Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
This is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Petitioners on their behalf and in representation
Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a of their respective sectors, filed the present
Temporary Environmental Protection Order petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan or
(TEPO) in relation to the grounding of the US TEPO against respondents composed of
military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha members of the US Navy, the President Aquino,
Reefs. Defense Secretary, Philippine Coast Guard, etc.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Marine Park. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed Guardian cause and continue to cause
by the United Nations Educational Scientific and environmental damage of such magnitude as to
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Heritage Site. Located in the middle of Central Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Sulu Sea, southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
Triangle, the global center of marine constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
biodiversity. ecology. They also seek a directive from the
Court for the institution of civil, administrative
In 2010, Congress passed Republic Act No. and criminal suits for acts committed in
10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha violation of environmental laws and regulations
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to in connection with the grounding incident.
ensure the protection and conservation of the
Tubbataha Reefs. Under the "no-take" policy, Held:
entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly
regulated and many human activities are Citizen suit in Environmental cases (Locus
prohibited and penalized or fined, including Standi of petitioners)
fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing
the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise 1. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a
created the Tubbataha Protected Area court of justice on a given question."
1
Specifically, it is "a partys personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
substantial interest in a case where he has stewards of nature.
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result" of the act being challenged, and "calls State immunity from suit (Doctrine of
for more than just a generalized grievance." sovereign immunity)
2. However, the rule on standing is a 6. The immunity of the State from suit, known
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary non-suability of the State, is expressly provided
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
public interest so requires, such as when the Constitution which states: : The State may not
subject matter of the controversy is of be sued without its consent.
transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public 7. The rule that a state may not be sued
interest. without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we
3. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, have adopted as part of the law of our land
Jr., we recognized the "public right" of citizens under Article II, Section 2. Even without such
to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for affirmation, we would still be bound by the
the first time in our constitutional history, is generally accepted principles of international
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
We declared that the right to a balanced and this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
healthful ecology need not be written in the states, such principles are deemed
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil incorporated in the law of every civilized state
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of as a condition and consequence of its
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind membership in the society of nations. Upon its
and it is an issue of transcendental importance admission to such society, the state is
with intergenerational implications. Such right automatically obligated to comply with these
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain principles in its relations with other states. (see
from impairing the environment. U.S. vs. Guinto)
4. The Court ruled that not only do ordinary 8. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of
citizens have legal standing to sue for the state immunity is based on the justification
enforcement of environmental rights, they can given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no
do so in representation of their own and future legal right against the authority which makes
generations. Their personality to sue in behalf the law on which the right depends."
of the succeeding generations can only be [Kawanakoa v. Polybank] In the case of the
based on the concept of intergenerational foreign state sought to be impleaded in the
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
and healthful ecology is concerned. Every expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
generation has a responsibility to the next habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals
to preserve that rhythm and harmony of and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
nature for the full enjoyment of a balanced and another. A contrary disposition would, in the
healthful ecology. language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the
peace of nations." (see U.S. vs. Guinto)
5. The liberalization of standing first
enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to Doctrine of non-suability of the State also
minors and generations yet unborn, is now applies to complaints filed against officials
enshrined in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise of the state for acts performed by them in
known as the Rules of Procedure for the discharge of their duties
Environmental Cases (Rules) which allows the
filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. 9. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules suits against the state without its consent, it
"collapses the traditional rule on personal and is also applicable to complaints filed against
2
officials of the state for acts allegedly territorial jurisdiction.
performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.The rule is that if the judgment against State immunity extends only to acts Jure
such officials will require the state itself to imperii
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount 12. The traditional rule of State immunity which
needed to pay the damages awarded against exempts a State from being sued in the courts
them, the suit must be regarded as against the of another State without the former's consent
state itself although it has not been formally or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
impleaded. [Garcia vs. Chief of Staff] In such a doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
situation, the state may move to dismiss the governmental acts (Jure imperii) from private,
complaint on the ground that it has been filed commercial and proprietary acts (Jure
without its consent. gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts
Immunity of foreign states from the Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
jurisdiction of local courts immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the
10. The precept that a State cannot be sued in foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing economic affairs.
rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a 13. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not
foreign sovereign from suit and, with the apply and may not be invoked where the public
emergence of democratic states, made to official is being sued in his private and personal
attach not just to the person of the head of capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
state, or his representative, but also distinctly protection afforded the officers and agents of
to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the the government is removed the moment they
acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign are sued in their individual capacity. This
government done by its foreign agent, although situation usually arises where the public official
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acts without authority or in excess of the
acting in his official capacity, the complaint powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign principle of law that a public official may be
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a liable in his personal private capacity for
representative of a state is believed to be, in whatever damage he may have caused by his
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is act done with malice and in bad faith, or
not accorded for the benefit of an individual but beyond the scope of his authority or
for the State, in whose service he is, under the jurisdiction. The rationale for this ruling is that
maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot as an instrument for perpetrating an
assert jurisdiction over one another. The injustice. (Shauf vs. Court of Appeals)
implication, in broad terms, is that if the
judgment against an official would require the Present petition is a suit against the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to United States, and is barred under the
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of principle of state immunity
the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded 14. The US respondents in this case were sued
as being against the state itself, although it has in their official capacity as commanding officers
not been formally impleaded. (see Minucher vs. of the US Navywho had control and supervision
Court of Appeals) over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
11. In the case of diplomatic immunity, the grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
privilege is not an immunity from the was committed while they were performing
observance of the law of the territorial official military duties. Considering that the
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
rather, an immunity from the exercise of will require remedial actions and appropriation
3
of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US Award of damages not one of the reliefs
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore granted in a Writ of Kalikasan suit
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and 19. We cannot grant damages which have
Robling. resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
Waiver of state immunity under the VF A damages, including the collection of
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suitor that deemed instituted with
15. Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of the criminal action charging the same violation
immunity from suit found in the Visiting Forces of an environmental Law.
Ageement (VFA). Even under the common law
tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US 20. Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs
respondents are liable for negligence, trespass which may be granted in a petition for issuance
and nuisance. of a Writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
16. The waiver of State immunity under the SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from
VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and the time the petition is submitted for decision,
not to special civil actions such as the present the court shall render judgment granting or
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7
of the Rules that a criminal case against a The reliefs that may be granted under the writ
person charged with a violation of an are the following:
environmental law is to be filed separately. xxx
( e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right
17. The VFA is an agreement which defines the of the people to a balanced and healthful
treatment of United States troops and ecology or to the protection, preservation,
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote rehabilitation or restoration of the
"common security interests" between the US environment, except the award of damages to
and the Philippines in the region. It defines the individual petitioners.
rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal US expected to comply with international
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, obligations under the UNCLOS, despite
importation and exportation of equipment, being a non-party to the international
materials and supplies. The invocation of US agreement
federal tort laws and even common law is thus
improper considering that it is the VFA which 21. Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
governs disputes involving US military ships position that the conduct of the US in this case,
and crew navigating Philippine waters in when its warship entered a restricted area in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage
to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
18. In any case, it is our considered view that a within the ambit of Article 31 of the United
ruling on the application or non-application of Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
personnel who may be found responsible for warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
premature and beyond the province of a UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it cases where they fail to comply with the rules
unnecessary at this point to determine whether and regulations of the coastal State regarding
such waiver of State immunity is indeed passage through the latter's internal waters
absolute. and the territorial sea.
26. A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into 31. The US and Philippine governments both
our internal waters with resulting damage to expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss
marine resources is one situation in which the the matter of compensation for the damage
above exception (removing immunity) may caused by the USS Guardian. Exploring avenues
apply. But what if the offending warship is a for settlement of environmental cases is not
5
proscribed by The Rules. Mediation and
settlement are available for the consideration During the pre-construction survey for Package
of the parties, and which dispute resolution VI, Mendoza alleged that he discovered that the
methods are encouraged by the court. whole stretch of the 15-kilometer project had
no right-of-way, in violation of Ministry Order
32. The Court defers to the Executive Branch No. 65. He brought the matter to the attention
on the matter of compensation and of the DPWH and UTI but according to him, it
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic was only resolved on 29 November 1989 when
channels. Resolution of these issues impinges the affected landowners and farmers allowed
on our relations with another State in the passage at Mendozas risk.
context of common security interests under the
VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the Mendoza alleged that the defendants DPWH
foreign relations of our government is and UTI, except for DPWH Secretary Estuar,
committed by the Constitution to the executive conspired to make it appear that Superior
and legislative-"the political" --departments of Builders incurred negative slippage of 29% and
the government, and the propriety of what may recommended the forfeiture of the contract.
be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. Mendoza further alleged that as regards
Package IX, the DPWH did not execute any
2. Case Summary contract despite the Superior Builders
Heirs of Mendoza vs DPWH (2014) compliance with all the post-evaluation
G.R. No. 203834 | 2014-07-09 requirements. The DPWH also recommended
the rebidding of Package IX. Package IX was, in
Subject: Termination of the project contract effect, canceled together with the forfeiture of
was justified due to delays incurred by the contract for Package VI.
contractor; State will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its nonsuability only if it has Mendoza filed an action for specific
entered into a contract in its proprietary or performance and damages, with prayer for
private capacity; Contracts entered into by preliminary injunction against DPWH and UTI.
DPWH with Mendoza for public works
construction were done in the exercise of its The RTC ruled that the termination of the
governmental functions contract over Package VI and the non-award of
Package IX to Superior Builders were arbitrary
Facts: and unjustified. Superior Builders could not be
faulted for its failure to perform the obligation
Diosdado Mendoza, doing business under the within the stipulated period because the DPWH
name and style of D Superior Builders, was the made it impossible by its failure to acquire the
winning bidder for the construction of the 15- necessary right-of-way. The trial court further
kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling Road in ruled that in entering into a contract, the DPWH
Benguet and the engineers quarters and divested itself of immunity from suit and
laboratory, designated as Package VI, of the assumed the character of an ordinary litigant.
Highland Agriculture Development Project
(HADP). His total bid for materials and labor The Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts
was P16,176,878.58. He was also the winning decision and held that the DPWHs forfeiture
bidder for the construction of the 15-kilometer order of Package VI of the HADP as well as the
barangay roads in Benguet, designated as non-award of Package IX to Superior Builders
Package IX of the HADP, with a bid of was justified. The negative slippage of Superior
P10,527,192.14. Builders was already 31.852%, or more than
double the limit of what is considered as being
The DPWH hired United Technologies, Inc. (UTI) at terminal stage, which is 15%. The Court of
as consultant for Packages VI and IX, under the Appeals also ruled that the DPWHs contractual
direct charge of UTIs President Pedro Templo obligation was made in the exercise of its
and UTIs Project Manager Rodante Samonte. governmental functions and was imbued with
public interest.
6
obligations. We also note that Package IX of the
Held: HADP was tied to the completion of Package VI
because the Asian Development Bank could not
Termination of the project contract was approve the award of Package IX to Superior
justified due to delays incurred by Builders unless its work on Package VI was
contractor satisfactory to the DPWH. This explains why
Package IX had to be rebid despite the initial
1. The negative slippage incurred by Superior award of the project to Superior Builders.
Builders, which reached 31.852%, far exceeded
the allowable slippage under Presidential State will be deemed to have impliedly
Decree No. 1870, series of 1983, which states waived its nonsuability only if it has
that: Whenever a contractor is behind entered into a contract in its proprietary
schedule in its contract work and incur 15% or or private capacity
more negative slippage based on its approved
PERT/CPM, the implementing agency, at the 5. The doctrine of immunity from suit is
discretion of the Minister concerned, may anchored on Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
undertake by administration the whole or a Constitution which provides: The State may
portion of the unfinished work, or have the not be sued without its consent.
whole or a portion of such unfinished work done
by another qualified contractor through 6. The general rule is that a state may not be
negotiated contract at the current valuation sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it
price. consents to be sued, either expressly or
impliedly. There is express consent when a law
2. Under Department Order No. 102, series of so provides, while there is implied consent
1988, the discretion of the DPWH to terminate when the State enters into a contract or it itself
or rescind the contract comes into play when commences litigation.
the contractor shall have incurred a negative
slippage of 15% or more. 7. In order to determine implied waiver when
the State or its agency entered into a contract,
3. Superior Builders claimed that the negative there is a need to distinguish whether the
slippages were attributable to the government, contract was entered into in
citing the right-of-way problem because the its governmental or proprietary capacity.
construction site was privately owned.
However, the right-of-way problem turned out 8. When a state enters into a contract, it does
to affect only the first 3.2 kilometers of the not automatically mean that it has waived its
project. Apparently, Superior Builders was not nonsuability. The State will be deemed to
able to go beyond the 3.2 kilometers because have impliedly waived its nonsuability only
of the limited equipment it mobilized on the if it has entered into a contract in its
project site. In fact, its bulldozer broke down proprietary or private capacity.
after three days of work, proving that Superior However, when the contract involves
Builders had been remiss in its responsibilities its sovereign or governmental capacity, no
as a contractor. In addition, Abalos, the such waiver may be implied. Statutory
property owner affected by the right of way, provisions waiving state immunity are
denied that he disallowed the passage of construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
Superior Builders vehicles and equipment on immunity is in derogation of sovereignty. (see
the road within his property. In short, Superior Department of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth,
Builders could have proceeded with the project, Inc.)
as it was constantly reminded to do so, but it
capitalized on the right-of-way problem to
justify its delays. 9. An unincorporated agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
4. Given the foregoing, the DPWH was justified immunity from suit because it is invested with
in forfeiting Package VI for Superior Builders an inherent power of sovereignty. However, the
failure to comply with its contractual need to distinguish between an unincorporated
7
government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
functions has arisen. The immunity has been Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a
upheld in favor of the former because its government agency created under Republic Act
function is governmental or incidental to such No. 821. The Land Reform Code (Republic Act
function; it has not been upheld in favor of the No. 3844) reorganized and changed its name to
latter whose function was not in pursuit of a the Agricultural Credit Administration. A
necessary function of government but was collective bargaining agreement was entered
essentially a business. (see Air Transportation into between ACCFA and its two unions. The
Office v. Ramos) Union declared a strike and, together with its
mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Contracts entered into by DPWH with Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO)
Mendoza for public works construction filed a case with the Court of Industrial
were done in the exercise of its Relations (CIR) for unfair labor practice. During
governmental functions the pendency of this case, the unions filed a
petition for certification election with the CIR. In
10. The DPWH is an unincorporated both instances, ACCFA challenges the
government agency without any separate jurisdiction of the CIR arguing that is engaged
juridical personality of its own and it enjoys in governmental functions
immunity from suit.
Held:
11. It is clear from the enumeration of its
functions that the DPWH performs Governmental functions
governmental functions. Section 5(d) of EO 124
states that it has the power to [i]dentify, plan, 1. ACCFA is a government office or agency
secure funding for, program, design, construct engaged in government, not proprietary
or undertake prequalification, bidding, and functions
award of contracts of public works projects x x
x while Section 5(e) states that it shall 2. It was established to extend credit and
[p]rovide the works supervision function for all similar assistance to agriculture. The
public works construction and ensure that implementation of the land reform program in
actual construction is done in accordance with accordance with the Land Reform Code is most
approved government plans and certainly a governmental, not a proprietary
specifications. function.
12. The contracts that the DPWH entered into Constituent functions
with Mendoza for the construction of Packages
VI and IX of the HADP were done in the exercise 3. These functions may not be strictly what
of its governmental functions. Hence, President Wilson described as "constituent," as
petitioners cannot claim that there was an opposed to ministrant such as those relating
implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering to the maintenance of peace and the
into a contract. The Court of Appeals correctly prevention of crime, those regulating property
ruled that theDPWH enjoys immunity from suit and property rights, those relating to the
and may not be sued without its consent. administration of justice and the determination
of political duties of citizens, and those relating
3. Case Summary to national defense and foreign relations.
ACCFA v. CUGCO
G.R. No. L-21484 | 1969-11-29 4. Under this traditional classification, such
constituent functions are exercised by the State
Subject: Governmental function, proprietary as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
function, constituent function, ministrant promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
function the people these letter functions being
ministrant he exercise of which is optional on
Facts: the part of the government.
8
all subsistence fishermen from the coastal
5. The growing complexities of modern society, barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose
however, have rendered this traditional livelihood was adversely affected by the
classification of the functions of government construction and operation of Shell's natural
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas gas pipeline. They claimed that their fish catch
which used to be left to private enterprise and became few after the construction of the
initiative and which the government was called pipeline. As a result, their average net income
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it per month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only
was better equipped to administer for the P573.00. They said that "the pipeline greatly
public welfare than is any private individual or affected biogenically hard-structured
group of individuals," continue to lose their communities such as coral reefs and led [to]
well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea."
within activities that the government must They now have to stay longer and farther out at
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to sea to catch fish, as the pipeline's operation
meet the increasing social challenges of the has driven the fish population out of coastal
times. Here as almost everywhere else the waters.
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for
this development was envisioned, indeed dismissal of the complaint. It alleged that the
adopted as a national policy, by the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle it is a "pollution case" and the Pollution
concerning the promotion of social justice. Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary
jurisdiction. Shell also claimed that it could not
4. Case Summary be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
Shell Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. immunity since under Service Contract, it
Efren Jalos served merely as an agent of the Philippine
G.R. No. 179918 | 2010-09-08 government in the development of the
Malampaya gas reserves. Shell points out that
Subject: The case falls within the the complaint also states no cause of action
administrative jurisdiction of the Pollution because it failed to specify any actionable
Adjudication Board; The complaint sufficiently wrong or particular act or omission on Shell's
alleges a cause of action against Shell; Shell is part.
not an agent of the State and cannot invoke
state immunity The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the
action should be brought before the PAB, the
Facts: government agency vested with jurisdiction
over pollution-related cases.
In 1990, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
(Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and upheld
entered into Service Contract 38 for the the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action. It
exploration and extraction of petroleum in said that Shell was not being sued for
northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell committing pollution, but for constructing and
discovered natural gas in the Camago- operating a natural gas pipeline that caused
Malampaya area and pursued its development fish decline and considerable reduction in the
of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas fishermen's income. The claim for damages was
Project. This entailed the construction and thus based on a quasi-delict over which the
installation of a pipeline spanning 504 regular courts have jurisdiction. The CA also
kilometers which crossed the Oriental Mindoro rejected Shell's assertion that the suit was
Sea. actually against the State and that it stated no
cause of action.
In 2003, respondents Efren Jalos and 75 other
individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA's
damages against Shell before the Regional Trial decision but the same was denied. Hence, it
Court (RTC). Jalos, et al claimed that they were
9
filed this petition for review under Rule 45. The and negatively affected its life sustaining
issues for resolution are: function. The power and expertise needed to
determine such issue lies with the Pollution
(a) Whether or not the complaint is a pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).
case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of
the PAB; 4. Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to
(b) Whether or not the complaint sufficiently the PAB the powers and functions of the
alleges a cause of action against Shell; and National Pollution and Control Commission
(c) Whether or not the suit is actually against provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984.
the State and is barred under the doctrine of These empowered the PAB to "determine the
state immunity. location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes
and effects" of water pollution. Among its
Held: functions is to "serve as arbitrator for the
determination of reparation, or restitution of the
The case falls within the administrative damages and losses resulting from pollution."
jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication In this regard, the PAB has the power to
Board conduct hearings, impose penalties for violation
of P.D. 984, and issue writs of execution to
1. Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does enforce its orders and decisions. The PAB's final
not use the word "pollution" in describing the decisions may be reviewed by the CA under
cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Sea, it is unmistakable based on their
allegations that Shell's pipeline produced some 5. Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative
kind of poison or emission that drove the fish recourse before filing their complaint with the
away from the coastal areas. While the regular courts. The laws creating the PAB and
complaint did not specifically attribute to Shell vesting it with powers are wise. The definition
any specific act of "pollution," it alleged that of the term "pollution" itself connotes the need
"the pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard- for specialized knowledge and skills, technical
structured communities such as coral reefs and and scientific, in determining the presence, the
led [to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro cause, and the effects of pollution. These
Sea." This constitutes "pollution" as defined by knowledge and skills are not within the
law. competence of ordinary courts. Consequently,
resort must first be made to the PAB, which is
2. Section 2(a) of P.D. 984 the agency possessed of expertise in
defines "pollution" as "any alteration of the determining pollution-related matters.
physical, chemical and biological properties of
any water x x x as will or is likely to create or 6. To this extent, the failure of Jalos, et al to
render such water x x x harmful, detrimental or allege in their complaint that they had first
injurious to public health, safety or welfare or taken resort to PAB before going to court means
which will adversely affect their utilization for that they failed to state a cause of action that
domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, the RTC could act on. This warranted the
recreational or other legitimate purposes." dismissal of their action.
3. It is clear from this definition that the stress The complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
to marine life claimed by Jalos, et al is caused of action against Shell
by some kind of pollution emanating from
Shell's natural gas pipeline. The pipeline, they 7. A cause of action is the wrongful act or
said, "greatly affected" or altered the natural omission committed by the defendant in
habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters' violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. Its
natural function as fishing grounds. elements consist of: (1) a right existing in favor
Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et al's claim for of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the
damages, the proper tribunal must determine defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and
whether or not the operation of the pipeline (3) an act or omission of the defendant in
adversely altered the coastal waters' properties violation of such right. To sustain a motion to
10
dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the exploration and development of one of the
complaint must show that the claim for relief country's natural gas reserves. While the
does not exist and not only that the claim was Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or to conduct petroleum operations in the
uncertain. Camago-Malampayo area under the State's full
control and supervision, it does not follow that
8. All the elements of a cause of action are Shell has become the State's "agent" within the
present. First, Jalos, et al had the right to the meaning of the law.
preferential use of marine and fishing resources
which is guaranteed by no less than the 12. The essence of an agency is the agent's
Constitution. Second, Shell had the correlative ability to represent his principal and bring about
duty to refrain from acts or omissions that could business relations between the latter and third
impair Jalos, et al's use and enjoyment of the persons. It is this power to affect the principal's
bounties of the seas. Lastly, Shell's construction contractual relations with third persons that
and operation of the pipeline, which is an act of differentiates the agent from a service
physical intrusion into the marine environment, contractor.
is said to have disrupted and impaired the
natural habitat of fish and resulted in 13. Shell's main undertaking under Service
considerable reduction of fish catch and income Contract 38 is to "perform all petroleum
for Jalos, et al. operations and provide all necessary
technology and finance" as well as other
9. While the complaint did not contain some connected services to the Philippine
scientific explanation regarding how the government. Shell's primary obligation under
construction and operation of the pipeline the contract is not to represent the Philippine
disturbed the waters and drove away the fish government for the purpose of transacting
from their usual habitat as the fishermen business with third persons. Rather, its
claimed, the lack of particulars is not a ground contractual commitment is to develop and
for dismissing the complaint. manage petroleum operations on behalf of the
State.
10. The construction and operation of the
pipeline may, in itself, be a wrongful act that 14. Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the
could be the basis of Jalos, et al's cause of Philippine government, but a provider of
action. The rules do not require that the services, technology and financing for the
complaint establish in detail the causal link Malampaya Natural Gas Project. It is not
between the construction and operation of the immune from suit and may be sued for claims
pipeline, on the one hand, and the fish decline even without the State's consent. Notably,
and loss of income, on the other hand, it being Service Contract 38 stipulated that payment of
sufficient that the complaint states the ultimate claims and damages pursuant to a judgment
facts on which it bases its claim for relief. The against Shell can be deducted from gross
test for determining the sufficiency of a cause proceeds. This signifies that the State itself
of action rests on whether the complaint acknowledged the suability of Shell.
alleges facts which, if true, would justify the
relief demanded. In this case, a valid judgment 5. Case Summary
for damages can be made in favor of Jalos, et Saguisag vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa
al, if the construction and operation of the (2015)
pipeline indeed caused fish decline and G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444 | 2016-01-12
eventually led to the fishermen's loss of
income, as alleged in the complaint. Subject: Power of judicial review; Requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review; An
Shell is not an agent of the State and actual case or controversy is present; Locus
cannot invoke state immunity standi; Petitions cannot qualify as citizens',
taxpayers', or legislators' suits; Petition
11. Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the nonetheless raise issues involving matters of
Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the transcendental importance; The role of the
11
President as the executor of the law includes Department committed grave abuse of
the duty to defend the State, for which purpose discretion in entering into the Enhanced
he may use that power in the conduct of Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with
foreign relations; Constitution prohibits the the United States of America (U.S.) in the form
entry of foreign military bases, troops or of an executive agreement, instead of a treaty
facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in concurred in by the Senate.
by the Senate; Constitutional restriction under
Sec 25, Art XVIII pertains to the entry of the The EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to
bases, troops, or facilities, and not to have access to and conduct activities within
the activities to be done after entry is certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was
authorized; Treaties vs. Executive Agreement; not transmitted to the Senate on the
Constitutional restrictions on the power of the executive's understanding that to do so was no
President to conclude international agreements; longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the
Power of the President to enter into binding Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
executive agreements without Senate U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes
concurrence; President had the choice to enter confirming the completion of all necessary
into EDCA by way of an executive agreement or internal requirements for the agreement to
a treaty; Executive agreements may cover the enter into force in the two countries. President
matter of foreign military forces if it merely Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on June 6,
involves detail adjustments; EDCA as a valid 2014. The Philippine and the U.S. governments
executive agreement; EDCA is consistent with had yet to agree formally on the specific sites
the content, purpose, and framework of the of the Agreed Locations mentioned in the
MDT and the VFA; Admission of U.S. military agreement.
and civilian personnel into Philippine territory is
already allowed under the VFA; EDCA does not The issues presented before the court are:
guaratee admission of U.S. contractors into
Philippine territory; Authorized activities of U.S. (a) Whether the essential requisites for judicial
military and civilian personnel within Philippine review are present
territory are in furtherance of the MDT and the (b) Whether the President may enter into an
VFA; EDCA does not authorize permanent executive agreement on foreign military bases,
presence of US forces and bases; Authorized troops, or facilities
activities performed by US. contractors within (c) Whether the provisions under EDCA are
Philippine territory are subject to Philippines consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
laws and must be consistent with the MDT and existing laws and treaties
the VFA; EDCA is not a disguised version of the
Military Bases Agreement (MBA); Agreed Held:
Locations under EDCA do not fall under the
concept of "foreign military bases and facilities" I. Procedural Issues
which requires Senate concurrence under
Section 25, Art XVIII, 1987 Constitution; First Power of judicial review
standard: independence from foreign control;
Second standard: Philippine sovereignty and 1. Distinguished from the general notion of
applicable law; Third standard: must respect judicial power, the power of judicial
national security and territorial integrity; Public review specially refers to both the authority
franchise not required for telecommunication and the duty of this Court to determine whether
system intended solely for the use of the U.S.; a branch or an instrumentality of government
Prohibition on introduction of nuclear weapons has acted beyond the scope of the latter's
into Philippine territory is respected; constitutional powers. As articulated in Section
Assumption of tax liability by the Philippine 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of
government does not create a tax exemption judicial review involves the power to resolve
cases in which the questions concern the
Facts: constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law,
The petitions allege that the Executive presidential decree, proclamation, order,
12
instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In our
fundamental law, the role of the Court is to ( d) the issue of constitutionality is the lis mota
determine whether a branch of government has of the case.
adhered to the specific restrictions and
limitations of the latter's power. An actual case or controversy is present
2. Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of 5. The focus of this requirement is the ripeness
the power of judicial review has been extended for adjudication of the matter at hand, as
to the determination of whether in matters opposed to its being merely conjectural or
traditionally considered to be within the sphere anticipatory. The case must involve a definite
of appreciation of another branch of and concrete issue involving real parties with
government, an exercise of discretion has been conflicting legal rights and legal claims
attended with grave abuse. The expansion of admitting of specific relief through a decree
this power has made the political question conclusive in nature. It should not equate with a
doctrine "no longer the insurmountable mere request for an opinion or advice on what
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the the law would be upon an abstract,
impenetrable shield that protects executive and hypothetical, or contingent state of facts.
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review. 6. The OSG contends that the nonparticipation
of the Senators in the present petitions only
3. The "pillars" of the limitations on the power confirms that even they believe that EDCA is a
of judicial review are: binding executive agreement that does not
require their concurrence.
1. That there be absolute necessity of
deciding a case 7. It must be emphasized that the Senate has
2. That rules of constitutional law shall already expressed its position through SR 105.
be formulated only as required by the facts of Through the Resolution, the Senate has taken a
the case position contrary to that of the OSG. As the
3. That judgment may not be sustained on body tasked to participate in foreign affairs by
some other ground ratifying treaties, its belief that EDCA infringes
4. That there be actual injury sustained by the upon its constitutional role indicates that an
party by reason of the operation of the statute actual controversy - albeit brought to the Court
5. That the parties are not in estoppel by non-Senators, exists.
6. That the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality 8. The matter before us involves an actual case
or controversy that is already ripe for
(see Demetria v. Alba and Francisco v. House of adjudication. The Executive Department has
Representatives citing the concurring opinion already sent an official confirmation to the U.S.
of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Embassy that "all internal requirements of the
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority) Philippines x x x have already been complied
with." By this exchange of diplomatic notes, the
Executive Department effectively performed
Requisites for the exercise of the power of the last act required under Article XII(l) of EDCA
judicial review before the agreement entered into
force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the
4. The power of judicial review may only be Constitution, is clear that the presence of
exercised when the following four stringent foreign military forces in the country shall only
requirements are satisfied: be allowed by virtue of a treaty concurred in by
the Senate. Hence, the performance of an
(a) there is an actual case or controversy official act by the Executive Department that
(b) petitioners possess locus standi led to the entry into force of an executive
(c) the question of constitutionality is raised at agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual
the earliest opportunity; and case or controversy requirement.
13
enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so,
Locus standi the present petitions cannot be considered by
the Court as citizens' suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
9. The question of locus standi or legal
standing focuses on the determination of (b) Petition cannot qualify as Taxpayer's
whether those assailing the governmental act suits
have the right of appearance to bring the
matter to the court for adjudication. They must 13. A taxpayer's suit concerns a case in which
show that they have a personal and substantial the official act complained of directly involves
interest in the case, such that they have the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
sustained or are in immediate danger of from taxation. Applying that principle to this
sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence case, petitioners must establish that EDCA
of the enforcement of the challenged involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
governmental act. or spending powers.
10. Here, it would be insufficient to show that 14. The petitions cannot qualify as taxpayers'
the law or any governmental act is invalid, and suits. A taxpayers' suit contemplates a situation
that petitioners stand to suffer in some in which there is already an appropriation or a
indefinite way. They must show that they have disbursement of public funds. A reading of
a particular interest in bringing the suit, and Article X(l) of EDCA would show thatthere has
that they have been or are about to be denied been neither an appropriation nor an
some right or privilege to which they are authorization of disbursement of funds.
lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be Specifically, EDCA provides that All obligations
subjected to some burden or penalty by reason under this Agreement are subject to the
of the act complained of. availability of appropriated funds authorized for
these purposes Hence, under the agreement,
Petitions cannot qualify as citizens', before there can even be a disbursement of
taxpayers', or legislators' suits public funds, there must first be a legislative
action. Until and unless the Legislature
11. The present petitions cannot qualify as appropriates funds for EDCA, or unless
citizens', taxpayers', or legislators' petitioners can pinpoint a specific item in the
suits; the Senate as a body has the requisite current budget that allows expenditure under
standing, but considering that it has not the agreement, we cannot at this time rule that
formally filed a pleading to join the suit, as it there is in fact an appropriation or a
merely conveyed to the Supreme Court its disbursement of funds that would justify the
sense that EDCA needs the Senate's filing of a taxpayers' suit.
concurrence to be valid, petitioners continue to
suffer from lack of standing. (c) Petition cannot qualify as Legislator's
suits
(a) Petition cannot qualify as Citizen's
suits 15. In a legislators' suit, those Members of
Congress who are challenging the official
12. In assailing the constitutionality of a act have standing only to the extent that the
governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens alleged violation impinges on their right to
may dodge the requirement of having to participate in the exercise of the powers of the
establish a direct and personal interest if they institution of which they are members.
show that the act affects a public right. But Legislators are allowed to sue to question the
aside from general statements that the validity of any official action, which they claim
petitions involve the protection of a public infringes their prerogatives as legislators. As
right, and that their constitutional rights as legislators, they must clearly show that there
citizens would be violated, petitioners fail to was a direct injury to their persons or the
make any specific assertion of a particular institution to which they belong.
public right that would be violated by the
14
16. The power to concur in a treaty or an power has been specifically vested in the
international agreement is an institutional President of the Philippines (formerly, Governor-
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the General). One of the principal functions of the
Senate, not to the entire Legislature. The supreme executive is the responsibility for
injured party would be the Senate as an the faithful execution of the laws as embodied
institution or any of its incumbent members, as by the oath of office.
it is the Senate's constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated. Petitioners, not being 20. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of
members of the Senate, do not have any legal the land is inherent in executive power and is
standing to file the suits concerning the lack of intimately related to the other executive
Senate concurrence in EDCA (see Pimentel v. functions. More important, this mandate is self-
Office of the Executive Secretary) executory by virtue of its being inherently
executive in nature. The import of this
Petition nonetheless raise issues involving characteristic is that the manner of the
matters of transcendental importance President's execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is justified by
17. In a number of cases, the Court has taken a necessity and limited only by law, since the
liberal stance towards the requirement of legal President must "take necessary and proper
standing, especially when paramount interest is steps to carry into execution the law."
involved. When those who challenge the official
act are able to craft an issue of transcendental 21. The presidential role in foreign affairs is
significance to the people, the Court may dominant and the President is traditionally
exercise its sound discretion and take accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
the inability of the petitioners to show that they validity of his actions are adjudged under less
have been personally injured by the operation stringent standards, lest their judicial
of a law or any other government act. repudiation lead to breach of an international
obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture
18. Petitioners have presented serious of confidence, national embarrassment and a
constitutional issues that provide ample plethora of other problems with equally
justification for the Court to set aside the rule undesirable consequences. (see Vinuya v.
on standing. The transcendental importance of Romulo)
the issues presented here is rooted in the
Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign
thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much military bases, troops or facilities, except
stricter mechanism required before foreign by way of a treaty concurred in by the
military troops, facilities, or bases may be Senate
allowed in the country. The DFA has already
confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal 22. Despite the President's roles as defender of
requirements of the Philippines x x x have the State and sole authority in foreign relations,
already been complied with." It behooves the the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability
Court in this instance to determine whether in instances when it involves the entry of
there was grave abuse of discretion on the part foreign military bases, troops or facilities.
of the Executive Department.
23. The initial limitation is found in Art
II. Substantive Issues VII, Section 21 of the provisions on the
Executive Department: "No treaty or
The role of the President as the executor international agreement shall be valid and
of the law includes the duty to defend the effective unless concurred in by at least two-
State, for which purpose he may use that thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
power in the conduct of foreign relations
24. The specific limitation is given by Art
19. Throughout the different versions of the XVIII, Section 25 under the Transitory
Philippine Constitution, the supreme executive Provisions, which reads as follows:
15
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Treaties vs. Executive Agreement
Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America 29. Treaties are formal documents which
concerning Military Bases, foreign military require ratification with the approval of two-
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be thirds of the Senate.Executive
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty agreements become binding through
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the executive action without the need of a vote by
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the Senate or by Congress. (see Commissioner
the votes cast by the people in a national of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading)
referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting 30. Executive agreements must remain
State. traceable to an express or implied authorization
under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties.
25. It is quite plain that the Transitory The absence of these precedents puts the
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution intended to validity and effectivity of executive agreements
add to the basic requirements of a treaty under under serious question for the main function of
Section 21 of Article VII. This means that both the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and
provisions must be read as additional the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to
limitations to the President's overarching defeat or interfere in the performance of these
executive function in matters of defense and rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot
foreign relations. create new international obligations that are
not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in
Constitutional restriction under Sec 25, the law they purport to implement.
Art XVIII pertains to the ENTRY of the
bases, troops, or facilities, and not to 31. Treaties are, by their very nature,
the activities to be done AFTER entry is considered superior to executive agreements.
authorized Treaties are products of the acts of the
Executive and the Senate unlike executive
26. Under the principles of constitutional agreements, which are solely executive
construction, of paramount consideration is the actions. Because of legislative participation
plain meaning of the language expressed in the through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as
Constitution, or the verba legis rule. Thus, if being on the same level as a statute. If there is
taken literally, the phrase "shall not be an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty
allowed in the Philippines" plainly refers to takes precedence over one that is prior. An
the entry of bases, troops, or facilities in the executive agreement is treated
country. differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are
27. It is evident that the constitutional considered ineffective. Both types of
restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the international agreement are nevertheless
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations Constitutional restrictions on the power of
provided by the rest of the Constitution and the President to conclude international
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 agreements
requirement of validity through a treaty.
32. Although the Chief Executive wields the
28. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) has exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
already allowed the entry of troops in the relations, this power must still be exercised
Philippines. The VFA provides that visiting US within the context and the parameters set by
forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for the Constitution, as well as by existing
purposes other than military, i.e., joint training domestic and international laws. There are
exercises like the Balikatan (see Lim v. constitutional provisions that restrict or limit
Executive Secretary) the President's prerogative in concluding
16
international agreements, such as those that The raison d'etre of executive agreements
involve the following: hinges on prior constitutional or legislative
authorizations.
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
within Philippine territory 35. The term "international agreements" as
contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does not
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export include executive agreements.
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to President had the choice to enter into
the authority granted by Congress EDCA by way of an executive agreement
or a treaty
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must
be pursuant to a law concurred in by a majority 36. There are no hard and fast rules on the
of all the Members of Congress propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a
treaty or an executive agreement as an
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of instrument of international relations. The
the Philippines, of foreign loans that must be primary consideration in the choice of the form
previously concurred in by the Monetary Board of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to
craft an international agreement in the form
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign they so wish to further their respective
military bases, troops, or facilities in the interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a
country must be in the form of a treaty duly back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
concurred in by the Senate. binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty an
or executive agreement, as the parties in either
f. For agreements that do not fall under international agreement each labor under the
paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is pacta sunt servanda principle. (see Bayan
required, should the form of the government Muna v. Romulo)
chosen be a treaty.
37. In the exercise of its power of judicial
Power of the President to enter into review, the Court does not look into whether an
binding executive agreements without international agreement should be in the form
Senate concurrence of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in
cases in which the Constitution or a statute
33. In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast
Trading , executive agreements are defined constitutional powers and prerogatives granted
as "international agreements to the President in the field of foreign affairs,
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out the task of the Court is to determine whether
well-established national policies and traditions the international agreement is consistent with
and those involving arrangements of a more or the applicable limitations.
less temporary nature. In Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, this Court further clarified that Executive agreements may cover the
executive agreements can cover a wide array of matter of foreign military forces if it
subjects that have various scopes and merely involves detail adjustments
purposes.
38. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution
34. Executive agreements may dispense with contains stringent requirements that must be
the requirement of Senate concurrence fulfilled by the international agreement allowing
because they merely involve arrangements on the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
the implementation of existing policies, rules, or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement
laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must
adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or be duly concurred in by the Senate.
upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature;
or (3) in the exercise of the President's 39. If the agreement is not covered by the
independent powers under the Constitution. above situation, then the President may choose
17
the form of the agreement (i.e., either an combat-related components are allowed under
executive agreement or a treaty), provided the treaty.
that the agreement dealing with foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal 45. Moreover, both the VFA and EDCA are
agreement that first allows their entry or silent on what these activities actually are. Both
presence in the Philippines. the VFA and EDCA deal with the presence of
U.S. forces within the Philippines, but make no
40. The executive agreement must not go mention of being platforms for activity beyond
beyond the parameters, limitations, and Philippine territory. While it may be that, as
standards set by the law and/or treaty that the applied, military operatjons under either the
former purports to implement; and must not VFA or EDCA would be carried out in the future,
unduly expand the international obligation the scope of judicial review does not cover
expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in potential breaches of discretion but only actual
the law or treaty. occurrences or blatantly illegal provisions.
Hence,we cannot invalidate EDCA on the basis
41. The executive agreement must be of the potentially abusive use of its provisions.
consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties. 46. It was also averred that EDCA supposedly
introduces a new concept not contemplated in
EDCA as a valid executive agreement the VFA or the MDT, i.e, Agreed Locations,
Contractors, Pre-positioning, and Operational
42. In light of the President's choice to enter Control. It must be clarified that the terms and
into EDCA in the form of an executive details used by an implementing agreement
agreement, respondents (Executive branch) need not be found in the mother treaty. They
carry the burden of proving that it is a mere must be sourced from the authority derived
implementation of existing laws and treaties from the treaty, but are not necessarily
concurred in by the Senate. EDCA must be expressed word-for-word in the mother treaty.
carefully dissected to ascertain if it remains
within the legal parameters of a valid executive (b) Admission of U.S. military and civilian
agreement. personnel into Philippine territory is
already allowed under the VFA
(a) EDCA is consistent with the content,
purpose, and framework of the MDT and 47. By virtue of Articles I and III of the VFA, the
the VFA Philippines already allows U.S. military and
civilian personnel to be "temporarily in the
43. An executive agreement may not be used Philippines," so long as their presence is "in
to amend a treaty. Accordingly, the EDCA shall connection with activities approved by the
be scrutinized by studying "the framework of Philippine Government." The VFA does not limit
the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines their temporary presence to specific locations.
bound itself" i.e., the Military Defense Treaty
(MDT) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). 48. The admission and presence of U.S.
military and civilian personnel in Philippine
44. It is pointed in the dissenting opinion that territory are already allowed under the VFA, the
the VFA contemplates the entry of troops for treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA.
training exercises, whereas EDCA allows the What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is
use of territory for launching military and merely provide the mechanism to identify the
paramilitary operations conducted in other locations in which U.S. personnel may perform
states. Jurisprudence however has established allowed activities pursuant to the VFA. As the
that combat-related activities, as opposed to implementing agreement, it regulates and
actual combat, were allowed under the MDT limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the
and VFA. Hence, even if EDCA was borne of country.
military necessity, it cannot be said to have
strayed from the intent of the VFA since EDCA's (c) EDCA does not guaratee admission of
U.S. contractors into Philippine territory
18
public safety, public health, public morals, and
49. EDCA recognizes the presence in the national interest. They may also be deported if
country of three distinct classes of individuals they are found to be illegal or undesirable
who will be conducting different types of aliens pursuant to the Philippine Immigration
activities within the Agreed Locations: (1) U.S. Act267 and the Data Privacy Act. In contrast,
military personnel; (2) U.S. civilian personnel; Article 111(5) of the VFA requires a request for
and (3) U.S. contractors. removal from the Philippine government before
a member of the U.S. personnel may be
50. Of the three aforementioned classes of "dispos[ed] xx x outside of the Philippines.
individuals who will be conducting certain
activities within the Agreed Locations, we note (d) Authorized activities of U.S. military
that only U.S. contractors are not explicitly and civilian personnel within Philippine
mentioned in the VFA. This does not mean, territory are in furtherance of the MDT
though, that the recognition of their presence and the VFA
under EDCA is ipso facto an amendment of the
treaty, and that there must be Senate 55. Manifest in the provisions of the MDT and
concurrence they before are allowed to enter VFA are the abundance of references to the
the country. creation of further "implementing
arrangements" including the identification of
51. Nowhere in EDCA are U.S. contractors "activities to be approved by the Philippine
guaranteed immediate admission into the Government."
Philippines. Articles III and IV, in fact, merely
grant them the right of access to, and the 56. The Court has already settled in Lim v.
authority to conduct certain activities within the Executive Secretary that the phrase "activities
Agreed Locations. Since Article II(3) of EDCA approved by the Philippine Government" under
specifically leaves out U.S. contractors from the Article I of the VFA was intended to be
coverage of the VFA, they shall not be granted ambiguous in order to afford the parties
the same entry accommodations and privileges flexibility to adjust the details of the purpose of
as those enjoyed by U.S. military and civilian the visit of U.S. personnel. In this manner,
personnel under the VFA. visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine
territory for purposes other than military.
52. Consequently, it is neither mandatory nor
obligatory on the part of the Philippines to 57. The "activities" referred to in the VFA treaty
admit U.S. contractors into the country. We are meant to be specified and identified in
emphasize that the admission of aliens into further agreements. EDCA is one such
Philippine territory is "a matter of pure agreement. EDCA seeks to be an instrument
permission and simple tolerance which creates that enumerates the Philippine-approved
no obligation on the part of the government to activities of U.S. personnel referred to in the
permit them to stay." Unlike U.S. personnel who VFA.
are accorded entry accommodations, U.S.
contractors are subject to Philippine 58. After a thorough examination of the
immigration laws. The latter must comply with content, purpose, and framework of the MDT
our visa and passport regulations and prove and the VFA, we find that EDCA has remained
that they are not subject to exclusion under any within the parameters set in these two treaties.
provision of Philippine immigration laws. The Just like the Terms of Reference mentioned
President may also deny them entry pursuant inLim, mere adjustments in detail to implement
to his absolute and unqualified power to the MDT and the VFA can be in the form of
prohibit or prevent the admission of aliens executive agreements.
whose presence in the country would be
inimical to public interest. (e) EDCA does not authorize permanent
presence of US forces and bases
53. The President may exercise the plenary
power to expel or deport U.S. contractors as 59. Petitioners assert that the VFA
may be necessitated by national security, contemplated mere temporary visits from U.S.
19
forces, whereas EDCA allows an unlimited consistent with Philippine laws and regulations
period for U.S. forces to stay in the Philippines. and pursuant to the MDT and the VFA.
The provisions of EDCA directly contradict this
argument by limiting itself to 10 years of 64. The concerns raised by petitioners do not
effectivity. Although this term is automatically give the Court enough justification to strike
renewed, the process for terminating the down EDCA. The courts cannot take judicial
agreement is unilateral and the right to do so notice of claims aired in news reports for the
automatically accrues at the end of the 10 year simple reason that facts must be established in
period. Clearly, this method does not create a accordance with the rules of evidence. Courts
permanent obligation. EDCA merely follows the also cannot move one step ahead and
practice of other states in not specifying a non- speculate that the alleged illegal activities of
extendible maximum term. This practice, these contractors in other countries would
however, does not automatically grant a badge likewise take place in the Philippines. Making
of permanency to its terms. sure that U.S. contractors comply with
Philippine laws is a function of law enforcement.
60. Moreover, EDCA merely grants American EDCA does not stand in the way of law
troops, ships and planes rotational access to enforcement.
facilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines -
but not permanent bases which are prohibited 65. To emphasize, U.S. contractors are
under the Philippine Constitution. explicitly excluded from the coverage of the
VFA. As visiting aliens, their entry, presence,
61. It could not have been by chance that and activities are subject to all laws and
the VFA does not include a maximum time limit treaties applicable within the Philippine
with respect to the presence of U.S. personnel territory. Our penal laws, labor laws, and
in the country. We construe this lack of immigrations laws apply to them and therefore
specificity as a deliberate effort on the part of limit their activities here.
the Philippine and the U.S. governments to
leave out this aspect and reserve it for the (g) EDCA is not a disguised version of the
"adjustment in detail" stage of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA)
implementation of the treaty.
66. Petitioners Saguisag et al. claim that EDCA
(f) Authorized activities performed by US. permits the establishment of U.S. military bases
Contractors within Philippine territory are through the "euphemistically" termed "Agreed
subject to Philippines laws and must be Locations. " Alluding to the definition of this
consistent with the MDT and the VFA term in Article II( 4) of EDCA, they point out that
these locations are actually military bases, as
62. Petitioners also raise concerns about the the definition refers to facilities and areas to
U.S. government's purported practice of hiring which U.S. military forces have access for a
private security contractors in other countries. variety of purposes. Hence, EDCA is but a
They claim that these contractors have been disguised version of the 1947 Military Bases
implicated in incidents or scandals in other Agreement (MBA).
parts of the globe involving rendition, torture
and other human rights violations. They also 67. Under the MBA, the U.S. had the right to
assert that these contractors employ construct, operate, maintain, utilize, occupy,
paramilitary forces in other countries where garrison, and control the bases. The so-called
they are operating. parallel provisions of EDCA allow only
operational control over the Agreed Locations
63. EDCA requires that all activities within specifically for construction activities. They do
Philippine territory be in accordance with not allow the overarching power to operate,
Philippine law. This means that certain maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison, and control
privileges denied to aliens are likewise denied a base with full discretion.
to foreign military contractors. Hence, even
when U.S. contractors are granted access to the 68. Under the MBA, the U.S. retains ownership
Agreed Locations, all their activities must be if it paid for the facility. Under EDCA, an
20
immovable is owned by the Philippines, even if viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers, and streams in
built completely on the back of U.S. funding. the Philippines in the same manner that
This is consistent with the constitutional Philippine military forces enjoyed that right. No
prohibition on foreign land ownership. such arrangement appears in EDCA. In fact, it
merely extends to U.S. forces temporary access
69. Under the MBA, the U.S. retained all rights to public land and facilities when requested.
of jurisdiction in and over Philippine territory
occupied by American bases. In contrast, under 76. Under EDCA, the U.S. no longer has the
EDCA, the U.S. does not enjoy any such right right, power, and authority to construct, install,
over any part of the Philippines in which its maintain, and employ any type of facility,
forces or equipment may be found. weapon, substance, device, vessel or vehicle,
or system unlike in the MBA. EDCA merely
70. Under the MBA, the U.S. and the grants the U.S., through bilateral security
Philippines were visibly not on equal footing mechanisms, the authority to undertake
when it came to deciding whether to expand or construction, alteration, or improvements on
to increase the number of bases, as the the Philippine-owned Agreed Locations.
Philippines may be compelled to negotiate with
the U.S. the moment the latter requested an 77. EDCA does not allow the U.S. to acquire, by
expansion of the existing bases or to acquire condemnation or expropriation proceedings,
additional bases. In EDCA, U.S. access is purely real property belonging to any private person.
at the invitation of the Philippines. The old MBA gave this right to the U.S.
71. Under the MBA, the U.S. had complete 78. EDCA does not allow the U.S. to unilaterally
control over its military bases, and the U.S. bring into the country non-Philippine nationals
could effectively prevent Philippine authorities who are under its employ, together with their
from entering those bases. In EDCA, the families, in connection with the construction,
Philippines is guaranteed access over the entire maintenance, or operation of the bases. EDCA
area of the Agreed Locations. strictly adheres to the limits under the VFA.
72. Under the MBA, the U.S. was given the 79. EDCA does not allow the U.S. to exercise
authority to use Philippine territory for jurisdiction over any offense committed by any
additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery person within the Agreed Locations, unlike in
ranges. No such right is given under EDCA. the former MBA.
73. Under the MBA, the U.S. was given the 80. EDCA does not allow the U.S. to operate
right, power, and authority to control and military post exchange (PX) facilities, which is
prohibit the movement and operation of all free of customs duties and taxes, unlike what
types of vehicles within the vicinity of the the expired MBA expressly allowed.
bases. The U.S. does not have any right, power,
or authority to do so under EDCA. Agreed Locations under EDCA do not fall
under the concept of "foreign military
74. Under the MBA, the U.S. had the right to bases and facilities" which requires
improve and deepen the harbors, channels, Senate concurrence under Section 25, Art
entrances, and anchorages; and to construct or XVIII, 1987 Constitution
maintain necessary roads and bridges that
would afford it access to its military bases. 81. Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Under EDCA, the U.S. is merely given Constitution is explicit that foreign military
temporary access to land and facilities bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
(including roads, ports, and airfields). in the Philippines, except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate. Notably, Section 25
75. Under the MBA, the U.S. was granted the does not define what is meant by a "foreign
automatic right to use any and all public military facility or base." At the time of its
utilities, services and facilities, airfields, ports, crafting of the Constitution, the 1986
harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges, Constitutional Commission had a clear idea of
21
what exactly it was restricting. Its point of measures to protect United States forces and
reference was clearly areas covered by the United States contractors.
1947 MBA as amended. In 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the successor treaty of the 86. Petitioners mistakenly equate "operational
1947 MBA that would have allowed the control" with "effective command and
continuation of U.S. bases in the Philippines. control." Operational controlis the delegable
aspect of combatant command,
82. The latest agreement is EDCA, which while command and control is the overall power
proposes a novel concept termed "Agreed and responsibility exercised by the commander
Locations." The bone of contention is whether with reference to a mission. Operational control
the Agreed Locations are, from a legal is a narrower power and must be given, while
perspective, foreign military facilities or bases. command and control is plenary and vested in
This legal framework triggers Section 25, Article a commander. Operational control does not
XVIII, and makes Senate concurrence a sine qua include the planning, programming, budgeting,
non. and execution process input; the assignment of
subordinate commanders; the building of
(a) First standard: independence from relationships with Department of Defense
foreign control agencies; or the directive authority for logistics,
whereas these factors are included in the
83. The heart of the constitutional restriction concept of command and control.
on foreign military facilities and bases is the
assertion of independence from the U.S. and 87. EDCA indeed contains a specific provision
other foreign powers, as independence is that gives to the U.S. operational control within
exhibited by the degree of foreign control the Agreed Locations during construction
exerted over these areas. The essence of that activities. Despite this grant of operational
independence is self-governance and self- control to the U.S., it must be emphasized that
control. the grant is only for construction activities.
The narrow and limited instance wherein the
84. The Agreed Locations are contained within U.S. is given operational control within an
a property for public use, be it within a Agreed Location cannot be equated with foreign
government military camp or property that military control.
belongs to the Philippines. EDCA explicitly
provides that ownership of the Agreed 88. Limited control does not violate the
Locations remains with the Philippine Constitution. The fear of the commissioners was
movement. What U.S. personnel have a right total control, to the point that the foreign
to, pending mutual agreement, is access to and military forces might dictate the terms of their
use of these locations. EDCA, in respect of its acts within the Philippines. More important,
provisions on Agreed Locations, is essentially a limited control does not mean an abdication or
contract of use and access. The activities derogation of Philippine sovereignty and legal
carried out within these locations are subject to jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations. It is
agreement as authorized by the Philippine more akin to the extension of diplomatic
movement. courtesies and rights to diplomatic agents,
which is a waiver of control on a limited scale
85. Under Article VI(3) of EDCA, U.S. forces are and subject to the terms of the treaty.
authorized to act as necessary for "operational
control and defense." The legal concept (b) Second standard: Philippine
of operational control involves authority over sovereignty and applicable law
personnel in a commander-subordinate
relationship and does not include control over 89. From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed
the Agreed Locations in this particular case. Locations are territories of the Philippines that
Though not necessarily stated in EDCA the U.S. forces are allowed to access and use.
provisions, this interpretation is readily implied By withholding ownership of these areas and
by the reference to the taking of "appropriate retaining unrestricted access to them, the
government asserts sovereignty over its
22
territory. That sovereignty exists so long as the EDCA that the telecommunication system is
Filipino people exist. solely for the use of the U.S. and not the public
in general, and that this system will not
90. The Philippines retains primary interfere with that which local operators use.
responsibility for security with respect to the Consequently, a public franchise is no longer
Agreed Locations. Hence,Philippine law remains necessary.
in force therein, and it cannot be said that
jurisdiction has been transferred to the U.S. Prohibition on introduction of nuclear
weapons into Philippine territory is
(c) Third standard: Must respect national respected
security and territorial integrity
95. The charge that EDCA allows nuclear
91. Any armed attack by forces of a third state weapons within Philippine territory is entirely
against an Agreed Location can only be speculative. It is noteworthy that the
legitimate under international humanitarian law agreement in fact specifies that the
if it is against a bona fide U.S. military base, prepositioned materiel shall not include nuclear
facility, or installation that directly contributes weapons. Petitioners argue that only
to the military effort of the U.S. Moreover, the prepositioned nuclear weapons are prohibited
third state's forces must take all measures to by EDCA, and that, therefore, the U.S. would
ensure that they have complied with the insidiously bring nuclear weapons to Philippine
principle of distinction (between combatants territory. The general prohibition on nuclear
and non-combatants). weapons, whether prepositioned or not, is
already expressed in the 1987 Constitution. It
92. There is, then, ample legal protection for would be unnecessary or superfluous to include
the Philippines under international law that all prohibitions already in the Constitution or in
would ensure its territorial integrity and the law through a document like EDCA.
national security in the event an Agreed
Location is subjected to attack. As EDCA stands, Assumption of tax liability by the
it does not create the situation so feared by Philippine government does not create a
petitioners - one in which the Philippines, while tax exemption
not participating in an armed conflict, would be
legitimately targeted by an enemy of the U.S 96. petitioners allege that EDCA creates a tax
exemption, which under the law must originate
93. Concerns on national security problems from Congress. EDCA simply states that
that arise from foreign military equipment the taxes on the use of water, electricity, and
being present in the Philippines must likewise public utilities are for the account of the
be contextualized. Most significantly, the VFA Philippine Government. This provision creates a
already authorizes the presence of U.S. military situation in which a contracting party assumes
equipment in the country. the tax liability of the other. In National Power
Corporation v. Province of Quezon, the court
Public franchise not required for concluded that an enforceable assumption of
telecommunication system intended solely tax liability requires the party assuming the
for the use of the U.S. liability to have actual interest in the property
taxed. This rule applies to EDCA, since the
94. In reference to the issue on Philippine Government stands to benefit not
telecommunications, suffice it to say that the only from the structures to be built thereon or
initial impression of the facility adverted to improved, but also from the joint training with
does appear to be one of those that require a U.S. forces, disaster preparation, and the
public franchise by way of congressional action preferential use of Philippine suppliers. Hence,
under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. the provision on the assumption of tax liability
As respondents submit, however, the system does not constitute a tax exemption as
referred to in the agreement does not provide petitioners have posited.
telecommunications services to the public for
compensation. It is clear from Article VIl(2) of 6.Case Summary
23
Pamatong vs Comelec (2004) candidates since it does not ask for the
G.R. No. 161872 | 2004-04-13 candidate's bio-data and his program of
government.
Subject: There is no constitutional right to run
for or hold public office; Policy provisions under Held:
the Constitution are generally not self-executing
and not give rise to judicially enforceable There is no constitutional right to run for
rights; "Equal access" provision requires or hold public office
implementing legislation to make it operative;
Nuisance candidate prohibition is a valid 1. Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the
limitation on the privilege to seek elective constitutional provision ensuring "equal access
office; Prohibition against nuisance candidates; to opportunities for public office" is the claim
Question of whether a candidate is a nuisance that there is a constitutional right to run for or
candidate or not is both legal and factual; hold public office and, particularly in his case,
Validity of the form for the certificate of to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
candidacy recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II
Facts: of the Constitution neither bestows such a right
nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong (petitioner) filed his enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
Certificate of Candidacy for President for the language of the provision which suggests such
2004 elections. The Commission on Elections a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy in its Policy provisions under the Constitution
Resolution No. 6558 . The decision, however, are generally not self-executing and not
was not unanimous since Commissioners give rise to judicially enforceable rights
Tancangco and Sadain voted to include
petitioner as they believed he had parties or 2. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed
movements to back up his candidacy. part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies."
The COMELEC denied petitioner's Motion for The provisions under the Article are generally
Reconsideration. The COMELEC declared considered not self-executing,and there is no
petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance plausible reason for according a different
candidates who could not wage a nationwide treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like
campaign and/or are not nominated by a the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
political party or are not supported by a the provision does not contain any judicially
registered political party with a national enforceable constitutional right but merely
constituency. specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not
Petitioner filed the present Petition For Writ of give rise to any cause of action before the
Certiorari. Petitioner alleged that COMELEC courts.
resolutions were rendered in violation of his
right to "equal access to opportunities for 3. The original wording of the present Section
public service" under Section 26, Article II of 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden
the 1987 Constitution by limiting the number of opportunities to public office and prohibit public
qualified candidates only to those who can dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice)
afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an
are nominated by political parties. amendment that changed the word "broaden"
to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the substitution of the word "office" to "service."
form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared The provision is not intended to compel the
by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the State to enact positive measures that would
form does not provide clear and reasonable accommodate as many people as possible into
guidelines for determining the qualifications of public office. The approval of the "Davide
24
amendment" indicates the design of the Resolution No. 6452 . Thus, their presumed
framers to cast the provision as simply validity stands and has to be accorded due
enunciatory of a desired policy objective and weight.
not reflective of the imposition of a clear State
burden. Prohibition against nuisance candidates
"Equal access" provision requires 8. The rationale behind the prohibition against
implementing legislation to make it nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
operative candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for office is easy to divine.
4. It is difficult to interpret the clause as The State has a compelling interest to ensure
operative in the absence of legislation since its that its electoral exercises are rational,
effective means and reach are not properly objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims State takes into account the practical
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear considerations in conducting elections.
to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases Inevitably, the greater the number of
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and candidates, the greater the opportunities for
"public service" are susceptible to countless logistical confusion, not to mention the
interpretations owing to their inherent increased allocation of time and resources in
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the preparation for the election.
intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from 9. The preparation of ballots is but one aspect
which innately unenforceable rights may be that would be affected by allowance of
sourced. "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections.
Our election laws provide various entitlements
Nuisance candidate prohibition is a for candidates for public office, such as
valid limitation on the privilege to seek watchers in every polling place, watchers in the
elective office board of canvassers, or even the receipt of
electoral contributions. Moreover, there are
5. The privilege of equal access to election rules and regulations the formulations
opportunities to public office may be subjected of which are dependent on the number of
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically candidates in a given election.
on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election 10. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a
Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC credible and orderly election, the State could
Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 exclude nuisance candidates and need not
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to moon on gossamer wings."
or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
11. The COMELEC is mandated by the
6. As long as the limitations apply to Constitution with the administration of elections
everybody equally without discrimination, and endowed with considerable latitude in
however, the equal access clause is not adopting means and methods that will ensure
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the promotion of free, orderly and honest
the burdens engendered by the limitations are elections. Moreover, the Constitution
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to guarantees that only bona fide candidates for
file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, public office shall be free from any form of
there is no showing that any person is exempt harassment and discrimination. The
from the limitations or the burdens which they determination of bona fide candidates is
create. governed by the statutes and the concept is
satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election
7. Petitioner does not challenge the Code.
constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Question of whether a candidate is a
25
nuisance candidate or not is both legal delegation of legislative authority; President
and factual exercises power of supervision (not control)
over local governments; Issues on proper party
12. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC and prematurity of action
do not direct the Court to the evidence which it
considered in determining that petitioner was a Facts:
nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court
from reviewing at this instance whether the In 1964, the President of the Philippines,
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
in disqualifying petitioner. Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129,
13. Petitioner has submitted to the Court mere creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.
photocopies of various documents purportedly
evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President
for the presidency. Yet the Supreme Court, not of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
being a trier of facts, can not properly pass the present special civil action for prohibition
upon the reproductions as evidence at this against the Auditor General to restrain him from
level. passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said executive orders
14. The question of whether a candidate is a and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are
is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of null and void because Section 68 of the Revised
this case for the reception of further evidence is Administrative Code has been impliedly
in order. repealed by Republic Act 2370 and that Section
68 constitutes an undue delegation of
Validity of the form for the certificate of legislative power.
candidacy
Subsequently, the mayors of several
15. As to petitioner's attacks on the validity of municipalities adversely affected by the
the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice executive orders which took away from the
it to say that theform strictly complies with former the barrios composing the new political
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This subdivision - intervened in the case. Moreover,
provision specifically enumerates what a Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did
required information tending to show that the appear as amici curiae.
candidate possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position aspired for as Held:
established by the Constitution and other
election laws. Denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio, implies a negation of
7. Case Summary the bigger power to create municipalities
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965)
G.R. No. L-23825 | 1965-12-24 1. Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act
No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
Subject: Denial of the presidential authority to created or their boundaries altered nor their
create a new barrio, implies a negation of the names changed" except (a) by Act of
bigger power to create municipalities; Authority Congress or (b) of the corresponding provincial
to create municipal corporations is essentially board "upon petition of a majority of the voters
legislative in nature; Section 68 of the Revised in the areas affected" and the
Administrative Code, which vests on the "recommendation of the council of the
President the power to create municipalities, is municipality or municipalities in which the
an an undue delegation of legislative power; proposed barrio is situated."
Public welfare as a sufficient standard for
26
2. Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the
President, under this new law, cannot even Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
create a barrio, can he create a municipality Code, which vests on the President the
which is composed of several barrios, since power to create municipalities, is an
barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor undue delegation of legislative power
General reasoned that the authority exists
under the theory that a new municipality can
be created without creating new barrios, such 5. Although Congress may delegate to another
as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction branch of the government the power to fill in
of the new municipality. However, the court the details in the execution, enforcement or
agreed with the petitioner that the statutory administration of a law, it is essential, to
denial of the presidential authority to create a forestall a violation of the principle of
new barrio implies a negation of the bigger separation of powers, that said law:
power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. Founded upon logic (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth
and experience, it cannot be offset except by a therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to implemented by the delegate; and
the contrary, and no such manifestation, (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. sufficiently determinate or determinable - to
2370, has been shown. which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature 6. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
3. The Auditor General alleges that the power formulate such policy, which is the essence of
of the President to create municipalities under every law; and, without the aforementioned
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code standard, there would be no means to
does not amount to an undue delegation of determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
legislative power. The Auditor General cites the delegate has acted within or beyond the
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of scope of his authority.
Binagonan. However, said case is inapplicable
since it involved, not the creation of a new 7. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory - Code does not meet these well settled
from an already existing municipality (Cardona) requirements for a valid delegation of the
to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
existing at the time of and prior to said transfer law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
- in consequence of the fixing and definition, of carried out or implemented by the President.
the common boundaries of two municipalities. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
4. Whereas the power to fix such common to.
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, Public welfare as a sufficient standard
may partake of an administrative nature - for delegation of legislative authority
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and
ways to carry into effect the law creating said 8. Under the last clause of the first sentence of
municipalities - the authority to create Section 68, the President ". . . may change the
municipal corporations is essentially legislative seat of the government within any subdivision
in nature. to such place therein as the public welfare may
It is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely require."
and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power" As the Supreme Court of Washington 9. From the language of this clause, the phrase
has put it, "municipal corporations are purely "as the public welfare may require" qualifies,
the creatures of statutes." not the clauses preceding but only the place to
27
which the seat of the government may be
transferred. 13. Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the 1935
Constitution ordains:
10. Even if we assumed that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" in said Section 68 "The President shall have control of all
qualifies all other clauses thereof, the same will executive departments, bureaus or offices,
not save the provision. The Court has upheld exercise general supervision over all local
"public welfare" and "public interest" as governments as may be provided by law, and
sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
authority to execute the law (see Calalang vs.
William and People vs. Rosenthal) . But, the 14. The power of control under this provision
doctrine laid down in these cases must be implies the right of the President to interfere in
construed in relation to the specific facts and the exercise of such discretion as may be
issues involved therein, outside of which they vested by law in the officers of the executive
do not constitute precedents and have no departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
binding effect. Unlike in the cases government, as well as to act in lieu of such
of Calalang and Rosenthal, the creation of officers. This power is denied by the
municipalities is not an administrative function, Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
but one which is essentially and eminently governments are concerned. With respect to
legislative in character. The question whether the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
or not "public interest" demands the exercise of wieldno more authority than that of checking
such power is not one of fact. It is "purely a whether said local governments or the officers
legislative question" or a political question. thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President
11. The term "public welfare" is so broad as to cannot interfere with local governments, so
vest in the President a discretion that is long as the same or its officers act within the
"virtually unfettered", and, consequently, scope of their authority. He may not enact an
tantamount to a delegation of legislative ordinance which the municipal council has
power. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby
powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
would no longer be any legal impediment to a although he may see to it that the
statutory grant of authority to the President to corresponding provincial officials take
do anything which, in his opinion, may be appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither
required by public welfare or public may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance
interest. Such grant of authority would be a passed by said council within the scope of its
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it
favor of the Executive, and would bring about a may be. He may not even suspend an elective
total collapse of the democratic system official of a regular municipality or take any
established by our Constitution, which it is the disciplinary action against him, except on
special duty and privilege of this Court to appeal from a decision of the corresponding
uphold. provincial board.
12. It may not be amiss to note that the 15. If the President could create a municipality,
executive orders in question were issued after he could, in effect, remove any of its officials,
the legislative bills for the creation of the by creating a new municipality and including
municipalities involved in this case had failed to therein the barrio in which the official
pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that concerned resides, for his office would thereby
the issuance of said executive orders entails become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing
the exercise of purely legislative functions can the power to create a new municipality (if he
hardly be given. had it), without actually creating it, he could
compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
President exercises power of supervision thereby, in effect, exercising over them the
(not control) over local government power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.
28
proprietary, function, said local officials, if any,
16. Also, the power of control of the President are mere agents or representatives of the
over executive departments, bureaus or offices national government. Their interest in the case
implies no more than the authority to assume at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
directly the functions thereof or to interfere in represented.
the exercise of discretion by its officials.
Manifestly, such control does not include the 19. Respondent alleges that "the present
authority either to abolish an executive petition is premature" since he has not as yet
department or bureaus, or to create a new one. acted on any of the executive order in question
As a consequence, the alleged power of the and has not intimated how he would act in
President to create municipal corporations connection therewith. It is however, a matter of
would necessarily connote the exercise by him common, public knowledge, subject to judicial
of an authority even greater than that of control cognizance, that the President has, for many
which he has over the executive departments, years, issued executive orders creating
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of municipal corporations and that the same have
the Revised Administrative Code does not been organized and in actual operation, thus
merely fail to comply with the constitutional indicating that the expenditures incidental
mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the thereto have been sanctioned, approved or
President less power over local governments passed in audit by the General Auditing Office
than that vested in him over the executive and its officials. There is no reason to believe,
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the therefore, that respondent would adopt a
process and does the exact opposite, by different policy as regards the new
conferring upon him more power over municipal municipalities involved in this case, in the
corporations than that which he has over said absence of an allegation to such effect, and
executive departments, bureaus or offices. none has been made by him.
21. Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from 24. It is claimed that the title of Republic Act
the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary, No. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail
capricious, taking into account the illegitimate Business) is misleading or deceptive, as it
and pernicious form and manner in which the conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
aliens have heretofore engaged therein? The nationalize the retail business and prohibit
answer is clear. The law in question is deemed aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
absolutely necessary to bring about the desired provision which is claimed to be violated in
legislative objective, i.e., to free national Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
economy from alien control and dominance. It
is not necessarily unreasonable because it No bill which may be enacted in the law shall
affects private rights and privileges. The test of embrace more than one subject which shall be
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness expressed in the title of the bill.
or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into 25. What the above provision prohibits is
effect. Judged by this test, the disputed duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to
legislation, which is not merely reasonable but appraise the legislators or the public of the
actually necessary, must be considered not to nature, scope and consequences of the law or
have infringed the constitutional limitation of its operation. A cursory consideration of the
reasonableness. title and the provisions of the bill fails to show
the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
22. A cursory study of the provisions of the law "regulate" does not and may not readily and at
immediately reveals how tolerant, how first glance convey the idea of "nationalization"
reasonable, the Legislature has been. The law is and "prohibition", which terms express the two
made prospective and recognizes the right and main purposes and objectives of the law.
privilege of those already engaged in the But "regulate" is a broader term than either
occupation to continue therein during the rest prohibition or nationalization. Both of these
of their lives; and similar recognition of the have always been included within the term
right to continue is accorded associations of regulation.
aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those
only upon conviction of certain offenses 26. The word "regulate" is of broad import,
and necessarily implies some degree of
23. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in
law attacked as a violation of due process, is connection with the thing to be regulated.
not its reasonableness, but its While word regulate does not ordinarily convey
unreasonableness, and we find the provisions meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason
are not unreasonable. These principles also why it should not have such meaning when
answer various other arguments raised against used in delegating police power in connection
the law, some of which are: that the law does with a thing the best or only efficacious
not promote general welfare; that thousands of regulation of which involves suppression. (see
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that State vs. Morton)
34
those of the United States, who are granted
27. The general rule is for the use of general special rights by the Constitution, are all
terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
that the title need not be an index to the entire But even supposing that the law infringes upon
contents of the law . The above rule was the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
followed since the title of the Act in question qualification or amendment by a subsequent
adopted the more general term "regulate" law and the same may never curtail or restrict
instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". the scope of the police power of the State.
Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may 9. Case Summary
not be included in the terms "nationalization" or Naval vs. Comelec (2014)
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from G.R. No. 207851 | 2014-07-08
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there
would have been many provisions not falling Subject: Jurisprudence on the three-term limit
within the scope of the title which would have rule; The role of elections in our Democratic
made the Act invalid. The use of the term and Republican state, and the restraints
"regulate", therefore, is in accord with the imposed upon those who hold public office; The
principle governing the drafting of statutes, Constitution mandates the strict
under which a simple or general term should be implementation of the three-term limit rule;
adopted in the title, which would include all Aldivino ruling: The three-term limit rule is
other provisions found in the body of the Act. inflexible; Reapportionment and its basis; R.A.
No. 9716 created a new Second District, but it
No violation of international treaties and merely renamed the other four; Application of
obligations three-term limit rule upon local elective officials
in renamed and/or reapportioned districts; The
28. Another argument against the validity of presumed competence of the COMELEC to
the law is the supposed violation thereby of the resolve matters falling within its jurisdiction is
Charter of the United Nations and of the upheld
Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly. The Facts:
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of From 2004 to 2007 (1st term) and 2007 to 2010
their subjects, and the Declaration of Human (2nd term), Angel G. Naval had been elected
Rights contains nothing more than a mere and had served as a member of the
recommendation or a common standard of Sanggunian, Second District, Province of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. Camarines Sur.
That such is the import of the United Nations
Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights On October 12, 2009, the President approved
can be inferred the fact that members of the Republic Act No. 9716, which reapportioned the
United Nations Organizations, such as Norway legislative districts in Camarines Sur. In
and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from particular, the Second District was
engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of reapportioned such that 8 out of its 10 town
the world laws against foreigners engaged in constituencies are carved out and placed under
domestic trade are adopted. the Third District. The Second District is left
with the two remaining towns, Gainza and
29. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic Milaor, merged with five towns from the old
of the Philippines and the Republic of China of First District.
April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by
the law in question. All that the treaty In the 2010 elections (3rd term), Naval once
guarantees is equality of treatment to the again won but this time as a member of the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until
nationals of any other country." But the 2013.
nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was
35
re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third mayor into a local government post different
District. from the office of the city mayor. The Court
took into account the following circumstances:
On October 29, 2012, Nelson B. Julia invoked (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city
Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code was the same as that of the municipality; (2)
(OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified That the inhabitants were the same group of
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the voters who elected the municipal mayor for
Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
that the three-term limit rules application is inhabitants were the same group of voters over
more with reference to the same local elective whom he held power and authority as their
post, and not necessarily in connection with an chief executive for nine years.
identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval
to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth 2. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (1999), a
time, irrespective of the District, is violative of candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won
the three-term limit rule enshrined in the in three consecutive elections. While serving his
Constitution and the LGC, which must be third term, his opponent filed an election
strictly construed. protest. Months before the expiration of the
mayors third term, he was ousted from office.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled He ran again for the same post in the
Navals COC on the ground that Naval had immediately succeeding election. The Court
committed a false material misrepresentation ruled that the mayor could not be considered as
when he declared that he was eligible to run having served a full third term. An interruption
when in fact he is disqualified under the three for any length of time, if due to an involuntary
term limit rule. The said body rationed that the cause, is enough to break the elected officials
new Third District where Naval was elected and continuity of service.
has served (his 3rd term) is composed of the
same municipalities comprising the previous 3. In Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC (1998) , the
Second District, absent the towns Gainza and mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in
Milaor. Hence, the territorial jurisdiction Naval office by the vice mayor. In the two
seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the immediately succeeding elections, the latter
same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he
served. The electorate who voted for him in ran for the same position for the third time, his
2004 (1st term) , 2007 (2nd term)and 2010 (3rd disqualification was sought for alleged violation
term) is the same electorate who shall vote for of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that
him come May 13, 2013 Elections. when he assumed the position of mayor by
virtue of succession, his service should not be
The COMELEC en banc denied Navals Motion treated as one full term. For the disqualification
for Reconsideration to the above and affirmed to apply, the candidate should have been
the application of the three-term limit rule thrice elected for and had served the same
against Naval. Hence, this petition. post consecutively.
16. After the reapportionment of the districts in 20. Sustaining Navals arguments would
Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which practically allow him to hold the same office for
brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a 15 years. These are the circumstances the
population of 35,856 less than that of the old Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
Second District, which elected him in 2004 and
2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 The presumed competence of the
indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a COMELEC to resolve matters falling within
single new Second District from the merger of its jurisdiction is upheld
the towns from the old First District with Gainza
and Milaor. As to the current Third District, 21. A petition for certiorari against actions of
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word the COMELEC is confined only to instances of
rename. Although the qualifier without a grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent
change in its composition was not found in and substantial denial of due process, because
Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), the COMELEC is presumed to be most
still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to competent in matters falling within its domain.
38
public use, should require an enabling law for
22. In a special civil action for certiorari, the its validity. However, Congress never enacted a
burden rests on the petitioner to prove not law to establish the DAP nor to authorize
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of release of public funds to implement the DAP.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of Thus, it is contended that DAP contravenes
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987
issuing the impugned order, decision or Constitution which states that [n]o money
resolution. Grave abuse of discretion arises shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
when a court or tribunal violates the pursuance of an appropriation made by law
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, the Court finds the The OSG posits, however, that no law was
COMELECs disquisitions to be amply supported necessary for the adoption and implementation
by the Constitution, law and jurisprudence. of the DAP because of its being neither a fund
nor an appropriation, but a program or an
10. Case Summary administrative system of prioritizing spending;
Araullo vs Aquino (2014) and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue
G.R. No. 209287 | 2014-07-01 of the authority of the President as the Chief
Subject: Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully
executed
Judicial Review; Philippine Budget System;
Section 25(5) and Section 29(1) of Article VI of The DBM also cited as legal bases for the DAPs
the 1987 Constitution; Impoundment; Equal use of savings (a) Section 25(5), Article VI of
Protection; Doctrine of Operative Fact the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the
President the authority to augment an item for
Facts: his office in the general appropriations law (b)
various sections of EO 292 (Administrative Code
Consolidated petitions assail the of 1987); and (c) the General Appropriations
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget provisions on the use of savings.
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) implementing the DAP. Held:
(2) Current operating expenditures: the (2) Specific Income (taxes, fines)
purchases of goods and services in current
consumption the benefit of which does not 16. In the Philippines, public revenues are
extend beyond the fiscal year. The two generally derived from the following sources, to
components of current expenditures are those wit:
for personal services (PS), and those for
maintenance and other operating expenses (1) Tax revenues (i.e., compulsory contributions
(MOOE). to finance government activities);
12. Public expenditures are also broadly (2) capital revenues (i.e., proceeds from sales
grouped according to their functions into: of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and
public domain, and gains on such sales like sale
(1)economic development of public lands, buildings and other structures,
expenditures (i.e.,expenditures on agriculture equipment, and other properties recorded as
and natural resources, transportation and fixed assets);
communications, commerce and industry, and
other economic development efforts); (3) Grants (i.e., voluntary contributions and aids
given to the Government for its operation on
(2)social services or social development specific purposes in the form of money and/or
expenditures (i.e., government outlay on materials, and do not require any monetary
education, public health and medicare, labor commitment on the part of the recipient);
and welfare and others);
(4) extra-ordinary income (i.e., repayment of
(3) general government or general public loans and advances made by government
services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the corporations and local governments and the
41
receipts and shares in income of the Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts); and 21. Based on this definition, it may be gleaned
that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
(5) public borrowings (i.e., proceeds of obligation and not the directive to
repayable obligations generally with interest pay.Practically speaking, the SARO does not
from domestic and foreign creditors of the have the direct and immediate effect of placing
Government in general, including the National public funds beyond the control of the
Government and its political subdivisions) disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even
be withdrawn under certain circumstances
Appropriation vs Allotments which will prevent the actual release of funds.
On the other hand, the actual release of funds
is brought about by the issuance of the Notice
17. Appropriation is the act by which Congress of Cash Allotment (NCA), which is subsequent
designates a particular fund, or sets apart a to the issuance of a SARO. (Belgica v. Executive
specified portion of the public revenue or of the Secretary)
money in the public treasury, to be applied to
some general object of governmental DAP
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or
expense. 22. DAP was designed as a stimulus package
intended to fast-track public spending and to
18. Allotments, which authorize an agency to push economic growth by investing on high-
enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. impact budgetary PAPs (program, activity or
Allotments are lesser in scope than project) to be funded from the savings
appropriations, in that the latter embrace the generated during the year as well as from
general legislative authority to spend. unprogrammed funds.
Allotments may be released in two forms
through a comprehensive Agency Budget DAP is not an appropriation measure;
Matrix (ABM), or, individually, by Special hence, no appropriation law is required to
Allotment Release Order (SARO). adopt or to implement it
Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for In July 2013, NBI began its probe into
Adjudication, Political Question, Locus allegations that the government has been
Standi, Res Judicata, Stare Decisis, Pork Barrel, defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10
Congressional Pork Barrel, Presidential Pork years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
Barrel, Mandamus, Right to Information, SARO, barrel of lawmakers and various government
Operative Fact Doctrine agencies for scores of ghost projects. The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits
Facts: of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos
taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of from the public coffers for ghost projects
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork using no fewer than 20 dummy non-
Barrel System. government organizations for an entire decade.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified 1. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo Constitution, judicial power operates only when
revealed that huge sums of government money there is an actual case or controversy.
went into the pockets of legislators as
kickbacks. 2. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which involves a conflict of
in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
nullification of the PDAF for being claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of any distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal difference or dispute.
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
46
either by Congress, through the passage of a
3. The Court finds that there exists an actual repealing law, or by the Court, through a
and justiciable controversy in these cases. The declaration of unconstitutionality
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is
clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of 8. Moreover, the Court will decide cases,
the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork otherwise moot, if: (a) there is a grave violation
Barrel System. Also, the challenged funds and of the Constitution; (b) the exceptional
the provisions allowing for their utilization character of the situation and the paramount
such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for public interest is involved; (c) when the
the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869 for the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
and operational; hence, there exists an bar, and the public; (d) the case is capable of
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as repetition yet evading review. All the four
a result of the unconstitutional use of these exceptions are applicable in this case.
public funds.
Political Question
Ripeness for Adjudication
9. The issues raised before the Court do not
4. Related to the requirement of an actual case present political but legal questions which are
or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, within its province to resolve. A political
meaning that the questions raised for question refers to those questions which, under
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for the Constitution, are to be decided by the
adjudication. A question is ripe for people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
adjudicationwhen the act being challenged has to which full discretionary authority has been
had a direct adverse effect on the individual delegated to the Legislature or executive
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that branch of the Government. It is concerned with
something had then been accomplished or issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
performed by either branch before a court may legality, of a particular measure.
come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or 10. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork
threatened injury to itself as a result of the Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon
challenged action the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the
5. The cases at present have not become moot. Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
A case becomes moot when there is no more act upon. More importantly, the present
actual controversy between the parties or no Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the right to exercise judicial power but
the merits. essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith
under the expanded concept of judicial power
6. The Court observes that respondents under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would Constitution
not terminate the controversy since said reform
is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the Locus Standi
2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct
subject matter, remains legally effective and 11. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
existing. any of his constitutional rights by the operation
of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
7. Neither will the Presidents declaration that
he had already abolished the PDAF render the 12. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the
issues on PDAF moot precisely because the requisite standing to question the validity of the
Executive branch of government has no existing Pork Barrel System under which the
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its taxes they pay have been and continue to be
legal existence. By constitutional design, the utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done unconstitutional usage of public funds.
47
of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases
13. Moreover, as citizens, petitiones have call for a more holistic examination of the entire
equally fulfilled the standing requirement given Pork Barrel System. The complexity of the
that the issues they have raised may be issues and the broader legal analyses herein
classified as matters of transcendental warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
importance, of overreaching significance to powerful countervailing reason against a
society, or of paramount public interest wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
Res Judicata (does not apply)
18. In addition, the Court observes that the
14. Res judicata means a matter adjudged. Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
The focal point of res judicata is inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
the judgment.The res judicata principle states similarly countervail against a full resort to
that a judgment on the merits in a previous stare decisis.
case rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, 19. As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the
between the first and second actions, there said case was dismissed on a procedural
exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, technicality and, hence, has not set any
and of causes of action. controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these
cases.
15. The res judicata principle cannot apply in
this case. The required identity is not present II. Substantive issues
since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively,
involved constitutional challenges against the Pork Barrel System
1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader 20. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as
constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel the collective body of rules and practices that
System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a govern the manner by which lump-sum,
dismissal based on a procedural technicality discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive
Stare Decisis (does not apply) branches of government, including its
members.
16. Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or
simply, stare decisis) means follow past 21. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
precedents and do not disturb what has been kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
settled. The focal point of stare decisis is
the doctrine created. The stare decisis (a) Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-
principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators,
Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake either individually or collectively organized into
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case committees, are able to effectively control
should be doctrinally applied to those that certain aspects of the funds utilization through
follow if the facts are substantially the same, various post-enactment measures and/or
even though the parties may be different. It practices.
proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing (b) Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-
considerations, like cases ought to be decided sum, discretionary fund which allows the
alike. President to determine the manner of its
utilization.
17. The Philconsa resolution was a limited
response to a separation of powers problem, Constitutionality of the Congressional
specifically on the propriety of conferring post- Pork Barrel
enactment identification authority to Members
48
22. The Supreme Court declared that
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent,
(PDAF) and its predecessor, the Countrywide the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
Development Fund said legislators, who are vested with post-
(CDF) are unconstitutional. enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves
23. The Supreme Court declared the Pork participate. Also, this very same concept of
Barrel System as unconstitutional on the post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
following grounds: Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF phases of project implementation renders them
Article, legislators have been authorized to susceptible to taking undue advantage of their
participate in the various operational aspects own office.
of budgeting, including the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities and (e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the
the regulation and release of funds, in 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-
violation of the separation of powers principle. executing due to the qualifying phrase as may
From the moment the law becomes effective, be defined by law. In this respect, said
any provision of law that empowers Congress or provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
any of its members to play any role in the judicially enforceable constitutional right but
implementation or enforcement of the law merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
violates the principle of separation of powers executive action.
and is thus unconstitutional.
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF
(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and office, without taking into account the specific
must be exercised only through legislation, interests and peculiarities of the district the
pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 legislator represents. As a result, a district
Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
has conferred unto legislators the power of gets the same amount of funding as a district
appropriation by giving them personal, representative of a far-flung rural province
discretionary funds from which they are able to which would be relatively underdeveloped
fund specific projects which they themselves compared to the former. This concept of
determine, it has violated the principle of non- legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
delegability of legislative power; conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs).
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-
enactment legislative identification feature, the Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely
flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 local nature, despite the existence of capable
Billion would be treated as a mere funding local institutions, it has likewise subverted
source allotted for multiple purposes of genuine local autonomy.
spending. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork
and purposes of the appropriation for further Barrel
determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be 24. While the designation of a determinate or
subject to the Presidents power of item veto. determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
Insofar as it has created a system of budgeting exist, the appropriation law must contain
wherein items are not textualized into the adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed delegates rule-making authority to the
procedure of presentment and, in the process, Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up
denied the President the power to veto items the details of the law for its enforcement,
49
known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) determined the purposes for the appropriation.
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual On the other hand, the Executive was
operation, referred to as contingent rule- responsive for the implementation of the
making. priority projects specified in the law. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the authority
25. The phrase and for such other purposes as given to the members of Congress is only to
may be hereafter directed by the President propose and identify projects to be
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue implemented by the President. Under the GAA
delegation of legislative power insofar as it of 1994, the President must examine whether
does not lay down a sufficient standard to the proposals submitted by the members of
adequately determine the limits of the Congress fall within the specific items of
Presidents authority with respect to the expenditures for which the CDF was set up, and
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may if qualified, the President next determines
be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the whether they are in line with other projects
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, proposed projects qualify for funding, it is the
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate President who shall implement them. The
public funds beyond the purview of the law. proposals and identifications made by the
members of Congress are merely
26. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the recommendatory.
President the power to appropriate
funds intended by law for energy-related In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the
purposes only to other purposes he may deem CDF is a recognition that individual members of
fit as well as other public funds under the broad Congress, far more than the President and their
classification of priority infrastructure congressional colleagues are likely o be
development projects, it has transgressed the knowledgeable about the needs of their
principle of non-delegability. respective constituents and the priority to be
given to each project.
Previous Rulings on PDAF/CDF
28. In Sarmiento v. Treasurer, G.R. Nos. 125680
27. In Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, & 126313, September 4, 2001, the petitioners
August 19, 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the questioned the constitutionality of the CDF
constitutionality of the then known Countrywide under the GAA of 1996. Seeking the reversal
Development Fund (CDF). The petitioners in the of Philconsa v. Enriquez, the petitioners alleged
said case claimed that the power given to the that the proposal and identification of projects
members of Congress to propose and identify by members of Congress were not merely
the projects and activites to be funded by the recommendatory considering that requests for
CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on releases of funds under the CDF are automically
executive power. They argued that the proposal released. The Solicitor General argued that
and identification of the projects do not involve since the questioned provision is basically the
the making of laws or the repeal and same provision found in the 1994 GAA held as
amendment thereof which is the only function constitutional by the Supreme Court
given to the Congress by the Constitution. in Philconsa v. Enriquez, the instant case should
be resolved in the same manner, following the
The Supreme Court held that the power of principle of stare decisis.
appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded The Supreme Court upheld the
under the appropriation law. It can be as constitutionality of the CDF under the
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to 1996 GAA.
be. The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and 29. In League Against Monopoly and Poverty
computers and other priority projects and (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and
activities and other credit facilities to qualified Management, G.R. 164987, April 21, 2012,
beneficiaries..." It was Congress itself that petitioners assailed the constitutionality and
50
legality of the implementation of the Priority Section 7, Article III (right of the people to
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as information on matters of public concern) of the
provided for in the GAA of 2004. According to 1987 Constitution.
the petitioners, the provision in the GAA as
regards the PDAF is silent and therefore 32. The court denied the prayer of petitioner on
prohibits an automatic allocation of lump sums procedural grounds. The proper remedy to
to individual senators and congressmen for invoke the right to information is to file
funding of projects. It does not give the a petition for mandamus. Citing Legaspi vs CSC:
individual members of Congress the mandate the duty to disclose the information of public
to propose, select and identify programs and concern, and to afford access to public records
projects to be funded out of PDAF. The cannot be discretionary on the part of said
petitioners submitted that such a situation agencies. Xxx The constitutional duty, not
violates the principle of separation of powers being discretionary, its performance may be
because in receiving and thereafter spending compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper
funds for their chosen projects, the members of case
Congress in effect intruded into an executive
function. Further, the authority to propose and 33. Moreover, in the case of Valmonte v.
select projects does not pertain to legislation. It Belmonte Jr., it has been clarified that the right
is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of to information does not include the right to
constitutional sanction and therefore compel the preparation of lists, abstracts,
impermissible and must be considered nothing summaries and the like. In the same case, it
less than malfeasance. was stressed that it is essential that the
applicant has a well defined, clear and certain
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality legal right to the thing demanded and that it is
of the PDAF. The Court stated that no the imperative duty of defendant to perform
convincing proof was presented showing that, the act required. Hence, without the foregoing
indeed there were direct releases of funds to substantiations, the Court cannot grant a
members of Congresss, who actually spent particular request for information.
them according to their sole discretion. Not
even a documentation of the disbursement of 34. In these cases, aside from the fact that
funds by the DBM in favor of the members of none of the petitions are in the nature of
Congres was presented by the petitioner to mandamus actions, the Court finds that
convince the Court to probe into the truth of petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-
their claims. The Court further stated that the defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
authority granted to members of Congress to furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the
propose and select projects was already upheld DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List
in Philconsa v. Enriquez, and there is no need to and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did
review or reverse the pronouncements made in petitioners assert any law or administrative
said case so long as there is no showing of a issuance which would form the bases of the
direct participation of legislators in the actual latters duty to furnish them with the
spending of the budget. documents requested
37. In response to the Courts September 10, 41. the Courts pronouncement anent the
2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article
remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
the DBM issued Circular 2013-8 which Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
authorized the continued implementation and thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such
disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
are: (a) covered by a Special Allotment Release the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and
Order (SARO); and (b) that said SARO had been (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
obligated by the implementing agency development projects" under Section 12 of PD
concerned prior to the issuance of the Courts 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be
September 10, 2013 TRO. treated as prospective in effect in view of the
operative fact doctrine.
38. As to the issue of lifting the TRO, the
present decision has rendered it moot and
academic. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 42. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the
PDAF Article as declared herein has the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
consequential effect of converting the appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
temporary injunction into a permanent one. certain legislative or executive act, such act is
Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
the release of the remaining PDAF funds for obedience and respect and should be properly
2013, among others, is now permanently enforced and complied with.
enjoined.
12. Case Summary
39. As to the coverage and application of the Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
TRO, the Court agreed with the petitioners Secretary
position that "the issuance of the SARO does G.R. No. 83896 | 1991-02-22
not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the Subject:
issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA).
As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple
by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined. Offices; Positions held in Ex-Officio capacity; De
A SARO only evinces the existence of an Facto Officers; Statutory Construction of
obligation and not the directive to pay. Constitutional Prohibitions
Practically speaking, the SARO does not have
the direct and immediate effect of placing Facts:
public funds beyond the control of the
disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even (Former) President Corazon Aquino issued
be withdrawn under certain circumstances Executive Order No. 284, allowing appointive
which will prevent the actual release of funds officials of the Executive Department (members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
40. Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, assistant secretaries) to hold, in addition to his
public funds should not be treated as funds primary position, not more than two positions in
which have been "released." In this respect, the government and government corporations
therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF and receive the corresponding compensation
funds which are only covered by obligated therefor.
SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decisions The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently is being challenged by petitioners on the
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the principal submission that it adds exceptions to
general fund Section 13, Article VII other than those provided
in the Constitution.
52
Members of Congress, members of the civil
Petitioners further argue that the exception to service in general and members of the armed
the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
on the Civil Service Commission applies to Constitution to treat the President and his
officers and employees of the Civil Service in official family as a class by itself and to impose
general and that said exceptions do not apply upon said class stricter prohibitions.
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article
VII which applies specifically to the President, 5. While all other appointive officials in the civil
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and service are allowed to hold other office or
their deputies or assistants. employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
Held: primary functions of their positions,members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
Constitutionality of EO 284 do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
1. By ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, 6. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may meant to lay down the general rule applicable
hold in addition to their primary position to not to all elective and appointive public officials and
more than two positions in the government and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
government corporations, EO 284 actually meant to be the exception applicable only to
allows them to hold multiple offices or the President, the Vice-President, Members of
employment in direct contravention to the the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from Exception to Prohibition on Multiple
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Offices
Constitution itself.
7. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
Constitutional Prohibition on Holding is not to be interpreted as covering positions
Multiple Offices held without additional compensation in ex-
officio capacities as provided by law and as
2. The prohibition imposed on the President and required by the primary functions of the
his official family is all-embracing and covers concerned official's office, namely:
both public and private office or employment.
(a)the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
3. It is quite notable that in all Constitutional (2), Article VII; or
provisions on disqualifications to hold other
office or employment, the prohibition pertains (b) the Vice-President acting as President in
to an office or employment in the those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
government and government-owned or (2) and (3), Article VII;
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In
striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, (c) the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
Article VII which states that (T)he President, member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this 8. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
Constitution, hold any other office or virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
employment during their tenure. derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual
4. These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions character, but rather annexed to the official
imposed on the President and his official family, position."
which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on
other public officials or employees such as the 9. An ex-officio member of a board is one who
53
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in
office, and without further warrant or Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
appointment. To illustrate, by express provision obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the
of law, the Secretary of Transportation and framers of the Constitution as to when the high-
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of ranking officials of the Executive Branch from
the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one
the Light Rail Transit Authority. hand, and the generality of civil servants from
the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary
De Facto Officers downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during their
10. During their tenure in the questioned tenure.
positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such 16. The Court in construing a constitution
entitled to emoluments for actual services should bear in mind the object sought to be
rendered. accomplished by its adoption and the evils if
any sought to be prevented or remedied. A
11. It has been held that in cases where there doubtful provision will be examined in the light
is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in of the history of the times and the condition
good faith has had possession of the office and and circumstances under which the
has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is Constitution was framed.
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office,
and may in an appropriate action recover the 17. Moreover, it is a well-established rule in
salary, fees and other compensations attached constitutional construction that no one
to the office. provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but
12. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that subject are to be brought into view and to be so
the public should benefit by the services of an interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
officer de facto and then be freed from all of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
liability to pay any one for such services. particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
13. Any per diem, allowances or other purpose of the Constitution and one section is
emoluments received by the respondents by not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
virtue of actual services rendered in the reasonable construction, the two can be made
questioned positions may therefore be retained to stand together.
by them.
18. In other words, the court must harmonize
Statutory Construction them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word
14. The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise operative, rather than one which may make the
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, words idle and nugatory
Article VII cannot possible refer to the broad
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX- 19. Moreover, wherever the language used in
B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
qualifying phrase as such would render understood as intended to be a positive and
nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution otherwise provided in this Constitution" must
to impose a stricter prohibition on the be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
President, Vice-President, Members of the those particular instances cited in the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with Constitution itself.
respect to holding other offices or employment
in the government during their tenure. 13. Case Summary
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the
15. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 Philippines (2012)
54
G.R. No.
196271/196305/197221/197280/197282/19739 (b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If
2/197454 | 2012-02-28 so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite
Subject: Synchronization mandate for national requirements?
and local elections includes ARMM elections;
Autonomous regions like the ARMM are (c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054
classified as local governments; Elections held constitutional?
in autonomous regions are considered as local
elections; R.A. No. 10153 does not amend R.A. (d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call
No. 9054; Supermajority vote requirement for special elections in ARMM?
makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law which is
constitutionally prohibited; Not every (e) Does granting the President the power to
amendment to the ARMM Organic Act requires appoint OICs violate the elective and
ratification by means of a plebiscite (The representative nature of ARMM regional
plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 is overly legislative and executive offices?
broad and therefore unconstitutional); Congress
has no authority to extend the three-year term (f) Does the appointment power granted to the
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. President exceed the Presidents supervisory
9054; COMELEC has no authority to hold special powers over autonomous
elections; Presidents power to appoint OICs
under RA 10153 covers both appointive and Held:
elective positions in the ARMM; Power to
appoint OICs is not incompatible with the Synchronization mandate for national and
Presidents power of supervision over local local elections includes ARMM elections
governments and autonomous regions; RA No.
10153 is an interim measure; Executive is not 1. While the Constitution does not expressly
bound by the principle of judicial courtesy instruct Congress to synchronize the national
and local elections, the intention can be
Facts: inferred from the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
On October 18, 2011, the Supreme Court issued particularly Sec 1, 2 and 5. The court came to
a Decision where it upheld the constitutionality the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission
of Republic Act No. 10153. on Elections, where the court unequivocally
stated that the Constitution has mandated
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronized national and local elections.
synchronization, RA 10153 postponed the
regional elections in the Autonomous Region in 2. That the ARMM elections were not expressly
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of Constitution on synchronization cannot be
August 2011) to the second Monday of interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections
May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power are not covered by the constitutional mandate
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to of synchronization. We have to consider
temporarily assume these positions upon the that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet
expiration of the terms of the elected officials. been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by the
Hence, the present motions for reconsideration people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is
filed by petitioners. The motions raise the not intended to provide merely for the
following questions: exigencies of a few years but is to endure
through generations for as long as it remains
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,
synchronization of ARMM regional elections a constitution should be construed in the light
with national and local elections? of what actually is a continuing instrument to
govern not only the present but also the
55
unfolding events of the indefinite future. in autonomous regions are also considered as
Although the principles embodied in a local elections.
constitution remain fixed and unchanged from
the time of its adoption, a constitution must be 8. In construing provisions of the Constitution,
construed as a dynamic process intended to the first rule is verba legis, that is, wherever
stand for a great length of time, to be possible, the words used in the Constitution
progressive and not static. must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. Applying
Autonomous regions like the ARMM are this principle to determine the scope of local
classified as local governments elections, we refer to the meaning of the word
local, as understood in its ordinary sense. As
3. Article X of the Constitution, entitled Local defined in Websters Third New International
Government, clearly shows the intention of the Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to
Constitution to classify autonomous regions, something that primarily serves the needs of a
such as the ARMM, as local governments. particular limited district, often a community or
Section 1 of Article X provides: minor political subdivision. Obviously, the
ARMM elections, which are held within the
Section 1. The territorial and political confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines Mindanao, fall within this definition.
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions 9. To be sure, the fact that the ARMM
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as possesses more powers than other provinces,
hereinafter provided. cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to
treat the ARMM regional elections differently
4. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the from the other local elections. Ubi lex non
enumeration of political subdivisions of the distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When
State under the heading Local Government the law does not distinguish, we must not
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent distinguish.
to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments. R.A. No. 10153 does not amend R.A. No.
9054
5. That the Constitution mentions only the
national government and the local 10. Petitioners insist that the provisions of RA
governments, and does not make a distinction No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections,
between the local government and the amend RA No. 9054.
regional government, is particularly revealing,
betraying as it does the intention of the framers 11. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals
of the Constitution to consider the autonomous that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
regions not as separate forms of government, elections; it does not provide the date for the
but as political units which, while having more succeeding regular ARMM elections. In fixing
powers and attributes than other local the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to
government units, still remain under the the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
category of local governments. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054,
and do not change or revise any provision in RA
Elections held in autonomous regions are No. 9054.
considered as local elections
12. The clear intention of Congress is to treat
6. The petitioners argue that the ARMM the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
elections are not covered by the ARMM elections as separate and distinct from
synchronization mandate since they are the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
regional elections and not local elections. consistently with this intent when it passed RA
No. 10153 without requiring compliance with
7. Since autonomous regions are classified as the amendment prerequisites embodied in
local governments, it follows that elections held
56
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. plenary legislative power of succeeding
9054. Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold
than what the Constitution requires to enact,
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed
No. 9054 an irrepealable law which is fixing such a higher vote threshold because
constitutionally prohibited Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation,
to amend the Constitution.
13. Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but
merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is Not every amendment to the ARMM
no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the Organic Act requires ratification by means
amendment requirements set forth in Article of a plebiscite (The plebiscite requirement
XVII of RA No. 9054. in RA No. 9054 is overly broad and
therefore unconstitutional)
14. Even so, the supermajority vote
requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII 19. Petitioners' contention that the plebiscite
of RA No. 9054 ( i.e., 2/3 vote from the House of requirement applies to all amendments of RA
Representatives and the Senate, voting No. 9054 is also struck down for being
separately) is unconstitutional for violating the an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite
principle that Congress cannot pass requirement set forth in the Constitution.
irrepealable laws.
20. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
15. The power of the legislature to make laws provides that the creation of the autonomous
includes the power to amend and repeal these region shall be effective when approved
laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
laws, the Court has the duty to strike down
such act for interfering with the plenary powers 21. We interpreted this to mean that only
of Congress. amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of
16. Every legislative body may modify or autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
abolish the acts passed by itself or its specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
predecessors. This power of repeal may be Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
exercised at the same session at which the require ratification through a plebiscite. We
original act was passed; and even while a bill is stand by this interpretation.
in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a 22. For if we were to go by the petitioners
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures Constitution that all amendments to the
or the effect of subsequent legislation upon Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite
existing statutes. (see Duarte v. Dade) requirement before becoming effective, this
would lead to impractical and illogical results
17. Under our Constitution, each House of hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding
Congress has the power to approve bills by Congress from enacting laws that timely
a mere majority vote,provided there is quorum. address problems as they arise in the region, as
In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 well as weighing down the ARMM government
to comply with a higher voting requirement (2/3 with the costs that unavoidably follow the
vote) than what the Constitution provides, holding of a plebiscite.
Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly
violated the very principle established 23. It is posited that that Sec 3 of RA No.
in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature 10153, in giving the President the power to
is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands appoint OICs to take the place of the elective
of, future legislatures. . officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental
change in the basic structure of the
18. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the government, and thus requires compliance with
57
the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No.
9054. The court disagrees. The said provision 29. In the past, the court has recognized the
clearly preserves the basic structure of the validity of holdover provisions in various laws.
ARMM regional government when it recognizes One significant difference is that while these
the offices of the ARMM regional government past cases all refer to
and directs the OICs who shall temporarily elective barangay or sangguniang
assume these offices to perform the functions kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
pertaining to the said offices. explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials -
Congress has no authority to extend the the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor,
three-year term limit by inserting a and the members of the Regional Legislative
holdover provision in RA No. 9054 Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-
year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
24. Petitioners are one in defending the Constitution.
constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA
No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to 30. Even assuming that a holdover is
remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. constitutionally permissible, and there had
The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM been statutory basis for it, the rule of holdover
regional officials should be allowed to remain in can only apply as an available option where no
their respective positions until the May 2013 express or implied legislative intent to the
elections since there is no specific provision in contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
the Constitution which prohibits regional contrary intent is evident.
elective officials from performing their duties in
a holdover capacity. 31. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has
25. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution clearly acted within its discretion when it
provides: deleted the holdover option under RA 9054.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local COMELEC has no authority to hold special
officials, except barangay officials, which shall elections
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three 32. The Constitution has merely empowered
consecutive terms. the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an
26. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of election. Although the legislature, under the
the Constitution expresses the intent of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang
framers of the Constitution to categorically set (BP) 881), has granted the COMELEC the power
a limitation on the period within which all to postpone elections to another date, this
elective local officials can occupy their offices. power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law.
27. Elective ARMM officials are also local Specifically, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP
officials,thus, they are bound by the three-year 881 address instances where elections have
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. already been scheduled to take place but do
not occur or had to be suspended because of
28. It is irrelevant that the Constitution does unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
not expressly prohibit elective officials from such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other
acting in a holdover capacity. Short of analogous circumstances.
amending the Constitution, Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by 33. In contrast, the ARMM elections
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
Thus, the term of three years for local officials constitutional mandate of synchronization of
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the national and local elections. Obviously, this
Constitution, and cannot be extended by does not fall under any of the circumstances
holdover by Congress.
58
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP appointments the President can make are
881. enumerated in a singlesentence, the 1987
Constitution enumerates the various
34. More importantly, RA No. 10153 has appointments the President is empowered to
already fixed the date for the next ARMM make and divides the enumeration
elections and the COMELEC has no authority to in two sentences. The change in style is
set a different election date. significant; in providing for this change, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought
35. Even assuming that the COMELEC has the to make a distinction between the first group of
authority to hold special elections, and this presidential appointments and the second
Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there group of presidential appointments.
is still the problem of having to shorten the
terms of the newly elected officials in order to 39. The first group of presidential
synchronize the ARMM elections with the May appointments: the heads of the executive
2013 national and local elections. Obviously, departments, ambassadors, other public
neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed
authority to do this, amounting as it does to an Forces, and other officers whose appointments
amendment of Section 8, Article X of the are vested in the President by the Constitution,
Constitution, which limits the term of local pertains to the appointive officials who have to
officials to three years. be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
Presidents power to appoint OICs under
RA 10153 covers both appointive and 40. The second group of officials the President
elective positions in the ARMM can appoint are all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
36. It is argued that the Presidents power to otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
appoint pertains only to appointive positions he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
and cannot extend to positions held by elective second sentence acts as the catch-all
officials. provision for the Presidents appointment
power, in recognition of the fact that the power
37. The power to appoint has traditionally been to appoint is essentially executive in nature. In
recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, other words, where there are offices which have
Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad to be filled, but the law does not provide the
strokes the extent of this power, thus: process for filling them, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the President to fill the
Section 16. The President shall nominate office by appointment.
and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the 41. Any limitation on or qualification to the
executive departments, ambassadors, other exercise of the Presidents appointment power
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the should be strictly construed and must be clearly
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval stated in order to be recognized. Given that
captain, and other officers whose appointments the President derives his power to appoint OICs
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall in the ARMM regional government from law, it
also appoint all other officers of the falls under the classification of
Government whose appointments are not presidentialappointments covered by the
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Constitution. The Presidents appointment
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of Power to appoint OICs is not incompatible
departments, agencies, commissions, or with the Presidents power of supervision
boards. over local governments and autonomous
regions
38. While in the 1935 Constitution, the various
59
national and local elections. In other words,
42. There is no incompatibility between the given the plain unconstitutionality of providing
Presidents power of supervision over local for a holdover and the unavailability of
governments and autonomous regions, and the constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
power granted to the President to appoint OICs. shortening the term of the elected ARMM
officials, is the choice of the Presidents power
43. The power of supervision is defined as the to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an
power of a superior officer to see to it that interim measure, and as allowed under Section
lower officers perform their functions in 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
accordance with law. This is distinguished from unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for
the power of control or the power of an officer Congress to make?
to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the 47. The grant to the President of the power to
performance of his duties and to substitute the appoint OICs in place of the elective members
judgment of the former for the latter. of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither
novel nor innovative. The power granted to the
44. The petitioners apprehension regarding President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint
the Presidents alleged power of control over members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
the OICs is rooted in their belief that the is comparable to the power granted by BP 881
Presidents appointment power includes the (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to
power to remove these officials at will. fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional
However, Section 3 of RA No. 10153 clearly Legislative Assembly (then called
provides that once the President has appointed the Sangguniang Pampook)
the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Regional 48. While synchronization will temporarily
Legislative Assembly, these same officials will disrupt the election process in a local
remain in office until they are replaced by the community, however, the adoption of this
duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. measure is a matter of necessity in order to
Nothing in this provision even hints that the comply with a mandate that the Constitution
President has the power to recall the itself has set out.
appointments he already made.
Executive is not bound by the principle of
RA No. 10153 is an interim measure judicial courtesy
45. Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily 49. Several petitioners question the propriety
to heed the constitutional mandate to of the appointment by the President of Mujiv
synchronize the ARMM regional elections with Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon
the national and local elections. To do this, as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They
Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM argue that since our previous decision was
elections for another date, leaving it with the based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with numerous motions for reconsideration filed by
governance in the intervening period, between the parties, the President, in recognition of the
the expiration of the term of those elected in principle of judicial courtesy, should have
August 2008 and the assumption to office 21 refrained from implementing our decision until
months away of those who will win in the we have ruled with finality on this case.
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
50. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is
46. In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an based on the hierarchy of courts and applies
interim measure, enacted to respond to the only to lower courts in instances where, even if
adjustment that synchronization requires. Given there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO
the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by issued by a higher court, it would be proper for
the standard of reasonableness in responding a lower court to suspend its proceedings for
to the challenges brought about by practical and ethical considerations. In other
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the words, the principle of judicial courtesy
60
applies where there is a strong probability that exceed one year; Ad-interim appointments vs.
the issues before the higher court would be Appointments in an acting capacity
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower Facts:
court or court of origin. Consequently, The Senate and the House of Representatives
this principle cannot be applied to the ("Congress") commenced their regular session
President, who represents a co-equal branch of on July 26, 2004. The Commission on
government. To suggest otherwise would be to Appointments, composed of Senators and
disregard the principle of separation of powers, Representatives, was constituted on August 25,
on which our whole system of government is 2004.
founded upon.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo, through Executive
51. Secondly, the fact that our previous Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita),
decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does issued appointments to respondents
not, and cannot, have the effect of making our as acting secretaries of their respective
ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless departments. Respondents took their oath of
of how close the voting is, so long as there is office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
concurrence of the majority of the members of
the en banc who actually took part in the On September 8, 2004, Senator Aquilino Q.
deliberations of the case, a decision garnering Pimentel, Jr., together with other senators, filed
only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a the present petition for certiorari and
decision of the Supreme Court en banc and prohibition to declare unconstitutional the
must be respected as such. The petitioners are, appointments issued by President Arroyo to
therefore, not in any position to speculate that, respondents as acting secretaries of their
based on the voting, the probability exists that respective departments.
their motion for reconsideration may be
granted. Congress adjourned on September 22, 2004.
On September 23, 2004, President Arroyo
52. We agree with the petitioner that the lifting issued ad interim appointments to respondents
of a TRO can be included as a subject of a as secretaries of the departments to which they
motion for reconsideration filed to assail our were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
decision. It does not follow, however, that the
TRO remains effective until after we have The petition questions the constitutionality of
issued a final and executory decision. Unlike President Arroyo's appointment of respondents
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance cited by as acting secretaries without the consent of the
petitioners, in the present case, we expressly Commission on Appointments (CoA) while
lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011. Congress is in session.
There is, therefore, no legal impediment to
prevent the President from exercising his Held:
authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor
and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in Courts will decide a question, even if
RA No. 10153. rendered moot, if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review
14. Case Summary
Pimentel vs. Ermita (2005) 1. The Solicitor General argues that the
G.R. No. 164978 | 2005-10-13 petition is moot because President Arroyo had
extended to respondentsad
Subject: Courts will decide a question, even if interim appointments on 23 September 2004
rendered moot, if it is capable of repetition yet immediately after the recess of Congress.
evading review; Power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature; Lack of standing of 2. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to
petitioners as members of Congress; enjoin acts already done. However, as an
Appointment of department secretaries in an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will
acting capacity; Acting appointments cannot decide a question otherwise moot if it is
61
capable of repetition yet evading review. In the appointments while Congress is in session
present case, the mootness of the petition does impairs no power of Congress.
not bar its resolution. The question of the
constitutionality of the President's appointment 6. Among the petitioners, only the following
of department secretaries in an acting capacity are members of the Commission on
while Congress is in session will arise in every Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator
such appointment. Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson
as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator
Power to appoint is essentially executive Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator
in nature Osmea as members. Thus, on the impairment
of the prerogatives of members of the
3. The power to appoint is essentially Commission on Appointments, only Senators
executive in nature, and the legislature may not Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and
interfere with the exercise of this executive Osmea have standing in the present petition.
power except in those instances when the This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel,
Constitution expressly allows it to Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to vigilant in protecting their perceived
appoint are construed strictly against the prerogatives as members of Congress, possess
legislature. The scope of the legislature's no standing in the present petition.
interference in the executive's power to appoint
is limited to the power to prescribe the Appointment of department secretaries in
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress an acting capacity
cannot appoint a person to an office in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. 7. The essence of an appointment in an acting
Neither may Congress impose on the President capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
the duty to appoint any particular person to an measure intended to fill an office for a limited
office. time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an
4. Even if the Commission on Appointments is office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
composed of members of Congress, the such as the office of a department secretary,
exercise of its powers is executive and not the President must necessarily appoint an alter
legislative. The Commission on Appointments ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
does not legislate when it exercises its power to permanent appointee of her choice could
give or withhold consent to presidential assume office.
appointments. The Commission on
Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. 8. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on
Although its membership is confined to the President the obligation to appoint
members of Congress, said Commission is automatically the undersecretary as her
independent of Congress. The powers of the temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
Commission do not come from Congress, but temporary or permanent, holds a position of
emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
the functions of the Commissioner are purely cannot impose on the President who her alter
executive in nature. ego should be.
21. It is in pursuance of that intention that the 25. To repeat, the affidavit is required of
Commission provided for Section 2 immediately immigrants and permanent residents abroad
66
because by their status in their host countries, said to be completely separable and distinct
they are presumed to have relinquished their from the regular system of voting, and to be a
intent to return to this country; thus, without new and different manner of voting from that
the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment previously known, and an exception to the
of Philippine domicile shall remain. customary and usual manner of voting. The
right of absentee and disabled voters to cast
26. It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) their ballots at an election is purely
does not only require an affidavit or a promise statutory; absentee voting was unknown to,
to "resume actual physical permanent and not recognized at, the common law. xxx
residence in the Philippines not later than three Such statutes are regarded as conferring a
years from approval of his/her registration," the privilege and not a right, or an absolute
Filipinos abroad must also declare that they right. (citing 29 C.J.S. 575-577)
have not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, they must return to the 30. When the legislature chooses to grant the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return right by statute, it must operate with equality
"shall be cause for the removal" of their names among all the class to which it is granted; but
"from the National Registry of Absentee Voters statutes of this nature may be limited in their
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote application to particular types of elections. xxx
in absentia." they should also be construed in the light of the
circumstances under which they were enacted.
27. Indeed, the probability that after an Further, in passing on statutes regulating
immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he absentee voting, the court should look to the
shall opt to remain in his host country beyond whole and every part of the election laws, the
the third year from the execution of the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit
affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for of their adoption, and try to give effect to every
this Court to determine the wisdom of a portion thereof. (citing 29 C.J.S. 575-577)
legislative exercise. As expressed in Taada vs.
Tuvera, the Court is not called upon to rule on In election laws, residence is considered
the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify synonymous with domicile
it if we find it impractical.
31. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident
28. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
components of the system of overseas time, both a resident and an absentee.
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. However, under our election laws and the
The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the countless pronouncements of the Court
affidavit is deemed to have retained his pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not attached to his residence in the Philippines
to have lost his domicile by his physical as residence is considered synonymous
absence from this country. His having become with domicile.
an immigrant or permanent resident of his host
country does not necessarily imply an 32. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that
abandonment of his intention to return to his "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
under the law, he must be given the natural persons is their place of habitual
opportunity to express that he has not actually residence." In Ong vs. Republic, this court took
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by the concept of domicile to mean an individuals
executing the affidavit required by Sections "permanent home," "a place to which,
5(d) and 8(c) of the law. whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on facts
Absentee Voting, being an exception to and circumstances in the sense that they
the regular form of voting, is purely a disclose intent."
statutory privilege
33. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes
29. The method of absentee voting has been the twin elements : (1) the fact of residing or
67
physical presence in a fixed place and
(2) animus manendi, or the intention of 38. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be
returning there permanently. repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as Sec 18.5 totally
34. Residence, in its ordinary conception, disregarded the authority given to Congress by
implies the factual relationship of an individual the Constitution to proclaim the winning
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of candidates for the positions of president and
a person in a given area, community or country. vice-president.
The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the 39. Section 18.5 of RA 9189 is far too sweeping
intent to leave when the purpose for which the that it necessarily includes the proclamation of
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may the winning candidates for the presidency and
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, the vice-presidency. It clashes with paragraph
business, or health. If a persons intent be to 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is which provides that the returns of every
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it election for President and Vice-President shall
is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal be certified by the board of canvassers to
for an individual to have different residences in Congress.
various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various 40. The provisions of the Constitution as the
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile fundamental law of the land should be read as
in favor of another domicile of choice. part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
35. There is a difference between domicile and and the proclamation of the winning candidates
residence. Residence is used to indicate a for president and vice-president for the entire
place of abode, whether permanent or nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, Sections 19 and 25 of RA 9189 are
one has the intention of returning. A man may unconstitutional --Congress may not
have a residence in one place and a domicile in intrude into the independence of the
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile COMELEC by exercising supervisory
is residence coupled with the intention to powers over its rule-making authority.
remain for an unlimited time. (see Uytengsu vs.
Republic) 41. Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of
R.A. No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article IX-A of
36. The registration of a voter in a place other the Constitution which provides that
than his residence of origin has not been Constitutional Commissions shall
deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or be independent . Particularly, the creation of
loss of such residence of origin. the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and
Section 18.5 of RA 9189 is approve the Implementing Rules and
unconstitutional insofar as it enables the Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC
Comelec to ususrp the duty of Congress to intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC
proclaim the winning candidates, for which, as a constitutional body, is not under the
president and vice-president. control of either the executive or legislative
departments of government; and that should
37. Section 4 of RA 9189 provides that the the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate
overseas absentee voter may vote for any law, it is the Court that has the power to
president, vice-president, senators and party- review the same via the petition of any
list representatives. Section 18.5 of the same interested party, including the legislators.
law empowers the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates, including 42. Section 25 of RA 9189 provides for the
that for president and vice-president. creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC). Composed of Senators and
68
Members of the House of Representatives, the not confer upon itself the authority to approve
JCOC is a purely legislative body. However, or disapprove the countries wherein voting by
aside from its monitoring and evaluation mail shall be allowed, as determined by the
functions, RA 9189 gives to the JCOC the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided
following functions: (a) to "review, revise, for in Section 17.1 of RA 9189. Otherwise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules Congress would overstep the bounds of its
and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the constitutional mandate and intrude into the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject independence of the COMELEC.
to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the
voting by mail in not more than three countries In summary:
for the May 2004 elections and in any country
determined by COMELEC. A. Section 5(d) is CONSTITUTIONAL
43. Once a law is enacted and approved, the B. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
legislative function is deemed accomplished CONSTITUTIONAL with respect only to the
and complete. The legislative function may authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the
spring back to Congress relative to the same winning candidates for the Senators and party-
law only if that body deems it proper to review, list representatives but UNCONSTITUTIONAL
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to with respect to the power to canvass the votes
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of and proclaim the winning candidates for
the COMELEC. President and Vice-President which is lodged
with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
44. By vesting itself with the powers to Constitution.
approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, C. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
Congress went beyond the scope of its declared VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
constitutional authority. Congress trampled being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the
upon the constitutional mandate of Constitution mandating the independence of
independence of the COMELEC. Hence, the constitutional commission, such as COMELEC:
second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee the approval of the Joint Congressional
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," Oversight Committee;"
and the second sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section
review, revise, amend and approve the 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of
Implementing Rules and Regulations the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
promulgated by the Commission," should be
stricken out of the statute for constitutional c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of
infirmity. Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
45. Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the Congressional Oversight Committee created by
approval of the Congressional Oversight virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and
Committee" in the first sentence of Section
17.1 which empowers the Commission to d) The second sentence in the second
authorize voting by mail in not more than three paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review,
countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the revise, amend and approve the Implementing
phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" Commission" of the same law;
found in the second paragraph of the same
section are unconstitutional as they require 16. Case Summary
review and approval of voting by mail in any Matibag v. Benipayo (2002)
country after the 2004 elections. Congress may G.R. No. 149036 | 2002-04-02
69
alter its permanent character. The Constitution
Subject: itself makes such ad interim appointment
permanent by making it effective until
Ad interim appointment, Commission on disapproved by the COA or until the next
Elections, Commission on Appointments adjournment of Congress.
Facts: While the case was still with the COMELEC First
Division, or on May 8, 2004, the COMELEC en
Petitioner Miles Roces and former Congressman banc issuedResolution No. 6823, declaring
Harry Ang Ping filed their respective certificates moot Mr. Ang Ping's Affidavit of Withdrawal,
of candidacy (COCs) for the position of denying due course to the substitute COC of
Representative for the 3rd Congressional Mrs. Ang Ping and ordering the deletion of Mr.
District of Manila in the May 2004 elections. Ang Ping's name from the certified list of
candidates. Among the signatories to the
A registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Resolution were Commissioners Javier, Borra,
Gomez questioned Mr. Ang Ping's candidacy and Garcilliano of the COMELEC First
before the COMELEC through a petition to deny Division before which the petition to deny due
due course or cancel his COC. The petition course was still pending.
alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented
himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence was The spouses Ang Ping repaired to the Supreme
disqualified for the position. Court and filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for temporary restraining order assailing
Acting for the COMELEC First Division, COMELEC Resolution No. 6823.
Commissioner Garcilliano issued an order on
April 30, 2004 scheduling the promulgation of On the election day itself, the Manila City Board
its resolution on May 5, 2004. Two days of Canvassers (BOC) resolved not to canvass
before the scheduled promulgation or on May 3, the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping citing
2004, Mr. Ang Ping filed with the COMELEC a COMELEC Resolution No. 6823. After counting
Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC. only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered
The next day, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, voters in the district, the Manila BOC
the political party of Mr. Ang Ping, sought that proclaimed Roces as winner on May 15, 2004.
Mr. Ang Ping's wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping (Mrs.
Ang Ping), substitute for him. Mr. Ang Ping also Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad
filed a motion to dismiss the petition to deny Cautelam with the House of Representatives
due course or cancel his COC. Electoral Tribunal (HRET) challenging COMELEC
Resolution No. 6823. Roces filed his answer
On May 5, 2004, Commissioner Borra deferred alleging that the HRET has no jurisdiction over
the promulgation for lack of quorum. the case.
The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution The Supreme Court dismissed the certiorari
76
petition in view of the pending HRET determine the controversy presented, and the
protest filed by Mrs. Ang Ping. Thereafter, Mrs. right to decide whether that state of facts exists
Ang Ping filed in the HRET a motion to convert which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other
the ad cautelam protest to a regular protest. matters which arise in the case legitimately
The motion was granted. before it. Accordingly, it has the power to hear
and determine, or inquire into, the question of
In the HRET, Roces filed a motion to dismiss the its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to
protest, assailing in the main the personality of subject matter, and to decide all questions,
Mrs. Ang Ping to file the protest. The HRET whether of law or fact, the decision of which is
denied Roces's motion to dismiss. It ruled that necessary to determine the question of
Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to file the jurisdiction. One of the three essential elements
protest against Roces since there was no final of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be
COMELEC resolution disqualifying or denying present. Consequently, the HRET merely
due course to the COC of Mr. Ang Ping, thus her exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled
substitution for the latter was legally that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to
permissible under the Omnibus Election Code. contest the election of Roces.
Also, she was one of the candidates voted for
during election day 3. In order to support his motion to dismiss,
Roces offered as evidence the COMELEC
Roces then filed the present petition resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang
for certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Ping's COC. In doing so, Roces submitted to the
HRET. The issues for resolutionare: HRET the admissibility and validity of these
resolutions and the HRET cannot be faulted in
(1) whether or not the HRET committed grave reviewing the said resolutions especially for the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess purpose of determining whether Roces was able
of jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping to discharge his burden of proving that Mrs.
is a proper party to file the election protest Ang Ping is not the proper party to assail his
despite the denial in due course and election. In passing upon the COMELEC
cancellation of her COC under COMELEC resolutions especially for that purpose, it
Resolution No. 6823; and cannot be said that the HRET usurped the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
(2) whether or not HRET has jurisdiction to
review a resolution or order of the COMELEC Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest
and/or declare the same as void and disregard the election of Roces
or set it aside.
4. The HRET did not abuse its discretion in
Held: holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to
contest the election of Roces.
HRET has the power to determine whether
it has jurisdiction over the controversy 5. Under COMELEC rules of procedure, the
promulgation of a decision or resolution of the
1. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of Commission or a Division shall be made on a
discretion amounting to lack or excess of date previously fixed, of which notice shall be
jurisdiction when it denied the Roces' motion to served in advance upon the parties or their
dismiss. attorneys personally or by registered mail or by
telegram.
2. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and 6. Promulgation is important because it
qualifications of the members of the House of determines when the reglementary period
Representatives and has the power to begins to toll. In the case at bar, Commissioner
promulgate procedural rules to govern Garcilliano fixed the promulgation of its
proceedings brought before it. This exclusive resolution whether to give due course to the
jurisdiction includes the power to determine candidacy of Mr. Ang Ping on May 5, 2004.
whether it has the authority to hear and However, for mysterious reasons, the COMELEC
77
First Division of Commissioner Garcillano did was to execute the April 30, 2004 resolution of
not promulgate the resolution on May 5, 2004 its First Division which, at that time, had not yet
in accordance with its notice of promulgation. become final and executory. These
Despite the deferment of the promulgation by irregularities cannot be swept away by the
Commissioner Borra to a date to be set by the belated COMELEC en banc's April 28, 2005
COMELEC First Division, the resolution was resolution denying Mr. Ang Ping's motion for
deemed "promulgated" by the COMELEC on reconsideration dated May 10, 2004.
April 30, 2004 when it was filed with the clerk
of court. The April 30, 2004 COMELEC 10. Citing T.H. Valderama & Sons, Inc. v. Drilon,
resolution was received by Mr. Ang Ping's it is argued that Mrs. Ang Ping's motions for
counsel only on May 8, 2004. Yet on May 5, reconsideration and appeals "cured" whatever
2004, the COMELEC First Division denied Mr. defects occurred at the COMELEC. Contrary to
Ang Ping's motion to dismiss on the ground that Roces's posture, Valderama and its kin required
the motion was filed after the April 30, 2004 that the aggrieved party be given an
resolution. opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, Mrs.
Ang Ping was systematically denied the
Motion for reconsideration of COMELEC opportunity to be heard. The resolution of the
Division order or resolution is a COMELEC's First Division was made before its
prerequisite before COMELEC En Banc may priorily set date of promulgation, deemed final
take cognizance (COMELEC En Banc and executory by the COMELEC en banc in
improperly issued Resolution No. 6823) Resolution No. 6823 before expiry of the
reglementary period, and executed by the
Manila City Board of Canvassers. The petition
7. The COMELEC en banc usurped the forcertiorari filed by Mrs. Ang Ping challenged
jurisdiction of the COMELEC First Division when these resolutions and could not have cured
it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 these blatant violations of her right to due
despite the fact that: (1) the reglementary process.
period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not yet
expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a motion COMELEC's resolutions are void ab
for reconsideration on May 10, 2004 within the initio for violating Mrs. Ang Ping's
five-day reglementary period. constitutional right to due process
COMELEC contended that (1) Sema wrongly 2. The writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC to perform an act which the law specifically
issued the same in the exercise of its enjoins as a duty. However, there is no law
administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition exclude from canvassing the votes cast in
became moot with the proclamation of Cotabato City for representative of Shariff
respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen as Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
representative of the legislative district of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. The writ of prohibition is appropriate to
test the constitutionality of election laws,
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. rules and regulations
7902 is constitutional because it did not
apportion a legislative district for Shariff 3. The inapplicability of certiorari and
Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative mandamus, however, do not justify the outright
districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
Maguindanaos first legislative district. because Sema also prayed for the issuance of
Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the the writ of Prohibition and we have long
COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos recognized this writ as proper for testing the
first legislative district to make Cotabato City its constitutionality of election laws, rules, and
sole component unit as the power to regulations.
reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively
with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato Dilangalens proclamation did not render
City does not meet the minimum population the petition moot
requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for the creation of a legislative 4. Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the
district within a city. 14 May 2007 elections for representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
The issues are (1) whether Section 19, Article VI City did not moot this petition. This case does
of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional not concern Dilangalens election. Rather, it
Assembly the power to create provinces, is involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, Resolution No. 7902, as well as the
whether a province created under Section 19, constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section
Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one 19, Article VI of RA 9054.
representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a 5. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one
legislative district for such new province. way or another, determines whether the votes
cast in Cotabato City for representative of the
Held: district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City will be included in the
I. Procedural Issues canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental
consequence is no reason for the court not to
Writs of certiorari and mandamus are not proceed with the resolution of the novel issues
applicable raised here. The Courts ruling in these
petitions affects not only the recently
1. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to concluded elections but also all the other
correct grave abuse of discretion by any succeeding elections for the office in question,
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
quasi-judicial functions. However, The Assembly to create in the future additional
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in provinces.
82
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, which
II. Substantive Issues grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces and cities,
Creation of provinces, cities and is Unconstitutional
municipalities requires a legislative act
from Congress, while creation of a 10. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
barangay may be delegated to local Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
legislative bodies Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
6. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the 11. There is no provision in the Constitution
Constitution, which provides: that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or create municipalities and barangays,
barangay may be created, divided, merged, provided Section 10, Article X of the
abolished or its boundary substantially altered Constitution is followed. However, the creation
except in accordance with the criteria of provinces and cities is another matter.
established in the local government code and Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
subject to approval by a majority of the votes provides, Each city with a population of at
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
affected. province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of
7. Thus, the creation of any of the four Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
local government units province, city, Ordinance appended to the Constitution
municipality or barangay must comply provides, Any province that may hereafter be
with three conditions. created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred
First, the creation of a local government unit fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local immediately following election to at least one
Government Code. Member x x x.
Second, such creation must not conflict with
any provision of the Constitution. 12. Clearly, a province cannot be created
Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political without a legislative district because it will
units affected. violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
8. Under its plenary legislative powers, Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
Congress can delegate to local legislative the same reason, a city with a population of
bodies the power to create local government 250,000 or more cannot also be created
units, subject to reasonable standards and without a legislative district. Thus, the power to
provided no conflict arises with any provision of create a province, or a city with a population of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
has delegated to provincial boards, and city create a legislative district. Even the creation of
and municipal councils, the power to a city with a population of less than 250,000
create barangays within their involves the power to create a legislative
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with district because once the citys population
the criteria established in the Local reaches 250,000, the city automatically
Government Code, and the plebiscite becomes entitled to one representative. Thus,
requirement. the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a
9. However, under the Local Government legislative district.
Code, only an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities or 13. For Congress to delegate validly the power
municipalities. to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create
83
a legislative district. The issue then is, can evident inherent limitation on the legislative
Congress validly delegate to the ARMM powers of every local or regional legislative
Regional Assembly the power to create body that it can only create local or regional
legislative districts for the House of offices, respectively, and it can never create a
Representatives? The answer is in the negative. national office.
Legislative districts are created or 18. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of
reapportioned only by an act of Congress legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of
14. Under Section 5, Article VI of the its exclusive authority to create legislative
Constitution, the power to increase the districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
allowable membership in the House of the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in
Representatives, and to reapportion Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
legislative districts, is vested exclusively authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
in Congress. impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative
districts for Congress.
15. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
vests in Congress the power to 19. The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in
increase, through a law, the allowable creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
membership in the House of Representatives. exclusive nature of Congress power to create
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining
reapportion legislative districts. The power to from creating a legislative district for Shariff
reapportion legislative districts necessarily Kabunsuan. However, a province cannot
includes the power to create legislative districts legally be created without a legislative
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these district because the Constitution mandates
powers through a law that Congress itself that each province shall have at least one
enacts, and not through a law that regional or representative. Thus, the creation of the
local legislative bodies enact. Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
16. The allowable membership of the House
of Representatives can be increased, and For a legislative body to create a province
new legislative districts of Congress can such legislative body must have the
be created, only through a national law power to create legislative districts
passed by Congress. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable 20. Sema contends that with the creation of
membership or in its incumbent membership Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, it is
through the creation of legislative districts must automatically entitled to one member in the
be embodied in a national law. Only Congress House of Representatives. As support for her
can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for stance, she invokes the statement in Felwa that
regional or local legislative bodies to create or when a province is created by statute, the
reapportion legislative districts for a national corresponding representative district comes
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative into existence neither by authority of that
body, created by a superior legislative body, statute which cannot provide otherwise
cannot change the membership of the superior nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
legislative body. Constitution, without a reapportionment.
17. Moreover, the office of a legislative district 21. Felwa does not apply to the present case
representative to Congress is a national office, because in Felwa the new provinces were
and its occupant, a Member of the House of created by a national law enacted by Congress
Representatives, is a national official. It would itself. Here, the new province was created
be incongruous for a regional legislative body merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a Regional Assembly.
national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory. It is a self- 22. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of
84
a legislative district by Congress does not maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution.
emanate alone from Congress power Further, representatives from the ARMM
to reapportion legislative districts, but also from provinces can become the majority in the
Congress power to create provinces which House of Representatives through the ARMM
cannot be created without a legislative district. Regional Assemblys continuous creation of
Thus, when a province is created, a provinces or cities within the ARMM)
legislative district is created by operation
of the Constitution because the Constitution 25. It is axiomatic that organic acts of
provides that each province shall have at least autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
one representative in the House of Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the
Representatives. This does not detract from the Constitution expressly provides that the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative powers of regional assemblies are
legislative districts belongs exclusively to limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and
Congress. It merely prevents any other subject to the provisions of the Constitution and
legislative body, except Congress, from national laws The Preamble of the ARMM
creating provinces because for a legislative Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
body to create a province such legislative ARMM Government is established within the
body must have the power to create framework of the Constitution. This follows
legislative districts. In short, only an act of Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which
Congress can trigger the creation of a mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x
legislative district by operation of the x within the framework of this Constitution and
Constitution. the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
23. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201
apportioned a legislative district to Shariff In summary:
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave
Cotabato City as the lone component of the first (a) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative Assembly the power to create provinces
district by itself because as of the census taken and cities, is void for being contrary to
in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article
constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao will Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which requires that [E]ach city Only Congress can create provinces and
with a population of at least two hundred fifty cities because the creation of provinces
thousand x x x, shall have at least one and cities necessarily includes the
representative. creation of legislative districts, a power
only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
24. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
and cities within the ARMM with or without Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of the enact a law creating a national office like the
Local Government Code (RA 716), namely: (a) office of a district representative of Congress
minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and because the legislative powers of the ARMM
(b) minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 Regional Assembly operate only within its
square kilometers or minimum population of territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
250,000. If upheld, this will lead to absurd Article X of the Constitution.
consequences not contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution. (ex: an inferior legislative (b) MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can Regional Assembly and creating the Province
create 100 or more provinces and thus increase of Shariff Kabunsuan,is void.
the membership of a superior legislative body,
the House of Representatives, beyond the (c) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
85
preserving the geographic and legislative G.R. No. 146710-15 and G.R. No. 146738 |
district of the First District of Maguindanao with 2001-03-02
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies
with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of
Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section
1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Subject:
Constitution.
86
That same afternoon, Estrada and his family left or instrumentality of government.
Malacaang and transmitted a signed letter
appointing then Vice-President Arroyo as Acting EDSA 1 vs EDSA 2
President, citing Section 11, Article 7 of the
Constitution, to the House Speaker and Senate
President. 4. EDSA People Power I involves the exercise of
the people power of revolution which overthrew
the whole government while EDSA People
Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Power II is an exercise of people power of
Office of the Ombudsman. Estrada filed with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition petition the government for redress of
which sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from grievances which only affected the office of the
conducting any further proceedings in cases President.
filed against him, not until his term as president
ends. He also filed a petition for quo warranto 5. EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II
praying for judgment confirming him to be the is intra constitutional.
lawful and incumbent President of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.
6. EDSA I presented a political question while
EDSA II involved legal questions.
Held:
88
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if It set the rule that (t)he right of the
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his State to recover properties unlawfully
prosecution. It will place him in a better acquired by public officials or employees,
situation than a non-sitting President who has from them or from their nominees or
not been subjected to impeachment transferees, shall not be barred by
proceedings and yet can be the object of a prescription, laches or estoppel.
criminal prosecution. It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an
anti-graft court.
It created the office of the Ombudsman
and endowed it with enormous powers,
among which is to (investigate on its own,
or on complaint by any person, any act or
Presidential Immunity from Suit
omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
16. Estrada does NOT enjoy immunity from suit. inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman
Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or was also given fiscal autonomy.
from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure but not
beyond in accordance with the ruling inIn Re: Theory of Derivative Prejudice
Saturnino Bermudez.
(In this case, the Supreme Court holds that the The JBC resolved to refer this apparent
ninety-day period mandated by Section 4(1), constitutional conflict to the Supreme Court En
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for the Banc. On March 30, 1998, however, President
filling of vacancies in the Supreme Court, is Ramos sent to the Chief Justice the
restricted by Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 appointment letters of two (2) Judges of the
Constitution, prohibiting the President from Regional Trial Court: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
making any appointments within two months and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta. This was about
immediately before the next presidential less than a month before the May 11, 1998
elections and up to the end of his term; elections.
mentions and discusses midnight
appointment)
Issue:
Facts: Whether or not the appointment of the two RTC
Ricardo J. Francisco retired from his office Judges was validly made.
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
President Fidel Ramos asked from the Judicial Ruling:
and Bar Council (JBC) the final list of nominees The Supreme Court En Banc, through
from whom he will choose and appoint to Chief Justice Narvasa, holds that the
succeed the retired Justice. But the JBC, headed appointment of the two RTC Judges in this case
by Chief Justice Narvasa, encountered an is void.
apparent conflict between two particular
provisions of the Constitution regarding the It is the Courts view that during the
Presidents power to appoint Members of the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts. Constitution (or two months immediately before
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution the next presidential elections and up to the
provides: Two months immediately before the end of his term), the President is not required to
next presidential elections and up to the end of make appointments to the courts; and he is not
his term, a President or Acting President shall allowed to do so. Further, Sections 4(1) and 9
not make appointments, except temporary of Article VIII simply mean that the
appointments to executive positions when President is required to fill vacancies in
continued vacancies therein will prejudice the courts within the time frames
public service or endanger public safety. provided therein, unless prohibited by
However, Section 4(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy
Constitution seems to allow the President to that the prohibition on appointments
make appointments to vacancies in the comes into effect only once every six
Supreme Court within the two-month ban, to years.
wit: The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. The Supreme Court explains that Section
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any appointments: (1) those made for buying votes,
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from and (2) those made for partisan considerations.
the occurrence thereof.
The first refers to those appointments
President Fidel Ramos was of the view made within the two months preceding a
that the election-ban provision under Section Presidential election and are similar to those
15, Article VII applies only to executive that are declared election offenses in the
appointments or appointments in the Executive Omnibus Election Code (i.e. vote-buying and
branch of the government, the whole article vote-selling, and appointment of new
being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. He also employees, creation of new position, promotion
noted that appointments to the Judiciary have
90
or giving of salary increases for purposes of be filled within ninety days (in the last
influencing the election). sentence of Section 4(1) of Article VIII)
contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15,
The second type of appointments Article VII, which is couched in stronger
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of negative language: that a President or Acting
the so-called midnight appointments. In President shall not make appointments.
Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the Further, the prevention of vote-buying and
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, delays in filling up of court vacancies or the
who was defeated in his bid for reelection, disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies
became no more than a caretaker can abide the period of the ban which,
administrator whose duty was to prepare for incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming to exist only once in every six years. Moreover,
President. Said the Court: The filling up of those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so temporarily by designation. On the other hand,
spaced as to afford some assurance of prohibited appointments are long lasting and
deliberate action and careful consideration of permanent in their effects. They may, in fact,
the need for the appointment and appointee's influence the results of elections. It is for this
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. reason that the same is considered an election
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one offense.
night and the planned induction of almost all of
them in a few hours before the inauguration of The appointments of Valenzuela and
the new President may, with some reason, be Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998)
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being were unquestionably made during the period of
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all the ban. Consequently, they come within the
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and operation of the first prohibition relating to
other conditions, and thereby to deprive the appointments that are considered to be for the
new administration of an opportunity to make purpose of buying votes or influencing the
the corresponding appointments. The Court election. While the filling of vacancies in the
recognizes the possibility of appointments to judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest,
important positions that must be made even there is no showing in this case of any
after the proclamation of the new President. compelling reason to justify the making of the
The outgoing President can make these appointments during the period of the ban. On
appointments, so long as they are few and so the other hand, as already discussed, there is a
spaced as to afford some assurance of strong public policy for the prohibition against
deliberate action and careful consideration of appointments made within the period of the
the need for the appointment, and the ban.
appointees qualifications.
25. Case Summary
The Court notes that the exception in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
Section 15 of Article VII is much narrower than (2010)
that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows G.R. No. 191002 | 2010-03-17
only the making of temporary appointments to
executive positions, when continued vacancies Subject:
will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. Section 15 Article VII greatly restricts Locus Standi, Taxpayers Suit, Citizens Suit,
the appointing power of the President during Justiciable Issue, Midnight Appointment Ban,
the period of the ban. Statutory Construction, Judicial and Bar Council,
Acting Chief Justice under the Judiciary Act of
In case of conflict, Section 4(1) of Article 1948, Chief Justice, Mandamus, Ministerial Act,
VIII should yield to Section 15 of Article VII of Discretionary Act
the Constitution. The Supreme Court points out
that the instruction wherein any vacancy shall Facts:
91
has been or is about to be denied some right or
This case involves several petitions filed either privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
for the prohibition of or mandamus for the he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to submit to the penalties by reason of the statute or the act
President its list of nominees for the position of complained of.
Chief Justice. The case also raised the issue on
whether the appointment of the next Chief 4. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in
Justice by the incumbent President GMA is a constitutional law because in some cases, suits
midnight appointment prohibited by the are not brought by parties who have been
Constitution. personally injured by the operation of law or
any other government act but by concerned
The controversy arose from the forthcoming citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on the public interest.
May 17, 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. On 22 December 2009, Taxpayers Suit vs. Citizens Suit
Congressman Matias Defensor, an ex-officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the 5. In Beauchamp v. Silk, it was held that in a
JBC and requested that the process for taxpayers suit, the plaintiff is affected by the
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be expenditure of public funds, while in a citizens
commenced immediately. Consequently, the suit, the plaintiff is but a mere instrument of the
JBC passed a resolution unanimously agreeing public concern.
to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice. The process has already begun, 6. Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen
however, the JBC is not yet decided on when to and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts
submit to the President its list of nominees due to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to
to controversy in this case being unresolved. his injury cannot be denied.
3. It must appear that the person complaining 10. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of
92
the perceived threat to a constitutional interest midnight appointments, or appointments made
is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a for partisan considerations, from being made by
challenge, provided the Court has sufficient an outgoing Chief Executive.
facts before it to enable to intelligently
adjudicate the issues. 18. In contrast, the appointments to the
Judiciary made after the establishment of the
Midnight Appointment Ban JBC would not be suffering from such defects
because of the JBCs prior processing of
11. The prohibition against presidential candidates.
appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judicial and Bar Council
Judiciary.
19. The creation of the JBC was precisely
12. Article VII is devoted to the Executive intended to depoliticize the Judiciary by doing
Department. Specifically, the presidential away with the intervention of the Commission
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections on Appointments.
14, 15 and 16 of the Article. On the other hand,
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department. Section 4(1) and Section 9
specifically provide for the appointment of the 20. The intervention of the JBC eliminates the
Supreme Court Justices. danger that appointments to the Judiciary can
be made for the purpose of buying votes in a
13. Had the framers intended to extend the coming presidential election, or of satisfying
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII partisan considerations because any
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme recommended candidate first had to undergo
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there.
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. 21. It is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy
Statutory Construction in the Supreme Court in order to enable
the President to appoint one of them within the
14. The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the 90-day period from the occurrence of the
word shall constitutes an imperative duty on vacancy.
the President to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days 22. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list
from the occurrence of the vacancy. of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court to the President after the vacancy occurs,
15. It is the intent of the Constitutional because that shortens the 90-day period
Commission to have Section 4(1), Article VIII allowed by the Constitution for the President to
stand independently of any other provision, make the appointment.
least of all one found in Article VII. The two
provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, Valenzuela Ruling Reversed
regardless of Section 15, Article VII being
couched in the negative. 23. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express
intent of the Constitutional Commission to have
16. The enactment should be construed with Section 4(1), Article VIII stand independently of
reference to its intended scope and purpose, any other provision, least of all one found in
and the court should seek to carry out this Article VII.
purpose rather than to defeat it.
24. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
Rationale for the Prohibition interpretation to determine the intent of the
framers rather than on the deliberations of the
17. One of the reasons underlying the adoption Constitutional Commission.
of Section 15, Article VII was to eliminate
93
25. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that having the Associate Justice who is first in
Section 15 extends to appointments to the precedence take over.
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of Mandamus
the Judicial Department from the Executive and
Legislative Departments. 33. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
Appointment to the Supreme Court neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station.
26. The Supreme Court is composed of a Chief
Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall 34. Mandamus is not available to direct the
be appointed by the President from a list of at exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
least three nominees prepared by the JBC for particular way.
every vacancy, which appointments require no
confirmation by the Commission on 35. For mandamus to lie, the following must be
Appointments. complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the
27. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or duty of the defendant to perform the act,
she is appointed by the President as Chief because it is mandated by law; (c) the
Justice, and the appointment is never in an defendant unlawfully neglects the performance
acting capacity. of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
28. The framers intended the position of Chief (e) there is no appeal or any other plain,
Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
in an acting or temporary capacity. course of law.
Acting Chief Justice under the Judiciary Ministerial Act vs. Discretionary Act
Act of 1948
36. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which
29. Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
responds to a rare situation in which the new of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which to the mandate of a legal authority, without
the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
perform the duties and powers of the office. upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. The duty is ministerial only when the
30. It is to be noted, however, that the Judiciary discharge of the same requires neither the
Act was enacted because the Chief Justice exercise of official discretion or judgment.
appointed under the 1935 Constitution was
subject to the confirmation of the Commission 37. A discretionary act or duty is one in which
on Appointments, and the confirmation process the law imposes a duty upon a public officer
might take longer than expected. and gives the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed.
Chief Justice
38. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of
31. The Chief Justice, as the head of the entire nominees before the start of the Presidents
Judiciary, performs functions absolutely mandatory 90-day period to appoint
significant to the life of the nation.The lack of is ministerial, but its selections of the
any appointed occupant of the office of Chief candidates whose names will be in the list to be
Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary. submitted to the President lies within
the discretion of the JBC.
32. The appointment of the next Chief Justice
by the incumbent President is preferable to
26. Case Summary
94
Jardeleza vs. Sereno (2014) Court (SC) praying that the Court, in the
G.R. No. 213181 | 2014-08-19 exercise of its constitutional power of
supervision over the JBC, issue an order: (1)
Subject: The Supreme Court, in the exercise of directing the JBC to give him at least five (5)
its Power of Supervision over the JBC, has working days written notice of any hearing of
constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the JBC to which he would be summoned; and
the case; Remedy of Mandamus is not available the said notice to contain the sworn
(JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary); specifications of the charges against him by his
Remedy of Certiorari is available (under oppositors, and supporting witnesses, if any,
expanded Power of Judicial Review); Unanimity and copies of documents in support of the
Rule of the JBC applies only when the moral charges; (2) allowing him to cross-examine his
fitness of an applicant is put in issue; Uniformity oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, to
rule was improperly applied with respect to the be conducted in public (3) directing the JBC to
charge on Jardeleza's past handling of reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014
government cases; Uniformity rule applies to to another date; and (4) directing the JBC to
allegations of extra-marital affair and acts of disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating
insider-trading; Availability of Due Process in in the voting on June 30, 2014 for the position
the Proceedings of the JBC; Under JBC rules, an vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
applicant has the right to be heard and to
answer the accusations against him; The According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
application of the unanimity rule on integrity questioned Jardelezas ability to discharge the
resulted in Jardelezas deprivation of his right to duties of his office as shown in a confidential
due process; Need to Revisit JBCs Internal legal memorandum over his handling of an
Rules; international arbitration case for the
government. Jardeleza was also informed that
Facts: Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the
JBC and disclosed confidential information
Due to the imminent compulsory retirement of which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his
Associate Supreme Court Justice Roberto Abad (Jardeleza) integrity as dubious.
on May 22, 2014, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announced the opening for application or During the June 30, 2014 meeting, Jardeleza
recommendation for the said vacated position. was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted
to defend himself against the integrity issues
The JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo raised against him. He answered that he would
Concepcion of the University of the Philippines defend himself provided that due process would
nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza, be observed. Jardeleza requested the JBC to
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for defer its meeting considering that the Court en
the said position. Jardeleza was included in the banc would meet the next day to act on his
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule pending letter-petition. Jardeleza was thereafter
of public interviews. Jardeleza was interviewed excused from the meeting.
by the JBC.
However, later that same day, and apparently
Jardeleza received telephone calls from denying Jardelezas request for deferment of
incumbent JBC member, Justice Aurora Lagman, the proceedings, the JBC continued its
who informed him that during the meetings deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
held, Chief Justice Sereno, who served as JBC nominees to be included in the shortlist. The
ex-officio Chairperson, manifested that she JBC released the subject shortlist of four (4)
would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC- nominees which included: Apolinario D.
0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed Bruselas, Jr., Jose C. Reyes, Jr., Maria Gracia M.
to make himself available before the JBC on Pulido Tan, and Reynaldo B. Daway. The
June 30, 2014, during which he would be shortlist did not include Jardeleza.
informed of the objections to his integrity.
A newspaper article was later published in the
Jardeleza filed a letter-petition to the Supreme online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
95
stating that the Courts Spokesman, Atty.
Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually Held:
five nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist,
but one nominee could not be included because I. Procedural Issues
of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the
JBC rules. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
Power of Supervision over the JBC, has
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the SC noted constitutional bases to assume
Jardelezas letter-petition in view of the jurisdiction over the case
transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the
Office of the President, without prejudice to 1. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
any remedy available in law and the rules that Constitution, which provides for the creation of
petitioner may still wish to pursue. the JBC, states that: A Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby created under the supervision of the
Hence, Jardeleza filed the present petition for Supreme Court...
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary 2. Jurisprudence provides the definition and
Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the scope of supervision. It is the power of
JBC to include him in the list of nominees for oversight, or the authority to see that
Supreme Court Associate Justice, on the subordinate officers perform their duties.
grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno It ensures that the laws and the rules governing
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to the conduct of a government entity are
lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, observed and complied with. Supervising
despite having garnered a sufficient number of officials see to it that rules are followed, but
votes to qualify for the position. Jardeleza they themselves do not lay down such rules,
posited that, having secured the sufficient nor do they have the discretion to modify or
number of votes (4 out of 6), it was ministerial replace them. If the rules are not observed,
on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the they may order the work done or redone, but
shortlist. only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the
For its part, the JBC explained that, as a general act. They have no discretion on this matter
rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist except to see to it that the rules are followed.
when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at
least a majority of all the members of the JBC. 3. The supervisory authority of the Court over
When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance
invoked because an applicants integrity is with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal
challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, allegations in his petition merit the exercise of
when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the said this supervisory authority.
provision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote
of all the JBC members to be included in the Remedy of Mandamus is not available
shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Serenos (JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary)
vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even
then, he needed the votes of the five (5) 4. The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of
remaining members. He only got four (4) mandamus is not available. Mandamus lies to
affirmative votes. In contrast, applicant compel the performance, when refused, of a
Reynaldo B. Daway, who got four (4) affirmative ministerial duty, but not to compel the
votes, was included in the shortlist because his performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus
integrity was not challenged. As to him, the will not issue to control or review the exercise
majority rule was considered applicable. of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon said public officer the right and
At issue is the correct application of Section 2, duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
Rule 10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the any matter in which he is required to act. It is
substantive rights of applicants. his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court. There is no question that
96
theJBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and
it may not be compelled to do something. 9. The JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring
judges and justices, making certain that the
Remedy of Certiorari is available (under nominees submitted to the President are all
expanded Power of Judicial Review) qualified and suitably best for appointment. In
this way, the appointing process itself is
5. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of shielded from the possibility of extending
certiorari is directed against a tribunal judicial appointment to the undeserving and
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial mediocre and, more importantly, to the
function. Judicial functions are exercised by a ineligible or disqualified.
body or officer clothed with authority to
determine what the law is and what the legal 10. A set of uniform criteria had to be
rights of the parties are with respect to the established in the ascertainment of whether
matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is one meets the minimum constitutional
a term that applies to the action or discretion of qualifications and possesses qualities of mind
public administrative officers or bodies given and heart expected of him and his office. The
the authority to investigate facts or ascertain JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw form of JBC-009. As a qualification, the term
conclusions from them as a basis for their integrity is taken to refer to a virtue, such
official action using discretion of a judicial that integrity is the quality of persons
nature. character.
6. Respondent JBC opposed the petition for 11. Under Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, a
certiorari on the ground that, in the higher voting requirement is absolute in cases
performance of its function of recommending where the integrity of an applicant is
appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not questioned. Simply put, when an integrity
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. question arises, the voting requirement for his
or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
7. It has been judicially settled that a petition becomes unanimous instead of the majority
for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the vote . Considering that JBC-009 employs the
act of any branch or instrumentality of the term integrity as an essential qualification for
government on the ground of grave abuse of appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
discretion amounting to lack or excess of person merits a higher hurdle to surpass (the
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC),
the government, even if the latter does not the Court is of the safe conclusion that
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial integrity as used in the rules must be
functions. interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an
8. In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he applicants moral fitness is challenged. It
earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, follows then that the unanimity rule only
it was negated by the invocation of the comes into operation when the moral character
unanimity rule on integrity in violation of his of a person is put in issue. It finds no
right to due process guaranteed not only by the application where the question is essentially
Constitution but by the Councils own rules. For unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness.
said reason, the Court is of the position that it
can exercise the expanded judicial power of Uniformity rule was improperly applied
review vested upon it by Section 1, Art VIII of with respect to the charge on Jardeleza's
the 1987 Constitution. past handling of government cases
Subject: Held:
7. KMU's assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. 12. Petitioners failed to show that President
No. 5 violated its right to peaceful Arroyo's exercise of the calling-out
assembly may be deemed sufficient to power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally
give it legal standing. Organizations may bereft of factual basis. The government
be granted standing to assert the rights presented reports of events leading to
of their members. The courts took the issuance PP 1017 (i.e. escape and
judicial notice of the announcement by threats of Magdalo group, defections in
the Office of the President banning all military, etc.) which was not
rallies and canceling all permits for contradicted by petitioners. Hence, the
public assemblies following the issuance President was justified in issuing PP 1017
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. calling for military aid.
8. The national officers of the Integrated Facial Challenge (Over breadth Doctrine)
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal
standing, having no direct or potential 13. The over breadth doctrine is an
injury which the IBP as an institution or analytical tool developed for testing 'on
its members may suffer as a their faces' statutes in free speech
consequence of the issuance of PP No. cases. PP 1017 is not primarily directed
1017 and G.O. No.5. The mere invocation to speech or even speech-related
by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP
of law is too general an interest. to prevent or suppress all forms of
However, in view of the transcendental lawless violence.
importance of the issue, the Court
vested them with locus standi. 14. Claims of facial over breadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes
Political Question, Calling-Out Power which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only 'spoken words' and 'over breadth
9. While the President's 'calling-out' power claims have been curtailed when invoked
is a discretionary power solely vested in against ordinary criminal laws that are
his wisdom, 'this does not prevent an sought to be applied to protected
examination of whether such power was conduct.'
exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was Facial Challenge (Vagueness)
exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.'
102
15. Related to the 'over breadth' doctrine is public utility and business affected with
the 'void for vagueness doctrine' which public interest.
holds that 'a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily 19. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
guess at its meaning and differ as to its Law. It is merely an exercise of President
application.' It is subject to the same Arroyo's calling-out power. As such, it
principles governing over breadth cannot be used to justify acts that only
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical under a valid declaration of Martial Law
tool for testing 'on their faces' statutes in can be done. specifically, (a) arrests and
free speech cases. And like over breadth, seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
it is said that a litigant may challenge a ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over
statute on its face only if it is vague in all of news media and agencies and press
its possible applications. censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees, are powers which
Calling Out Power (First Provision of PP can be exercised by the President as
1017) Commander-in-Chief only where there is
a valid declaration of Martial Law or
16. Section 18, Article VII of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of 'Take Care' Power (Second Provision of PP
graduated powers. From the most to the 1017)
least benign, these are: the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the 20. The second provision pertains to the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, power of the President to ensure that the
and the power to declare Martial Law. laws be faithfully executed. This is based
Citing IBP v. Zamora, the Court ruled on Section 17, Article VII of the
that the only criterion for the exercise of Constitution.
the calling-out power is that 'whenever
it becomes necessary,' the President 21. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
may call the armed forces 'to prevent grants President Arroyo the authority to
or suppress lawless violence, promulgate 'decrees.' Legislative power
invasion or rebellion.' is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a
17. Considering the circumstances then state of rebellion nor a state of
prevailing, President Arroyo found it emergency can justify President Arroyo's
necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her exercise of legislative power by issuing
Office's vast intelligence network, she is decrees. Presidential Decrees are laws
in the best position to determine the which are of the same category and
actual condition of the country. binding force as statutes because they
were issued by then President Marcos in
18. There is a distinction between the the exercise of his legislative power
President's authority to declare a 'state during the period of Martial Law under
of rebellion' and the authority to the 1973 Constitution.
proclaim a? state of national
emergency?. In declaring a state of 22. President Arroyo has no authority to
national emergency, President Arroyo did enact decrees. It follows that these
not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of decrees are void and, therefore, cannot
the Constitution, a provision calling on be enforced. With respect to 'laws,' she
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless cannot call the military to enforce or
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also implement certain laws, such as customs
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a laws, laws governing family and property
provision on the State's extraordinary relations, laws on obligations and
power to take over privately-owned contracts and the like. She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to
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enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence. 'Acts of Terrorism'
Take Over Power (Third Provision of PP 27. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the
1017) PNP to immediately carry out the
'necessary and appropriate actions and
23. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it measures to suppress and prevent acts
grants the President, during a ?state of of terrorism and lawless violence.'
emergency?, authority to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any 28. The Court declares that the 'acts of
privately-owned public utility or business terrorism' portion of G.O. No. 5 is
affected with public interest, without unconstitutional. Since there is no law
authority or delegation from Congress. defining 'acts of terrorism,' it is President
24. A distinction must be drawn between Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has
the President's authority to declare 'a the discretion to determine what acts
state of national emergency' and to constitute terrorism. Consequently, there
exercise emergency powers. While the can be indiscriminate arrest without
President alone can declare a state of warrants, breaking into offices and
national emergency, however, the residences, taking over the media
exercise of emergency powers , such enterprises. These acts go far beyond
as the taking over of privately owned the calling-out power of the President.
public utility or business affected with Yet these can be effected in the name of
public interest, requires a delegation G.O. No. 5 under the guise of
from Congress. The President has no suppressing acts of terrorism.
absolute authority to exercise allthe
powers of the State under Section 17, Right to Peaceably Assemble
Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by 29. David's warrantless arrest was
Congress. unjustified. David, et al. were arrested
25. Congress may grant emergency powers while they were exercising their right to
to the President, subject to certain peaceful assembly. They were not
conditions, thus: committing any crime, neither was there
(1) There must be a war or other a showing of a clear and present danger
emergency. that warranted the limitation of that
(2) The delegation must be for a right. As can be gleaned from
limited period only. circumstances, the charges of inciting to
(3) The delegation must be sedition and violation of BP 880 were
subject to such restrictions as the mere afterthought.
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must 30. The wholesale cancellation of all
be exercised to carry out a permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
national policy declared by the principle that 'freedom of assembly
Congress. is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and
'As Applied' Challenge present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent.'
26. Courts do not declare statutes invalid
merely because they may afford an 31. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority
opportunity for abuse in the manner of to regulate assemblies and rallies is
application. The validity of a statute or lodged with the local government units.
ordinance is to be determined from its They have the power to issue permits
general purpose and its efficiency to and to revoke such permits after due
accomplish the end desired, not from its notice and hearing on the determination
effects in a particular case. of the presence of clear and present
104
danger. Here, petitioners were not even
notified and heard on the revocation of On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into
their permits. force after an Exchange of Notes between
Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon and US
28. Case Summary Ambassador Hubbard.
Bayan vs Zamora (2000)
G.R. No. 138570 | 2000-10-10 The VFA provides for the mechanism for
regulating the circumstances and conditions
Subject: under which US Armed Forces and defense
personnel may be present in the Philippines.
Locus Standi; Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA);
Senate Concurrence on Treaties (Section 21, Petitioners - as legislators, non-governmental
Article VII vs Section 25, Article XVIII); Treaty organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail
(Ratification; Concurrence of Senate); Pacta the constitutionality of the VFA and impute
Sunt Servanda; Statutory Construction (Special grave abuse of discretion in the ratification of
over General; Ubi Lex Non Distinguit; Use of the agreement.
disjunctive or)
Held:
Facts:
Locus Standi
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines (RP) and the
United States of America (US) forged a Military 1. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Bases Agreement which formalized the use of constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must
installations in the Philippine territory by United show "not only that the law is invalid, but also
States military personnel. that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct
The RP-US Military Bases Agreement expired in injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
1991 without having been renewed. merely that he suffers thereby in some
Notwithstanding, the defense and security indefinite way." He must show that he has
relationship between the Philippines and the US been, or is about to be, denied some right or
continued pursuant to a Mutual Defense Treaty privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that
entered into on August 30, 1951. he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute complained
In 1997, negotiations began between the RP of.
and US for a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
President Ramos approved the VFA, which was 2. Petitioners failed to show that they have
respectively signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any
Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
February 10, 1998. the VFA.
105
Philippines. Under this provision,
5. Similarly, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to theconcurrence of the Senate is only one of the
bring this suit in the absence of a board requisites to render compliance with the
resolution from its Board of Governors constitutional requirements and to consider the
authorizing its National President to commence agreement binding on the Philippines. Section
the present action. 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities" may be
6. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a
importance and the constitutional significance treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified
of the issues raised in the petitions, the Court, by a majority of the votes cast in a
in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes national referendum held for that purpose
aside the procedural barrier and takes if so required by Congress, and
cognizance of the petitions. In cases of recognized as such by the other
transcendental importance, the Court may relax contracting state.
the standing requirements and allow a suit to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to 10. The VFA is an agreement which defines the
the party claiming the right of judicial review. treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for
Senate Concurrence on Treaties (Section the guidelines to govern such visits of military
21, Article VII vs Section 25, Article XVIII) personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in
7. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
is applicable considering that the VFA has for its vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
subject the presence of foreign military troops of equipment, materials and supplies.
in the Philippines. Respondents maintain that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as 11. Section 25, Article XVIII, which
the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
agreement which involves merely the military bases, troops, or facilities, should
temporary visits of US personnel engaged in apply in the instant case. To a certain extent
joint military exercises. and in a limited sense, however, the provisions
ofsection 21, Article VII will find applicability
8. Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise with regard to the issue and for the sole
or international agreements in general, in which purpose of determining the number of votes
case, theconcurrence of at least two-thirds required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
(2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is Senate.
required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on Statutory Construction (Special over
the part of the Philippines. This provision lays General)
down the general rule on treatise or
international agreements and applies to any 12. A basic principle of statutory construction
form of treaty with a wide variety of mandates that general legislation must give
subject matter, such as, but not limited to, way to a special legislation on the same
extradition or tax treatise or those economic in subject, and generally be so interpreted as to
nature. All treaties or international agreements embrace only cases in which the special
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of provisions are not applicable, and that where
subject matter, coverage, or particular two statutes are of equal theoretical application
designation or appellation, requires the to a particular case, the one designed therefor
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and specially should prevail. Lex specialis derogat
effective. generali.
9. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a Statutory Construction (Ubi lex non
special provision that applies to treaties distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos)
which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the 13. Section 25, Article XVIII does not require
106
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or two-thirds requirement means that no less
placed permanently in the Philippines. It is than 16 votes is necessary to ratify the VFA.
specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII
is inapplicable to mere transient agreements Recognized as a Treaty by other
Since the Constitution makes no distinction contracting state
between "transient' and "permanent".
19. The phrase "recognized as a treaty"
Statutory Construction (use of the means that the other contracting
disjunctive or) party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other
14. We do not subscribe to the argument that contracting state (USA) to submit the VFA to the
Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since United States Senate for concurrence pursuant
no foreign military bases, but merely foreign to its Constitution is to accord strict meaning to
troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. the phrase.
15. The clause does not refer to "foreign 20. The words used in the Constitution are to be
military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively given their ordinary meaning except where
but treats them as separate and independent technical terms are employed, in which case
subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive the significance thus attached to them prevails
word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others 21. It is inconsequential whether the United
included in the enumeration, such that, the States treats the VFA only as an executive
provision contemplates three different agreement because, under international law,
situations - a military treaty the subject of there is no difference between treaties and
which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) executive agreements in their binding effect
foreigntroops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of upon states concerned, as long as the
the three standing alone places it under the negotiating functionaries have remained within
coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII their powers. International law continues to
make no distinction between treaties and
Compliance with Section 25, Article XVIII executive agreements: they are equally
binding obligations upon nations. To be sure, as
16. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
military bases, troops, or facilities in the agreement under international law, the said
country, unless the following conditions are agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly 22. For as long as the United States of America
concurred in by the Senate and, when so accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
required by congress, ratified by a majority of and binds itself further to comply with its
the votes cast by the people in a national obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
referendum; and (c) recognized as a marked compliance with the mandate of the
treaty by the other contracting state. Constitution.
17. The "concurrence requirement" under 23. A treaty, as defined by the Vienna
Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an
relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article international instrument concluded between
VII which requires that concurrence of a treaty, States in written form and governed by
or international agreement, be made by a two international law, whether embodied in a single
-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. instrument or in two or more related
Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be instruments, and whatever its particular
treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. designation.
18. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The 24. There are many other terms used for a
107
treaty or international agreement, some of
which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis Pacta sunt servanda
d' arbitrage, concordat, convention,
declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, 30. With the ratification of the VFA, which is
charter and modus vivendi. The names or titles equivalent to final acceptance, and with the
of international agreements included under the exchange of notes between the Philippines and
general term treaty have little or no legal the United States of America, it now becomes
significance and they furnish little more than obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
mere description the principles of international law, to be bound
by the terms of the agreement.
Ratification of Treaty
31. Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights
25. Ratification is generally held to be an and Duties of States adopted by the
executive act, undertaken by the head of the International Law Commission in 1949 provides:
state or of the government, as the case may "Every State has the duty to carry out in good
be, through which the formal acceptance of the faith its obligations arising from treaties and
treaty is proclaimed. other sources of international law, and it may
not invoke provisions in its constitution or its
26. A State may provide in its domestic laws as an excuse for failure to perform this
legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. duty."
The consent of the State to be bound by a
treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the 32. Article 26 of the convention which
treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is provides that "Every treaty in force is binding
otherwise established that the negotiating upon the parties to it and must be performed
States agreed that ratification should be by them in good faith." This is known as the
required, (c) the representative of the State has principle of pacta sunt servanda.
signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d)
the intention of the State to sign the treaty 29. Case Summary
subject to ratification appears from the full Lacson vs. Perez (2001)
powers of its representative, or was expressed G.R. No. 147780 | 2001-05-10
during the negotiation
Subject: Petitions have become moot; Petition
27. In the Philippine jurisdiction, the power to for prohibition and mandamus are not the
ratify is vested in the President and not, as proper remedies against a warrantless arrest;
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role (Lacson group): Petitions for prohibition and
of the Senate is limited only to giving or habeas corpus are premature since no criminal
withholding its consent, or concurrence, charges have been filed and any fear of
to the ratification. unlawful restraint is merely speculative;
(Santiago petition): Mandamus will not issue
28. In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have unless the right to relief is clear at the time of
recognized the binding effect of executive the award; (Lumbao petition): Declaration of a
agreements even without the concurrence of state of rebellion is the domain of the President,
the Senate or Congress. in exercise of Commander in Chief powers; (LDP
Petition): LDP not a real party in interest since,
Political Question (Concurrence of Senate) being a juridical person, it is not subject to
arrest
29. The role of the Senate in relation to treaties
is essentially legislative in character. The Facts:
Senate, as an independent body possessed of
its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo,
either accept or reject the proposed agreement, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with
and whatever action it takes in the exercise of explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting
wisdom rather than the legality of the act. and attempting to break into Malacaang,
108
issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there are under imminent danger of being arrested
was a state of rebellion in the National Capital without warrant do not justify their resort to the
Region. She likewise issued General Order No. extraordinary remedies of mandamus and
1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines prohibition, since an individual subjected to
and the Philippine National Police to suppress warrantless arrest is not without adequate
the rebellion in the National Capital Region. remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders individual may ask for a preliminary
and promoters of the "rebellion" were investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of
thereafter effected. court, where he may adduce evidence in his
defense, or he may submit himself to inquest
Thereafter, the four present petitions( for proceedings to determine whether or not he
prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas should remain under custody and
corpus) were filed before the Supreme Court. correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a
All the petitions assail the declaration of a state person subject of a warrantless arrest must be
of rebellion by President Arroyo and the delivered to the proper judicial authorities
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue within the periods provided in Article 125 of the
thereof, as having no basis both in fact an in Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting
law. officer could be held liable for delay in the
delivery of detained persons. Should the
As to petitioner's claim that the proclamation of detention be without legal ground, the person
a "state of rebellion" is being used by the arrested can charge the arresting officer with
authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez denies that to his filing an action for damages against the
it has issued a particular order to arrest specific arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil
persons in connection with the "rebellion. He Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other
states that what is extant are general remedies which they can avail themselves of,
instructions to law enforcement officers and thereby making the prayer for prohibition and
military agencies to implement Proclamation mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2
No. 38. Indeed and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
3. Moreover, petitioners' contention that they 5. As regards petitioner's prayer that the hold
109
departure orders issued against them be expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be
declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
that petitioners are not directly assailing the the Philippines and whenever it becomes
validity of the subject hold departure orders in necessary, he may call out such armed forces
their petition. They are not even expressing to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
intention to leave the country in the near invasion or rebellion..."
future. The prayer to set aside the same must
be made in proper proceedings initiated for that 10. The factual necessity of calling out the
purpose. armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters
6. Anent petitioner's allegations ex abundante considered for satisfying the same is a
ad cautelam in support of their application for combination of several factors which are not
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is always accessible to the courts. Besides
manifest that the writ is not called for since its the absence of testual standards that the court
purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful may use to judge necessity, information
restraint , a matter which remains necessary to arrive at such judgment might
speculative up to this very day. also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information necessary to
(Santiago petition): Mandamus will not arrive at such judgment might also prove
issue unless the right to relief is clear at unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
the time of the award information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
7. The petition is denominated as one for instances, the evidence upon which the
mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to President might decide that there is a need to
petitions for mandamus that the legal right of call out the armed forces may be of a nature
the petitioner to the performance of a particular not constituting technical proof. On the other
act which is sought to be compelled must be hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has
clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue a vast intelligence network to gather
unless the right to relief is clear at the time of information, some of which may be classified as
the award. Up to the present time, petitioner highly confidential or affecting the security of
Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
imminent danger of being arrested without a on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have necessary in emergency situations to avert
categorically stated that petitioner will not be great loss of human lives and mass destruction
arrested without a warrant. of property. (see IBP vs. Zamora)
(Lumbao petition): Declaration of a state 11. The Court, in a proper case, may look into
of rebellion is the domain of the the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President, in exercise of Commander in exercise of this power. However, this is no
Chief powers longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38
having been lifted.
8. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's
Movement against Poverty (PMAP) argues that (LDP Petition): LDP not a real party in
the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is interest since, being a juridical person, it
violative of the doctrine of separation of is not subject to arrest
powers, being an encroachment on the domain
of the judiciary which has the constitutional 12. Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong
prerogative to "determine or interpret" what Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule
took place on May 1, 2001, and that the requires that a party must show a personal
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to
exception to the general rule on the allocation himself that can be redressed by a favorable
of the governmental powers. decision so as to warrant an invocation of the
court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of
9. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution the court's remedial powers in his behalf. Here,
110
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to
itself which would justify resort to the By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject occupation had ended. After hours-long
to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to
by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its barracks. The President, however, did not
leaders, members, and supporters are being immediately lift the declaration of a state of
threatened with warrantless arrest and rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
detention for the crime of rebellion. Every through Proclamation No. 435.
action must be brought in the name of the
party whose legal right has been invaded or In the interim, several petitions were filed
infringed, or whose legal right is under before this Court challenging the validity of
imminent threat of invasion or infringement. Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
13. At best, the instant petition may be Petioners (including members of Congress and
considered as an action for declaratory relief, party-list organizations like Sanlakas, Partido ng
petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of Manggagawa , and SJS Society) pose similar
expression and freedom of assembly is affected contentions questioning the authority of the
by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and President to declare a state of rebellion in the
that said proclamation is invalid for being exercise of the calling out power granted
contrary to the Constitution. However, to under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
consider the petition as one for declaratory
relief affords little comfort to petitioner, On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues
the Supreme Court not having jurisdiction in the that the petitions have been rendered moot by
first instance over such a petition. the lifting of the declaration. The Solicitor
General likewise questions the standing of the
30. Case Summary petitioners to bring suit.
Sanlakas vs Executive Secetary Reyes
(2004) Held:
G.R. No. 159085 | 2004-02-03
Moot and Academic (Exceptions)
Subject:
1. The issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
Locus Standi, Calling out power, Declaration of declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased
state of rebellion to exist, has rendered the case moot.
As a party list organization, it has not 11. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
demonstrated any injury to itself which would Constitution requires the concurrence of two
justify the resort to the Court. It is a juridical conditions, namely, (1) an actual invasion or
person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot rebellion, and (2) that public safety requires the
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. exercise of such power. However, these
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and conditions are not required in the exercise of
supporters are being threatened with the calling out power.
warrantless arrest and detention for the crime
of rebellion. Every action must be brought in 12. The only criterion for the exercise of the
the name of the party whose legal rights has calling out power is that 'whenever it
been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right becomes necessary,' the President may call
is under imminent threat of invasion or the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress
infringement. (citing Lacson vs Perez) lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
7. That petitioner SJS officers/members are 13. The President has full discretionary power
taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily to call out the armed forces and to determine
endow them with standing. the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the
A taxpayer may bring suit where the act power was exercised within constitutional limits
complained of directly involves the illegal or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
disbursement of public funds derived from discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by
taxation. No such illegal disbursement is way of proof, supported their assertion that the
alleged President acted without factual basis.
16. Nevertheless, in calling out the armed 21. The President, in declaring a state of
forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
notice to the nation that such a state exists and Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
that the armed forces may be called to prevent These are purely executive powers, vested on
or suppress it. Such a declaration is devoid the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
of any legal significance. For all legal intents, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
the declaration is deemed not written. contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
However, the provincial election supervisor 3. The essential distinction between residence
stated that that the deadline for filing and domicile in law is that residence involves
certificates of candidacy has already lapsed. the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
The Comelec Division declared Marcos may seek a place for purposes such as
disqualified for failing to meet and prove the pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
one year residency requirement. It did not give intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if
credence to her claim of honest error. his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
Moreover, the division found that, except for established it is residence. Thus, an individual
the time that she studied and worked for some may have different residences in various
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she places. However, a person can only have a
continuously lived in Manila. She even single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
registered as a voter in various places in Manila he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
and served as member of the Batasang of another domicile of choice.
Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of 4. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
Metro Manila. In effect, Marcos was deemed to abode, whether permanent or temporary;
have abandoned her domicile in Tacloban City "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
in favor of Manila. to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in
The Comelec En Banc upheld the division and one place and a domicile in
declared Marcos as disqualified from running another. Residence is not domicile, but
for the First District of Leyte for failing to meet domicile is residence coupled with the intention
the residency requirement. to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for the same purpose at
In the meantime, Marcos was the overwhelming any time, but he may have numerous places of
winner of the elections for the congressional residence.
seat in the First District of Leyte in the May 8,
1995 elections. In view of the Comelec Determining Residency Qualification
Resolution suspending her proclamation,
Marcos filed a petition with the Supreme Court 5. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in
to obtain relief. a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and
Held: individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said
Residency Qualification (Residence and statement becomes material only when there is
Domicile in Election Law) or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
1. In election cases, the term "residence" otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the Domicile of Marcos
intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with 6. It appears that Marcos merely committed an
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which the space provided for the residency
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like qualification requirement. A close look at said
reasons, one intends to return. (citing Perfecto certificate would reveal the possible source of
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino) the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No.
114
7) is followed immediately by the entry for origin by operation of law as a result of her
residence in the constituency where a marriage to the late President Ferdinand Marcos
candidate seeks election (Item No. 8). The in 1952. The female spouse does not
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 - automatically lose her domicile of origin in
the first requiring actual residence and the favor of the husband's choice of residence
second requiring domicile - coupled with the upon marriage.
circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to 12. When Imelda was married to then
her writing down an unintended entry for which Congressman Ferdinand Marcos, she was
she could be disqualified. obliged - by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil
Code - to follow her husband's actual place of
7. An individual does not lose his domicile even residence fixed by him. What she gained in that
if he has lived and maintained residences in case was merely a new actual residence. She
different places. Residence implies a factual did not lose her domicile of origin.
relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or 13. Even assuming that she lost her domicile
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to upon marriage to her husband, her actions after
do other things of a temporary or semi- the death of her husband and her return to the
permanent nature does not constitute loss of country indicate her choice to make her
residence. Hence, the registration of a voter domicile of origin (Tacloban) as her new
in a place other than his residence of domicile, i.e., seeking the PCGG's permission to
origin has not been deemed sufficient to rehabilitate the ancestral house in Tacloban and
constitute abandonment or loss of such obtaining her residence certificate in 1992 in
residence. Tacloban.
9. As to the contention that Tacloban was not (1) An actual removal or an actual change of
Marcos domicile of origin because she was domicile;
born in Manila and did not live in Tacloban until
she was eight years old, it is held that a minor (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the
follows the domicile of his parents.In spite former place of residence and establishing a
of the fact of her being born in Manila, her new one; and
domicile of origin by operation of law is
Tacloban, Leyte. (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose.
19. The difference between a mandatory and Petitioners argue that the respondent parties do
directory provision is often determined on not belong to the marginalized and
grounds of expediency, the reason being that underrepresented sector, hence should be
less injury results to the general public by disqualified.
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law.
Held:
Jurisdiction over Disqualification Case
(Comelec vs Electoral Tribunal) Recourse under Rule 65 of Rules of Court
20. The COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction to 1. Under both the Constitution and the Rules of
hear and decide a pending disqualification case Court, a challenge on the validity of a Comelec
under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the Resolution for having been issued with grave
elections. abuse of discretion may be brought before the
Supreme Court in a verified petition for
21. The jurisdiction of House of Representatives certiorari under Rule 65.
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and 2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 was
qualifications of members of Congress promulgated by the Comelec en banc. As such,
begins only after a candidate has become a no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
member of the House of Representatives. being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d),
(Note: a winning candidate to a Congressional Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
seat only becomes a member of the House Hence, resort to Rule 65 is proper.
after being proclaimed as the winner and being
duly sworn into office. Marcos, not being 3. In any event, this case presents an exception
proclaimed and sworn in yet, cannot invoke the to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
jurisdiction of the HRET) absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. It has been held that
32. Case Summary certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. presence of other remedies, where the issue
COMELEC raised is one purely of law, where public
116
interest is involved, and in case of urgency. organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
4. Procedural requirements may be glossed the Constitution and RA 7491.
over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when
the issue involves the principle of social justice, 12. RA 7491 mandates a state policy of
when the decision sought to be set aside is a promoting proportional representation by
nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely means of a party-list system which will enable
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and the election to the House of Representatives of
speedy remedy available. Filipino citizens, 1. Who belong
to marginalized and
Participation of Political Parties in the underrepresented sectors, organizations and
Party-List System parties; and 2. Who lack well-defined
constituencies; but 3. Who could contribute to
5. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, the formulation and enactment of appropriate
respondents cannot be disqualified from the legislation that will benefit the nation as a
party-list elections, merely on the ground that whole.
they are political parties.
Proportional representation
6. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of 13. Proportional representation does not refer
Representatives may be elected through a to the number of people in a particular district,
party-list system of registered national, because the party-list election is national in
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
7. Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article
IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may 14. Proportional representation refers to the
be registered under the party-list system. representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented
8. During the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Monsod stated that Lack of well-defined constituency
the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance 15. Lack of well-defined constituency refers to
to parties that consistently place third or fourth the absence of a traditionally identifiable
in congressional district elections to win a seat electoral group, like voters of a congressional
in Congress. district or territorial unit of government. It
points again to those with disparate interests
9. Section 3 of RA 7941 expressly states that a identified with the marginalized or
'party' is 'either a political party or a sectoral underrepresented.
party or a coalition of parties.'
Marginalized and Underrepresented
10. RA 7941 defines 'political party' as 'an
organized group of citizens advocating an 16. The marginalized and underrepresented
ideology or platform, principles and policies for sectors are enumerated in Section 5 of RA
the general conduct of government and which, 7491: namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
as the most immediate means of securing their poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
adoption, regularly nominates and supports handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
certain of its leaders and members as overseas workers, and professionals.
candidates for public office'
17. While the enumeration is not exclusive, it
11. The fact that political parties may demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
participate in the party-list elections does not not all sectors can be represented under the
mean, however, that any political party or any party-list system.
organization or group for that matter may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or 18. The OSGs assertions that any party or
117
group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of organization must represent marginalized
RA 7491 may participate, even the super-rich and underrepresented sectors. So also
and overrepresented, are contrary to RA 7491 must its nominees.
and the Constitution. The party-list system is a
tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the Eighth, while lacking a well-defined
law could not have given the same tool to political constituency, the nominee must
others, to the prejudice of the intended likewise be able to contribute to the
beneficiaries. formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a
19. The intent of the Constitution is to give whole.
genuine power to the people by enabling them
to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Nevertheless, the Comelec must ensure that 33. Case Summary
only Filipinos who are marginalized and Atong Paglaum vs Comelec (2013)
underrepresented may become members of G.R. No. 203766, G.R. Nos. 203818-19, G.R. No.
Congress under the party-list system, Filipino- 203922, G.R. No. 203936, G.R. No. 203958, G.R.
style. No. 203960, G.R. No. 203976, G.R. No. 203981,
G.R. No. 204002, G.R. No. 204094, G.R. No.
Requirement to Participate in the 204100, G.R. No. 204122, G.R. No. 204125, G.R.
Philippine Party-List System No. 204126, G.R. No. 2041 | 2013-04-02
20. Guidelines for Screening Party-List Subject: Party-List System under the 1987
Participants: Constitution; Party-List system was intended to
First, the political party, sector, include even non-sectoral organizations;
organization or coalition must represent Political party vs Sectoral party; National and
the marginalized and underrepresented Regional parties need NOT represent the
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
may be simply organized as political parties;
Second, while even major political parties Not all sectoral parties must represent the
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
Constitution to participate in the party-list Marginalized and Underrepresented
system, they must comply with the requirement shall be limited to sectors that by
declared statutory policy enabling Filipino their nature are economically at the margins of
citizens belonging to marginalized and society; Major political parties could participate
underrepresented sectors to be elected to in party-list elections only through their sectoral
the House of Representatives. wings; Re-examination of the ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT; New Parameters in
Third, the religious sector may not be determining who are qualified to participate in
represented in the party-list system. the party-list elections
Party-List System under the 1987 6. Thus, the party-list system is composed
Constitution of three different groups:
(1) national parties or organizations;
1. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for (2) regional parties or organizations; and
the party-list system of representation. (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National
Relevant provisions are found in Section 5, and regional parties or organizations are
Article VI and Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C of different from sectoral parties or organizations.
the 1987 Constitution. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and
2. The party-list system is intended to need not represent any particular sector.
democratize political power by giving political
parties that cannot win in legislative district Political party vs Sectoral party
elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two 7. Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List
representatives in the House of System Act, which is the law that implements
Representatives: one for his or her legislative the party-list system, defines a party as
district, and another for his or her party-list either a political party or a sectoral party or a
group or organization of choice coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of
Party-List system was intended to include R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a political
even non-sectoral organizations party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
3. Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main principles and policies for the general conduct
sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that of government. On the other hand, Section
the party-list system is not synonymous with 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral
that of the sectoral representation party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
4. The framers of the 1987 Constitution Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
expressly rejected the proposal to make the pertains to the special interest and concerns of
party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties their sector.
only, and they clearly intended the party-list
system to include both sectoral and non- National and Regional parties need NOT
sectoral parties. The framers intended the represent the marginalized and
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the underrepresented sectors, may be simply
entirety, of the party-list system. In fact, the organized as Political Parties
proposal to give permanent reserved seats to
certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the 8. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives regional parties or organizations to represent
was only allowed for the first three consecutive the marginalized and underrepresented
terms. sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent
5. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution the marginalized and underrepresented is to
provides that there shall be a party-list system deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-
of registered national, regional, and sectoral based and cause-oriented parties from the
parties or organizations. The commas separate party-list system. To exclude them from the
national and regional parties from sectoral party list system is to prevent them from
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
119
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude that by their nature are economically at
them from the party-list system is patently the margins of society
contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 12. The phrase marginalized and
7941. underrepresented should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
9. Under the party-list system, an ideology- economically marginalized and
based or cause-oriented political party is clearly underrepresented. These sectors are: labor,
different from a sectoral party. A political party peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
need not be organized as a sectoral party and cultural communities, veterans, overseas
need not represent any particular sector. There workers, and other similar sectors. For these
is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a sectors, a majority of the members of the
national or regional political party must sectoral party must belong to the marginalized
represent a marginalized and and underrepresented. The nominees of the
underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that sectoral party either must belong to the sector,
the political party consists of citizens who or must have a track record of advocacy for the
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the sector represented. Belonging to the
same governance principles and policies, marginalized and underrepresented sector
regardless of their economic status as citizens. does not mean one must wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one,
Not all sectoral parties must represent the or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
marginalized and underrepresented More specifically, the economically
sectors marginalized and underrepresented are those
who fall in the low income group as classified
10. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, 13. The recognition that national and regional
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, parties, as well as sectoral parties of
overseas workers, and professionals. The professionals, the elderly, women and the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all youth, need not be marginalized and
necessarily marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-
underrepresented. For sure, professionals based and cause-oriented parties who lack
are not by definition marginalized and well-defined political constituencies a chance
underrepresented, not even the elderly, to win seats in the House of Representatives.
women, and the youth. However, professionals, On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized
the elderly, women, and the youth may lack and underrepresented the sectoral parties for
well-defined political constituencies, and can labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
thus organize themselves into sectoral parties indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
in advocacy of the special interests and veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
concerns of their respective sectors. that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the marginalized
11. The phrase marginalized and and underrepresented an opportunity to
underrepresented appears only once in R.A. likewise win seats in the House of
No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. Representatives.
While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 broadly refers to marginalized and 14. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987
underrepresented sectors, organizations and Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise
parties, the specific implementing provisions to a multi-party system where those
of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that marginalized and underrepresented, both in
the sectors, organizations or parties must be economic and ideological status, will have the
marginalized and underrepresented. opportunity to send their own members to the
House of Representatives.
Marginalized and Underrepresented
requirement shall be limited to sectors Major political parties could participate in
120
party-list elections only through their form part does not participate in the party-list
sectoral wings system.
15. The major political parties are those that 20. A party-list nominee must be a bona
field candidates in the legislative district fide member of the party or organization which
elections. Major political parties cannot he or she seeks to represent. In the case of
participate in the party-list elections since sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list
they neither lack well-defined political nominee one must either belong to the sector
constituencies nor represent represented, or have a track record of advocacy
marginalized and underrepresented for such sector.
sectors.
Re-examination of the ruling in Ang
16. Thus, the national or regional parties under Bagong Bayani and BANAT
the party-list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political parties. This 21. In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC
automatically reserves the national and used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
regional parties under the party-list system Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid
tothose who lack well-defined political down the guidelines qualifying those who desire
constituencies, giving them the opportunity to to participate in the party-list system. Notably,
have members in the House of Representatives. major political parties were allowed to
participate in party-list elections. In 2009, by a
17. However, major political parties could vote of 8-7 in BANAT, the majority officially
participate in party-list elections only excluded major political parties from
through their sectoral wings. The participating in party-list elections. The minority
participation of major political parties through in BANAT, however, believed that major political
their sectoral wings, a majority of whose parties can participate in the party-list system
members are marginalized and through their sectoral wings.
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies, will facilitate the entry 22. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for
of the marginalized and underrepresented following prevailing jurisprudence in
and those who lack well-defined political disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
constituencies as members of the House of jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
Representatives. committed grave abuse of discretion. However,
for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
18. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a we must now impose and mandate the party-
major political party that fields candidates in list system actually envisioned and
the legislative district elections must organize a authorized under the 1987 Constitution and
sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, R.A. No. 7941. We declare that it would not be
urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
that can register under the party-list system. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT in determining who are
19. Such sectoral wing of a major political party qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
must have its own constitution, by-laws, 2013 party-list elections.
platform or program of government, officers
and members, a majority of whom must belong 23. The COMELEC excluded from participating
to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections those
in itself an independent sectoral party, and that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all
is linked to a major political party through a national, regional, and sectoral groups or
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of organizations must represent the marginalized
R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all
parties or organizations of a coalition may nominees must belong to the marginalized
participate independently (in party-list and underrepresented sector they represent.
elections) provided the coalition of which they Petitioners may have been disqualified by the
COMELEC because as political or regional
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parties they are not organized along sectoral lacking in well-defined political
lines and do not represent the marginalized constituencies. It is enough that their principal
and underrepresented. Also, petitioners' advocacy pertains to the special interest and
nominees who do not belong to the sectors concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
they represent may have been disqualified, marginalized and underrepresented include
although they may have a track record of labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
of non-sectoral parties may have been veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
disqualified because they do not belong to any that lack well-defined political constituencies
sector. Moreover, a party may have been include professionals, the elderly, women, and
disqualified because one or more of its the youth. 5. A majority of the members of
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has sectoral parties or organizations that represent
at least one remaining qualified nominee. As the marginalized and underrepresented must
discussed above, the disqualification of belong to the marginalized and
petitioners, and their nominees, under such underrepresented sector they represent.
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. parties or organizations that lack well-defined
political constituencies must belong to the
New Parameters in determining who are sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
qualified to participate in the party-list parties or organizations that represent the
elections marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political
24. Thus, we remand all the present petitions to constituencies, either must belong to their
the COMELEC. In determining who may respective sectors, or must have a track record
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC nominees of national and regional parties or
shall adhere to the following parameters: organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.
1. Three different groups may participate in the
party-list system: (1) national parties or 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
organizations. they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize 34. Case Summary
along sectoral lines and do not need to Veterans Foundation Party vs. COMELEC
represent any marginalized and (2000)
underrepresented sector. G.R. No. 136781 | 2000-10-06
3. Political parties can participate in party-list Subject: Party list system - four inviolable
elections provided they register under the parameters; Twenty (20%) percent allocation,
party-list system and do not field candidates in computation; Twenty (20%) percent allocation,
legislative district elections. A political party, a ceiling only; Two (2%) percent threshold, valid
whether major or not, that fields candidates in statutory requirement; Three (3) seat
legislative district elections can participate in allocation, valid statutory requirement; Method
party list elections only through its sectoral of Allocating Additional Seats; Method of
wing that can separately register under the Allocating Additional Seats - Philippine formula;
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself Comelec resolutions void for being violative of
an independent sectoral party, and is linked to RA 7941
a political party through a coalition. Facts:
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either Pursuant to Section 18 of Republic Act (RA) No.
be marginalized and underrepresented or 7941 or the Party List System Act, the Comelec
122
en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, percent-vote requirement prescribed under
prescribing the rules and regulations governing Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 and thus concluded
the election of party-list representatives that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x
through the party-list system. x x should have at least one representative."
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list The Comelec en banc affirmed the Resolution of
representation was held simultaneously with its Second Division. The Comelec en banc
the national elections. A total of 123 parties, accepted that the 20% party list membership,
organizations and coalitions participated. On comprising 52 seats, must be filled up. It
June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed resolved that the 38 remaining seats (52 less
thirteen party-list representatives from twelve 14 who qualified under the 2% vote threshold)
parties and organizations, which had obtained should be distributed, not among those same
at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for 14 qualifying party list organizations, but
the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed among the remaining party lists even if they
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, had not passed the two percent threshold.
which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
Several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
After a special elections, the Comelec en banc mandamus were filed before the Supreme Court
further determined that COCOFED (Philippine by the parties and organizations that had
Coconut Planters' Federation, Inc.) was entitled obtained at least two per cent of the total votes
to one party-list seat for having garnered cast for the party-list system.
186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list The court narrowed the issues for resolution to
system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. the following:
Calderon, was proclaimed as the 14th party-list
representative. (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or is it merely a
PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for ceiling? In other words, should the twenty
Peace and Good Government Towards percent allocation for party-list solons be filled
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) up completely and all the time?
filed a petition with the Comelec alleging that
the filling up of the twenty percent membership (2) Are the 2% threshold requirement and the
of party-list representatives in the House of three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
Representatives, as provided under the 7941 constitutional?
Constitution, equivalent to 52 party-list
representatives, was mandatory. It claimed that (3) If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
the literal application of the two percent vote how should the additional seats of a qualified
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA party be determined?
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision,
for only 25 nominees would be declared Held:
winners. Thereafter, other party-list
organizations filed their respective Motions for Party list system - four inviolable
Intervention, seeking the same relief. parameters
The Comelec Second Division promulgated its 1. Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It feature into our presidential system of
ordered the proclamation of herein 38 government -- the party-list method of
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already representation. Under this system, any
sitting, would thus total 52 party-list national, regional or sectoral party or
representatives. It held that "at all times, the organization registered with the Commission on
total number of congressional seats must be Elections may participate in the election of
filled up by 80% percent district representatives party-list representatives who, upon their
and 20% party-list representatives." In election and proclamation, shall sit in the House
allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two of Representatives as regular members. In
123
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the
House -- one for a district congressman and To illustrate, considering that there were 208
another for a party-list representative. district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-
2. The party list system of representation is list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution. Pursuant thereto, Congress 208
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 or the Party -------- x .20 = 52 .80
List System Act on March 3, 1995. Under the
Constitution and RA No. 7941, the four 4. This formulation means that any increase in
inviolable parameters under a Philippine-style the number of district representatives, as may
party-list election are: be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-
(a) the twenty (20%) percent allocation - list seats.
the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent Twenty (20%) percent allocation, a ceiling
of the total membership of the House of only
Representatives, including those elected under
the party list. 5. A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution conveys that Congress was
(b) the two (2%) percent threshold - only vested with the broad power to define and
those parties garnering a minimum of two prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
percent of the total valid votes cast for the system of representation. The Constitution
party-list system are "qualified" to have a explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
seat in the House of Representatives; total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list
(c) the three-seat limit - each qualified party, representatives.
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three 6. In the exercise of its constitutional
seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941.
additional seats. Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of
(d) proportional representation - party-list representatives in order to enable
the additional seats which a qualified party is Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to underrepresented sectors to contribute
their total number of votes." legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties,
Twenty (20%) percent allocation, organizations and coalitions participating in the
computation system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in
3. The Constitution makes the number of order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
district representatives the determinant in garnering more than this percentage could
arriving at the number of seats allocated for have additional seats in proportion to their total
party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise number of votes. Furthermore, no winning
"twenty per centum of the total number of party, organization or coalition can have more
representatives including those under the than three seats in the House of
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision Representatives.
into a mathematical formula, as follows:
7. Considering the foregoing statutory
No. of district representatives requirements, the 20% allocation under Section
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party- 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
list mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
.80 representatives party-list seats in Congress.
124
pronouncements, Congress set theseat-limit to
8. On the contention that a strict application of three (3) for each qualified party, organization
the two percent threshold may result in a or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat
that the prerogative to determine whether to limit ensures the entry of various interest-
adjust or change this percentage requirement representations into the legislature; thus, no
rests in Congress. Indeed, the function of the single group, no matter how large its
Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and membership, would dominate the party-list
quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as seats, if not the entire House.
we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, Method of Allocating Additional Seats
insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of 12. Several methods were considered in
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed determining how to allocate additional seats:
at all times. This is the essence of the rule of
law. (a) One Additional Seat Per Two Percent
Increment a party that wins at least six
Two (2%) percent threshold, valid percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to
statutory requirement three seats; another party that gets four
9. In imposing a two percent threshold, percent will be entitled to two seats; and one
Congress wanted to ensure that only those that gets two percent will be entitled to one
parties, organizations and coalitions having seat only. However, the court considered a
a sufficient number of constituents deserving of scenario wherein Party A receives 20% of votes
representation are actually represented in cast; Party B, 10%; and Party C, 6%. Applying
Congress. this method, Party A=10 seats; Party B=5 seats
and Party C=3 seats. Considering the three-
10. The two percent threshold is consistent not seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will
only with the intent of the framers of the each uniformly have three seats only. This
Constitution and the law, but with the very results in a party garnering two or more times
essence of "representation." Under a republican the number of votes obtained by another, yet
or representative state, all government getting the same number of seats as the other
authority emanates from the people, but is one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
exercised by representatives chosen by them. proportional representation will be contravened
But to have meaningful representation, the and the law rendered nugatory. Hence, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a Court discarded it.
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, (b) Niemeyer Formula - this was developed by a
the result might be the proliferation of small German mathematician and adopted by
groups which are incapable of contributing Germany as its method of distributing party-list
significant legislation, and which might even seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the
pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, number of additional seats to which a qualified
even legislative districts are apportioned party would be entitled is determined by
according to "the number of their respective multiplying the remaining number of seats to
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and be allocated by the total number of votes
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local obtained by that party and dividing the product
representation. by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the
Three (3) seat allocation, valid statutory resulting product will be the number of
requirement additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to. Next is to distribute the extra seats
11. An important consideration in adopting the left among the qualified parties in the
party-list system is to promote and encourage a descending order of the decimal portions of the
multiparty system of representation. Consistent resulting products.
with the Constitutional Commission's
125
No. of remaining seats additional seats than the first party for two
to be allocated reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and
No. of additional the first party will always be less than 1:1, and
-------------------------- x No. of votes of = (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
seats of party rounding off, because there is no such thing as
Total no. of votes of party concerned a fraction of a seat. A fractional membership
concerned cannot be converted into a whole membership
qualified parties of one when it would, in effect, deprive another
Integer.decimal) party's fractional membership. It would be a
violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. (see Guingona Jr. v.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable Gonzales)
for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat Number of votes
limit and the non-mandatory character of the of first party Proportion of votes of
twenty percent allocation. In Germany, there -------------------- = first party relative to
are no seat limitations, because German law Total votes for total votes for party-list
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In system
contrast, RA 7941 imposes a three-seat limit to party-list system
encourage the promotion of the multiparty
system. If the proportion of votes received by the first
party without rounding it off is :
Applying the Niemeyer formula under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified (a) equal to at least 6% of the total valid votes
parties will each be entitled to three seats, cast for all the party list groups - then the first
resulting in an overall total of 39. Like the party shall be entitled to two additional seats or
previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would a total of three seats overall.
violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list (b) equal to or greater than 4% but less than
system. 6% - then the first party shall have one
additional or a total oftwo seats.
Method of Allocating Additional Seats -
Philippine formula (c) less than 4% - then the first party shall not
be entitled to any additional seat. In short, it
13. The Philippine style party-list system is a shall have one seat.
unique paradigm which demands an equally
unique formula: Note that the above formula will be applicable
only in determining the number of additional
Step 1: Rank all the participating parties, seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be
highest to lowest, according to the votes they used to determine the number of additional
each obtained. Then the ratio for each party is seats of the other qualified parties. The use of
computed by dividing its votes by the total the same formula for all would contravene the
votes cast for all the parties participating in the proportional representation parameter.
system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat Step 3: Solve for the number of additional
each. Only these parties shall be considered in seats that the other qualified parties are
the computation of additional seats. The party entitled to, based
receiving the highest number of votes shall onproportional representation. In simplified
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party. form, the formula is written as follows:
4. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 9. Allocation of Qualified seats (First Round):
No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be (a) The parties shall be ranked from the
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their highest to the lowest based on the
total number of votes." This is where number of votes they garnered during the
petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the elections.
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause "in proportion to their total number of (b) The parties receiving at least two
votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the percent of the total votes cast for the
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the party-list system shall be entitled to one
express language of R.A. No. 7941. guaranteed seat each.
6. The two percent threshold makes it (d) The remaining available seats for
mathematically impossible to achieve the allocation as additional seats are the
maximum number of available party list seats maximum seats reserved under the Party
when the number of available party list seats List System (20 percent ceiling) less the
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two guaranteed or qualified seats.
percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the (e) First, The percentage of votes
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of garnered by each party-list candidate is
the House of Representatives shall consist of multiplied by the remaining available
party-list representatives. seats. The resulting number (integer only,
no rounding up) corresponds to a party's
Three-seat cap share in the remaining available seats.
7. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the (f) Second, one party-list seat is assigned
number of seats that a qualified party-list to each of the parties next in rank until all
organization may occupy, remains a valid available seats are completely distributed.
128
the HRET, the petitioner filed the present
(g) Finally, apply the three-seat cap to Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for
determine the number of seats each Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Restraining Order (TRO).
Major Political Parties The petition mainly asks the Supreme Court to
modify the interpretation of the formula stated
11. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the divisor for
prohibits major political parties from the computation of the percentage
participating in the party-list system. Major votes, from total number of votes
political parties are allowed to participate in castminus the votes for the disqualified party-
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. list candidates, to the total number of votes
cast regardless whether party-list groups are
12. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court disqualified.
decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties The petitioner puts in issue the interpretation of
from participating in the party-list elections, Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,
directly or indirectly. which states:
18. Comelec applied the (old) formula used In March 2014, Alroben J. Goh filed before the
in BANAT vs. COMELEC to arrive at the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Lucilo
winning party-list groups and their guaranteed R. Bayron, the incumbent mayor of Puerto
seats, where: Princesa City, due to loss of trust and
confidence brought about by gross violation of
[No. of votes of the Party List / Total No. of votes pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and
for party-list candidates] = % of votes garnered Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of
by the Party List pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials,
19. Under the present ruling, the (new or Incompetence, and other related gross
modified) formula to determine the proportion inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty,
garnered by the partylist group would now be: intellectual dishonesty and emotional
immaturity.
132
2014 GAA provides such authorization to the
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864 COMELEC Chairman.
which found the recall petition sufficient in form
and substance, but suspended further Expenditures for the conduct of recall
proceedings on recall until the funding issue electionsis deemed covered under
raised by the Finance Services Department COMELEC appropriations for operating
shall have been resolved. expenditures
Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an 3. Despite Resolution No. 9882s statement
Motion for Reconsideration and prayed for the about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to
dismissal of the recall petition. provide for a line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections, the court holds
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882 that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides
which suspended any proceeding relative to for a line item appropriation for the conduct
recall as the recall process does not have an and supervision of recall elections. This is found
(line item) appropriation in the General in the Programs categoryof its 2014 budget,
Appropriations Act of 2014 (2014 GAA) and the which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No.
2014 GAA does not provide the COMELEC with 9882 is a line item for the Conduct and
legal authority to commit public funds for the supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
recall process. The COMELEC concluded that and plebiscites.
until a law is passed by Congress
appropriating funds for recall elections either 4. In addition, one of the specific constitutional
by approving the Commissions budget functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall
proposal for FY 2015 or through a supplemental elections. When the COMELEC receives a
(special) appropriation for FY 2014 any budgetary appropriation for its Current
proceeding relative to the instant petition for Operating Expenditures, such appropriation
recall should be suspended further. includes expenditures to carry out its
constitutional functions, including the conduct
Goh filed the present Petition challenging the of recall elections.
above COMELEC Resolutions.
5. In Socrates vs. COMELEC, recall elections
Held: were conducted even without a specific
appropriation for recall elections in the 2002
1. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of GAA. [Thus], we find it difficult to justify the
discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and COMELECs reasons why it is unable to conduct
9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line item recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was
appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite
its constitutional mandate of conducting recall lack of the specific words Conduct and
elections. There is no need for supplemental supervision of ...recall votes in the 2002 GAA.
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to In facts, in the 2002 GAA, the phrase Conduct
conduct recall elections for 2014. and supervision of elections and other political
exercises was sufficient to fund the conduct of
COMELECs Fiscal Autonomy recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is
a specific line item appropriation for the
2. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides Conduct and supervision of ... recall votes .
the COMELEC with the power to [e]nforce and The requirement that an appropriation
administer all laws and regulations relative to 'must be for a specific purpose' is satisfied
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, even if the indicated purpose is capable of
referendum, and recall. The 1987 Constitution further specification
not only guaranteed the COMELECs fiscal
autonomy, but also granted its head (COMELEC 6. To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a
Chairman) as authorized by law, to augment specific amount and a specific purpose.
items in its appropriations from its savings. The However, the purpose may be specific even if it
is broken down into different related sub-
133
categories of the same nature. For example, the Conduct and supervision of ..recall votes
the purpose can be to conduct elections, in its budget appropriation.
which even if not expressly spelled out
covers regular, special, or recall elections. The 10. Contrary to the COMELECs assertion,
purpose of the appropriation is still specific to the appropriations for personnel services and
fund elections, which naturally and logically maintenance and other operating
include, even if not expressly stated, not only expenses falling under Conduct and
regular but also special or recall elections. supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscitesconstitute a line item which can
7. The constitutional test for validity is not how be augmented from the COMELECs savings to
itemized the appropriation is down to the fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014.
project level but whether the purpose of the The conduct of recall elections requires only
appropriation is specific enough to allow the operating expenses, not capital outlays. The
President to exercise his line-item veto power. COMELECs existing personnel in Puerto
Section 23, Chapter 4, Book VI of the Princesa are the same personnel who will
Administrative Code provides a stricter evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions
requirement by mandating that there must be a and conduct the recall elections.
corresponding appropriation for each program
and for each project. A project is a component 11. Moreover, the line item appropriation for
of a program which may have several projects. the Conduct and supervision of x x x recall
A program is equivalent to the specific purpose votes x x x in the 2014 GAA is sufficient to
of an appropriation. An item of appropriation for fund recall elections. There is no constitutional
school-building is a program, while the specific requirement that the budgetary appropriation
schools to be built, being the identifiable must be loaded in contingent funds. The
outputs of the program, are the projects. The Congress has plenary power to lodge such
Constitution only requires a corresponding appropriation in current operating expenditures.
appropriation for a specific purpose or program,
not for the sub-set of projects or activities. We 38. Case Summary
thus find unnecessary the COMELECs protests Gaminde vs. COA (2000)
regarding the difference between Projects G.R. No. 140335 | 2000-12-13
and Programs for their failure to allocate
funds for any recall process in 2014. Subject: Rotational system of appointment;
Term vs Tenure; Gaminde is bound by the term
COMELEC Chairman's authority to fund of the appointment she accepted which expired
recall elections from savings on February 2, 1999; Gaminde entitled to
receive salaries and emoluments for period
8. Despite the PhP2 billion to PhP10.7 billion served as de fact officer in good faith
savings existing in the COMELECs coffers, the
COMELEC asserts that it cannot legally fund the Facts:
exercise of recall elections. The power to
augment from savings lies dormant until On June 11, 1993, the President of the
authorized by law. Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, as Commissioner of the
9. The 2014 GAA provides a line item Civil Service Commission (CSC). She assumed
appropriation for the COMELECs conduct of office after taking an oath of office.
recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits Subsequently, the Commission on Appointment
that it does not have sufficient funds from its confirmed her appointment. The appointment
current line item appropriation for the Conduct paper stated that: you are hereby appointed,
and supervision of..recall votes to conduct an ad interim, COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE
actual recall election, then there is therefore an COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2,
actual deficiency in its operating funds for the 1999.
current year. This is a situation that allows for
the exercise of the COMELEC Chairmans power On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought
to augment actual deficiencies in the item for clarification from the Office of the President as
134
to the expiry date of her term of office. The reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that shall be only for the unexpired term of the
petitioner's term of office would expire on predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
February 2, 2000, not on February 2, 1999. appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
remained in office after February 2, 1999. CSC 2. The rotational system for the appointment of
Chairman de Leon wrote the Commission on CSC members was first introduced under the
Audit (COA) requesting an opinion on whether 1973 Constitution. The operation of the
or not Commissioner Gaminde and her co- rotational plan requires two conditions, both
terminous staff may be paid their salaries indispensable to its workability:
notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on February 2, 1999. (a) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date,
The COA General Counsel issued an opinion and,
that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has (b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation
expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her or disability before the expiration of the term
appointment papers. should only be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term. (see Republic vs. Imperial)
Consequently, the CSC Resident Auditor issued
a notice of disallowance on the salaries and 3. Applying the foregoing conditions to the
emoluments pertaining to petitioner Gaminde case at bar, the appropriate starting point of
and her co-terminous staff, effective February the terms of office of the first appointees to the
2, 1999. Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must be on February 2, 1987, the
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
COA en banc but the COA affirmed the In case of a belated appointment or
propriety of the disallowance, holding that qualification, the interval between the start of
petitioner's term of office is stated in her the term and the actual qualification of the
appointment paper which set the expiration appointee must be counted against the latter.
date on February 2, 1999, and that COA is
bereft of power to recognize an extension of her Term vs Tenure
term, not even with the implied acquiescence
of the Office of the President. Motion for 4. In the law of public officers, there is a settled
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present distinction between "term" and "tenure." "The
petition. term of an office must be distinguished from
the tenure of the incumbent. The term means
Held: the time during which the officer may claim to
hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
Rotational system of appointment after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the
1. The term of office of the Chairman and term during which the incumbent actually holds
members of the Civil Service Commission is the office. The term of office is not affected by
prescribed in under Article IX, 1987 the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than
Constitution, as follows: the term for reasons within or beyond the
power of the incumbent.
"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the 5. Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987
President with the consent of the Commission Constitution provides:
on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first "SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for Service Commission, the Commission on
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall
another Commissioner for three years, without continue in office for one year after the
135
ratification of this Constitution, unless they are
sooner removed for cause or become Gaminde entitled to receive salariesand
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their emoluments for period served as de fact
office or appointed to a new term thereunder. In officer in good faith
no case shall any Member serve longer than
seven years including service before the 9. However, she served as de facto officer in
ratification of this Constitution." good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus
entitled to receive her salary and other
6. What the above quoted Transitory Provisions emoluments for actual service rendered.
contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred
incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil in disallowing in audit such salary and other
Service Commission, the Commission on emoluments, including that of her co-terminous
Elections and the Commission on Audit, who staff.
"shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, unless they are 39.Case Summary
sooner removed for cause or become Funa vs MECO and COA (2014)
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their G.R. No. 193462 | 2014-02-04
office or appointed to a new term thereunder."
The term "unless" imports an exception to the Subject: Petition, even if rendered moot and
general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions academic by supervening events, may still be
mean that the incumbent members of the decided upon under exceptional circumstances;
Constitutional Commissions shall continue in Legal standing of petitioner as a citizen; Audit
office for one year after the ratification of this jurisdiction of the COA; MECO is Not a GOCC or
Constitution under their existing appointments a Government Instrumentality; MECO is
at the discretion of the appointing power, who organized as a Non-Stock Corporation; MECO
may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal performs functions with a public aspect; MECO
from office for cause; (2) their becoming is Not owned or controlled by the Government;
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their MECO is a Sui Generis entity; Certain accounts
office, or (3) their appointment to a new term of MECO (Verification Fees and Consular Fees)
thereunder, all of which events may occur are subject to audit by the COA;
before the end of the one year period after the
effectivity of the Constitution. Facts:
7. However, the transitory provisions do not After the Chinese civil war, China was faced
affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, with two (2) governments: (i) the communist
providing for a seven-five-three year rotational Peoples Republic of China (PROC) which
interval for the first appointees under this controls the mainland territories, and (ii) the
Constitution. nationalist Republic of China (ROC) which
controls the island of Taiwan. Both the PROC
Gaminde is bound by the term of the and ROC adhered to a policy of One China
appointment she accepted which expired i.e., the view that there is only one legitimate
on February 2, 1999 government in China, but differed in their
respective interpretation as to which that
8. Gaminde is bound by the term of the government is.
appointment she accepted, expiring February 2,
1999. In this connection, the letter of Deputy The Philippines formally ended its official
Executive Secretary Renato Corona clarifying diplomatic relations with the government in
that her term would expire on February 2, 2000, Taiwan on 9 June 1975, when the Philippines
was in error. What was submitted to the and the PROC expressed mutual recognition
Commission on Appointments was a nomination thru the Joint Communiqu between the two
for a term expiring on February 2, 1999. Thus, countries.
the term of her successor must be deemed to
start on February 2, 1999, and expire on However, this did not preclude the Philippines
February 02, 2006. from keeping unofficial relations with Taiwan on
136
a people-to-people basis. Maintaining ties hand, the COA argues that only the accounts of
with Taiwan that is permissible by the terms of the MECO that pertain to the verification fees
the Joint Communiqu required the Philippines it collects on behalf of the DOLE are auditable
and Taiwan to course any such relations thru because the former is merely a non-
offices outside of the official or governmental governmental entity required to pay xxx
organs. government share per the Audit Code.
In August 2010, petitioner Dennis Funa sent a 2. A case is deemed moot and academic when,
letter to the COA requesting for a copy of the by reason of the occurrence of a supervening
latest financial and audit report of the MECO event, it ceases to present any justiciable
invoking, for that purpose, his constitutional controversy. Since they lack an actual
right to information on matters of public controversy otherwise cognizable by courts,
concern. The petitioner made the request on moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.
the belief that the MECO, being under the
operational supervision of the Department of 3. The rule that requires dismissal of moot
Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government cases, however, is not absolute. It is subject
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and to exceptions. Courts will decide cases,
thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. otherwise moot and academic, if:
Assistant COA Commissioner Naranjo revealed (i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
in a memorandum that the MECO was not (ii) the exceptional character of the situation
among the agencies audited by any of the and the paramount public interest is involved;
three Clusters of the Corporate Government (iii) when constitutional issue raised requires
Sector. Taking the memorandum as an formulation of controlling principles to guide the
admission that the COA had never audited and bench, the bar, and the public;
examined the accounts of the MECO, petitioner (iv) the case is capable of repetition yet
Funa filed the instant petition for mandamus in evading review. (see David v. Macapagal-
his capacities as taxpayer, concerned citizen, Arroyo)
a member of the Philippine Bar and law book
author.
4. The issuance by the COA of Office Order No.
This petition for mandamus seeks to compel 2011-698 indeed qualifies as a supervening
the Commission on Audit (COA) to audit and event that effectively renders moot and
examine the funds of MECO, and the MECO to academic the main prayer of the instant
submit to such audit and examination. mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to
compel the COA to audit the accounts of the
Petitioner posits that all accounts of the MECO MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity,
are auditable as the latter is a bona fide GOCC when the former had already obliged itself to
or government instrumentality. On the other do the same.
137
transcendental importance, involved as they
5. Be that as it may, this Court refrains from are with the performance of a constitutional
dismissing outright the petition. We believe that duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA.
the mandamus petition was able to craft Hence, petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has
substantial issues presupposing the commission the requisite legal standing to file the instant
of a grave violation of the Constitution and mandamus petition.
involving paramount public interest. An
allegation as serious as a violation of a 9. Petitioner does not need to make any prior
constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the demand on the MECO or the COA in order to
pressing public interest in the resolution of all maintain the instant petition. The duty of the
related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a COA sought to be compelled by mandamus,
definitive ruling thereon, if not for the proper emanates from the Constitution and law, which
guidance of the government or agency explicitly require, or demand, that it perform
concerned, then for the formulation of the said duty. To the mind of this Court,
controlling principles for the education of the petitioner already established his cause of
bench, bar and the public in general. For this action against the COA when he alleged that
purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic the COA had neglected its duty in violation of
function. Moreover, the inclusion of the MECO the Constitution and the law.
in Office Order No. 2011-698 appears to be
entirely dependent upon the judgment of the Audit jurisdiction of the COA
incumbent chairperson of the COA, susceptible
of being undone, with or without reason, by her 10. Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of
or even her successor. Hence, the case now the 1987 Constitution, the COA was vested
before this Court is dangerously capable of with the power, authority and duty to
being repeated yet evading review. examine, audit and settle the accounts of
the following entities:
Legal standing of petitioner as a citizen
(a) The government, or any of its subdivisions,
6. Petitioner has standing, as a concerned agencies and instrumentalities;
citizen, to file the instant petition for (b) GOCCs with original charters;
mandamus. (c) GOCCs without original charters;
(d) Constitutional bodies, commissions and
7. The rules regarding legal standing in offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
bringing public suits, or locus standi, are under the Constitution; and
already well-defined in our case law. Standing (e) Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
to sue is accorded provided that the following or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
requirements are met: the government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to the COA for
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues; audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the 11. The term accounts mentioned in the
tax measure is unconstitutional; subject constitutional provision pertains to the
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of revenue, receipts, expenditures and
obvious interest in the validity of the election uses of funds and property of the foregoing
law in question; entities.
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of 12. Complementing the constitutional power of
transcendental importance which must be the COA to audit accounts of non-
settled early; and governmental entities receiving subsidy or
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that equity xxx from or through the government
the official action complained of infringes upon is Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, which
their prerogatives as legislators. grants theCOA visitorial authority over the
following nongovernmental entities:
8. The instant petition raises issues of
138
(a) Non-governmental entities subsidized by functions relating to public needs whether
the government governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through
(b) Non-governmental entities required to pay its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
levy or government share applicable as in the case of stock corporations,
(c) Non-governmental entities that have to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent
received counterpart funds from the of its capital stock: x x x.
government, and
(d) Non-governmental entities partly funded 17. GOCCs, therefore, are stock or non-stock
by donations through the government. corporations vested with functions relating to
public needs that are owned by the
13. Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, however, Government directly or through its
limits the audit of the foregoing non- instrumentalities. By definition, three
governmental entities only to funds xxx attributes thus make an entity a GOCC:
coming from or through the government. This
section of the Audit Code is,in turn, (i) Its organization as stock or Non-stock
substantially reproduced in Section 14(1), Book Corporation
V of the Administrative Code. (ii) The public character of its function;
(iii) Government ownership over the same.
14. In addition, the Administrative Code also
empowers the COA to examine and audit the 18. Possession of all three attributes is
books, records and accounts of public utilities necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
in connection with the fixing of rates of every
nature, or in relation to the proceedings of the 19. In this case, MECO possesses the first and
proper regulatory agencies, for purposes of second attributes. It is the third attribute, which
determining franchise tax. the MECO lacks.
15. Government instrumentalities are agencies 20. MECO was incorporated as a non-stock
of the national government that, by reason of corporation under the Corporation Code. The
some special function or jurisdiction they purposes for which the MECO was organized
perform or exercise, are allotted operational are somewhat analogous to those of a trade,
autonomy and are not integrated within the business or industry chamber, but only on a
department framework. Subsumed under the much larger scale i.e., instead of furthering the
rubric government instrumentality are the interests of a particular line of business or
following entities: industry within a local sphere, the MECO seeks
to promote the general interests of the Filipino
1. Regulatory agencies, people in a foreign land. Finally, none of the
2. Chartered institutions, income derived by the MECO is distributable as
3. Government corporate entities (GCE) or dividends to any of its members, directors or
government officers.
Instrumentalities with corporate powers (GICP),
and MECO performs functions with a public
4. GOCCs aspect (2nd GOCC attribute present)
16. The Administrative Code defines a GOCC 21. Consistent with its corporate purposes, the
(as reiterated in Republic Act No. 10149 or the MECO was authorized by the Philippine
GOCC Governance Act of 2011): government to perform certain consular and
other functions relating to the promotion,
(13) Government-owned or controlled protection and facilitation of Philippine interests
corporation refers to any agency organized as in Taiwan. (see Sections 1 and 2 of EO No. 15,
a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with s. 2001)
139
original incorporators of the MECO were shown
22. The functions of the MECO bears an to be government officials at the time of the
uncanny similarity to some of the functions corporations organization. Indeed, none of the
typically performed by the DFA itself, through members, officers or board of directors of the
the latters diplomatic and consular MECO, from its incorporation up to the present
missions.The functions of the MECO, in other day, were established as government
words, are of the kind that would otherwise be appointees or public officers designated by
performed by the Philippines own diplomatic reason of their office. There is, in fact, no law or
and consular organs, if not only for the executive order that authorizes such an
governments acquiescence that they instead appointment or designation. Hence, from a
be exercised by the MECO. Evidently, the strictly legal perspective, it appears that the
functions vested in the MECO are impressed presidential desire letters are, no matter how
with a public aspect. strong its persuasive effect may be, merely
recommendatory.
3. Based on the interpellations of the 1986 9. The recognized exceptions to the rule are
Constitutional Commission which drafted the as follows:
1987 Constitution,initiative can only relate
to "amendments" not "revision of the (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
Constitution. Moreover, the process of under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
proposing amendments to the Constitution Constitution;
through initiative must be more rigorous and (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
difficult than the initiative on legislation. President under Section 23(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
RA 6735 is Inadequate to cover the (3) Delegation to the people at large;
System of Initiative on the Constitution (4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies
4. RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to 10. The delegation is valid only if the
the Constitution. However, RA 6735 is law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
essential terms and conditions insofar as or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes
initiative on amendments to the a sufficient standard - the limits of which are
Constitution is concerned. sufficiently determinate and determinable - to
which the delegate must conform in the
5. Although Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of RA performance of his functions.
6753 defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, itdoes not provide for the contents 11. A sufficient standard is one which defines
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
Other provisions of the Act cannot be made to boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply to fill in the gap since these provisions apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
expressly refer to proposed laws sought to be which the legislative command is to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or effected.
repealed
Invalid Delegation to Comelec (Lack of
6. While RA 6735 provides separate Subtitles Sufficient Standard)
for initiative and referendum on laws and
ordinances, no subtitle is provided for initiative 12. The deficiency of RA 6735 are fatal and
142
cannot be cured by "empowering" the 41. Case Summary
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and Lambino v. COMELEC
regulations as may be necessary to carry out G.R. No. 174153 | 2006-10-25
the purposes of the Act.
16. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory 1. The Lambino Group's initiative is void and
petition under RA 6735 and COMELEC unconstitutional because it fails to comply with
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon
17. Given the foregoing, the court stated that a petition."
further discussion on the issue of whether the
proposal to lift the term limits of elective 2. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is
national and local officials is an amendment to, the governing constitutional provision that
and not a revision of, the Constitution is allows a people's initiative to propose
rendered unnecessary, if not academic. amendments to the Constitution. It states:
143
Sec 2. Amendments to this Constitution may dilemma since they can answer only either yes
likewise be directly proposed by the people or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to
through initiative upon a petition of at least sign a petition that effectively contains two
twelve per centum of the total number of propositions, one of which they may find
registered voters of which every legislative unacceptable. Under American jurisprudence,
district must be represented by at least three the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
per centum of the registered voters therein. proposition and not only the unrelated subject
Xxx matter.
3. Two essential elements must be 8. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
present. First, the people must author and thus Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
sign the entire proposal. No agent or propose further amendments or revisions to the
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, Constitution, is a subject matter totally
the proposal must be embodied in a petition. unrelated to the shift in the form of
government.
4. In order to comply with these essential
elements, the petition must contain the full Amendment vs Revision of the
text of the proposed amendments. The full text Constitution
of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached 9. Revision broadly implies a change that
to it. If so attached, the petition must state the alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
fact of such attachment. altering the principle of separation of powers or
the system of checks-and-balances. There is
5. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution also revision if the change alters the substantial
does not expressly state that the petition must entirety of the constitution, as when the change
set forth the full text of the proposed affects substantial provisions of the
amendments. However, the deliberations constitution. Revision generally affects several
clearly show that the framers of the provisions of the constitution. The intention of a
Constitution intended to adopt the relevant revision is to contemplate a re-examination of
American jurisprudence on people's initiative the entire document, or of provisions of the
where the requirement is that the people must document which have over-all implications for
first see the full text of the proposed the entire document
amendments before they sign to signify their 10. Amendment broadly refers to a change
assent. This is so that registered voters can that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the the basic principle involved. Amendment
initiative petition. generally affects only the specific provision
being amended. The intention of an
6. The Lambino Group merely submitted a amendment is to improve specific parts or to
copy of the signature sheet. The signature add new provisions deemed necessary to meet
sheet does not show to the people the draft of new conditions or to suppress specific portions
the proposed changes before they are asked to that may have become obsolete or that are
sign the signature sheet. The signature sheets judged to be dangerous. [Examples: reducing
do not also contain any indication that the draft the voting age from 18 years to 15 years;
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
signature sheets. The signature sheet is not the companies from 100 percent to 60 percent;
'petition' envisioned in the initiative clause of change requiring a college degree as an
the Constitution. additional qualification for election to the
Presidency]
Logrolling in the petition
11. US courts have developed a two-part
7. American jurisprudence on initiatives test in determining whether the proposed
outlaws logrolling - when the initiative petition changes constitute an amendment or revision:
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition. This puts the people in a
144
(a) The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is 'so extensive in its 16. Since a revision of a constitution affects
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial basic principles, or several provisions of a
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
alteration of numerous existing provisions.' The proceedings is best suited to undertake a
court examines only the number of provisions revision.
affected and does not consider the degree of
the change.
Revisit of Santiago v Comelec not
(b) The qualitative test asks whether the necessary
change will 'accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic 17. The Court must decline to revisit
governmental plan as to amount to a revision'. Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
Whether there is an alteration in the structure does not comply with the requirements of the
of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Constitution to implement the initiative clause
on amendments to the Constitution. An
12. The Lambino Group's initiative is a revision affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, change the outcome of the present petition.
the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the 18. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - implement the constitutional provision on
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed not change the result here because the present
changes alter substantially the basic plan of petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
government, from presidential to Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a initiative must first comply with Section 2,
unicameral legislature. Article XVII of the Constitution even before
complying with RA 6735.
People's Initiative applies only to
amendments 19. The present initiative violates Section 5(b)
of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for
13. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
of three modes of amending the have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
Constitution. total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires
a) By Congress upon three-fourths vote of all that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
its Members. signatories." The 6.3 million signatories did not
b) By Constitutional convention. sign the petition filed with the COMELEC. Only
c) through a People's initiative. Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato,
and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition
14. A people's initiative to change the and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Constitution applies only to an Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.
amendment of the Constitution andnot to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or 42. Case Summary
a Constitutional convention can Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967)
propose both amendments and revisions to the G.R. No. L-28196 and G.R. No. L-28224 | 1967-
Constitution. (Sec 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 11-09
Constitution)
Subject:
15. In other words, only Congress or a
Constitutional convention may Constitutional Amendments, Reapportionment
propose revisions to the Constitution. A of congressional districts, De facto doctrine
people's initiative is only available to propose
amendments. Facts:
145
violates the Constitution is essentially
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to
of Representatives passed Joint Resolutions (a) judicial review, and, (Note: to the extent that
to increase the membership of the House of this view may be inconsistent with the stand
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter
provided in the present Constitution, to a should be deemed modified accordingly)
maximum of 180 to be apportioned among the
several provinces; (b) to call a convention to Amendment of the Constitution
propose amendments to the present
Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, 3. The power to amend the Constitution or
Article VI of the said Constitution so they can to propose amendments thereto is not
become delegates themselves to the included in the general grant of legislative
Convention. powers to Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which 4. The power to amend the Constitution lies in
became RA 4913, providing that the the inherent powers of the peopleas the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in repository of sovereignty in a republican state
the aforementioned Resolutions be submitted, to make, and hence, to amend their own
for approval by the people, at the general fundamental law.
elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967. 5. Congress may propose amendments to
the Constitution merely because the same
In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon explicitly grants such power. When exercising
A. Gonzales and PHILCONSA seek to declare RA the same, Senators and Members of the House
4913 unconstitutional and to restrain COMELEC of Representatives act, not as members of
from holding the plebiscite for the ratification of Congress, but as component elements of
the constitutional amendments proposed in a constituent assembly.
Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
6. When acting as such, the members of
It is further contested that said resolutions are Congress derive their authority from the
null and void because: (1) The Members of Constitution, unlike the people, when
Congress, which approved the proposed performing the same function, for their
amendments and the resolutions are, at best, authority does not emanate from the
de facto Congressmen; (2) Congress may adopt Constitutionthey are the very source of all
either one of two alternatives-- propose powers of government, including the
amendments or call a convention-- but may not Constitution itself.
avail of both at the same time; (3) The election,
in which proposals for amendment to the Ratification of Constitutional
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, Amendments- can be joined in a General
must be a special election, not a general Election
election.
7. Also, the ratification of the amendments to
Held: the Constitution need not necessarily be in
a special election or plebiscite called for
Not a Political Question that purpose alone. While such procedure is
highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks
1. The judicial department is the only simply of an election at which the
constitutional organ which can be called upon amendments are submitted to the people for
to determine the proper allocation of powers their ratification.
between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof. 8. To join the ratification of the proposed
amendments with an election for candidates to
2. The issue whether or not a Resolution of public office does not render it any less an
Congress acting as a constituent assembly election at which the proposed amendments
146
are submitted to the people for their limits of the authority vested in their respective
ratification. No prohibition being found in the offices, position or employments.
plain terms of the Constitution, none should be
inferred. Nullification of legislative acts
On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the
Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for interpretation of the term "initiate".
being insufficient in substance, although it
was sufficient in form. Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the 3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:
complaint or 4 months and 3 weeks since the
filing thereof, a 2nd impeachment 1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by
complaint was filed with the Houses Secretary any member of the House of Representatives;
General by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and or
Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of 2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements endorsement by any member (of the House of
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Representatives); or
149
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
House of Representatives others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
Impeachment Rules (of the 12th as to effectuate the great purposes of the
Congress) instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted
Impeachment proceedings are deemed together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
initiated: the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee construction, the two can be made to stand
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or together. In other words, the court must
resolution is sufficient in substance; or harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render
2) once the House itself affirms or overturns every word operative, rather than one which
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the may make the words idle and nugatory.
verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance; or Reliance on Foreign Jurisprudence to
Interpret the Constitution
3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of 4. In this case, the House argues that the
the members of the House impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review in relation to Art XI
Held: Section 3(6) of the constitution which says that
the Senate has the sole power to try and decide
Statutory Construction (of the impeachment cases. The House also relies on
Constitution) American jurisprudence to support their claim.
1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, 5. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,
the words used in the Constitution must be "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
given their ordinary meaning except where Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
technical terms are employed. We look to the jurisprudence some of which are hardly
language of the document itself in our search applicable because they have been dictated by
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, different constitutional settings and needs."
but that is where we begin. Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can
trace its origins to that of the United States,
2. Second, where there is their paths of development have long since
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words diverged.
of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. The 6. There are also glaring distinctions between
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
the framers of the Constitution to enact the Constitution with respect to the power of the
particular provision and the purpose sought to House of Representatives over impeachment
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe proceedings.
the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that -the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
purpose. impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation
3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is -the Philippine Constitution, though vesting in
a well-established rule in constitutional the House of Representatives the exclusive
construction that no one provision of the power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
150
for several limitations to the exercise of such raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include very lis mota of the case.
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,
and the one year bar on the impeachment of Locus Standi
one and the same official.
12. Locus standi or legal standing has been
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or
7. The Courts power of judicial review is will sustain direct injury as a result of the
conferred on the judicial branch of the governmental act that is being challenged.
government in Article VIII section 1 of the 1987
Constitution. Citizen standing
8. Judicial review is an integral component of 13. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the
the delicate system of checks and petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
balances which, together with the statute must bedirect and personal. He must be
corollary principle of separation of powers, able to show, not only that the law or any
forms the bedrock of our republican form of government act is invalid, but also that he
government and insures that its vast powers sustained or is in imminent danger of
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
which it serves. enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
9. When the judiciary mediates to allocate that the person complaining has been or is
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert about to be denied some right or privilege to
any superiority over the other departments; which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
rather, it only asserts the solemn and sacred to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to by reason of the statute or act complained of.
check the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to 14. When the proceeding involves the assertion
declare executive and legislative acts void if of a public right, the mere fact that he is a
violative of the Constitution. citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
10. The power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in Taxpayer standing
impeachment proceedings.
15. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to
Requisites for exercise of Judicial Review sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is
11. The courts' power of judicial review is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
subject to several limitations. In order for the that there is a wastage of public funds through
courts to exercise its judicial review power, the the enforcement of an invalid or
following requisites must be established: unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the raised by taxation and that he would sustain a
exercise of judicial power; direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
(2) the person challenging the act must have the questioned statute or contract. It is not
"standing" to challenge; he must have a sufficient that he has merely a general interest
personal and substantial interest in the case common to all members of the public. At all
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, events, courts are vested with discretion as to
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
(3) the question of constitutionality must be entertained.
151
16. In this case, the Court opts to grant 21. Where it clearly appears that not all
standing to most of the petitioners, given their interests can be sufficiently represented as
allegation that any impending transmittal to the shown by the divergent issues raised in the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No.
ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
involve the expenditure of public funds.
22. However, since petitioners additionally
Legislator standing allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, their
petition will stand.
17. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which Impeachment, meaning of to Initiate
he claims infringes his prerogatives as a (Impeachment case vs Impeachment
legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Proceeding)
Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and 23. The word "initiate" as it twice appears in
privileges vested by the Constitution in his Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means
office. to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary
Associations standing men to mean, as dictionaries do: to begin, to
commence, or set going.
18. While an association has legal personality
to represent its members, especially when it is 24. According to Father Bernas, an amicus
composed of substantial taxpayers and the curiae, an impeachment proceeding is not a
outcome will affect their vital interests, the single act. It is a complexus of acts consisting
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the of a beginning, a middle and an end.
Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of (a) The beginning or the initiation is the filing of
law and nothing more, although undoubtedly the complaint and its referral to the Committee
true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. on Justice.
Its interest is too general. It is shared by other (b) The middle consists of those deliberative
groups and the whole citizenry. moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment.
19. However, a reading of the petitions shows (c) The end is the transmittal of the articles of
that it has advanced constitutional issues which impeachment to the Senate.
deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as 25. An impeachment case is the legal
precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to controversy that must be decided by
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the the Senate. The Constitution provides that the
issues presented by it. House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is
Class suits in that sense that the House has "exclusive
power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No
20. When dealing with class suits filed in other body can do it. However, before a
behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must decision is made to initiate a case in the
be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
interests of all concerned to enable the court to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
deal properly with all interests involved in the "initiated."
suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under 26. An impeachment proceeding takes place
the res judicataprinciple, binding on all not in the Senate but in the House and consists
members of the class whether or not they were of several steps:
before the court.
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(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by 28. Therefore, considering that the first
a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the impeachment complaint, was filed by former
House of the Representatives; President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr., along with 7 Associate Justices of
(2) the processing of this complaint by the the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003 and
proper Committee which may either reject the referred to the House Committee on Justice on
complaint or uphold it; August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Teodoro, Jr.
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
must be forwarded to the House for further prohibition against the initiation of
processing; and impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-
(4) the processing of the same complaint by the year period.
House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of 45. Case Summary
one-third of all the members. Morales vs. Court of Appeals and Binay
(2015)
(5) If at least one third of all the Members G.R. Nos. 217126-27 | 2015-11-10
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It Subject: Resort to the extraordinary remedy of
is at this point that the House "initiates an Certiorari and Prohibition is proper, without
impeachment case." It is at this point that an need of prior motion for reconsideration before
impeachable public official is successfully the Court of Appeals; Section 14, RA 6770;
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully Second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is
charged with an impeachment "case" before unconstitutional; Court may decide on
the Senate as impeachment court. constitutional questions affecting jurisdiction
even though not raised in the pleadings;
27. Father Bernas further explains: The Consequence of invalidity ( CA has subject
"impeachment proceeding" is not initiated matter jurisdiction); Ombudsman's
when the complaint is transmitted to the independence protects it from political pressure
Senate for trial because that is the end of the , but not from judicial power; First paragraph of
House proceeding and the beginning of another Section 14, RA 6770 is declared ineffective
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the insoafar as it encroaches upon the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the court's inherent power to issue injunctions;
House deliberates on the resolution passed on Preventive suspension order; The condonation
to it by the Committee, because something doctrine, which is the basis of the CA's
prior to that has already been done. The action injunctive writs, is abandoned; Abandonment of
of the House is already a further step in the the condonation doctrine should
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. be prospective in application; Objection to
Rather, the impeachment proceeding propriety of contempt charge is premature
is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Facts:
Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps On July 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed
that follow. He concludes that when Section 3 before the Office of the Ombudsman against
(5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) and
initiated against the same official more than other public officers and employees of the City
once within a period of one year," it means that Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
no second verified complaint may be accepted accusing them of Plunder and violation of
and referred to the Committee on Justice for Republic Act No. 3019,otherwise known as "The
action. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
153
connection with the five (5) phases of the prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB
procurement and construction of the Makati Cases filed against them.
City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building). On March 11, 2015, Binay, Jr. filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
A Special Panel of Investigators was constituted seeking the nullification of the preventive
to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The suspension order and praying for the issuance
panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Binay,
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six Jr. argued that any anomalous activity relating
(6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, to Phases III to V transpired during his first term
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati
the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) for a second term effectively condoned his
criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of administrative liability therefor.
RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., DILG
Regional Director Renato Brion caused the
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that implementation of the preventive suspension
he was involved in anomalous activities order by posting a copy of the order on the wall
attending the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally
phases of the Makati Parking Building project, serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of
committed during his first (2010-2013) and entry to the Makati City Hall were closed.
second/ present term (2013-2016) as City
Mayor of Makati. In particular, Binay, Jr. issued At noon of the same day, the CA issued a
the Notice of Awards for Phase III, IV and V of Resolution (dated March 16, 2015) granting
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO notwithstanding
Construction Corporation and executed the Vice Mayor Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as
corresponding contracts without the required Acting Mayor earlier that day. Citing the case
publication and the lack of architectural design, ofGovernor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, the CA applied the
and approved the release of funds therefor. condonation doctrine espoused by Binay, Jr.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter- Binay, Jr. likewise filed a petition for contempt
affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the with the Court of Appeals accusing Secretary
challenged order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under Roxas, Director Brion, et al of deliberately
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) refusing to obey the CA. The CA directed the
months without pay, during the pendency of Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.
the OMB Cases. Consequently, the Ombudsman
directed DILG Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II to The Ombudsman, without filing a prior motion
immediately implement the preventive for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals,
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon filed the present petition for Certiorari and
receipt of the same. Prohibition before the Supreme Court claiming
that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of
the preventive suspension of a public officer are RA 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
present, finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, which states that no injunctive writ could be
Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong, (b) Binay, Jr., et issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation
al.were administratively charged and said unless there is prima facie evidence that the
charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal subject matter thereof is outside the latter's
from public service under the Revised Rules on jurisdiction and (b) the Ombudsman is an
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be
(RRACCS), and (c) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective subjected to contempt proceedings
positions give them access to public records
and allow them to influence possible witnesses; In the meantime, the CA issued a
hence, their continued stay in office may Resolution dated April 6, 2015 granting Binay,
Jr.'s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
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The CA found that Binay, Jr. is entitled to the desires exculpation from administrative liability.
nullification of the preventive suspension order, As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort
in view of the condonation doctrine, to certiorari and prohibition before this Court,
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos. notwithstanding her failure to move for the
prior reconsideration of the assailed
Held: issuances before the CA, is justified.
9. The second paragraph of Section 14, RA 13. The second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, which the Ombudsman particularly relies 6770's extremely limited restriction on
on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
over the main CA petition, as it is supposedly appeal can only be taken against final decisions
the Supreme Court which has the sole or orders of lower courts, and not against
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies.
decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (a) it is unclear what the phrase 14. Congress cannot alter the scope of a Rule
"application for remedy" or the word "findings" 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory
refers to; and (b) it does not specify what "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
procedural remedy is solely allowable to the significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule
Supreme Court, save that the same be taken 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy
only against a pure question of law. of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction,
in denigration of the judicial power
10. As an aid to construction, courts may avail constitutionally vested in courts.
themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body in interpreting a statute of 15. In this light, the second paragraph of
doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a Section 14, RA 6770 also increased the
provision of a statute means, the meaning put Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, without
to the provision during the legislative a showing, however, that (the SC) gave its
deliberations may be adopted, albeit not consent to the same. Applying the ruling
controlling in the interpretation of the law. in Fabian vs Desierto, second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is unconstitutional and
11. The Ombudsman submits that the perforce, invalid.
legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770,
particularly on the matter of judicial review of Court may decide on constitutional
her office's decisions or findings can be gleaned questions affecting jurisdiction even
from the Senate deliberations. The Court is, though not raised in the pleadings
156
freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
16. While courts will not ordinarily pass upon purposes germane to [its] functions, hence, its
constitutional questions which are not raised in budget cannot be strategically decreased by
the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to officials of the political branches of government
admit of certain exceptions. It does not so as to impair said functions; and
preclude a court from inquiring into its own
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment Third: insulation from executive supervision
that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on and control, which means that those within the
which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no internal authority. (see Gonzales III v. Office of
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may the President)
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the 20. All three aspects of independence intend to
constitutionality of the statute. protect the Office of the Ombudsman
Consequence of invalidity ( CA has subject from political harassment and pressure. That
matter jurisdiction) being the case, the concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to
17. With the unconstitutionality of the second insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts
consistent with existing jurisprudence, are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act
concludes that the CA has subject matter as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to
jurisdiction over the main CA petition (Binay all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can
petition seeking the nullification of the be exempt from an incident of judicial power -
preventive suspension order). that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays
Ombudsman's independence protects it from the concept's rationale of insulating the
from political pressure, but not from office from political harassment or pressure.
judicial power
First paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is
18. Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 declared ineffective insoafar as it
Constitution guarantees the independence of encroaches upon the court's inherent
the Office of the Ombudsman. Under Section power to issue injunctions
12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be 21. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
the "protector of the people" against the inept, prohibits all courts, except the Supreme Court,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to from issuing provisional writs of injunction to
function essentially as a complaints and action enjoin an Ombudsman investigation.
bureau. Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to
enable it to further realize the vision of the 22. A temporary restraining order and a writ of
Constitution. (see Gonzales III v. Office of the preliminary injunction both constitute
President) temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature,
19. The concept of Ombudsman's ancillary because they are mere incidents in
independence covers three (3) things: and are dependent upon the result of the main
action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a
First: creation by the Constitution, which means temporary restraining order or a writ of
that the office cannot be abolished, nor its preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
constitutionally specified functions and mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by the merits of the case can be heard. They are
law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an preservative remedies for the protection of
amendment thereto is made; substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not
a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the a main suit.
office "may not be obstructed from [its]
157
provisional remedy that was created by this
23. The power of a court to issue these Court under its duly promulgated rules of
provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with procedure, which utility is both integral and
its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, inherent to every court's exercise of judicial
processes, and other means necessary to carry power. Without the Court's consent to the
its acquired jurisdiction into effect. (see Section proscription, as may be manifested by an
6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court) adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular
24. A court, once having obtained jurisdiction of issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a
a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its violation of the separation of powers principle.
constitutional grant of power, inherent power to
do all things reasonably necessary to the 28. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or
administration of justice in the case before it. In not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole
the exercise of this power, a court, when prerogative and authority over all matters of
necessary in order to protect or preserve the procedure, deems it proper to declare as
subject matter of the litigation, to protect its ineffective the prohibition against courts other
jurisdiction and to make its judgment than the Supreme Court from issuing
effective, may grant or issue a temporary provisional injunctive writs to enjoin
injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal investigations conducted by the Office of the
action. Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative
25. The control over this inherent judicial power circular duly issued therefor.
(i.e. issuance of provisional injunction) is
exclusively within the constitutional realm of 29. Consequently, it remains that the CA had
the courts. As such, it is not within the purview the authority to issue the questioned injunctive
of the legislature to grant or deny the writs enjoining the implementation of the
power nor is it within the purview of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances At the risk of belaboring the point, these
under which this inherently judicial power may issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise
be or may not be granted or denied. of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it
under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
26. The Court rules that when Congress passed amended, and which it had already acquired
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, over the main case (i.e., Binay petition to nullify
in so doing, took away from the courts their preventive suspension order).
power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, Preventive suspension order
it encroached upon this Court's constitutional
rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, 30. By nature, a preventive suspension order is
which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and not a penalty but only a preventive measure. Its
auxiliary writs created under the provisions of purpose is to prevent the official to be
the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure suspended from using his position and the
which belong exclusively within the province of powers and prerogatives of his office to
this Court. influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution of
27. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 the case against him. If after such investigation,
is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the the charge is established and the person
Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not investigated is found guilty of acts warranting
define, prescribe, and apportion the subject his suspension or removal, then he is
matter jurisdiction of courts to act suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of penalty. (see Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
courts, particularly the CA, stands under the Gervacio; Section 24 of Rule XIV of the
relevant sections of BP 129 which were not Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
shown to have been repealed. Instead, through Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
this provision, Congress interfered with a No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws)
158
31. Not being a penalty, the period within which
one is under preventive suspension is not 35. The conclusion is at once problematic since
considered part of the actual penalty of this Court has now uncovered that there is
suspension. (Section 25 of Rule XIV of the really no established weight of authority in the
Omnibus Rules) United States (US) favoring the doctrine of
condonation. In fact, at least seventeen (17)
32. Section 24, RA 6770 sets forth two (2) states in the US have abandoned the
conditions that must be satisfied to justify the condonation doctrine.
issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely: 36. While the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, has been carried over in
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and numerous cases after, the doctrine of stare
(2) Either of the following circumstances co- decisis does not preclude this Court from
exist with the first requirement: revisiting existing doctrine when there are
powerful countervailing considerations against
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression its application.
or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; 37. Pascual was a decision promulgated in
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
service; or context of the 1935 Constitution which was
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office silent with respect to public accountability, or of
may prejudice the case filed against him. the nature of public office being a public trust.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, it
The condonation doctrine, which is the introduced an entire article on accountability of
basis of the CA's injunctive writs, is public officers, found in Article XIII.
abandoned Significantly, the 1987 Constitution
strengthened and solidified what has been first
33. The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the commanding public officers to be accountable
nullification of the preventive suspension order, to the people at all times. (see Section 1,
finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose Article XI of the 1987 Constitution)
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given
that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of 38. For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the
Makati condoned any administrative liability grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an
arising from anomalous activities relative to the elective local official from office are stated in
Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
2013 known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC). Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that
34. The condonation doctrine - which connotes the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
this same sense of complete extinguishment of unexpired term of the elective local official nor
liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as
not based on statutory law. It is a he meets the qualifications required for the
jurisprudential creation that originated from office. Note, however, that the provision only
the1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial pertains to the duration of the penalty and its
Board ofNueva Ecija, which was decided under effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing
the 1935 Constitution. As there was no legal therein states that the administrative liability
precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and election. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC
proceeded to declare that: The weight of prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
authorities x x x seems to incline toward the suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
rule denying the right to remove one from elective local official's prior term, and likewise
office because of misconduct during a prior allows said official to still run for re-election
term
159
39. The concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability 42. It should be clarified that this Court's
to the people at all times, as mandated under abandonment of the condonation doctrine
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent should be prospective in application for the
with the idea that an elective local official's reason that judicial decisions applying or
administrative liability for a misconduct interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
committed during a prior term can be wiped off reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
by the fact that he was elected to a second the Philippines.Hence, while the future may
term of office, or even another elective post. ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should
Election is not a mode of condoning an be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law"
administrative offense, and there is simply no prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
constitutional or statutory basis in our new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official and should not apply to parties who had relied
elected for a different term is fully absolved of on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
any administrative liability arising from an thereof.(see People v. Jabinal)
offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative 43. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
offenses may be condoned bv the President in "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
Constitution which was interpreted inLlamas v. legal system of the Philippines." But while the
Orbos to apply to administrative offenses. [Supreme Court's] decisions form part of the
law of the land, they are also subject to Article
40. Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws
the electorate, when re-electing a local official, shall have no retroactive effect unless the
are assumed to have done so with knowledge contrary is provided.
of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, 44. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance
if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged
that no such presumption exists in any statute on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine.
or procedural rule.Besides, it is contrary to Hence, by merely following settled precedents
human experience that the electorate would on the condonation doctrine, which at that
have full knowledge of a public official's time, unwittingly remained "good law," it
misdeeds. Misconduct committed by an elective cannot be concluded that the CA committed a
official is easily covered up, and is almost grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
always unknown to the electorate when they attribution. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
cast their votes. At a conceptual level, injunction against the Ombudsman's preventive
condonation presupposes that the condoner suspension order was correctly issued.
has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation Objection to propriety of contempt charge
of an act that is unknown. is premature
41. This Court simply finds no legal authority to 45. On the issue of whether the CA's Resolution
sustain the condonation doctrine in this directing the Ombudsman to comment on
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is improper,
it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US the sole premise of the Ombudsman's
rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch contention is that, as an impeachable officer,
from - and now rendered obsolete by - the she cannot be the subject of a charge for
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high indirect contempt because this action is
time for this Court to abandon the condonation criminal in nature and the penalty therefor
doctrine that originated from Pascual. would result in her effective removal from
office.
Abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application 46. However, a reading of the aforesaid CA
Resolution does not show that she has already
160
been subjected to contempt proceeding. The Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or
Ombudsman is merely being directed to Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility for
comment on the contempt petition. Thus, purposes of permanent appointment
absent any indication that the contempt
petition has been given due course by the CA, it In 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul
would then be premature for this Court to rule Elmer M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus,
on the issue. Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III
of petitioner by the Ombudsman. The CSC
46. Case Summary approved the appointments on the condition
Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC (2005) that for the appointees to acquire security of
G.R. No. 159940 | 2005-02-16 tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service
Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by
Subject: Inok ruling not a precedent; Career the CESB.
Service; Positions in the Career Executive
Service refer to positions by appointment of the In a letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman
President (Graft Investigation Officer III is requested for the change of status, from
appointed by the Ombudsman, hence, CES temporary to permanent, of the appointments
eligibility not required); Authority of CSC to of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus effective
approve appointments in the civil service is December 18, 2002. The Ombudsman invoked
limited to determining whether or not the the Court of Appeals ruling in Khem N. Inok v.
appointees possess the legal qualifications and Hon. Corazon Alma de Leon, as affirmed by the
the appropriate eligibility Supreme Court, which declared that the Career
Executive Service (CES) is limited to CES
Facts: positions in the Executive Branch of
Government, and that the Judiciary, the
In 1994, in a letter addressed to then Constitutional Commissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, the Civil Service Ombudsman and the Commission on Human
Commission (CSC) approved the Qualification Rights are not covered by the CES governed by
Standards for several positions in the Office of the Career Executive Service Board. Said
the Ombudsman (petitioner) including that for Decision thereby effectively granted the
Graft Investigation Officer III. petition of Mr. Inok for security of tenure as
Director II of the Commission on Audit despite
In 1996, the Career Executive Service Board the absence of a CES eligibility.
(CESB) subsequently advised the Ombudsman
that pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. Carandang and Clemente were in the meantime
21, s.1994, the position of Graft Investigation conferred with CSE Eligibility. The CSC, by the
Officer III, among other positions in petitioner's challenged Resolution of August 28, 2003,
office, was classified as a Career Executive changed the status of Carandangs and
Service (CES) position, hence, governed by the Clementes appointments to permanent
rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility, effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to
appointment to CES ranks, and performance De Jesus on the ground that he has not met
evaluation, among other things. the eligibility requirements.
In 1999, the members of the Constitutional Hence, the present petition where it is
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), namely: the contended by petitioner that
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), CSC,
Commission on Audit (COA), Commission on (a) the general power of respondent Civil
Human Rights (CHR), Office of the Ombudsman Service Commission (CSC) to administer the
and the Supreme Court adopted Joint civil service cannot constitutionally curtail the
Resolution No. 62, where it was resolved that specific discretionary power of appointment,
all career third level positions identified and including the grant of security of tenure, by the
classified by each of the member agency are Ombudsman as an independent constitutional
not embraced within the Career Executive body in favor of the latters own officials.
Service (CES) and as such shall not require
161
institutions which shall establish and maintain
(b) the CES Eligibility, as administered by the their own merit systems;
respondent CESB, cannot be validly made a
requisite for the attainment of security of (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service
tenure on qualified career officials of petitioner (CES); namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
who are not legally part of the CES. Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
(c) officials which are appointed by the Director, Chief of Department Service and other
Ombudsman are technically classified as officers of equivalent rank as may be identified
belonging to the Closed Career Service, the by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
positions being unique and highly technical as whom are appointed by the President;
they involve investigatorial, quasi-judicial and
prosecutorial functions, in much the same way Positions in the Career Executive Service
as judges are involved in judicial functions. refer to positions by appointment of the
Hence, appointment to such positions is President (Graft Investigation Officer III is
likewise characterized by security of tenure. appointed by the Ombudsman, hence, CES
eligibility not required)
Held:
3. From the above-quoted provision of the
Inok ruling not a precedent Administrative Code, persons occupying
positions in the Career Executive Service (CES)
1. Inok cannot be invoked as precedent in are presidential appointees. A person occupying
arriving at the question raised in this petition. the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is
This Court dismissed the petition of the CSC in not, however, appointed by the President but
the Inok case on a technicality therein by the Ombudsman as provided in Section 6,
petitioner CSCs failure to file a reply within the Article IX of the Constitution.
required period and not on the merits.
4. To classify the position of Graft Investigation
Career service Officer III as belonging to the CES and require
an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE
eligibility before acquiring security of tenure
2. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the would be absurd as it would result either in 1)
Administrative Code of 1987 provides: vesting the appointing power for said position
in the President, in violation of the Constitution;
SECTION 7. Career Service. The Career or 2) including in the CES a position not
Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary
based on merit and fitness to be determined as to the Administrative Code.
far as practicable by competitive examination,
or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) Authority of CSC to approve appointments
opportunity for advancement to higher career in the civil service is limited to
positions; and (3) security of tenure. determining whether or not the
appointees possess the legal
The Career Service shall include: qualifications and the appropriate
eligibility
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to
which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required; 5. Under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which
authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to
(2) Closed Career positions which positions in the civil service, except those
are scientific, or highly technical in nature; specified therein, its authority is limited only to
these include the faculty and academic staff of [determine] whether or not the appointees
state colleges and universities, and scientific possess the legal qualifications and the
and technical positions in scientific or research appropriate eligibility, nothing else.
162
6. It is not disputed that, except for his lack of passed the May, 1993 Board Examinations with
CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the a rating of 75.42%
basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation
Officer III, as provided in the Qualification An anonymous letter was sent to PRC Chairman
Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has Pobre claiming that certain BIR employees
the ministerial duty to grant the request of the allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams
Ombudsman that appointment be made under anomalous circumstances"
permanent effective December 18, 2002. To
refuse to heed the request is a clear PRC Chairman Pobre wrote Ombudsman
encroachment on the discretion vested solely Vasquez that BIR employees Marilyn Lee,
on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. Connie Dimapilis, Eilene Purification, Elenita
The status of the appointments of Carandang Villamor, Lodiminda Crizaldo, Maria Rosario de
and Clemente, who were conferred CSE los Reyes, and petitioner Olivia Camanag did
eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03- not actually pass the CPA licensure
0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to examinations.
permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.
Associate Ombudsman Investigator (AOI)
7. Third level eligibility is not required for third Bumanlag conducted a fact-finding
level officials of petitioner appointed by the investigation, and thereafter filed a Report
Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the finding probable cause against petitioner for
Constitution vis-a-vis the Administrative Code of violation of Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal
1987 Code. AOI Bumanglag recommended a
preliminary investigation to be conducted on
Case Summary the case, and at the same time, he executed
47. Camanag vs. Guerrero (1997) under oath the corresponding affidavit-
G.R. No. 121017 | 1997-02-17 complaint against petitioner.
Subject: Grant of prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman Investigator (OI) Almazan directed
Ombudsman under RA 6770 is valid; Office of petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit.
the Ombudsman is a distinct constitutional Thereafter, OI Almazan issued a Resolution,
body whose duties and functions are provided finding probable cause against petitioner for
for by the Constitution itself; Congress may the crimes of falsification of public documents.
remove some of the powers of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) and Deputy Ombudsman for the Armed Forces of
transfer the same to the Ombudsman; the Philippines (AFP) Casaclang deputized
Investigating prosecutor has discretion in the respondent City Prosecutor of Manila Jesus
determination of what constitute sufficient Guerrero to file the corresponding charges
evidence to establish "probable cause" for filing against petitioner and to handle the
an information; An injunction will not generally prosecution of the cases.
lie to restrain a criminal action
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila set it
Facts: for another round of preliminary investigation
after which City Prosecutor Guerrero issued the
In 1993, the Professional Regulations questioned Resolution, " finding sufficient
Commission (PRC) issued the Table of Results of ground to hold petitioner for trial" and ordering
those who failed the May, 1993 Certified Public the filing of the Information in court.
Accountant (CPA) Licensure Examinations.
Petitioner Olivia B. Camanag was listed as Three (3) Informations for falsification of public
having failed with a general average of 50.00% documents were filed against petitioner.
Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the
However, petitioner, in accomplishing her constitutionality of the Ombudsman Act (R.A.
Personal Data sheet (CSC form No. 212) as No. 6770), on several grounds:
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), indicated under question No. 18 that she (a) Sections 15 and 17, RA 6770, insofar as
163
they empowers the Office of the Ombudsman act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
to conduct preliminary investigation and to improper, or inefficient.
directly undertake criminal prosecutions , are
without constitutional basis. Concomitantly, the xxx
Ombudsman does not possess the power to
conduct formal preliminary investigation (3) Direct the officer concerned to take
proceedings for the reason that formal appropriate action against a public official or
preliminary investigation proceedings employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
constitute an integral part of the process of suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
criminal prosecutions. prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith
(b) The Office of the Ombudsman is a 3. Petitioner argues that while Sec 13 par (1)
constitutional body, belonging neither to the empowers the Ombudsman to conduct
legislative, executive nor judiciary branches. As investigations, the power to directly undertake
such, it is not empowered to conduct criminal prosecutions has been clearly withheld.
preliminary investigations, as these pertain Sec 13 par (3) merely empowers the Office of
exclusively to the executive branch. the Ombudsman "to direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action and
(c) The unqualified grant of prosecutorial recommend prosecution". Hence, petitioner
powers on the Office of the Ombudsman is in contends that the power of the Ombudsman is
direct contravention of Article XI, Section 7 of limited to the mere issuance of the directives to
the 1987 Constitution which provides: the appropriate officer, i.e., the Prosecutor, to
cause the filing of the information and the
Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter prosecution thereof.
be known as the office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and 4. In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the
exercise its power as now or hereafter may be court upheld the validity of the grant of
provided by law, except those conferred on the prosecutorial powers on the Ombudsman,
office of the Ombudsman created under this notwithstanding the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. 1987 Constitution to withhold such powers from
him. Notably, Constitutional Commission
Held: recommended that the Legislature could,
through statute, prescribe such other powers,
Grant of prosecutorial powers to the functions and duties to the Ombudsman. This is
Ombudsman under RA 6770 is valid now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI , 1987 Constitution.
1. In assailing Sections 15 and 17 of the
Ombudsman Act, insofar as it empowers the 5. The Ombudsman, under par 8, Section 13,
Ombudsman to directly undertake criminal Article XI, 1987 Constitution, may be validly
prosecutions, for being without constitutional empowered with prosecutorial functions by the
basis, petitioner submits that under the 1987 legislature, and this the latter did when it
Philippine Constitution, specifically in Section passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the
13, Article XI, entitled "Accountability of Ombudsman, among others, the power to
Public Officers", the powers of the Ombudsman investigate and prosecute individuals on
are clearly defined or delineated, to wit matters and/or complaints referred or filed
before it.
2. Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct
duties: constitutional body whose duties and
functions are provided for by the
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by Constitution itself
any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such 6. Petitioner contends that the Office of the
Ombudsman, being a constitutional body,
164
cannot exercise executive functions, such as 9. Petitioner alleges that the refusal by the City
conducting preliminary investigation in criminal Prosecutor and Assistant City Prosecutor to
cases. The contention is devoid of merit. conduct another preliminary investigation of
TheOffice of the Ombudsman is a distinct the anonymous complaint filed against
constitutional body whose duties and functions petitioner is tantamount to a denial of due
are provided for by the Constitution itself. process.
Considering that the power of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute criminal cases 10. Petitioner does not deny that the
emanates as it does from the Constitution itself, Ombudsman actually conducted a preliminary
particularly, under paragraph 8, Section 13, investigation of the charges against her.
Article XI , which empowers the Ombudsman to Another round of preliminary investigation,
"exercise such other powers or perform such apart from the one conducted by the Office of
other functions or duties" as Congress may the Ombudsman, was also conducted by the
prescribe through legislation, it cannot be Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
logically argued that such power or the exercise Petitioner had likewise filed her comment on
thereof is unconstitutional or violative of the the cases against her then pending with the
principle of separation of powers enshrined in City Prosecutor. The PRC also submitted
the Constitution. evidence against petitioner in the same
proceedings. Finally, a memo of preliminary
Congress may remove some of the powers investigation conducted by the City Prosecutor
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was attached to the Informations eventually
(formerly Tanodbayan) and transfer the filed against petitioner before the Ombudsman.
same to the Ombudsman These pieces of evidence clearly indicate that a
second round of preliminary investigation was
7. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 6770, in fact conducted by the City Prosecutor.
insofar as it unqualifiedly vests prosecutorial
functions on the Ombudsman, infringes on 11. Neither is the alleged inherent weakness of
Section 7, Article XI of the Constitution, in that complainant's case, a ground to compel the
it invariably diminishes the authority and power City Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary
lodged in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. investigation, apart from the one already
conducted and the one conducted earlier by
8. When one considers that by express the Ombudsman. On this score, suffice it to
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI state that this Court has adopted a policy of
of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
"exercise such other powers or perform investigations; and leaves to the investigating
functions or duties as may be provided by law," prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
it is indubitable then that Congress has the exercise of determination of what constitute
power to place the Office of the Special sufficient evidence as will establish "probable
Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. cause" for filing of information against a
In the same vein, Congress may remove some supposed offender.
of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by
P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the 12. The rule on non-interference is based not
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special only upon the investigatory and prosecutory
Prosecutor such other powers and functions powers granted by the Constitution to the
and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality
This Congress did through the passage of R.A. as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
No. 6770(see Acop v. Office of the will be grievously hampered by innumerable
Ombudsman) petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Investigating prosecutor has discretion in Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
the determination of what constitute before it, in much the same way that the courts
sufficient evidence to establish "probable would be extremely swamped if they could be
cause" for filing an information compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the prosecuting attorneys each
165
time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private Facts:
complainant." (see Cruz, Jr. v. People)
Gonzales Petition (G.R. No. 196231)
An injunction will not generally lie to
restrain a criminal action Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando
Mendoza, together with four others, (Mendoza
13. Petitioner contends that the Informations group) was the subject of an administrative
filed before the sala of respondent judge, charge for grave misconduct filed before the
allegedly without the benefit of a preliminary National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
investigation conducted by City Prosecutor, are
characterized by such fatal defects that would Emilio Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for
warrant a writ of prohibition to enjoin Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
respondent judge from taking any further action (MOLEO) took over the case.
thereon. Petitioner's prayer for injunction to
restrain the criminal action against her is not The Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez
legally permissible. approved Gonzales drafted decision finding the
14. An injunction will not generally lie to Mendoza group guilty of grave misconduct and
restrain a criminal action. In Brocka v. imposing on them the penalty of dismissal from
Enriel , the court laid the following exceptions the service. The Mendoza group filed a motion
to the rule (1) when the injunction is necessary for reconsideration.
to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the
is necessary for the orderly administration of Ombudsman on the Mendoza case, Mendoza
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of hijacked a tourist bus and held the passengers
actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question as hostages. The incident resulted in the deaths
which is subjudice; (4) when the acts of the of Mendoza and several others on board the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) hijacked bus.
where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (6) when double President Aquino directed the conduct of a joint
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the investigation of the incident. The joint
Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) committee (IIRC) found Ombudsman Gutierrez
where it is a case of persecution rather than and Gonzales accountable, in particular, the
prosecution; (9) where the charges are unjustified delay in the resolution of Mendoza's
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for motion for reconsideration spanning nine
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no months precipitated the desperate resort to
prima facie case against the accused and a hostage-taking.
motion to quash on that ground has been
denied. Gonzales was formally charged before the
Office of the President (OP) for Gross Neglect of
15. Petitioner has not shown that her case falls Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of
within any of the recognized exceptions. Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office. The
OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and
48. Case Summary dismissed him from the service.
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President
(2014) Gonzales contends that the OP has no
G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 | 2014- administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
01-28 Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA
No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
Subject: administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the
Deputy Ombudsman.
Independence of the Ombudsman; Disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President; Removal of Non- Sulit Petition (G.R. No. 196232)
Impeachable Officers
166
In 2005, The Office of the Ombudsman charged 1. The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman
Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several (Gonzales) may be subjected to the
others before the Sandiganbayan with plunder administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
and money laundering. President (concurrently with that of the
Ombudsman) is a justiciable - not a political -
In 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through question.
Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a
plea bargaining agreement with Garcia whereby 2. A justiciable question is one which is
he would be allowed to plead guilty to lesser inherently susceptible of being decided on
offenses in exchange for surrendering the grounds recognized by law, as where the court
assets he was charged to have illegally taken. finds that there are constitutionally-imposed
limits on the exercise of the powers conferred
Although the Sandiganbayan approved the on a political branch of the government.
Agreement, the public outrage it engendered
prompted the House of Representatives to 3. In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire
conduct an investigation. The House Committee into the wisdom of the Congress' choice to
found that Sulit and her deputies committed grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the
culpable violations of the Constitution and President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such
betrayal of public trust -- grounds for removal statutory grant violates the Constitution,
under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 -- and particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No.
recommended to the President the dismissal 6770 violates the core constitutional principle
from the service of Sulit. of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI
The OP initiated an administrative disciplinary of the Constitution.
proceeding against Sulit. Sulit questioned the
OP 's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the OP set the Independence of constitutional bodies vs
case for preliminary investigation, prompting the Ombudsman's independence
Sulit to seek relief from the Supreme Court
4. The independence enjoyed by the Office of
The SC Ruling subject of the MR the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics -
The Gonzales and Sulit petition both challenged they do not owe their existence to any act of
the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Congress, but are created by the Constitution
Act (RA) No. 6770. In its September 4, 2012 itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal
Decision, the SC upheld the constitutionality of autonomy.
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the
President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a 5. The Constitutional Commissions (CSC,
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. COMELEC, COA), which have been
However, the SC reversed the decision of the characterized under the Constitution as
OP and ordered the reinstatement of Gonzales. "independent," are not under the control of the
Hence, the OP filed the present motion for President, even if they discharge functions that
reconsideration. are executive in nature. The kind
of independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Held: Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is
similar in degree and kind - to the
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is unconstitutional independence similarly guaranteed by the
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
but constitutional as to the Office of the Special since all these offices fill the political interstices
Prosecutor as the latter does not enjoy of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
independence under the Constitution. existence and proper functioning
Similarly, Macalino falsified PNB Check No. "Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The
552312 for P2,250,000.00 by altering the payee Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
indicated therein to make it appear that the following powers, functions and duties:
check was payable to Wacker Marketing instead
of Interbank. "1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of
Petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to any public officer or employee, office or
dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan agency, when such act or omission appears to
has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
public officer because the (PNCC, formerly the
Construction and Development Corporation of "2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own
the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government- instance, any officer or employee of the
owned or controlled corporation with original Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
charter. instrumentality thereof, as well as any
government-owned or controlled
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion corporationswith original charters, to perform
to dismiss for lack of merit. and expedite any act or duty required by law,
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or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or concerned is heard; A reelected local official
impropriety in the performance of duties." may not be held administratively accountable
for misconduct committed during his prior term
4. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original of office (Aguinaldo doctrine)
charter as it was incorporated under the
general law on corporations, it follows Facts:
inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as Petitioner Alvin B. Garcia, in his capacity as
amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
jurisdiction over him. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The
contract was signed on May 7, 1998 or just four
5. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan days before the date of the 1998 election. The
has jurisdiction over a private individual is contract covers the period 1998-2001 which
when the complaint charges him either as a co- was to commence on September 1998 when
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public the first delivery should have been made by F.E.
officer who has been charged with a crime Zuellig.
within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Sometime in 1999, news reports came out
6. The 1973 Constitution included as public regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of
officers, officials and employees of corporations asphalt by Cebu City. This prompted the Office
owned and controlled by the government of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an
though organized and existing under the inquiry into the matter. The special prosecution
general corporation law. The 1987 Constitution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
excluded such corporations. assigned to conduct the inquiry, after
investigation, recommended that the inquiry be
7. The crimes charged against petitioner were upgraded to criminal and administrative cases
committed in 1989 and 1990. The criminal against petitioner Garcia and eight other city
actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled officials involved. Respondent Arturo Mojica,
that "the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved
case is determined by the law in force at the this recommendation.
institution of the action.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued the order
50. Case Summary placing petitioners and the eight city officials
Garcia vs. Mojica (1999) under preventive suspension without pay for
G.R. No. 139043 | 1999-09-10 the maximum period of six months and to
cease and desist from holding office
Subject: Authority of Ombudsman to conduct immediately.
administrative investigations; Authority of
Ombudsman (and Deputy Ombudsman) to Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
preventively suspend an official subject to its said order, which motion was denied. Hence,
administrative investigation; Determination of the present petition assailing the validity of the
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as preventive suspension order.
to warrant preventive suspension, as well as
the period of such suspension, rests with the Petitioner argued that:
Ombudsman (but may be questioned via
certiorari under Rule 65); Evidence sufficiently (a) Ombudsman is without jurisdiction over the
strong to justify preventive suspension but administrative case, considering that the
imposing maximum period of suspension is alleged act (contract signing) was committed
unwarranted; Preventive suspension (max 60 during his previous term, and petitioner is
days) under the Local Government Code is already serving a succeeding term after being
distinct from preventive suspension (max 6 reelected for the same position
months) under the Ombudsman Law;
Preventive suspension order may be issued (b) Section 63 of the Local Government Code
even before the charges against the official mandates that the preventive suspension of
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local elective officials be ordered only after the Ombudsman) to preventively suspend an
issues have been joined, and only for a period official subject to its administrative
not in excess of sixty (60) days. investigation
(c) the order was based on evidence on record 5. The power of the Office of the Ombudsman
consisting solely of a hearsay affidavit, and to preventively suspend an official subject to its
inadmissible newspaper reports. administrative investigation is provided by
specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of
Held: R.A. 6770
"SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary 6. We have previously interpreted the phrase
Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the "under his authority" to mean that the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority Ombudsman can preventively suspend all
over all elective and appointive officials of the officials under investigation by his office,
Government and its subdivisions, regardless of the branch of government in
instrumentalities and agencies, including which they are employed, excepting of course
Members of the Cabinet, local government, those removable by impeachment, members of
government-owned or controlled corporations Congress and the Judiciary.
and their subsidiaries, except over officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over 7. The power to preventively suspend is
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary." available not only to the Ombudsman but also
to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear
4. Petitioner is an elective local official accused import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 . Hence, there
of grave misconduct and dishonesty. That the can be no question in this case as to the power
Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an and authority of respondent Deputy
administrative investigation into the acts Ombudsman Mojica to issue an order of
complained of, appears clear from the preventive suspension against an official like
foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770. the petitioner, to prevent that official from
using his office to intimidate or influence
Authority of Ombudsman (and Deputy witnesses or to tamper with records that might
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be vital to the prosecution of the case against quoted in the contract was too expensive
him. compared to the amount for which asphalt may
be bought from local suppliers such as Shell
Determination of whether or not the and Petron, particularly considering that the
evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant amount was fixed in dollars and was payable in
preventive suspension, as well as the pesos, thus exposing the city government to
period of such suspension, rests with the the risks attendant to a fluctuating exchange
Ombudsman (but may be questioned via rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the
certiorari under Rule 65) contract is not protected by adequate security.
These findings were based on the contract itself
8. Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. and on letters from Bitumex and Credit
6770 may be imposed when, among other Lyonnais. There were also letters from Shell and
factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The Petron that were replies to the Office of the
period for which an official may be preventively Ombudsman's (Visayas) inquiry on whether or
suspended must not exceed six months. In this not they could supply Cebu City with asphalt
case, petitioner was preventively suspended and on what terms. Given these findings, we
and ordered to cease and desist from holding cannot say that there is no evidence sufficiently
office for the entire period of six months, which strong to justify the imposition of preventive
is the maximum provided by law. suspension against petitioner. But considering
its purpose and the circumstances in the case
9. The determination of whether or not the brought before us, it does appear to us that
evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant the imposition of the maximum period of six
preventive suspension rests with the months is unwarranted.
Ombudsman. The discretion as regards the
period of such suspension also necessarily 12. If the purpose of the preventive suspension
belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he was to enable the investigating authority to
cannot extend the period of suspension beyond gather documents without intervention from
that provided by law. petitioner, then, from respondents' submission,
we can only conclude that this purpose was
10. But, in our view, both the strength of the already achieved, during the nearly month-long
evidence to warrant said suspension and the suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19,
propriety of the length or period of suspension 1999. Granting that now the evidence against
imposed on petitioner are properly raised in this petitioner is already strong, it is clear to us that
petition for certiorari and prohibition. These the maximum six-month period is excessive
equitable remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules and definitely longer than necessary for the
of Court precisely exist to provide prompt relief Ombudsman to make its legitimate case
where an "officer exercising judicial or quasi- against petitioner. We must conclude that the
judicial functions has acted...with grave abuse period during which petitioner was already
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of preventively suspended, has been sufficient for
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the hiding and destroying needed documents, or
ordinary course of law." (See Rule 65, Sec. 1). harassing and preventing witnesses who wish
to appear against him.
Evidence sufficiently strong to justify
preventive suspension but imposing Preventive suspension (max 60 days)
maximum period of suspension is under the Local Government Code is
unwarranted distinct from preventive suspension (max
6 months) under the Ombudsman Law
11. The recommendation that petitioner be 13. Petitioner claims that the Local
preventively suspended was based on an initial Government Code (LGC) should apply to this
investigation purportedly showing that: (1) the case of an elective local official. Under the LGC,
contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu City was preventive suspension may only be imposed
designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount after the issues are joined, and only for a
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maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an
was suspended without having had the chance administrative investigation without him being
to refute first the charges against him, and for given the required number of hours to answer.
the maximum period of six months provided by
the Ombudsman Law. But administrative 17. Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner
complaints commenced under the Ombudsman was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a
Law are distinct from those initiated under the written answer to the complaint against him.
Local Government Code. The shorter period of This, however, does not make invalid the
suspension under the Local Government Code preventive suspension order issued against
is intended to limit the period of suspension him. As we have earlier stated, a preventive
that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, suspension order may be issued even before
or the President, who may be motivated by the charges against the official concerned is
partisan political considerations. In contrast the heard.
Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period
of preventive suspension, is not likely to be A reelected local official may not be held
similarly motivated because it is a administratively accountable for
constitutional body. misconduct committed during his prior
term of office (Aguinaldo doctrine)
14. Ombudsman has not been stripped of his
power to investigate local elective officials by 18. Petitioner contends that, per the ruling
virtue of the Local Government Code. Indeed, in Aguinaldo v. Santos, his reelection has
there is nothing in the Local Government Code rendered the administrative case filed against
to indicate that it has repealed, whether him moot and academic. This is because
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions reelection operates as a condonation by the
of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the electorate of the misconduct committed by an
specific matter in question are not so elective official during his previous term.
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down 19. Respondents, on the other hand, contend
the other. (see Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole) that while the contract in question was signed
during the previous term of petitioner, it was to
commence or be effective only on September
Preventive suspension order may be 1998 or during his current term. Hence, the
issued even before the charges against Aguinaldo doctrine cannot apply, because what
the official concerned is heard is involved in this case is a misconduct
committed during a previous term but to be
15. As to whether a local elective official may effective during the current term. Moreover,
be preventively suspended even before the respondents point out that the contract entered
issues could be joined, it has been held in other into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed
cases that there could be preventive just four days before the date of the elections.
suspension even before the charges against the It was not made an issue during the election,
official are heard, or before the official is given and so the electorate could not be said to have
an opportunity to prove his voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
innocence. Preventive suspension is merely a particular aspect of his life and character.
preliminary step in an administrative
investigation and is not in any way the final 20. In a number of cases, the court has
determination of the guilt of the official repeatedly held that a reelected local official
concerned. may not be held administratively accountable
for misconduct committed during his prior term
16. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to Section of office. The rationale for this holding is that
26(2) of the Ombudsman Law, before an inquiry when the electorate put him back into office, it
may be converted into a full-blown is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of
administrative investigation, the official his life and character, including his past
concerned must be given 72 hours to answer misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it
the charges against him. In his case, petitioner still reelects him, then suchreelection is
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considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. Aguinaldo applies even where the effects of the
act complained of are still evident during the
21. That the people voted for an official with subsequent term of the reelected official.
knowledge of his character is presumed,
precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in 23. The court, applying the doctrine in
factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Salalima, ruled that petitioner cannot anymore
Such an undertaking will obviously be be held administratively liable for an act done
impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not during his previous term, that is, his signing of
distinguish the precise timing or period when the contract with F.E. Zuellig.
the misconduct was committed, except that it
must be prior to the official's reelection. 24. While petitioner can no longer be held
administratively liable for signing the contract
22. In Salalima v. Guingona, the court absolved with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not
Albay governor Romeo R. Salalima of his prejudice the filing of any case other than
administrative liability as regards a retainer administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in
agreement he signed in favor of a law firm this case, may not be taken to mean the total
during his previous term, although exoneration of petitioner for whatever
disbursements of public funds to cover wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed
payments under the agreement were still being in signing the subject contract.
done during his subsequent term. Petitioner
argues that, following Salalima, the doctrine in
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