1 We have a certain conceptual scheme of the world.

We think of the world

as occupied by independently exiting particular things and events about which we
can talk and think about. Strawsons goal is to exhibit the general and structural
features of this conceptual scheme. The overarching project is to show that bodies
are basic in our conceptual scheme. The central idea to keep and mind and around
which everything revolves is that the identification of things of all sorts rests at
bottom on our ability to identify bodies.
2 We need some way that we can place or locate particulars into our own
general picture of the world.

When is it that we know that something has been successfully identified?

When the particular being referred to or thought about is identical to some
particular which the individual knows an individuating fact about, a fact which
is true of one and only one particular.
For Strawson, certain theoretical possibilities give us an idea as to the structure of
our conceptual scheme. Can we plausibly claim that there is a single system of
relations in which each has a place, and which includes whatever particulars are
directly locatable? 22. For Strawson, that system is the spatiotemporal system.
Within the system of spatiotemporal relations, not only is every particular uniquely
related to one another within the framework, it is necessarily true that they are.
Perhaps not all particulars are in both time and space. But it is at least plausible to
assume that every particular which is not, is uniquely related in some other way to
one which is. 23.
Strawson holds certain difficulties with this picture to be merely apparent. The
skeptical among us might be suspicious and claim that no matter how detailed of a
description we may offer, we can never be certain we are providing a truly
individuating description. Perhaps there is a reduplication of our circumstances in an
exactly similar portion of the universe? For example, how do we know that there is
not in fact a man qualitatively identical to myself (perish the thought) in a
qualitatively identical state of affairs on a qualitatively identical planet tucked away
in some corner of the universe? For Strawson, even if the universe suffered from
various re-duplications, it would still be no obstacle to using descriptions
supplemented with demonstratives to uniquely relate any given particular to our
reference point.

It is a necessary truth that any new particular of which we learn is somehow

identifyingly connected with the framework Each element is uniquely
related to every other and hence to ourselves and our surroundings. It cannot
be denied that this framework of knowledge supplies a uniquely efficient
means of adding identified particulars to our stock.24.
3 Not only can we identify things and recognize how things are related, we can
recognize one thing as identical to something we encountered before.

If we are to operate with the spatiotemporal framework then we must be able

to re-identify particulars.
This is because we cannot observe in a comprehensive fashion the entirety of the
framework and cannot observe any part of it continuously. We get tired and sleep.
We get hungry and eat and simply lack a G*ds eye view. Therefore, operating
with the framework relies on distinguishing between qualitative and numerical
identity.

It is the essence of the matter that we use the same framework on different
occasions... Whatever our account may be must allow for discontinuities and
limits of observation. 32-33.
The reidentification of places is essentially tied to the reidentification of
things. One requirement for the identity of the material thing is that its existence be
continuous in space. There must be a continuous set of places occupied by the thing
we are talking or thinking about. Furthermore, if there is a single spatiotemporal
network there must be an answer to the question of what is the spatial relation
between various places over time. To answer that question one must also be able to
reidentify places. However, according to Strawson the reidentification of places is
not independent of the reidentification of things. Places are defined only by the
relations of things So the identification and distinction of places turn on the
identification and distinction of things; and the identification and distinction of
things turn, in part, on the identification and distinction of places. There is no
mystery about this mutual dependence. 37.
4 Is there a class of particulars which are basic insofar as particular
identification is concerned? The way in which we use expressions to identify
particulars in many cases suggests that the identifiability of some classes of
particulars is dependent on the identifiability of others. This, together with the facts
about the spatiotemporal framework makes it seem as though there will be some
particulars which are basic. Basic here meaning there would be at least some
particulars which it would not be possible to identify without, nor would they rely on
any other kind of particular to make identifying references to them.

Strawson holds that which particulars are basic can be deduced from the
general character of the conceptual scheme itself.
Note: We must be careful to distinguish this from a metaphysical thesis. Even
if material bodies were strictly speaking ontologically basic in the sense that
events or processes just were changes in bodies, this would not be sufficient
for his purposes. Basic here is basic for the purposes of identification, having
to do with thought and communication.
5 What particulars can we rule out? There are cases where reference to a
certain kind of particular must be supplemented by reference to another kind of
particular. For example, private particulars such as sense data are dependent on
the class of particulars persons. Contra Russell, they cannot be basic because
individuating them ultimately relies on identifying the persons to whom they belong.
This brings up an important point for Strawson. Since our framework is
spatiotemporal, whatever the basic particulars are, they must have a kind of
spatiality in order to confer the proper characteristics on the framework. However,
there is spatiality and spatiality.

It is not enough that basic particulars simply be observable.

Afterall, echoing Moore, we can speak of the observability of sense data.

Basic particulars must be public objects of perception, capable of being

directly located or are identifiable without a mediating reference to any
other particular. Different people can quite literally see or hear or feel by
contact or taste or smell the same objects of these kinds. 45.
6 Even at that, simply because it is possible for something to be directly
located without relying on reference to any other kind particular does not by itself
tell us that such a thing is basic. There is a distinction in the realm of publicly
perceptible things. There are events and processes and material bodies. Both
processes and events and material bodies can meet the conditions.
Strawson gives a number of cases where particular events or processes are
directly locatable public objects. For example;

Such expressions as That terrible noise, uttered while the noise

continues, enable the hearer directly to locate the particular in question. They
involve no reference to any particular at all Suppose All the flashes and
bangs that occurred can be ordered in a single temporal series. Then, every
member of the series could be identified without reference to anything that
was not a member of the series. Thus a directly locatable sequence for a
speaker hearer pair at a certain time would be a series which was going on at
that time or had just ceased at that time and all the members of which were
audible to both members of the pair. 47
Though there are cases where events and processes are directly locatable or
locatable in such a way as to make no reference to any other kind of particular,
these are highly restricted cases. The limitation of states and processes and events
is that they fail to deliver the kind of consistency required for a stable framework.
There is a definite practical limitation here. Not every event or process will be such
that we can referentially identify it without reference to any other kind of particular.
For example, if I ask you if you heard the loud thunder last night how else do we
determine that we in fact heard the same thing? Apparently, we will make use of
the settings surrounding events and processes e.g. the body or bodies undergoing
or taking part. This is especially salient in regards to possibly simultaneous events.
Furthermore, there is serious question as to whether every directly locatable event
or process and directly locatable sequences could be coordinated in such a way as
to uniquely individuate a given particular. There is no reason to suppose that any
such series which any one person was able to make use of for identificatory
purposes would be identical with any similar series which any other person was able
to make use of for these purposes. 49. Our practice reflects this practical
consideration as we are more often than not not in a position to place an event or
process in a directly locatable sequence and simply identify them by reference to a
particular of a different kind. Lastly, there will be a large amount of events and
processes which are necessarily dependent on other particulars bodies because
they are events or processes which happen to or things which bodies do or undergo.
7 Most importantly, it is not that we have a certain conceptual scheme with
which we run into problems of identification and so then look to a class of things
which can resolve the problem.

The very reason the question of identification can come up at all is because
material bodies are basic. Quite cryptically, It is only because the solution is
possible that the problem exists. 40.
Identification and reidentification rests on locating a given particular in a unified
spatiotemporal framework.

The only things which can constitute the framework are those which give it its
fundamental spatiotemporal characteristics. For Strawson, it follows from this
that the basic particulars must be temporally subsistent material bodies.
Whereas events and processes satisfy the criteria of identification and
reidentification only in special circumstances, it is simply the normal
condition of material bodies that they satisfy these conditions. They stand to
produce a framework of reference in which any constituent can be identified
without reference to a particular of another type. The fundamental condition
of identification about dependence on alien types- viz. the forming of a
comprehensive and sufficiently complex type homogenous framework of
reference-is satisfied for the case of material bodies. 54.
The reidentification of material bodies does not turn on any other particular
type. On the other hand, the criteria of re-identification for other types will at
least in part turn on material bodies.