Roberto Hofmeister Pich

The Account of Transcendental Concepts

by Jernimo Valera (1568-1625)
in His Summulae dialecticae (1610)

Introduction

Jernimo Valera was born in 1568 in the Peruvian town of Chachapoyas. He

received a rigorous education in all disciplines of arts from 1583 to 1587 at
San Martn College, founded by the Jesuits in Lima. In August 1588 he became
a Franciscan, taking the habit in the Convent of San Francisco de Lima. He
worked there as reader of Sacred Theology and Arts for sixteen years, in the
period ranging from 1590 to 16071.
What has survived of Valeras output up to our days, namely the Commentarii
ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Sco-
ti logicam (1610), was the first philosophical work ever printed in South Amer-
ica. It was written as a textbook of logic for Franciscan friars. Latin-american
colonial philosophy was essentially restricted to members of the religious Or-
ders, whether in monasteries, convents, seminars or university chairs. Professors
of philosophy produced basically handbooks in the form of Commentarii,
Summae and Cursus and treatises. Most of the authors made use of Aristotelian
works as the basis for philosophical education and problem formulation. Aris-
totelian and summulistic logics were studied continuously; accordingly minor
logic (called summulae because its original model was Peter of Spains Summu-
lae logicales) and greater logic divided the production in logics. Greater
logic included commentaries on Porphyriuss Eisagog, on Aristotles Categories

1 Cf. D. Crdova Salinas, Crnica de La Provncia de los Doce Apstoles (1651), Edicin de Lino Ca-

nedo, Washington 1957, p. 623; G. Furlong, Nacimiento y desarrollo de La filosofia en el Rio de La Plata
1536-1810, Editorial Guillermo Kraft Limitada (Publicaciones de La Fundacin Vitoria y Surez), Buenos
Aires 1952, pp. 137-138; V.S. Cspedes Agero, La filosofia escotista de Jernimo de Valera (1568-1625),
in J.C. Balln Vargas (ed.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosfico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII
(Seleccin de textos, notas y estudios), Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Acadmico, Lima 2011, pp. 435-514,
480 sqq.; R.H. Pich, Notas sobre Jernimo Valera e suas obras sobre lgicas, in Cauriensia, 6 (2011), pp.
169-202; R.H. Pich, Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jernimo Valeras (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic,
in Bulletin de Philosophie Mdivale, 54 (2012), pp. 333-370.

Quaestio, 14 (2014), 299-314 10.1484/j.quaestio.5.103617

300 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

and Second Analytics, and quite often on the Topics and the Sophistical Refuta-
tions2 depending on its previous treatment or not in the Summulae commentar-
ies on On Interpretation and First Analytics would belong to this script as well3.
Valeras work on logics perfectly fits this picture. In the surviving volume, we
find both the Summulae dialecticae, or minor logic, and the greater questions
or rather Commentarii ac quaestiones on Aristotles Organon. Valeras Commen-
tarii display an order of exposition similar to the one used by the famous logi-
cian Antonio Rubio (1548-1615), active in Mexico and contemporary to Valera4,
in his own Commentarii. Particularly remarkable is the fact that even under a
common structure Valeras work is Scotist logic. He wants to expose, through
commentaries articulated in distinctions, articles, and questions Aristot-
les works on logics with the help of Scotist works and accounts of logical matters.
If Valeras logic is initially guided by Scotuss logicalia, it is fundamental to note
that the logic of Scotus could be significantly remade with the privileged point of
view found in the rest his opera. Valera refers extensively to Quaestiones in libros
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Ordinatio, Reportationes, and Quodlibeta5. In fact,
Valeras work in via Scoti concerns not only logical matters, but also important
issues concerning other fields especially language, mind, and metaphysics6.
Which logical works of Scotus did Valera have in mind? Obviously he had
access to editions of Scotuss works published before 16397, that is, before the

2 Cf. W.B. Redmond, Latin America, Colonial Thought in, in E. Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclo-

pedia of Philosophy, London-New York 1998, Vol. 5, pp. 421-426; L.F. Restrepo, Colonial Thought, in S.
Nuccetelli / O. Schutte / O. Bueno (eds), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell,
Chichester 2010, pp. 36-52, esp. pp. 36-37; R.H. Pich, Recepo e desenvolvimento da Escolstica Bar-
roca na Amrica Latina, sculos 16-18: notas sobre a contribuio de Walter Bernard Redmond, in Scripta
Mediaevalia, 4/2 (2011), pp. 1-22.
3 Cf. W.B. Redmond / M. Beuchot, Pensamiento y realidad en fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz, Centro de

Estudios Clsicos-unam, Ciudad de Mxico 1987, pp. 109 sqq.

4 However, Antonio Rubio declares not to have had the intention of commenting on Aristotles First

analytics and the Topics. Cf. M. Beuchot, Historia de la filosofa en el Mxico Colonial, Herder, Barcelona
1996, pp. 143-145; W.B. Redmond, La Logica mexicana de Antonio Rubio Una nota histrica, in Dinoia
(unam), 28 (1982), pp. 309-330; W.B. Redmond / M. Beuchot, La lgica mexicana en el Siglo de Oro,
Universidad Autnoma de Mxico, Ciudad de Mxico 1985, pp. 243 sqq., 267-268; Antonius Rubius,
Commentarii in universam Aristotelis dialecticam, Alcal 1603.
5 Cf. Hyeronimus de Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi

Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam, Apud Francisco a Canto, Lima 1610, Liber Primus de introductione
ad logicam Aristotelis; Liber Secundus in quo praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expenduntur; I, d. 1, q.
3 p. 8; I, d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 48-49; I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 6, pp. 70-71; I, d. 3, a. 1, q. 4, pp. 111-112; II, d. 2, q.
1, p. 217; II, d. 4, q. 1, pp. 244-245; II, d. 4, q. 4, p. 261; II, d. 4, q. 9, pp. 277-278; II, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, p.
299; II, d. 5, a. 2, q. 6, p. 316; II, d. 6, q. 2, p. 353; II, d. 7, q. 2, pp. 370-371.
6 Cf. for example Valeras treatments of common nature, real being and being of reason, of

substance, quantity, and relation in Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 2,

a. 1, pp. 34-53; I, d. 1, pp. 8-17 and I, d. 2, a. 2, pp. 52-59; II, d. 3, pp. 227-242; II, d. 4, pp. 242-280;
II, d. 5, pp. 280-347.
7 Cf. U. Smeets, Lineamenta bibliographiae scotisticae, Commissio Scotistica, Roma 1942, pp. 2-4.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 301

referential edition by Wadding8. As we know, also concerning the opera philo-

sophica the modern critical editions corrected several wrong attributions. Valera
considered as Scotist works listed as inauthentic in todays catalogues. Given the
editions that he had at his disposal, we can affirm that Jernimo Valera partially
constructed his logic on non Scotist material9, namely the comments on the First
and Second Analytics and on the Topics10.
At any rate, and this seems to be unanimously attested by contemporary cata-
logues, one should note that the existing volume by Valera, in the part dedicated
to commentaries, relates only to authentic works by Scotus, even if not to critical
editions. The volume is divided into three parts: Summulae, Liber Primus, and
Liber Secundus, wherein the Liber Primus and Liber Secundus are structured
around authentic Scotist works, namely Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge
and Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, respectively. The front page of
the volume announces that this is the first part of an entire logic divided into
two parts. Only some specific sections of the Summulae (in the references to
Analytica priora) and a significant part of the either never written or today lost
pars secunda were built on spurious works.

1. Jernimo Valera on Dialectics in the Summulae

Valera offers his general understanding of dialectics in the opening chapter of

his minor logic. The goal of summular teaching is not only to facilitate an un-
derstanding of the books of the Aristotelian Organon, but also to lead the meth-
od of disputating into maturity11. He divides the Summulae into three parts,
following the traditional three operations of the intellect: (i) simple apprehen-
sion either of things or simple terms, which is the very basis for (ii) composition
or division of simple things apprehended in affirmative and in negative propo-

8 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, ed. L. Wadding, 12 Vols., Lyon 1639, repr. Olms, Hildesheim

1968-1969. Cf. also R. Andrews et Al., Introduction, in Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera
Philosophica I Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristote-
lis, Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure-Washington D.C. 1999, pp. vii-xliii, esp. p. xxiii,
also footnote 46; R. Andrews et Al., Introduction, in Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera
Philosophica II Quaestiones in libros Perihermeneias Aristotelis, Franciscan Institute Publications, St.
Bonaventure-Washington D.C. 2004, pp. 9-35, esp. p. 21; R. Andrews et Al., Introduction, in Ioannes
Duns Scotus, Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica II Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis,
St. Bonaventure-Washington D.C. 2004, pp. 257-266, esp. pp. 259-260.
9 On the critical editions of Scotuss works, cf. A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh

University Press, Edinburgh 2006, pp. 103-147.

10 Cf. again Pich, Notas sobre Jernimo Valera cit., pp. 189-197; Pich, Scholastica colonialis cit., pp.

333-370.
11 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Summulae dialecticae (= SD), Discursus prolegomenus, pp. 1-2, in Com-

mentarii ac quaestiones cit.

302 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

sitions respectively, which finally allow (iii) discourse, in which case depart-
ing from one proposition (or from several propositions) another is inferred. The
proper concern of dialectics is the art of concluding after correct argumentation.
It is the method or art of reasoning12. Having notorious didactical concerns in
his writing, Valera makes explicit the several names given to dialectica as art
of reasoning. That faculty relates firstly to dialectica as derived from the Greek
dialegome. For Valera, already in Aristotle one can see that the meaning of the
word embraces both the topical and the demonstrative aspects, so that dialectics
is the art of making evident the unknown things from the known things, through
argumentation, be it probable or necessary. That faculty relates secondly to the
name logica, from the Greek logos, meaning reason or discourse, and in this
sense it provides the direction of both external and internal discourse13.
An important question for Valera was from where to begin the Summulae
or the teaching of logic as such. Summulists are not unanimous about the
beginning and the ordering of topics. Two views are found in the schools. First,
the beginning should be the way of knowing (modus sciendi), and this is
the oration that manifests some unknown thing. Assuming three causes for
there being unknown things, the way of knowing is triple: an unknown thing
becomes manifest (i) through division, (ii) definition, and (iii) argumenta-
tion, in which case from a known property another still unknown is deduced.
Here, the way of knowing is the oratio, which amounts to a consequence or
a valid argument14. If this is where dialectics starts, it excludes authority,
experiment without determined rules and techniques, and examples that
manifest something unknown just accidentally15. To begin with the way of know-
ing in logic means to begin already with the most universal instrument of the
intellect, to which everything else is directed in it in the reason of the intelli-
gible: syllogism16.

12 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, pp. 1-2.

13 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 1, p. 2. Accordingly, Valera does not follow
a humanist, but rather a traditional scholastic view on dialectics; cf. on this L. Jardine, Humanism
and the Teaching of Logic, in N. Kretzmann / A. Kenny / J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982 (repr. 1996), pp. 797-807, esp. pp. 798-804; L. Jardine,
Humanistic Logic, in C.B. Schmitt / Q. Skinner (eds), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988 (repr. 1990), pp. 173-198, esp. pp. 175-176 (also pp.
178-186); W.K. Percival, Changes in Approach to Language, in N. Kretzmann / A. Kenny / J. Pinborg
(eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy cit., pp. 808-817, esp. pp. 810 sqq.; R. Pozzo,
Adversus Ramistas. Kontroversen ber die Natur der Logik am Ende der Renaissance, Schwabe Verlag,
Basel 2012, pp. 29-62.
14 In this way of proceeding and in this choice of prolegomenous topics, Valera is not alone; one

can find the same approach in the Summulae of Domingo de Soto, first edition 1529, in the Introductiones
dialecticae; see Ashworth, Traditional Logic cit., pp. 143-172, esp. pp. 162 sqq.
15 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 3.
16 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 3.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 303

There is, however, a second opinion about the starting point in dialectics.
According to it, the beginning is not the way of knowing itself, but a more simple
part of it, namely the term. The order of doctrine, as every art, follows an order
of nature, and nature progresses from potency to act, from part to whole, from
simple to composed things, etc. Grammar confirms this, for in it scholastici start
with the knowledge of terms in the form of grammatical classifications such as
noun, verb, etc. Moreover, the first and simpler things, the parts, are easier
to know, because they are more independent. Finally, the logician has to conduct
first of all the previous and independent intellectual operation, and this is the
apprehension of the terms17.
What then is Valeras determination about the mode of beginning of dialectics
as a discipline? He affirms that all ways of disserting, the universal instru-
ments of the intellect that consist of universal laws and serve all investigative
undertakings, are presented in scientific form in the logica magna that follows
the Summulae. In the compendium, one has to obtain some knowledge of how to
reason correctly, before one proceeds to more complex steps. There we have a
confuse and imperfect knowledge of the way of knowing, and there is no reason
why one should bring yet another confuse compendium before this one, in a
process ad infinitum. Surely one cannot have distinct knowledge of what is the
way of knowing, unless strict divisions and definitions are made. But before this
it should be known what is definition, division, consequence, etc., more
simply or vaguely. It is not the case that right at the beginning the exact definition
of the modus sciendi can be grasped. If at least for the confuse knowledge of the
way of knowing another way of knowing is not required, the same is valid
for the knowledge of the modus sciendi prepared in the Summulae. Also for the
subject matter of logic it is necessary to begin from some point. Therefore, the
knowledge of division, definition, consequence, etc., arrived at through
the guiding nature or through the sharpness of natural logic is enough. More-
over, for the disciple it is enough to receive vaguely the way of knowing transmit-
ted by the master with the confidence that what he receives is exact and true.
At any rate, the point of departure in dialectics is not confidence in a master,
but the confuse notions that one possesses through a logical intelligence given
by nature18.
Valera, therefore, cannot share the first opinion about the beginning of dialec-
tics. It is not possible to begin with a non-confusing way of knowing. One has
to start with the simpler things and terms in fact, things of reason and second
intentions , i.e. through division and definition. Valera posits, in answering the

17 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 4.

18 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 4.
304 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

first argument in defense of the first opinion, that if one affirms that the more nec-
essary science must come before the other sciences and that is the science that
investigates the modus sciendi , one has to say that this scientific knowledge
cannot be possessed from the beginning. It has to be obtained on the basis of
previous efforts and still confused states of knowledge19. Answering the second
argument proving the first opinion, he says that, in order to acquire knowledge
of logics, one cannot and needs not attain the way of knowing in the assigned
act, but only in the exercised act. This is what the novice realizes by making
use of the definition offered by the master20. There is a didactical principle here.
Before he comprehends distinctly the very subject matter of logic, the apprentice
has only to follow the masters procedures in the discipline.

2. Transcendental Terms in the Summulae

A simple example of the Scotist character of Valeras logic can already be

viewed in his Summulae. In the First Book of the Summulae, which is actually
preparatory to the subject of logic as such, which is valid argument or syl-
logism, Valera deals with the first operation of the intellect, i.e. simple appre-
hension. Objects of this operation are simple things. The corresponding items
in the intellect are terms. At the beginning, logic has to define, divide, and
characterize simple things or terms. It is not surprising that Chapter I of Book
I is called On the term in common. What follows should be viewed then as a
Scotist doctrine of terms. Basically and in analogy to continuous things in ge-
ometry , a term is an extremum, an ultimate or final point of a thing in the sense
that nothing of the thing is beyond that, and all its parts are contained within
such ultimate or final point. Following Aristotle, a logical term is the extreme of
the proposition in which the proposition is analyzed as in subject and predicate.
The two extremes of the simple proposition are separated by the verb, as in Man
is white: they are subject and predicate, and a predicate is subjected to the
subject. Predicates are and can always be resolved or analyzed back as
parts of a composition as, for instance, the material parts are in respect to a
house (domus in lapidem et lignum) or the spiritual and material parts are in
respect to a human being (homo in animam et corpus). One extreme is put in
the place of a (categorical) genus, for in it the term incurs with everything which
is ultimate in a given thing. The other extremes are put in the place of the dif-

19 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 5.

20 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, Discursus prolegomenus, c. 2, p. 5.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 305

ference, insofar as that first extreme-genus is distinguished from other extremes

exactly through those other terms that stay in the place of a given differentia21.
Chapter II, On the division of terms from the part of the subject, basically
says that terms are divided in mental, vocal, and written. But in the doctrine of
terms, all things are to be understood mostly about the mental term. A mental
term is the extreme of a mental proposition. The most basic expression for a
mental term is conceptus, although there are several others such as species of
the thing22. Chapter III, On the division of terms from the part of the thing
signified and the mode of signifying, offers first a definition of sign (signum).
A sign is what conducts us to the knowledge of another thing, wherein sign and
signifying (significare) relate as agent (agens) and action (actio). Prop-
erly speaking, there are three kinds of sign: (i) natural, (ii) artificial (ad
placitum); (iii) customary (ex consuetudine). Divisions (i) and (ii) apply both
to things and words. From that point on, Valera establishes several divisions of
signifying terms, whether mental, vocal or written, always with some depend-
ence of signification on the mental term. He first divides (1) natural sign in
formal and instrumental. Formal natural sign is the one through which the
intellectual power enables us to know the thing without any previous knowledge,
and this is a mental term, which inheres formally in the intellect as a natural like-
ness of the thing. Its meaning concerns the essence of the thing, and the mental
aspect of the thing is a signification common to everyone. The signification of
things is the same, but not the spoken words which are imposed to signify the
same thing. An instrumental sign is one that, beyond the species that enables
us to know a thing and is a sign of it, works as an instrument to the knowledge
of things totally diverse to the first signification. As a form printed in the sand
is the sign of a foot, it brings us also to the knowledge of a specific animal that
was the agent of that act of stepping. The instrumental aspect of a sign belongs
to all signs ad placitum23.
Signifying terms divide further into (2) categorematic and syncategoremat-
ic, (3) complex and incomplex, and (4) concrete and abstract. Abstract
terms deserve special attention. An abstract term is one that precisely signifies
the form as separate from the subject to which it gives being. Although that
form is a parte rei in the supposit or subject, the mode of signifying of the term
is, as it were, of a separate form such as whiteness (albedo) by the one
that posseses it. Abstract terms divide further24 into (4) abstract through last

21 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 1, pp. 5-6.

22 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 2, p. 7.
23 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, pp. 7-8.
24 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, p. 9. Valera affirms that he follows our Doctor (nostrum

Doctorem) in (Ordinatio) I, d. 5, q. 1. The passage in view is probably Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I,
306 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

abstraction and not through last abstraction. Terms divide then into (5) ab-
solute and connotative, (6) extrinsic and intrinsic, and (7) singular and
common. Now we must pay attention to common terms. As we would expect,
common terms are of three kinds: (i) univocal, (ii) equivocal, and (iii) analogous.
Valera affirms that this last threefold division fits both vocal and written terms,
but not the mental term, for mental term is univocal, not equivocal. Mental terms
cannot signify several things as they are several things, for it is a natural like-
ness (naturalis similitudo), and there cannot be a likeness of several things as
long as they are several things. Just after this, he offers a new threefold division
of common terms25.
(I) There is a transcendent (transcendens) common term that signifies lim-
itless reason (rationem illimitatam); it applies to each thing existing in the
world (in mundo existenti). In order to find the list of such terms, our author says
that they are in number of six (senario numero) and can be learned through
the expression rev bau: res, ens, verum, bonum, aliquid, unum. (II) There is
also a supertranscendent (supratranscendens) common term, which means a
reason common to all beings, not only true and real, but also possible and im-
aginary beings, such as the terms imaginable (imaginabile) and intelligible
(intelligibile). (III) There is still a peculiar or non transcendent (peculiaris sive
non transcendens) common term, which signifies peculiar and limited nature.
Here we have as sub-kinds of (III), as it were the so-called predicables of
Porphyry, in the number of five: genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens.
Valera also shortly explains the basic meaning of each one of these five logical
distinctions26, which will be explained and debated at length in Book I of his
Commentarii. (I), (II), and (III) are of course kinds of common terms.
One should realize by now that Valeras division of terms27 has no strict par-
allel in other standard and influential 16th century Summulae (or Summulae-like
rather popular textbooks) such as the ones by Domingo de Soto (1529)28 and

d. 5, q. 1, nn. 17-24, pp. 17-23; Ioannes Duns Scotus, ed. L. Wadding 1639, vol. V.1, d. 5 (Utrum essentia
divina generet, vel generetur?), q. 1, nn. 5-7, pp. 639-640.
25 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, pp. 9-10.
26 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, p. 10.
27 In fact, cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, pp. 10-11, our author proceeds up to eleven divi-

sions of terms, which do not need to be pursued here.

28 Cf. Domingo de Soto [Dominicus a Soto], Summulae (1529), Salamanca 1554-1555, repr. Olms,

Hildesheim-New York 1980, (Liber primus De termino), pp. 1-15; following A. DOrs, Las Summulae
de Domingo de Soto. Los limites de la regla tollendo ponens, in Anuario Filosofico, 16/1 (1983), pp.
209-217, esp. pp. 211-213, the Summulae were edited at least eleven times; it suffered a major change in
literary form in its second edition 1539, and some partial changes as well in the third edition 1543 all
further editions reproduce the third one. On Domingo de Sotos logic (particularly in his Summulae), cf.
for example A. Muoz Delgado, Logica formal y filosofia en Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Publicaciones
del Monasterio de Poyo, Madrid 1964, pp. 73-101; E.J. Ashworth, Domingo de Soto on Obligationes: His
Use of Dubie Positio, in I. Angelelli / P. Prez-Ilzarbe (eds), Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 307

Pedro da Fonseca (1564)29, and of course previously in the Summulae logicales

by Peter of Spain30. It does have similarities, however, with Domingo de So-
tos division of terms, and actually an equivalence in respect to the division of
singular and common terms, and more importantly in respect to the division
of common terms in transcendental, supertranscendental, and non-tran-
scendental with the difference that this is the fourth division by Domingo de
Soto, and the seventh division by Valera. Valera assumes the threefold division,
and particularly the abbreviation rev bau, of Domingo de Sotos Summulae. And
he finds that division also in Fonsecas Institutionum. But because significant
differences can be viewed too, the three texts must be highlighted:

Rursus terminus communis est triplex, alius transcendens qui significat rationem

Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Olms, Hildesheim 2000, pp. 291-
307; E.P. Bos, Nature and Number of the Categories and the Division of Being According to Domingo de
Soto, in I. Angelelli / P. Prez-Ilzarbe (eds), Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th
European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Georg Olms, Hildesheim 2000, pp. 327-353; E.J.
Ashworth, The Scope of Logic: Soto and Fonseca on Dialectic and Informal Arguments, in M. Cameron /
J. Marenbon (eds), Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, Brill, Leiden
2011, pp. 127-147.
29 Cf. Pedro da Fonseca [Petrus Fonseca], Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo (1564), ed. and

Port. transl. by J. Ferreira Gomes, Editora da Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra 1964 (Liber primus:
de necessitate, nominibus et natura huius artis). John P. Doyle affirms that Fonsecas Institutionum were
reprinted fifty-one more times by 1625. Cf. J.P. Doyle, Hispanic Scholastic Philosophy, in J. Hankins
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2007, pp. 250-269, esp. p. 255. On Pedro da Fonsecas logic (particularly in his Institutionum), cf. for
example E.J. Ashworth, Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being, in P.A. Easton
(ed.), Logic and the Workings of the Mind: The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern
Philosophy, Ridgeview, Atascadero 1997, pp. 47-63; E.J. Ashworth, Le syllogisme topique au XVI sicle:
Nifo, Melanchthon et Fonseca, in J. Biard / F. Mariani Zini (ds), Les lieux de largumentation. Histoire
du syllogisme topique dAristote Leibniz, Brepols, Turnhout 2009, pp. 409-423; Ashworth, The Scope of
Logic cit., pp. 127-147.
30 As a matter of fact, the comparison between the structure and division of topics (chapters) in

Valeras Summulae and in the much more extensive Peter of Spains Tractatus or Summulae logicales is
a further evidence of how far logical textbooks in 16th-17th centuries are from their original model. Of
course some of the divisions of terms that Valera uses appear scattered in Peter of Spains work. But Peter
of Spains Tractatus presents not even a single chapter similar to Valeras first three chapters on terms
and the division of terms. Valeras Summulae Book I integrates what would correspond to parts of Peter
of Spains Tractatus Primus: De introductionibus, Tractatus Sextus: De Suppositionibus, Tractatus Nonus:
De ampliationibus, Tractatus Decimus: De appelationibus, and Tractatus Undecimus: De restrictionibus.
Valeras Summulae Book II integrates much of Peter of Spains Tractatus Primus: De introductionibus.
Valeras Summulae Book III integrates much of Peter of Spains Tractatus Quartus: De sillogismis. Cf.
Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), Tractatus (Summule logicales) 1972, ed. L.M. De Rijk,
pp. 1-16, 43-54, 79-88, 194-208. On the destiny of his summulistic logic in 16th-17th centuries cf. also E.J.
Ashworth Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism, in E. Kessler / C.H.
Lohr / W. Sparn (Hrsg.), Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt, Harrassowitz,
Wiesbaden 1988, pp. 75-87. In fact, Soto and Fonseca are the only two authors nearly contemporary to
Valera that he mentions in his Summulae dialecticae, which surely proves at least the attention that he
gave to their logical introductions; cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. II, c. 5, p. 23 (for Domingo de Soto),
and lib. I, c. 4, p. 11 (for Petrus Fonseca).
308 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

illimitatam et unicuique rei in mundo existenti convenientem, et hi sunt famosissimi

illi senario numero comprehensi qui hac dictione (reu bav) notari solent, scilicet, res
ens, verum, bonum, aliquid, unum. Alius supratranscendens, qui significat rationem
communem omnibus entibus non solum veris et realibus sed etiam possibilibus et
imaginaris ut imaginabile, intelligibile. Alius peculiare sive non transcendens qui
scilicet significat naturam peculiarem, et limitatam, et hic quintuplex communiter
assignatur. Genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, de quibus Porphyrius in
praedicabilibus, quae pro nunc sic explanantur31.

Circa terminum communem adhuc est notandum, esse aliquos terminos universa-
lissimos, quos dialectici vocant transcendentes, quia omnia significent, qui nimirum
sunt sex, designati his dictionibus, reu, bav, videlicet, res, ens, unum, bonum, aliquid,
verum. Quorum duo primi, sunt termini absoluti, reliqui vero connotativi, significantes
passiones entis. Connotat enim ly unum, quod sit ens indivisum, id est, integrum, non
divisum in partes. Aliquid, ut sit divisum a quolibet alio, id est, aliud quid. Verum
dicit ordinem ad intellectum, est enim quod movet intellectum ad formandum talem
iudicium quale est ipsum ens. Et ly bonum dicit ordinem ad voluntatem, quod sit
ipsius attractivum: ut dicit Aristoteles in exordio Ethicorum, bonum est quod omnia
appetunt. Sunt etiam alii termini qui dicuntur supratranscendentes, qui ad plura se
extendunt quam transcendentes, ut imaginabile, etc.32.

Nomen transcendens, etsi non eadem significatione apud omnes sumitur, tamen iuxta
communiorem usurpationem sic definiri potest. Nomen transcendens est, quod de om-
nibus ac solis veris rebus dicitur. Sex porro transcendentia esse dicuntur, Ens, Unum,
Verum, Bonum, Aliquid, et Res. [...]. Reliqua iuxta hanc sententia sunt non transcen-
dentia: in quibus numerantur ea, quae a recentioribus dicuntur Supertranscendentia,
ut, Opinabilis, Cogitabilis, Apprehensibilis, et si quae sunt alia, quae non tantum de
omnibus rebus veris, sed etiam de quibuscunque aliis vere affirmantur33.

3. Some Preliminary Remarks

Valeras remarks on transcendentals can be checked in several different pas-

sages of his Commentarii..., both in Book I and especially in Book II, although
nowhere does he treat them systematically, and as a rule he essentially con-
trasts the aspects of a logic which should include transcendentals with a logic
to which a treatment of such terms is fundamentally alien i.e., traditional
Aristotelian predicamental logic itself. Both his short account in the Summulae
and his accounts in the Commentarii about subjects such as transcendental

31 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, SD, lib. I, c. 3, p. 10

32 Domingo de Soto, Summulae cit., nn. 4-5, p. 10
33 Pedro da Fonseca Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo, Ingolstadt 1607, p. 62.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 309

order34, transcendental unity35, transcendentals36, and transcendental re-

lation(s)37 illustrate a tension that a fully developed Scotist logic would have to
deal with in order to cover through divisions, definitions, and consequenc-
es the entire structure of language and reality. In several aspects38, Valeras
logic is a draft of such a philosophical program in logic. But already departing
from our case study in the Summulae the same would apply to the other passag-
es and contexts we must raise the question: How Scotist is Valeras attempt
of inserting transcendental and supertranscendental terms in the scope of the
division of terms?
Although we do not find in Valeras work clear criteria for defining or identi-
fying transcendental concepts, as we do in the works of Scotus39, and although
Valeras definition of transcendent/transcendental is not literally taken from
Scotus and, in addition, is focused on the Summulae not in other passages of
his work40 only in being and the so-called convertible properties of it41,
his definition is surely Scotist42. After all, it coheres with what we learn from
Scotus in Ord. I d. 8 q. 1-3 n. 113-115, wherein a transcendental concept is
one that (1) is predicable either of being as such in its indifference to the prima
divisio of infinitum-finitum or a proper perfection of the infinite being, since in
this way it transcends categorical division; or one that (2) being common and
predicable both of God and creatures is such that it is first attributable to being
in its indifference to the prima divisio and therefore before it falls into categorical
division43. His background knowledge of Scotuss accounts could also explain

34 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 1, q. 3, p. 10; II, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, pp.

284; II, a. 2, q. 8 p. 320.

35 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., II, d. 4, q. 2, p. 252; II, d. 4, q. 4, pp.

259, 262.
36 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., II, d. 4, q. 4, p. 263; II, d. 4, q. 5, p. 267.
37 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., II, d. 4, q. 4, p. 263; II, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1,

pp. 283-284; II, d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, p. 286.

38 See the last four footnotes above.
39 Cf. above all L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegen-

stand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Aschendorff, Mnster 19892, pp. 268-434;
L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realitt in der
Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus - Surez - Wolff - Kant - Peirce), Felix Meiner
Verlag, Hamburg 1990, pp. 56-199; L. Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, Beck, Mnchen 2005, pp. 48-112,
esp. pp. 56-75; L. Honnefelder, Metaphysik als Scientia Transcendens: Joahnnes Duns Scotus und der
Zweite Anfang der Metaphysik, in R.H. Pich (ed.), New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens,
fidem, Louvain-la-Neuve 2007, pp. 1-19.
40 Cf. for example the treatment of infinite and finite, as well as absolute perfections, in Hyeronimus

Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., II, d. 2, q. 2, pp. 221-222.

41 On this cf. also G. Sondag, Duns Scot. La mtaphysique de la singularit, Vrin, Paris 2005, pp. 89

sqq.
42 At any rates, he clearly recognizes passages where Scotus points out to what defines a transcendens;

cf. for example Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., II, d. 5, a. 1, q. 4, p. 306.
43 Cf. above all H. Mhle, Der Tractatus de Transcendentibus des Franciscus de Mayronis, Peeters,
310 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

why Valera, other than Soto and Fonseca, defines transcendental in terms of
limitlessness and not in terms of maximal universality or maximal general-
ity. But again Valeras list of transcendental terms is not Scotist; Scotuss list,
disregarding here disjunctive properties and pure perfections, contains only
one absolute term and three convertible properties, i.e. ens, unum, verum, and
bonum44, and it is assumed that ens as such covers sufficiently in its indifference
to infinitum-finitum all real being. Although it is obvious that Valera takes that
list from Domingo de Soto, it is still unclear from what sources does Domingo de
Soto himself take the list and the abbreviation reu bav. The number of six
transcendentia was stressed and popularized by Lorenzo Valla (ca. 1406-1457),
who criticized the doctrine in his Dialecticae disputationes, presenting it in a
different order45 an author that Valera knew, for he mentions him in his Com-
mentarii46. But in the case of Lorenzo Valla, so J.A. Aertsen remarks, it rather
betrays influence of Aquinass account of the transcendentals in De veritate47,
as we can also affirm about Domingo de Sotos use of it. This explanation, how-
ever, does not seem to be of much help in case we assume that Jernimo Valera
makes use of and repeats that list under well reflected grounds.
In terms of meaning, Valera seems to be quite close to Scotus about (ii) cate-
gorical terms, although the terminology the denomination of categorical terms
as peculiar terms is not Scotist either48. The place given to (iii) supertran-
scendental terms in the division and the definition of them are by all means
remarkable. Neither the doctrine nor the terminology are Scotist; although the
doctrine as such can be traced back to 14th century Medieval authors some
of them Scotist it grew in importance during 16th-17th centuries in Baroque
Scholasticism, as especially the studies by J.P. Doyle have revealed49. Clearly,

Leuven-Paris-Dudley 2004, pp. 17-18; Pich, Introduction, in Pich (ed.), New Essays on Metaphysics cit.,
pp. xi-xxvii, esp. p. xx.
44 Cf. above all Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens cit., pp. 321-335; Honnefelder Duns Scotus cit.,

pp. 56-75; Sondag, Duns Scot cit., pp. 89-102.

45 Cf. J.A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca.

1225) to Francisco Surez, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2012, pp. 569-570. Cf. also L. Nauta, Lorenzo Valla and
the Rise of Humanistic Dialectic, in J. Hankins (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philoso-
phy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, pp. 193-210, esp. p. 198.
46 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 3, a. 2, q. 2, p. 116.
47 Cf. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy cit., p. 570; cf. also J.A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the

Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden-Boston 1996, pp. 71-112.
48 Cf. above footnote 26.
49 Cf. J.P. Doyle, The Borders of Knowability: Thoughts From or Occasioned by Seventeenth-Century

Jesuits, in M. Pickav (Hrsg.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2003
(Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 30), pp. 643-658. John P. Doyle pursued the thesis that supertranscendental
being would be the key to understand the passage from transcendental being and concepts in Medieval
philosophy to transcendental being and concepts in Kants critical philosophy; cf. especially J.P. Doyle,
Between Transcendental and Transcendental, in The Review of Metaphysics, 50 (1997), pp. 783-815; J.P.
Doyle, Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy, in S.F. Brown (ed.), Meeting of
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 311

according to the doctrine there are concepts even more general than transcen-
dental ones, since certain concepts can be common both to real beings and to
beings of reason. In fact, Domingo de Soto and Pedro da Fonseca are attested to
be the first authors to mention the notion50 it may be the case that Valera is the
third one, and again he follows them in inserting such terms in the division of
terms, at the beginning of a logical textbook. It has been held by researchers that
an explanation of motives for a doctrine of transcendentals will be found only in
certain 17th century Jesuit thinkers. The Jesuit Thomas Compton Carleton (1591-
1666), in his Philosophia universa (1649), affirmed that supertranscendental
terms encompass true things and also mere fictions. The examples he offers
are the intelligible (intelligibile) and the imaginable. J.P. Doyle affirms that
this is revealing, for it would show that knowability or intelligibility would
no longer be taken as a convertible property of being as transcendental, i.e. an
intrinsic property, as the relationship between ens and verum should reveal.
Carleton would say that cognoscibility or intelligibility is extrinsic51; as
J.A. Aertsen summarizes, it is then due either from species from other things or
by extrinsic denomination from a possible intellect, and it is found as such both
in real beings and beings of reason. This is the relevant passage by Carleton:

Termini supertranscendentales sunt qui non de rebus veris tantum, sed etiam de fictis
affirmantur, ut intelligibile, imaginabile, unde dici solet, latius patet ens imaginabile
quam ens possibile52.

We now emphasize that, if we can attribute these merits in the development

of the problem to Carleton, we have to attribute them first to Valera, who pub-
lished his work in 1610, hence thirty nine years before Carleton. In a similar
vein, Valera defines a supertranscendental term as one that signifies a common
content both to true and real beings and to possible and imaginable beings
Carleton talks here of fictive or invented beings , and his two examples of
kinds of supertranscendentals are exactly the imaginable and the intelligi-
ble. We have reasons to suppose that, according to Valeras view, a supertran-
scendental term such as the intelligible covers both the realm of real being
and the realm of being of reason. In his logical treatises based on Aristotles
and Scotuss logical books, Valera will have to treat the beings of reason proper

the Minds. The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, Brepols, Turnhout
1998, pp. 297-316. Cf. also Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy cit., pp. 643-656.
50 I am following Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy cit., pp. 635-637.
51 Cf. J.P. Doyle, Extrinsic Cognoscibility: A Seventeenth Century Supertranscendental Notion, in

The Modern Schoolman, 68 (1990), pp. 57-80, esp. p. 60.

52 Cf. Thomas Compton Carleton, Logica, in Philosophia universa, Antuerpen 1649, disp. 2, s. 6, n.

5, p. 8.
312 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

to logic. Especially by treating the logical property of terms called universalitas,

which is a being of reason, Valera makes efforts to show how we can attribute
the property intelligibilis and intelligibilitas to it53. He is conscious that such a
property seems to be proper only to real being, but he sees no other option as to
concede that it belongs to universale and universalitas as well54, i.e. to beings of
reason; the clue for a sound explanation seems to be on the proof that being of
reason is in a qualified sense ens, and the basis of this is the Scotist doctrine
of ens diminutum, which is placed somehow between real being and purum ni-
hil55. Intelligibilitas would then belong proportionally to a being of reason, after
all56. And as a result the real of real being and the real of being of reason
would be just one, differing only in level. Surely this is an account that must be
explained in details in a future study, but it is enough to give Valera a special
place in the history of the doctrine of supertranscendental terms.
In fact, still in relation to (i) transcendental terms, and particularly to their
range of application according to the definition as limitless reason, i.e.
everything in the world and existing, we have reason to think that Valera is
thinking in contrast to the range of application of supertranscendental terms
of true and real beings. But we also have reason to believe that for real
being as the virtual object of metaphysics for him57 Valeras view is mixed
with non-Scotist accounts too. So, for example, in a passage from Book I of his

53 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 3 (Quid sit universalitas),

p. 61: Prima conclusio: universalitas est ens. Sic noster Doctor q. 4 universalium, quae in nostro ordine
est prima, eamque sic probat: quidquid est intelligibile est ens, quia ens et verum convertuntur, et simi-
liter verum et intelligibile; ergo et ens et intelligibile. Sed universalitas est intelligibile, cum experiamur
nos disputare de universalitate, et illam intelligere. Tum etiam non entis non est diffinitio, sed universale
diffinitur; ergo est ens.
54 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 7 (Utrum universalitas

sit per se intelligibilis), p. 74: Prima conclusio: universalitas sicut et quaelibet alia secunda intentio eo
modo, quod et esse, et diffiniri, ita et intelligi, et sciri sortitur.
55 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 (Quid ens rationis sit?),

pp. 52-56, esp. p. 54.

56 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 7 (Utrum universalitas sit

per se intelligibilis), p. 75: Ad tertium: quod intelligibilitas per antonomasiam est passio entis realis, et
non entis rationis. Habet tamen ens rationis suam intelligibilitatem propriam proportionatam suae entitati,
et haec est passio illius. [...]. Ad quartum: transeat antecedens, consequentia autem distinguitur, se per
se sumatur prout distinguitur contra per aliud concedo; si sumatur prout distinguitur contra per accidens
nego; hoc est quod licet ens rationis per aliud cognoscatur, non tamen per accidens, quia secundum suam
propriam entitatem, intelligibilitatem, diffinibilitatem, et proprietatem cognoscitur.
57 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 1, q. 3, p. 9: Secunda vox est ens

rationis, quae sic pro nunc breviter explicatur, quod ens reale dicitur illud quod potest existere in rerum
natura. Ens vero rationis illud esse diminitum quod res acquirit, quando est sub cognitione. Ex eo enim
quod noster intellectus cognoscat, verbi gratia hominem nihil reale in illo ponit, cum homo non mutetur
realiter ex eo quod intelligatur, tribuit tamen illi quoddam esse rationis quod tantum habet quandiu
cognoscitur, ut quod homo sit subiectum, vel praedictum, vel species, nihil est reale a parte rei, sed solum
quia intellectus id in homine fingit. Et sic solet dici ens reale habere esse factum; ens vero rationis habere
esse fictum ab intellectu ad similitudinem entis realis.
 The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jernimo Valera in His Summulae dialecticae 313

Commentarii, i.e. the Book on Porphyrys Eisagog, Question 3 (Which being

is the object of logic? Real or of reason?), Valera affirms that real being (ens
reale) is the being that can exist in the nature of things. A being of reason (ens
rationis) has a diminished existence, which the thing acquires only when it is un-
der cognition. There is, for example, such an ens when human being (homo) is
known as subject, predicate or species: this is not real a parte rei, but only
because the intellect creates that in respect to human being; a being of reason
has a being invented by the intellect grounded on the likeness of the real being.
Jernimo Valera will follow the opinion, which he affirms is traditional and given
by the fathers, according to which the object of logic as a science is a being of
reason58. Although Valeras accounts of the conceptus entis and the object of the
science of metaphysicis are scanty and unsystematized in his Commentarii, we
have reasons to suspect that his view of ens as transcendental and first object of
metaphysics would bear traces of Francisco Surezs view of it as being insofar
as it is real being59, a concept able to comprehend all different beings, for it is,
as Scotus would of course endorse, the most abstract real concept60. Although
such a consideration of ens excludes of its scope beings that are purely beings of
reason and beings which are completely accidental61, Surezs real being is
not actual being; even if it is true that only existing things have actual being,
real being includes both real-actual beings (which have an actualized essence)
and possible being (which do not have an actualized essence), where possible
beings are those that have an aptitude to existence62, and non-real beings are
those that just do not have such an aptitude63.

***
Already in his Summulae dialecticae Valera attempts to construct a Scotist logic,
since he presents a doctrine of terms, propositions, and consequences by setting
some accounts of Scotus into the standard form of an introductory logic textbook
of the 16th-17th centuries. The import of Valeras logical views, however, is also

58 Cf. Hyeronimus de Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones cit., I, d. 1, q. 4, pp. 10-17.

59 Cf. F. Surez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), ed. and Span. transl by S. Rbade Romeo / S.
Caballero Snchez / A. Puigcerver Zann, Editorial Gredos, Madrid 1960, disp. I, s. 1, n. 24, pp. 8-11.
60 Cf. Surez, Disputationes metaphysicae cit., disp. II, s. 2, nn. 14-18.
61 Cf. Surez, Disputationes metaphysicae cit., disp. I, s. 1, n. 26. Cf. J.J.E. Gracia, Surez (and La-

ter Scholasticism), in J. Marenbon (ed.), Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. III: Medieval Philosophy,
Routledge, London-New York 1998, pp. 452-474, esp. p. 463; J. Francisco Yela, La sntesis metafsica
de Surez, in Pensamiento, 4 (1948), pp. 271-303.
62 Cf. also J.P. Doyle, Surez on the Reality of the Possibles, in J.P. Doyle, Collected Studies on Fran-

cisco Surez, S.J. (1548-1617), ed. by V.M. Salas, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2010, pp. 21-40, esp.
pp. 23-24.
63 Cf. Surez, Disputationes metaphysicae cit., disp. XXXI, s. 2, n. 10. Cf. Gracia, Surez (and Later

Scholasticism) cit., p. 464.

314 Roberto Hofmeister Pich

very much influenced by and mixed with Post-Scotist doctrines, still to be de-
scribed in detail and in respect to his Commentarii. as a whole. But by all means,
as future studies of his Summulae and Commentarii will be able to reveal, his
innovative undertaking amounts to a fine device to conceive more systematically
Scotuss views on logic and metaphysics, as well as a useful instrument to meas-
ure their potential for expansion and discussion with the theories proposed many
centuries after the life of the Subtle Doctor.

Abstract: The Peruvian Franciscan thinker Jernimo Valera (1568-1625) published in

1610 his Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Io-
annis Duns Scoti logicam, which was the first philosophical work printed in South Ameri-
ca. Both in his Summulae dialecticae and in the Books that comprise his Commentarii he
deals with metaphysical questions. In this paper, we illustrate how he inserts important
Scotist logical-metaphysical doctrines in his logical work, in this case the account of
transcendental concepts given in his Summulae.
Key words: Jernimo Valera; Summulae dialecticae; Colonial Scholasticism; Transcen-
dental Concepts.

Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Pontifcia Universidade Catlica do Rio Grande do Sul
Facultade de Filosofia e Cincias Humanas
Av. Ipiranga, 6681 - Prdio 5 - 6a Andar
Porto Alegre/RS - Brasil
roberto.pich@pucrs.br