Ms. Juliet Joslin et al.

v New Zealand
Communication No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 at 214 (2002)

FACTS:
Ms Joslin and Ms Rowan commenced a lesbian relationship in January 1988, since then, they
jointly assumed responsibility for their children out of previous marriages. They all lived together.
They applied under the Marriage Act 1955 to the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages
for a marriage licence, by lodging a notice of intended marriage at the local Registry Office. The
Deputy Registrar-General rejected the application. Similarly, Ms Zelf and Ms Pearl commenced a
lesbian relationship in April 1993. They also share responsibility for the children of a previous
marriage also they pooled financial resources and maintained sexual relations. On 22 January
1996, the local Registry Office refused to accept a notice of intended marriage.

ISSUE:
W/N failure of the Marrieage Act of New Zealand to provide for homosexual marriage
discriminates against them directly on the basis of sex, and indirectly on the basis of sexual
orientation.

HELD:

In considering whether the treatment of the applicants had been discriminatory under articles 2(1)
and 26 of the ICCPR, it was necessary for the Committee to consider the nature of the right to
marry under article 23(2). The Committee agreed with the State that the gender specific language
of article 23(2) as compared to the gender neutral language in the rest of the ICCPR had been
consistently and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of State parties
stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to recognise as marriage only the
union between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other. Therefore the Committee found
that in merely refusing to allow homosexual couples to marry, the State had not violated article 26
(or any of the other articles raised by the applicants).

Sanchez vs. People

G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated
August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias
Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically
one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and
which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as
amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during
the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not prejudicial
to the child-victims development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and he should be
charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended and RA 7610 are applicable to the case at hand.

HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs
development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from
one another and from the act prejudicial to the childs development. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove
that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former
acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
childs development supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the childs development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as
petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the
entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely
as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the
protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law,
child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

People v. Doriquez

FACTS:
Appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before the CFI
of Iloilo by virtue of an information which recites: .

That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named defendant, with deliberate intent of bringing
Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit, disrepute and public contempt, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons
against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions
to wit: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto ko, nagastohan ako sing linibo
sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00 lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo
ang gasto ko," which, translated into English runs as follows: "You are a foolish class of person,
you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to
Purita; you had been telling people that I paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos
for my case," and other similar words of import.

Six days later, he was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm.Upon arraignment,
he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. He moved to dismiss both informations

One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal action for discharge of firearm places him
in double jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo
which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm and
scandal based on the same facts.

The court denied the motion to dismiss, MR was also denied. Hence, this appeal

ISSUE:

WON the said appellant was placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of
firearm.

HELD:

For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there
is "identity of offenses," so that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court, his "conviction or acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express
consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any
attempt to, commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information."

It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm
and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted
that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the
reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or
subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.

Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the
same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual
setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are
definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony -
alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime
against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge
of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the
latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill.

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense11 or identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed.