26 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.

485

American University International Law Review

2011

Comment

COLLECTIVE V. INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE FOR INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES

Austin Badger [FNa1]

Copyright (c) 2011 American University International Law Review; Austin Badger

IN 486
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E. 496
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B. 505
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INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration) by a vote of 143 states in favor and only four states
against. [FN1] As one of the key missions of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations since
its establishment in 1982, the Declaration aims to make progress towards rectifying the perceived
inadequacy of existing international human rights law. [FN2] Past international human rights
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, emphasize the individual but lack
language protecting culturally distinct indigenous communities.[FN3] In response, the drafters of the
Declaration set out to create an international instrument expressly recognizing a collective right to
protection from state action that could undermine an indigenous group's ability to remain a culturally
distinct people. [FN4]
In its dissent, the United States explained several perceived problems with the Declaration,
including a concern that the Declaration lacks adequate guidance on the resolution of conflicts
between collective indigenous rights and individual human rights. [FN5] Although non-binding, the
Declaration is seen as carrying significant weight in outlining indigenous collective rights. [FN6] It
encourages nations to look to the principles embodied in the Declaration in developing their own
domestic policies. [FN7] Proponents argue that the Declaration could come to reflect international
customary law as its principles are injected into domestic judicial rulings and legislative
acts. [FN8] Proactively addressing the conflicts perceived by dissenters may speed this process and
further the goals of indigenous peoples. [FN9]
Courts and legislatures seeking to apply the collective rights embodied in the Declaration will be
forced to grapple with the conflict between individual and collective human rights. [FN10] To
explore one of these conflicts, this Comment will focus on the tension between the individual human
right [FN11] to enjoy one's own culture [FN12] articulated in Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights [FN13] (ICCPR), and the collective indigenous right to self-determination
and autonomy in internal affairs embodied in Articles 1 and 4 of the Declaration. [FN14] Part II of this
Comment briefly traces the historical and modern treatment of indigenous peoples which provide the
underlying justification for indigenous rights instruments, such as the Declaration being necessary and
distinct from individual human rights. [FN15] Part III argues that the Declaration embodies a flawed
rationale found in previous court decisions which gives greater weight to collective human rights at the
expense of individual human rights. Moreover, host-nation review of indigenous group membership
decisions promotes protection of individual human rights without undermining indigenous peoples'
right to internal self-determination. [FN16] Part IV recommends that indigenous peoples cede partial
control of reviewing membership decisions to the host nation to ensure that individual human rights
are respected. [FN17] Part IV further recommends that the Declaration should be amended to more
effectively guide courts in balancing individual human rights and collective rights. [FN18]

I. BACKGROUND

It is from a history of injustices that modern activists of indigenous people's rights continue to
draw caution and strength. [FN19] In stark contrast to the eras of assimilation and termination, the
current era of indigenous peoples is said to be that of self-determination, which
affords indigenous peoples the right to remain a distinct, often self-governed group: a longstanding
goal of indigenouspeoples groups. [FN20] This Comment briefly traces the background
of indigenouspeoples and control of membership decisions, as well as the Declaration, ICCPR, and
court decisions dealing with the conflicting guidance between the two. [FN21]

A. History of Oppressive Treatment of Indigenous Peoples

The history of oppressive programs enacted by nations upon indigenouspeoples is

undeniable. [FN22] Whether conquered or colonized, stories of death and displacement are common
to indigenous peoples around the globe. [FN23]The indigenous peoples that survived and were not
enslaved or assimilated found it increasingly difficult to hold onto their lands. [FN24] Through the right
of conquest [FN25] and doctrine of discovery, [FN26] land clearly inhabited byindigenous peoples
was declared uninhabited--a legal fiction known as terra nullius, which granted title to the conqueror
so that the land could be put to more productive use. [FN27]
In Canada and the United States, indigenous peoples were removed from their ancestral
lands, [FN28] occasionally through barter and treaty, [FN29] seldom equitable in nature, and just as
often through force. [FN30] What lands theindigenous peoples did retain were whittled down over
time through programs aimed at terminating reserved lands and assimilating indigenous peoples into
the mainstream. [FN31] Those indigenous peoples who clung to their traditional ways
found themselves with limited resources and ever-shrinking domains often far from their traditional
haunts. [FN32] Poverty and reliance on government handouts became the norm
for indigenous peoples living on reservations as modern society continued to develop and encroach
upon them. [FN33]
B. Modern Era of Self-Determination

The reservation system, which sets aside land for indigenous peoples, persists as the most
common state solution to accommodating indigenous peoples as distinct cultures. [FN34] One of the
major goals of indigenous peoples across the globe, however, is the recognition of a collective right
to self-determination.[FN35] As indigenous peoples secure greater representation in both domestic
and international fora, they rightfully demand participation in state decisions that affect their way of
life. [FN36] Though the extent to which indigenous peoples are successful in this pursuit varies from
nation to nation, the overall trend is moving towards greater respect for the right
of indigenous peoples to exist as a culturally distinct group. [FN37]
The United States affords a relatively expansive form of indigenous sovereignty
to indigenous tribes. U.S. federal Indian law is rooted in the principle that tribes,
as indigenous peoples, existed as sovereigns before colonization, [FN38] and therefore retain powers
of sovereignty not expressly abrogated by Congress.[FN39] Though not as expansive as U.S. domestic
policy, other countries also recognize indigenous peoples' right to self-determination. [FN40] For
example, in the Awas Tingni case, South American indigenous peoples successfully reclaimed title to
their ancestral lands by asserting a collective right to self-determination.[FN41] Integral to the idea of
self-determination is control of internal group affairs, such as determination of membership status,
which is most often considered on genealogical or racial grounds. [FN42]

C. Benefits of Membership and Membership Governance

An indigenous person is a citizen of the host nation in addition to his status as an indigenous
person. [FN43] Status as a member of a government-recognized indigenous group can determine
legally whether one is entitled to certain benefits provided by the host nation. [FN44] Historically,
these benefits ranged from the basic right to live on the reservation, to usufructuary rights extending
far beyond the reservation's borders. [FN45] Though membership status includes access to the
reservation, there is typically no requirement that a member live within its borders.[FN46]
Financial benefits may also be afforded to indigenous peoples. [FN47] In Sweden, status as a
member of the Sami indigenous people provided special reindeer breeding rights. [FN48] In the United
States, the Indian Gaming Act paved the way for successful casino operations which can provide
generous income streams to members of the host tribe. [FN49] As these financial benefits grow, so
does the import of determining status as an indigenous person in a just manner.[FN50]

D. Collective Rights: U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The concept of collective human rights is not universally accepted. [FN51] Like the United States,
other nations object to collective rights as conflicting with individual human rights. [FN52] Despite the
continuing debate, one of the main goals of the Declaration is to clearly signal to the international
community that internal self-governance should be recognized as a collective indigenous right and left
in the control of the indigenous group itself. [FN53] Article 4 of the Declaration emphasizes and
clarifies the right to internal self-determination. [FN54] It specifically cites autonomy or internal self-
governance as necessary rights in order to exercise the right to self-determination. [FN55] Internal
self-governance encompasses the right to control enrollment and disenrollment of members. [FN56]
Self-determination for indigenous peoples as a group differs from that of nations or
individuals. [FN57] If full self-determination was afforded to indigenous groups, the logical end result
could entail full independence and secession from the nation within which they currently
reside. [FN58] In fact, progress on the Declaration halted until it incorporated provisions to expressly
disclaim any impact on territorial sovereignty of the host nation in its adoption of Article
46. [FN59]The form of self-determination adopted in the Declaration is that of internal self-
determination. In one description offered by the Australians, internal self-determination is limited to
helping enable indigenous peoples seeking to assert their identities, to preserve their languages,
cultures, and traditions and to achieve greater self-management and autonomy, free from undue
interference from central governments. [FN60] In addition, internal self-determination is seen as a
collective or group right as opposed to an individual right. [FN61] Deference to an indigenous group's
control of internal matters and self-determination is construed with a historical eye towards past
treatment. [FN62]
E. Individual Rights: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

In contrast to the aspirational, non-binding nature of the Declaration, the ICCPR carries the weight
of a treaty. [FN63] Adopted in 1966, Article 27 of the ICCPR applies to ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities located within host nations.[FN64] It provides that those fitting the description must be
afforded the right to enjoy their own culture with the other members of their group. [FN65] Article 27
is seen as encompassing an individual right of cultural access by implicitly requiring preservation of
the group in order for that culture to continue to exist. [FN66]
The ICCPR is one of several international declarations and covenants which indigenous peoples
have invoked with some success. [FN67] The drafters of the ICCPR also provided for U.N. Human
Rights Committee (HRC) oversight of the provisions through acceptance of an optional
protocol. [FN68] In countries such as Canada and Sweden, which acceded to the optional protocol, a
petitioner may seek review by the HRC after exhausting domestic remedies. [FN69]

F. Court Decisions Considering Membership Governance

In Lovelace v. Canada, brought before the HRC through the optional protocol, a woman registered
as a Maliseet Indian lost her status as a member of the indigenous community under federal--not
tribal--law by marrying a non-member.[FN70] Denial of membership based upon marriage to a non-
member was limited to women marrying non-member men per the Canadian Indian Act [FN71] and
purported to reflect a history of patriarchal membership determinations within the indigenous
community. [FN72] Lovelace asserted among her claims that denial of membership deprived her of the
cultural benefits of living in an Indian community, the emotional ties to home, family, friends and
neighbours, and the loss of identity. [FN73] The HRC noted that this claim fell most directly under
Article 27 of the ICCPR which should protect those who were raised on a reservation, maintained ties
with the reservation community, and wished to continue to do so.[FN74]
The HRC found that while the Canadian Indian Act denied Lovelace her legal status as an Indian,
she remained Indian ethnically, and by preventing her from living on the reservation as a right, she
was impermissibly denied access to her own culture. [FN75] The HRC determined that Canada must
reasonably and objectively justify the imposition of statutory restrictions on an indigenous person's
access to the reservation with which they have ties. [FN76] Finding no reasonable and objective
justification for denying the right to residence based on Lovelace's prior marriage to a non-member,
the HRC found that Canada violated the ICCPR. [FN77]
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed indigenous control of membership in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez. [FN78] The petitioner in this case, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo Indian tribe,
sought relief in federal court after her children were denied membership by the tribe due to her having
a non-member husband.[FN79] This was in contrast to the freely admitted membership of children of
men who married non-member women. [FN80] The petitioner argued that her civil rights, as provided
by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), were violated. [FN81]The Supreme Court held that suits
against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit and that Congress did
not expressly or implicitly abrogate this sovereign immunity from suit in passing the ICRA. [FN82] The
Court opined that Congress envisioned resolution of statutory issues under the ICRA as better
addressed in tribal forums more familiar with tribal tradition and custom.[FN83] In effect, the Court
sanctioned a clearly discriminatory policy, one that would have probably been struck down had the
rule been that of a state rather than an indigenous group. [FN84] Academics have postulated that
even if the United States previously acceded to the optional protocol, the HRC would have upheld the
deference to membership rules enforced by the indigenous group itself.[FN85]
The HRC again dealt with Article 27 in Kitok v. Sweden where an ethnic Sami individual was denied
special reindeer breeding rights afforded to the indigenous group. [FN86] Mr. Kitok lost this breeding
right under a 1971 Swedish statute; providing that once a Sami engages in any other profession for a
period of three years, he loses his status as a Sami herder and cannot re-assert those rights except
with special permission. [FN87] In the Swedish system, indigenous groups decide membership status
first, but the decision may be appealed to the national judicial system if special circumstances are
found. [FN88] Although both parties agreed that securing reindeer breeding rights is an integral part
of Sami culture, it was the financial interest of the group to limit the number of Sami who can exercise
the reindeer rights that led to Kitok's denial of recognition. [FN89]Sweden argued that exercise of
one's Article 27 rights are justified in a democratic society when necessary to further important public
interests or protect the rights and freedoms of the people. [FN90] The HRC added a State requirement
that restrictions on individual membership decisions be reasonable and objective, as well as necessary
to ensure the continued existence of the minority as a community. [FN91] The HRC ultimately agreed
with Sweden's exercise of restraint in declining to grant Kitok member status and therefore Sweden
did not violate Article 27. The HRC noted however that Kitok was still permitted to engage in the
reindeer business, just not as a right. [FN92]

II. ANALYSIS

The Declaration adds to human rights literature that is already crowded with several declarations
and covenants. [FN93] It endorses the analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara which is
overly deferential to the tribe in membership decisions. [FN94] By doing so, the Declaration fails to
offer a balanced approach to the resolution of conflicts between collective and individual human rights
that arise in membership governance disputes. [FN95] To ensure respect of individual human rights,
host-nation review of indigenous membership decisions facilitates the nation ultimately responsible to
international law obligations taking an active role in the membership decisions. [FN96] A negotiated
agreement between the host nation and the indigenous group, balancing individual rights against
collective rights, would not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination. [FN97] This
Comment discusses each of these issues in turn.

A. The Declaration fails to offer an appropriately balanced approach to resolving conflicts between
collective and individual human rights that arise in membership governance disputes.

In failing to offer guidance on how to balance rights afforded indigenous peoples as a collective,
and indigenous peoples as individuals, the Declaration endorses the U.S. Supreme Court's deferential
analysis in Santa Clara rather than the more appropriate balancing analysis set out by the HRC in
Lovelace and Kitok. Whether nominally binding as a treaty, or only aspirational in nature, the
Declaration purports to represent principles applicable across national boundaries, with the implicit
goal of recognition and enforceability as customary international law. [FN98] The Declaration
unabashedly attempts to strengthen indigenous peoples' right to self-determination as a collective
human right. [FN99] In linking internal self-governance to self-determination, proponents of the
Declaration frame control of membership decisions as a key collective right. [FN100] Deference to
collective rights is excessive when an analysis entails inquiries into membership governance in terms
of the collective right to self-determination without giving proper weight to the individual right to enjoy
one's own culture. [FN101] As a standard to be pursued, the Declaration's failure to appropriately
balance collective and individual human rights could undermine its aspirational goals. [FN102]
The Declaration encourages analysis of membership governance disputes in terms of collective
self-determination rather than in terms of individual rights.[FN103] In Santa Clara, the U.S. Supreme
Court analyzed a membership dispute in terms of the impact on the tribe's right to self-determination
while discounting that its decision would deny a domestic forum to review the petitioner's gender
discrimination and community access claim. [FN104] While recognizing that Congress, through the
ICRA, codified an extension of individual civil and human rights to tribal members, the Court
rationalized that providing a federal forum for review of the enforcement of those rights would
undermine the tribe's collective right to self-determination to an impermissible degree. [FN105] The
Court further opined in Santa Clara that tribal courts are better equipped than federal courts to rule on
membership decisions. [FN106] A fair interpretation of the Santa Clara holding concedes that a tribal
court possesses the best knowledge and expertise to determine the impact on the collective of
granting membership status to an individual petitioner. [FN107] On the other hand, the impact the
indigenous group considers may be of a financial or political measure, rather than based on the impact
a grant of membership status may bear on the collective cultural identity.[FN108]
The Declaration fails to provide a standard on which to judge the equities of indigenous group
membership decisions. [FN109] Without a standard, the indigenous group may continue to arbitrarily
disregard individual rights. [FN110] In Lovelace, where the state--and not the indigenous group--
made the membership determination, the HRC determined that the petitioner's membership could not
be denied without a reasonable and objective justification. [FN111] The Declaration, through its
emphasis on collective rights, supports the proposition that protection of internal self-governance
should end the inquiry into whether a reasonable and objective justification exists in disputed
membership decisions. [FN112]
 A more balanced approach is required in order to ensure that rights guaranteed to individuals, by
international instruments such as the ICCPR, are not violated in membership decisions left entirely
under the control of indigenous groups. [FN113]Without a more balanced approach, indigenous groups
retain free reign to make arbitrary decisions which violate anti-discrimination and other human rights
laws.[FN114]
Though the Declaration represents a standard for a nation's treatment of indigenous group rights,
it also invites nations to allow indigenous groups to make membership decisions without host-nation
review by granting the indigenous group the right to self-determination. [FN115] When viewing
membership decisions solely in terms of preserving self-determination for the collective, the balancing
seen in Kitok may not occur. [FN116] The HRC considered and weighed the petitioner's individual right
and deemed such a denial as reasonably and objectively necessary for the viability of the collective as
a whole. [FN117] By considering the petitioner's individual human rights, the HRC recognized the
inadequacy of analyzing membership governance disputes solely in terms of internal self-governance
and collective self-determination. [FN118] Though ultimately decided against the petitioner under the
deferential analysis of Santa Clara and the Declaration, the entire inquiry may have ended once
internal self-governance was implicated. [FN119]
Vigorous enforcement of collective rights without respect to individual rights runs the risk of
fostering resentment by non-members towards indigenous groups and thereby undermining the goals
of the Declaration. [FN120] The rationale for the adoption of collective rights was that individual rights
were not sufficient to protect indigenous groups from assimilative pressures. [FN121] Once collective
rights are perceived as granting more than is arguably necessary, the nation granting those rights may
come under criticism for uneven enforcement of individual human rights. [FN122]
As indigenous peoples travel along the path of self-determination and experience more success
and prosperity, the special protections and benefits they enjoy will become increasingly desirable to
those with a plausible claim to membership. [FN123] Despite a present dearth of examples of
membership disputes being litigated, disputes may become more commonplace in the near future, as
seen in the United States with the rise of potential casino-derived income and increases in
disenrollment rates. [FN124] A balanced approach to weighing individual rights against the collective
right will help ensure that the principles of the Declaration can live up to the aspirational standard it
purports to represent. [FN125]

B. Host-nation review of indigenous membership decisions helps ensure individual human rights are
respected and does not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination.

Kitok, Lovelace, and Santa Clara each offer insight into how courts resolve indigenous group
membership disputes. [FN126] All three cases exhibit deference to collective rights, which the
Declaration encourages; however, each differs with respect to the level of deference and the system of
review over such membership decisions. [FN127] The three decisions are the subject of considerable
discussion among indigenous rights commentators, [FN128] but in order to ensure that individual
human rights are not sacrificed in the name of collective self-determination, a state forum competent
to review indigenous membership decisions is required, as seen in Kitok and Lovelace. [FN129]
Kitok stands apart in describing a system that maintains deference to indigenous group rights to
self-determination while ensuring that individual human rights are respected through host-nation
review. [FN130] In Lovelace, a government gender-based rule impermissibly denied a woman access
to her culture. [FN131] Similarly, in Santa Clara a rule enforced by an indigenous sovereign was found
to be unreviewable by the government. [FN132] However, in contrast, Kitok presents a government
rule based on financial interests of the indigenous group, reviewable by the group in the first instance,
and appealable to the government. [FN133]
While it would be a step backwards for indigenous rights proponents to encourage full host-nation
government creation and control of membership criteria, host-nation review of indigenous group-
created membership criteria would not undermine the goals of self-determination. [FN134] The
petitioner in all three cases was denied access to their own culture, but it appears that only when the
government creates, as in Lovelace, or is able to review the membership rule, as in Kitok, that
consideration of individual human rights occurs. [FN135] In Santa Clara, the host nation entrusted the
balancing of rights to the indigenous group itself, but in doing so also removed a forum for review of
such decisions. [FN136] Just as indigenous groups increasingly turn to international courts to provide
objective review of disputes between themselves and their host nation, [FN137] in cases of
membership denial an individual should be able to seek review of indigenous group membership
decisions in a neutral forum provided by the host nation to help ensure that a reasonable and
objective justification is provided. [FN138]
In order to preserve individual human rights, those adversely affected by an indigenous group
membership decision should be able to appeal to the government of the host
nation. [FN139] Recognition that host-nation integrity is superior to the indigenous collective right
of self-determination is already incorporated in the Declaration's provisions to expressly disclaim any
impact on territorial sovereignty as a concession to the African nations. [FN140] Though objectively
these provisions expressly limit the concept of self-determination in order to preclude secession from
the host nation, the same rationale supports host-nation review of membership decisions. [FN141] In
that respect, the host nation and its court systems would consistently be held as the nation's final
arbiter before proceeding to international review. [FN142] Otherwise, one would think that logically a
membership dispute by an individual would go from indigenous group straight to an international
forum, bypassing the host nation and undermining its authority and territorial
integrity. [FN143] Providing for host-nation review does not undermine indigenous group control of
internal self-governance any more than disclaimers providing that regardless of the actions of the host
nation, the indigenous group will not secede from the nation. [FN144]
This review process will not impact the indigenous group's right to self-determination as long as
sufficient deference is given to the indigenous group's decisions. [FN145] Deference is a concept
well articulated by courts in many contexts ranging from the deference appeals courts give to trial
judges in decisions pertaining to admitting evidence, [FN146] to the deference given by the HRC and
the Swedish court system to the Sami indigenous group in its decision not to re-enroll
Kitok. [FN147] Oversight and reasonable limitations on indigenous group control of membership
decisions will help avoid the potential for abuse of generally accepted individual rights of access to
culture in the name of preserving the collective identity of the group. [FN148]
The overarching goal of the Declaration is respect for an indigenous group's right to exist as a
distinct, self-governing community with the right to fully participate in host-nation decisions affecting
its way of life. [FN149] As the indigenous community seeks assurances that the host nation fairly
grants access to the political process which affects their group, the individual with ethnic ties to such a
community is justified in seeking assurance that the group fairly grants access to the political process
which affects their membership status. [FN150] As the indigenous community turns to the
international courts to occasionally review disputes between the community and the host
nation, [FN151] the individual should in turn be able to turn to the host nation to occasionally review
disputes between the individual and the community. [FN152]

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Indigenous groups should cede some control of indigenous group membership decisions to the host
nation.

While the history of treatment of indigenous peoples justifies zealous defense of any perceived
abrogation of indigenous peoples' rights, [FN153] advocates should not lose sight of a rational basis to
justify collective rights as necessarily separate from individual human rights. [FN154] The original
international human rights instruments aspired to craft universal human rights that would protect all
individuals from discrimination and oppression irrespective of their group memberships. [FN155] With
the Declaration, advocates of indigenous peoples' rights created an instrument that protects groups
from discrimination and oppression. [FN156] Human rights issues of the individual and collective are
receiving ever increasing attention both domestically and internationally. [FN157]
As host nations are ultimately responsible to all their respective citizens for individual human
rights, they should ensure that collective rights infringe on individual rights only when required by a
reasonable and objective justification.[FN158] As recognized in Lovelace, having access to one's ethnic
community is enshrined in Article 27 of the ICCPR as a fundamental human
right. [FN159] Whenindigenous groups are afforded special rights or privileges such as land use and
protections, they take on an additional responsibility to not deny the privileges that flow from
membership absent sufficient cause. [FN160] The nation which allows the indigenous group to retain
and sometimes grant these privileges also has an interest in overseeing membership
governance. [FN161]
 In light of growing international recognition of indigenous peoples and their unique
circumstances, indigenous groups should encourage host nation participation by allowing judicial
review of decisions, such as in Kitok. [FN162] This may be accomplished through laws enacted by the
host nation being drafted with the participation of
the indigenous groups. [FN163] Although indigenoussovereignty and self-determination should be
fiercely guarded against encroachment by arbitrary national laws, absolute deference
to indigenoussovereigns opens the host nation up to criticism on individual human rights
grounds. [FN164] However, as long as proper deference is given to indigenousgroup membership
decisions, host-nation review will not unnecessarily undermine the group's right to self-determination.

B. The Declaration should be amended to clearly reflect indigenous control coupled with host-nation
review of tribal membership decisions.

The Declaration advocates self-determination of internal matters without providing for host-nation
review. [FN165] The failure to address dissenters' concerns regarding the balancing of individual and
group human rights resulted in four of the largest indigenously populated nations voting against the
Declaration's adoption and profusely disclaiming any legal effect on the state of the law of indigenous
peoples. [FN166] Since the Declaration was amended to accommodate the African states' concerns
that indigenous groups could use the Declaration as a platform from which to justify secession from
the nation state, the Declaration should be further amended to reflect the HRC's decisions in Kitok and
Lovelace, which support deference for tribal membership decisions made initially by the indigenous
group coupled with the opportunity for host-nation review. [FN167]Such assurances would reign in
critiques that the Declaration is overly expansive and would also help alleviate the dissenters' concern
that the Declaration's version of self-determination goes too far and encourages political independence
from the host nation. [FN168]
Santa Clara is the most deferential policy regarding host-nation non-interference with indigenous
group membership decisions because it leaves individuals without a remedy under the courts of the
government which granted the rights. [FN169] Though celebrated by domestic Indian law scholars,
the policy opens the United States to criticism internationally as the balance between collective and
individual human rights becomes customary international law.[FN170] As parties to international
human rights instruments, host nations are responsible to ensure that their individual citizens are able
to exercise their rights.[FN171] Since indigenous members are also citizens of the host nation, they
should be able to appeal adverse membership decisions to the host nation's courts pursuant to self-
determination rights, as well as individual human rights, in order to better shape the evolution of the
law. [FN172]

CONCLUSION

Indigenous peoples must proactively address issues raised by powerful host nations. Given the
history of oppression which only in recent decades gave way to an era of self-
determination, indigenous peoples should take care not to let the pendulum swing too far in their
favor. When host nations grant indigenouspeoples special rights and privileges, non-member citizens
will increasingly take notice of who is afforded those benefits. The Declaration, although it already
recognizes the importance of indigenous control of membership decisions, should be amended to
take into account individual human rights found in the ICCPR and other individual human rights
instruments. In host nations where indigenousgroups are afforded special rights, leaving ultimate
review of membership decisions under the purview of the host nation helps
immunize indigenous groups from potential criticism. It is vital to the continued success
of indigenous groups to gain the support of powerful nations such as the United States, and advocate
for a system which respects both collective and individual rights, even when the current doctrine goes
too far in deferring to the indigenous group.
[FNa1]. J.D. Candidate, May 2011, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A. English and
Japanese, 2003, University of Texas at Austin. Thanks to the editors and staff of the American
University International Law Review, with special thanks to my editor, Lindsay Heitger, for their advice
and hard work. Thanks also to Monica Bansal for her support and friendship. Finally, heartfelt thanks
to my parents, Bruce and Janet Badger, and my brothers, Tom and John Badger, for their
unreasonable faith in me.
[FN1]. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 *Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].

[FN2]. See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1141, 1173-76
(2008) (seeking to preserve indigenous cultures by recognizing the necessity for affirmation of self-
determination, self-help, and re-empowerment of indigenous groups).

[FN3]. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (containing no mention of group or collective rights).

[FN4]. See, e.g., Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A
Historic Change in International Law, 45 Idaho L. Rev. 539, 539-43 (2009) (lauding the Declaration as
signaling the end of the view that issues concerning indigenous peoples are a temporary problem that
will eventually become moot due to natural assimilation).

[FN5]. See Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, Explanation of Vote on the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2007),
http://www.treatycouncil.org/PDFs/US_DRIP.pdf (citing flaws in the Declaration's treatment of self-
determination; land, resources & redress; collective rights, specifically that, under the fundamental
human rights doctrine of universal applicability, no group of individuals may have rights not afforded
to another group of individuals within the same nation-state; and general welfare).

[FN6]. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 551-52 (arguing that formal declarations by every nation are not
necessary to obligate all nations to adhere to human rights principles adopted by many nations and
binding as customary international law).

[FN7]. See UN News Center, United Nations Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept.
13, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=23794&cr=indigenous&cr1=# (urging
U.N. member states to integrate indigenous rights into their policies, even though the Declaration is a
non-binding document); see also Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 (arguing that the Declaration, as an
official statement, carries political and moral force, creating the basis for it to become binding
customary international law).

[FN8]. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 n.43, 551-52 (noting that the Declaration can be used by a
variety of people, including leaders of indigenous people, public officials, and educators as a tool in
domestic advocacy and legislative efforts).

[FN9]. Cf. Dwight G. Newman, Theorizing Collective Indigenous Rights, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 273,
280 (2007) (cautioning careful consideration of the concerns of dissenting nations and encouraging
development of an adequate and sound theoretical response).

[FN10]. See id. at 283-84 (offering that, while probabilistic, conflicting interests do not logically or
necessarily preclude the possibility of compatible individual and collective rights regimes).

[FN11]. See Hagen, supra note 5 (noting that the addition of collective rights to the existing body of
individual human rights begs the question of which should prevail in a dispute between them).

[FN12]. See Johanna Gibson, The UDHR and the Group: Individual and Community Rights to Culture,
30 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 285, 287 (2008) (relating the unique indigenous link between access to
land and enjoyment of one's own culture through the example of Australian aborigines).

[FN13]. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR] (expressing minority communities' rights in a state to enjoy their distinct
culture, practice their religion, and use their own language).

[FN14]. See Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 1, 4 (Indigenous peoples have the right to the full
enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights ...).

[FN15]. See discussion infra Part II (linking the history of treatment of indigenous peoples to the
development of collective group rights, and discussing current court treatment of conflicts between
collective and individual rights).

[FN16]. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that excessive deference to collective rights will lead to
violations of individual human rights unless there is a just system for review of membership
decisions).

[FN17]. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recommending that indigenous groups form agreements with
the host nation to provide for appellate review of tribal membership decisions by the courts of the host
nation).

[FN18]. See discussion infra Part IV.B (seeking amendment of the Declaration to encourage future
accession by the dissenting nations by incorporating a balance between collective and individual
rights).

[FN19]. See Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (reiterating in its preamble that indigenous peoples
have suffered from historic injustices).

[FN20]. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 15-34, 49-72, 97-115 (2d ed.
2004) (recounting the history of indigenous peoples' treatment and the current opportunities for
indigenous peoples in international forums); Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the Right to
Self-Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 Brook. J. Int'l L. 503, 506-17 (2008)
(outlining the history of territoriality and self-determination in the context of indigenous peoples).

[FN21]. See discussion infra Part II.A-F.

[FN22]. See generally Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present,
and Future of American Indian Governance, in The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization,
and Resistance 88, 88-107 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) (detailing the history of host nation
and indigenous people interaction in North America); Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Peoples and
Postcolonial Colonialism, in Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision 39, 39-41 (Marie Battiste ed.,
2000) (chronicling the forceful colonization of indigenous people in the United States, Canada, Africa,
and Asia).

[FN23]. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 39-41 (linking advances in warfare and transportation
technology to increased colonization).

[FN24]. See, e.g., Thomas D. Hall & James V. Fenelon, Indigenous Peoples and Globalization:
Resistance and Revitalization 6-11 (2009) (introducing examples ofindigenous resistance to
globalization and efforts of indigenous peoples to preserve traditional culture).
[FN25]. See Calvin's Case, [1608] 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B.) (proclaiming if a Christian King
should conquer a kingdom of an infidel ... the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that they be not
only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature ...).

[FN26]. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (ruling that the principle of
discovery applies, and therefore the [indigenous] inhabitants are to be considered merely as
occupants ... deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others).

[FN27]. E.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1153 (noting that an important goal of the Declaration was
delegitimizing the theory of terra nullius, a concept that treated the original inhabitants of conquered
land as legally irrelevant).

[FN28]. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History 63-70
(2007) (finding the removal of Native Americans from their land to be the conceptual predecessor to
modern day deportation--the exercise of a nation's plenary power to exclude foreigners).

[FN29]. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth--How Long a Time is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601,
608-19 (1975) (detailing the canons of construction favoring the American Indians that were used to
interpret treaties made between them and the United States, developed in order to inject some
semblance of equality into the agreements).

[FN30]. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 41 (concluding that superior technology enabled forceful
eviction of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands).

[FN31]. See generally Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 34-55 (1963)
(reviewing arguments in favor of assimilation as the best alternative to exterminating American Indian
culture and reservations).

[FN32]. See generally Kanstroom, supra note 28, at 63-70 (describing removal era policies and
jurisprudence).

[FN33]. Cf. Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in
Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints--Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44
Tulsa L. Rev. 383, 407-11, 423-26 (2008) (blaming federal and state policies for restricting economic
growth of American Indian Nations and requesting recognition of full sovereignty and a return to
treaty making between American Indian nations and the U.S. government as a remedy).

[FN34]. See G. Edward White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Marshall Court
and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 705-06 (1988) (asserting that the initial impetus for creation of the
reservation system in the United States was to forcibly separate the American Indians from white
society because of cultural differentness).

[FN35]. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (praising the Declaration as being a formal recognition
of indigenous peoples' collective right to exist as a distinct culture or society).

[FN36]. See id. at 553 (urging participation by leaders of indigenous groups in the political process
to garner increased support for recognition by the United States in international declarations
establishing indigenous rights).

[FN37]. See S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, Op-Ed., The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, Jurist (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php (hailing the
Declaration as a milestone that reaffirms the developing customary law in the indigenous rights
field); see also Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Making of a
Regime, 30 Queen's L.J. 348, 373-87 (2004) (summarizing regional trends and state practice in the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South America, Japan, Africa, the European Arctic
Regions, and the Philippines as reflecting a positive posture towards indigenous causes).

[FN38]. See generally Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 206 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2005) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)) (describing Indian tribes as
holding inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished); Vine Deloria,
Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in Native American Sovereignty 118, 123
(John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (extolling the virtues of increased deference to tribal sovereignty as a
remedy for the host nation's artificial control of community functions).

[FN39]. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-63 (1832)(reinforcing the plenary
power of Congress to abrogate any sovereign right of an Indian nation through litigation); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831) (establishing a guardian and ward relationship
between the federal government and tribes); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587
(1823)(accepting the doctrine of discovery for the proposition that all title to lands are distributed by
the conqueror). These three cases establish the principles of American Indian law and are collectively
known as the Marshall trilogy. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80
N.D. L. Rev. 691, 698 (2004) (explaining that the Marshall trilogy of cases is the first articulation of
Indian Tribes' position under federal law).

[FN40]. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 189, 219
(2001) (tracing decolonization efforts of former European colonies to the rise of self-determination as
a legal right).

[FN41]. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, 27 Wis. Int'l L.J. 51, 62 (2009) (discussing the Awas Tingni community's
struggle with Nicaraguan authorities which culminated in the Inter-American Court ordering the
Nicaraguan government to demarcate and title ancestral lands back to the Awas Tingni people).

[FN42]. See Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition: Soifer on Law,
Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 359, 371-86 (1997) (reviewing Aviam Soifer, Law
and the Company We Keep (1995)) (recognizing Soifer's view that indigenous identity poses a
significant challenge to American constitutionalism and liberal ideologies); see also Kirsty
Gover,Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in
Membership Governance in the United States, 33 Am. Indian L. Rev. 243, 250-54 (2009) (searching
for the legal origins of the tribal preference for descent rules as a basis for membership).

[FN43]. See Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian
Tribes' Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 Va. L. Rev. 793, 858-63 (2006) (tracing the federal
government's duty to protect the rights of tribal members as its wards).

[FN44]. See id. at 816-17 (remarking that increased barriers to tribal membership in the United
States may be related to maximizing the tribe's prosperity and minimizing payout).
[FN45]. See generally Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law, supra note 38, at 1122-23
(discussing the rights, similar to easements, that natives retained over traditional fishing, hunting, and
gathering grounds).

[FN46]. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (noting many tribal members live off-reservation).

[FN47]. Cf. Reitman, supra note 43, at 817-18 (cautioning that it would be naive to discount financial
motivations in tribal membership decisions).

[FN48]. See 1 Rennringslagen [Reindeer Husbandry Act] (Svensk frfattningssampling [SFS]

1971:437) (Swed.) (permitting official Sami members to exercise reindeer breeding rights not
available to non-members, whether ethnically Sami or not).

[FN49]. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (explaining that while termination-era policies created
economic hardships for some tribes, gaming and contracting opportunities provided economic benefits
to others).

[FN50]. See id. at 244 (crediting the importance of tribal membership criteria to the deference federal
governments give to such determinations and the resultant federal benefits conferred).

[FN51]. See Newman, supra note 9, at 280 (recognizing that the concept of collective, universal
human rights is not unanimously accepted at a conceptual or moral level).

[FN52]. See id. at 278 (including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United Kingdom among the
nations which have gone on record as opposing the idea of collective rights).

[FN53]. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (granting indigenous peoples the right to autonomy or
self-government in internal and local matters).

[FN54]. See Caroline E. Foster, Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 141, 150-56 (2001) (characterizing an indigenous group's
exercise of the right to self-determination as a form of political participation in interactions with the
host nation).

[FN55]. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4.

[FN56]. See id. arts. 4, 33 (finding that in addition to the right to self-governance, indigenous peoples
also have the right to determine identity and membership in accordance with their own traditional
practices).

[FN57]. See generally Castellino, supra note 20, at 505 (analyzing the individual, group, and national
right to self-determination in the context of land rights).

[FN58]. See generally Eyassu Gayim, The Eritrean Question: The Conflict Between the Right of Self-
Determination and the Interests of States 191-94 (1993) (associating self-determination with the right
to establish an independent state).

[FN59]. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (expressing the adamant rejection of any interpretation
of the Declaration's provisions which might suggest the right of any individual or group to violate the
U.N. Charter, and also cautioning against acts which would threaten the territorial integrity of existing
nation states).
[FN60]. See Anaya, supra note 20, at 111 (quoting Australian Government Delegation, Speaking Notes
on Self-Determination (July 24, 1991)).

[FN61]. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5,
Paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Concerning Communication No. 197/1985, Kitok v.
Sweden, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) (Mar. 25, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 HRC
decision] (upholding an indigenous group's decision to deny membership to a former member who had
lost membership status by temporarily abandoning work in the reindeer herding business).

[FN62]. See Anaya, supra note 20, at 129-31 (finding that host nations must bolster rights which
protect indigenous groups in order to eradicate the legacies of discrimination and past oppression).

[FN63]. See ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 1, 2 (declaring a covenant by the adopting states to follow
the principles espoused within, while conforming with obligations of the U.N. Charter).

[FN64]. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27.

[FN65]. See id. (establishing also the right of minorities, when acting in community, to their own
religion and language).

[FN66]. Cf. Gibson, supra note 12, at 315-17 (concluding that individual rights to culture implicate
intellectual property declarations to protect cultural knowledge).

[FN67]. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 363-67 (listing successful international indigenous
peoples' laws as emerging from such sources as labor disputes, racial discrimination, and indigenous
activism).

[FN68]. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (enabling the HRC to receive and consider communications from
individuals alleging violations of the ICCPR).

[FN69]. But see U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977,
Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, 2d-16th Sess., at 83, 87, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (July
30, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 HRC Decision] (recognizing that while exhaustion of domestic remedies is
usually required before an individual's communication is admissible, in this instance, Canadian case
law explicitly set the national Indian Act as controlling the issue).

[FN70]. Id.

[FN71]. Indian Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. I-5, 12(1)(b) (Can.).

[FN72]. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 84 (recognizing that patrilineal relationships were
utilized in determining the foundation for legal claims).

[FN73]. Id. at 85. Petitioner's claim under a gender discrimination theory was not addressed because
the marriage took place six years before the ICCPR. Id. at 84, 87.

[FN74]. See id. at 86 (associating the legal right to reside on the reservation to the rights of minorities
guaranteed by Article 27).
[FN75]. See id. at 86 (finding that Lovelace's several-year absence from the reserve since the time of
her marriage did not remove her from belonging to the minority).

[FN76]. See id. at 87 (noting that the restrictions must also be consistent with the other provisions of
the ICCPR).

[FN77]. Id. at 87 (holding that the denial of Lovelace's right to reside on Tobique Reserve breached
Article 27 of the ICCPR, even though she had married and later divorced a non-member).

[FN78]. 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978) (examining an Indian tribe's ordinance that regulated tribe
membership for certain female tribal members' children).

[FN79]. See id. at 51-52 (submitting that the children's membership was denied, even though the
children were raised on, and as adults, continued to live on the reservation).

[FN80]. Id. at 51.

[FN81]. See id. (asserting a violation of Title I of the Act, which restricts the denial of equal protection
of law by tribal rule on the basis of both sex and ancestry).

[FN82]. Id. at 59.

[FN83]. Id. (recognizing Congress' desire for little intrusion into the tribes' self-government, as well as
the knowledge of traditions and customs that tribal fora possess that federal courts lack).

[FN84]. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) (invalidating a similar state law basing
parental rights on the gender of the parent due to it not being substantially related to an important
state interest). See also Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 211-16 (comparing Santa Clara and Kitok to
other cases invoking the Optional Protocol).

[FN85]. See David H. Getches et al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 1018-19 (5th ed.
2005) (claiming that the HRC, in its decisions in Kitok and Lovelace, expressly limited the application
of ICCPR Article 27 to decisions to deny membership made by a national as opposed to tribal
government).

[FN86]. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 221-22 (considering whether Sweden denied Kitok
the right to enjoy his indigenous culture and therefore violated Article 27).

[FN87]. Rennringslagen [Reindeer Husbandry Act] (Svensk frfattningssampling [SFS] 1971:437)

(Swed.); see also 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 222 (stating that the Swedish Crown and the
Lap bailiff instituted the statute in an effort to reduce the number of reindeer breeders).

[FN88]. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 229 (acknowledging that while the initial conflict
was between a Sami individual and the Sami community, the existence of the Reindeer Husbandry Act,
which permits an appeal to Swedish courts in the event the Sami refused an individual membership,
constituted state action and triggered the responsibility of the state).

[FN89]. See id. at 229 (noting that regulating economic activity is generally an exclusive matter for
the state, except when such activity is an essential element of an indigenous culture that wishes to
protect its lifestyle).
[FN90]. See id. at 225 (arguing that the goal of the Reindeer Husbandry Act was to protect and
preserve Sami culture, and that any restrictions on an individual's exercise of rights should be weighed
against this strong public interest).

[FN91]. See id. at 230 (noting the conflict between the purpose of the legislation--to protect the rights
of the Sami as a group--and the application of the legislation to a single member of that group).

[FN92]. Id.

[FN93]. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 292-99 (including, but not limited to, the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities) Additionally, the established international
literature on human rights pertains to the protection of individuals, minorities, and intellectual
property as relevant to the right to culture. See id.

[FN94]. See discussion infra Part III.A (asserting that the balancing approach of Kitok is fairer and
preferable to the highly deferential approach of Santa Clara because it accounts for both the collective
right of self-determination and the individual right to enjoy one's own culture).

[FN95]. See id. (arguing that deference to collective rights is excessive when inquiries into
membership governance are analyzed in terms of the collective right to self-determination without
giving proper weight to the individual right to enjoy one's own culture).

[FN96]. See discussion infra Part III.B (contending that the host nation's court systems, which could
provide a neutral forum to help ensure that a reasonable and objective justification was provided in
cases of membership denial, should consistently be held as the nation's final arbiter before a claim of
violation of Declaration rights could proceed to international review).

[FN97]. See id. (claiming that the same rationale for the Declaration provisions that expressly limit the
concept of self-determination to preclude secession from the host nation, support host-nation review
of membership decisions).

[FN98]. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 552 (characterizing the Declaration as a statement by the
countries who support it that collective indigenous rights exist in customary international law, and
must be respected with or without formal adoption).

[FN99]. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1 (specifying a collective right to enjoyment of
international human rights law).

[FN100]. See id. art. 4 (declaring the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy in internal affairs).

[FN101]. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 248-50 (arguing that the current flexibility allowed in
choosing a theory upon which to resolve individual versus collective rights allows evasion and abuse,
and runs the risk of delegitimizing indigenous claims by polarizing political forces against them).

[FN102]. But see Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (characterizing the Declaration as embodying a
standard of achievement to be sought by the international community).

[FN103]. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 190, 247 (differentiating five conceptual structures
for indigenous peoples claims including 1) human rights and non-discrimination claims, under which
the petitioner in Santa Clara may have prevailed, and 2) self-determination claims, under which the
Court decided Santa Clara and embodied in the Declaration Article 4).

[FN104]. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (reasoning that Congress
deliberately passed the Indian Civil Rights Act without an explicit provision providing for federal review
of tribal enforcement of the statute).

[FN105]. See id. at 64 (finding that federal review of tribal membership decisions would contradict the
legislative purpose of ICRA to protect tribal self-government by undermining tribal authority and
imposing serious financial burdens on tribes defending federal lawsuits).

[FN106]. See id. at 65, 71 (reasoning that civil disputes arising under Section 1302 of ICRA often turn
on issues involving tribal customs and traditions, which tribal forums may be best suited to address).

[FN107]. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 822-23 (relating the holding of courts that have relied on
Santa Clara interpreting it to mean that internal tribal affairs, such as membership decisions, are not
the appropriate subjects for federal courts, only tribal courts).

[FN108]. See id. at 801-03 (noting ways in which gaming tribes may abuse control of membership
decisions, including disenfranchisement, disenrollment, and banishment).

[FN109]. See Hagen, supra note 5 (justifying voting against the Declaration because the text was
prepared through a flawed process and is both confusing and open to conflicting interpretation).

[FN110]. Cf. Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American
Indian Tribes, 9 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 42 (2006)(asserting that [t]ribal violations of U.S.
international human rights obligations are attributable to the United States because the tribes ... fall
under the rubric of State organs[,] and thus trigger the responsibility of the state).

[FN111]. 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (finding that while restrictions on indigenous rights
must be reasonable and objective, Article 27 must also be applied in light of other relevant Declaration
provisions).

[FN112]. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (commenting that the Declaration represents a formal
recognition by the international community of the right of indigenous peoples to exist and their right
to self-governance).

[FN113]. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 398 (concluding that support for indigenous people's
rights as customary law is premised on moral as well as legal theories, and that states must continue
to protect the binding obligations comprising existing human rights law). But see, Newman, supra note
9, at 285 (postulating that the relationship between individual and collective rights are internally
bonded because groups with collective rights ultimately serve their individual members; thus, conflict
between the two rights should be a rare occurrence).

[FN114]. See Tina Kempin Reuter, Dealing with Claims of Ethnic Minorities in International Law, 24
Conn. J. Int'l L. 201, 213 (2009) (recognizing the tension created by empowering ethnic minorities
over other minorities or individuals, but finding that practical goals of peace and stability favor such an
approach).

[FN115]. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (Indigenous peoples ... have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs ...); Wiessner, supra note 2, at
1174 (including local and internal self-government as essential to providing an appropriate legal
framework within which indigenous peoples rights are respected).

[FN116]. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (employing a balancing approach to resolve
the apparent conflict between the legislation, which protects the minority as a whole and the
application of that legislation, which can adversely affect individual members of that minority).

[FN117]. Id. (holding that the restriction of Mr. Kitok's reindeer herding rights were not
disproportionate to the legitimate goals of the legislation to protect the welfare of the whole Sami
community).

[FN118]. See id. (eschewing resolving the conflict between collective and individual rights solely in
terms of collective rights).

[FN119]. Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (finding that federal review
of tribal membership decisions would clearly undermine tribal self-government and would also fail to
address petitioner's individual rights), with 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (discussing the
implications of the legislation protecting Sami breeding rights on the petitioner's individual rights,
despite the potential encroachment on tribal self-government decisions).

[FN120]. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 287 (recounting the moral controversy inspired by
conflict between U.S. federal child protection laws and tribal control of children born within the tribe).

[FN121]. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law,
80 Am. J. Int'l. L. 369, 371 (stating that the partial basis for the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations was the notion that existing human rights were either inadequate or not fully applied).

[FN122]. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 849-50 (describing the dual economic benefit that comes
with tribal membership: income derived from the tribe itself and income derived from federal subsidies
granted to tribes).

[FN123]. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 27-30 (leaving control of access to tribal membership
to the tribes themselves does not provide an adequate substantive remedy to individuals affected by
membership denial decisions).

[FN124]. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems,
37 N.M. L. Rev. 85, 136 (2007) (noting the obvious correlation between tribal economic success and
desirability of tribal membership).

[FN125]. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 288 (theorizing that points of reconciliation between
individual and collective moral rights will prove that implementation of collective legal rights can
alleviate concern about the potentially adverse affect that the growth of collective human rights law
will have on individual rights).

[FN126]. See discussion supra Part II.F (discussing court decisions considering indigenous group
membership disputes).

[FN127]. See discussion supra Part II.F (finding that Santa Clara demonstrates total deference to
indigenous control while Kitok and Lovelace exhibit national systems that provide for host-nation
control or review of such decisions).
[FN128]. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 207-16 (discussing Kitok, Lovelace, and Santa Clara as
indicative of some of the misgivings of indigenous groups regarding Article 27 of the Declaration).

[FN129]. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of indigenous membership
decisions helps ensure individual human rights are respected and does not unnecessarily undermine
the goals of self-determination).

[FN130]. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (expressing concern for the rights of the
individual petitioner and employing a balancing test to ensure that the restriction upon the petitioner's
rights was both reasonably and objectively justified, and was necessary for the welfare of the minority
as a whole).

[FN131]. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Lovelace case in which a woman was denied
membership due to her previous marriage to a non-member).

[FN132]. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Santa Clara case where a woman's children
were denied membership by the tribal group because their father was a non-member).

[FN133]. See discussion, supra Part II.F.

[FN134]. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 862-63 (arguing that review of indigenous group
membership decisions is the host nation's affirmative duty in order to protect indigenous groups).

[FN135]. See, e.g., Christina L. Brandt-Young, Multicultural Jurisdictions at the National and
International Levels, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 241, 242-56 (2002) (reviewing Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural
Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (2001)) (employing Lovelace and Kitok to
discuss the author's proposed solutions to the tension caused by encounters between women's rights
movements and inflexible traditional culture protected by indigenous group rights).

[FN136]. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 73 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (taking
issue with the majority failing to provide a federal forum for vindication of a federally granted right).

[FN137]. See, e.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-55 (documenting the change within international
law by recognizing the rights of indigenous groups and granting indigenous groups means for
protecting those rights).

[FN138]. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (noting the absurdity of either extreme of severely
restricting a tribe's authority to determine citizenship or granting a tribe unfettered membership power
to point out that federal review of membership decisions should be required).

[FN139]. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 89-91 (2007) (recommending federal review of tribal
banishment decisions based on comity of nations and exhaustion of tribal remedies, and arguing that
such review achieves the important tribal objectives of preserving traditional tribal values and
practices while upholding tribal self-government).

[FN140]. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160 (indicating that the incorporation of Article 45 of the
Declaration was an attempt to quell the African nations' fears that borders imposed since colonial
times could be re-opened for dispute, absent language limiting the concept of indigenous self-
determination in Article 3).

[FN141]. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 138 (noting that tribal courts, similar to other foreign
nations granted comity by US courts, must guarantee basic due process rights to members).

[FN142]. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (concluding that the comity-exhaustion device sufficiently addresses
the interests at stake--tribal sovereignty, culture, and self-government as well as individual ICRA and
due process rights--in allowing the national government to be the final arbiter of tribal membership
disputes).

[FN143]. Cf. Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160-61 (describing the fear held by African nations that
pursuing self-determination to its logical end could create threats to existing territorial integrity).

[FN144]. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (seeking recognition of self-determination for
indigenous groups while prohibiting actions which may undermine political unity of the host nation).
But see Newman, supra note 9, at 279 (forecasting that Anaya's theory will likely not assuage critics
of collective rights by simply saying that collective rights do not threaten previously existing individual
human rights because balancing of competing rights has always occurred).

[FN145]. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 114, at 229 (finding the recognition of limited autonomy for
indigenous groups to be desirable and consistent with recent trends in minority rights, as the lack of
such limits could lead to ethnic conflicts and grave human rights violations such as genocide).

[FN146]. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) (citing the Federal Rules of Evidence as
requiring that an appellate court afford the trial court wide discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence).

[FN147]. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 223, 230 (discussing the Reindeer Act's deference
to Sami membership decisions, and ultimately holding that the Act did not violate the ICCPR's
guarantee that an individual may enjoy his or her own culture).

[FN148]. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (defining the roles of federally recognized tribes as
sovereign political entities to which the federal government owes a duty of protection; thereby
concluding that tribal abuses of membership decisions, which could undermine their own continued
existence, must be actionable by the federal government).

[FN149]. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 143-44 (proposing federal review of tribal banishment
decisions based on principles of fairness and deference to tribal traditions as the best solution for tribal
abuse of plenary power of membership decisions).

[FN150]. See id. at 131-33 (providing an example showing that sometimes internal conflicts regarding
the direction of the tribe have resulted in banishments as a form of political reprisal, seriously
undermining individual human rights and freedom of participation in the tribe's political process).

[FN151]. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-54 (summarizing the past half century of increased
active participation by proponents of indigenous rights on the international stage).

[FN152]. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 137 (advocating the use of the principles of comity to ensure
proper respect of foreign sovereign judgments while balancing the interests of each nation).

[FN153]. See generally EagleWoman, supra note 33, at 388-406 (reinforcing the point that despite
advances in tribal rights throughout history, European and U.S. policy undermined tribal economic
development by not fully embracing tribal sovereignty).
[FN154]. See generally Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 244-45 (calling attention to the issues that arise
from adding indigenous group claims as a new conceptually distinct category in a field already
occupied with other minority and gender rights).

[FN155]. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 294 (noting that minority rights were deliberately omitted
from the UDHR because rights to culture were thought to be achievable through universal individual
human rights).

[FN156]. See Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 37 (claiming the Declaration offers legal protections from
state action, such as genocide and forced assimilation, aimed at diminishing an indigenous group's
integrity as a distinct group).

[FN157]. See Reuter, supra note 114, at 236 (finding that the international community failed in the
creation of a unified legal approach with standardized guidelines to resolving the increasing claims of
ethnic groups in international law).

[FN158]. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 796 (contrasting the legal obstacles a host nation faces
when attempting to forcibly revoke a person's citizenship with the ease with which indigenous
communities may banish one of its members).

[FN159]. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (recognizing that a state's restrictions on the
right to residence, when it unreasonably interferes with the right of access to one's native culture,
constitutes a breach of the right to enjoy one's culture); see also ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27
(stating that persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture).

[FN160]. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 1 (noting that when indigenous peoples take on
governmental powers, their host government can potentially be responsible for the indigenous groups'
human rights violations).

[FN161]. See, e.g., id. at 42 (proposing that [t]ribal violations of U.S. international human rights
obligations are attributable to the United States because the tribes ... fall under the rubric of State
organs).

[FN162]. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 145 (arguing that the uncertainty and unfairness
surrounding the existence and protection of individual human rights within membership decisions by
tribes leads to fear, distrust, and contempt).

[FN163]. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 848-50 (noting that because all indigenous peoples are also
citizens of their host nation, subjecting membership decisions to judicial review by the host nation is
already within the host nation's authority).

[FN164]. See Cowan, supra note 110, at 43 (concluding that because it is possible for the United
States to be held accountable for tribes' human rights violations, tribal governments should take
measures to incorporate human rights protections to protect their sovereignty from more intrusive
federal restrictions and oversight).

[FN165]. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that by linking internal self-governance to self-
determination, which established control over membership decisions as a key collective right without
also providing for a meaningful review for those decisions, the Declaration failed to appropriately
balance collective rights with individual rights).
[FN166]. See Hagen, supra note 5 (expressing the rejection by the United States of any possibility
that the Declaration, as an aspirational document, is or could ever become binding as customary
international law).

[FN167]. See discussion supra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of indigenous membership
decisions helps ensure that individual human rights are respected and does not unnecessarily
undermine the goals of self-determination).

[FN168]. See, e.g., Pasqualucci, supra note 41, at 51-54 (reporting that while the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights largely conforms to the Declaration's principles, the Court diverges from the
Declaration's expansive proclamations of indigenous rights in relation to a State's appropriation of
natural resources on indigenous lands).

[FN169]. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 83 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (And
once it has been decided that an individual does possess certain rights vis--vis his government, it
necessarily follows that he has some way to enforce those rights.).

[FN170]. See, e.g., Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 Harv.
L. Rev. 1751, 1756-60 (2003) (asserting that indigenous groups' right to cultural integrity is a
powerful example of the interaction between general customary international law and other legal
norms which result in a legal norm being accorded the status of customary international law).

[FN171]. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 12, at 285-89 (arguing that the host nation is obligated to
maintain and protect the indigenous community's cultural knowledge in order to maintain the ability of
the individual to enjoy participation and access to that community knowledge).

[FN172]. See, e.g., John D. Smelcer, Comment, Using International Law More Effectively to Secure
and Advance Indigenous Peoples' Rights: Towards Enforcement in U.S. and Australian Domestic
Courts, 15 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 301, 305-06 (2006) (encouraging the use of international instruments
as persuasive authority in domestic courts in order to speed the process of such international
instruments developing into customary international law).

26 AMUILR 485

END OF DOCUMENT
26 Am. U. Int 'l L. Rev. 485

American University Tinjauan Hukum Internasional

2011

Komentar

KOLEKTIF INDIVIDU V. HAK ASASI MANUSIA DALAM PEMERINTAHAN KEANGGOTAAN UNTUK MASYARAKAT
ADAT

Austin Badger [FNa1]

Copyright (c) 2011 Universitas Amerika Tinjauan Hukum Internasional; Austin Badger
PENDAHULUAN ................................................. .............. 486
I. LATAR BELAKANG ............................................... ............... 489
A. Sejarah Pengobatan menindas Masyarakat Adat ............ 489
B. Era Modern Penentuan Nasib Sendiri ...................................491
Manfaat C. Keanggotaan dan Tata Kelola Keanggotaan .................. 493
D. Hak Kolektif: Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Adat 494
E. Hak Individu: Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak Sipil dan Politik 496
F. Keputusan Pengadilan Tata Menimbang Keanggotaan ................ 497
II. ANALISIS ................................................. .................. 500
A. Deklarasi gagal untuk menawarkan pendekatan tepat seimbang untuk menyelesaikan konflik antara hak asasi
manusia kolektif dan individu yang timbul dalam sengketa tata kelola
keanggotaan ........................ ................................................................... 501
B. Host-negara meninjau keputusan keanggotaan adat membantu memastikan hak-hak individu dihormati dan tidak
perlu merusak tujuan diri- 505
III. REKOMENDASI ................................................. .......... 510
A. kelompok adat harus menyerahkan beberapa kontrol keputusan keanggotaan kelompok masyarakat adat untuk
menjadi tuan rumah 510
B. Deklarasi harus diubah untuk mengontrol jelas mencerminkan adat ditambah dengan host-negara meninjau
keanggotaan suku512
KESIMPULAN ................................................. ................. 513

PENDAHULUAN

Pada tahun 2007, Majelis Umum PBB mengadopsi Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat ("Deklarasi")
dengan suara 143 negara mendukung dan hanya empat negara melawan. [FN1] Sebagai salah satu misi utama dari
Kelompok Kerja PBB untuk Masyarakat Adat sejak berdirinya di tahun 1982, Deklarasi ini bertujuan untuk membuat
kemajuan menuju perbaikan ketidakcukupan dirasakan ada hukum HAM internasional. [FN2] Telah instrumen
internasional hak asasi manusia, seperti Deklarasi Universal Hak Asasi Manusia, menekankan individu tetapi bahasa
kurangnya melindungi komunitas adat budaya yang berbeda. [FN3] Sebagai tanggapan, para perancang Deklarasi
ditetapkan untuk menciptakan sebuah instrumen internasional secara tegas mengakui hak kolektif untuk
perlindungan dari tindakan negara yang bisa melemahkan kemampuan sebuah kelompok masyarakat adat untuk
tetap menjadi orang yang berbeda budaya. [FN4]
Dalam perbedaan pendapat tersebut, Amerika Serikat menjelaskan beberapa masalah yang dirasakan dengan
Deklarasi ini, termasuk kekhawatiran bahwa Deklarasi kekurangan bimbingan yang memadai pada resolusi konflik
antara hak-hak kolektif masyarakat adat dan hak asasi manusia individu. [FN5] Meskipun tidak mengikat, Deklarasi
dilihat sebagai membawa berat badan yang signifikan dalam menguraikan hak-hak kolektif masyarakat adat. [FN6]
Ini mendorong bangsa untuk melihat ke prinsip-prinsip yang terkandung dalam Deklarasi dalam mengembangkan
kebijakan dalam negeri mereka sendiri. [FN7] Pendukung berpendapat bahwa Deklarasi bisa datang untuk
mencerminkan hukum kebiasaan internasional sebagai prinsip-prinsip yang disuntikkan ke dalam putusan peradilan
domestik dan tindakan legislatif.[FN8] Secara proaktif menangani konflik yang dirasakan oleh para pembangkang
dapat mempercepat proses ini dan memajukan tujuan masyarakat adat. [FN9]
Pengadilan dan legislatif berusaha untuk menerapkan hak-hak kolektif yang diwujudkan dalam Deklarasi akan
dipaksa untuk bergulat dengan konflik antara hak-hak individu dan kolektif.[FN10] Untuk menjelajahi salah satu dari
konflik-konflik, Komentar ini akan fokus pada ketegangan antara hak individu manusia [FN11] untuk menikmati
budayanya sendiri [FN12] diartikulasikan dalam Pasal 27 dari Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak Sipil dan Politik
[FN13] ( "ICCPR"), dan hak kolektif masyarakat adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri dan otonomi dalam urusan
internal terkandung dalam Pasal 1 dan 4 dari Deklarasi. [FN14] Bagian II dari Komentar ini singkat jejak pengobatan
historis dan modern masyarakat adat yang memberikan pembenaran yang mendasari untuk instrumen hak-hak adat,
seperti Deklarasi yang diperlukan dan berbeda dari hak asasi manusia individu. [FN15] Bagian III berpendapat
bahwa Deklarasi mewujudkan alasan cacat ditemukan dalam putusan pengadilan sebelumnya yang memberi bobot
lebih besar untuk hak asasi manusia kolektif dengan mengorbankan hak-hak individu. Selain itu, tuan-bangsa review
keputusan keanggotaan kelompok adat mempromosikan perlindungan hak asasi manusia individu tanpa mengurangi
hak masyarakat adat untuk internal penentuan nasib sendiri. [FN16] Bagian IV merekomendasikan bahwa
masyarakat adat menyerahkan sebagian kontrol meninjau keputusan keanggotaan untuk negara tuan rumah untuk
memastikan bahwa hak asasi individu dihormati. [FN17] Bagian IV Deklarasi lanjut merekomendasikan bahwa harus
diubah untuk lebih efektif membimbing pengadilan dalam menyeimbangkan hak-hak individu dan hak kolektif.[FN18]

I. LATAR BELAKANG

Ini adalah dari sejarah ketidakadilan yang modern aktivis hak-hak masyarakat adat yang terus menarik hati dan
kekuatan.[FN19] Dalam kontras dengan era asimilasi dan terminasi, era saat ini masyarakat adat dikatakan bahwa
penentuan nasib sendiri, yang memberikan masyarakat adat hak untuk tetap menjadi, berbeda sering diatur diri
kelompok: tujuan lamakelompok indigenouspeoples. [FN20] Komentar ini secara singkat latar belakang jejak
indigenouspeoples dan kontrol keputusan keanggotaan, serta Deklarasi, ICCPR, dan keputusan pengadilan
berurusan dengan bimbingan bertentangan antara keduanya. [FN21]

A. Sejarah Pengobatan menindas Masyarakat Adat

Sejarah program menindas diberlakukan oleh negara-negara pada indigenouspeoples tidak bisa disangkal. [FN22]
Apakah ditaklukkan atau terjajah, cerita kematian dan perpindahan yang umum untuk masyarakat adat di seluruh
dunia. [FN23] Para masyarakat adat yang selamat dan tidak diperbudak atau berasimilasi merasa semakin sulit
untuk terus ke tanah mereka.[FN24] Melalui hak penaklukan [FN25] dan doktrin penemuan, [FN26] tanah jelas dihuni
masyarakat byindigenous dinyatakan tidak berpenghuni - sebuah fiksi hukum terra nullius yang dikenal sebagai,
yang memberikan judul untuk penakluk sehingga tanah bisa diletakkan untuk menggunakan lebih produktif. [FN27]
Di Kanada dan Amerika Serikat, masyarakat adat telah dihapus dari tanah leluhur mereka, [FN28] kadang-kadang
melalui barter dan perjanjian, [FN29] jarang merata di alam, dan hanya sesering melalui kekuatan. [FN30] Apa tanah
masyarakat theindigenous tidak mempertahankan yang dipangkas dari waktu ke waktu melalui program-program
yang bertujuan untuk mengakhiri tanah dilindungi dan asimilasi masyarakat adat ke mainstream. [FN31] Mereka
masyarakat adat yang menempel dengan cara-cara tradisional mereka menemukan diri mereka dengan sumber
daya terbatas dan domain terus menyusut sering jauh dari menghantui tradisional mereka. [FN32] Kemiskinan dan
ketergantungan pada bantuan pemerintah menjadi norma bagi masyarakat adat yang hidup di masyarakat modern
pemesanan sebagai terus mengembangkan dan mengganggu atas mereka.[FN33]

B. Era modern Penentuan Nasib Sendiri

Sistem reservasi, yang menyisihkan lahan untuk masyarakat adat, tetap sebagai solusi negara yang paling umum
untuk mengakomodasi masyarakat adat sebagai budaya yang berbeda. [FN34] Salah satu tujuan utama dari
masyarakat adat di seluruh dunia, bagaimanapun, adalah pengakuan hak kolektif untuk menentukan nasib sendiri
[FN35]. Sebagai masyarakat adat aman representasi yang lebih besar di kedua forum domestik dan internasional,
mereka berhak menuntut partisipasi dalam negara keputusan yang mempengaruhi cara hidup mereka. [FN36]
Meskipun sejauh mana masyarakat adat yang sukses dalam mengejar ini bervariasi dari satu negara ke negara, tren
keseluruhan bergerak menuju penghormatan atas hak masyarakat adat untuk eksis sebagai kelompok budaya yang
berbeda. [FN37]
Amerika Serikat memberikan sebuah bentuk yang relatif luas kedaulatan adat untuk suku-suku asli. Federal AS India
hukum berakar pada prinsip bahwa suku, seperti masyarakat adat, ada sebagai penguasa sebelum kolonisasi,
[FN38] dan karenanya mempertahankan kekuasaan kedaulatan tidak tegas dibatalkan oleh Kongres [FN39]
Meskipun tidak luas sebagai kebijakan domestik AS, lainnya. negara juga mengakui hak masyarakat adat untuk
menentukan nasib sendiri. [FN40] Misalnya, dalam kasus Tingni Awas, Amerika Selatan masyarakat adat berhasil
direklamasi judul untuk tanah leluhur mereka dengan menegaskan hak kolektif untuk menentukan nasib sendiri
[FN41] Integral terhadap gagasan penentuan nasib sendiri. Adalah kontrol urusan kelompok internal , seperti
penentuan status keanggotaan, yang paling sering dianggap atas dasar silsilah atau ras. [FN42]

C. Manfaat Keanggotaan dan Tata Kelola Keanggotaan

Orang pribumi adalah warga negara tuan rumah di samping statusnya sebagai orang pribumi. [FN43] Status sebagai
anggota kelompok masyarakat adat yang diakui pemerintah dapat menentukan apakah seseorang secara legal
berhak untuk manfaat yang disediakan oleh negara tuan rumah. [FN44] Secara historis, manfaat ini berkisar dari hak
dasar untuk hidup di reservasi, untuk hak usufructuary membentang jauh melampaui batas pemesanan itu. [FN45]
Meskipun status keanggotaan termasuk akses ke reservasi, ada biasanya ada persyaratan bahwa seorang anggota
hidup dalam perbatasannya [FN46].
Keuntungan finansial juga dapat diberikan kepada masyarakat adat. [FN47] Di Swedia, status sebagai anggota
masyarakat adat diberikan hak Sami rusa penangkaran khusus. [FN48] Di Amerika Serikat, Undang-Undang Gaming
India membuka jalan untuk operasi kasino sukses yang dapat memberikan aliran pendapatan murah hati kepada
anggota suku tuan rumah. [FN49] Seperti keuntungan finansial tumbuh, demikian juga impor menentukan status
sebagai orang pribumi secara adil. [FN50]

D. Hak Kolektif: Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat

Konsep hak asasi manusia kolektif ini tidak diterima secara universal. [FN51] Seperti Amerika Serikat, negara-negara
lain menolak hak-hak kolektif sebagai bertentangan dengan hak asasi manusia individu. [FN52] Meskipun
perdebatan terus, salah satu tujuan utama dari Deklarasi adalah sinyal jelas kepada masyarakat internasional bahwa
internal yang pemerintahan sendiri harus diakui sebagai hak kolektif masyarakat adat dan kiri di kontrol dari
kelompok adat itu sendiri. [FN53] Pasal 4 Deklarasi menekankan dan menjelaskan hak untuk internal penentuan
nasib sendiri. [FN54] Ini khusus mengutip otonomi atau internal pemerintahan sendiri sebagai hak yang diperlukan
dalam rangka untuk melaksanakan hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri. [FN55] internal pemerintahan sendiri
meliputi hak untuk mengontrol pendaftaran dan disenrollment anggota. [FN56]
Penentuan nasib sendiri bagi masyarakat adat sebagai kelompok berbeda dari negara atau individu. [FN57] Jika
penuh penentuan nasib sendiri yang diberikan kepada kelompok-kelompok pribumi, hasil akhir yang logis bisa
memerlukan kemerdekaan penuh dan pemisahan diri dari negara di mana mereka saat ini berada. [FN58] Pada
kenyataannya, kemajuan Deklarasi dihentikan sampai dimasukkan ketentuan untuk tegas menolak dampak pada
kedaulatan teritorial negara tuan rumah dalam adopsi Pasal 46. [FN59] Bentuk penentuan nasib sendiri diadopsi
dalam Deklarasi adalah "internal" penentuan nasib sendiri. Dalam satu deskripsi yang ditawarkan oleh Australia,
"internal" penentuan nasib sendiri terbatas untuk membantu mengaktifkan masyarakat adat "mencari untuk
menegaskan identitas mereka, untuk melestarikan bahasa mereka, budaya, dan tradisi dan untuk mencapai
manajemen diri yang lebih besar dan otonomi, bebas dari yang tidak semestinya gangguan dari pemerintah pusat.
"[FN60] Selain itu," internal "penentuan nasib sendiri dipandang sebagai hak kolektif atau kelompok sebagai lawan
dari hak individu. [FN61] Deference untuk mengendalikan sebuah kelompok adat urusan internal dan menentukan
nasib sendiri merupakan ditafsirkan dengan mata sejarah menuju pengobatan masa lalu. [FN62]

E. Hak Individu: Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak Sipil dan Politik

Berbeda dengan alam, aspiratif tidak mengikat dari Deklarasi, ICCPR membawa berat dari sebuah perjanjian. [FN63]
Diadopsi pada tahun 1966, Pasal 27 ICCPR berlaku untuk minoritas etnis, agama, atau bahasa yang terletak di
dalam negara tuan rumah [FN64]. Hal ini memberikan bahwa mereka uraian yang sesuai harus diberikan hak untuk
menikmati kebudayaan mereka sendiri dengan anggota lain dari kelompok mereka. [FN65] Pasal 27 adalah dilihat
sebagai hak individu mencakup akses budaya oleh implisit membutuhkan pelestarian kelompok agar budaya yang
terus eksis. [FN66]
ICCPR adalah salah satu dari beberapa deklarasi internasional dan perjanjian-perjanjian yang telah dipanggil
masyarakat adat dengan beberapa keberhasilan. [FN67] Para perancang ICCPR juga disediakan untuk PBB Komite
HAM ("HRC") pengawasan ketentuan melalui penerimaan dari protokol opsional. [FN68] Di negara-negara seperti
Kanada dan Swedia, yang menyetujui protokol opsional, pemohon dapat mencari review oleh HRC setelah
melelahkan pemulihan domestik. [FN69]

F. Keputusan Pengadilan Tata Menimbang Keanggotaan

Dalam Lovelace ay Kanada, dibawa ke hadapan HRC melalui protokol opsional, seorang wanita India terdaftar
sebagai Maliseet kehilangan statusnya sebagai anggota masyarakat adat di bawah federal - tidak suku - hukum
dengan menikahi anggota non-[FN70. ] Penolakan keanggotaan berdasarkan pernikahan dengan non-anggota yang
terbatas pada wanita menikahi pria non-anggota per UU India Kanada [FN71] dan diakui untuk mencerminkan
sejarah penentuan keanggotaan patriarkal dalam masyarakat adat. [FN72] Lovelace menegaskan kalangan
mengklaim bahwa penolakan keanggotaan kehilangan nya "manfaat budaya hidup dalam masyarakat India, ikatan
emosional ke rumah, keluarga, teman dan tetangga, dan hilangnya identitas." [FN73] HRC mencatat bahwa klaim ini
jatuh yang paling langsung di bawah Pasal 27 dari ICCPR yang harus melindungi orang-orang yang dibesarkan di
reservasi, dipelihara hubungan dengan komunitas reservasi, dan ingin terus melakukannya [FN74].
HRC menemukan bahwa sementara India Kanada Undang-Undang ditolak Lovelace status hukum sebagai seorang
India, dia tetap etnis India, dan dengan mencegah dia dari hidup di reservasi sebagai hak, dia impermissibly ditolak
akses ke budaya sendiri. [FN75] HRC menetapkan bahwa Kanada harus cukup dan obyektif membenarkan
pengenaan pembatasan hukum terhadap akses orang pribumi untuk reservasi yang mereka memiliki ikatan. [FN76]
tidak menemukan pembenaran yang masuk akal dan obyektif untuk menyangkal hak untuk tinggal didasarkan pada
pernikahan sebelum Lovelace kepada anggota non-, HRC menemukan bahwa Kanada melanggar ICCPR. [FN77]
Mahkamah Agung AS ditujukan kontrol adat keanggotaan di Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. [FN78] Para Pemohon
dalam kasus ini, seorang anggota perempuan dari Santa Clara suku Indian Pueblo, mencari bantuan di pengadilan
federal setelah anak-anaknya ditolak keanggotaannya oleh suku karena dia memiliki suami non-anggota [FN79]. Ini
di Berbeda dengan keanggotaan bebas mengakui anak laki-laki yang menikahi wanita non-anggota. [FN80]
Pemohon berpendapat bahwa hak-hak sipil itu, seperti yang disediakan oleh Undang-Undang Hak Sipil India
("ICRA"), dilanggar. [FN81] Mahkamah Agung memutuskan bahwa tuntutan terhadap suku bawah ICRA dilarang oleh
kekebalan berdaulat dari jas dan bahwa Kongres tidak tegas atau implisit mencabut kekebalan ini berdaulat dari
setelan dalam melewati ICRA tersebut. [FN82] Mahkamah berpendapat bahwa Kongres membayangkan resolusi
masalah hukum di bawah ICRA sebagai lebih baik dibahas dalam forum suku lebih akrab dengan tradisi suku dan
adat istiadat. [FN83] Akibatnya, Pengadilan sanksi kebijakan yang jelas diskriminatif, yang mungkin akan
menjadi memukul kalah itu telah memiliki aturan adalah bahwa negara daripada kelompok pribumi. [FN84] Akademisi
telah mendalilkan bahwa bahkan jika Amerika Serikat sebelumnya mengaksesi protokol opsional, HRC akan
menjunjung tinggi penghormatan untuk aturan keanggotaan ditegakkan oleh kelompok adat sendiri [FN85].
HRC lagi ditangani dengan Pasal 27 di Kitok ay Swedia di mana seorang individu etnis Sami ditolak hak-hak
peternakan rusa khusus diberikan kepada kelompok pribumi. [FN86] Mr Kitok kehilangan hak ini berkembang biak di
bawah undang-undang 1971 Swedia, menyediakan bahwa sekali terlibat Sami dalam setiap profesi lainnya untuk
jangka waktu tiga tahun, ia kehilangan statusnya sebagai gembala Sami dan tidak dapat kembali menegaskan hak-
hak tersebut kecuali dengan khusus izin. [FN87] Dalam sistem Swedia, kelompok masyarakat adat memutuskan
status keanggotaan pertama, tetapi keputusan dapat mengajukan banding ke sistem peradilan nasional jika keadaan
khusus ditemukan. [FN88] Meskipun kedua belah pihak sepakat bahwa mengamankan hak penangkaran rusa
merupakan bagian integral dari budaya Sami, itu adalah kepentingan keuangan kelompok untuk membatasi jumlah
Sami yang dapat melaksanakan hak rusa yang menyebabkan penolakan Kitok dari pengakuan. [FN89] Swedia
berpendapat bahwa pelaksanaan Pasal 27 hak seseorang dibenarkan dalam suatu masyarakat demokratis bila
diperlukan untuk kepentingan publik yang penting atau melindungi hak-hak dan kebebasan rakyat. [FN90] HRC
menambahkan persyaratan Negara bahwa pembatasan keputusan keanggotaan individu masuk akal dan obyektif,
serta diperlukan untuk menjamin kelangsungan hidup minoritas sebagai sebuah komunitas. [FN91] HRC akhirnya
setuju dengan olahraga Swedia menahan diri dalam menolak status anggota Kitok hibah dan karena Swedia tidak
melanggar Pasal 27. HRC dicatat bahwa Kitok masih diizinkan untuk terlibat dalam bisnis rusa, hanya saja tidak
sebagai hak. [FN92]

II. ANALISIS

Deklarasi ini menambah literatur hak asasi manusia yang sudah ramai dengan beberapa deklarasi dan
perjanjian. [FN93] Ini mendukung analisis Mahkamah Agung AS di Santa Clara yang terlalu hormat kepada suku
dalam keputusan keanggotaan.[FN94] Dengan demikian, Deklarasi gagal untuk menawarkan pendekatan yang
seimbang untuk resolusi konflik antara hak asasi manusia kolektif dan individu yang muncul dalam sengketa
pemerintahan keanggotaan. [FN95] Untuk memastikan penghormatan hak asasi manusia individu, tuan-negara
meninjau keputusan keanggotaan adat memfasilitasi bangsa bertanggung jawab terhadap kewajiban hukum
internasional mengambil peran aktif dalam keputusan keanggotaan. [FN96] Kesepakatan dinegosiasikan antara
negara tuan rumah dan kelompok adat, menyeimbangkan hak individu terhadap hak-hak kolektif, tidak akan perlu
merusak tujuan penentuan nasib sendiri. [FN97] Komentar ini membahas setiap masalah pada gilirannya.

A. Deklarasi gagal untuk menawarkan pendekatan tepat seimbang untuk menyelesaikan konflik antara hak asasi
manusia kolektif dan individu yang muncul dalam sengketa pemerintahan keanggotaan.
Dalam gagal untuk menawarkan panduan tentang bagaimana untuk menyeimbangkan hak-hak yang diberikan
masyarakat adat sebagai masyarakat kolektif, dan masyarakat adat sebagai individu, Deklarasi mendukung analisis
hormat Mahkamah Agung AS di Santa Clara daripada analisis keseimbangan yang lebih tepat ditetapkan oleh HRC
di Lovelace dan Kitok. Apakah nominal mengikat sebagai perjanjian, atau hanya aspirasi di alam, Deklarasi
dimaksudkan untuk mewakili prinsip yang berlaku melintasi batas-batas nasional, dengan tujuan implisit dari
pengakuan dan keberlakuan sebagai hukum kebiasaan internasional. [FN98] Deklarasi ini tanpa malu-malu upaya
penguatan hak masyarakat adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri sebagai hak asasi manusia kolektif. [FN99] Dalam
menghubungkan diri-pemerintahan internal untuk menentukan nasib sendiri, para pendukung kontrol frame Deklarasi
keputusan keanggotaan sebagai hak kolektif kunci. [FN100] Deference hak-hak kolektif yang berlebihan ketika
analisis memerlukan penyelidikan ke dalam pemerintahan keanggotaan dalam hal hak kolektif untuk menentukan
nasib sendiri tanpa memberikan bobot yang tepat untuk hak individu untuk menikmati budaya sendiri.[FN101]
Sebagai standar untuk dikejar, kegagalan Deklarasi untuk menyeimbangkan secara tepat hak asasi manusia kolektif
dan individu dapat merusak tujuan aspirasional nya. [FN102]
Deklarasi ini mendorong analisis sengketa pemerintahan keanggotaan dalam hal kolektif penentuan nasib sendiri
bukan dalam hal hak-hak individu [FN103] Di Santa Clara., Mahkamah Agung AS dianalisis sengketa keanggotaan
dalam hal dampak di sebelah kanan suku untuk diri sedangkan penentuan diskon yang keputusannya akan
menyangkal sebuah forum dalam negeri untuk meninjau diskriminasi gender pemohon dan mengklaim komunitas
akses. [FN104] Meskipun mengakui bahwa Kongres, melalui ICRA ini, dikodifikasikan perpanjangan hak-hak sipil dan
asasi manusia individu untuk anggota suku, Pengadilan merasionalisasi bahwa menyediakan forum federal untuk
meninjau penegakan hak-hak tersebut akan merusak hak kolektif suku untuk diri tekad untuk gelar diizinkan. [FN105]
Mahkamah berpendapat lanjut di Santa Clara bahwa pengadilan suku yang lebih baik dari pengadilan federal untuk
memerintah pada keputusan keanggotaan. [FN106] Sebuah penafsiran yang wajar dari Santa Clara memegang
mengakui bahwa pengadilan suku memiliki pengetahuan terbaik dan keahlian untuk menentukan dampak pada
kolektif pemberian status keanggotaan kepada pemohon individu. [FN107] Di sisi lain, dampak kelompok adat
mungkin menganggap ukuran keuangan atau politik, bukan berdasarkan dampak hibah status keanggotaan dapat
menanggung pada identitas budaya kolektif. [FN108]
Deklarasi gagal untuk menyediakan sebuah standar untuk menilai ekuitas keputusan keanggotaan kelompok
pribumi.[FN109] Tanpa standar, kelompok adat dapat terus sewenang-wenang mengabaikan hak-hak
individu. [FN110] Dalam Lovelace, di mana negara - dan bukan kelompok pribumi - membuat penentuan
keanggotaan, HRC menetapkan bahwa keanggotaan pemohon tidak dapat dipungkiri tanpa pembenaran yang
masuk akal dan obyektif. [FN111] Deklarasi ini, melalui penekanannya terhadap hak-hak kolektif, mendukung
proposisi bahwa perlindungan internal pemerintahan sendiri harus mengakhiri penyelidikan apakah suatu
pembenaran yang masuk akal dan obyektif ada dalam keputusan keanggotaan disengketakan. [FN112]
Sebuah pendekatan yang lebih seimbang yang diperlukan dalam rangka untuk memastikan bahwa hak individu
dijamin oleh instrumen internasional seperti ICCPR, tidak dilanggar dalam keputusan keanggotaan diserahkan
sepenuhnya di bawah kendali kelompok-kelompok pribumi. [FN113] Tanpa pendekatan yang lebih seimbang,
kelompok masyarakat adat mempertahankan pemerintahan bebas untuk membuat keputusan sewenang-wenang
yang melanggar anti-diskriminasi dan hukum hak asasi manusia. [FN114]
Meskipun Deklarasi merupakan standar untuk pengobatan bangsa hak-hak kelompok masyarakat adat, juga
mengajak negara-negara untuk memungkinkan kelompok masyarakat adat untuk membuat keputusan tanpa
keanggotaan negara tuan review oleh kelompok adat pemberian hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri. [FN115] Saat
melihat keputusan keanggotaan hanya dalam hal melestarikan penentuan nasib sendiri bagi kolektif, keseimbangan
terlihat di Kitok tidak mungkin terjadi.[FN116] HRC dipertimbangkan dan ditimbang hak individu pemohon dan
dianggap seperti penolakan yang cukup dan objektif yang diperlukan untuk kelangsungan hidup kolektif secara
keseluruhan. [FN117] Dengan mempertimbangkan hak-hak individu pemohon itu manusia, HRC mengakui
ketidakmampuan menganalisis perselisihan keanggotaan hanya dalam hal tata kelola internal pemerintahan sendiri
dan kolektif penentuan nasib sendiri. [FN118] Meskipun akhirnya memutuskan pemohon di bawah analisis hormat
Santa Clara dan Deklarasi, seluruh penyelidikan mungkin telah berakhir sekali diri pemerintahan internal yang telah
terlibat. [FN119]
Penegakan hukum yang kuat hak-hak kolektif tanpa menghormati hak-hak individu menjalankan risiko mendorong
kemarahan oleh non-anggota terhadap kelompok-kelompok pribumi dan dengan demikian merusak tujuan dari
Deklarasi. [FN120] Alasan untuk adopsi hak-hak kolektif adalah bahwa hak-hak individu tidak cukup untuk melindungi
kelompok-kelompok pribumi dari tekanan asimilatif. [FN121] Setelah hak-hak kolektif dianggap sebagai pemberian
lebih dari ini bisa dibilang perlu, bangsa pemberian hak tersebut berada di bawah kritik untuk penegakan hak asasi
manusia yang tidak merata individu. [FN122]
Sebagai masyarakat adat perjalanan sepanjang jalan menentukan nasib sendiri dan pengalaman lebih sukses dan
kemakmuran, perlindungan khusus dan manfaat yang mereka nikmati akan menjadi semakin diinginkan untuk
mereka dengan klaim yang masuk akal untuk keanggotaan. [FN123] Meskipun kelangkaan sekarang contoh
sengketa keanggotaan yang litigated, perselisihan dapat menjadi lebih umum dalam waktu dekat, seperti yang
terlihat di Amerika Serikat dengan munculnya potensi kasino yang diturunkan pendapatan dan kenaikan tingkat suku
disenrollment. [FN124] Pendekatan yang seimbang untuk menimbang hak-hak individu terhadap hak kolektif akan
membantu memastikan bahwa prinsip-prinsip Deklarasi dapat hidup dengan standar aspirasional memiliki tujuan
untuk mewakili. [FN125]
B. Host-negara meninjau keputusan keanggotaan adat membantu memastikan hak-hak individu dihormati dan tidak
perlu merusak tujuan penentuan nasib sendiri.
Kitok, Lovelace, dan Santa Clara masing-masing menawarkan wawasan ke dalam bagaimana menyelesaikan
sengketa pengadilan keanggotaan grup pribumi. [FN126] Semua tiga kasus menunjukkan penghormatan terhadap
hak-hak kolektif, yang mendorong Deklarasi, namun, masing-masing berbeda sehubungan dengan tingkat
penghormatan dan sistem review atas keputusan keanggotaan tersebut. [FN127] Tiga keputusan subjek diskusi yang
cukup besar di antara para komentator hak-hak adat, [FN128] tetapi dalam rangka untuk memastikan bahwa hak
asasi manusia individu tidak dikorbankan dalam nama kolektif penentuan nasib sendiri, sebuah forum negara yang
kompeten untuk meninjau keputusan keanggotaan adatdiperlukan, seperti terlihat dalam Kitok dan Lovelace. [FN129]
Kitok berdiri terpisah dalam menggambarkan suatu sistem yang menjaga menghormati hak-hak kelompok
masyarakat adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri sambil memastikan bahwa hak asasi manusia individu dihormati
melalui host-bangsa tinjauan. [FN130] Dalam Lovelace, pemerintah berbasis gender aturan impermissibly ditolak
akses wanita untuk budayanya. [FN131] Demikian pula, di Santa Clara aturan ditegakkan oleh penguasa pribumi
ditemukan unreviewable oleh pemerintah. [FN132] Namun, sebaliknya, menyajikan Kitok aturan pemerintah
berdasarkan kepentingan keuangan kelompok adat, reviewable oleh kelompok dalam contoh pertama, dan diajukan
banding kepada pemerintah. [FN133]
Sementara itu akan menjadi langkah mundur bagi pendukung hak masyarakat adat untuk mendorong penuh host-
bangsa penciptaan dan kontrol pemerintah kriteria keanggotaan, tuan-bangsa pribumi meninjau kelompok-dibuat
kriteria keanggotaan tidak akan merusak tujuan penentuan nasib sendiri. [FN134] Para Pemohon dalam ketiga kasus
ditolak akses ke budaya mereka sendiri, tapi tampaknya hanya ketika pemerintah menciptakan, seperti di Lovelace,
atau mampu untuk meninjau aturan keanggotaan, seperti dalam Kitok, bahwa pertimbangan hak asasi manusia
individu terjadi. [FN135] Di Santa Clara, negara tuan rumah dipercayakan keseimbangan hak kepada kelompok
masyarakat adat itu sendiri, tetapi dengan begitu juga dihapus forum untuk meninjau keputusan tersebut. [FN136]
Sama seperti kelompok masyarakat adat semakin beralih ke pengadilan internasional untuk memberikan tinjauan
Tujuan dari perselisihan antara mereka dan negara tuan rumah mereka, [FN137] dalam kasus-kasus penolakan
keanggotaan individu harus mampu mencari review keputusan keanggotaan kelompok adat di sebuah forum
netral disediakan oleh negara tuan rumah untuk membantu memastikan bahwa pembenaran yang masuk akal dan
obyektif disediakan. [FN138]
Dalam rangka melestarikan hak asasi manusia individu, mereka yang terpengaruh oleh keputusan keanggotaan
kelompok adat harus bisa banding kepada pemerintah negara tuan rumah.[FN139] Pengakuan bahwa host-bangsa
integritas unggul dari hak kolektif masyarakat adat atas penentuan nasib sendiri sudah dimasukkan dalam ketentuan
Deklarasi untuk tegas menolak dampak apapun terhadap kedaulatan teritorial sebagai konsesi kepada bangsa-
bangsa Afrika. [FN140] Meskipun obyektif ketentuan ini secara tegas membatasi konsep penentuan nasib sendiri
dalam rangka untuk menghindari memisahkan diri dari negara tuan rumah, alasan yang sama mendukung host-
negara meninjau keputusan keanggotaan. [FN141] Dalam hal itu, negara tuan rumah dan sistem pengadilan yang
secara konsisten akan diselenggarakan sebagai wasit final bangsa sebelum melanjutkan untuk meninjau
internasional. [FN142] Jika tidak, seseorang akan berpikir bahwa logis sengketa keanggotaan oleh individu akan
pergi dari kelompok adat langsung ke forum internasional, melewati negara tuan rumah dan merusak otoritas dan
integritas teritorial. [FN143] Menyediakan untuk host-negara meninjau tidak merusak adat kelompok kontrol internal
pemerintahan sendiri lebih dari penyangkalan memberikan bahwa terlepas dari tindakan negara tuan rumah,
kelompok pribumi tidak akan memisahkan diri dari bangsa. [FN144]
Ini proses review tidak akan mempengaruhi hak kelompok adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri asalkan
menghormati cukup diberikan untuk keputusan-keputusan kelompok adat. [FN145] Deference adalah sebuah konsep
yang baik diartikulasikan oleh pengadilan dalam banyak konteks mulai dari pengadilan banding penghormatan
diberikan kepada hakim pengadilan dalam keputusan-keputusan yang berkaitan dengan bukti mengakui, [FN146]
untuk penghormatan yang diberikan oleh HRC dan sistem pengadilan Swedia dengan penduduk asli Samikelompok
dalam keputusan untuk tidak mendaftarkan ulang Kitok. [FN147] Pengawasan dan pembatasan yang wajar pada
kelompok kontrol asli keputusan keanggotaan akan membantu menghindari potensi penyalahgunaan hak-hak
individu yang berlaku umum akses ke budaya dalam nama melestarikan identitas kolektif kelompok. [FN148]
Tujuan menyeluruh dari Deklarasi ini adalah penghormatan atas hak kelompok masyarakat adat untuk eksis sebagai
sebuah komunitas, pemerintahan sendiri yang berbeda dengan hak untuk berpartisipasi penuh di host-bangsa
keputusan yang mempengaruhi cara hidupnya. [FN149] Sebagai masyarakat adat mencari jaminan bahwa negara
tuan rumah cukup memberikan akses ke proses politik yang mempengaruhi kelompok mereka, individu dengan
ikatan etnis kepada masyarakat seperti dibenarkan dalam mencari jaminan bahwa kelompok itu cukup memberikan
akses ke proses politik yangmempengaruhi status keanggotaan mereka. [FN150] Sebagai masyarakat adat beralih
ke pengadilan internasional untuk sesekali meninjau perselisihan antara masyarakat dan negara tuan rumah,
[FN151] individu dalam gilirannya harus mampu beralih ke negara tuan rumah untuk sesekali meninjau perselisihan
antara individu dan masyarakat . [FN152]

III. REKOMENDASI

A. kelompok adat harus menyerahkan beberapa kontrol keputusan keanggotaan kelompok adat untuk negara tuan
rumah.
Sementara sejarah pengobatan masyarakat adat membenarkan pertahanan fanatik dari setiap pembatalan yang
dirasakan dari hak-hak masyarakat adat ', [FN153] advokat seharusnya tidak melupakan dasar yang rasional untuk
membenarkan hak-hak kolektif sebagai sesuatu yang terpisah dari hak asasi manusia individu. [FN154] internasional
asli instrumen hak asasi manusia bercita-cita untuk kerajinan hak asasi manusia universal yang akan melindungi
semua individu dari diskriminasi dan penindasan terlepas dari keanggotaan kelompok mereka.[FN155] Dengan
Deklarasi, pembela hak-hak masyarakat adat 'menciptakan sebuah alat yang melindungi kelompok dari diskriminasi
dan penindasan. [FN156] isu hak asasi manusia adalah individu dan kolektif menerima perhatian yang semakin
meningkat baik domestik maupun internasional. [FN157]
Sebagai negara tuan rumah pada akhirnya bertanggung jawab untuk semua warga negara masing-masing untuk hak
asasi manusia individu, mereka harus memastikan bahwa hak-hak kolektif melanggar hak-hak individu hanya bila
diperlukan oleh pembenaran yang masuk akal dan obyektif. [FN158] Seperti yang diakui di Lovelace, memiliki akses
ke komunitas etnis seseorang diabadikan dalam Pasal 27 ICCPR sebagai hak asasi manusia yang
fundamental. [FN159] kelompok Whenindigenous yang diberikan hak khusus atau hak istimewa seperti penggunaan
lahan dan perlindungan, mereka mengambil tanggung jawab tambahan untuk tidak menyangkal hak-hak istimewa
yang mengalir dari keanggotaan tidak ada alasan yang cukup. [FN160] Bangsa yang memungkinkan kelompok adat
untuk mempertahankan dan kadang-kadang memberikan hak istimewa ini juga memiliki kepentingan dalam
mengawasi pemerintahan keanggotaan. [FN161]
Dalam terang pengakuan internasional tumbuh masyarakat adat dan keadaan mereka yang unik, kelompok
masyarakat adat harus mendorong partisipasi negara tuan rumah dengan memungkinkan judicial review keputusan,
seperti di Kitok.[FN162] Hal ini dapat dicapai melalui undang-undang ditetapkan oleh negara tuan rumah yang
dirancang dengan partisipasi dari kelompok-kelompok pribumi. [FN163] Meskipun indigenoussovereignty dan
penentuan nasib sendiri harus dijaga terhadap perambahan keras oleh hukum nasional yang sewenang-wenang,
penghormatan mutlak untuk membuka indigenoussovereigns negara tuan rumah hingga kritik pada individu dasar
hak asasi manusia. [FN164] Namun, selama menghormati tepat adalah diberikan kepada keputusan keanggotaan
indigenousgroup, host-bangsa tidak akan perlu meninjau merusak hak kelompok untuk menentukan nasib sendiri.

B. Deklarasi harus diubah untuk mengontrol jelas mencerminkan adat ditambah dengan host-negara meninjau
keputusan keanggotaan suku.
Deklarasi para pendukung penentuan nasib sendiri masalah internal tanpa menyediakan untuk host-bangsa
tinjauan. [FN165] Kegagalan untuk mengatasi kekhawatiran pembangkang 'tentang keseimbangan hak-hak individu
dan kelompok manusia yang mengakibatkan empat dari negara terbesar penduduk pribumi suara terhadap adopsi
Deklarasi dan deras disclaiming efek hukum pada keadaan hukum masyarakat adat. [FN166] Sejak Deklarasi itu
diubah untuk mengakomodasi keprihatinan negara-negara Afrika bahwa kelompok-kelompok adat bisa
menggunakan Deklarasi sebagai platform dari yang untuk membenarkan pemisahan dari negara-bangsa, Deklarasi
harus diubah lebih lanjut untuk mencerminkan keputusan HRC di Kitok dan Lovelace , yang mendukung rasa hormat
bagi keputusan keanggotaan suku awalnya dibuat oleh kelompok pribumi ditambah dengan kesempatan untuk host-
bangsa tinjauan.[FN167] jaminan tersebut akan memerintah di kritik bahwa Deklarasi ini terlalu luas dan juga akan
membantu meringankan kekhawatiran pembangkang 'bahwa versi Deklarasi tentang penentuan nasib sendiri pergi
terlalu jauh dan mendorong kemerdekaan politik dari negara tuan rumah. [FN168]
Santa Clara adalah kebijakan yang paling hormat tentang host-bangsa non-interferensi dengan keputusan
keanggotaan kelompok adat karena membuat individu tanpa obat bawah pengadilan dari pemerintah yang diberikan
hak. [FN169] Meskipun dirayakan oleh domestik sarjana hukum di India, kebijakan membuka Amerika Serikat untuk
kritik internasional sebagai keseimbangan antara hak asasi manusia kolektif dan individu menjadi hukum kebiasaan
internasional. [FN170] Sebagai pihak untuk instrumen-instrumen internasional hak asasi manusia, negara tuan
rumah bertanggung jawab untukmemastikan bahwa warga negara masing-masing mampu untuk melaksanakan hak
mereka [FN171]. Karena anggota masyarakat adat juga warga negara tuan rumah, mereka harus mampu banding
keputusan keanggotaan merugikan ke pengadilan negara tuan rumah sesuai untuk menentukan nasib sendiri hak-
hak, serta hak asasi manusia, dalam rangka untuk lebih membentuk evolusi hukum. [FN172]

KESIMPULAN

Masyarakat adat harus secara proaktif menangani masalah-masalah yang diangkat oleh negara tuan rumah yang
kuat.Mengingat sejarah penindasan yang hanya dalam beberapa dekade terakhir memberikan jalan untuk era
menentukan nasib sendiri, masyarakat adat harus berhati-hati untuk tidak membiarkan ayunan pendulum terlalu jauh
yang menguntungkan mereka. Ketika negara-negara tuan rumah memberikan indigenouspeoples hak khusus dan
hak istimewa, non-anggota warga negara akan semakin memperhatikan yang diberikan manfaat. Deklarasi ini,
meskipun sudah mengakui pentingnya kontrol asli keputusan keanggotaan, harus diubah untuk memperhitungkan
hak akun manusia individu ditemukan dalam ICCPR dan lainnya masing-masing instrumen hak asasi manusia. Di
negara-negara tuan rumah dimana indigenousgroups yang diberikan hak khusus, meninggalkan meninjau keputusan
akhir dari keanggotaan di bawah lingkup negara tuan rumah membantu mengimunisasi kelompok masyarakat adat
dari kritik potensial. Hal ini penting untuk keberhasilan lanjutan dari kelompok-kelompok pribumi untuk mendapatkan
dukungan dari negara-negara kuat seperti Amerika Serikat, dan advokasi untuk sebuah sistem yang menghormati
hak-hak kolektif dan individual baik, bahkan ketika doktrin saat ini berjalan terlalu jauh dalam tunduk kepada
kelompok pribumi .
[FNa1]. Calon JD, Mei 2011, American University, Washington College of Law; BA Inggris dan Jepang, 2003,
University of Texas di Austin. Berkat para editor dan staf dari American University Law Review International, dengan
terima kasih khusus kepada editor saya, Lindsay Heitger, untuk saran mereka dan kerja keras. Terima kasih juga
kepada Monica Bansal atas dukungan dan persahabatan. Akhirnya, Terima kasih tulus kepada orang tua saya, Bruce
dan Janet Badger, dan saudara-saudara saya, Tom dan John Badger, karena iman tidak masuk akal mereka dalam
diriku.

[FN1]. Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat, GARes. 61/295, Lampiran, U. N. Dok. A/RES/61/295 *
Oktober 2, 2007) [Deklarasi selanjutnya].

[FN2]. Lihat, misalnya, Siegfried Wiessner, Kedaulatan Adat: Sebuah Penilaian ulang dalam Terang Deklarasi PBB
tentang Hak Masyarakat Adat, 41 tongkatku. J. Transnat 'l L. 1141, 1173-1176 (2008) (berusaha untuk melestarikan
budaya asli dengan mengakui perlunya penegasan penentuan nasib sendiri, menolong diri sendiri, dan re-
pemberdayaan kelompok pribumi).

[FN3]. Lihat Deklarasi umumnya Universal Hak Asasi Manusia, GA Res. 217 (III) A, U. N. Dok. A/RES/217 (III) (10
Desember 1948) (berisi tidak menyebutkan kelompok atau hak-hak kolektif).