Critically analyse the benefits and dangers of international intelligence liaison.

Use examples
to illustrate your answer.

In light of the recent events, intelligence liaison has become an important discussed subject
among academics, politicians, and different intelligence-security specialists. As expert Adam Svendsen
has argued Liaison today represents the most significant dimension of intelligence. 1 Its significance
has been acknowledged again, especially, as a result of the 9/11 events, followed by the proclamation
and implementation of the so-called doctrine War on Terror, jointed by the so-acknowledged
emerging threat known as the Axis of Evil.2 In other words, the current developing transition from a
unipolar world, with America as the only hegemon, to a multipolar world has produced some major
changes regarding the relationships between the actors part of the international system. Focusing on
intelligence, if it is seen as a mean to gain power and security, these changes have resulted with a
strong need from the countries to make alliances in order to overcome and successfully respond to the
existing threats, or the developing ones, against the security of a particular actor. This need for
intelligence alliance can be observed by looking at the western societies policies, discussions, and
actions against terrorist groups such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, the intelligence liaison
phenomenon remains mainly under-studied and substantially under-theorized. One of the reasons of
this insufficiency is due to the different political views that have influenced states actions and national
security programs. In this sense, there were moments in human history such as the two World Wars
when the realism paradigm was the predominant philosophy. Although, there were also moments such
as the formation of the League of Nation or United Nation when the liberalism paradigm was
paramount. Fundamentally, the liberalism paradigm was for the idea of cooperation, while the realism
paradigm was sceptical concerning the possibility of cooperation between belligerents. Another reason
is the scarcity of records regarding global intelligence cooperation compared with the records regarding
intelligence liaison between western societies. Moreover, intelligence co-operation appears to have an
intrinsic double-sided nature. On one hand, there are serious advantages for those belligerents who are
part of a particular intelligence liaison; while on the other hand, there are also disadvantages that must
be taken into consideration. Consequently, the essay will have the following structure. The first part of
this essay will discuss the factors that resulted in intelligence liaison being an understudied subject. The
second part will examine the advantages and disadvantages that can be encountered by belligerents
involved in intelligence liaison. Additionally, all the points presented are going to be supported by
examples that will enhance the arguments presented within this analysis. In the end, the essay will
conclude that global intelligence liaison can be only achieved with intelligence liaison partners, where
opportunities should not be wasted and where the risks from the persisting dangers must be tolerated or
significantly diminished.
When evaluating the benefits and risks regarding intelligence liaison, it is important to outline
the factors that are making global intelligence liaison an under-studied topic. In this sense, three main

1AdamSvendsen,ConnectingIntelligenceandTheory:IntelligenceLiaisonandInternational
Relations,inIntelligenceandNationalSecurity,Vol.24,2009,p.700.
2WynRees,SecuringtheHomelands:TransatlanticCooperationafterBush,inTheBritishJournal
ofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,2009,Vol.11,pp.109109.
factors have been identified. The first factor is the attitudes of leaders towards the idea of cooperation.
The history of international relations has shown that its actors choose to have different perspectives
regarding intelligence cooperation. This can be observed especially by examining the disparity between
the rationality of the realism and of the liberalism paradigm. Stephen Walt has argued that the logic
behind the origins of alliances lies within the different paradigms of the International Relations Theory
that were embraced by actors during a particular moment in human history.3 The second factor is the
ideology and the cultural background of a particular state or organization. Alexander Wendt has stated
in his works it would have been utopic to believe, based on their embraced ideology, that states such as
USA and North Korea can share intelligence. 4 Finally, the third factor is the lack of a culture of sharing
intelligence across the globe. This can be observed by looking at the scarcity of records regarding
intelligence liaison. More precisely, the archives regarding intelligence cooperation are mainly about
United States of America and other western democracies, and are mainly focused on the Second World
War and the Cold War.5 In addition, As Arthur Hulnick argues, counter-intelligence and cover actions
have to some extent been neglected in international liaison as a result of not being part of the
intelligence cycle.6 This inconsistency vis--vis global intelligence liaison does not influence its
advantages and risks, but it explains its lack of study.
The advantage of intelligence liaison is that the actors involved can exchange information
assessments and products for understanding and responding more efficiently against a particular threat.
The relevance of this mentioned advantage is that actors through this shared intelligence can put them
in a better position during a confrontation or a war. In other words, sharing intelligence as information
reduces the fog of the war and decides the outcome of a battle. Take as an example, the value of the
intelligence shared between the Allies powers during the Second World War. In fact, Allies won the war
because of the value of ULTRA, which had played a significant role in sustaining Allied shipping and
impending the transportation of Axis supplies across the Mediterranean 7. Moreover, through ULTRA,
Allies were aware both of their own position, and of the adversarys interpretation of it. This full
knowledge, compared to Axis states partial understanding, provided the Allied forces with the
opportunity to reroute their naval armies and to preserve their lines of support to their troops in North
Africa.8 As these events have shown, intelligence cooperation can help the actors involved to
understand and more efficiently to manage their troops in responding to a specific threat or enemy, as
the Axis Powers were for the Allied forces.
The resources available for the intelligence services are limited and sometimes insufficient. As
Stphane Lefebvre has stated in his article no intelligence service has all the resources - financial,

3StephenM.Walt,TheOriginsofAlliances,London:CornellUniversityPress,1987,pp.1725.
4AlexanderWendt,SocialTheoryofInternationalPolitics,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1999,pp.246253.
5JenniferE.Sims,ForeignIntelligenceLiaison:Devils.Deals,andDetails,inInternationalJournal
ofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,2006,Vol.19,Nr.2,p.195.
6ArthurS.Hulnick,WhatswrongwiththeIntelligenceCycle,inIntelligenceandNationalSecurity,
22thDecember2006,Vol.21,Nr.6,pp.959961.
7MariaRobson,Signalsinthesea:thevalueofUltraintelligenceintheMediterraneaninWorldWar
II,inJournalofIntelligenceHistory,2014,Vol.13,Nr.2,p.178.
8Ibidem,p.179.
human, and technical - to be entirely self sufficient in all areas. 9 Therefore, working with partners on
similar matters, the resources will increase while simultaneously the intelligence coverage of the globe
will be expanded.
Another example of intelligence liaison collaboration is the intelligence support for a
particular partner. This collaboration form is similar to the idea of sharing information, but in this case
the liaison is characterised by a dominant-subordinate pattern in which the receiver partner is more
dependent on the donor than vice-versa. This type of liaison was obvious during the 1940s, when
Britain offered intelligence to Americas intelligence services with the aim of what H. Bradford
Westerfield entitled the pre-Pearl Harbor covert propaganda collaboration between MI6-CIA and MI5-
FBI.10 Moreover, the advantage of this support was also obvious through W. Churchills letter, in
1942, for the American president Roosevelt when he advised Roosevelt about the weaknesses of
Americas diplomatic codes that must urgently be improved. As Churchill wrote: From the moment
when we became allies [] the danger of our enemies having achieved a measure of success cannot
[] be [admitted].11 In todays context this advantage of information support has two advantages,
similar to what the example outlined has indicated. First, the intelligence provided from another
agency, in this case United Kingdoms agencies, helps the partner agency, America, to better
understand the realities and organize a successful operation. In other words, the relevance of this
advantage is that America has received insight of an event that otherwise could have been
misinterpreted.12 Secondly, through this support the receiver partner manages to identify its deficiencies
in order to undertake policies of improving the services of its intelligence agencies. As professor
Damon Wells has argued: [] the USA-UK intelligence liaison is the main reason why the Americans
were appreciative, lastingly so, and to a remarkable degree.13
Nowadays, SIGINT (signals intelligence) satellites and their ground processing facilities are
extremely costly, especially if a global coverage is required. These huge costs, around 1 billion dollars
apiece, are obvious as a result of Britain attempted to design its own SIGINT satellite, know as Zircon.
But the cost of owing such a satellite by the GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) was
14
simply unaffordable. The United Kingdom instead reached an agreement to contribute to USA
satellite programmes through developing different technological platforms and investments. Therefore,
this agreement provided the UK with time-share operational control over a global SIGINT satellite

9StphaneLefebvre,TheDifficultiesandDilemmasofInternationalIntelligenceCooperation,in
InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,2ndFebruary2015,Vol.16,Nr.4,pp.
536537.
10H.BradfordWesterfield,Americaandtheworldofintelligenceliaison,inIntelligenceand
NationalSecurity,1996,Vol.11,Nr.3,pp.532534.
11StephenBudiansky,TheDifficultBeginningsofUSBritishCodebreakingCooperation,inDavid
Stafford&RhodriJeffreysJones(eds.),AmericanBritishCanadianIntelligenceRelations19392000,
London:FRANKCASS,2000,pp.5253.
12EricRosenbach,IntelligenceandInternationalCooperation,inConfrontationofCollaboration?
CongressandtheIntelligenceCommunity,July2009,pp.5053.Videhttp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard
.edu/publication/19153/intelligence_and_international_cooperation.html[Accessedon21stFebruary
2015]
13DamonWellsapudWesterfield,op.cit.,p.534.
14MaciejOsowski,EUUSintelligencesharingpost9/11:predictionsforthefuture,inE
InternationalRelationsStudents,8thMarch2011.Videhttp://www.eir.info/2011/03/08/euus
intelligencesharingpost911predictionsforthefuture/[Accessedon21stFebruary2015]
capability. The negative side of this arrangement for UK is that the NSA retains control in positioning,
targeting, and can override tasking.15 In other words, this dependency on USAs satellite capabilities is
obvious by examining other European states, such as France or Germany. However, in the context of
the war on terrorism, the existing intelligence liaison agreement is of great value, taking into
consideration the weaknesses outlined by the Silberman-Robb Reports (2005) regarding USAs
performances in areas such as HUMINT a priori the invasion of Iraq in 2003.16 If the answer to the
terrorism as a threat is global intelligence liaison; then, the collaboration between USA and other states
is a necessity. As former intelligence director of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, has stated: [] in a
world where the threats get more sophisticated and more global, the intelligence task gets more
difficult, and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital.17
Even those states, such as USA, with overwhelming intelligence machinery in terms of
resources and capabilities still need liaison partners and intelligence cooperation. Geographically
speaking, it is hard for a super power such as USA to be present in all the regions of the globe. As
professor Barry Buzan has stated in his works: In todays context is impossible to talk about a
hegemon [as USA has proved to be] that can intervene everywhere across the globe. [More precisely,]
the world these days is composed out of regions with specific actors [states] within those regions that
can influence the interactions, events, or respectively the dynamics of a particular region. 18 In other
words, according to Barry Buzans perspective, global intelligence similar to global security can only
be created through world cooperation. This can be only achieved by working with different partners
that are located in different regions of the globe. As Stphane Lefebvre has illustrated in his article
regarding the intelligence liaison: Most intelligence agencies recognize that their gaps [within their
receives] can [only] be compelled [by relying] on allied intelligence services to fill the void. 19 It is for
this reason that a huge number of intelligence-security partnerships have been formed recently in the
world such as NATO Special Committee, the Club of Berne, the CAZAB Club, the Kilowatt Group,
UKUSA New-Agreement, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
Nowadays the most important advantage of a global intelligence liaison is that the belligerents
involved can more successfully conduct and undertake special and counter-intelligence operations.
Even if the idea of intelligence liaison is not something new for the intelligence literature 20, its

15MartinRudner,HuntersandGatherers:TheIntelligenceCoalitionAgainstIslamicTerrorism,in
InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,17thAugust2010,Vol.17,Nr.2,pp.
200201.
16SilbermanRobbReports(2005)apudMarkPhythian,ThePerfectIntelligenceFailure?U.S.Pre
WarIntelligenceonIraqiWeaponsofMassDestruction,inPolitics&Policy,2006,Vol.34,No.2,
pp.406410.
17DameStellaRimington,OpenSecret:TheAutobiographyoftheFormerDirectorGeneralofMI5,
London:Hutchinson,2001,p.205.
18BarryBuzan&OleWaever,RegionsandPowers:TheStructureofInternationalSecurity,London:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,pp.4051.
19Lefebvre,op.cit.,p.533.
20Thereareexamplesofintelligenceliaisonfromtheearlystagesofhumanhistorysuchasthe
momentillustratedintheOldTestamentwhenMosessentspiestogatherinformationaboutthelandof
Canaan;ormorerecentmomentssuchastheAmericanRevolution,whentheContinentalArmyused
forhirespynetworkstosupplementmilitaryreconnaissanceandinformationgatheringoperations.
Also,videGlennJ.VoelzarticleContractorsandIntelligence:ThePrivateSectorintheIntelligence
Community.
importance has been acknowledged especially as a result of the globalization of terrorist activities. As
former DCI R. James Woolsey famously put it: we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering
variety of poisonous snakes.21 The statement is important because of two reasons. First, it reveals in an
indirectly manner that the threats nowadays are different in nature fluctuating from the traditional
threats specific before the fall of the Berlin Wall to those emerging in todays context. Secondly, it
outlines that the answer to these emerging threats relies on the global intelligence cooperation. As EUs
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, has repeatedly emphasised: the key to counter-
terrorism is the global liaison between actors. 22 In essence, these ideas outlined as a response against
terrorist groups were materialised through the creation of a multilateral intelligence cooperation named
the Alliance Base. As 2006 Pulitzer Prize winner Dana Priest has stated: the CIA has established joint
operation centres in more than two-dozen countries [], where the intelligence agencies involved
work side by side for identifying, tracking, and capturing or killing those committed jihadists [who are
willing to undertake terrorist activities]. 23 This strategy of global intelligence liaison proved to be as
Zivanovic Katrina has illustrated in her article the best strategy of fighting against terrorism. 24 Its value
was strengthen by the declaration of the CIAs Deputy Director of Operations in 2005 at a closed
committee session on Capitol Hill: virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside
Iraq since September, 11, 2001, attacks - more than 3,000 - was a result of foreign services work
alongside the agency.25 This is the main reason why global intelligence liaison is beneficial for all the
actors involved.

21James R. Woolsey apud LochK.Johnson,AmericasIntelligenceLiaisonwithInternational

Organisations,inBendeJong,WiesPlatje,RobertDavidSteele(eds.),PeacekeepingIntelligence:
EmergingConceptsfortheFuture,Virginia:OSSInternationalPress,April2003,p.363.Vide
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060508/8e58954fdad968d78fbed60854a6ba96/PKI
%20Full%20Text.pdf[Acessedon22thFebruary2015].
22GillesdeKerchoveapudRichardJ.Aldrich,Internationalintelligencecooperationinpractice,in
Born,Hans,andLeigh,IanandWills,Aidan(eds.),Internationalintelligencecooperationand
accountability.StudiesinIntelligence,NewYork:Routledge,2011,p18.Videhttp://www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/lectures/aldrich.international_intelligence_cooperati
on_in_practice.10.oct.doc.[Accessedon22thFebruary2015].
23DanaPriest,ForeignNetworkatFrontofCIA'sTerrorFight,inWashingtonPost,18November
2005,p.A01.Videhttp://www.pulitzer.org/archives/6957[Acessedon22thFebruary2015].
24ZivanovicKatrina,InternationalCooperationofIntelligenceAgenciesagainstTransnational
TerrorisTargets,inTheQuarterlyJournal,2008,Vol.8,Nr.1,pp.134135.
25Priest,op.cit.,p.A01.Videhttp://www.pulitzer.org/archives/6957[Acessedon22thFebruary2015].