What Christian Liberation Theology and Buddhism Need to Learn from Each

Other

John Makransky

Buddhist-Christian Studies, Volume 34, 2014, pp. 117-134 (Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/bcs.2014.0002

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/567827

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 What Christian Liberation Theology
and Buddhism Need to Learn
from Each Other
John Makransky
Boston College

Both Christian liberation theologians and engaged Buddhists seek to empower the
deepest personhood of people by liberating them from conditions of suffering that
hide their deeper identity and impede their fuller potential.1 Christian and Buddhist
liberation theologies differ in what they identify as the main conditions of suffer-
ing, and in the epistemologies they use to disclose those suffering conditions and to
address them. Through their differences, I argue, each tradition points out an episte-
mological weakness in the other that would otherwise have remained unnoticed and,
by exposing it, helps correct it.
In terms of Christian liberation epistemology, even taking into account the his-
torical situation that liberation theologians speak from, one weakness is a tendency to
construct and reify a duality between those who are preferred by God and those who
are not, a duality that makes it difficult, practically speaking,actually to love each
person unconditionally in the way that Jesus taught. This is exacerbated by insuffi-
cient attention to layers of suffering in people that drive their unjust actions against
others. I draw on Buddhist epistemology to uncover these problems by critically
analyzing some of the language of a few liberation theologians.
On the other hand, Buddhist epistemology lacks the concept of a God who chose
to incarnate uniquely among the most marginalized and rejected, and the related
Christian concept of social sin. This focus of liberation theology can sharpen Bud-
dhist attention on nonpersons in our midst and to the social forces behind their
marginalization and suffering. Christian liberation theology thus informs and helps
reframe Buddhist understandings of compassion and its cultivation, and stimulates
new insights into current social implications of ancient Buddhist teachings of karma,
interdependence, and bodhisattva practice.
This essay begins with Buddhist ideas, but it is not a religious studies analysis of
them concerned with their diverse developments through history. Rather, this essay
is the Buddhist equivalent of an exercise in comparative, constructive theology, which
speaks from within a specific location in a Buddhist tradition to explore how dia-
logue with part of another religious tradition, here Christian liberation theology, may
stimulate fresh insights.

Buddhist-Christian Studies 34 (2014) 117134. by University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.
118 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

buddhist epistemological principles relevant

to christian liberation theology
In what follows I will briefly summarize and draw on elements of Tibetan Buddhist
theory and practice from the Nyingma tradition, the most ancient Tibetan Buddhist
tradition. According to the theory and practice of this tradition, all of our experiences
of self, others, and world possess two essential qualities: emptiness and cognizance.
The minds cognizance is the knowing, aware quality within each experience. The
minds emptiness is the basic space in and through all experiences that permits every-
thing we experience to be as impermanent as it is. Emptiness is also described as the
basic space of dependent arising that permits each thing to arise in dependence upon,
and as an expression of, other things. Emptiness is thus also the lack of any isolated,
autonomous being in anything we experience. The essence of enlightenment dawns
when the minds cognizant quality recognizes the emptiness of all experiences, the
basic space of dependent arising in and through all things. Emptiness then becomes
the space of freedom for our cognizance, much more fully, to express its latent capaci-
ties of loving connection, compassion, and wisdom. These are qualities of a Buddhas
enlightenment.2 Please note, therefore, that the term emptiness should not be mis-
understood to imply that we do not exist. Indeed, to have insight into the emptiness
of our being is to have insight into our deep interdependence with others, permitting
our fuller humanity to manifest: our underlying capacity for much greater love, care,
discernment, courage, and creative responsiveness to the world. Such insight recog-
nizes that our limiting thoughts of self and other, which we tend to mistake in the
moment as fully defining persons, are merely relative, limited constructs, not fully
defining of anyone.
The Buddha disclosed this possibility of enlightenment because we are, by and
large, not enlightened in this way, but caught in an entrenched delusion that affects
everything we think, feel, and do, a delusion that binds us into layers of individual
and social suffering without awareness. This delusion, at its root, is a fear of the
insubstantial, unbounded nature of our experience, which is utterly impermanent,
empty of substance, interdependent with all, and thus beyond boundary. This fear of
the empty, unbounded nature of our being generates a compulsive urge to think up a
self that can feel ultimately bounded, separate, substantial, concrete, and secure, the
thought of self as a seeming refuge from the frighteningly insubstantial and unlim-
ited nature of being as it is. But this thought of a substantial, isolated self is, in itself,
just a passing thought. To make its thought of self feel like something more substan-
tial, the mind strings together transitory thoughts of self into a chain, thereby sus-
taining the impression of a separate unchanging self. In this way, the mind reifies its
narrow thoughts of self, mistaking the current thought of self, moment to moment,
for the totality of ones being.3
Life thus becomes a struggle at a subconscious level, because each situation feels
like it must be interpreted to establish the concreteness of a self that is actually just
a series of ephemeral thoughts. To reify its thoughts of self, the mind also reifies its
thoughts of others, routinely mistaking its own self-concerned, partial thoughts of
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 119

other persons for their whole being. When others speak or act in ways that support
our brittle, reified sense of self, making it feel real or important, we think of them as
likable. When others seem to undercut this sense of self, we think of them as dislik-
able. Those who seem irrelevant to our sense of self at the moment evoke the thought
of them as stranger, which we also mistake for those people. In this way we mistake
our own reified thoughts of everyone for the actual persons, moment by moment, day
by day. This profoundly impedes our potential to commune with others in their fuller
humanity with reverence, appreciation, and love.
There is nothing wrong with the mere thought of self or others if it is recognized
as a mere thought or label. Such thoughts unify the elements of our experience and
personality so we can carry out our roles in relation to others. But when the mind
reifies its thoughts of self and other it mistakes the whole person for one small set of
characteristics imputed to him by ones mind, reducing the other person to a simple,
singular thing that the mind absolutizes as the whole person. We thus routinely mis-
take our own fragmented images and thoughts of others for their whole being: just
a janitor, just some old guy, just a girl, just a [racial epithet]. We then react
to our narrow thought and associated feeling of the other person, mistaking it for the
actual person, unawares. This habit, cultivated pervasively through individual and
social conditioning, hides everyones deeper personhood, the cognizant emptiness of
each person that possesses a vast potential of love, compassion, wisdom, creativity, joy,
and courage. In authentic moments of loving connection, we momentarily commune
with others in their deeper personhood, the primal goodness and potential of their
fuller humanity. Yet, far more than we are conscious, we mistake our own reductive
thoughts of them for them, thereby shutting down our potential to commune with
their fuller humanity from within our own fuller humanity.4
These unconscious dynamics condition layers of suffering in us that are also largely
unconscious, which the Buddha disclosed. The first is the suffering of self-centered
conditioning: the suffering inherent in the minds ongoing struggle to establish a
substantial self that does not exist by reifying its own reductive thoughts of per-
sons and world. This level of suffering conditions the next level that all persons are
caught in: the suffering of transience. This suffering is felt in our ongoing attempts to
ground ourselves by holding on to passing things for the reified selfsuch as material
goods, pleasant settings, home, loved onesas if they were the very source of lasting
safety and well-being when deep down we know, in time, we must lose every one of
them. The suffering of transience, largely unconscious to us, takes expression in the
daily turmoil of our emotions as we try to flee our mortality by grasping to things,
circumstances, and people that can never provide lasting safety and well-being since
they do not last. The third level is the suffering of obvious physical or mental pain,
experienced within our reified sense of self, which includes sufferings such as agoniz-
ing illness, physical harm and exploitation by others, hunger, or intense grief of loss.5
Societies tend to think of compassion for others only when their suffering is of this
obvious kind. We tend not to view others with compassion in their moments of hap-
piness under pleasant circumstances, yet clinging to temporal happiness exemplifies
the second suffering of transience. It is peoples response to this suffering of tran-
120 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

sience, not fully conscious to them, that takes expression in forces of greed, hatred,
and oppression in our societies, as people seek stable security by gaining power over
goods, wealth, and other persons, none of which can provide lasting safety, intensify-
ing the virulence, for example, with which corrupt regimes defend their power, as if
fighting for their very lives.
Because the Buddha had insight into all three levels of suffering, and into the posi-
tive potential hidden in the depth of everyones mind (buddha-nature), he taught an
unconditional compassion and love for all persons equally, no matter how badly any-
one behaved. He understood that all are caught in sufferings of transience and con-
ditioning beyond what we see, and that we try to avoid those sufferings by acting in
harmful ways that we do not see as harmful, in the futile attempt to ground ourselves
by possessing things, controlling others, and defending our reified conceptual world.
In pointing to nirvana or buddha-nature, the Buddha showed that ultimate safety is
found only in the interdependent, cognizant, and empty nature of our being, which,
when realized, permits our latent potential for unconditioned wisdom, unconditional
love, and compassion to be actualized. In sum, the Buddha taught a path of liberation
that aims to free us from bondage to the reified identities we have all been caught in,
so we can know self and others in their depth and underlying potential, so we can live
from that depth, actualize that potential, and challenge others to do likewise.

problems of christian liberation epistemology

in light of buddhist epistemology
Gustavo Gutierrez, speaking from within the massively oppressive conditions of
impoverished peoples of Latin America, articulates an epistemology of social sin that
shows how our world has been caught in patterns of social conditioning that block
our capacity to know, empathize with, and take action for the oppressed. The privi-
leged tend not to see the depth of suffering of the poor, rationalizing it with ideolo-
gies that naturalize unjust social structures in ways that make those structures seem
inevitable, while relegating the poor and marginalized to the status of nonpersons.
The prophetic message of the Bible, Gutierrez argues, shows Gods special care and
identification with the oppressed over and against their oppressors throughout his-
tory: Gods preference for the poor. By pointing this out, Gutierrez seeks to awaken
the consciences of all who participate in unjust structures and to empower the poor
to recognize their special place in Gods care, to move from the margins to a new
position as historical subjects, and to imagine a world of justice in which the social
order can be remade.
The epistemology in this approach, informed by the prophetic tradition culmi-
nating in Jesuss identification with the oppressed, points our attention intensively
to the most poor and socially marginalized, and, through them, to the oppressive
structures that mediate their suffering, a social analysis that goes beyond what
Buddhist epistemology, in its classical forms, has attempted to do. This perspec-
tive from contemporary Christian social ethics has significantly informed elements
of engaged Buddhism today and, I will argue later, should further inform many
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 121

aspects of Buddhist thought and practice. In this section I will focus on ways that
the theology of Gutierrez and other liberation theologians, in light of Buddhist
epistemology, harbor hidden obstacles to the unconditional love that they proclaim
as Christians.
The problem I am pointing to takes expression in some of Gutierrezs (and other
theologians) use of language. In his Theology of Liberation he writes (emphases mine):
To deny the fact of class struggle is really to put oneself on the side of the dominant
sectors. Neutrality is impossible. It is not a question of admitting or denying a fact
which confronts us; rather it is a question of which side we are on . . . The Gospel
announces the love of God for all people and calls us to love as he loves. But to accept
class struggle means to decide for some people and against others . . . To love all men does
not mean avoiding confrontations . . . Universal love is that which, in solidarity with
the oppressed, seeks also to liberate the oppressors from their own power. On the next
page he says: In the context of class struggle today, to love ones enemies presupposes
recognizing and accepting that one has class enemies and that it is necessary to combat
them. It is not a question of having no enemies, but rather of not excluding them
from our love.6
It is important first to acknowledge the historical situation out of which Gutierrez
writes, which, as he says, necessitates decisive action on behalf of the powerless and
marginalized. While I admire the moral force of his argument, his use of language
creates a problem that would tend to impede the universal love that he also declares.
As he states: To accept class struggle is to decide for some people and against others.
From a Buddhist perspective, the epistemological error hidden in this language is the
tendency to think we must decide for some persons over others (in their whole being)
in order to liberate both. This error is further expressed in Gutierrezs use of the word
solidarity. Gods love is in solidarity with the oppressed, not equally in solidarity
with the oppressor, although it also seeks to free oppressors from their inhumanity.
But if Gods love is not in equal solidarity with all persons in the very core of their
being, it is not unconditional love (Matt. 5:4348).
In Buddhist epistemology, as noted, enlightened wisdom knows all persons pos-
sess a vast potential of goodness within their fundamental awareness, and how that
potential is impeded by layers of self-centered grasping in their minds. In other
words, such wisdom knows the enlightened potential that is latent in persons beyond
the reductive images that we tend to mistake for their whole being. Unconditional
love, as the expression of such wisdom, upholds that potential equally in every person
while challenging what impedes it in the same persons.
From the perspective of such love, what needs to be challenged in each person
differs. For the marginalized and oppressed, self-images of unworthiness and power-
lessness need to be challenged. For the powerful and corrupt, rationalized selfishness,
apathy, and cruelty need to be challenged. In both cases, there can be no decision for
some people against others as Gutierrez called for. There can be no stance of solidar-
ity with some that exclude equal solidarity with the others as full human beings.
Instead, there is a choice to uphold the deeper humanity in all, by confronting what
impedes the fuller potential in all, equally on behalf of all. To accept class struggle,
122 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

then, in the sense of working to overcome oppressive social forces, pace Gutierrez,
does not entail choosing sides to confront one group alone. It entails different modes
of confrontation for the different groups involved. The choice is not for some against
others. The choice of unconditional love and compassion is always for every person,
by confronting every person, differently.7
Some readers may react by saying, Oh, Gutierrez meant that in what he wrote.
But his language communicates otherwise, and the distinction is important. To
decide for some people over others as whole persons, as his words connote, is to mis-
take our partial, reified thoughts of people for the actual persons. That is the error
that conditions everyone to react to many others each day as merely strangers (basi-
cally, as nonpersons), collectively contributing to the social injustices in which we are
all involved. Leaders of oppressive regimes seek to crush valid opposition because they
are caught in that very problem. In their suffering of transience, they cling to social
structures of power to secure their reified concepts of self and world, while mistak-
ing the people oppressed by those structures for their own partial thoughts of them
as nonpersons. To decide for some people against others as whole persons, thereby
losing the fuller persons for our partial thought of them, is to replicate the pattern of
misperception operative in the corrupt officials we oppose, in the name of opposing
them. To choose one person as a whole over another is to fall, in that moment, from
the equal love for all that is ascribed to God in Christian understanding, even if we
believe cognitively we are enacting such love.8
Exacerbating the problem of losing the person in our reductive thought of him
is the tendency to view one group alone as the one suffering, the other group as not
suffering but only inflicting suffering. I often hear Christian activists refer to those
who are suffering to distinguish the oppressed from the oppressors, as if oppressors
actions were not attempts to avoid their sufferings of transience and conditioning
by futilely seeking safety in possessiveness and violence. In the moment we think
the phrase those who are suffering, implying that others are not, we hold only
the obvious level of suffering in mind, not the subconscious sufferings of transience
and conditioning from which people seek escape by oppressing others, in a fruit-
less attempt thereby to find safety and well-being. We lose sight, in that moment,
of the causality of their behavior, and thus tend to view them as simply wicked,
with no conscious awareness of the deeper humanity in them that their behaviors
hidetheir latent potential to find safety where it really is available: in the deepest
ground of their being, in God or buddha-nature. By losing the fuller person in our
reductive image of him as oppressor, we lose the chance to refract Gods (or the
Buddhas) love to that personto uphold his fuller humanity by confronting what
obscures it in him.9
Gutierrez affirms that other persons are really the enemy, then claims that to view
them as such is right and good, as long as we also love them. But to think of another,
in the moment of reading such words, as just my enemy tends to lose the person in
our reductive, hateful thought of her. In the split second that we mistake our partial
thought of someone as enemy for her whole being, we are not conscious of the hid-
den layers of suffering in her that drive her actions, or of the fuller human potential
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 123

in her that her actions hide. In that moment, we automatically hate her, even if not
conscious of it, because we are out of touch with anything in her beyond the hateful
image enemy. In that moment we cannot give rise to the compassionate love for
enemy that Jesus embodied.
As worked out in Buddhist epistemology and observed in mindfulness practice,
two directly opposing states of mind do not coexist at the same moment.10 In the
mental moment of hate, we do not love. To implicitly cultivate moments of hatred
through such language, while proclaiming a cognitive framework of universal love (as
Gutierrez does), is to cultivate hate in the name of love unconsciously. Many Christian
social activists report they have become trapped in dysfunctional feelings of anger and
hatred for those they oppose, fueling burnout.11 This stems, in part, from the error of
losing the persons in our reductive images of them, preventing us from communing
with their fuller personhood so as to uphold it by challenging what impedes ita
perspective from which we could never choose one person as a whole over another.
Jesuss use of the word enemy in Matthew 5:4345 dereifies the word, by demon-
strating the possibility compassionately to commune with the conventional enemy at
the level of his being, his deepest potential, and to pray for him there, which avoids
reifying the concept enemy. Gutierrezs use of the word enemy does not replicate
Jesuss profound dereification of the word.12
Implied in the prior two paragraphs is a related teaching of Buddhism: the teach-
ing of ultimate and conventional truths. To know the ultimate truth of persons is to
know them in their emptiness and interdependent existence, as infinitely mysterious
and multifaceted. Our functional labels of persons, which are conventional truths, do
not capture the full reality of persons, but function in limited ways for conventional
understanding and action. For example, when I am sick, I visit the woman who is
my doctor for diagnosis and treatment. But to reify and absolutize the label doctor
(which our minds tend to do) is to think of her as only a doctor. She may also be a
mother, a loving aunt, a social activist, a careful driver, and so on. The word doctor
is a conventional truth, useful in certain contexts, that never captures the persons
fuller, interdependent reality. Similarly, in order usefully to retain the word enemy
as merely a conventional truth (as Gutierrez wants to do), we would have to avoid rei-
fying it. For that, we would have to be mindfully aware, in any moment of using the
word, how it functions as a conventional construct that never captures the full reality
of anyone. A person, when viewing me as his opponent and seeking to overcome me,
is conventionally functioning as an enemy. But when my mind reifies the concept
enemy (and our minds are conditioned to do so), the concept is absolutized and no
longer functions as a contextual, conventional truth. At that point the whole person
has become an enemy to me. In that moment, I have lost touch with the fuller real-
ity of self and other, the fuller reality in which authentic love as social challenge to
the enemy can function.13
In The Principle of Mercy, Jon Sobrino writes (emphases mine): Liberation from
oppression . . . means destroying the person oppressing, in his formal capacity as
oppressor. And although this task is difficult and dangerous, it cannot be abandoned for
love of the oppressed. The spirituality of forgiveness must integrate this tension between
124 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

love and destruction.14 If Sobrino understood Gods love as truly equal for oppres-
sor and oppressed, it would be difficult to end his next-to-last sentence that way:
[this task] cannot be abandoned for love of the oppressed. For the urge to confront
the oppressor would come as much from love for the oppressor as from love for
the oppressed. The seeming tension between love and destruction (love and just
confrontation) that Sobrino notes is created only when we lose the fuller person in
our partial image of him, absolutized as the whole person (just oppressor). There
is no such tension when everyone involved is viewed as a full person, composed of
multiple aspects. Then love, to uphold one aspect of the oppressor (his deep human
potential), confronts another aspect that impedes that potential, ultimately to its
destruction. Authentic love would do the same with regard to anyone, not just with
regard to oppressors.15
Toward the end of his book On Job, Gutierrez seeks a way to integrate justice (the
prophetic) with gratuitous love (the contemplative).16 When justice is miscon-
ceived as on behalf of one group over against another, it conflicts with the uncon-
ditional love ascribed to God that is equal to all (Matt. 5), generating the apparent
tension between justice and love that Gutierrez and Sobrino seek to heal. But when
justice is seen as a moral imperative to confront what must be confronted in every
person in order to uphold each persons humanity, and when love is understood always
to confront everyone in that way (not to confront one group of whole persons against
another group of whole persons), then there is no logical tension between justice and
love. Buddhist epistemology refuses to permit any human being to be reduced to one
reified trait, mistaken as the whole person. Indeed part of what justice must confront
is that tendency in each of us, the tendency to mistake our own reductive thoughts
of each other for the whole persons, leading inevitably to hatred, possessiveness, or
apathy toward them in our minds, if not also in verbal or physical action. In terms of
distributive justice, this means that those who harm others by preventing a just dis-
tribution of resources harm themselves by losing their deeper personhood and must
be confronted for their sake as much as for the sake of those impoverished by their
actions.
Is there room in this analysis for what Christians and Jews call righteous anger,
anger at injustice? Anger at injustice contains important truth, but must not be
immune to critical investigation. How does righteous anger differ from ordinary
anger? Speaking from a Buddhist perspective, the ordinary anger that we experi-
ence in daily life is a strong aversion in the mind reacting to an absolutized nega-
tive image that the mind has constructed of someone or something, with the mind
unaware of the extent to which it is reacting to its own construct. In the moment
we think the angry thought he is horrible, we are unaware in that moment of the
fuller human being.17 Does what Christians call righteous anger avoid that falsity?
In any moment, what percentage of righteous anger is righteousresponding to
the deepest truth and potential of all persons involved in the situation? What per-
centage is more self-righteous than truly righteous in a prophetic sense? How is
one to discern the difference? Is there a way to purify righteous anger to its truest
underlying intent?
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 125

Buddhist philosophy recognizes that there is much to be confronted in persons:

all of our ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are reductive of beings and
harmful to them. But because of the falsity of angerits tendency to mistake its
own reductive images of persons for the actual persons unawareto confront oth-
ers out of anger is to not see their worth and potential beyond the reductive image.
Thus to confront others out of anger, ironically, is to repeat the pattern of mis-seeing
and mistreating that we may think our anger is opposing. For this reason, the Bud-
dhist principle of confrontation is a fierce form of love, a fierce compassion, rather
than any ordinary form of anger. This is exemplified in Asian stories of enlight-
ened beings that fiercely challenge individuals or groups out of compassion for all
involved. Fierce compassion is also imaged in the wrathful, enlightened deities of
Tibetan Buddhism. Fierce compassion is the power to confront someone who acts
harmfully, forcefully if necessary, both on behalf of those he harms and on behalf of
his own positive potential, his deeper personhood. Such a fierce, confronting com-
passion is only possible if it is the expression of a dereifying wisdom rather than any
kind of reifying anger.18

the crucial importance of contemplative discipline

in uncovering the unity of justice and love
In order to confront another without losing the fuller person in our narrow image
of her, we need a dereifying wisdom that senses others in the primal goodness and
potential of their being, beyond the partial images operative in all our minds. But as
the Buddha taught, all of us are caught in the entrenched habit of losing the fuller
person in our reified, partial thoughts of her. Only a contemplative discipline that
shows us that error as it arises in the mind in the moment, a discipline that draws
our minds away from identification with our reified thoughts back to the ground of
our being, can bring us a greater freedom to know persons more fully, with greater
awareness of their hidden potential and what obscures it. Through such a contem-
plative discipline, we learn to be surrendered to the ground of our being, where the
primal goodness and potential of our being is revealed, from which we can know the
same primal potential in others and uphold it in them, while noticing how they are
caught, as we have been, in errors of self-clinging misperception.19 This is the pur-
pose of various forms of Buddhist meditation and, I would argue, must be part of the
purpose of any contemplative system that would support work against injustice that
avoids the fractured misperception of other persons that contribute to the dynamics
of injustice itself.20
This argumentthat for social challenge to be just, it must never decide for some
over others but enact a love and compassion equal to all that challenge all differ-
entlyis aligned with the views and actions of Martin Luther King Jr., Howard
Thurman, Oscar Romero, Desmond Tutu, Mohandas Gandhi, and others. What I
have argued for here by drawing on Buddhist analysis does not arrive at an exclusively
Buddhist way of being.
Does this argument imply we should not defend the poor against the depredations
126 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

of corrupt people and systems? No. It means that to do so is not to be in solidarity

with some against others but to be in solidarity with all. To defend those who suf-
fer most intensively against depredations of the powerful is not to decide for the
powerless over the powerful as human beings, but to choose the fuller humanity in
both, and so to confront both differentlychallenging the powerless to discover their
power, challenging the powerful by working to stop their actions that not only hurt
the poor but also impede their own fuller humanity. Contemplative disciplines that
empower such love, compassion, and wisdom challenge all of us in our entrenched
habits of misconceiving persons, habits that contribute to injustice in our responses
to others every day, beyond our conscious awareness.
Does this Buddhist critique reject the focal concern of Christian liberation theol-
ogy forcefully to challenge and change social systems out of compassion evoked by
paying special attention to those who suffer most intensively in them? No. Indeed
liberation theology can help Buddhists further awaken the compassionate attitudes
and actions that can only unfold through increasing awareness of the fuller social real-
ity. That is the subject of the next section.

problems of buddhist epistemology, and new buddhist possibilities,

in light of christian liberation theology
Buddhism also has an epistemological weakness that is brought to light by liberation
theology.21 The focus of Buddhist attention on investigating the nature of ones own
experience has great power to reveal how we have each been caught, unconsciously,
in mental causes of harm and suffering that we had not recognized. But this focus on
personal experience, of itself, does not reveal sufferings that others experience as an
effect of their location in a social system that differs from ones own place in it. And
the Buddhist argument above for solidarity with all does not, of itself, point out those
who suffer most intensively within social structures, nor why the rest of us tend not
to notice them, and what that tendency to ignore them signifies about us and the
social structures in which we participate. As Paul Knitter notes, The tendency to
ignore [the poor and marginalized] comes not just from inattention, but from fear
of confronting how we are complicit in their oppression, insofar as we are part of an
oppressive economic or political system. We ignore those who suffer differently from
us in order to [avoid critically inquiring into] the systems that bring us so much
benefit.22 This is an enormously important observation that challenges me to deep
reflection as a Buddhist.
Generosity has been a central value of Asian Buddhist cultures, and while there
is a special emphasis for laypeople on offering to the monastic community and to
institutions that transmit the Buddhas teaching, Buddhists have also been taught to
practice extensive generosity with regard to their wider communities, guests, strang-
ers, and the poor. The focus in Buddhist cultures has been on personal cultivation of
generous attitudes and actions, which are viewed as karmically fruitful, as empower-
ing ones path of awakening, and as inspiring others to act similarly. The Buddha is
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 127

quoted as saying: The noble disciple lives at home with a heart free from the taint
of stinginess, he is open handed, pure handed, delighting in self-surrender, one to
ask a favor of, one who delights in dispensing charitable gifts.23 A number of schol-
ars therefore argue that in Buddhist cultures, personal acts of generosity (dna), not
concepts of structural justice, have been the touchstone of Buddhist social thought.24
The traditional emphasis on personal acts of generosity and compassion does not give
primary attention to socioeconomic structures that cause special suffering for the poor
and marginalized, suffering that those in more privileged social locations have dif-
ficulty noticing. Contemporary engaged Buddhist thinkers such as Sulak Sivaraksa,
A.T. Ariyaratne, the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Aung San Suu Kyi, and David
Loy have given new Buddhist attention to social structures as causes of massive suffer-
ing. Liberation theology has been an important modern instigator for this fresh focus
in Buddhist thinking and can further inform it.
The cultivation of compassion for others that is central to Buddhist traditions calls
for us to bring to mind beings who suffer in all realms of existence (humans, animals,
beings in hellish realms, ghostly realms, and others), to generate strong compassion
that seeks their freedom from all layers of their suffering. But as many Buddhist
teachers point out, we can lose the particular persons and beings too much in our
general wish of compassion for all if we do not cultivate vivid attention to particular
beings. And in their particulars, my meditations of compassion may tend to include
just beings that I think of or notice. What about human beings that I tend not to
notice due to my social conditioning, people that the social world of my upbringing
deemed unworthy of much care or attention from the time I was very young, beyond
my conscious awarenesspeople of other races, classes, ethnicities, sexualities, parts
of the world? Christian liberation, feminist, Latina, and black theologians, by relent-
lessly pointing to the most marginalized people of societies, expose unconscious ways
I have been socially conditioned not to see them. I do not see past my own non-
noticing of particular sufferings of the most marginalized unless someone points me
to their visceral experience in its particulars and, through that, to the social dynamics
that contribute to their suffering in ways I also had not noticed. This is what writ-
ings of Gustavo Gutierrez, Jon Sobrino, Martin Luther King Jr., Howard Thurman,
James Cone, Alice Walker, Shawn Copeland, Ivone Gebarra, Mayra Rivera, Rosemary
Radford Ruether, and others have done for me.
Why does Christian liberation ethics have such a profound social epistemology,
from which a Buddhist can learn in this way? As Gutierrez, Sobrino, Cone, and others
argue, the Abrahamic tradition of the prophets discloses Gods special focus on the
oppressed and Gods fierce challenge of the powerful that exploit them. This focus
culminates in Christianity with the traditional assertion that God chose, in Gods
human incarnation as Jesus, to live among the most marginalized and to undergo the
ignominious death on the cross in oneness with societys nonpersons. Such a life and
death raised up the social sinfulness of societies, showing how their values reverse
Gods, so that those in positions of power routinely mistook good for evil and evil for
good in each of their decisions leading to Jesuss death. Jesuss interactions with oth-
128 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

ers throughout his life, death, and resurrection simultaneously reveal the unconscious
sin operative in the norms of societies and the divine power of unconditioned good-
ness that transcends it (cf. Matt. 25:3146).25
Gutierrez interprets Gods actions in history to mean that God actually prefers
poor over powerful people, a position I have rejected as contradicting the meaning of
unconditional love, which can prefer none and confronts all. But the Christian revela-
tion that Gods one human incarnation occurred among the powerless, for liberation
theologians, motivates a fiercely compassionate look into society from the bottom
up, a way of looking and seeing that has profoundly informed the social ethics of the
Catholic Church in our time. Although Buddhist texts describe rebirths of bodhi-
sattvas in all realms of existence out of compassion for beings, which includes birth
among the poor, Buddhism lacks Christian liberation theologys unique focus on the
poor and most marginalized, provided by Gods unique incarnation among them, as
the hermeneutic key to the unconscious, socially conditioned sin that we participate
in and do not see.26
To focus attention first on the nonpersons of society is the most effective way to
expose the suffering nature of the social system as a wholethe hellacious karma
of self-centered thought, action, and consequent suffering operative in all who par-
ticipate in it. Special attention first to those who suffer most evokes an urgency of
compassion that wants to take a fierce look into social forces behind such suffering
and to take action to change them. Such a look can open into an increasingly inclu-
sive compassion that embraces all who are caught in those social forces at every level
of participation (including fruitless attempts by many of us to avoid our sufferings
of conditioning and transience, to flee from our mortality, by accumulating wealth,
power, and status in ways that press down the most vulnerable and the planet while
impeding our own fuller humanity).27
Many Buddhist doctrines can be increasingly informed by such learning from
Christian liberation theology.28 In classical texts, Buddhist analysis of karma has
included a social dimension primarily in the context of rebirth, with the understand-
ing that some group experiences constitute a fruition of communal actions that the
same group of individuals had done together in a past life. But the special turn of
attention that Christian liberation theology instigates pushes Buddhist thinkers to
develop much further their understanding of social karma, by focusing attention on
socially conditioned patterns of thought, feeling, and action that become part of social
systems that make it hard for many people to have adequate food, water, housing,
health care, and education. The same socially conditioned patterns tend also to pre-
vent us from noticing those affected in such ways and from taking responsibility for
those effects.
This would also nuance Buddhist understandings of interdependence, by pointing
to ways that each individual in society tends to be conditioned by and conditions oth-
ers not to notice the nonpersons of their society or the social causes of their suffering,
and how the awakening of even one individual to that reality, with equal compassion
for all in their interdependence, can beneficially shake up the society from the bottom
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 129

up (as exemplified by Martin Luther King Jr., Bishop Desmond Tutu, Gandhi, Aung
San Su Kyi, and others).
To awaken compassion for all in the Buddhist sense would now include a new
consciousness of those most intensively suffering from historical causes and effects of
social structures that are difficult to see from ones own location in society, historically
conditioned causes revealed not just by investigating ones personal experience but
also by getting to know experiences of others in diverse social locations, including
many non-Buddhists. To this end, the writings of Gutierrez, Sobrino, Cone, James
Baldwin, Alice Walker, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Emilie Townes, and many others
throughout the world, arguably, should be added to the Buddhist curriculum.
This, in turn, would shift part of our Buddhist understanding of the six perfec-
tions that constitute the bodhisattva path of awakening, by encouraging us to take
people previously marginal to our awareness into the center of our attention, both in
contemplative practice and in action. This would amend the classical interpretation
of the six perfections to include not only ones personal interactions with others but
prominently also communal organization and action to address social and ecological
problems and needs.29
Liberation theology would also shine light on Buddhist epistemological prin-
ciplesfor example, how reifying ignorance and the attempt by dominant groups
to avoid their sufferings of transience shape forms of racism, ethnocentrism, patri-
archy, and economic oppression that hide their motivations through ideological
rationalization.30
Finally for now, the classical Buddhist teaching on the preciousness of a fully
endowed human life would take on new connotations in light of liberation theol-
ogy. In Indian and Tibetan Buddhist systems of contemplation, within the prelimi-
nary practices of the path of enlightenment, practitioners repeatedly reflect on their
individual good fortune to have received a human life possessed of all conditions
and freedoms necessary to realize their spiritual potential and full enlightenment
(including positive material, social, and political conditions and freedoms). The main
purpose of this contemplation is to recognize ones priceless opportunity to use ones
human life for spiritual awakening, and thus to generate strong personal motivation
for intensive spiritual practice.31 Buddhist dialogue with liberation theology partly
reframes this teaching, so it is applied not only to ones own situation but equally to
othersnoticing those who lack requisite material and social resources essential for
them to have the freedom to uncover their fullest human potential. This would tie
the teaching of the fully endowed human life directly to the bodhisattva path itself,
partly reframing the six perfections as practices of active compassion to help as many
as possible gain such a life.

conclusion
Through the ages, both Christians and Buddhists have customarily viewed their own
traditions as lacking nothing essential, certainly not needing any fundamental addi-
130 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

tion or correction by another religious tradition. The aim of this paper has been to
point out a weakness in each tradition, an incompleteness, that the other tradition
discloses and thereby helps to correct. If this argument has merit, it suggests that
Christians and Buddhists need to learn from each other if they are to fulfill the deep-
est intent of their traditions to empower our best possibilities and to disempower
our worst tendencies.

notes
1. The directions of thought in this article were evoked in conversations with Paul Knit-
ter, Kyeongil Jung, Melanie Harris, Won-jae Hur, Karen Enriquez, and Stephanie Corigliano,
for which I am grateful. Several of my colleagues generously gave critical responses to an early
draft: Paul Knitter, Roberto Goizueta, Stephen Pope, David Hollenbach, Kenneth Himes,
Andrew Prevot, and Brian Robinette. I thank them all.
2. For an excellent introduction to Tibetan Buddhist principles, practices, history, and
culture, see Geoffrey Samuel, Introducing Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Routledge, 2012). For a
fuller introduction to ideas from Tibetan Buddhism in the paragraphs above, see Tulku Urgyen
Rinpoche, As It Is Volume II (Hong Kong: Rangjung Yeshe, 2000); Longchenpa, The Practice of
Dzogchen: An Anthology of Longchen Rabjams Writings on Dzogpa Chenpo, trans. Tulku Thondup
(Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2002); Reginald Ray, Secret of the Vajra World (Boston: Shambhala,
2001); Tsoknyi Rinpoche, Open Heart, Open Mind (New York: Harmony, 2012); John Makran-
sky, Awakening through Love (Boston: Wisdom, 2007).
3. On this, see Makransky, Awakening through Love, pp. 3640, 103105.
4. On these points, see ibid., pp. 95156.
5. On these three levels of suffering, see Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, pp.
1928; Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vol. 1, trans.
Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, ed. Joshua Cutler (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2000), pp.
289292; Makransky, Awakening through Love, pp. 161163.
6. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1973), pp. 275, 276.
7. Further examples of Gutierrezs language that suggest a choice of some over others as
total human beings: An option for the poor is an option for one social class against another.
It means taking sides with the dispossessed . . . It means entering into solidarity with its
interests and its struggles (Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History [Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis, 1983], p. 45). This is a choice to cultivate empathy for some, not all, human
beings. The gospel enjoins us to love our enemies . . . This means we have to recognize the
fact of class struggle and accept the fact that we have class enemies to combat. There is no way
not to have enemies. What is important is not to exclude them from our love (ibid., p. 48).
While this seems reasonable while holding an overarching belief in universal love, the partial
image of another whole person as class enemy, in the very moment of that thought, normally
conditions hatred, not love, for that reified enemy. To cultivate hatred unconsciously in many
such moments of thought is to contradict, in practical terms, ones belief in love, without con-
sciously noticing the contradiction. In Christian circles . . . we are not very much accustomed
to thinking in conflictual, concrete terms . . . We have to learn to live peace, and think peace,
in the midst of conflict (ibid., p. 48). But to choose one side over the other as human beings
is not to live peace. That is the choice that corrupt regimes have made, leading to injustice
and conflict. To live peace would be to choose the latent power of peace present in the hearts of
every person involved, while challenging all of their thoughts and actions that impede it. To
know God is to do justice, is to be in solidarity with the poor person . . . At the same time,
a relationship with the God who has loved medespoils me, strips me. It universalizes my
love for others and makes it gratuitous too. Each of the two movements demands the other,
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 131

dialectically (ibid., p. 51). But to speak of solidarity so frequently as only for some, not others,
is (even if unconsciously) to choose some over the others as whole human beings, which is to
obstruct the possibility of love actually becoming unconditional and equal to all, like Gods
love. The dialectic Gutierrez is trying to reach would be better supported by focusing atten-
tion first on those suffering most as the way to evoke compassion that can then be extended to
others, including the corrupt and unjust, without impeding the process of universalization by
ever deciding for one group against others (again, in order to challenge all, differently, out of
equal love for all). God has a preferential love for the poor . . . simply because they are poor
and living in an inhuman situation that is contrary to Gods will (Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job
[Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985], p. 94). If, as Gutierrez elsewhere argues, Gods love for the poor
is also a love on behalf of the rich and powerful, to liberate their fuller humanity, then why
depict God as having a preferential love for the poor? Isnt Gods love equally in solidarity with
all (not just the poor), and that is why it confronts all, differently, in order to liberate the fuller
humanity in all, by socially uplifting some and socially challenging others?
8. In discussing these points, one of my colleagues raised this objection: Gutierrez is
arguing for us to side with the poor only with regard to their economic and social situation.
He is not saying to side with them as whole persons over other whole persons. I do not argue
against the notion of taking sides in that limited sense, taking sides on social policies in
order to uphold the humanity of everyone involved. But Buddhist epistemology raises a subtle
point: When, as Gutierrez states, we must decide for some people and against others (without
qualifying the statement as my colleague did), the wording automatically and unconsciously
tends to become absolutized in our minds as us against them. Remember, in Buddhist obser-
vation, our minds tend to reify our thoughts of self and others moment by moment, reducing
the person in our reified thought of him to a simple, singular thing, absolutized as the whole
person. To decide for some people against others, then, is almost automatically to be for
whole persons against other whole persons. That is how our conditioned minds translate and
reify such words. To counter the tendency to reify persons that is evoked by such wordings of
careful qualification, like that by my colleague, would need to be made much more thoroughly
and frequently. But in order actually to undercut the minds conditioned tendency to reify its
reductive concepts of everyone and thus misreact to everyone, a dereifying contemplative dis-
cipline is the most essential need. This will be discussed in section 3.
9. In The Principle of Mercy (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994), pp. 2223, Jon Sobrino argues
for his readers to give the suffering of the worlds poorest our primary attention, not the lesser
forms of suffering of many in the First World. If too much attention is paid to the universality
of suffering, he argues, it would become an excuse to avoid the essence of mercy, which is the
praxic love that swells in a person at the sight of another persons unjustly inflicted suffering.
His concern is to counter apathy in the church and among the privileged. But compassion is
the awareness of others suffering that wishes them to be freed from it. If we avoid that aware-
ness, we have avoided compassion. In consciously choosing not to be aware of the sufferings of
transience that drive harmful actions in people of power, Sobrino loses sight of the object of
compassion, their suffering, making it impossible actually to have compassion for them, even
if, as Sobrino elsewhere argues, we are supposed to.
10. Daniel Goleman, Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue
with the Dalai Lama (New York: Bantam, 2004), pp. 7576; Geshe Rabten, A Textbook of Bud-
dhist Epistemology and Psychology, trans. and ed. Stephen Batchelor (Mt. Pelerin, Switzerland:
Tharpa Choeling, 1978), pp. 8890.
11. The prevalence of dysfunctional anger and burnout in Christian social activists is part
of what motivated Paul Knitters exploration of Buddhist practice, as he reports in chapter 7 of
Without Buddha I Could Not Be a Christian (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009). In multifaith workshops
I have taught over the past ten years, which focus on meditations of compassion from Tibet,
I have met many Christian activists who reported this problem as a reason for attending the
workshop.
132 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

12. Thich Nhat Hanh, in Living Buddha, Living Christ (New York: Penguin, 1995), pp.
7981, also critiques the argument of liberation theology that we must choose sides, from a
Buddhist perspective. While agreeing with Thich Nhat Hanh, I try to go further into the Bud-
dhist epistemology behind the critique.
13. Paul Knitter, upon reading this paragraph, kindly sent me this important observa-
tion: To hold that doctor as applied to the woman who cares for your health and torturer
to indicate the person who stole your land and is now torturing you are conventional truths
in the same way is going to rankle many a Christian sensitivity about justice. Conventional
when used to indicate behaviors that are unjust or evil falls a bit flat, seems dangerous. Such an
observation focuses our attention, as Christian activists importantly do, on the virtual impos-
sibility of breaking free of limiting labels for others if one is undergoing overwhelming suf-
fering inflicted by them. The complementary issue here from a Buddhist perspective concerns
how the inflictor of such suffering got to that point, the point of so thoroughly not knowing
the humanity of the people he harms. In how many moments has he mistaken other persons
for his own reductive thought of them unaware? How many such moments, individually and
socially conditioned, preceded those harmful actions? To what degree have we all been part of
that web of mis-seeing and mis-reacting? In effect, this part of the essay is a Buddhist plea to
those who are not suffering torture at the moment to look deeply into our own conditioned
patterns of mis-knowing and mis-reacting, to thereby discern better how human beings get
caught in such patterns, in order to challenge what should be challenged in societies without
inwardly replicating the pattern of injustice in thought and action that we are trying to solve.
The Mdhyamika school of Buddhism, influential in medieval Indian Buddhism and Tibet, is
a primary source here for the teaching of ultimate and conventional truths. On this, see Peter
Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism, Teachings, History and Practices, 2nd ed. (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013), pp. 114126; and Paul Williams, Mahyna Buddhism: The
Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 7679.
14. Sobrino, Principle of Mercy, p. 65.
15. Roger Haight is careful to declare Gods love totally equal for all persons in his Logic
of the Christian Response to Social Suffering, in Marc H. Ellis and Otto Maduro, eds., The
Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutierrez (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1989).
Yet, Haight writes: Gods creative love fills up what is lacking, reestablishes what is missing,
in all persons. In this sense are the poor the favorites of God in a special way, for the more one
lacks in integral humanity and acquired power, the more powerful is Gods love in reestab-
lishing it (p. 145). But if Gods love fills up what is missing in all persons, why arent those
corrupted by acquired power equally noted in the last sentence, like this: and the more one
lacks in integral humanity because of the corruption of acquired power, the more powerful is
Gods love in reestablishing it by confronting that person, out of love. This omission seems to
disclose the same unconscious tendency to lose the fuller person of the oppressor in our partial
image of him, so we dont actually hold the oppressor fully in parallel with the oppressed in
declaring Gods reestablishment of what is missing in each person.
16. Gutierrez, On Job, pp. 9497.
17. Geshe Rabten, Mind and Its Functions, pp. 8890.
18. On fierce compassion as a Buddhist principle of confrontation, see Makransky, Awak-
ening through Love, pp. 179185; Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, Visual Dharma: The Buddhist
Art of Tibet (Berkeley, CA: Shambhala, 1975), p. 21. See also The Life of Marpa the Translator,
trans. Nalanda Translation Committee (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. xixl. This principle
is depicted in many stories in which a Buddhist teacher fiercely challenges his disciples or the
larger community, as in several of the stories compiled from China and Japan in Zen Flesh, Zen
Bones, ed. Paul Reps (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle, 1957), and from Tibet in Surya Das, The
Snow Lions Turquoise Mane (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).
19. On Jesuss dereifying wisdom, see the previous section. The ground of being in
Tibetan Nyingma tradition is the space in and through all impermanent experience (empti-
 CHRISTIAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND BUDDHISM 133

ness), a space that is undivided from the primordial awareness operative in all experience. This
primordially aware emptiness (Tibetan: rig pa, buddha-nature) is endowed with an unconfined
potential of love, compassion, wisdom, and all other qualities of enlightenment, capacities that
have become narrowed and distorted through our self-clinging patterns of reification, posses-
siveness, and aversion. Further details are in Makransky, Awakening through Love, and Tsoknyi
Rinpoche, Open Heart, Open Mind. I tried to word this section in a way that can also support
Christian understanding of the ground of being in God, from which the image of God within
us, with all qualities of goodness given in creation, may be restored through deepening sur-
render to Gods grace.
20. There is a broad parallel in my argument to Gutierrezs call for prophetic confronta-
tion as the expression of Gods gratuitous love for all. As Lefebure summarizes Gutierrez from
On Job: Without the prophetic challenge to practice justice, contemplative language could
be a flight from responsibility. Without the contemplative emphasis on gratuitous love, the
prophetic insistence on justice could imprison God in a framework of retribution. The Buddha
and the Christ: Exploration in Buddhist and Christian Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1993), p.
183. But our epistemologies differ. As long as reified, partial images of persons are mistaken
for those persons subconsciously, and the phrasings by Gutierrez, Sobrino, and Haight noted
above tend to support that reification, love is caught in reified dualisms of the merely innocent
against the merely wicked, and we become imprisoned in frameworks of retribution subcon-
sciously even if we think weve escaped them.
21. This section informed by conversations with Paul Knitter and Rita Gross.
22. Private communication.
23. Harvey, Introduction to Buddhism, p. 63, quoting Buddhist scripture Anguttara Nikya
II.66.
24. Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000), p. 202, quoting R. R. Sizemore and D. K. Swearer, eds., Ethics, Wealth and Salvation:
A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 13.
25. Paul Knitter, critically responding to this paragraph, wrote: I suggest that you might
recognize liberation theologys challenge to Buddhism (and to all) to be aware of systemic
oppression caused by structures and not just personal oppression of others that comes from
delusion about the self. I think this point is basically correct, while also adding, from a Bud-
dhist perspective, that the deluded attempt in all our minds to reify the self and, in support
of that, to reify our reductive images of others that support that false sense of self is a crucial
underpinning in the creation of social and economic systems that make a few lives comfortable
while ignoring the basic needs of many others and the planet.
26. We have to allow the suffering of the poor to be the standard by which structures are
criticized, that its always the people who are most marginalized who will give us the perspec-
tive from which the underside can most clearly be seen. Michael Himes, Doing the Truth in
Love: Conversations about God, Relationships, and Service (New York: Paulist Press, 1995), p. 59.
This articulates well the focus of concern embodied by Pope Francis.
27. As David Loy argues, the three poisons of greed, ill will, and delusion in individuals
become systemic in social systems that they build, which then condition individuals into those
poisons as they participate in those social systems. David Loy, Great Awakening: A Buddhist
Social Theory (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), pp. 84, 87.
28. Most of the social directions of Buddhist interpretation and action suggested in the fol-
lowing paragraphs have already been taken up by modern engaged Buddhist leaders and social
theorists, such as Sulak Sivaraksa, the Dalai Lama, A. T. Ariyaratne, Ambedkar, Thich Nhat
Hanh, Aung San Suu Kyi, Buddhadasa, David Loy, Rita Gross, Bhikku Bodhi, Bernie Glass-
man, and others. Here I highlight shifts in Buddhist doctrinal reflection that are instigated by
learning from specific aspects of Christian liberation theology.
29. The six perfections are generosity, moral discipline, patience, perseverance, concen-
tration, and wisdom. In classical Buddhist commentaries, they concern the practice of the
134 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUDIES

individual bodhisattva who puts those perfections into action for the benefit of others. Such
commentaries lack analysis of social structures. See, for example, Yangsi Rinpoche, Practicing
the Path, p. 353ff.
30. I have noted the power of liberation theology to point our attention to the social mar-
gins of the human realm. A distinctive strength of Buddhist theology is that it points our
attention also to the sufferings of animals and all sentient creatures that are part of our larger
family within the web of interdependence and through cycles of rebirth in Buddhist cosmol-
ogy. The suffering of nonhuman sentient beings remains marginal in the consciousness of some
Christian liberation theologians.
31. For traditional teaching on the precious human opportunity, see, for example, Yangsi
Rinpoche, Practicing the Path, pp. 8196, which is based on the writings of the late fourteenth-
century Tibetan teacher Tsongkhapa.