The Case for the National Identification System in the Context

of the 9/11 Attacks

On September 11, 2001 America was forever changed as a team of foreign

terrorists flew hijacked airliners into the World Trade Towers and the
Pentagon; a fourth jetliner only failed to hit its intended target because the
passengers and crew of the hijacked aircraft sacrificed their lives to force it
down. All of the nineteen terrorists had entered the U.S. legally but at least
five were in illegal status for either overstaying their visas or for violating a
condition of their visa (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, 2004):

Drivers
Name of Hijacker Visa Type Visa Status
License
F-1 Illegal-Violated by failing to
Hani Hasan Hanjour Virginia
Student attend school
Khalid al-Mihdhar B1
Legal nonimmigrant Virginia
(Almidhar)* Business
Nawaf al-Hamzi (or IllegalNine month
B2 Tourist CA, FL, Virginia
Alhamzi)* overstay
Salem al-Hamzi (or B-2
Legal nonimmigrant Virginia
Alhamzi) Tourist
B-2
Majed Moqed Legal nonimmigrant Virginia
Tourist
B- Change of status approved
Mohamed Atta** Florida
2/trainee 9-2001
B-1
Satam al-Suqam*** IllegalOverstay None
Business
Waleed al-Shehri (or B-2
IllegalOverstay Florida
Alshehri Tourist
Wail al-Shehri (or B-2
Legal nonimmigrant Florida ID card
Alshehri) Tourist
Abdulaziz al-Omari B-2
Legal nonimmigrant Florida, Virginia
*** Tourist
B-2
Marwan al-Shehhi Legal nonimmigrant Florida
Tourist
B-2
Fayez Ahmed Legal nonimmigrant None
Tourist
B-2 Virginia, Florida
Ahmed al-Ghamdi IllegalOverstay
Tourist ID card

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Hamza Saleh al- B-2

Legal nonimmigrant Florida
Ghamdi Tourist
B-2
Mohand al-Shehri Legal nonimmigrant None
Tourist
B-2
Ziad Samir Jarrah Legal nonimmigrant Florida
Tourist
B-2
Saeed al-Ghamdi Legal nonimmigrant Florida ID card
Tourist
Ahmed Ibrahim A. B-2
Legal nonimmigrant Florida
al-Haznawi Tourist
Ahmed Abdullah al- B-2
Legal nonimmigrant Florida ID card
Nam Tourist

*On terrorist watch list, was still able to enter the U.S.

**Was detained in UAE since he name appeared on a terrorist watch list but
later released after a lack of follow-up by U.S. authorities; also had a bench
warrant pending for driving without a license in Florida.

***Passport was doctored, presumably to conceal travel to countries where

they received terrorist training
As the list above indicates, all 19 hijackers had entered the U.S. legally,
despite the fact that three of them were on a terrorist watch list and two had
doctored passports. All of the hijackers had social security cards and 13 had
obtained theirs legally. Several of the hijackers had flown either domestically
or internationally while living in the U.S., a few of them many times, all
without arousing suspicion. They were able to obtain drivers licenses, open
bank accounts and rent cars without difficulty. In the months before the 9/11
attacks, three of the hijackers (Hanjour, Jarrah and Atta) had been stopped
for traffic offenses but remained undetected.

The argument goes that had an effective national identification system been
in place, at least three and as many as eight of the 9/11 terrorists could been
stopped prior to the attacks, perhaps preventing or disrupting some of the
events of that fateful day. Given that an estimated 45% of all foreigners who
enter the U.S. legally overstay their visas, an national identification system
may assist in detecting those people, some of whom may potentially be

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sleeper terrorists attempting to live quietly amongst us until activated for

the next 9/11.

Reference

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004).

The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission
on terrorist attacks upon the United States. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.