Sie sind auf Seite 1von 161

General Civil Aviation Authority

AIRWORTHINESS
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
WORKSHOP
Abu Dhabi
01 NOV 2016

AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145


OMAR MUSA
Senior Airworthiness Inspector
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145

CONTENTS:

The MORC SCHEME Update:


AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145

MORC SCHEME Update: (19th May 2016)


- Regulations Published in Section B Part V Chapter 3 CAR 145
Approved Maintenance Organisation
- Preparation for Implementation: Target July 2016
Procedure AWP-73 published.
Form AWF-MORC-001 ( Maintenance Organisation Review Certificate) + NDA
Form AWF-MORC-002 (Maintenance Organisation Review Certificate-
Statement)
E-Services PH MORC AS Application
GCAA Q-Pulse Creation of Sub-Group for MORC-AS personnel

- Training Package - GCAA will provide training to qualify/authorised


MORC-AS
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
MORC SCHEME:
MORC-AS TRAINING
GCAA Training for MORC- AS completed on 31/5 to 01/6/2016
11 Nominated person from 4 approved organisations

Following GCAA Interviews:


8 successfully candidates issued with MORC-AS
1 withdrawn & 2 failures

Another training planned before the end of the 2016


AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
MORC SCHEME:
Implementation of MORC Facing challenges:
Extending the Q-Pulse Audit Module access to MORC-AS (outside GCAA) to
generate Audit report
Tackling issues such as allocation Q-Pulse access (Licensing), allocation PW/Username, access by
MORC-AS on the operators IT system, limitation of access by organisation MORC-AS access, selection
of Regulation, completion of reports etc.
Q-Pulse Audits completed simulation audits by selected MORC-AS On going

Enabling CAR 145 e-Services access to MORC-AS/operator (CAR 145 AMO


applications).
To enable assignment of MORC Task to MORC-AS
Tackling CAR 145 e-Services changes/ redesign IT architecture - ongoing

AW CAR 145 started to assign MORC-AS Task outside the system


AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
MORC SCHEME:
Temporary Revision to CAR 145 Regulations:
(Pending approval with PRP):

AMC 145.70 MOE


Introduce Para 3.17 MORC Procedure (If applicable)
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145

MORC SCHEME:
MORC Technical Committee - Planned MORC TC meeting
To report & update progress
Discuss relevant implementation issue:
Feedback from Training of MORC-AS
Enhancing communication with individual MORC-AS
Commercial pressure affecting MORC-AS
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145

MORC SCHEME:
ICAO Working Paper:
MORC Scheme has been chosen as one of the GCAA projects pesented to
ICAO assembly.
Purpose - Sharing of innovative idea amongst member states for the benefit of
the other CAA and their industry.
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
01 Nov 2016
ACC meeting 01Nov. 2016
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
ACC meeting 01NoAv. 2016
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO

Recent Changes in Airworthiness Forms

Maintenance Over Run

Certification Privileges Exceedance

Airworthiness Review Responsibility

VORSY Implementation.

Impending Significant Requirement


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Recent Changes in Airworthiness Forms

1. CAME/MOE Compliance Check List- AWF-AMA-001

2. CAME Compliance Check List- AWF-AMA-003

3. CAMO Audit Check List- AWF-AMA-004

4. Aircraft Maintenance Program Check List- AWF-AMP-001

5. Application for Reservation of Reg. Mark & Mode S code - AWF-COR-001

6. Aircraft Delivery Check List - AWF-COR-003

7. Aircraft Delivery Filing Check List - AWF-AFC-001


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Recent Changes in Airworthiness Forms
8. Certificate of Airworthiness for Export - AWF-COA-009

9. Application for De-registration - AWF-COR-010

10. Deregistration Check List -AWF-COR-008

11. Aircraft de-registration Check List enforcing IDERA letterAWF-COR-008a

12. Certificate of De-registration -AWF-COR-009

13. Application for Confirmation of Registered particulars in A Certificate of


Registration- AWF-COR-011

14. Payment request Airworthiness - AWF-IPD-004


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Maintenance Over Run

Regulation: CAR M.201 (a) The owner shall ensure that no flight takes
place unless the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition.

Non Compliance: Airworthiness Over Run

Non-airworthy Operation

Airworthy Unsafe
Envelope Operation
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Maintenance Over Run

Consequence:

Operating non-airworthy aircraft. (ie The C of A is invalid)

Risk 1. Legal action as the operational requirement is violated

Risks: 2. Insurance Certificate is invalid and as a result;

a)Financial liability in the event of any incident/accident, as the


insurance is invalid

b) Company reputation jeopardized

Conclusion: Maintenance Over Runs are not acceptable.,


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Certification Privileges Exceedance

Regulation : Privileges of AME License specified in CAR 66.20

Violation : Instances of Maintenance certification beyond the privileges


of AME License have been observed.

Risk: Un-Airworthy Aircraft (ie The C of A is invalid)

Enforcement Action:
Any certification beyond the privileges granted, shall be liable to
disciplinary action and likelihood of loss of license of those involved.
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Airworthiness Review Responsibility

Regulation: CAR-M, entrusts the responsibility of complying with


Continuing Airworthiness requirements with the Operator. This includes
the Airworthiness Review of Aircraft, which otherwise was being done
by the GCAA.

Benefit: CAR-M provisions allow Air Operators the flexibility to conduct


their own Continuing Airworthiness compliance.

Conclusion: GCAA proposes that all Operators obtain Subpart I privilege /


contract Airworthiness Review activity to an approved CAMO.

Suggested Timeframe (open for discussion)


Air Operators- 06 Months

Flight Training organization : 12 Months


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
VORSY Implementation
Regulation: VORSY is a requirement under CAAP-57

Compliance:
Organization need to encourage voluntary reporting either through
the VORSY process or companys internal reporting system.

Organizations internal reporting process shall NOT replace the


VORSY reporting system.

The Organization must ensure that all staff are to be made aware of
VORSY.

VORSY features and requirements to be made part of the training


syllabus of the Organization.

Monitoring: Record of VORSY Training will be verified during Audits.


xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Impending Significant Requirement

Regulation: ICAO Annex -6, Part 1, EASA NPA 2013-26

Requirement: FDR shall have securely attached an automatically


activated ULB operating at a frequency of 37.5 kHz, operating for a
minimum of 90 days.

Applicability: International Commercial Air Transport Airplane.

Effective date:

ICAO- Not later than 01 January 2018.

EASA - Not later than 01 June 2018.

GCAA will be inline with EASA decision.

GCAA will issue an NPA and operators will need to respond accordingly
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx

CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO


Xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx

CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO

Thank You
AMMROC An Overview
November 2016

Thomas L Holmes Jr
VP Aviation Quality & Safety Standards
Legal Notice

This presentation is provided with the express understanding that it contains technical, business, and/or
financial information which is disclosed in confidence; and no disclosure or use of the information in any media
is permissible without the prior written consent of AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and
Overhaul Center) LLC.

This material is provided for informational purposes only, and AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance,
Repair and Overhaul Center) LLC and its affiliates make no warranty, representation, or guarantee with respect
to the information contained herein, or the results of the use of, or reliance on, such information.

COPYRIGHT 2016 AMMROC (ADVANCED MILITARY MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL CENTER) LLC

13 AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


AMMROC at a glance

A World Class Certifications


Partnership Lockheed Martin
Approved Service
Center
Established World Class, Established Multiple OEM
in 2010 Dedicated Facilities in 2010 certifications and
licenses
ISO 9001 / AS9110
Highly Skilled & Industry Leading Compliant QMS
Educated Workforce Standards
ISO 14001
Compliant

Capability on Uniquely OHSAS 18001


30+ Platforms Positioned Compliant
UAE GCAA
Approval
Commitment Versatile
to Excellence and Reliable

14 AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


Purpose
AMMROC was formed to provide industry best maintenance service and support for
national and international customers Air Forces across the SAMENA region with world class
facilities and highly skilled educated workforce

Pioneering new technologies

AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


Operating Infrastructure Established infrastructure
Standardized operating
procedures
Performance management and
reporting
Target

Operational End state: Robust and


Availability sustainable system
Certifications: personnel attainment,
Management
Performance

training, and course development


SCM system: inventory accuracy, forecasting,
provisioning, engineering and material analysis
Automated KPIs: visual platform tracking for serviceability,
availability, sortie completion, deployments and war reserves

Information Technology and Facilities Infrastructure


Infrastructure

Supply Engineering Quality,


Maintenance Human Technical
Chain & Processes &
Operations Capital Training
Management Capabilities Procedures

Program Management Teams

16 AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


Capabilities Snapshot
Aircraft Services
Modifications & Upgrades
Strategic OEM alliances
providing world class
capability

Servicing 7+ national Air


Engine Services Forces within the region
Capability on
30+ Platforms

Component Services

Proven capability and value pricing

Established capability

AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


Military Aircraft Heavy Maintenance / Repair & Overhaul / Modifications
Existing capabilities

Aircraft Services (Bases & MRO Facility)


Flight Line Maintenance 1st and 2nd Line (O & I Level)
Light & Heavy Depot Maintenance for 15+ platforms
Lockheed Martin certified C-130 / L-100 / F-16 Block 60 service center

Engine Services
Repair & Overhaul
GE F110
GE CT7-9C
GE T700-701C/D
R-R Adour 861 & 871
Snecma M53-P2 Module 07
PT-6A and PT6T

Component Services
Repair & Overhaul of Components for various types of military aircraft
Strategic OEM partners
Hydraulics, pneumatics, wheels & brakes, flight controls, avionics, electrics,
landing gear components, fuel components (multi-platform)

Modifications and Upgrades


For a variety of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft
Mid Life Upgrades and Structural Life Extension Programs
Routine modifications and updates from Service Bulletins, TCTOs

AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


Capability on Over 30 Platforms

Grob 115 Training C-130 Airlift C-17 Airlift F-16 Air Defence AW109 Special Mission Cessna 208 Special Mission AS332 Naval Operations

PC-7 Training CN-235 Airlift Hawk 102 Training Mirage Air Defence AW139 Special Mission AT802 Special Mission AS656 Maritime Patrol

PC-21 Training Da-42 Vip Hawk 61 Target Towing MPA Maritime Patrol AS550 Special Mission Dash-6 Special Mission AS365 VIP

King Air Cloud Seeding Avanti II VIP MB339 Air Display King Air Special Mission CH-147 Special Mission UH-60 Special Mission AW139 SAR

MRTT Refuel/Transport Seeker VIP Skyhawk VIP AS350 Special Mission Bell 407 Training

AH-64 Attack

AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


AMMROC CAR 145 - Horizon

Contracted AMMROC as their Approved Maintenance


Organization.
AMMROC holds CAR 145 Approval No. UAE.145.0047
for Bell 206 helicopters.

Horizon International Flight Academy is located in Al


Ain.

An approved flight training organization specializing in


helicopter flight training.

Operate a fleet of civil registered Bell 206 Jet Rangers


and a fleet of military registered Bell 407 helicopters. Bell 407 helicopters also maintained in accordance with CAR
145, but release to service is a non-CAR 145 RTS.
Maintenance provider to Horizon for 3 years.
Al Ain MRO
Developing a World Class Facility

AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential


ACC Meeting - 01Nov.
2016

Organization Risk Scope-ORS


Organization Risk Scope-
ORS
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
Agenda

Introduction

Objective

Method

Risk Calculation

Implementation of ORS

Interfacing
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS

Introduction

Risk Based Oversight:-

Risk-based Oversight (RBO) is a way of performing


oversight, where planning is driven by the risk profile and
execution, besides ensuring compliance, focuses on the
management of operational risks.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization Risk Scope - ORS
xx
Introduction

SMS
5 ROS
4.5
AUD
4
3.5 IT
3
ORP
2.5
2 OR
1.5 S
1
0.5
0
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
Introduction

Organization
Risk
Profiling

Risk
Based
Oversight
Organization
Risk Scope
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx Risk Scope - ORS
xx
Introduction

Organiza Organiza
tion Risk tion Risk
Profiling Scope

Review & Update ALL Aggregate all data from all


Org. Profile sources

Classify ALL Org. and Calculate the RI for Each


determine audit Scope item
frequency
Analyze the RI and
Strengthen the monitoring
Execute audit as per
frequency
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS

Organization
Risk Scope

ORS is a tool to identify risk in the aviation industry


through data evaluation and apply a focused approach to
eliminate / control risks.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx Organization Risk Scope
xx
Program- ORS
Objectives:

Support State Safety Program.

Identify the weak compliance area in the UAE Aviation


Industry, using audit finding data.

Strengthen the Safety and Airworthiness Standards


through enhanced monitoring.

Contribute to measure effectiveness of the SMS.


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
Methodology

Define a model of ORS that will identify

specific risky areas of an Organization

Systemic issues for an Organization

Systemic issues in the UAE total aviation Industry

Draw a threshold level for each organization to


classify the risk level.

Strengthen monitoring of the identified high risk area


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
xx
Methodology

Multiplicat
ion Factor

V2 V1
Findings

V3

R
I
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS

Risk Severity

Risk Severity factoring:

To moderate effect of different level of finding


on risk calculation, each finding is biased by
a multiplication factor (MF) based on finding
level.

MF for Level 1 finding = X

MF for Level 2 finding =Y

MF for Level 3 finding = Z


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxxOrganization Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Method
Spec
ific
V1= . .

Glob
al
V2=
. .

Glob
al
V3 =
. .

V1 takes the value of 1/ 0 depending on the value is above or below


the threshold

V2 & V3 are common to all Org.


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxxOrganization Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Risk Calculation

RISK INDEX (RI)

RI = 1x4 + 2x2 + 3x1

This method ensure that Specific and Global


variable do not contribute to the same level by an
weightage for risk calculation

Depending on complexity of activity GCAA has decided


V1 threshold different for different Organization.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Risk Index RI Description
V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.;
V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
0 V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.;
V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
1 V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.;
V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
2 V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.;
V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
3 V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.;
V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
4 V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.;
V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
5 V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.;
V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
6 V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.
V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.;
V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower;
7 V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Implementation

Map risk index of Org . using Q-Pulse audit


data.

Define the threshold and identified high risk


area in each organization.

Strengthen monitoring of high risk area


through emphasize during regular audit, to
capture effectiveness of preventive action.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Implementation RI Chart (Before moderation)
Scope


CAR M.101 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.201 Responsibilities 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 1

CAR M.301 Continuing airworthiness tasks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 5 1 5 5 1

CAR M.202 Occurrence reporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance programme 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

CAR M.303 Airworthiness directives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

CAR M.304 Data for modifications and repairs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

CAR M.305 Aircraft continuing airworthiness


record system 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 5 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.306 Operator's technical log system 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.307 Transfer Of Aircraft Continuing


Airworthiness Records 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.401 Maintenance data 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.402 Performance of maintenance 5 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5

CAR M.403 Aircraft defects 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 1 1

CAR M.501 Installation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.502 Component Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.503 Service life limited components 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0


CAR M.504 Control of unserviceable
components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

CAR M.601 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.602 Application 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.603 Extent Of Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.604 Maintenance Organisation Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.605 Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.606 Personnel requirements 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.607 Certifying Staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


CAR M.608 Components, Equipment And
Tools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.609 Maintenance Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Implementation- RI Chart

Scope

CAR M.101 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.201 Responsibilities 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.301 Continuing airworthiness tasks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1

CAR M.202 Occurrence reporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance programme 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

CAR M.303 Airworthiness directives 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.304 Data for modifications and repairs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.305 Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1

CAR M.306 Operator's technical log system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.307 Transfer Of Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness


Records 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.401 Maintenance data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.402 Performance of maintenance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.403 Aircraft defects 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.501 Installation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.502 Component Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.503 Service life limited components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.504 Control of unserviceable components 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

CAR M.601 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.602 Application 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.603 Extent Of Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.604 Maintenance Organisation Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.605 Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.606 Personnel requirements 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.607 Certifying Staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.608 Components, Equipment And Tools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.609 Maintenance Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Implementation

Immediate Long-term

Enhanced Training to
GCAA audit based enhance
Organizatio on RI standardiz
n with Review
ation
of
identified Regulat
Risk Area ions
Airline Continual
Operat proactive assessment
or action through
Audits
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization Risk Scope Program-
xxxx
xx ORS
Implementation
When Risk Index identified is 5
The risk profile of each organization will be
shared by the PI in order to proactively initiate
review and appropriate actions by the operator.

For the next GCAA audit, PI shall schedule at


least 01 additional day to focus on the risk areas.

During the audit, the PI shall review the actions


taken by the operator based on his risk profile.

When RI is 4, actions to be taken at the


discretion of the PI
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx Organization Risk Scope
xx
Program- ORS
Other sources

ORS methodology may, in future, be fed with


other sources of data other than audit data
eg;

ROSI

VORSY

Internal audits

External audits
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope
Program- ORS

s
Xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope
Program- ORS

Thank You
SMS
Enhancement Working Group
An open forum for approved organizations to propose and recommend potential improvements to
the SMS implementation programme, and possible amendments to CAR X

Nadia Algosaibi
SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering
nalgosaibi@etihad.ae
SMS
Enhancement Working Group

3rd Meeting: 25th August 2016

NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error


Safety Promotion
NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error
Brain storming session conducted at the 2nd SMS Enhancement Working Group, 8th May

GCAA identified this SPI as an Airworthiness AloSP parameter

Industry to assist GCAA in establishing target value for this ALoSP


by including it as an SPO for 2016 Quarter 4

Maintenance Error
An SPI with agreed alert levels and targets for 2017
In accordance with CAR-X which required an established safety performance monitoring
and measurement system

47
NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error

2016 Q4: All organizations to include it as an SPO in their SMS Report


2017: It will form part of GCAA Airworthiness ALoSP in 2017

Agreed Elements
Maintenance error will be limited to the below items only
Installation Failure Fault Isolation/Test/Inspection failure
Servicing Failure Foreign Object Damage/Debris
Repair Failure Airplane/Equipment Damage

48
Installation Failure Servicing Failure Repair Failure Fault Isolation/ Foreign Object Airplane/
Test/Inspection Damage/ Equipment
Failure Debris Damage
Equipment/part not Not enough fluid (e.g. component or Did not detect fault Tooling/equipment left Tools/equipment use
installed structural repair) in aircraft/engine improperly
Wrong equipment /part Too much fluid Incorrect Not found by fault Debris on ramp Defective
installed isolation tools/equipment sued
Wrong orientation Wrong fluid type Unapproved Not found by operational/ Debris falling into Struck by/against
functional test open systems
Improper location Required servicing Incomplete Not found by task Other Pulled/pushed/drove
not performed inspection into
Incomplete installation Access not closed Other Access not closed Fire/smoke

Extra parts installed System/equipment no System/equipment not Other


deactivate/reactivated deactivated/reactivated
Access not closed Other Not found by part
inspection
System/ Equipment not Not found by visual
reactivated/ deactivated inspection
Damaged on Technical log oversight
remove/replace
Cross connection Other

Mis-rigging

Consumables not used


Wrong consumables
used
Unserviceable part
installed
Other

49
NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error

SPI formally proposed at 3rd SMS Enhancement Working Group, 25th August

SPI: Maintenance Error


Line Maintenance: Maintenance Error per Departure
Base Maintenance: Maintenance Error per Productive Man Hours
If an organization holds GCAA approval for both line maintenance and base maintenance,
both are required and reported to GCAA

Quarterly report in 2017 to be submitted to GCAA


Organizations to outline mitigation taken to reduce the number of events
airworthiness@gcaa.gov.ae

50
Safety Promotion

Safety Communication
Provide lines of communication at all stages of SMS implementation
Improving safety performance by communicating lessons learned
Distributing safety procedures in the organisation
Raising awareness of potential hazards and risks
Fostering a learning and ongoing reporting culture

safety bulletins, safety notices, posters, newsletters, training, emails,


intranet, briefings and workshops
Safety Communication: Safety Briefings
Safety Reporting Briefings
Ensure all staff are fully aware of the SMS and the SMS processes
Explain reasons for the procedures
Introduce reporting and investigation procedures
Introduce the event forms and IT systems
Provide examples of a recent report, its investigation and the lessons learnt
Convey safety critical information
Explain why particular actions are taken

52
Safety Communication: Safety Briefings
Advantages of Briefings
SMS team see the reaction from staff
Opportunity for staff to ask questions and get them answered immediately
Instant feedback regarding questions and other discussion issues
Helps prevent misinterpretation
Suitable for staff with limited computer aptitude

Challenges
Staff availability at scheduled briefings
Does not manage the quality of reports Next Stage of Briefings

53
Thank-you

SMS Enhancement Working Group


An open forum for approved organizations to propose and recommend potential improvements to
the SMS implementation programme, and possible amendments to CAR X

Nadia Algosaibi
SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering
nalgosaibi@etihad.ae
ROSI Management & Processing
Update
Eng. Khalid Saud Al Humaidan
Senior Specialist Safety Policy & Regulation

Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting


Abu Dhabi
1 Nov 2016
Presentation Content

Current Safety Intelligence & Management


activities
ROSI management
ROSI workflow
ROSI electronic form fields

2
What is Safety Intelligence ?

Safety Intelligence is the organizational capability to


manage a systematic and continuous process to
collect key operational data, translate it to
meaningful information, to learn or understand, or
to deal with new or trying situations, as well applying
knowledge to achieve the expected outcome in an
efficient way for managing safety risks

3
Search for precursors of
Risk Based Oversight
accidents
Know where to look
See it coming

Need for intelligence, assembly


of data and serious analytical
capacity

4
What is Safety Intelligence ?

knowledge gained through the analysis and study of available data and
information

knowledge on safety performance

knowledge on Safety Issues


5
The Cycle

Identify
Safety Issues

Safety
Performance Assesment
Monitoring
(assurance)
Safety of Safety
Issues
Risk
Portfolio

Implementat Definition of
ion & follow Safety
up Actions

6
Safety Action
Safety Issue Safety Issue Programming Safety
Identification Assessment and Performance
Implementation
Analysis of Scope
MOR/VOR Data Decision on
Actions Indicators relevant
Causes
for measuring
Emerging Safety Consequences efficiency of
Issues based on Risk Controls actions
safety research Impact
assessment,
Analysis of prioritization
Audit/Inspection
Indicators relevant
Data for monitoring the
Analysis of Risk Assessment safety issue
Follow-up of
operational data implementation
(FDM/Radar/Health
Monitring)

7
Intelligence Sources

Safety
Safety Recommend
Research & ations
Study

Occurrence
Reliability Reporting

Internation
FDM AHM Audits al Exchange ATM Data
& Sharing

8
ROSI Management & Processing
Prior to 2010, GCAA didnt have a mandatory occurrence system proportionate with the
size and the complexity of the UAE Civil Aviation System

Current occurrence reporting system was introduced in 2010

The evolution were bringing is:

ROSI Management transfer from the SRM Safety Risk Management section to the
Aviation Safety Affairs Sector

Management of occurrences is being dealt with dedicated subject matter experts

ROSI have already undergone enhancements, and will undergo further


developments.

9
10
ROSI Management & Processing

Safety Occurrence Management Team

Composed of SMEs from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the central
point for receipt of Occurrence Report.

SMEs composed of various domains:

Airworthiness
Flight Operations
Air Navigation & Aerodrome
Air Navigation & Aerodrome

11
ROSI Management & Processing

CAAP 22 occurrence examples will be divided in to two categories

Category 1

Category 1 reportable incidents are occurrences which were deemed to be critical


and required to be notified to the GCAA within 24 hours and routed to Inspector
and the Safety Occurrence Management Team within 72 Hours.

Category 2

Category 2 reportable incidents are occurrences which are were not considered as
Category 1 and are to be reported to the GCAA within 15 days from date of
occurrence with an investigation/initial investigation report as necessary

12
ROSI Management & Processing

Category 1 Occurrences

GCAA will get notified on Category 1 occurrence within 24 hours

Occurrence to be submitted to the GCAA within 72 hours.

ASAS Occurrence Management Team will monitor opened occurrence reports


periodically

Once occurrence enquiry/follow up is completed by Inspector, Occurrence


Management Team will close the occurrence.

13
ROSI Management & Processing
Category 2 Occurrences

-Organization Inspector wont get notified


-Occurrence will be routed to Safety Occurrence Management Team.
-Investigation report is to be submitted to the GCAA within 15 days from date of
occurrence
-Operator may elect to consider the report as initial investigation report and
investigate further as necessary.
-Final report within 45 days. Further extension can be agreed with GCAA.
-The team will make a technical judgment in case occurrence requires to be further
followed up by Inspector.
-Inspector wont be assigned occurrence unless Safety Occurrence Management
Team determines the need to. For ex, no sufficient info by operator.

14
ROSI Management & Processing

Introduction of new fields for cause, preventive and corrective actions

15
ROSI Management & Processing

Risk Area & ALoSP SPI.


Field currently visible to GCAA only

For the Airworthiness domain:

Maintenance interval exceedance


Maintenance error

16
ROSI Management & Processing

Standardization of state of occurrence field

Standardization of From and To fields

17
ROSI Management & Processing

Thank You

18
Avisa Gulf Aviation
Advisory Service & Consultancy.
Commercial, Operations & Technical.

56
Developing a Reliability Programme to
Support the AMP for Small Fleet.

57
MAIN POINTS OF THIS PRESENTATION:

1. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of an AMP as per the UAE
CARs.
2. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of a Reliability Programme
as per the UAE CARs.
3. To consider the most effective & applicable method of developing a Reliability
Programme for a small fleet of aircraft (Commercial, Private or Business aircraft.)
4. To consider ETOPs implications in Reliability Programmes.

58
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP)
CAR M.302

AMC to CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance Programme


AMC to CAR M.302 (a) Aircraft Maintenance Programme
AMC to CAR M.302 (d) Aircraft Maintenance Programme Compliance
AMC to CAR M.302 (f) Aircraft Maintenance Programme - Reliability Programmes.

Revisions to the approved programme should be raised by the operator, to


reflect changes in the Type Certificate holders recommendations,
modifications, service experience, or as required by the GCAA.

Reliability programmes form one of the important methods of updating


approved programmes.

59
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP)

The AMP is developed with the function of ensuring that the continued
integrity & airworthiness of design is maintained to the same level of resistance
to failure of the initial airworthiness in the Type Certificate.

The OEM with the NAA & Operators develop the MRBR using MSG3 analysis to
identify the tasks & instructions for continued airworthiness of the type.

The MRBR is developed in to an MPD then the Operator develops their AMP
with local conditions in consideration.

On going validity of the AMP is required to be conducted by the Operator.

60
AIRWORTHINESS & MAINTENACE

You can not improve the level of airworthiness & resistance to


failure of the initial type design, you can only conduct tasks &
procedures that maintain the initial level of resistance to failure of
type design. The MRBR`s purpose is to continuously maintain the
level of resistance to failure & airworthiness of the initial type
design.

To improve the level of airworthiness & resistance to failure


modifications can raise the initial resistance to failure & can then
raise the continued airworthiness of the initial type design.

61
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP) REVIEW

1. Each task in the AMP should be applicable & effective.


1. Applicable means the system or component exists & derived correctly from MSG3.
2. Applicable means the task type is correct, DVI, GVI, FUC, OPC, NDT etc.
3. Effective means the task has real purpose & is detecting failures.

2. Each task interval should appropriate in its unit of measure & its interval
time.
1. UOM: a/c cycles, engine cycles, landings, flight hours, calendar time,
2. Time interval with consideration to the MSG3 analysis & failure data.

62
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY

The purpose of a reliability programme

1. To support the AMP tasks as being effective & applicable.


2. To support the AMP tasks intervals as being effective &
applicable.
3. To identify missing AMP tasks.
4. To identify aircraft & component design defects.
5. To identify Human factors affecting the reliability or the
operation or maintenance of the aircraft.
Training, manuals, procedures, processes etc.

63
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY

With out a reliability programme in place you can not show

1. Are the AMP tasks effective & applicable.


2. Are the AMP tasks intervals effective & applicable.
3. Are we missing AMP tasks.
4. Do we have aircraft & component design defects.
5. Do we have Human factors affecting the reliability or the
operation or maintenance of the aircraft.
Training, manuals, procedures, processes etc.

64
THE 4 ACTIONS OF A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

The 4 Reliability Actions;

1. Data collection;
2. Data analysis;
3. Corrective action;
4. Data storage & retrieval.

65
RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES

Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation
of the aircraft,

On the Flight Line: The Technical Log


PREPs: Pilot Reports
In flight defects
Walk Round defects
MREPs: Maintenance Reports
Component failures
Oil uplift
Findings during operation

These are all originated out side of the AMP`s scope

66
RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES

Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation
of the aircraft,

On Maintenance: The Non Routine Card


Detected as a result of an AMP task

These are all originated from with in the AMP`s scope

67
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES

Line Operation:

1. STATISTICAL BASED RELIABILITY.


2. EVENT BASED RELIABILITY.
3. ENGINE CONDITION TREND MONITORING.
4. OIL UPLIFT MONITORING.
1. Engine oil
2. APU oil
3. Hydraulic oil

68
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES

Flight Line:

1. STATISTICAL BASED RELIABILITY.


2. EVENT BASED RELIABILITY.
3. ENGINE CONDITION TREND MONITORING.
4. OIL UPLIFT MONITORING.
1. Engine oil
2. APU oil
3. Hydraulic oil

69
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES

Maintenance Engineering:
1. Non Routine Cards & Findings
1. Linked to the parent AMP task.
2. Found with no parent AMP task.
2. Component removals & shop reports
1. No Fault Found NFF
3. AD & SB analysis
1. Addressing type design faults & giving improvements
4. Modification analysis & their Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA)
1. STC`s, Part 21 etc.
70
ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY for ETOPs

1. Inflight Engine Shut Downs.


2. APU Starts.
3. ETOPs Sensitive ATA Events.

71
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

A simple reliability programme with 4 aspects to it.

1. Line Reliability
2. Maintenance AMP Reliability
3. Engine / Systems Condition Trend Monitoring
4. Component Reliability Monitoring

72
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

With fleets of the same type of less than 6 aircraft, statistical


analysis & alert setting is difficult.

Event Based reliability of Flight Line PREPS & MREPS.


1. review finding.
2. review corrective action.
3. monitor reoccurrence confirming route cause addressed.
4. consider AMP tasks.
5. consider Human Factors.
6. store in its ATA-Sub ATA.
7. Report in a 3 monthly report.

73
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

Reliability Monitoring of Maintenance Events: NRC`s.


1. review NRC`s & ensure correct reference & link to AMP task.
2. review corrective action.
3. monitor reoccurrence confirming route cause addressed.
4. Monitor if the AMP task have before had NRC`s linked to it.
5. consider AMP tasks as being effective & applicable.
6. consider AMP task interval as being effective & applicable.
7. consider Human Factors.
8. Store NRC linked to its AMP task.
9. Report in a 3 monthly report.

74
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

Reliability Monitoring of Engine Condition & Oil Up lift.


1. review Tech Log & NRC`s for oil uplift.
2. review if there is a trend of oil consumption.
3. consider Human Factors.
4. issue maintenance action special work order if required.
5. monitor ECTM reports for events.
6. report in a 3 monthly report.

75
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

Reliability Monitoring of Components.


1. review every component removal for reason.
2. review corrective action.
3. consider Human Factors.
4. review shop report confirming the failure root cause.
5. issue maintenance action special work order if required.
6. Report in a 3 monthly report.

76
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY & ITS ROLE IN THE ARC

When completing an ARC, the Reliability programme should be


reviewed for being established, correctly followed & events being
addressed.

If there is no Reliability Programme in place at all, we never know


if the AMP effective & if we are really developing the AMP to
operators conditions & environment, also we are ignoring very
important in operational information that will lead us to
maintenance or operational actions to maintain the airworthiness
of the initial type design or to even improve it.

77
Thank you for listening & participating.

Dr Mark J Pierotti MBA. FRAeS. IEng.


Email: Mark.pierotti@ajaprivatejets.com
Mobile:+971508128600
www.avisagulf..aero

78
.

79
Background
Final report of AAIS case AIFN/0016/2012

Maintenance error related incident

Report identifies a number of Contributing Factors

Makes Safety Recommendations

80
Relevant contributing factors

The effect of fatigue on the engineers decision making process


due to his shift pattern of working an average of 8.5 hours a
day for 32 days continuously.

Lack of guidance provided by the GCAA and the operator, on


the effect of shift duty times and the management of risk
associated with fatigue.

81
Safety recommendations.
GCAA should;
Issue guidance to the industry regarding man-hour
. methodology, duty times, including maximum days on
duty, working hours, shift patterns, working beyond
normal duty times, minimum rest between shifts and
rest days.
Issue guidance to the industry for workers involved with
safety sensitive jobs regarding fatigue risk management.

82
Way ahead?

In advance of a possible regulatory amendment GCAA


intends, by end of November 2016, to publish a Safety
Alert outlining recommendations regarding Aircraft
. Maintenance Engineers duty times.

Additionally, when an organisation elects not to fully adopt


the published recommendations, Appendix 1 to the Safety
Alert will detail the requirements for and guidance on, the
implementation of an acceptable Fatigue Risk
Management Scheme.

83
What is fatigue?

A physiological state of reduced mental or physical


. performance capability resulting from sleep loss or extended
wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental and/or
physical activity) that can impair an individuals alertness and
ability to perform safety related duties. (ICAO manual for
Regulators).

84
Safety Alert Likely Recommendations

Shifts longer than 12 hours should be considered undesirable.


Shifts should not be extended by overtime to longer than 13
hours.
.
A minimum rest period of 11 hours between shifts should not
be compromised by overtime.
When designing shift schedules the number of days off
between shifts must be considered. After more than 2-3 days
on night shift , several days of rest time may be required to
recuperate/alleviate sleep debt and fatigue.
Engineers should be given at least 28 days notice of schedule.

85
Absolute maximum of seven successive work days before a break
of at least two rest days.

.
(7 successive 12 hour days may not be acceptable, 7 successive
7/8 hour days may be).

Absolute maximum of 60 accumulated hours before a break of at


least two rest days.

86
Background to recommendations:

Extracted from Appendix P to UK CAA CAP 716 (Aviation Maintenance Human


. Factors).
CAP 716 published in 2003 contains a detailed study of the effect of working
hours on human performance and limitations.
Used as a benchmark for other authorities in adopting a standard for shift
work and working hours.
Prepared by Dr Simon Folkard, Body Rhythms and Shiftwork Centre,
University of Wales, after extensive review of published academic literature
with respect to the impact of various aspects of work hours on health, sleep,
fatigue and safety.

87
Fatigue Risk Management Scheme

.
When a Fatigue Risk Management Scheme is implemented,
the organisation should establish, document and maintain
the FRM scheme as an integral part of its Safety
Management System.

88
Fatigue Risk Management scheme-requirements:
(a) incorporate scientific principles and knowledge;
(b) manage the operational risks of the organisation arising from fatigue of
personnel on an ongoing basis;
(c) ensure that actions necessary to effectively mitigate the organisations
. risks arising from fatigue are implemented promptly;
(d) provide for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the
mitigation of fatigue risks;
(e) be supported by the organisations just culture policy to ensure
confidence in reporting fatigue related hazards;
(f) include a set of procedures that aim to ensure that personnel involved in
aircraft maintenance are appropriately rested and fit to perform their
duties safely.

89
Thank you for your attention.

Questions?

90
Manufacturing Organization Approval

Andek Heshamuddin Engineering Safety Inspector

16th Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting

1st November 2016


Vision for MOA
Stimulate growth of UAEs aviation supply chain:

Catalyzes the setting up of new organization that starts with


manufacturing of non critical components with no airworthiness impacts

Segregates critical and non-critical component manufacturing approvals


that encourages focus for business operations

Expands business opportunities through supports of not only specific


organization, but also for other organization through subcontract
manufacturing

MOA is a new evolving concept

92
MOA Scope
Organization:
Organization within the physical boundaries of UAE

Components Manufactured:
Components for UAE-registered aircraft only
Non-critical components with no airworthiness impacts
Examples: small plastic components, seat covers, carpets, side panels
Expansion of the list shall be considered on case to case basis

93
Scopes

CAR Part 21 CAR Part V


CAR 145
Subpart G Chapter 6 (MOA)
Maintenance Organization Production Organization Manufacturing Organization
Approval Approval Approval

Maintenance of aircraft Production organization Simple non-critical


and components for UAE showing conformity of component manufacturing
registered aircraft, with products, parts and for UAE registered aircraft
varying categories plus appliances with applicable only
limited fabrication for design data
aircraft maintained

94
MOA Eligibility

Any person or organization is eligible to apply for manufacturing under MOA


regulation (Part V Chapter 6)

Application shall be made in a form and manner established by the GCAA and
shall include; the Exposition Manual, Scope of Approvals applied and the
payment of applicable fee

95
MOA Quality Management System
A Quality System is required:

And shall be formally documented:


Has established and able to maintain a quality system to ensure conformity to
applicable design data and is in condition for safe operation

As formal documentation for outlining control procedures for:


Organizational changes
Processes compliance and control
Materials and products conformity to approved data

As an independent quality assurance function to monitor


compliance, and adequacy of the documented procedures

96
MOA Exposition Manual
Organization Setup:
Management commitment
Organization chart showing chain of responsibilities
Certifying personnel
Facility setup

Process Setup:
Organizational capabilities and scope of approval
Details of quality system and procedures
Description of products and processes control
Amendment procedures for organizational and process changes

97
MOA Form 299

98
MOA Airworthiness Release Form 299

Certification of conformity to the approved design data and for condition


of safe operation

Contents:

Organizational data
Released component information
Endorsement and certification details

Completion Instruction:
Provided in the MOA regulations

99
Advantages: MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
The MOA Regulations are introduced with the intent of:

The Manufacturing Organization Approval regulations are applicable to


manufacturing of simple non critical components only.
The MOA requirements have been simplified compared to CAR 21
Subpart G, where CAR 21 Subpart G are more comprehensive and cater
for all kind of manufacturing
It is envisaged that MOA will be an intermediate step towards acquiring
CAR 21 Subpart G approval (POA)

100
Advantages MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Minimal setup and operating cost due to:
Simpler components requires less complex processes and facility
Fewer certifying personnel with overlap of non conflicting roles
permissible
Minimal migration cost as existing facility can and will be able to be used

101
Advantages MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Minimal setup time and approval time:
Simpler initial facility setup compared to POA setup, speeds up operational
readiness
Less migration cost from CAR 21 Subpart G and CAR 145 categories
Minimal organizational setup compared to POA (minimal manpower & certifying
staff)
More focus on operational requirements, further leads to increase productivity

102
Advantages MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Allows gradual expansion of facilities and operational undertakings.

Lower initial setup cost


Organizational capability can be expanded along with management awareness of
approval requirements
Expansion of facility and undertaking can be made in stages with no hold up of
operations
Operational track records further assist in building better reputation with customers
and Authority

103
MOA Certification Implementation (1/2)
Potential organizations:
New organizations
Part 145 Approval Holders

Expected Timeframe:
Expected implementation by end of the year
Already receiving applications, three applications being processed

104
MOA Certification Implementation (2/2)

Existing Fabrication under CAR 145:


Fabricate within scope of CAR 145 is only permitted
Any fabrication beyond the provision of CAR 145 will be considered for
transfer to MOA
Identifying CAR 145 approved organizations carrying out manufacturing
beyond CAR 145 provisions
Discussion with CAR 145 organizations for moving to MOA
Agreeing on time frame to move such CAR 145 organizations to MOA on
case by case basis

105
Questions / Discussion

106
New Concept For Safety Occurrence
Report Management

Eng. Khalid Saud Al Humaidan


ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
ICAOs GASP

Requires effective Implementation of ICAO Standards and


Recommended Practices (SARPs) related to the States approval,
Short Term authorization, certification and licensing processes
2017

Requires States to move from a compliance-based oversight


approach to one which begins to proactively manage risks globally
Mid-Term through the identification and control of existing or emerging
2022 safety issues

Requires the introduction of advanced safety capabilities that


increase capacity while maintaining or enhancing operational
Long-Term safety margins and manage existing and emerging risks
2027
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Current Safety Intelligence Activities

Acquire effective storage, analysis and assessment of safety data


capabilities.
The enhancement will enable the GCAA to proactively identify,
assess and mitigate identified safety issues in the UAE civil aviation
system .

Translation of Safety Data to valuable Safety Information is an


enabler for taking Risk Based Decisions for targeting of oversight of
areas of greater concern or need.
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

What is Safety Intelligence and how is it connected to GCAA MOR


system ?

Is knowledge gained through the analysis of available safety data

Is knowledge on safety performance

Is knowledge on Safety Issues

The knowledge gained via a robust intelligence system can enable the
GCAA to perform its State Safety Management functions
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Safety Intelligence is the organizational capability


to manage a systematic and continuous process
to collect key operational data, translate it to
meaningful information, to learn or understand,
or to deal with new or trying situations, as well
applying knowledge to achieve the expected
outcome in an efficient way for managing safety
risks
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
A CAA 10 Milestones Map , presented by the GCAA at the ICAO High Level Safety
Conference, Montreal, Feb 2015
Establishment of Key partnerships with key institutional and industry stakeholders
1

Implement performance-based regulations on safety management and data protection


2

Re-design organizational structures to integrate RBO & PBO into the SSOS CE-8
3

Upgrade and improve the State safety reporting programme to be harmonized with international standards
4

Development of the necessary human resources to fulfill new positions and competencies
5

Development of multi-source safety data processing and analysis capabilities


6

Development of data modeling capabilities to asses operationally significant safety risks


7

Agreement on safety performance indicators and safety performance targets for key industry stakeholders as well as for the State
8

Definition of criteria for risk and performance based oversight of industry


9

Definition of procedures and mechanisms for risk and performance based oversight
10
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Identify Safety
Issues

Safety
Performance Assessment of
Monitoring Safety Issue
(Assurance)

Implementation Definition of
& Follow Up Safety Actions
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Intelligence cycle starts at the Identification of Safety Issues.

Enablers for identification:

1. MOR
2. VOR
3. Audits
4. Inspections
5. FDM/Reliability
6. Other
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Status in 2010 Vs Now

Prior to 2010, GCAA didnt have a mandatory occurrence system


proportionate with the size and the complexity of the UAE Civil
Aviation System

Current occurrence reporting system was introduced in 2010

But what we need is to,,,

ACT
Current Occurrence Management Process
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Objective of ASAS Safety Occurrence Management:

Enhance the capabilities of the GCAAs Occurrence Reporting System to


become a key contributor for the management of risk in the framework of
the UAEs State Safety Program and Safety Intelligence

Support for the establishment of an adequate regulatory framework

Development and introduction of standard protocols for reports


management
Process
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Goals:

Ensure reports are efficiently processed.

Classify events as per ECCAIRS classification

Coordinate multi-decipline events

Quality Assurance

Asses analysis reports to monitor trends and safety performance

Highlight safety concerns derived from Occurrence data to decision


makers
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Safety Occurrence Management Team

Composed of SMEs from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the
central point for receipt of Occurrence Report.

Airworthiness Representative
Flight Operations Representative
Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative
Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
Taking in to account historical data of occurrences assigned to ASAS in 2015.

ANA: 5442
AWR: 447
FO: 1415

For ANA, figure includes AOP, ATC , BWI occurrences

SMO Team is expected to receive as a minimum following No of


occurences per month.

ANA: 453 / Month


AWR: 38 / Month
FO: 118 / Month
Occurrence Classification

CAAP 22 Occurrences will be regrouped to two categories as following:

In order to increase the efficiency of ASAS Occurrence Report Management,,

Category 1 incidents which were deemed to be critical and required to be


notified to the GCAA and routed to concerned department Inspector and the
Safety Occurrence Management Team within 72 Hours (For info and
immediate safety intervention by Inspector as necessary)

Category 2 incidents which were not considered as Category 1, GCAA will


require an investigation report (IR) to be submitted within a given time (15
days)
Occurrence Classification

Category 1 Occurrences

Department Inspector will get notified on Category 1 occurrence similar to


current workflow within 72 hours

Occurrence will be allocated to Inspector and ASAS Occurrence Management


Team within 72 hours.

ASAS Occurrence Management Team will monitor opened occurrence reports


periodically

Once occurrence enquiry/follow up is completed by Inspector, Occurrence


Management Team will do the Quality Check of the occurence.
Occurrence Classification

Category 1 Occurrences Examples

Operation of Aircraft:

- Take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed, occupied or incorrect runway.
- Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of usable fuel.
- Loss of control (including partial or temporary loss of control) from any cause.
- Depressurization

Aircraft Technical:

- Damage to or defect exceeding allowed tolerances of a structural element which failure could reduce the
structural stiffness to such an extent that the required flutter, divergence or control reversal margins are
no longer achieved.
- Loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight.
- Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a fire hazard or possible hazardous
contamination of aircraft structure, systems or equipment, or risk to occupants.
- Flameout, shutdown or malfunction of any engine.
Occurrence Classification

Category 1 Occurrences Examples

Air Navigation Service Provider:

- ASMI CAT A, B, C, D
- Loss of Runway separation CAT A, B, C, D

Aerodromes:

- Runway incursion CAT A, B, C, D


- Maneuvering area Excursion CAT A, B, C, D
- Runway operation incident
Occurrence Classification
Category 2 Occurrences

- Organization Inspector wont get notified


- Occurrence will be routed to Safety Occurrence Management Team.
- Investigation report will be submitted to the GCAA within 15 days from date of occurrence
- Operator may elect to consider the report as initial investigation report and investigate
further as necessary.
- Final report within 45 days. Further extension can be agreed with GCAA.
- The team will make a technical judgment in case occurrence requires to be further followed
up by Inspector.
- Inspector wont be allocated occurence unless Safety Occurrence Management Team
determines the need to. For ex, no sufficient info by operator, operator exceeding closing
date.
Occurrence Classification

Category 2 Occurrences Examples

Operation of Aircraft:
- Laser incident
- Wake turbulence encounters (depends on severity)
- Aircraft Ground Handling and Servicing

Technical:
- Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or inaudible
passenger address system.
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

What We Need From You

- An effective internal reporting system

- Conduct adequate investigations backed up by Root Cause Analysis

- Assess and mitigate emerging risks

- Classify incidents in line with GCAAs classification protocol


ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

What We Expect
ASAS Safety Occurrence Reporting

We believe by this, the UAE will have an efficient


system which will be able to acquire quality data
and produce valuable information which will
positively contribute in enhancing aviation
safety.

Your Thoughts
Process
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Thank You