Journal of Consumer Research, Inc.

Detecting and Correcting Deceptive Advertising

Author(s): Gary M. Armstrong, Metin N. Gurol and Frederick A. Russ
Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Dec., 1979), pp. 237-246
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2488984 .
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Detecting and Correcting Deceptive
Advertising

GARY M. ARMSTRONG
METIN N. GUROL
FREDERICK A. RUSS*

This article investigates the use of the salient belief technique for measuring
deception and the effectiveness of corrective ads. The technique is applied to
Listerine advertising, which has already been found deceptive by the courts.
Comparisons between this technique and the normative belief technique
yielded similar results except for source effects over time.

The subject of deceptive advertisinghas been dis-
cussed in law journals for over half a century, but
articles on deceptive and corrective advertising have
appeared in marketing publications within only the past
decade. Despite progress in defining and measuring
deception, and similar progress in developing and im-
plementing corrective advertising, few studies have
sought both to measure deception and to assess means
of correcting it.
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
In legal literature there is no general statutory defini-
tion of deceptive advertising. In marketing literature
only a few authors have tried to define deception in
advertising (Aaker 1974; Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ
1975; Gardner 1975; Haefner 1972; Howard and Hul-
bert 1973; Jacoby and Small 1975), and they too have
not been able to develop a well accepted definition.
The courts have generally proclaimed that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) has expert judgment in
deceptive advertising cases, and often determined the
existence of deception based on FTC interpretations of
how consumers might construe an advertisement. Dur-
ing the past decade, however, this expert judgment has
been questioned by a number of lawyers, policy mak-
ers, marketing researchers, and advertisers, as well as
some Commission members themselves, who have
made strong arguments for the use of consumer re-
search in the determination of whether deception has
*Gary M. Armstrong and Frederick A. Russ are Associate Profes-
sors of Business Administration, both at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. Metin N. Gurol is Associate Profes-
sor of Marketing at the University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD
21201.
occurred.' Similarly, most definitions of deception in
advertising developed during the past several years,
and most of the procedures advanced for measuring
deception are based on consumer research.
In this article the approach is taken that: "Deception
occurs when a consumer perceives and believes an
advertising claim (explicit or implied) that is false, but
that deception is of little concern unless the claim is
relevant" (Armstrong and Russ 1975, p. 24). This
definition suggests three important components of sa-
lient deception: belief, falsity, and relevance.
Studies attempting to measure deception have used
one of two major approaches. The first approach is to
measure deception by asking subjects if certain adver-
tisements, claims, or situations are deceptive (Ford,
Kuehl and Reksten 1975; Haefner 1972; King and Wise
1974; Rao 1974). The second approach is to measure
advertising deception on the basis of brand attribute
beliefs of consumer respondents (Armstrong, Kendall,
and Russ 1975; Kuehl and Dyer 1976, 1977).
Evaluation of the literature shows that measuring
deception by asking subjects whether certain adver-
tisements or advertising claims are deceptive is inap-
propriate. Consumers who perceive an ad to be decep-
tive are not deceived by it. The most promising avenue
seems to be measurement of brand attribute beliefs of
respondents.
The use of brand attribute beliefs to detect deception
appears to have followed two distinctly different ap-
'See, for example, Aaker 1974; Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ
1975; Armstrong and McLennan 1973; Armstrong and Russ 1975;
Bemacchi 1974; Cohen 1969; 1972; 1974; 1975; Dillon 1973; Dyer
1972; Ford, Kuehl, and Reksten 1975; Gardner 1975; Gellhorn 1969;
Gerlach 1972; Haefner 1972; Haefner, Birchmore, and Permut 1974;
Howard 1974; Howard and Hulbert 1973; Jacoby and Small 1975;
Jones 1971; Pollay 1969; Preston 1976; Rosch 1975; Wilkie 1973;
Wilkie and Gardner 1974; Woodworth 1971.

237
C JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH * Vol. 6 . December 1979

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238
proaches. One approach is the normative belief tech-
nique, first advocated by Gardner (1975). It has been
employed in several studies of corrective advertising,
and was used by Dyer and Kuehl (1978) and Kuehl and
Dyer (1976; 1977) to establish that deception had oc-
curred in various advertising instances, after which cor-
rective advertising was implemented and assessed.
Conceptually, the normative belief technique
suggests that the standard against which allegedly de-
ceptive ads can be judged is the set of attribute beliefs
about a product category held by a representative group
of knowledgeable consumers. An advertisement that
causes a relevant audience to hold a more favorable set
of beliefs about a specific brand in the product category
is considered to be potentially deceptive. Conceptual
problems with this approach have been acknowledged
by Kuehl and Dyer (1976, p. 375).
Operationally, the normative belief technique in-
volves identifying the major functional attributes asso-
ciated with a product class, measuring the normative
brand beliefs about these attributes for the product
class, and measuring the specific brand beliefs held by
an audience after exposure to the ad being studied.
Using this approach, Dyer and Kuehl (1978) dis-
covered that consumer beliefs about Listerine's ability
to (1) prevent colds and sore throats and (2) to kill germs
effectively were significantly higher than the average of
other brands in the product class. This result was taken
as corroboration of findings of deception by the FTC in
the Listerine case.
A second approach using beliefs in the measurement
of deception is the salient belief technique, first advo-
cated by Armstrong and Russ (1975) and tested sub-
sequently by Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ (1975).
Conceptually, the salient belief technique suggests that
deception occurs when consumers perceive and believe
false claims either made or implied by an ad. To be of
any concern, however, these false claims must be rele-
vant to consumers' decisions to purchase a brand in the
product category. Falsely held beliefs about an irrele-
vant attribute are technically a deception, but because
they are unlikely to affect the decision process it seems
useful to distinguish between them and falsely held
beliefs that are relevant.
Operationally, the salient belief technique involves
(1) identifying claims that relevant consumers (not
necessarily knowledgeable) perceive that the ad is mak-
ing, (2) determining externally which of the claims are
false, and (3) measuring the perceptions, beliefs, and
saliences of a representative sample of consumers ex-
posed to the ad.
Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ (1975) used the tech-
nique to measure and compare the deceptiveness of
television ads for a food product, an insecticide, a
finance company, and a deodorant soap, which were
shown to adults in a convenience sample drawn from
church and PTA groups.
The normative belief technique (NBT) and the salient
belief technique (SBT) differ in three important ways:
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THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
1. The measure used. NBT uses beliefs about brands.
SBT uses perceptions and beliefs about claims made
by an ad. The former has the advantage of not requir-
ing measurements of perception of the claims, which
could be time consuming or unreliable. The latter has
the advantage of identifying the claims perceived in an
ad being tested, and thus can obviate the need for a
control group.
2. The standard used. NBT uses normative beliefs about
the product category. SBT uses judgments of truth
made externally. NBT, therefore, has an advantage
when dealing with claims that are difficult to test sci-
entifically, and a disadvantage in that inferences about
deception cannot be made with certainty without ref-
erence to some externally measured truth. For exam-
ple, before Listerine ads could be judged deceptive by
Dyer and Kuehl, it was necessary for them to know or
assume that the normative beliefs held by consumers
about the other three brands tested (the product class)
were an accurate representation of reality, and that
Listerine was not in any way differentiated from the
other brands on the attribute in question. Requiring
that beliefs about a specific brand match beliefs about
the entire product class leads to difficulties, either
when a brand is truly differentiated or when there are
misperceptions about the product class as a whole.
3. The issue of salience. NBT assumes that all beliefs are
equally relevant, or that their relevance is not a con-
cern. SBT measures relevance, and can use the meas-
ure to weight the belief score. Although the measure-
ment of salience is not a requirement for the meas-
urement of deception, it offers two advantages: (1) it
permits public policy makers to identify those decep-
tions that are adversely affecting either consumers or
competitive balance, and (2) it recognizes that attri-
bute saliences can also be the target of persuasive
communications. An ad that suggests the sound of a
door slamming as an indication of automobile quality
may make a claim about a particularcar's sound more
salient than it should be in a consumer's decision
process.
This article reports research that compares results of
using the salient belief technique with results found
using the normative belief technique in Dyer and Kuehl
(1978).
CORRECTIVE MESSAGES
Many conceptual articles deal with the behavioral
aspects of corrective messages (Aaker 1974; Cohen
1975; Dyer and Kuehl 1974; 1976; 1977; Hunt 1972a;
Kassarjian, Carlson, and Rosin 1975; Mazis and Adkin-
son 1976; Rosch 1975; Sawyer 1976; Wilkie and Gard-
ner 1974). Wilkie's treatment of the subject is probably
the most comprehensive (1973; 1974; 1975).
Empirical research on corrective advertising can be
divided into two groups according to the dependent
variables-attitudes toward the brand (Dyer and Kuehl
1974; Hunt 1972a,b; Kassarjian, Carlson, and Rosin
1975) and brand beliefs, on a multiattribute basis (Dyer
and Kuehl 1978; Kuehl and Dyer 1976, 1977; Mazis and
DETECTINGAND CORRECTINGDECEPTIVEADVERTISING 239

Adkinson 1976). The four empirical studies on remedial
messages that used attitudes toward the brand as their
main dependent variable consistently found that reme-
dial messages are effective in undoing the damage of a
deceptive advertisement by significantly changing the
attitudes in the negative direction.
Studies by Dyer and Kuehl (1978), Kuehl and Dyer
(1976; 1977), and Mazis and Adkinson (1976) represent
substantial progress, because they used brand attribute
beliefs rather that attitudes as the main dependent
variables. These and other such studies, however, had
several shortcomings. First, some of the brands used
were unfamiliar or fictitious, eliminating the need to
account for carry-over effects from previous advertising.
For example, Hunt's (1972a,b) experiments were based
on a brand of gasoline that was never available locally.
Kassarjian et al. (1975) used a not-very-popular
motorcycle safety device with a regional brand that was
sold by a distant retailer. Kuehl and Dyer's (1976; 1977)
experiment involved two fictitious products.
Second, only Kassarjian et al. (1975), Dyer and
Kuehl (1978), and Kuehl and Dyer (1976; 1977) meas-
ured the dependent variable after both the deceptive
and corrective messages. The first measure is necessary
to find out if deception has taken place; otherwise,
correction is unnecessary. Hunt (1972a,b) used a de-
ceptive message, but did not measure the dependent
variable until the subjects were exposed to both decep-
tive and corrective messages. Thus, he administered
the corrective message without knowing whether sub-
jects were deceived. Dyer and Kuehl (1974) and Mazis
and Adkinson (1976) did not use a deceptive message
before the remedial message.
Third, all the experiments on corrective messages
used either print or audio messages. Most of the FTC
corrective advertising cases have involved television
commercials.
Fourth, although researchers have realized that
brand attribute beliefs should be the dependent vari-
able, they have not concerned themselves with whether
these beliefs were caused by the specific ad being
tested, or whether these beliefs were salient in indi-
viduals' purchase decisions.
Fifth, all but the last Dyer and Kuehl (1978) experi-
ment are cross-sectional, and there is a lack of attention
to the time dimension. Current laboratory evidence
may overestimate the effectiveness of corrective adver-
tising because the persistence of its impact has not been
assessed.
PURPOSE
The original purposes of the research reported in this
article were the following:
1. to investigate further the use of the salient belief tech-
nique for measuring deception in an instance where
FTC and court decisions have already determined that
an ad is deceptive;
2. to assess the effectiveness of specially designed cor-
rective ads in reducing or eliminating deception in the
short- and long-run;
3. to provide additional information about the impact of
using different sources for corrective messages.
Additionally, the appearance of an article with a simi-
lar purpose (Dyer and Kuehl 1978), after the research
reported here was conducted, allows comparisons that
strengthen previously drawn conclusions and provides
new insights that neither study could have generated
separately.
METHODOLOGY
Experimental Procedure
The experimental procedure used in this study is
summarized in Table 1. The sample consisted of 134
subjects randomly assigned to four groups. For each
group, subjects were assembled in a laboratory setting
and shown various combinations of 60-second filmed
ads-deceptive and corrective ads for Listerine and
irrelevant ads for other products. Sets of SBT measures
were taken at three points during the laboratory exper-
iment, and a fourth measure was mailed six weeks later.
As Table I shows, subjects in all four groups completed
premeasurement questions (M) for the purpose of es-
tablishing initial levels of claim beliefs and saliences,
and to obtain information on product usage and famil-

TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

First Post-deception Second Post-correction Six-week

Group Post-measure treatment measure treatment measure measure

1 Deceptive ad M21 Corrective ad M31 M41

(company
source)
2 M12 Deceptive ad M22 Corrective ad M32 M42
(FTC source)
3 M13 Deceptive ad M23 Irrelevant ad M33 M43
4 M14 Irrelevant ad M24 Irrelevant ad M34 M44

Mijrefers to the ith measure for the jth group.

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240
iarity. For the first treatment, Groups 1, 2, and 3 were
exposed to a deceptive Listerine television commercial
and to television commercials for irrelevent products (a
food product and a finance company). Group 4 was
shown ads for the food product, the finance company,
and a third irrelevant product. A second set of questions
(M2), similar to the first, was completed by individuals
in each group to measure the changes in subjects' claim
beliefs and saliences. Group 4 served as a control for
measurement effects produced by the first set of ques-
tions.
For the second treatment, Group 1 saw a company-
source corrective ad for Listerine, along with ads for
the other two products. Group 2 saw an FTC-source
corrective ad along with the other two ads. Groups 3
and 4 saw only irrelevant ads. Each subject then com-
pleted a third set of questions (M3), the purpose of
which was to determine the effects of the corrective ads
for Listerine on claim beliefs and saliences. Group 3
served as a control for measuring the impact of the
corrective ads. Group 4 provided a way to examine full
potential for reactivity in the experiment.
After six weeks, all subjects were mailed a fourth set
of questions (M4), essentially identical to the first, to
determine the extent to which the effects found in pre-
vious measures persisted over time. Of the original 134
subjects, 106 (79 percent) returned this final question-
naire.
Two types of effects were not directly controlled for
in this experiment: (1) the interaction between pre-
measures and the experimental treatments (test-
treatment interaction effect) and (2) the reaction of sub-
jects to the experimenter and the experimental situation
(reactivity effect).
The test-treatment interaction effect was examined in
pretests with other, similar subjects. No test-treatment
interaction effect was found, so it was not controlled for
in the experiment reported here.
Reactivity effects are practically impossible to elimi-
nate or control in laboratory experiments. Reaction to
the experimenter was reduced by using written, stan-
dardized instructions that were read by a neutral party.
Reactions to the experimental situation might have
been assessed by including a fifth group that was ex-
posed to a neutral (nondeceptive or noncorrective) Lis-
terine ad. But, budget constraints plus the difficulty of
identifying truly neutral Listerine ads (those with no
deceptive claims or no possibility of evoking memories
of other Listerine ads that did have deceptive claims)
made this strategy untenable. Thus, the possibility of
reactivity effects must be considered in evaluating the
results of the study.
Also, measures taken six weeks after exposure to
corrective advertisements are not the ultimate answer
to the question of long-term effects. Future research
would do well to consider even longer-term effects of
corrective ads-either single insertions or repeated
ads.
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THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Subjects
The subjects were students enrolled at a large state
university, who responded to solicitations for volun-
teers and a small monetary inducement for participa-
tion. A sample consisting of student and nonstudent
subjects might have been more representative of rele-
vant consumers. But students do represent a segment of
relevant consumers (61 per cent were using Listerine or
had used it previously), and there may not be that much
difference between student consumers and nonstudent
consumers. The SBT results for the food product and
finance company ads in this study were similar to the
results of a previous study using the same ads with a
sample consisting of nonstudent adults of a wide range
of ages (Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ 1975).
The Deceptive and Corrective Ads
The deceptive Listerine television ad was chosen
from a reel of 29 Listerine ads held by the FTC as
evidence in the Warner-Lambert case. The particular
film used was selected because it expressed or implied
all three of the claims that the FTC had found to be
deceptive: Listerine will (1) prevent, (2) ameliorate,
and (3) cure colds and sore throats (Exhibit 1).
The corrective ads used in this study were profes-
sionally filmed for this experiment. Two ads were
produced-one with a company source and one with an
FTC source. The scripts (read by an actor) were identi-
cal in both filmed ads, except for the introductory sen-
tences that identified the source of the message. To
assure that subjects noted the source of the message,
relevant props were used in the ads to identify the
EXHIBIT1
TEXT OF THE DECEPTIVEADVERTISEMENT
[It is raining. Two mothers start talking. One mother has just
escorted her children to the school bus, the other (Muriel) is
checking the mailbox.].
1st Mother Muriel, where are Dave and Sue?
2nd Mother Oh, down with a cold again.
1st Mother Again?
2nd Mother Oh, guess your family always seems fine.
1st Mother I got a theory.
2nd Mother A theory? Nothing can prevent colds.
1st Mother You can help. Let's get out of the rain. [They go
inside the house.]
1st Mother Muriel, I make sure they have plenty of rest, and
I watch their diets.
2nd Mother Uh-huh.
1st Mother Then I have them gargle twice a day with Listerine.
2nd Mother Listerine antiseptic?
1st Mother Uh-huh. Ithink we've cut down on colds and those
we catch don't seem to last as long.
2nd Mother Sure seems to work for your family.
1st Mother Yes, it does.
2nd Mother Well, I'll try it.
Male Voice During the cold-catching season, for fewer colds,
milder colds, more people gargle with Listerine
than any other oral antiseptic. Listerine. [Music]
DETECTINGAND CORRECTINGDECEPTIVEADVERTISING
EXHIBIT 2
TEXT OF THE CORRECTIVEMESSAGE
Hello, I am Walter Hughes (fictitious name), representing the
(FTC or Warner-Lambert Company).
Contrary to prior advertising of Listerine, Listerine will not
prevent or cure colds or sore throats, and Listerine will not be
beneficial in the treatment of cold symptoms or sore throats.
Listerine is an antiseptic that kills germs on contact. It is
effective for general oral hygiene, bad breath, minor cuts,
scratches, insect bites, and infectious dandruff. But it is not
effective against colds and cold symptoms, because colds are
caused by viruses and Listerine does not kill viruses.
source visually throughout the message. The text of the
corrective message is provided in Exhibit 2.
The first paragraph of the message identifies the
source. The second paragraph is from the final order of
the FTC, and corrects previous impressions about the
product.2 The first two sentences of the final paragraph
state the benefits of Listerine as presented on the Lis-
terine label. The final sentence explains the reasoning
behind the corrective message.
In both ads, the message is presented in a straightfor-
ward narrative. The message is objective-the FTC has
medical evidence to support the negative claims and
Warner-Lambert has medical evidence to support the
positive claims. The message is two-sided-three nega-
tive and six positive claims are made. The message was
designed to fit the spirit of Senator Magnuson's (1972,
p. 4) suggestion that consumers have the right "to be
given the facts needed to make an informed choice."
Questionnaires
The first three sets of questions were combined in a
single questionnaire. The questionnaire began with a
short cover letter that introduced the experiment and
explained that it was part of a study designed to meas-
ure ad effectiveness. The first part of the questionnaire
contained the premeasures. In all cases, sets of ques-
tions about Listerine were placed between sets of simi-
lar questions about the food product and the finance
company. This allowed subjects to become familiar
with the format of the questionnaire while answering
"irrelevant" questions.
Regarding Listerine, subjects were first asked if they
were familiar with the brand. They were then given ten
claims about Listerine, and were asked to indicate the
extent to which they believed each claim was true
(definitely true, probably true, probably false, definitely
false). They were then asked to indicate how important
(very, moderately, slightly, not at all) each claim would
be to their decision to buy the product, if the claim were
true. Five of the claims used were mentioned in the
deceptive ad, and nine were stated in the corrective ads.
2When this research was conducted, the courts had not yet elimi-
nated the phrase "Contrary to prior advertising . . ."
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241
The second section of the questionnaire contained a
set of questions for each of the ads subjects saw in the
first treatment. Sets of questions pertaining to a particu-
lar ad were completed immediately after that ad was
viewed. The questions concerning Listerine were the
same as those found in the premeasure except that (1)
the product familiarity question was deleted, and (2)
subjects were asked to indicate which of the listed
claims they perceived the ad to be making.
The third part of the questionnaire, completed after
viewing corrective messages, was similar to the second
part except for two additions. Subjects were asked
about their purchase behavior for products shown in the
ads, and a question was inserted to determine if they
had correctly perceived the source of the corrective
message.
The final questionnaire, containing a fourth set of
measures similar to those in the first set of questions,
was mailed to subjects six weeks later. During that time
period there was no abnormal level of advertising or
publicity for Listerine.
ANALYSIS
The main dependent variable in this experiment was a
"Salient Deception Score" (SDS). An SDS was calcu-
lated for every false claim by multiplying the belief
score of every subject by that subject' s salience score
and summing over the three false claims. An SDS was
calculated four times for each subject. Generally, such
data are analysed with a univariate analysis of variance,
which has provisions for correlated or repeated meas-
urements. But, in addition to the usual assumptions
concerning normality and homogeneity of variance
within cells, Winer (1971) stresses that repeated-
measures analyses also require the assumption of
homogeneity of covariances (i.e., correlations) be-
tween repeated assessments.
McCall and Appelbaum (1973, p. 401) state that "al-
though researchers are accustomed to ignoring lack of
homogeneity of within-cell variances in the analyses of
variance (ANOVA), a repeated-measures ANOVA is
not robust with respect to violations of the additional
covariance (correlational) assumptions." Violations of
these assumptions produce artificially large F values
relative to the appropriate critical value (too many re-
jections of the null hypotheses for the stated significance
level).
For repeated-measures experiments such as this one,
McCall and Appelbaum (1973, pp. 406-13) and Kirk
(1968, pp. 143-4) recommend the use of multivariate
techniques that make no covariance assumptions and
provide exact probability statements. Their recom-
mendations were followed and multivariate analysis of
variance was used to analyze SDSs. The belief and
salience scores were analyzed separately using the
same techniques. Multivariate tests of significance
were calculated where appropriate.
242 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

TABLE 2 FIGUREA
MEAN SALIENTDECEPTIONSCORES: SHORT-RUN MEAN SALIENTDECEPTIONSCORES: SHORT-RUN EFFECTS
EFFECTSa
SALIENT
Post- Post- DECEPTION
Pre- deception correction SCORE
Group measure (M1) measure (M2) measure (M3)
23
Company-source 17.60 20.51 11.80
corrective ad 22
FTC-source 18.10 22.35 11.41
corrective ad 21
Deceptive ad only 17.42 22.10 21.26
Control 18.19 20.09 20 <t 0;------

a134 subjects were tested.

18

RESULTS
Analysis of the data allows for tentative conclusions
on several issues concerning the impact of deceptive
and corrective advertising. The results are reported in
terms of the SDS and its two components-a belief
score and a salience score.3 The first three results re-
ported here are based on the responses of the 134 sub-
jects who completed the first questionnaire (Tables 2
and 3 and Figure A). The remaining results are based on
the responses of the 106 subjects who completed first
and second (after six weeks) questionnaires (Tables 4
and 5 and Figure B).
1. Changes in the level of deception produced by
exposure to the Listerine ad were determined by com-
paring changes in deception (SDS) for Groups 1-3
(pooled) with changes in the unexposed control group
(Group 4). The means of the SDS measures are shown
in Table 2 and Figure A. Analysis of these changes
shows a significant increase, when compared to the
control group, in the level of salient deception (p < 0.09;
Table 3, row 1 under Salient Deception Score).
Although the means of the separate components are
not shown here, MANOVA performed on the SDS
components shows a significant increase in the salience
of false claims (p < 0.004; Table 3, row 1 under " Sali-
ence") with little effect on claim belief (p < 0.98; Table
3, row 1 under "Belief').
The overall result supports the findings of Dyer and
Kuehl (1978) and the judgment of the FTC and the
courts.
2. The impact of the corrective ads was measured by
comparing changes in SDS for Groups 1 and 2 (pooled)
to changes in Group 3, which saw the deceptive ad but
not a corrective ad. The MANOVA results suggest a
significant short-run reduction in salient deception at-
3TheSalient Deception Score for a single false claim could run from
1 to 16. Because the Listerine ad contained three false claims, the
SDS for the ad could run from 3 to 48. No single standard could be
used as a cutoff between deception and its absence, so the analysis
was repeated using a variety of standards to identify the number of
deceptions occurring and the number of people deceived. None of
these analyses showed substantially different results.
17
16 -
15 -
14
13-
GROUPI (Company source corrective ad) \
12 - GROUP2 (FTC source corrective ad)
GROUP3 (Deceptive ad only)
- - GROUP4 (Control)
Ml M2 M3
MEASURES
tributable to the corrective message (p < 0.001; Table 3,
row 2). This appears to be explained by a significant
reduction in the belief component (p < 0.001) rather
than in the salience component (p < 0.32). Again, this
supports the Dyer and Kuehl (1978) findings. Despite
many design and measurement differences, both
studies found that corrective ads had a significant effect
in reducing deception.
3. No significant short-run source effect was found.
There appears to be no significant difference (p < 0.28)
between the changes in deception levels produced by
the company source and the changes produced by the
FTC source (Table 3, row 3). No significant differences
were observed in either the belief component (p < 0. 18)
or the salience component (p < 0.76). These short-run
findings appear to corroborate the results of Hunt
(1972a), Mazis and Adkinson (1976), and Dyer and
Kuehl (1978).
4. The impact of the corrective messages appears to
have persisted over time-6 weeks. (The means of the
SDS measures are shown in Table 4 and Figure B.)
When deception levels, after six weeks, were compared
with initial levels, they had been significantly reduced
both in the group (Group 1) that received the company
source message (p < 0.040) and in the group (Group 2)
that received the FTC source message (p < 0.004).

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DETECTING AND CORRECTING DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 243

TABLE 3
MANOVA RESULTS: SHORT-RUN EFFECTSa

Salient
deception score Salience Belief
Group
comparisons d.f. F d.f. F d.f. F

Group 1-3 vs. Group 4, 1,129 2.95b 1,129 8.54c 1,130 .001
change from M1 to M2
Groups 1 and 2 vs. 1,95 32.18d 1,95 1.01 1,97 48.19d
Group 3, change from
M2 to M3
Group 1 vs. Group 2, 1,62 1.17 1,62 .10 1,64 1.88
change from M2 to M3

a134 subjects were tested.

bp < 0.1.

cp <0.01.
dp < 0.001.

TABLE 4 FIGURE B

MEAN SALIENT DECEPTION SCORES: LONG-RUN MEAN SALIENTDECEPTIONSCORES: LONG-RUN EFFECTS

EFFECTSa
SALIENT
Post- Post- DECEPTI ON
Pre- deception correction Six-week SCORE
measure measure measure measure
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) 23 -
Group

20.31 12.15 14.46 22 -

1 17.42
2 17.22 21.13 11.52 12.91
20.83 18.21
21 -
3 17.14 21.69
4 18.89 20.64 21.18
20
a106 subjects were tested.
19
TABLE 5 18
MANOVA RESULTS: LONG-RUN EFFECTSa 17
Group or Salient 16
comparison d.f. deception Salience Belief
15
Group 1, long-run 1,25 4.74C 49 6.47c
effect (M1 vs. M4) 14 _\
Group 2, long-run 1,22 10.60d .34 24.71e
effect (M, vs. M4) 13
Group 3, long-run 1,28 .46 3.30b .03
effect (M1 vs. M4) 12 GROUPI (Company source \
Group 1 vs. Group 2, 1,47 .75 .18 1.53 corrective ad)
GROUP2 (FTC source
difference in M4 II corrective ad)
Group 1 (M3 vs. M4) 1,25 4.0Qb 3.16b 11.21d ----GROUP 3 (Deceptive ad only)
Group 2 (M3 vs. M4) 1,22 1.18 .14 4.31c -GROUP4 (Control)

al06 subjects; scores reported are F ratios.

I ~~~I LI
bp < 0.1. Ml M2 M3 M4
cp < 0.05. MEASURES
dp < 0.01.
ep < 0.001.

Meanwhile, Group 3, which was exposed to the decep- (p < 0.02, p < 0.001) rather than salience-based (p <
tion ad, but did not receive the corrective message, 0. 49,p < 0.57; Table 5, columns 3 and 4). The results of
returned to a level of deception that was slightly above, the Dyer and Kuehl (1978) study also suggest that cor-
but not significantly different from, their original posi- rective ads are persistent, at least for three weeks.
tion (p < 0.50). (These results are shown in the first 5. There does not appear to be any long-run source
three rows of Table 5, column 1.) For both message effect (Table 5, row 4). The groups that received the
sources, the long-run effect appears to be belief-based corrective messages did not appear to differ

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244 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

significantly in their levels of deception, either at the EXHIBIT 3

beginning of the experiment or after six weeks (p < A COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES USED IN THE
0.39). TWO STUDIES
6. There is no direct evidence that the long-run effect
is likely to continue, but differences in the short-run and Dyer-Kuehl study
long-run levels of deception for the two groups exposed Design factor (1978) This study
to corrective advertising can be examined. In this case, Approach NBT SBT
visual inspection (Figure B) suggests that, as might be Ad medium Print Television
expected, the levels of deception of those exposed to Subject task Study and interpret View advertisements
corrective messages are rising toward their original advertisements
Claims tested Prevents colds Prevents, ameliorates,
levels. However, the increase for the company-source and cures colds
group is significant (p < 0.06), whereas the increase for Measures Beliefs (about brand Perceptions, beliefs,
the FTC-source group is not (p < 0.29; Table 5, rows 5 and product class) and saliences (for
and 6). brand attribute
This result could be interpreted as suggesting that the claims)
Control Deceptive ad Irrelevant ad
impact of a company-source message (at least with a Subjects Adult-education College students
single forced exposure to it) is not likely to persist for as students
long as would the impact of an FTC-source message. Time Three weeks Six weeks
However, it must be remembered that the analysis
shows no difference in the effects of the two sources at sistent (at least for three to six weeks). The only impor-
the time of the final measure. tant difference in findings concerned source effects
This study and the Dyer and Kuehl (1978) study differ over time.
on this finding. The Dyer and Kuehl results show the In the Dyer and Kuehl study (1978) and in the one
company-source message gaining ground on the FTC- reported here the content of the corrective message is
source message in its impact on deception levels over held constant, whereas the source is varied. In reality,
time. This study, on the other hand, suggests that both however, the content of the message would depend
corrective messages lost ground over time, with the heavily on who sponsored it. This relationship must be
company-source losing its effectiveness faster. One considered in conclusions drawn about the effective-
possible explanation for the difference in results is the ness of message sources.
time span prior to the final measure (three and six Although this and other studies provide insights into
weeks). Another possible explanation is the difference a number of deceptive and corrective advertising is-
in the tasks that subjects were required to perform. sues, many gaps in our knowledge remain. For exam-
Dyer and Kuehl subjects were asked to study print ads, ple, which approach is most effective and efficient for
whereas subjects in this study were exposed to 60- detecting advertising deception and for assessing the
second television commercials. This suggests that, ig- effects of corrective campaigns? There are currently no
noring reach and frequency considerations, corrective studies that have compared the salient belief and nor-
ads might be more effective in print media, where they mative belief techniques.
can be studied, than in broadcast media, where they A question also remains concerning standards to
may flash by too quickly to have substantial or lasting which advertisements should be held. At least some
impact. individuals will misread or misinterpret even the most
conscientiously prepared advertisement. On the other
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS hand, requiring that beliefs about a brand match beliefs
about the entire product class might find deception in
These results provide for some interesting compari- cases where a brand is truly differentiated, or might
sons between the study reported in this article and the overlook deceptions where there are misperceptions
Dyer and Kuehl (1978) study. Both studies constitute about the entire product class.
efforts to examine the longitudinal aspects of the meas- Not enough is known about the side effects of correc-
urement of deception and its correction. Despite some tive advertising-about its impact on company images,
similarities in the two studies, there are many differ- beliefs about other advertising claims, and, ultimately,
ences (Exhibit 3). sales of products for which corrective ads have been
Given the number and types of differences, the two run.
studies might have been expected to produce dissimilar The experimental studies reviewed in this article in-
results. Such was not the case. Both studies suggest volved forced exposure to potentially deceptive ads,
that the Listerine ad produced significant increases in and forced exposure to a single corrective message.
levels of deception. Both suggest that corrective ads Subjects generally were students. The Listerine correc-
had a significant effect in reducing deception. The tive campaign, and others that may follow, afford good
studies agree that source effects were statistically in- opportunities to study "real" consumers in "real" ad-
significant. Both suggest that corrective effects are per- vertising environments. The FTC has a major study

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DETECTINGAND CORRECTINGDECEPTIVEADVERTISING
underway to analyze the effects of the ten-million-
dollar corrective advertising campaign currently being
implemented for Listerine. This FTC study of the Lis-
terine campaign, along with similar studies being con-
ducted, should help fill gaps in our knowledge of decep-
tive and corrective advertising.
[Received May 1978. Revised June 1979.]
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