PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October

6, 1998

IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998

Purisima, J.

Facts:

1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and

Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease
Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an
LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;

2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for

P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation
represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;

3. After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines,

she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan;

4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with
the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision
because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction
of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;

5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued

Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and
designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;

6. On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that

he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice
Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;

7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the

petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;
8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of
3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;

9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time
prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her
right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:

a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged
disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease
contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; and

b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed
to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was
attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the
Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that
sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that
only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.

Held:

The petitioner is hereby acquitted.

1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by
the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00
per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any
evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the
property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE
WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE
OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
the petitioner reasonable doubt.

2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and
baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for
the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the
prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said number of
questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions. Another
ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied
IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could
no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other
Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is
therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the
lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court.

(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only
Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the
corrections of the perceived irregularities in the proceedings below.)

GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of respondent
Civil Service Commission ("CSC") relative to an administrative case, entitled "Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well as its resolution, dated 03 March
1994, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land
Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus
C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President with
having committed the following offenses:

(1) Dishonesty;

(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the
course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or
other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of
receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons;

(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;

 (4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations;

(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 1

Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending
loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release
of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to
have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera
supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money
for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel
accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong.

Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without
prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of
the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as
consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received
salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of
Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.

Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective
19 February 1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting
employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances
in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also
found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced
resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on
Rivera.

On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB")
which held. 2

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby modified

that respondent-appellant George I. Rivera is considered guilty only of
committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Considering
that this is his first offense on record, the penalty of Forced Resignation
without separation benefits and gratuities to which he may be otherwise
be entitled under the laws is reduced to one (1) year
suspension. 3
The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its
resolution, 4 promulgated on 08 June 1992, the MSPB denied the motion.

Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-1189, 5 the CSC
resolved only the appeal of Rivera (rejecting that of the LBP pursuant to the rule laid
down by his Court in Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission [215 SCRA 398]). The
resolution, in part, read:

The Commission is inclined to sustain the original decision of the Land

Bank of the Philippines. Committing an act punishable under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is considered a Grave Misconduct. It
is a wanton and/or blatant violation of law. As an officer of the Bank,
respondent Rivera should know better that it was illegal and improper for
him to accept regular monthly allowances from a private firm which is a
client of his Bank. More so, that such act is prohibited and punishable
under Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolves

to dismiss the appeal of Respondent George Rivera. Moreover, the
Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted
out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Accordingly, the MSPB
decision is hereby set aside. 6

Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No.
94-1276. 7

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the
capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.

On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to
sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned
resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the
petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P.
Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB
when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this
time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
with the CSC. The Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion,
to reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment thereon.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, dated 15 September 1994, sided
with petitioner and suggested that the CSC be given an opportunity to submit its own
comment. CSC did in due time.
This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial
issue.

In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had
been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous
decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the
act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not
turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the
same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
in his first view of the case.

The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo
Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently
its chairman, had earlier "concurred." 9

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner
Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to
CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due
process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's
decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for
reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.

WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case is
REMANDED to respondent Civil Service Commission for the resolution, sans the
participation of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, of herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 93-1189. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 DIGEST

Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43

MUST NOT ONLY BE IMPARTIAL BUT MUST ALSO APPEAR IMPARTIAL:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a
face, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case.

Exceptions to requirements of notice and hearing

1. Summary abatement of nuisance per se

2. Preventive suspension
3. Padlocking of filthy restaurants, theaters, etc.
4. Cancellation of passport of accused
5. Summary distraint and levy
6. Grant of provisional authority

Related Powers

1. Power to promulgate own Rules of Procedures

2. Subpoena Power
3. Contempt Power

Q: Does an administrative agency have the power to issue subpoena or hold a

person in contempt for failure to comply with its order?
A: It depends on whether or not the particular administrative agency has the authority to
take testimony or evidence under the law it is entrusted to implement. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, an agency that has been vested with the authority to take
testimony or evidence likewise has the power to subpoena witnesses and require them
to submit documents under a subpoena duces tecum. When a witness disregards its
orders, the administrative body may also apply for a contempt of court with the court of
first instance which has jurisdiction over the case, provided that such body has the
burden of proof in showing that it has authority to take testimony or evidence.

Q: Does an administrative agency authorized to investigate likewise have the

power to issue subpoena and contempt? How do you reconcile this with the rule
that administrative agencies can exercise powers expressly provided in the law
as well as all those that are necessarily incidental in the exercise thereof?
A: It depends. It is true that administrative agencies can exercise powers expressly
provided in the law as well as all those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
However, this rule admits of certain limitations, such as when the administrative agency
is only a sub-delegate, in which case, the agency must never go beyond the limits of the
function sub-delegated upon it by the authority vested by law. Another limitation is where
the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a
power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because it is necessary to its due
execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached. In
other words, in order to determine whether the power to investigate includes the
subpoena and contempt power, the law or rule vesting such authority must be examined
in order to determine the nature and character of the delegation. If it is in the nature of
subordinate delegation, then the general rule applies. But if it is merely a sub-delegation
of a function by the authority directly vested by law, then it is necessary that the body
must not exercise a power beyond that which has been sub-delegated. And finally, the
circumstances of the case must be taken in consideration, for where it involves the
liberty and property of persons there must be a clear showing that the case is within the
scope of the authority vested.

People vs. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 131638-39. March 26, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA MEDENILLA y

DORIA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262,
promulgated on November 26, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding
accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.[1]
Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15,
[2]
Article III of R.A. No. 6425. The information reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized
to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to another 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance positive to the test for
methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited
law.[3]

Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16,
[4]
Article III of R.A. No. 6425 with an information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized
to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and/or (sic) under his custody and control four (4) transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 200.45 grams, which were found positive to the
test for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the
above cited law.[5]

Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.[6] Joint
trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecutions version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1
Neowille De Castro and P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:
On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) in camp Crame and reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person
engaged in illegal drug pushing activities in Caloocan, Malabon and Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral
reported the matter to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas. [7] Accordingly, Sr. Insp.
Manzanas directed SPO2 Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2 Cabral
requested the confidential informant to contact the suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a
possible buyer.[8]
On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral
that he had arranged a meeting with the suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the
pre-arranged meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At
around 5:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota Corolla. [9] Without alighting from
his car, accused-appellant spoke with the informant.[10] The informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to
accused-appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams
of shabu he wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied that he needed five (5) grams. The suspect
then offered the shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2
Cabral agreed.[11] Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to return the following day. They agreed
that the pick up point would be at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Building also along
Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the informant reported the
results of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a buy-bust operation
was planned. SPO2 Cabral was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as his
back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be given by
SPO2 Cabral, through his pager, before apprehending accused-appellant.
At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
agreed meeting place at the UCPB Building in Boni Avenue. [12] Upon reaching the area, SPO2
Cabral alighted from the car while the other operatives positioned themselves in strategic areas.
[13]
After thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived.[14] after talking for a short time with
SPO2 Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former if he had the money.[15] SPO2 Cabral showed
the bundle of money[16] and accused-appellant told him to wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral
gave him the money and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed a pack containing a white
crystalline substance.[17] As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which prompted the
backup operatives to close in and apprehend accused-appellant. [18] SPO2 Cabral asked accused-
appellant if he could search the latters car. Accused-appellant acceded to the request and, as a
result, SPO2 Cabral found a brown clutch bag at the drivers seat of the car.Inside the clutch bag,
they found therein four plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance which they
suspected was shabu.[19]
Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de
Castro then submitted the substance they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.[20] They thereafter brought accused-appellant to the PNP General Hospital for a
medical and physical examination.[21]
The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu[22] and that the contents of the substance sold
weighed 5.08 grams while those taken from the bag had a total weight of 200.45 grams. The
report reads:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425 SUSPECT/S: LORETO MEDENILLA

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM

Camp Crame, Quezon City

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh A One (1) brown MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG containing the following specimens:

1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh A-1 with 5.08 grams of
white crystalline substance:
2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. A-2 through A-5 each with white
crystalline substance and having a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive result to the tests
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx

CONCLUSION:

Exhs. A-1, A-2 through A-5 contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

REMARKS:

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 0740H 17 April 1996[23]

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to his
arrest.
On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain
Jess Hipolito. It was to be used by his brother for a trip to Pangasinan. [24] On April 15, 1996, his
brother turned over the car to accused-appellant with the instruction to return the car to Jess
Hipolito.[25] However, before returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the same for a
night out with his friends.Accused-appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy,
Tess, Willy and Jong-jong, went to Bakahan in Quezon City for dinner and, thereafter,
transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of the said restaurant,. After having some
drinks, accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a taxicab with
his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan City. [26] They all proceeded to the
condominium unit of Jess Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City.[27] they
reached the place at around 2:30 a.m. [28] Accused-appellant told the guard of the condominium
building that he wanted to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The guard instructed him
to park the car in front of UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together with Jong-jong and
Joy went up to the unit of Jess Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in
the lobby.[29] While inside the unit of Jess Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to Alvin.
[30]
Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that he wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito
requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the rented car, to quezon City since the latter
was carrying a large amount of money.[31]Accused-appellant acceded to the request of Jess
Hipolito. They then all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who were then at the lobby,
boarded the vehicle.[32] However, when accused-appellant was about to back out the vehicle, a
white car blocked the rear portion of the car.[33] The passengers of the white car then stepped out
of their vehicle and approached them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de Castro,
asked accused-appellant to roll down his window and, after doing so, SPO2 Cabral introduced
himself and his companions as police officers.[34] Accused-appellant then asked: Bakit po, sir?
[35]
In response, one of the police officers said: May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna kayo.
[36]
after alighting from the vehicle, accused-appellant and his companions were frisked.
[37]
Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a brown clutch bag being held by Alvin and confiscated the
same. SPO2 Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can search the car. The latter
agreed. SPO2 Cabral searched the car for about 15 minutes but found nothing. [38] SPO2 Cabral
then opened the brown clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin and found plastic sachets containing
a white crystalline substance. The police officers then instructed accused-appellant and his
companions to board their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame. [39] When they reached
the said camp, they were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step
out of the vehicle and go inside the office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and
Joy, were brought inside the office and, after 30 minutes, accused-appellant, along with the two
remaining passengers, Willy and Jong-jong, followed.[40]
When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken
down. Thereafter, Jong-jong, Willy and accused-appellant were separated from the group and
placed inside the detention cell. Alvin and the two women were left behind in the office and were
later on released.[41] After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the detention
cell while accused-appellant, who was then sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and
Willy were brought into the office and were made to sign a document on a yellow pad, prepared
by the police officers. The police officers then cautioned the two that they will be implicated in
the case if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out to Camp Crame by a
police officer.[42] Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and was,
subsequently, solely charged for the illegal sale and possession of shabu.
While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess
Hipolito was owned by a certain Evita Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City
Jail for a drug-related offense.[43]
On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said
accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3618-D, suffer an
indeterminate sentence of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, to a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; (b) with respect to
Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and pay a fine in the amount
of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c) suffer all the accessories penalties consequent thereto;
and (d) pay the costs.

The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and ordered to
be forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[44]

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:

I. Was the accused arrested illegally?
II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?
III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process?[45]
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.
The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2
Cabral for the sale of 5 grams of shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually
took place.The prosecutions claim that there was a buy-bust operation is, according to the
defense, belied by the testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus that when the
incident took place, accused-appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other
persons.[46] thus, the defense argues that since there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of
accused-appellant was illegal since the arresting officers were not properly armed with a warrant
of arrest.
Accused-appellants argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the
testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a
legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their testimonies clearly showed that their confidential
informant reported the drug operations of accused-appellant; that a meeting took place between
accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the
NARCOM operatives planned a buy-bust operation; that the said operation was indeed
conducted; and that the same resulted in the arrest of accused-appellant and the confiscation of 5
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance. In this regard, the testimonies of the police
officers were given full credence by the trial court, to wit:

The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of accused Medenilla from the time Cabral was introduced to accused Medenilla
up to the buy-bust operation, which culminated in the arrest of accused-Medenilla. This Court
can find no inconsistency in their testimonies and, as such, gives full faith and credit thereto. In
addition, it is to be noted that no evidence exists to show that the law enforcers failed to perform
their duty regularly. Neither was any evidence presented to show that there was improper motive
on the part of said witnesses to falsely implicate accused Medenilla. On the contrary, it was
established that they did not know accused Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx[47]

The trial courts determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest
respect by this court, considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their
deportment and manner of testifying.[48] Furthermore, in the absence of any proof of any intent on
the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against accused-appellant,
the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of
belief due to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to law
enforcers.[49] Clearly, accused-appellants mere denial and concoction of another arrest scenario
cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers.
 Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the
said witness appeared to have been making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court
as noted by the trial judge, to wit:
COURT:
You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)
COURT:
No, he is laughing.
xxx
COURT:
And keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
He is smiling your Honor.
COURT:
No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on
laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng
maayos at tiyak at tahasan.[50]
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they
are replete with numerous inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified
that the Bakahan restaurant and the Music Box lounge they went to on the evening of April 15,
1996 are located in Quezon City.[51] However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that the said
establishments are located in Mandaluyong.[52] The divergence of their assertions on the location
of these establishments goes into the credibility of their claim that they were together with other
people and had a night out on the evening of April 15, 1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed
that at the time the police officers approached the car prior to the arrest, one of the officers
requested them to alight from the vehicle. [53] On the other hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified that
when the police officers approached them, they were forcibly pulled out of their vehicle. [54] Their
inconsistency on this matter renders questionable the veracity of the claim of Wilfredo de Jesus
that he was present during the arrest of accused-appellant by the NARCOM operatives. Third,
their claim that they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at around 3:00 oclock in
the morning of April 16, 1996 to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to
believe. Human experience dictates that one does not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the
early hours of the morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would
ordinarily be transacted during regular hours of work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not
during the hours of dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus claimed the
improbable scenario that, after they were accosted by the police officers, they were all brought to
camp Crame by riding the same vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two unlikely
situations are made to appear. Either all the six original passengers boarded the vehicle along
with a seventh passenger, one of the NARCOM operatives who will ensure that they will
proceed to the camp, or only the six original passengers boarded the car to go to Camp Crame
and they were just escorted by the police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation
is implausible since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only accommodate five, at most six,
fully grown adults but, definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the second situation is contrary
to human experience since it will not be in accord with good police operating procedure to allow
a group of suspects arrested for a drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves and drive
the same to the police headquarters.
Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from
accused-appellant, why were they not charged or, at least, booked in the records of the
NARCOM? No proof, not even an allegation, was presented by the defense to reasonably explain
why charges were not lodged against these alleged other passengers. The most that accused-
appellant did was to claim in his appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects were not
charged was because the police officers feared that bad luck might befall them if all were
charged. Thus, he argues:

xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases against all
the other occupants of the car together with the accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one
case and that is against the accused and in open court denied the presence of the other
companions of the accused.[55]

Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already
grasping at straws in order that he may be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or
otherwise, of the crimes he is charged with.
We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due
process. In this regard, accused-appellant claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right
on the following grounds:
a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have
the questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and
b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.[56]
Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime
Laboratory on the 5 plastic containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the
issuance of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96.[57] This was stipulated upon by accused-
appellant when the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. de Villa,
was presented as a witness, to wit:
Prosec. Paz:
The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No.
3618-D and 3619-D, that in Crim. Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance
which was sold by the accused Loreto Medenilla to the police operatives was examined
by the witness and found positive to the test of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in
 Crim. Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y Doria that the four (4)
transparent plastic bags found in the possession of the accused with a total weight of
200.45 grams was found positive to the test of shabu as examined by the witness, your
Honor.
May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:
Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?
Atty. Arias:
I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination
conducted by her and that the result of her examination was reduced into writing.
COURT:
And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.
Atty. Arias:
Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the
witness does not know where the specimen came from, how the specimen came into
being.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this
document prepared by witness after examining the specimen and the findings as stated in
the initial laboratory report.
Atty. Arias:
As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into
writing, this is the result of the examination, so be it, your Honor.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by the
forensic chemist.
Atty. Arias:
Everything is written in the document.[58]
However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic
chemist to conduct a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis on the subject
menthamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to determine its purity.[59] The trial court, after the
prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition[60] to the motion, issued an Order, dated March 17,
1997, denying the motion, to wit:
 This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the forensic
chemist be required to conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the subject
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the express
conformity of the accused, had agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts concerning
the nature, quality and quantity of the specimens submitted for chemical analysis. The results of
said analysis indicated that said specimens were positive to the test for shabu, and they weighed
5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively. These results were explicitly admitted by both the accused
and his counsel. The only matter that was not admitted was the alleged source of the stuff, it
being denied that it was found in and taken from the possession of the accused. The defense
counsel who was given the opportunity to cross-examine raised the forensic chemist when she
was presented, never raised the issue or even suggested that what was examined could not have
been pure shabu, and that if such was the case, it was necessary to determine which part is shabu
and which was otherwise. It appears that this idea is merely an after-thought. To the mind of the
Court, the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage of the action, when the
prosecution had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about to make
a written formal offer of exhibits, can have no other purpose than to repudiate the findings of the
forensic chemist, which had already been previously admitted. This cannot be permitted bythe
Court as it detracts from the full respect that must be accorded to judicial admissions that have
been freely and intelligently made. As correctly observed by the prosecution, said judicial
admissions are conclusive and binding upon the accused. The judicial admission that the stuff
submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, are indeed shabu
forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged purity.To speculate at this stage of the action
that the stuff is not pure shabu is to virtually repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist,
previously admitted without any qualification that the stuff analysed were indeed such illegal
drug. This can no longer be permitted by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit.[61]
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial
court to have the shabu subjected to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues
that such a test is crucial in view of the nature of the penalties for the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which are graduated depending on the amount of regulated or
prohibited drugs involved in a case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will
definitely show that the shabu involved herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams
contrary to the assertion of the prosecution that it is 200.45 grams. He anchors this argument on
the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at most, is only 85% unadulterated.[62]
We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the
defense stipulated with the prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected
in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and correct, the accused-appellant, in
effect, admitted that the substance examine was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride having
a weight of 5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No.
3619-D. Accused-appellant made no qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratorys
finding on the total weight of the examined shabu. In fact, no cross-examination was conducted
by accused-appellants counsel on the witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, regarding this
matter. Thus, when the defense tried to renege on the previous stipulation by filing a motion
requesting for a quantitative test on the shabu involved herein, the trial court was correct in
denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,[63] we held that there is no need to examine the
entirety of the submitted specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole
specimen, we held:

We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of
selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic
Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or
taken. This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to
be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-
appellant.[64]

This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,[65] thus:

To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This
amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of
either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances, the death penalty. Appellants
however foist the probability that the substance sold could contain additives or adulterants, and
not just methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu could be less
than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing the imposable penalty.

The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:

Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount of drugs
allegedly found inside the bags. It is suggested that since the law, Republic Act No. 7659,
imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs seized or taken, then laboratory
test should be undertaken for the entire amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine
the proper penalty to be imposed.

The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case, even
assuming that the confirmatory tests were conducted on samples taken from only one (1) of the
plastic packages, accused-appellants arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more
than sufficient to justify imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of he packages is logically presumed to be
representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-
appellant. Therefore, a positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1
kilogram of drugs in the plastic package from which the sample was taken. If it is then proved,
beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant transported into the Philippines the plastic
packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as prohibited drugs, then
conviction for importing shabu is definitely in order.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, it can be presumed that the entire substance is shabu. The burden of evidence
shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have not presented any
evidence to overcome the presumption.
It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined
specimens for Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams,
respectively, he in effect admitted that the said amounts of shabu are pure and
unadulterated. Moreover, accused-appellant made no reservations as to his admission on the
veracity of the results as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern,
at that time, was to make it clear that the forensic scientist who examined the confiscated
substance was not aware of where the specimen came from.[66] This was in accord with the theory
of the defense that it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who was in possession
of the confiscated substance. Thus, due to the absence of any reservation on the total weight of
the shabu examined, accused-appellant can no longer be heard to go back on his previous
admission by requesting a quantitative test of the same.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of
an alleged circular issued by this Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to
conduct a qualitative and a quantitative examination on all illegal drugs submitted to the said
office in relation to a case.[67]
This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This
Court never issued any such circular requiring the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative
and qualitative tests on substances which they examine. It is clear that this argument was resorted
to by counsel for the defense in order to mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting his
client. This contemptuous conduct of counsel for the defense will be dealt with appropriately.
Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due
process. In this regard, he cites in his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly
revealed his bias, to wit:
COURT:
Mark it.
Q What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?
A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue the
suspect and introduce ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.
COURT:
By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the alleged
substance?
A I gave it to him, your honor.
COURT:
So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu from
him.
A Yes, your Honor.[68]
 We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial
judge was biased. We have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and
determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this
case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness
if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng
Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in
an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that
he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had
intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway
in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the
record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts,
and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of
justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop
some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such
question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He
may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if
the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the
theory of one party.[69]
The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is
punishable with a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on
the quantity.[70]Thus, if the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67 grams, then the penalty
is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33 grams then the penalty
is prision mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams then the penalty
is reclusion temporal. In Criminal Case No. 3618-D, the amount of shabu involved weighs 5.08
grams, as such the appropriate penalty is prision correccional.There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period or from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty shall be within the range of prision correccional medium and the minimum
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this
case, arresto mayor. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial committed an error in
imposing an indeterminate sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and
2 months, as maximum, ofprision correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.
On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was correct
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found
GUILTY of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D, to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional; and (b)
in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10)
days why he should not be cited in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED

BY THE CSC ITSELF DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN
IMPARTIALJUDGE.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001]
KAPUNAN, J:FACTS:
On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that
Paitim,Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for
Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times.The CSC
found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against
youfor DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BESTINTEREST OF THE SERVICE.The petitioners filed their Answer to the
charge entering a general denial of the
materiala v e r m e n t s o f t h e " F o r m a l C h a r g e . " T h e y a l s o d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e
y w e r e e l e c t i n g a f o r m a l investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently
filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be
deprived of their right to due process because the CivilService Commission was the
complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.On November 16,
1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation"finding
the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the
governmentservicePetitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction
to hear and decide theadministrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1),
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is
vested with appellate jurisdiction only in alladministrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint
was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted
asinvestigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.
HELD:
NO
. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it couldnot
be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based
on substantialfindings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are
CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!!
25
POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos,
Jennifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino,Ricardo de Guzman, Ethel
Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanito Lim,
Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, RajiMendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aimee
Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Gloriosa Sze,
Maria FeTaal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the
petitioners were dulyinvestigated by the CSC.After a careful examination of the
records, the Commission finds respondents guilty ascharged. The photograph pasted
over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) duringt h e J u l y 3 0 , 1 9 8 9
Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also,
t h e signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from
the signatureof Gilda Cruz.Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of
law by the fact that the CSCa c t e d a s i n v e s t i g a t o r, c o m p l a i n a n t , p r o s e c u t o r
a n d j u d g e , a l l a t t h e s a m e t i m e a g a i n s t t h e petitioners is untenable. The
CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear anddecide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
includingactions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to
Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A,Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative
Code of 1987.It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a
finding that a primafacie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were
properly informed of the charges. Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not,therefore, claim that there was a
denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of the CSC to take
cognizance of the case.

G.R. No. 76761 January 9, 1989

THE HON. ASST. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, AND THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILIO MENDOZA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Velarde, Operiano & Associates for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The administrative Decisions of the Office of the President of the Philippines, dated 13 May 1969
and 28 September 1971, respectively, set aside by respondent Court of Appeals in its judgment,
dated 28 November 1986, constitute the nucleus of the present controversy.

The antecedent proceedings may be summarized thus:

1. On 15 April 1948, Jesus M. Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement Administration
(NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement District, Cotabato.

2. On 10 July 1950 Larrabaster's application was granted. Home Lot No. 336 (later known as Lot No.
355) with an area of 1,500 square meters (hereafter, the Disputed Property) was allocated to him on
the basis of a report of the supervisor of the Settlement District that the subject lot was vacant and
free from any claim or conflict.

Meanwhile, "Larrabaster leased the lot to private respondent, Basilio MENDOZA, and tolerated
Jorge Geller to squat on the portion thereof" (2nd Indorsement, February 10, 1969, Office of the
President, p. 1, Annex "C", Petition).

3. On 25 November 1952 the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) took
over the functions of the NLSA.

4. On 29 June 1956 Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the Disputed
Property to Jose B. PEA. "Notwithstanding the transfer, PEA allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay
on the lot." (id., p. 2).
5. On 8 September 1956 a Supplementary Deed of Sale was executed by the same parties defining
the boundaries of the Disputed Property, thus:

On the North by Bulok creek and a street; on the South by Bulok creek and the
National Highway; on the East by a street beside the public plaza; and on the West
by Bulok creek, which lot is designated as formerly lot No. 336 and now lot No. 355
on the new sketch plan of the Townsite of Marbel, South Cotabato. (2nd
Indorsement, Office of the President, February 10, 1969, p. 2, Annex "C", Petition).

6. On 18 June 1954 Republic Act No. 1160 transferred the custody and administration of the Marbel
Townsite to the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).

7. On 20 August 1956 PEA requested NARRA to approve the above-mentioned transfer of rights
but the latter did not act thereon in view of Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, returning to the
Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained unallocated by the LASEDECO at the
time of its abolition.

8. The Bureau of Lands did not act on PEA's request either, prompting him to bring up the matter to
the Board of Liquidators (BOL), which was created to wind up the affairs of LASEDECO.

Although LASEDECO bad initially denied the request, it subsequently confirmed the sale to PEA in
its Resolution No. 139, series of 1964.

9. PEA must have realized that the Disputed Property contained an area bigger than 1,500 sq. ms.,
hence, his request to BOL that the area be adjusted from 1,500 to 3,616.93 sq. ms. to conform to its
actual area.

10. In its Resolution No. 139, series of 1964, the BOL denied the request.

PEA moved for reconsideration stressing that the award should be for 3,616.93 sq. ms., but the
BOL again denied the same under its Resolution No. 439, series of 1967.

11. Feeling aggrieved, PEA appealed to the Office of the President.

12. Requested by that Office to comment, the BOL conducted an investigation and reported (a) that
Lot No. 355, as awarded to Larrabaster, contained only 1,500 sq. ms. but due to accretion, since the
lot was almost surrounded by a creek, the area increased to 3,616.93 sq. ms.; and (b) since home
lots had an average area of 1,500 sq. ms. only, the Bureau of Lands subdivided the Disputed
Property into three [3] parts, namely: Lot No. 107 with an area of 1,455 sq. ms., was allocated to
Basilio Mendoza; Lot No. 108, with an area of 1,500 sq. ms., was allocated to PEA; and Lot No.
109, with an area of 661 sq. ms., was allocated to Arturo Roxas. The BOL then recommended that
PEA be awarded Lot No. 108 instead of the whole of former Lot No. 355.

13. Excepting to the above, PEA alleged that the lot transferred to him by Larrabaster contains
3,616.93 and not 1,500 sq. ms., this being the area embraced within the boundaries described in the
Supplementary Deed of Sale executed between him and Larrabaster on 8 September 1956.

14. On 10 February 1969 the Office of the President "ordered that the area of PEA's lot (Lot No.
108, formerly a part of Lot No. 355) be maintained at 1,500 sq. ms.. xxx' on the premise that
accretion belonged to the Government.
15. Upon PEA's motion for reconsideration, the same Office, on 13 May 1969, modified its
Decision of 10 February 1969 and held that "the award to PEA of the original Lot No. 355 is hereby
maintained" (p. 9, Annex "D", Petition). It reasoned out that the benefits of accretion, pursuant to
Article 457 of the Civil Code, accrue to the owner, PEA, and not to the Government. That Decision
of 13 May 1969 is the first judgment assailed in this Petition.

16. On 14 May 1969 the BOL approved Resolution No. 236, series of 1969, directing its LASEDECO
Unit to advise PEA accordingly. And on 3 September 1969 the BOL recommended to the Director
of Lands the issuance of a patent in PEA's favor.

17. On 1 August 1969 private respondent MENDOZA addressed a letter-protest to the BOL, to which
the latter in its Resolution No. 488, dated 6 August 1969, responded by advising MENDOZA to direct
its protest to the Office of the President.

18. MENDOZA did so and on 28 September 1971 said Office rendered its letter-decision (the second
one challenged herein) affirming its previous Decision of 13 May 1969, having found no cogent
reason to depart therefrom (Annex "E", Petition).

19. In the meantime, on 27 January 1970, and while his protest with the Office of the President was
still pending, MENDOZA resorted to Civil Case No. 98 for certiorari before the then Court of First
Instance of Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and PEA.

On 23 June 1978, MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the administrative
Decision of 20 September 1971 denying his protest.

20. On 10 May 1985 the Trial Court 1 rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 98 dismissing MENDOZA's
Petition forcertiorari (Annex "B", Petition).

21. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court in its 28 November 1986
Decision, 2 with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal of petitioner Basilio Mendoza to be meritorious,

the Decision of May 10, 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, of Koronadal,
South Cotabato, in Special Civil Case No. 98 is SET ASIDE. The Decisions of
February 10, 1969, May 13, 1969 and September 28, 1971 of the Office of the
President in the administrative case are likewise SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the
reopening of the administrative case in said Office as to accord all parties concerned,
including petitioner, their constitutional rights to due process of law.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 23-31, Rollo)

Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari by petitioners-public officials anchored on the following
submissions:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PRIVATE RESPONDENT BASILIO MENDOZA HAS BEEN DENIED
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
 PRESIDENT IN QUESTION ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING

ASIDE THE ASSAILED DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF SOUTH COTABATO IN CIVIL CASE NO. 98 DATED
MAY 10, 1985 AND OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DATED
FEBRUARY 10, 1969, MAY 13, 1969 AND SEPTEMBER 28, 1971
AND IMPLICITLY ORDERING A REOPENING OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IN SAID OFFICE. (p. 9, Petition, p. 13,
Rollo)

We uphold petitioners' submissions.

1. In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the President were vitiated by failure to accord due
process of law to MENDOZA, respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations that MENDOZA
was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case; (2) not served with a copy of the 10 February
1969 Decision; and (3) not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 Decision nor served a
copy thereof.

The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion arrived at. After the Office of the President
had rendered its Decision dated 13 May 1969, MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1 August 1969
with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his protest with the Office of the President, which
he did. On 28 September 1971, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration was denied by said Office.
So that, even assuming that there was absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the
administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the 10 February 1969 and 13 May 1969
Decisions by the Office of the President, such procedural defect was cured when MENDOZA
elevated his letter protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the controversy to appellate
review but eventually denied reconsideration. Having thus been given a chance to be heard with
respect to his protest there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

There is no merit likeness to the point raised by petitioners that they were not
informed by respondent Judge of the petition by private respondent to set aside the
writ of execution. The order granting such petition was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. 'The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Under the
circumstances, the failure to give notice to petitioners had been cured. That is a well-
settled doctrine. Their complaint was that they were not beard. They were given the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to free the
order from the alleged infirmity. Petitioners then cannot be heard to claim that they
were denied procedural due process.' (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, L-25897, August 21,
1976, 72 SCRA 388, 394-395; Montemayor vs. Araneta Univ. Foundation, L- 44251,
May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 321 [1977]; also Sumpang v. Inciong, L-50992, June 19,
1985, 137 SCRA 56 [1985]).

It should also be recalled that MENDOZA filed his petition for certiorari before the then Court of First
Instance of Cotabato seeking to annul the 13 May 1969 Decision. At the time it was presented on 27
January 1970, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration with the Office of the President, involving the
same Decision, was still pending. In fact, it was only on 28 September 1971 that said Office denied
reconsideration. Evidently, MENDOZA had abandoned his pending administrative request for
reconsideration in favor of judicial proceedings. Again, therefore, MENDOZA cannot justifiably claim
that he was denied due process.
2. Substantial factual evidence support the questioned administrative rulings. The Office of the
President relied on the fact-finding report of the BOL made sometime in 1969 with respect to the
Disputed Property to the effect that although the area of Lot No. 355 awarded to Larrabaster was
1,500 sq. ms., it was found situated along a creek and that "it had increased in area to 3,616.93
square meters by accretion."

The question then which confronted the Office of the President was the ownership over the
increased area. In its Decision of 10 February 1969 it initially held, following the BOL
recommendation, that the accretion belonged to the government and that the excess of 2,116.93 sq.
ms. was an unallocated area which the Bureau of Lands had authority to dispose of so that said
Bureau was not remiss in subdividing the disputed Property into three (3 lots and allocating only Lot
No. 108, with an area of 1,500 sq. ms., to PEA, Lot No. 107 to MENDOZA, and Lot No. 109 to
Arturo Roxas.

Upon re-study, however, the Office of the President modified its conclusions in its Decision of 13 May
1969, and rightly so. It took into account Article 457 of the Civil Code, which provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

and opined that "creeks are included within the meaning of this Civil Code provision" (Letter-
Decision, 13 May 1969, p. 7, Annex 'D', Petition).

And as far as the ownership of the accretion is concerned, the Office of the President likewise
correctly held that "while it may be conceded that Lot No. 355 technically belongs to the government
because it was bought from the latter under an installment plan, it cannot be rightfully concluded that
the benefits of accretion must still be retained by the said seller" (Letter-Decision, 13 May 1969, p. 7,
Annex "D", Petition). In so ruling, that Office acted on the authority of Director of Lands, et al. vs.
Ricardo Rizal, et al., 87 Phil. 806, at 810, 814 [1950]), reading in part:

... When the lot bordering on a public stream is sold on installment basis by the
government, said stream is made the boundary. ... The stream may advance or
recede but it will always constitute the boundary or boundaries of the lot, and the
purchaser has the right to insist that the original boundaries be preserved, and all the
area inside said boundaries be considered as included in the sale.

xxx xxx xxx

... In the sale of a friar land, lot or parcel ordering on rivers under Act. No. 1120
pending payment in full of the purchase price, although the government reserves title
thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser,
and that any accretion by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs
to the purchaser thereof.

Since the Disputed Property no longer belonged to the Government the subdivision thereof by the
Bureau of Lands into three lots, as well as the allocation of said lots to two other individuals, was
beyond the scope of its authority. Under Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, the authority of the
Bureau of Lands to dispose of lots was limited to "unallocated areas." As the Letter-Decision of 28
September 1971 states: "however, it is equally true that the accretions took place after the land had
been allocated and assigned to Larrabaster. Clearly, therefore, when the accretion started.
Larrabaster had already acquired the beneficial and equitable title over the Lot No. 355, albeit the
Government still retained the naked title thereto. Consequently, to Larrabaster and now to his
assignee (Pea) belong the accretions to said lot which may no longer be allocated to others by the
Government." (Letter-Decision), 28 September 1971, Annex "E", Petition). Having been thus
allocated, the area within its original boundaries belong to the awardee whether the creek advances
or recedes. He is entitled to all the benefits which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the losses
that may befall it.

MENDOZA's filing of a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the Disputed Property with the Bureau
of Lands on 6 November 1962 must similarly be held to have been inappropriate and without any
legal force and effect since the same was no longer public land subject to disposition by the
Government. Contrary to the finding of respondent Appellate Court, no irregularity may be imputed to
the administrative decisions by reason of the fact that allegedly a copy of the investigation report of
the BOL was not among those elevated to the Trial Court or among those marked in evidence. It can
be safely assumed that the Office of the President could not have relied upon said report if the same
had not been before it when it rendered the questioned Decisions.

3. Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of
the government, "the findings of fact made therein must be respected, as long as they are supported
by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun, et al. vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682
[1948]); that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set
aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs. Moreno L-17821,
November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
852), which we find absent herein.

To reopen the case as ordered by the Court of Appeals would open wide the doors to a protracted
litigation of a controversy that has been pending for approximately nineteen (19) years now. It is high
time that a finish to the case be written.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 28 November 1986 of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE and the Decision of 10 May 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, in Civil Case No. 98, is hereby ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.