w e e n being and nonbeirlg has never been resolved.

Inada further probes the

nature of becoming by introducing the novel concepts of symmetric and
asymmetric components. These components, he argues, form the foundation
of becoming prior to the rise of being and nonbcing, and in doing so theY
help us to understand the being-nonbeing dynamics in our approach to the
meta~hvsics
*4
of the self.
In Chapter 6, "Reducing Concern with Self: Parfit and &c Ancient h d -
dhist Schools," Ananyo Basu compares Derek ParGt's reductionist view of
self with various Buddhist perspectives on the self. Basu begins with an exe-
gesis of Parfit's pcrspeceives on personal idcntily and sclf and cites some of
Parfit's responses to his critics. In particular, he considers the attempt by
David Bastow to expand Parfit's reductionist view along Buddhist lines and
indicates some of the waknesses in that approach. Basuss survey of compct-
ing, early Buddhist schools demonstrates that there is no perfect fit between
Parfit's view of self and the Buddhist views of same. Basu concludes by ad-
vocating reliance on tbc Madhyamika school su as to provide a reliable re-
ductionist, anri-essenrialisr approach to self. H e believes that this form of
Buddhism will provide the best insights and most promising directions for
contemporary philosophical approaches to self.
In Chapter 7, "Sartre and Samkhya-Yoga on Self," Ashok Malhotra delin-
eates six perspectives on the self presented by Jean-Paul Sartre in his work
Being arzd N02hingrzess. Sartre views the sclf as a consciousncss, an ego, a
body, a social entity, a value, and an egoless being. Malhotra compares and
contrasts Sartre's position with the Samkhya-Yoga view of the self as con-
sciuusncss, buddhi, ahnmkdrd, mnnds, the sense-motor organ complex, and
ego-less reality. Although there are major ontological differences between
the w o positions, Malhotra submits that they are similar in spirit.
In Chapler 8, "Nietzsche and Nkhitani on Nihilism and Tradition," Gra-
ham Parkes describes the profound influence of' Friedrich Nietzsche on
Nishitani Keiji, a Kyoto School philosopher in the tradition of Zen. It is
clear from Nishiunik 1949 test, The Sey-Overcoming of Nihilism, that he
shares with Nietzsche the idea that the self "becomes what it is" through the
confrontation with nihilism. The realization that "the highest values have
devalued themselves"-as Nietzschc characterized the nihilistic condition-
frees one from the bonds of cultural tradition, thus, in a sense, relieving one
of the burden of the past. Similarly, according to Nishitani, the confronta-
tion with nihilism effects a realization of &c self's ideratity with m%,or noth-
ingness, which in rurn distances the self from the conditioning factors of the
past. In short, Nietzsche and Nishitani concur that if one is able to sustain
the confrontation with nihilism, Ietciag the sclf plumb the phenomenon to
its utmost depths, a kind of rurn takes place in which nihilism ultimately
"overcomes itself." For Parkes, the interesting question to be asked regard-
ing this comrnonalily is, What does each thinker regard as the apprapriarrc