,000.00. Later, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next
call.
On the day Roderick was instructed to deliver the ransom money, he was told to park beside the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, a car pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4)
men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat,"
the men returned to their car and drove away.
During the investigation of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER),
Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed that he was part of the plan to kidnap
Edwin. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest. Following
DIONALDO, ET AL.s arrest, the dead body of Edwin was found in Batangas.

ISSUE: Whether DIONALDO, ET AL. are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.

HELD:
DIONALDO, ET AL. are guilty of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide

The crime the DIONALDO, ET AL. have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely
constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victims death, which was (a)
specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case.

As held by the Court in People v. Ramos:

Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

Further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, DIONALDO ET AL.s conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.

PEOPLE V. MADSALI
G.R. No. 179570| February 4, 2010

Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or detain, the information
specifically used the terms take and carry away. To kidnap is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud
or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away. Whereas, to take is to get into one's hand or
into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS: AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Palawan. Suddenly,
SAJIRON arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but
SAJIRON overtook them. SAJIRON then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at
Inon Dama and threatened to shoot her if she would not go; thus, Inon Dama left. Then, MARON,
SAJIRON's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA
refused, SAJIRON and MARON tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of
cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on.
AAA was sexually abused three times on the ground where she was made to lie down on a bed of
leaves.

Thereafter, the three went to the house of EGAP where AAA was detained in a room. Later on, AAA
and SAJIRON were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. After the marriage, AAA stayed in one
room with SAJIRON in the house of EGAP. During her detention, SAJIRON abused her twice every
night. AAA was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by
EGAP's wife who served as her guard. AAA got pregnant after some time.

Subsequently, AAAs mother BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's
abduction to the proper authorities. SAJIRON and EGAP were later on arrested by the police.

ISSUES:
1 Whether SAJIRON and MARON are guilty of the crime of abduction with rape.
2 Whether EGAP and SAJIRON are guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention.

HELD:
SAJIRON and MARON are guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape

Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was
actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or detain, the information
specifically used the terms take and carry away. To kidnap is to carry away by unlawful force or
fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away. Whereas, to take is to get into one's
hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem. Thus, the word take, plus the
accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused
that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.

The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough
that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of
cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. SAJIRON succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life,
AAA had no choice but to give in to SAJIRON's beastly and lustful assault.

EGAP and SAJIRON are guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention

All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a
female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was brought
to and detained at the house of EGAP and forced to cohabit with SAJIRON. From the very start of
her detention on July 2, 1994, EGAP directed SAJIRON to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted
to escape. She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she
attempted to flee.

PEOPLE V. MIRANDILLA, JR.

G.R. No. 186417 | July 27, 2011

No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape,
the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: AAA was at the plaza during the eve of the fiesta. She went to buy candies in a nearby store.
When she was on her way back, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a
knifes point thrust at her right side. After a four-hour walk through grassy field, they reached the
Mayon International Hotel where they boarded a tricycle. AAA was left with MIRANDILLA.
MIRANDILLA drove the tricycle farther away. Then, MIRANDILLA dragged AAA out of the tricycle
and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. When she
defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her
panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. He forcibly pulled
her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.

The next day, MIRANDILLA arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her
to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her
hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into
the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the roads side, MIRANDILLA pushed her against a
reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her
oversized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt MIRANDILLAs penis inside her vagina.
MIRANDILLA and his gang repeatedly detained AAA at daytime, moved her back and forth from
one place to another on the following nights where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was
raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell where they caged her in a small house in
the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times. Then one afternoon, AAA managed to
escape. A certain Evelyn Guevarra helped her and they reported the incident to the police.

ISSUE: Whether MIRANDILLA is guilty of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four
counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.

HELD:
MIRANDILLA is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention
with rape

No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are
regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one
single penalty.

It having been established that MIRANDILLAs act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention
(not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, MIRANDILLA is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death.

PEOPLE V. BALUTE
G.R.No.212932 | January 21, 2015

A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by
reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after
the robbery.

PERLAS- BERNABE, J.

FACTS: At around 8clock in the evening, SPO1 Manaois was on board his owner-type jeepney with
his wife and daughter, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop
at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two persons, later on identified as BALUTE and a certain
BLASTER, suddenly appeared on either side of the vehicle, with BALUTE poking a gun at the side of
SPO1 Manaois and saying Putang ina, ilabas mo! Thereafter, BALUTE grabbed SPO1 Manaois
mobile phone from the latters chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois
was taken to the hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical
intervention.
ISSUE: Whether BALUTE is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

HELD:
BALUTE is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

In People v. Ibaez, the Court explained that a special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes
place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. A conviction
requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that BALUTE poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention.

PEOPLE V. OROSCO
G.R.No.209227 | March 25, 2015

When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part
shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS: Witness Arca went to the store of Yap. Arca noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap
and OROSCO and a JOHN DOE. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and
insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the
store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills, Arca saw JOHN DOE placed his left
arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand, while OROSCO was at her
back restraining her hands. JOHN DOE stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released
Yap, she fell down on the floor. OROSCO then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the santo at
the altar infront of the stores window, and then OROSCO and JOHN DOE fled together with two
other men who acted as lookouts. Yap died.

ISSUE: Whether OROSCO is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

HELD:
OROSCO is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

In the case of People v. Baron, the Court held that when a homicide takes place by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.

The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that OROSCO acted in conspiracy with
JOHN DOE in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim. It must be stressed that
OROSCO played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the
victim holding her hands while JOHN DOE grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in
rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when JOHN DOE stabbed her frontally
in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with JOHN DOE, OROSCO is equally liable for the killing of
Yap.

PEOPLE V. CABBAB, JR.

G.R. No. 173479 | July 12, 2007

Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery is
absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains
fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection
with the robbery.

GARCIA, J.

FACTS: Father and son Vidal and Winner, together with Eddie, Felipe and PO William Belmes were
on their way home from a fiesta celebration when CABBAB, JR. and CALPITO invited them to play
pepito, a local version of the game of Russian poker. Only Winner and Eddie played pepito. Winner
won the last game.

While walking on their way home, PO William Belmes saw CABBAB, JR., CALPITO and a
companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner and Eddie, who were
then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal
to save himself from the continuous gunfire of CABBAB, JR.

PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal and Felipe and informed the two that Winner and Eddie were
ambushed by CABBAB, JR., and CALPITO. The three proceeded to the crime scene where they saw
the dead body of Winner, together with Eddie whom they mistook for dead. The three sought help
from the police authorities and returned to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie who was
still alive. Eddie narrated that it was CABBAB, JR., and CALPITO who ambushed them and took
the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner which he won in the card game. Eddie was brought to
the hospital, but died the following day.

ISSUE: Whether CABBAB, JR. is guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and
the separate crime of attempted murder.
HELD:
CABBAB, JR. is guilty only of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide

The crime committed by CABBAB, JR. was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery
with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that CABBAB, JR., having lost to Winner in
the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to P20,000.00. In pursuit of
his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, CABBAB, JR. shot and killed him as well as his companion,
Eddie.

However, the two courts below erred in convicting CABBAB, JR. of the separate crime of attempted
murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed
during or on the occasion of the robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is
a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides
or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.

G.R. No. 170191 | August 16, 2006

Delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is
rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS: At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, CLARISSA ANGELES was with her
boyfriend, WILLIAM FERRER, inside a pickup truck parked in a vacant lot, about fifteen meters
from the highway, when ROMMEL MACARUBBO, WILLY SUYU and FRANCES CAINGLET,
approached the vehicle and robbed the two passengers of their personal belongings at gunpoint.
Afterwards, SUYU clubbed FERRER and dragged him out of the truck. Fortunately, FERRER was
able to escape and immediately went to the police station to report the incident.

The three accused-appellants brought ANGELES on a house nearby, where RODOLFO SUYU,
WILLY SUYUs half- brother, came out and took ANGELES from them and then he started
embracing and kissing her and fondled her breast. With WILLY SUYU and MACARUBBO as the
lookouts, RODOLFO SUYU tried to insert his fully erected penis inside her vagina while CAINGLET
was holding her hands but ANGELES kicked RODOLFO SUYU and he gave her over to CAINGLET,
who was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her vagina when the two lookouts alerted them
that two vehicles arrived from about 10 to 15 meters away from the pickup truck. The culprits
allowed ANGELES to leave after she promised not to report them to the police.

Thereafter, ANGELES went to the Don Domingo Police Station, where she saw FERRER, and
reported the incident. When asked by the police if she was sexually abused, she declared that there
was merely an attempt to rape her. At that time, she was ashamed to admit in front of her boyfriend
that she had been abused.

ISSUES:

1 Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of robbery with rape, despite the initial
statement of ANGELES that there was merely an attempted rape.
2 Whether the accused-appellants can be convicted of robbery with rape despite the
slight penetration made against the victim.
3 Whether WILLY SUYU and MACARUBBO are liable as conspirators in the crime of
robbery with rape.

HELD:

The accused-appellants are guilty of robbery with rape

Oftentimes, rape victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal their
shame to the world. It is not uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about
what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape
is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was
unreasonable and unexplained.

Understandably, ANGELES was reluctant to reveal, while at the police station, the fact that she was
raped, considering that her boyfriend was present when she made her first statement before the
police investigator. Further, one of the investigating officers was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of
social humiliation prevented ANGELES from revealing, at the time, the details of her defilement.
She was in a state of trauma, impelled by her natural instinct to put out of her mind such a painful
and disturbing experience. Besides, Clarissa sufficiently explained her initial reluctance on cross-
examination.
Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration, and rape is deemed
consummated in either case

In the crime of rape, it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the
vagina takes placepartial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration, and rape is deemed
consummated in either case.

WILLY SUYU and MACARUBBO are liable as conspirators

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that once once conspiracy is established between several accused in
the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by
any of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent
the other from committing rape.

Here, at the time of the commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each doing his part to
fulfill their common design to rob the victim and although only two of them, through force and
intimidation, raped ANGELES, the failure of WILLY SUYU and MACARUBBO to prevent its
commission although they were capable would make their act to be the act of all.

G.R. No. 198020 | July 10, 2013

When the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to
perpetrator and no personal property was shown to have been taken, and by reason of such attempt to
rob the victim is killed, the crime committed is Attempted Robbery with Homicide.

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: In the evening of October 9, 2003, the accused JOSEPH BARRA entered the house of
ELMER LAGDAN and pointed a gun at him, while asking for money. When LAGDAN stated that the
money was not in his possession, BARRA shot him, causing the death of LAGDAN.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found BARRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide, as defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The decision
was modified by the Court of Appeals (CA) to the crime of attempted robbery with homicide, under
Article 297 of the RPC, since there is no evidence was presented to establish that BARRA took away
the victims money or any property, and therefore, there is no element of taking of personal property.

ISSUE:

Whether BARRA is guilty of robbery with homicide.

HELD:

BARRA is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, not of consummated robbery with
homicide

The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were enumerated in People v. Quemeggen, (594
SCRA 94), to wit: 1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; 2. The property taken belongs to another; 3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and 4. By
reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. The fact of asportation must
be established beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to
give his money to BARRA and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this
reason that the victim was shot. BARRA can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide.

G.R. No. 197562 | April 20, 2015

The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the
residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of committing the
robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an inhabited house, the more serious
crime. All the accused are liable because the act of one is the act of all.
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: On February 20, 1991 between 3 oclock and 4 oclock in the afternoon, AURORA ENGSON
FRANSDILLA was able to enter the house of LALAINE YREVERRE, by pretending to be a
representative of Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) who is looking for YREVERREs
sister. While FRANSDILLA was using the phone of YREVERRE, her four companions who stayed
outside the house went inside and one of her companions armed with a gun, announced a hold-up
and thereafter locked up the maids along with YREVERREs niece and cousins inside the bodega.
The perpetrators were able to take the vault and other jewelries and when YREVERRE tried to stop
them, she was slapped and her hands were tied. The vault contained jewelry and cash, amounting to
a total of PhP2,701,000.00.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found FRANSDILLA, along with her
four co-conspirators, guilty of the crime of Robbery punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code. Fransdilla argued before the appellate court that the Prosecution did not establish her having
conspired with the other accused in committing the robbery, but to no avail.

ISSUE:

Whether FRANSDILLA is guilty as a co-conspirator for the crime of Robbery.

HELD:

FRANSDILLA is guilty as a co-conspirator for the crime

For an accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her
overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt
acts of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive
conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such
conspirator is the mastermind. Here, FRANSDILLA was satisfactorily shown not to have been a
mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by
representing herself as an employee of the POEA.
In that respect, it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly
entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful
scheme or objective would be carried out. Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing
their joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once
conspiracy is established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.

Lastly, the crime committed was the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code

G.R. No. 160188 | June 21, 2007

So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission
of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage.

TINGA, J.

FACTS: In the afternoon of May 19, 1994, LORENZO LAGO, the security guard in the parking lot of
Super Sale Club saw the petitioner ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA, who was wearing an identification
card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent
of the well-known Tide brand. VALENZUELA unloaded these cases in an open parking space,
where his co-accused JOVY CALDERON was waiting. He returned inside the supermarket and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. VALENZUELA and CALDERON
then loaded the boxes in the taxi they haled. When they were about to leave the parking lot, LAGO
stopped them and he asked for a receipt of the merchandise and the two flee on foot but were
apprehended by the other security guards at the scene. The stolen merchandise were recovered from
them, which had an aggregate value of P12,090.00.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted VALENZUELA and CALDERON of the crime of
consummated theft. Before the Court of Appeals (CA), VALENZUELA, citing the cases of People v.
Dio (No. 924R, 18 February 1948, 45 O.G. 3446) and People v. Flores (6 C.A. Rep. 2d 835, 1964),
argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he
was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA rejected his contention
and affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether the theft committed by VALENZUELA should be deemed as consummated or merely

frustrated.

HELD:

There is no crime of Frustrated Theft

Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent
to gain, and, viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose
of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts
of execution.

Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces
the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only
conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage.
Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

G.R. No. 176298 | January 25, 2012

As long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is
immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the
property.

VILLARAMA, JR., J
FACTS: The petitioner, ANITA MIRANDA, was the accountant and bookkeeper of Video City
Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc. (Viva),and as such was privy to the financial
records and checks belonging to complainant and was actually entrusted with the said financial
records, documents and checks and their transactions thereof in behalf of her employer. Between
April 28, 1998 and May 2, 2002, by taking advantage of her position, she deposited checks coming
from other franchisees accounts into the joint account maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, one of
the franchisees of VCCI and Viva, and then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said joint account
using 42 pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other words, the bank account was used as an
instrument through which MIRANDA stole from her employer.

The theft was only discovered when an audit of the financial records was conducted after the
petitioner went on maternity leave and subsequently resigned from the company in May 2002.

MIRANDA insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution failed
to prove the private complainants absolute ownership of the thing stolen.

ISSUES:

1 Whether MIRANDA is guilty of Qualified Theft.

2 Whether proof of ownership of the property stolen is necessary for the conviction of
the crime of Qualified Theft.

HELD:

MIRANDA is guilty of Qualified Theft

The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are
as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. The Theft becomes qualified when any of the six circumstances under
Article 310 of the RPC is present.
Here, MIRANDA committed the Theft with grave abuse of confidence of her position as the
accountant and bookkeeper of her employer, from whom she had unlawfully taken money. All other
elements of Theft are also present.

Proof of ownership of the property stolen is not necessary for conviction

The subject of the crime of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC is any personal property belonging to
another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim
thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a
thief of the property.

G.R. No. 200308 | February 23, 2015

If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: The accused-appellant, MERA JOY NIELLES, worked as the cashier in the company of
JUANITA FLORES, and as such, she was assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to
encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, NIELLES did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit
it in her (Flores) account her collections amounting to P640,353.86, and instead, she issued 15
personal checks for the amount and deposited them to Flores account. However, all the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to account closed and NIELLES thereafter absconded.

ISSUE:

Whether NIELLES is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft.

HELD:

NIELLES is guilty of Qualified Theft

All the elements of qualified theft as provided under Art. 308 and Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code
were present, to wit: 1) taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that
the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that
it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon
things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.

The taking of the amount collected by NIELLES was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed
to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful
taking. The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was
evident in the functions of NIELLES as the cashier of the business.

G.R. No. 170863 | March 20, 2013

BRION, J

FACTS: The petitioner, ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, was the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga
Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc.
under subcontract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and
implement the fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building
including the receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site a
position of full trust and confidence. On two instances in October and November 2001, ZAPANTA
instructed the delivery truck driver and 10 welders of ANMAR to unload several wide flange steel
beams of different sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69 along Marcos Highway, Baguio City,
claiming it to be for Anmars alleged new contract project. The incident was discovered by AMGCS
Project Manager, ENGR. MARIGONDON, who is the owner of the construction materials, and a
criminal complaint was filed against ZAPANTA for Qualified Theft.
Among others, ZAPANTA argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams
or corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen
beams in court was fatal to the prosecutions cause.

ISSUE:

1 Whether ZAPANTA is guilty of Qualified Theft.

2 Whether ZAPANTAs conviction by the lower court was improper because the alleged
stolen beams or corpus delicti had not been established.

HELD:

ZAPANTA is guilty of Qualified Theft

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs
to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,
with grave abuse of confidence. All these elements are present in this case.

Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime

Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of
the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom or to the body of the person murdered or, in this case, to the stolen steel beams. In
Gulmatico vs.People (G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007), the Court held that: In theft, corpus delicti
has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by
felonious taking. Here, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the
corpus delicti.
 G.R. No. 199208 | July 30, 2014

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: The accused-appellant, TRINIDAD CAHILIG, worked as a cashier at Wyeth Philippines

Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November
2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the
WPESLAI. It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, CAHILIG made withdrawals
from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit amounting to a total
of P6,268,300.00.

The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to CAHILIG, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier, and she was supposed to transfer these funds to another bank account of WPESLAI. Instead,
she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and
then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution.

ISSUE:

Whether CAHILIG is guilty of Qualified Theft.

HELD:

CAHILIG is guilty of Qualified Theft

All the elements of qualified theft as provided under Art. 308 and Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code
were present, to wit: 1) taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that
the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that
it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon
things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.
CAHILIGs position as the cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers
of the association, considering that it involves handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing
money from WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the association. CAHILIGs responsibilities as
WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer.

G.R. No. 163437. February 13, 2008

The principal distinction between theft and estafa is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. Not all misappropriation is
estafa.

REYES, R.T., J.

FACTS: The appellant, ERNESTO PIDELI, assisted his brother, WILSON PIDELI, and his business
partner, PLACIDO CANCIO, in purchasing construction materials for a project by allowing them to
use his credit line in Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH). At the completion of their
project, the business partners WILSON and CANCIO heeded to the advice of ERNESTO that their
net income of P130,000.00 should be applied first to settle their balance to MTFSH, and they
entrusted the entire amount to ERNESTO, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the
remaining balance to them. Afterwards, ERNESTO refused to give CANCIO his share in the net
income despite the latters repeated demands.

ISSUE:

Whether ERNESTO is guilty of the crime of Theft or Estafa.

HELD:

ERNESTO is guilty of Theft, not Estafa

Although there is misappropriation of funds here, ERNESTO was correctly found guilty of theft. As
early as U.S. v. De Vera (43 Phil. 1000, 1921), the Court has consistently ruled that not all
misappropriation is estafa.

The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft
even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes
theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.

Here, when ERNESTO received the disbursement, he had but the material/physical or de facto
possession of the money and his act of depriving private complainant not only of the possession but
also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the money such that he (the appellant) could
dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of taking in the crime of theft. All other
elements of the crime of Theft as provided under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code are present.

G.R. No. 187044. September 14, 2011.

Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: RENATO LAGAT and JAMES PALALAY rented the tricycle of Jose Biag from Santiago to
Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan. Upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver
and the driver ran away. They chased him and stabbed him to death. On the same day that the
tricycle and Jose Biag were reported missing, LAGAT and PALALAY were apprehended by the police
and bloodstains were found in the tricycle but the murder weapon was never recovered. Biags wallet
and his tricycles registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the police.
Under the custody of the police, LAGAT and PALALAY voluntarily answered that Jose Biag is the
owner of the tricycle. They were convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and later affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA), of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which,
according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the carnapping.

ISSUE:

Whether LAGAT and PALALAY are guilty of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag.

HELD:

LAGAT and PALALAY are guilty of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag

Under Section 2 of RA 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, carnapping is defined as the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the same Act are the following: (1) that
there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the
offender himself; (3) that the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. All the elements of
carnapping are present and were proven during trial.

Under Section 14 of the same Act, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, when a person is killed or raped in
the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the
penalty is increased.

PEOPLE VS. JOEL AQUINO

G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014

FACTS:
 On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by
his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the formers black Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching
San Jose del Monte Elementary School, Joel Aquino together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro,
Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim
to proceed to the nipa hut owned by Aquino.

Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Lita, Aquino and his companions had a shabu session while
Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay
Five Hundred Pesos, but the victim said that he had no money. Aquino shouted Lita demanding him
to pay. Bing suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, Lita mounted his
tricycle and started the engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the
victim while Aquino and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson at the toolbox of the tricycle.
Inside the tricycle, Aquino pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victims
side. After Lita was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while Aquino drove the tricycle to
his friends house where they again stabbed the victim using the latters own knife. Then they loaded
Lita to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where Aquino and his companions dumped the body of
the victim. Thereafter, they returned to Aquinos residence. Jefferson told the sister of Aquino about
the death of his father but the sister only told him to sleep. The next day, Jefferson was brought to
the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa
Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father.

In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading received a call from Barangay Captain
that the body of a male person with several stab wounds was found dead on a grassy area beside the
road of the said barangay. Immediately, SPO3 Cabading together with a police aide proceeded to the
area. Thereat, they found the dead body whom they identified thru his Drivers License in his wallet
as Jesus Lita, the victim. Also recovered were a big stainless ice pick about 18 inches long including
the handle and a tricycle key. The police officers brought the body of the victim to the Sapang Palay
District Hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the address of the victim.

Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met
SPO3 Cabading outside their residence. SPO3 Cabading informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the
victim was found in Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3 Cabading that he was with his
father at the time of his death and he brought the police officers to the place where his father was
stabbed and to the hut owned by appellant. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored
knife case and the sandals of the victim.

Aquino was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does
not know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of Aquino
which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who
stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to
Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also
stabbed his father.
 Dr. Richard Ivan Viray, medico-legal, who conducted an autopsy on the victim, concluded that
cause of death is Hemorrhagic Shock due to multiple stab wounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and for violation of RA 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping
Law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court said that According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the
following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. Contrary to Aquinos assertion, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is
that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was
under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had a shabu session.
Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is
usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the
passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned
of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated
behind him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when
the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation
of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.

However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per
jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the
former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present,
the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, it being the lesser penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder
which is reclusion perpetua to death.
 The Court concurs with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
penalty of life imprisonment for carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life imprisonment
has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No.
7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is applicable only to the special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide which is not obtaining in this case. Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The
appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a
special complex crime because the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victims death
was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping.

JAIME ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

April 10, 2013

FACTS:

Private complainant Azajar was the owner of 44 Firestone truck tires. He acquired the same
from a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 and an Inventory List of serial numbers. Private complainant
marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse owned by his
relative Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After
Azajar sold 6 tires, 38 tires remained inside the warehouse.

Cabal then informed private complainant that all 38 truck tires were stolen from the
warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Pending the police investigation, private
complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen
tires. Azajar chanced upon Jong's Marketing owned and operated by Ong. Azajar inquired if Ong was
selling Firestone tires with same model as the one he lost, to which the latter replied in the
affirmative. Ong brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as
one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number
thereon. A buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco was conducted. Pseur-buyer Atienza asked
Ong if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. Ong then instructed his
helpers to bring out 12 more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. It was
found out that they were the same tires which were stolen, based on their serial numbers.

For his part, accused Ong denied that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires
in Jong Marketing. He averred that a certain Ramon Go offered to sell 13 Firestone truck tires
allegedly from Caloocan City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ong is guilty of violation of PD 1612 (Anti Fencing Law)

HELD:.

Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have
known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or
for another.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Azajar whose testimony was corroborated
by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the 38 tires were stolen testified that the crime
of robbery had been committed on 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through
Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he
never denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish
that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but 13 out of 38 missing
tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires
corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact
in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go
approached Ong and offered to sell the 13 tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the
tires. The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day. His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of
the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if
Go was just peddling the 13 tires in the streets.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
 Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing
from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the property.

PEOPLE V. DIMAT
G.R. NO. 181184, JANUARY 25, 2012

FACTS:

Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate
number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42-
126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow
officers of the Traffic Management Group spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon
City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered
that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They
also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp
Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner,
Mantequilla. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number
JHM-818. The vehicle was carnapped at Robinsons Gallerias parking area.

Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good
faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number
as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to
Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the
police officers took into custody, had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.

Hence, Dimat was charged with violation of Anti-Fencing Law before the RTC. The RTC
found the latter guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law which decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was
earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

HELD:
 Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery
or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing is derived from that crime; and
(4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari. Two years later, Dimat sold it to Delgado.
Dimats defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had
different engine and chassis numbers from that stolen from Mantequilla. But Dimats defense is
flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him turned out to have the engine and chassis
numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not
reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis. Second, Dimat claims lack of criminal
intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and its violation is regarded
as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still
prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the
Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of
registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat
insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could
not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That
Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed
to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

CARGANILLO VS PEOPLE
GR NO. 182424 SEPTEMBER 22, 2014

FACTS:

An Information for the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph l
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, was filed against Nenita Carganillo. Herein accused-petitioner alleged
to have entered a Kasunduan with Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Nueva Ecija. Teresita gave
the accusedan agent of buy-and-sell of palay, 132,000 pesos for the purpose of buying palay to be
delivered on or before Nov. 28, 1998 to Lazaro Palay Buying Station. In their Kasunduan, the parties
agreed that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos
(P0.20). But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return the
P132, 000 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28. However, no palay was received on the
prescribe day and the 132,000 was never returned. Then Teresita made oral and written demands to
the petitioner for the return of the P132, 000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. This
prompted Teresita to file a case of estafa against petitioner before the RTC.

On her defense, Carganillo denied that she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with,
and received the P132, 000 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance of
P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and that,
in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and
amount. She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita. And that
the "Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple money
loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never
received the P132, 000 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that "the offender receives the
money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same.

RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of estafa and CA affirmed petitioners conviction.
Hence, the petition on SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of estafa

HELD:

Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime estafa.

Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of
estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same
The petitioner received in trust the amount of 132,000 from Terisita for the purpose of
buying palay

(b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender,
or denial on his part of such receipt
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to conform in their Kasunduan, not
delivering the agreed palay nor returning the 132,000 for such failure of delivery of palay
(c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
The acts of petitioner was to the prejudice of Terisita
 (d) There is demand by the offended party to the offender.
Teresita demanded for the return of the 132,000 and this was shown in her oral and written
demands to the petitioner

Hence, all the elements of estafa are present in this case. The Court find worthy of credit and
belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the
petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement between her and Teresita as contrary to what
petitioner claims.

In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real
agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not that
of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims. Also, we cannot sustain the
petitioners claim that she had been the victim of a fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing
a blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had no date and amount written on it,
because Teresita led her to believe that the document would be used merely for show purposes with
the bank.

For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante)
inducement to the making of the contract, and must be serious in character. It must be sufficient to
impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of
each case.

In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum to
this Court, she narrated that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her
execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she refused to sign. This statement negates the
petitioners self-serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a blank
"Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a document.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 180016 April 29, 2014

FACTS:

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached
him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission
basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the
sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the
latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.

Information was filed against petitioner that he committed the crime of estafa on or about
July 5, 1991 where the latter entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution, to prove the above-stated
facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the
lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in
the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant. However, he
admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against
him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

RTC= The court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
CA=The court affirmed the decision of the RTC

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the ff. arguments:

a. The CA erred in confirming the admission and appreciation by the lower court of
prosecution evidence, including its exhibits, which are mere machine copies, as this violates the best
evidence rule;
b. The CA erred in affirming the lower court's finding that the criminal information for estafa
was not fatally defective although the same did not charge the offense under article 315 (1) (b) of the
revised penal code in that -
1. The information did not fix a period within which the subject [pieces of] jewelry
should be returned, if unsold, or the money to be remitted, if sold;
2. The date of the occurrence of the crime alleged in the information as of 05 july
1991 was materially different from the one testified to by the private complainant
which was 02 may 1991;
c. The CA erred in affirming the lower court's finding that demand to return the subject
[pieces of] jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold an element of the offense was proved;

ISSUES:
a.) W/N the CA erred in affirming the admission of evidence dated May 2, 1991 although the same
was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
b.) W/N the CA erred in finding the information filed against the petitioner complete

c.) W/N the demand to return the subject jewelry was proved.

HELD:

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit. The SC affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa.

A.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same
was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that
petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked
and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner
also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall
be considered as waived.

B.
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when
the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was
different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did
not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections
as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime,
hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in
the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

The CA ruled: x xx An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the

statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;
1.) the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense;
2.) the name of the offended party;
3) the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
4)and the place wherein the offense was committed.
 In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing
rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of
July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same
Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the
offense.The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element
of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render
the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred
against him.

C.
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x xx

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his
part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how
he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of
jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even
be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
 SULIMAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014

FACTS:

In six (6) Informations, Vilma Suliman, herein petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were charged
before the RTC with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m)
of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-large
despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs judgment.

ISSUE

Whether or not Suliman is guilty of estafa.

HELD:

Yes. The lower courts did not commit any error in convicting petitioner of the crimes of illegal
recruitment and estafa. As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person
who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a
false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.

In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-accused
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants
for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The misrepresentation was made
prior to private complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false
pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with
their money. As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants
suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts
of money they paid were never recovered.

Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she
aware of the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity
and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded.
As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of
Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business of the
said company. In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private
complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the
private complainants an alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment
did not materialize.

PEOPLE V. TIBAYAN AND PUERTO

G.R. Nos. 209655-60

FACTS:

Tibayan Group Investment Company Inc. (TGICI), an open-end investment company

registered with the SEC, was subjected to an investigation which led to the discovery that TGICI was
selling securities to the public without a registration statement and that it submitted a fraudulent
Treasurers Affidavit. The SEC revoked TGICIs corporate registration for being fraudulently
procured. This led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI, herein PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO and five
others who are still at large.

Private complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates,
as well as the assurance that they will recover the investments. They were given a Certificate of
Share and post-dated checks representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly
interest earnings. Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored as the account was already closed.
The TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid.

In their defense, Tibayan and Puerto denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators to defraud private complainants. The RTC issued six separate decisions convicting
Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts of Simple Estafa1. The CA modified accused-appellants
conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.

The RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to
allege in the Informations those accused-appellants and the other directors/ incorporators formed a
syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public.
Note:
A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on
attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false
appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the TGICI is guilty of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under
Item 2(a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

HELD:

Yes, the Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. Under the lucrative promise of
a very high monthly interest rate, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
However, TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay
the assured profits; thus, they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with
their investors money. The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under Item 2(a), Paragraph 4,
Article 315 of the RPC are: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to
his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b)
that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Under Section 1 of PD 1869, Syndicated Estafa has the following elements: (a) Estafa or
other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa
or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public. All the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme2, are
present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than
five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the
investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the
same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants' investments,
obviously to the latter's prejudice.

MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
FACTS:

On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.

Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was
the manager. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao, who presented herself as an officer of
various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation, the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. Because of their good
business relationship, Dy took Ngos advice to and thereafter, Dy initially invested the approximate
amount of P10,000,000.00 to State Resources.

This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he
eventually advanced almostP100,000,000.00 with the same company. Gracias succeeding checks
representing the earnings of his investments (P114,286,086.14 in total sum), however, were all
dishonored upon deposit. He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Gracias
husband, Dannys construction and realty business. Despite repeated demands and the petitioners
constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dys invested money and its supposed earnings.

An Information of syndicated estafa filed against the petitioners and their six co-accused
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant
of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the
pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice. The trial court denied the
petitioners twin motions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the CA.

The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest.

In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. The CA noted that
Judge Marquez committed no grave abuse of discretion because he only issued the warrants of arrest
after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case.

The offense charged should only be for simple estafa, not syndicated estafa. Since there was
no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to
solicit money from other persons aside from Dy. Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to
exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be
against the general public or at least a group of persons.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the inconsistencies in Dys affidavits negate the existence of probable cause against
them for the crime charged.

HELD:

We resolve to DENY the petition.

Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest

Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is mandated to
personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the prosecutors
resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. He may: a)dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause.

The trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused. The
records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause to support the issuance of the warrants. Hence, the warrants of arrest were not arbitrarily
issued.

Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages.

1. Executive level- where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information.
2. Judicial level- undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, it relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In order to properly
resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial courts issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or
through a syndicate.

The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. One of these modes is
estafa by means of deceit as clearly defined in Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, ESTAFA has the following elements:
1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud;
3) the reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which
induced him to part with his money or property;
4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are present in this case. Had it not been for the
petitioners false representations and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in State
Resources, to his damage. Dy was induced to invest with the promise of higher returns. Unknown to
him, petitioners employed deception to secure his money to be used in Dannys construction and
realty business. The petitioners deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition
that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. Petitioners
misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with
his money for investment with an inexistent corporation. These circumstances all serve as indicators
of the petitioners deceit.
"Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which
deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are present:
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons;
3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC
against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dys supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud
perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other
officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in
defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.

However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited
by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought
investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to
entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with.

Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit. CA did
not err in affirming the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to lift warrant of arrest.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V WAGAS

FACTS:

Prosecution:
Private complainant, Alberto Ligaray alleged that Wagas placed an order of 200 bags
of rice over the telephone to be paid by a postdated check. The goods were released to Robert
Caada, brother-in-law of Wagas, who at the same time give to Ligaray the BPI check in
issue. Said check is payable to cash. When he later deposited the check it was dishonoured
due to insufficiency of funds. He called Wagas about the matter and despite repeated
demands; the latter did not pay him.

Ligaray even presented a letter signed by Wagas addressed to his counsel. The letter
contains acknowledgement and explanation of the matter and a promise by Wagas to pay his
debt.

Defense:
Wagas denied of having a telephone conversation with Ligaray. Although he admitted
issuing the check in question; according to him it was issued by him to his brother-in-law,
Caada, as payment for portion of the latters property that he wanted to buy. The sale did
not push through so he did not fund the check anymore.

With regards to the letter purportedly signed by him, he admitted it but insisted that
it was Caada who transacted with Ligaray and that he signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband has begged him to assume responsibility in order to avoid
jeopardizing Caadas application for overseas employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of estafa

HELD:

The Supreme Court gave merit to Wagas appeal. The crime charged to Wagas is Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
 amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee
or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that
the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the prosecution must show that
the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were
it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.

The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds
to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit
exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.

The prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the
postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for
payment because of the insufficiency of funds. However it failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt
the identity of the offender. As can be gleaned from the facts Ligaray did not personally meet the
person whom he transacted over the phone. The prosecution did not even presented evidence as to
how Ligaray knew and identified that the one hes talking over the phone is indeed Wagas. In fact,
check was delivered and the goods were received by Caada. And there is no evidence pointing to the
fact that Caada was acting in behalf of Wagas despite their in-law relationship. Also, the check
delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. A check payable to cash according to Negotiable
Instruments Law is payable to bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without need of an
endorsement, hence it may be said that Wagas indeed did not issue the check in favour of Ligaray but
to somebody else.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the
check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been
Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

Hence, the prosecution did not prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Wagas
is acquitted of the crime charged.

PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
 G.R. No 163662 | February 25, 2015

FACTS: Accused-appellant Villanueva was charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the CA found her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

Records show that, complainant Madarang went to Villanueva's residence and was able to sell to
Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against
Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated for the payment of such jewelries.

Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored upon
presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only one of the eight postdated checks since the
remaining checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed or Drawn against Insufficient Funds.

Villanueva denies the crime and insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks.
She avers that (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or
encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the
Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties. She further argues that the checks
were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged fraud and that Madarang had instigated
her to issue the checks, hence, she cannot be held liable for estafa.

ISSUE:
(1) Did Villanueva commit estafa in issuing the seven postdated checks?

HELD:

Villanueva is liable under Art 315 paragraph 2(d).

YES. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) may be committed when: (1) the offender
has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating
or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has
been defrauded. The deceit should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. In
the present case, all the elements of estafa were present.

The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to
Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang
accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment.
The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment
due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also
proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the
balance of P995, 000.00. In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby
the latter would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in
Villanueva's account. This defense, however, crumbles because she did not present proof of the
supposed agreement. The prosecution has proved the existence of all elements of estafa under Article
315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, hence, accused-appellants conviction is affirmed.

DE CASTRO VS PEOPLE ET AL
G.R. No 171672 | February 2, 2015

A confession executed voluntarily under an administrative investigation is not violative of the

accuseds constitutional right against self-incrimination.

FACTS: Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbook with De Castro. Matuguina
withdrew P500 and left her passbook with De Castro upon her instruction. The branch manager told
De Castro to return Matuguinas passbook, and the latter came up with the convenient excuse that
she already returned the passbook. The branch manager reviewed Matuguinas account and found
three withdrawal slips containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of
Matuguina and covering a total of P65, 000. The initials of De Castro were affixed on the withdrawal
slips. Matuguina denied that the passbook was returned to her and insisted that the signatures in
the slips were not hers, forcing De Castro to admit that the passbook is still with her and kept in her
house. The same incident also happened to Cornejo. De Castro initially denied the claims but later
broke down and confessed her guilt on a letter to her superior. RTC found her guilty of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents but De Castro appealed to CA contending that her
confession was in violation of her right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied of her constitutional right against self-incrimination

HELD: No, De Castro was not denied of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. Rights
against self-incrimination apply only to custodial interrogation of a suspect. She was not subjected to
any investigation by the police instead, she underwent an administrative investigation. She was not
coerced to give evidence against herself, but she simply broke down when she was confronted of her
crimes.

CAMPOS VS PEOPLE & FWCC

G.R. No 187401 | September 17, 2014
Arrangement for payments after dishonor negates element of lack of notice.

FACTS: Ma. Rosario (Rosario) obtained a loan of P50,000.00 from First Womens Credit
Corporation. In return, she issued post-dated checks to FWCC as security for the loan.
Fourteen of these checks were dishonoured when presented to the drawee bank, hence,
FWCC filed cases for violation of BP 22 against Rosario. After her arraignment, she did not
attend anymore the hearings on the cases, hence, she was tried in absentia. The MeTC
after trial, convicted Rosario for violation of BP 22, hence she appealed her conviction to the
Regional Trial Court. In her appeal, she averred that she did not receive any notice of
dishonour. The prosecution only presented a demand letter through registered mail, hence,
not enough to convict her for violation of BP 22. Further, she made subsequent
arrangements for payments of the obligation to FWCC, which is tantamount to good faith.
Her appeal denied by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, she is now before the Supreme
Court to assail her conviction for violation of BP 22.

ISSUE: Whether or not Campos is liable for BP 22

HELD: Campos is liable for BP 22. In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed
the MeTCs finding that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by
Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was
not sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the
registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. Sec 2 of BP 22 creates
a presumption of insufficiency of funds. Campos categorically declared in her petition that,
she has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made
arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the
checks. Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged
arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as
to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.

GRIFFITH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No 129764| March 12, 2002
Payment of the amount of the dishonored check before the filing of Information in court exonerates the
accused from BP 22.

FACTS: In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
for a term of two years. Geoffrey Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. issued
two checks which contained an instruction that the checks were not to be presented without prior
approval from the corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986. On the 29 th of May, Griffith
wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment because they could not be funded due
to a labor strike that paralyzed the operations of Lincoln Gerard. Phelps Dodge advised Lincoln
Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard to a compound as a new tenant
was moving in. When no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, asking him to fund
the checks within the time prescribed by law. Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but
Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge explaining Lincolns inability to fund the said checks due to the
strike. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale, despite Lincoln Gerards
protest. On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Griffith. Lincoln
Gerard lodged a complaint for damages against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted
the auction sale. The trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied
the proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerards arrearages. The Metropolitan Trial Court found Griffith
guilty on two count of violation of BP 22. The RTC affirmed the lower courts decision. Griffith points
out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the check that they were unfunded at
the time of their issuance. He also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the
proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.

ISSUE: (1) Whether Griffith has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law

(2) Whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years prior to the filing of the
information for violation of BP 22 justifies his acquittal

HELD: The Court found that holding Griffith to answer for a criminal offense under BP 22 two years
after the said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. The
Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to
enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.

LIM VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No 190834| November 26, 2014
Payment of the amount of the dishonored check before the filing of Information in court exonerates the
accused from BP 22.

FACTS: Lim gave two checks, in the amount of 100,000.00 for each check to Castor as his campaign
donation for the latter. Castor used the checks for the delivery of the printing materials but later
instructed Lim to issue a stop payment as the printing materials were delivered too late. The
checks were dishonored by the bank. Private complainant, Badiee sent two demand letters to Lim
and subsequently filed a complaint. After one month from receipt of the demand letters, Lim issued a
replacement check in the amount of 200,000.00. Badiee was able to encash the said replacement
check. Six months after Lim had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against him before the trial court. Lim was found guilty for violation of BP 22. CA also affirmed the
trial courts judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent payment of the amount of the dishonored checks before the
Informations were filed in court warrants dismissal of the criminal case against him

HELD: Generally only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day
grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under BP 22, the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or
offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to societys sense of
justice. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after
having received the subpoena, should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court.

BUEBOS VS PEOPLE
G.R. No 163938 | March 23, 2008

The information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify
its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during trial if it was not properly alleged in the information.

FACTS: Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some noise, got up
and saw the petitioners congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her
hut on fire. Instead of helping her, petitioners fled.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which
merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua
HELD: Petitioners should be liable for simple arson. The nature of destructive arson is distinguished
from simple arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the offender. The information or
complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying
and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, Buebos will not be convicted of the offense
proved during trial if it was not properly alleged in the information. In the present case, the act
committed by the petitioners neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of
perversity and viciousness.

PEOPLE V MACABANDO
G.R. No 187401 | September 17, 2014

The law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because he acts that constitute it have a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness.

FACTS: In a small neighborhood one afternoon during the Christmas season, Macabando was found
on the road holding a lead pipe and breaking bottles. Shouting that he would get even, he also
declared that he would burn his house. That same night, a fire broke out in the Macabandos house.
Those living nearby tried to call for help and stop the fire but was prevented by the owner of the
house who stood outside his house and fired several gun shots in the air. He also threatened to kill
anyone who would try to put out the fire. In the process, other residential homes were also
destroyed. Although no one actually saw how the fire started, the Bureau of Fire Protection
conducted an investigation and the results revealed that the fire was intentionally started in the
mans home.

The Regional Trial Court found the circumstances of the case constituted an unbroken chain leading
to the unavoidable conclusion that Macabando set fire to his own house, to the exclusion of others.
Thus, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, punishable under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.

ISSUE: Whether Macabando committed the crime of destructive or simple arson

HELD: The Court modified the crime from destructive arson to simple arson, punishable under Sec.
3(2), P.D. 1613. The Court explained that simple arson was the proper crime committed since
destructive arson contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons while simple arson contemplates the malicious
burning of public and private structures, regardless of size not punished under destructive arson.
Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than destructive arson.

Under Sec. 3(2), two elements are required for simple arson: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The Court held that both elements
were sufficiently proven in court. All property destroyed in the fire were his own house and several
other inhabited homes. Based on the facts, the burning was clearly intentional.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG

VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No 181409| February 11, 2010

The absolutory cause under Art 332 is meant to address only simple crime of theft, swindling, and
malicious mischief. If the crime is complexed with another crime, he is not removed from the protective
mantle of the absolutory cause under Art 332.

FACTS: Mediatrix, as the duly appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased mother,
Manolita, filed a case for estafa through falsification of documents against her brother-in.law,
William Sato, a Japanese national. In essence, the affidavit narrated that William, who is the
husband of her sister Zenaida, who died ahead of their mother Manolita, made Manolita sign special
powers of attorney in behalf of Williams daughter, Wendy. Manolita, believing it was merely for
paying taxes, signed the documents unknowingly because she was blind, in the presence of Wendy
and her other grandchildren. These special powers of attorney were then made the basis for the sale
of four parcels of land in Tagaytay, wherein William received the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,
034,000.00. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor filed an Information charging
William with estafa through falsification of public documents.

At the Regional Trial Court, William filed a motion to quash the information. According to him, his
relationship with the person allegedly defrauded, his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance,
citing Article 332 of the RPC.The trial prosecutor opposed the motion, citing that the death of
Zenaida, Williams wife, extinguished the relationship by affinity between Manolita and William. The
RTC granted Williams motion and quashed the information, adopting the theory propounded by
William that he is exempted from criminal liability due to his relationship by affinity with Manolita.
The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC decision and dismissed the petition filed by the estate.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the death of Williams wife and Manolitas daughter, Zenaida,
extinguished the relationship by affinity between William and Manolita
(2) Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita

HELD: (1) Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.

(2) No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace,
the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended
party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the
violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members
as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the
violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a
breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in
the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.

PEOPLE V. AMARO

G.R. No 199100 | July 18, 2014

When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is true.

FACTS: On March 26, 1998, at the City of Puerto Princesa, Amaro abducted AAA, a seven-year old
girl, through deceit and force and intimidation with lewd designs. Amaro detained AAA for 28 days,
during which he had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will. AAA accounted her own version of
the events that transpired in that night, and so did Amaro. Their versions of the story had different
facts and antecedents. The RTC declared Amaro to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape. AAAs testimony was found to be credible and supported by medical
findings. The case was appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Appellant
contended that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. According to the
appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in his custody at the time and said
incident allegedly happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the complainant could sufficiently establish the guilt of the
accused for the crime of forcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainants
testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if
the matter to which she testified is true.
Conversely, mere denial without any strong evidence to support it cannot overcome the positive
declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime
attributed to him. An alibi is completely self-serving and cannot trump the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. Denial and alibi are both defenses used by the
appellant.

PEOPLE V. CAYANAN
G.R. No 200080 | September 18, 2013

Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the
victim.
FACTS: The informations charging Marvin Cayanan for Qualified Rape and Forcible Abduction
alleged that while AAA was sleeping alone in their house in Bulacan, she woke up to someone
caressing her, who turned out to be Cayanan, her brother-in-law. When she refused to remove her
shorts, Marvin forcibly took it off and inserted his organ into her genitalia. He threatened to kill AAA
if she told anyone about the incident. On February 26, 2001, while AAA was about to enter her school
campus, Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, pulled AAA towards the vehicle, and
boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop for a change of clothes, then to a Jollibee outlet, and
finally to his sisters house where he raped her again. A certain couple then brought her to the
barangay where she was asked to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan.
The latters mother and sister-in-law then brought her home. Only after her classmate informed her
family of what happened in school did she narrate the incidents to her mother and brother. In his
defense, Cayanan alleged that he and AAA were sweethearts, but the RTC did not believe him or the
genuineness of the love letters AAA supposedly sent him, and convicted him for Qualified Rape and
Forcible Abduction. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cayanan should be held liable for Qualified Rape and Forcible Abduction?

RULING: Cayanan is liable only for Qualified Rape. Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have
sex with him on February 1, 2001 and threatened her and her family with physical harm. The
testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAAs testimony that Cayanan forcibly took her by
the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and thereafter raped her. The defense failed to show
any reason why the prosecutions evidence should not be given weight or credit. Moreover, the claim
that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the crimes. For the Court to even
consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. The
defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof is
required such as tokens, mementos, and photographs and while Cayanan produced two love letters
allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters were
unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value. The Court, however, finds that
Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of
rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this case, circumstances show that
the victims abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the
tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sisters house where he raped her inside
the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

CAPILI VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 183805 | July 3, 2013

The subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case of bigamy. Bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared void.

PERALTA, J

FACTS: Virgilio CAPILI, petitioner, contracted a second marriage with one Shirley G. TISMO on
December 8, 1999 while having a previous and subsisting valid marriage with one Karla Y.
MEDINA- CAPILI. On June 28, 2004, CAPILI was charged with bigamy before the RTC, to which
CAPILI pleaded for a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that there is a pending civil case
for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage. CAPILI contends that a declaration of nullity of
the second marriage would extinguish his criminal liability, therefore invoking that such
circumstance would result to a prejudicial question.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the second marriage was found to be void ab initio. CAPILI
filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case of bigamy by reason that the second marriage was already
declared to be void ab initio. The RTC favored CAPILI and dismissed the criminal case of bigamy.
The case was elevated to the CA, wherein the decision was reversed and was remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. CAPILI filed for a review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case of bigamy

HELD:

The subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case of bigamy.

Bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared void. Thus, the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy,
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, CAPILIs assertion
would only delay the process of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition
to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
to the criminal case, which cannot be allowed to prosper.

A marriage, under the law, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Even if CAPILI eventually obtained a declaration that his second
marriage was void ab initio, the gist of the argument is that both the first and the second marriage
were both subsisting at the same time, which is bigamous.
Q: CAPILI contracted a second marriage while having a subsistent and valid first marriage. During
the pendency of the action the second marriage was declared void ab initio. CAPILI filed a motion to
dismiss the criminal case of bigamy contending that the second marriage was already declared to be
void ab initio. Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case of bigamy?

A: No, The subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case of bigamy. Bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared void. Thus, the accused may still be charged
with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
(Capili V. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013)

PEOPLE VS. ODTUHAN

G.R. No. 191566 | July 17, 2013

The declaration of nullity of the previous marriage subsequent to the contracting of the second
marriage would not extinguish the criminal liability for Bigamy. The parties cannot assume the
nullity of their marriage. They must first procure a declaration of nullity before the courts in order to
be allowed to contract a subsequent marriage; otherwise a bigamous marriage will arise

PERALTA, J

FACTS:

Edgardo ODTUHAN, contracted a marriage with Eleanor A. ALAGON on 1993 during the
subsistence of his marriage with Jasmin MODINA on 1980. On 1999, the first marriage, between
ODTUHAN and MODINA was declared to be void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Subsequently, his wife from the second marriage, ALAGON, died. On 2003, ODTUHAN was charged
before the RTC with Bigamy. ODTUHAN moved for the quashal of the information on the ground
that there was a declaration of nullity of the previous marriage prior to the filing of the action.

The RTC denied the ODTUHANs motion to quash holding that the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. ODTUHAN appealed to the CA
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information. CA agreed with ODTUHAN and ordered
the lower court to give due course on the motion to quash citing the case of Morigo V. People. The
case was appealed to the SC

ISSUE:
 1 Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage subsequent to the
contracting of the second marriage would extinguish the criminal liability for Bigamy.
2 Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint
against him is a valid reason to quash information

HELD:

The declaration of nullity of the previous marriage would not extinguish the criminal
liability for Bigamy.

It has been clarified in the Family Code and has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

The declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint against him is not
a valid reason to quash information

Well settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription.

SANTOS VS. SANTOS

G.R. No. 187061 | October 8, 2014

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
LEONEN, J

FACTS: On July 27, 2007, RICARDO Santos, the husband of RICARDO, CELERINA Santos,
declared the latter presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage. RICARDO married thereafter
and claims that it was also 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since CELERINA left. He
believed that she had passed away. Upon learning on October 2008 of RICARDOs petition,
CELERINA filed a petition for annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that RICARDO, knowing her true address,
misrepresented to the court her absence.

The CA dismissed CELERINAs petition for being a wrong mode of remedy, stating that the proper
remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

CELERINA contended that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouses death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing CELERINAs petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing CELERINAs petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive
death.

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead, consequences of legitimization of children during absence shall also be enjoyed.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void such will be proven if CELERINA be allowed to for a termination of judgment. A
subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the
valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

RICARDO was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he
contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of well-
founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule
against bigamous marriages to apply.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. CELERINAs choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie. The case was remanded to the CA for proceedings of the nullification of
judgment.

LASANAS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 159031 | June 23, 2014

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and inexistent for lack of a marriage license, is
guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. A subsequent
marriage that is void ab initio can still produce legal consequences such as incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.

BERSAMIN, J

FACTS: Noel LASANAS the accused was married to Socorro PATINGO without the benefit of a
marriage license. Afterwards, while the first marriage was not yet dissolved and while the couple
was separated in fact, LASANAS contracted another marriage with Josefa Eslaban. LASANAS filed
a complaint for annulment of the first marriage alleging that PATINGO employed fraud and
misrepresentation in securing his consent in their marriage. Subsequent to the filing for the
annulment of the marriage, PATINGO charged LASANAS with Bigamy. While the Bigamy case was
pending before the RTC, the annulment case filed by LASANAS was dismissed by the court.

The RTC rendered its decision, convicting LASANAS of the crime of Bigamy. The accused appealed
his conviction to the CA contending that because he had not been legally married to PATINGO, the
first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent
were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage. He further contends that Article 40 of the Family Code which requires a judicial
declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution. Even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be
acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment
of nullity of marriage thus lacking the element of bigamy that the subsequent marriage must be
valid

ISSUE: Whether or not LASANAS should be acquitted of bigamy.

HELD:

LASANAS should not be acquitted of bigamy because there is still a need for a declaration
of nullity of the first marriage before a subsequent marriage may be contracted. A
subsequent marriage that is void ab initio can still produce legal consequences such as
incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without
his marriage to PATINGO being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to PATINGO was still deemed valid and subsisting
due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with PATINGO prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa.

The Court has explained that since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

RONULO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182438 | July 2, 2014

The elements of this crime are: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony. There is no prescribed form of a marriage ceremony; however, the Family
Code supplies the minimal requirements for consideration. The moment that the minimal
requirements for a marriage ceremony are met and the elements of the crime are sufficed the crime will
arise. The fact that the couple was adjudged guilty of contracting an illegal marriage is not an
element for the crime to arise.

BRION, J
FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry at a Parish Church in Ilocos
Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the
marriage due to the lack of marriage license. The wedding couple subsequently decided to head to an
Aglipayan Church wherein an Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner RONULO, conducted a ceremony
on the same day despite RONULOs knowledge of the couple's lack of a marriage license.

RONULO was charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony before the MTC. The MTC found RONULO guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, and imposed a fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. which states that a violation of
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

RTC affirmed decision, however, it ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of
Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA sustained the decision of the RTC. Additionally, it ruled that the RONULOs criminal
liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were
charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.

RONULO contends that he is not criminally liable of the crime charged since he merely offered his
blessing and did not perform a marriage ceremony. He further contends that he cannot be penalized
because the wedding couple is yet to be declared guilty of contracting an illegal marriage by the
court.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not RONULO violated Article 352 for performing an illegal marriage.
2 Whether or not the penalty for violating Article 352 is in accordance with Section 44 of the
Marriage Law

HELD:

RONULO violated Article 352 for performing an illegal marriage.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

Both of the elements were present since RONULO had the authority to solemnize a marriage and
that the alleged "blessing" done by RONULO is tantamount to the performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony. While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
marriage ceremony; and what constitutes its illegal performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family
Code are clear on these matters. What RONULO performed suffices the minimal requirements. Also
the fact that the couple was adjudged guilty of contracting an illegal marriage is not an element for
the crime to arise.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Section 44.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly
found by the MTC, RONULO was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article
352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision
which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of
Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after
the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

BRILLANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118757 & 121571 | November 11, 2005

In libel cases against public officials, liability arises from the alleged defamatory statement related to
their official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice.

TINGA, J

FACTS:

Roberto BRILLANTE, a candidate for the position of councilor in Makati City held a press
conference where he accused Jejomar Binay and Nemesio Prudente of plotting an assassination plot
against Augusto Syjuco. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open letter was
published as well.

The trial court found BRILLANTE guilty of four counts of libel and imposed upon him a penalty of
imprisonment and a fine, which decision the CA affirmed. The case was raised to the SC.

The SC found him guilty of the crime of libel but reduced the amount of moral damages he is liable to
pay. BRILLANTE moves for a motion for reconsideration and claims that there is a semblance of
truth to the accusations he hurled at Binay and Prudente citing several instances of alleged violent
acts committed by the latter against his person.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not BRILLANTE is liable of the crime of Libel

 2 Whether or not the penalty to be imposed should include imprisonment

HELD:

BRILLANTE is liable of the crime of Libel

In libel cases against public officials, liability arises from the alleged defamatory statement related
to their official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice. In this case the court finds that indeed
petitioner is liable for libel since he failed to prove all the elements of qualified privilege
communication under par. 1 of Art. 354 of the RPC.

The penalty imposed should not include imprisonment

The circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which the libelous publications were
based in the instant case warrant the imposition of the penalty of fine only, instead of both
imprisonment and finethe intensely feverish passions evoked during election period in 1988 must
have agitated the accused into writing his open letter.

The previous decision was affirmed but with modification consisting of the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment.

BUATIS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 142509 | March 24, 2006

When the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the offender
(malice in fact), for the law already presumes that his imputation is malicious (malice in law).
Publication; In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it has been written.

AUSTRA- MARTINEZ, J

FACTS:

The wife of private-complainant Atty. Pieraz, retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her
husband. Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent
a communication by registered mail to said BUATIS, Jr. Reacting to the insulting words used by
BUATIS, particularly to the words: "Satan, senile, stupid, english carabao,". Atty. Pieraz filed a
complaint for libel against accused-appellant.

The defense made by BUATIS was that it was only a comment that he had dictated to one of his
secretaries and could not recall as to whether he had signed that letter-comment nor if it was even
addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Later, however during the counter-affidavit filed by BUATIS, the accused
did not deny the contents of the said letter and admitted that indeed he had sent the subject letter to
Atty. Pieraz.

CA found BUATIS guilty of libel. The case was brought before the SC.

BUATIS further contended that there was no proper publication and that there is no malice in fact
proven by the prosecution since he is merely a responding urban poor leader acting as counsel,
defending a member of an association under threat of ejectment from her dwelling place, and thus
should be considered as privileged communication.

ISSUE: Whether or not BUATIS is criminally liable of the crime of libel.

HELD:

BUATIS is criminally liable of the crime of libel. When the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of Buatis (malice in fact), for the law
already presumes that his imputation is malicious (malice in law).

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b)
it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. The last
two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. Publication; In libel, publication means
making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written. There is publication when that same letter was furnished to all those
concerned. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the
letter to one of his secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer and
distributed the said letter. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim
of privileged communication. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a
circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondents reputation. SC affirmed the
decision of the CA, rendering the accused guilty.

IVLER VS. MODESTO- SAN PEDRO

G.R. No. 172716 | November 17, 2010

Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty. Reckless Imprudence or negligence is the crime itself. Hence, once committed of
acquitted of a specific act of Reckless Imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for the
same act.

CARPIO, J

FACTS: Jason IVLER was charged with (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. PONCE; and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor
C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle..

IVLER pleaded guilty to the first charge and was convicted by final judgment. He moved to quash the
second charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The METC
refused quashal and the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the quashal.

IVLER argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense bars his prosecution in the chare of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property having been previously convicted for the same offense of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries. He submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty but such as is the same crime which is Reckless Imprudence.

ISSUE: Whether or not IVLERs constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars him for
being prosecuted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.

HELD:

IVLERs conviction of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars his
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property

Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty. Reckless Imprudence or negligence is the crime itself. Hence, once committed
of acquitted of a specific act of Reckless Imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for the
same act. For the essence of quasi offense of criminal negligence under Art 365 of the RPC lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that if intentionally done would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the offense is only taken into account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the
substance of the offense; And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense remains one and the same, and cannot be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
 MARIANO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 178145 | July 7, 2014

To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in
the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. The courts
must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by the mathematical formula
provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

BERSAMIN, J

FACTS: Reynaldo MARIANO was charged with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping
Ferdinand de Leon while the former was overtaking the latters jeep. DE LEON was thrown four
meters away from his jeepney. DE LEON and MARIANO had a prior altercation when Mariano
almost collided with the vehicle of DE LEON. According to MARIANO, he stopped as he saw an
oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, MARIANO made a signal and overtook the
jeep of DE LEON. However, DE LEON suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was
sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up.

The RTC found MARIANO guilty of Frustrated Homicide. On appeal, the CA modified the felony
committed by MARIANO to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. MARIANO
appealed to the SC contending that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt,
and claims that the victims injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked
criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have
appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not MARIANO is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical

injuries.
2 Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered

HELD:

MARIANO is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence
in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required. The fact that DE LEONs body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that
MARIANO was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of DE LEON. Thus, had
MARIANO not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of DE LEON, he could have
easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming
vehicle.

With MARIANO not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did not fall
under Article 263(1) supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioners act as a
grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prisin correccional in its medium period. Instead, the petitioners act that
caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because DE LEONs physical injuries were those under Article
263(3) supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged in for more than 90 days. Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from
one to four months

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be considered

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5
of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts
shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code. In order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts
must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by the mathematical formula
provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

GONZAGA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195671 | January 21, 2015

Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent in Article 365. The limiting element in the last paragraph
of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who
fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give., according to
case law, (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires
adequate proof.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS: Rogelio J. GONZAGA, was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263
of the RPC with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured
party such help that was in his hands to give before the RTC.

GONZAGA collided head-on with the motorcycle of the victims, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. and his two
children, while descending from a curved road. As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2
children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while
the children were severely injured. Dionesio Sr. died shortly after being brought to the hospital.

GONZAGA, in his defense claimed that it was not his fault that the tricycle swerved in his direction.
Additionally he forwarded the information that with the use of his jack handle and the assistance of
two (2) other motorists who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the
motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser; thus the aggravating circumstance must not be
appreciated.

On July 31, 2006, the RTC convicted him sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the following civil
liabilities. Upon reconsideration the penalty for imprisonment was reduced to four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities holding that the jack handle that was used
to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of
showing who owned the same and, accordingly, reduced the penalty. Upon Appeal to the CA, the first
decision of the RTC was reinstated.

ISSUE:

1 Whether or not the CA correctly upheld GONZAGAs conviction in accordance with the RTCs
July 31, 2006 Decision.
2 Whether or not the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the
injured party such help that was in his hands to give should be appreciated

HELD:

The CA correctly upheld GONZAGAs conviction in accordance with the RTCs July 31, 2006
Decision

Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent in the aforesaid crime.
The Court finds that GONZAGA acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering
him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.

Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the
death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of said penalty should be
taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a
need to modify the penalty to be imposed on GONZAGA and thus, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six
years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.

The aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party
such help that was in his hands to give should be appreciated

The Court is inclined to sustain GONZAGAs claim that he tried to extend help to the victims, but
when he started the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he discovered that the vehicle
had no brakes. Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance
under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should not be considered.

The limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next
higher in degree upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give., according to case law, (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of
the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident,
is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.