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Martin Horst

April 26, 2013


Katarzyna Dziwirek Honors 212 E
Language Commentary #1

A Critique of Wierzbickas Analysis of Libert in Comparison to Other Cultural


Equivalents

During the second chapter of Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words,
Wierzbicka primarily discusses the concepts of liberty and freedom as seen in the Polish,
Russian, Latin, and American languages. Although she briefly examines the French term libert
and its various uses as they relate to the Latin libertas, she may not have fully analyzed the
importance of libert and how it relates to Franco-society or history. The etymological influence
of Latin on French explains the semantic similarities between the two concepts, but has
Wierzbicka given enough attention to their subtle incongruence? Because French plays an
important role in my life, I decided to research the finer details of libert: how can it be
employed correctly in semantic and syntactic contexts? To what extent do natives of France
perceive the importance of this value? Can this truly be considered a key word? Is Wierzbickas
breakdown of this concept an accurate and holistic representation of its meaning? In the
following commentary, I will synthesize my findings in comparison to Wierzbickas data,
drawing on interviews with native speakers as well as examples of the term employed in
authentic French literature in order to achieve a more definitive definition of the notion.
In trying to grasp the omnipresence of this concept in French culture, I looked towards its
extensive history. France has been involved with constantly shifting powers since the reign of
Charlemagne in the fifth century,i and events such as the Norman conquest of 1066, the Hundred
Years War (1337-1453), the French Revolution (1789), and the German Occupation during
World War IIii speak to her struggles for autonomy. The Troisime Rpublique (1870-1940) alone
had over one hundred different governments,iii another fact which suggests a lack of (and by
extension, a need for) consistency in cultural or political values. Because the chef dtat often
influences the values of the state itself, the constantly changing belief paradigms would have
been difficult to support wholeheartedly. In this way, Wierzbicka correctly compares the French
noun libert with the Russian term svoboda;iv both of these concepts contain cultural weight
brought on by the political upheaval of their homelands. Naturally, the Polish term wolno
remains far more salient than equivalents in other languages given the countrys division from

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1795-1918,v but the same principle applies in French. In comparison with my own countrys
minute history, France appears to have endured centuries of conquest alternating with
suppression; is there any way that libert could NOT be entrenched in cultural understanding?
Wierzbickas premise that this concept is fundamental for the people of France is clearly
supported by the historical evidence surrounding it; this key value wont easily be forgotten.
Indeed, France has assured the permanent importance of libert by ensconcing it within her
national motto. Libert, galit, fraternit was adopted shortly after the French Revolution,
and to this day contains important cultural significance for les Franais.vi However, it remains
unclear whether or not the premier placement of libert has any weight or the order of these
ideals was chosen arbitrarily. vii Additional data is therefore needed to suggest any hypothesis
about the extent to which the French perceive this concept in their daily lives.
A concrete definition would help to isolate how libert is used within the culture, and for this
axiom I turned to the ninth edition Dictionary of lAcadmie Franaise: libert = pouvoir
dexercer sa volont ou doprer des choix.viii My English re-presentation of this phrase reads as
follows: the capability to effect ones will or desire, or facilitate ones own choices. The verb
phrase exercer sa volont can essentially be reproduced as the English freedom to do ____
because the possessive adjective (sa) denotes the subjects own will, and the preposition to also
implies a positive, causative action (volont). In the Natural Semantic Metalanguage, I posit that
it could be represented by the following:
I Subject (X) can think something like this:
II If I want to do something
III I can do the thing I want to do
IV This is good for X
The fourth component appears debatable, but I argue that the word pouvoir contains powerful
affirmation, meaning the ability or opportunity to do something of personal merit instead of the
ability to not do something so desired by an outside force. Through this definition, we
immediately encounter the dichotomy of positive and negative freedom associated with the
English counterpart which Wierzbicka discusses in her chapter. In English, the negative version
would translate roughly into freedom FROM something where the prepositional phrase from
something denotes a restraint or imposition on the subject. An example of this is freedom from
interference. Likewise, the Latin libertas cannot be used in negative collocations,ix and from the

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primary examination of a definition of libert, it appears that Wierzbicka has correctly
interpreted these two concepts deeper meanings.
The second part of the definition, doprer des choix, also connotes a positive power for the
subject. In lieu of being constrained by a single decision or possibility, the subject has a variety
of different conclusions (des choix) towards which they can choose to maneuver (doprer). It is
important to consider exactly why having multiple options seems to engender a positive
response, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides us with an insight into this discussion; lhomme
ne se distingue de lanimal que par un manque completle premier moment de la libert.x
(Man only distinguishes himself from animal by a complete voidthe first experience of
freedom.) This reveals that although humanity and the animal kingdom may be similar in
physical attributes, our inherent lack of destiny or predetermined nature transcends the
instinctual devices found in animals. Therefore, the ability to choose remains uniquely a human
quality, and all representations of this action can be seen as positive within a simplified
framework. This promotes an additional component for the natural form:
I Subject (X) can think something like this:
II I can do many things
II If I want to do something
IV I can do the thing I want to do
V This is good for X
This evidence reinforces the fact that libert contains positive semantic properties, a claim
supported by Wierzbicka in her chapter.
Further evidence that libert cannot be used negatively was provided during an interview with
my French Professor. She agreed that the phrase libert de rligion (freedom of religion) works
within the confines of French syntax, however the locutions *libert de loppression or *libert
de lintrusion could not be understood.xi Thus, these negative qualities simply do not fit into the
French idea of libert, and this is an essential clue when attempting to elucidate the concepts
pure form. Instead, my professor professed that for negative associations, one would use the
related form liberation, as in liberation de linterrogatoire (freedom from interrogation).xii The
most salient example of this is term given to the emancipation of France from the German
occupation after World War II: La Liberation.xiii From these data, it seems clear that libert
closely resembles the Latin equivalent instead of the English concept Freedom.

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Finally, one specific proverb entails an interesting perception of libert according to les
Franais: la libert des uns sarrte l o commence celle des autres.xiv My rendering reads as
follows: ones freedom stops where others begins. This proverb essentially states that ones
freedom is not limitless, that there are certain stipulations and boundaries which obstruct
complete freedom in a given person. If we accept this proverb as having cultural merit, then we
must adjust the representation of libert to include the following component:
I Subject (X) can think something like this:
II I can do many things
II If I want to do something
IV I can do the thing I want to do
V If someone says I dont want you to do it
then I have to think I cant do it anymore
VI This is good for X
This addendum substantiates the idea of the other in the French term libert, an enigmatic
notion in and of itself because libert, according to Wierzbicka, does not take negative qualities.
What then is the constraint posed by celle des autres? Can there be another quality associated
with freedom that is neither negative nor positive, yet exists simultaneously to inhibit it?
Needless to say, more research would have to be performed in order to completely isolate the
elemental semantics of libert in comparison with similar concepts.
Overall, my own findings reflected Wierzbickas original analysis of the French libert. I
provided additional evidence for the split between positive and negative usage, and corroborated
her statement that libert was au sein of French culture and society. Perhaps one day in the future
we will be able to more boldly assert the authentic origins of its semantics, but now it appears to
be solidly linked with the Latin libertas with only a slight deviation in meaning. The French truly
value this concept as a key value because of the struggles theyve faced in their history, and this
is echoed in the rich cultural intimacy with the notion libert.

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i http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/France-history.htm

ii IBID

iii La France Contemporaine Edmiston and Dumnil

iv Pg 143 Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words, Wierzbicka

v http://www.polishhome.org/HistoryPHAEng.htm

vi Hedwige Meyer 4/23/13 1.30pm-2pm

vii IBID

viii http://atilf.atilf.fr/dendien/scripts/generic/cherche.exe?22;s=852304605;;

ix Pg 146 Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words, Wierzbicka

x Pages 17,19 La notion de Libert Chez Rousseau, Kryger

xi Hedwige Meyer 4/23/13 1.30pm-2pm

xii IBID

xiii La France Contemporaine , Edmiston and Dumnil

xiv Hedwige Meyer 4/23/13 1.30pm-2pm

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