Name: CALO, Michael John T.

Citation: PACU vs Secretary of Education GR No 5279 31

October 1955
95 Phil. 806 Political Law

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed

the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws
that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education
before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private
school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also
provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain
textbooks from being used in schools.

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that

Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of
schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and
property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their
natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (3)
Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power. However, the Solicitor General
on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to
present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered no
wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise
said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because
the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy

presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the
exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him
by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all
educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private
education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that
are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control
and regulation by the State over all schools.
Tan v. Macapagal

Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino

people.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating
Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article
XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and
adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through
the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now
outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution
without altering the general plan laid down therein."

Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence
of its enforcement.

Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement

of public funds.

Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose

of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."

2. NO.
At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any
resolution that would radically alter the 1935 constitution therefore not
yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con
has actually does something already. Then the court may actually
inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.

Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as

they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for
advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it
may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper
time comes ripeness

Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections

95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal
Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has

already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.
Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides,
among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is
class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked
equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions
of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length
of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of

action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for
this case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different
from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There
are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is
contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years
of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to

require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also
be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable

disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas
F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the
revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays
that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz :

(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and

(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of

privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the

petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation
on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997,
petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies,
who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:
YES

Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople

is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O.
No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can
also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by
the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and
as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to
be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a
notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID)
card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced
that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to

implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the
rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the
dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a
commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte,
City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of
Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and
Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura

Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information
Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral

Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government
 of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five
cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court
namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its

prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to
the public and be open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null
and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing
the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to
declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and
those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally
signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived
therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by

and between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in
1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities;
and the following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled
the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office,
when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF
 was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and
MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001
lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF
Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-
AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as
reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic
act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169,
the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right
entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided
into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro

as all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These
people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro
homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their
prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe
the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM
in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which
will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and
B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE
shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the
coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters,"
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines
of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal
waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to
include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to
remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled
to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the
negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental
protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and
the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or
modify concessions and TLAs.
 And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be
further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which
was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the
right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of
which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements

for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on

public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated
and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the
laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is

indeed a need for the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy,

that is the court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned
problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The
contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication
since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in

violation of their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled
jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions
of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under
the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe
and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of
the Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of
Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan
Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus
standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if
include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in
alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can
be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as
an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for
justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be
benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the
MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of

the MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has
already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that
the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions,
provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary
cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it
does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially
when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the

disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and
academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus
for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the
 petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again
be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions
are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to
the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has
become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees

the right of the people to demand information, and integrated therein
is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable
to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-

executory with reasonable safeguards the effectivity of which need
not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is

corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback
means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of
the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the
petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent
Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he
already waived it when he complied with the Courts order to the
unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-
AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters

related to such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully
at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain,
hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to
the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is
the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince they
 allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in
any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be
no question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the

parties. The parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term
association was adapted from the international law. In international
law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily
establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into
the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the principle
of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies

power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government;
even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such
concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is
 nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-
AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the
MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in

the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to
become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the
MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in
contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states
that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is
just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of
the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its
inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend

that the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-
paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere
passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers
included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that
such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise
 new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance
the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The
Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is
the countrys sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be
granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former
provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be
amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and
development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD
does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity.
The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the
act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to

the adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-
AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people
and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-
AD which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and

recognition of the ancestral domain is a clear departure from the
procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of
reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international

law as part of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-
determination has long been recognized which states that people can
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external
self-determinationinternal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the
external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect
accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-
determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an
actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-
determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to
limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing
national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every
state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that

indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right
to independence or secession from those states under international
law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above
as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy
or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs,
as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions;
have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee
the indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it
shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the
protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the
indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it
would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
 independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion

cannot be had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall
not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal framework are
effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to

Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that
negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial
integrity of the countrysuch was negated by the provision on
association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the
suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated
power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will
require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The
legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether
the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the
GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot
delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President
has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of

peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the
Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may
not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers
viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those

powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner
that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the
principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing
even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed
as a certainty. The Presidents power is limited only to the preservation
and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply
recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive

condition but is a term because it is not a question of whether the
necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when.
Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes
to the legal framework which changes would include constitutional
amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it
must be struck down as unconstitutional.
 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or

unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international
law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the
Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents'
almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as
a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state,
but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30,
1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at
the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent,

his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises
a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint

a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation
of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise
to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds

it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides

for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows
the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by

which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations

of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED

and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v Guingona, Corona GR No. 113375 May 5,
1994

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Davide, Jr., J:

FACTS:

(1) Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its
protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato
Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and the
imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KI
LOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this
petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:

. . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESI DENT, ACTING THROUGH

RESPONDENTS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO
GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEI R DI SCRETI ON AND/OR FUN CTI ONS
TANTAMOUN T TO LACK OF JURISDI CTI ON AND/OR AUTHORI TY
IN RESPECTIVELY:
(A) APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND
(B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE"
WITH, RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION,
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATI ON OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY
AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR
AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSI DERING THAT:

a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited

from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity";

b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional

franchise is required before

Any person may be allowed to establish and operate said

telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60%
Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is
disqualified from operating a public service, like the said
telecommunications system; and

d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the

Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042)to install, establish and operate
the on-line lot to and telecommunications systems.

(2) Public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, J r.,

Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain
that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint
venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid
of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is
vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds
of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of
itspurposes and objectives."
ISSUE:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits
the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign."

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by
respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)is
hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.

RATIO:
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the
prohibition can be allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a
franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that
"in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of
rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most
strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or
privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove
his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed,
and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by
probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.

Kilosbayan vs. morato

Facts:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist
that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether
petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under
its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.
Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be
reopened.

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease

Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and
accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at
least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted
to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own
personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21,
1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same
as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of
the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the
1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different
from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their
moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract
Issue:
WON petitioners have legal standing?
Rulling:
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of
constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest,
applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule
on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against
that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by
petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the
courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official
actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution,
by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner

read:

Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the

protection life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.

Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.

Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
 Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.

As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing.

They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only
provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing
the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined
that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution,
the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect
to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268
[1994]).

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law

allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the
PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise
issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners,
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.

Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the

requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this
case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of
independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real
parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may
invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-
making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments
of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.

Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia

before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the provisions on
independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech,
however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the
speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the
government, rather than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the
advocacy of petitioners' views. 2 Indeed, the provisions on independent
people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with
the provision on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the
people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by
Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in
question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy
on lotteries.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded

standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving
"paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and
legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases
involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these
requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976);
Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of
Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is
assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the
validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity
of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned
citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of
"transcendental importance" which must be settled early. (Emergency
Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v.
Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives qualegislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994);
Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191
SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))

Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various
litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do
not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the

expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v.
 Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
[1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA
300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of
a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review.
As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677
[1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis added)

Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of

taxpayers' suits.

Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention

that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts
regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales
v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a
taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC
and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial court.
The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res
judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the
question of petitioner's standing.

On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989),

petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the
government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road
construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed,
but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he
was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which was
one of the defendants in the case.

In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon,

47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to sue
to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city
government for the purchase of road construction equipment because
their contention was that the contract had been made without their
authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it
that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by
law.

But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are
being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that
of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that
funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to
bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President
of the Philippines.

Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as

concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury
suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of
Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because
they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we

threw out a petition questioning another form of lottery conducted by
the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a "citizen,
lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no direct and
personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute complained of." In the case at bar, petitioners
have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they
should be accorded standing to bring this suit.

The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different.
Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of timber
licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art.
II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts.
That provision states:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)

In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in

this case do not permit of such categorization.

Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the

validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral.
This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to
decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.

Petition was denied.

IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have standing
Ruling:
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. [14] The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from
this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based
on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific
and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental
purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to
elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of
the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included,
have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it
has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not
shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue
of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members,
whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury
as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it
alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What
the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions
and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and
personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the
Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP
has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the
future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court
that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the
controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.
[16]
In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people.[17] Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure. [18] In this case, a reading
of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem,
the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.

Joya vs. PCGG

Facts:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled
on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters
Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the
custody of the Central Bank.

The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then

Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting
her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie,
Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or
CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of
eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be
part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives
and cronies.

On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive

Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction
off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.

On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the
Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the
agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction
the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in
seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified
by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of
the agreement. 1

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then

Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit
findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15
August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG
Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by
auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were
historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was
2
prohibited by law.

On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M.

Castro, wrote President Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement
and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo. 3 On the same
date, Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a
certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did
not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did
not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. On 11
January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and
the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.

Issue:
whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition?
Ruling:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself. 6 But the most important are the
first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in
an
action. 7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall
be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. 8Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
9
right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a
case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the
10
fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when
a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
11
disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply

concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic
wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents
Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty
to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987
Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture,
and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and
Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national
and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on
the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties
collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and
enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act
of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of
their right to public property without due process of law in violation of
12
the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and
in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by
private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its
president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity
to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware

were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries
from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an
occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was
toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and
silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however
should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due
process and just compensation. If these properties were already
acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in
their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only
by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the
legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by

concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit.
13
In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule
that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,
petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of
respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed.
Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and
appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every

action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official
acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public
funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined
14
at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition
of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that
petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.
Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority
Facts:

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of

Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum

directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future
works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA.

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special

Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land
so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred
fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441)
square meters or 157.841 hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA"
for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda

delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as
the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a
joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September
16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3)
the JVA itself is illegal.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity)

as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner
asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties
of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

Ruling:

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to

institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims
that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus,
there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the
petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of
citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to
disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth
billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent
PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to
comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to

the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen
to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to
the public, thus -

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-

gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental
importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers
have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public
interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and
moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.

xxx

In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue

concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner
is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws,
he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought
to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada,

further declared that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and,
therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
 Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of
public funds may not have been involved under the questioned
contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was]
definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and
the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding
the petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the

people to information and access to official records, documents
and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a
Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic
requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused
by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed."

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves

the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental
public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
David vs. arroyo

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of

the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after
the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these
petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. In their
presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
[4]
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General
specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners
counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to
give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of
the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual
bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the
facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are
presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the
issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio
Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood
mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a
public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at
all costs. They called upon the people to show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not
only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands
on our left arms. [5]

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled

Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for bombings and attacks
during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio
City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some
cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. [6] Upon the advice of
her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb
was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.

(sa net nga facts ni)

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th

Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the

Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article
12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No.

5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on

February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the
newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006.
Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP
and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence.

Issue:

Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.

171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

Ruling:

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the
Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on
legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question.[37] In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.[38] Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
 The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication
of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and
taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk,[39] where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[40] In matter of
mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt
is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With
respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan[41] held that the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot
be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with,
and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed
in Tileston v. Ullman.[43] The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,[44] it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany
of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,[45] Manila Race
Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,[46] Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works[47] and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.[48]
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement
of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers
Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[49] where the transcendental
importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such
liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,
[50]
this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-
reaching implications of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file
the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and
civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.[51]
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to
sue under the principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent
are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the Court ruled
that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information
and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of
transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, [53] wherein the Court

held that given the transcendental importance of the issues
involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and
allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the
parties seeking judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54] while the Court noted that the
petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a
showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress
taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[55] that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power.
This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal
standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to
the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of
Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court
on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of
the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as

respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, [67] may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
 usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people [68] but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.[69]
II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made

pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et

al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable

unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit

warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation
of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily

Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal.

Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence
of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the
warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Demetria vs. Alba

Facts:

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this

country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa
representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general
interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers
whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
1
prayed for" listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977'

INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.

B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS

REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE
PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.

C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177

ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS,
FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
 D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
EXECUTIVE.

E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF

FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER
OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
2
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.

Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution

dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public
respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He
further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted
pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that
at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government
to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.

Issue:

WON pet. Have legal standing?

Ruling:

It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as

to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take cognizance
of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss.
Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by
the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries
verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under
Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially
reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the
resolution of the case at bar.

The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant

consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al.,
110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:

Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be

contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering
anunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the
prevailing view in the United States is stated in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the

requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.

The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree

No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is
readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said
paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,

appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.

On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration

reads as follows:

Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer

of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another

was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to
afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those
of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of
a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway
granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds
may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if
there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the

privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President
to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within

the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to
interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty
of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government
had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was
adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of
law which We have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The
general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the
protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of
responsibility" but without it.

The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic
destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the
deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the
slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain
written in our statute books.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44

of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa

Facts:

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,

1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this
Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and
recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR
and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally,
petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish
petitioner with information on certain matters.
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in
his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the
Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this
case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on
March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24,
2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision.
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was

created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same.[1] Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
[2]
Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the
President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded
by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.

Issue:

WON pet. Has legal standing

Ruling:

In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing

constitutes another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial
power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[9] In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos.
43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. [10] A
citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12] we denied
standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation, stating that,
in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716,
Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to
declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid
because, as the Court held,
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of
three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner
claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been
directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant
Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality
of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and
the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what
particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not
detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that
their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under
Rule 3, d 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner,
which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect,
injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to
seek judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers
action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. [14] This was our ruling in a recent case
wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the
validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus
Election Code) requiring radio and television stations to give free air
time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign period.
[15]
The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as
a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or
spending power of Congress.[16]
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was
created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O.
No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds
of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states -
Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of
the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President,
subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission
upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not
by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by
law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
[21]
from the State to its creditors. The funds used for the PCCR were
taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to
section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the
power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit. [22] In
the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation
of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish
that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[23]
In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. [24] Nowhere in his
pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

Legal Standing
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006
Prepared By: Israel C. Sayao
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition
and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and
three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches
the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?

Ruling:
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People
v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Therefore, the
court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered
direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

Requisites for taxpayers suit, lawmakers suit, voters suit and

Concerned citizens suit;
Demetria vs. Alba (1987)
Subject: Locus Standi
Facts
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers, and members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa, assail the constitutionality of Section 44
of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) for being in violation
of Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Section 44 states
that: "The President shall have the authority to transfer
any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. "The Solicitor
General questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. It is
also argued that the abrogation of Section 16(5), Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986 has
effectively rendered the petition moot and academic.
Held
Locus Standi
The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain
a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Nevertheless,
taxpayers have been given standing to assail laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43
(E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of
the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner,
which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect,
injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to
seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is
readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43,
the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses
to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being
that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that
he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will
be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation
Sen. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 158088 , July 6,
2005
Facts :
This is a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit (even
without the signature of the President) the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence or ratification - in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty, under both

domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. That
under the treaty law and customary international law, Philippines has a
ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute.

Respondents on the other hand, questioned the legal standing of

herein petitioners and argued that executive department has no duty
to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Issues :
Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant
suit.

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign

Affairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by the Philippine Member to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.

Held :
Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power
as member of Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they
can seek redress in our domestic courts.

Petitioners interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to

ratify treaties does not belong to the Senate.

Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the
ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the President for
ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the
same to the Senate for concurrence.

The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring
the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity
of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate. The participation of the legislative branch
in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check
on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify

is vested in the President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.

The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds
the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.

Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence

to the ratification. It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty
to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus,

Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.

KilosBayan Vs Guingona Jr.

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose
of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.
Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya
Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling
35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral
concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and

2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1

of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.

RULING:
 1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental
importance to the public that the case demands. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise
of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural
barrier.

2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association,
company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign. The language
of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or
privilege to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO cannot exercise it
in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other
party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase.
By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor
can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

Estrada Vs Sandiganbayan
Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine

FACTS:
An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and
John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)

June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in

connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are
members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or
other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official
position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or
indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means

Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share,

percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit, by
himself and/or in connection with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling

Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or

misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain
and benefit, public funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less,
representing a portion of P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise
tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
 Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane
Does

For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares
Of Stocks, More Or Less, And The Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or Less, Of The
Belle Corporation worth P1,102,965,607.50 and
P744,612,450.00 respectively and by collecting or
receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or
percentages by reason of said purchases which became
part of the deposit in the equitable-pci bank under the
account name Jose Velarde

by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts,

shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary
benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the same under his
account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-Pci Bank

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since

for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as:
1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659
2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal
Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085)
April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds
of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than 1 offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)

HELD:
Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
1. YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law
o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice
o can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction
o a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
o the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms
o overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases.

UMALI v GUINGONA
Facts:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. However, a confidential memorandum against him
was sent to President Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential
Commission on anti-graft and Corruption for investigation. Umali
complied with the pleadings and hearings set #$ PC"C. Umali and
his lawyer did not raise clarificatory questions during the hearing.
PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support the charges and
President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He appealed to the
Office of the President but was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging
that he was not accorded due process and deprived of security
of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the decision
and was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the
constitutionality of PCAGC as a government agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest
opportunity?
Ruling:
In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the
constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only posed petitioner in his motion
for reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late to raise the
said issue for the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings.

Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi
Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by
the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter
to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit
that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
Held:
1. The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated.

2. The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables,
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There
is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is
the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not
tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at
redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is
the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the
Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender
the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so
that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC
rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to
the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against
TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker
beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its
implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as
two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs.
Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO,
it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as
vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the
Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary
Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to
the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two
groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory
Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions
before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation
of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received those
benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent
really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to
review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the
report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) therevocation of Resolution 89-12-
2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through
compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked
the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP
to the mandatedland acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These
acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of
CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Issue 2:
W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality
of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have
been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of
HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this
case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is
whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the
groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is
the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be
revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the
constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality
of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met
in this case.

Serrano de Agbayani v PNB

FACTS:

In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty

mortgage. In1944, the loan matured but PNB could not collect
because it was at thistime of the war. In 1945,
Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law(EO #32),
suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the
ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for
another eight years (upto 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA
342 as unconstitutional in the case ofRutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB
filed a suit for payment of the loan.

ISSUE:

WON the action prescribed?

HELD:

If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the
declarationof RA 342 as unconstitutional retroacted to 1945 when EO
32 was first issued. Between1944 when the loan matured and
1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15 yearshad elapsed. [The
orthodox view was announced by Mr. J. Field, in the caseof Norton
vs. Shelby County where the court held that:"xxx. An unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposesnod u t i e s
; it affords no protection; it creates no offi
c e ; i t i s , i n l eg a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n , inoperative, as if it
had not been passed.But if we take the unorthodox view, as
the SC did, the action couldstill prosper. The period from 1945
when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when itwas declared
unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose
ofprescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative
during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59).
Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could
not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt.

Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that

his respect foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to
collect.A r t . 7 of the Civil Code which provides
that, "When the c o u r t sd e c l a r e a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be voidand the
latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.

HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC

Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at

redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is
the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the
Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender
the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so
that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC
rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to
the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against

TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker
beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its
implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as
two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs.
Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO,
it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as
vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the

Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary
Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution
89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to
the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two
groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory
Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions
before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation
of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received those
benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent
really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.

The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to
review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the
report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and
(2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition
scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and
subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land
acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was
assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of

Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of
CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

ISSUES AND RESPECTIVE RULINGS:

1. Whether or not Supervisory Group, Ambala and their respective

leaders are real parties in interest?

YES.

>> HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported

leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA, i.e., Julio Suniga,
Windsor Andaya, and Rene Galang, who filed the revocatory petitions
before the DAR. As HLI would have it, Galang, the self-styled head of
AMBALA, gained HLI employment in June 1990 and, thus, could not
have been a party to the SDOA executed a year earlier. 85 As regards
the Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that supervisors are not regular
farmworkers, but the company nonetheless considered them FWBs
under the SDOA as a mere concession to enable them to enjoy the
same benefits given qualified regular farmworkers. However, if the
SDOA would be canceled and land distribution effected, so HLI claims,
citing Fortich v. Corona,86 the supervisors would be excluded from
receiving lands as farmworkers other than the regular farmworkers
who are merely entitled to the "fruits of the land."87

The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the

farmworkers who appear in the annual payroll, inclusive of the
permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically
employed by [HLI]."88 Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by
HLI, and is, thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within
the definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose
members were admittedly employed by HLI and whose names and
signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being qualified
beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are
certainly parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment
recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply
with RA 6657.

Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular
farmworkers, but are in the category of "other farmworkers" mentioned
in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, 89 thus only entitled to a share
of the fruits of the land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not
detract from the fact that they are still identified as being among the
"SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring
an action upon the SDP.

2. Constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657

CONSTITUTIONAL.
>> FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to
stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of
the Constitution.106

To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA

6657 permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer;
in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or
farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the
Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be
annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

>> The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657

and necessarily its counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail as
explained below.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or
legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential
requirements are first met, to wit:

(1) there is an actual case or controversy;

(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest

possible opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi;
and

(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.108

Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM,

composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its
failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as
early as November 21, l989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda
Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its
members received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest.
It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP
via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said
plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to
stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA.

Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the

constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the
purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the
SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor
General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the
other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA,
raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed
its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some
eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the
day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted
benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged
unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived.
The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue
that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and
the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from
the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of

constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is
properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first
opportunity.109 FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that
the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity is clearly wanting.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue
must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis
mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being
critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to
avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental act.110 If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law,
such recourse is favored.111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:

Lis Mota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will
undertake judicial review means that the Court will not pass upon a
question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application
of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show
that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.112 (Italics in the original.)

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally
taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged)
and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with
the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-
compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any
of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into
the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per
se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said
provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA

9700,113 amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of
RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In
its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "[T]hat after June 30,
2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer
to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all intents and purposes,
the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an
available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve

constitutional issues otherwise already moot and academic 114 provided
the following requisites are present:

x x x first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the

exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.

SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO

FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,
Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar.

" Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla."

On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to

whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:

"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ

POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA
COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10
AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."

On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

" Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No.

1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of
your recruitment agency ... "

On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.

Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty.
Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a
team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. The
team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

"Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at
her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the
ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the
owner thereof."

ISSUE:

May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the

Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

RULING:

NO.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
2
persons or things to be seized.

It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.

>> Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was
entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018
of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No.
1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall

have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person
engaged in illegal recruitment.

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges

of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no

longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.

Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED
to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of
Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

YMBONG VS OCHOA

Facts:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues
of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and
their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political
activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-
intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are

assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The
RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and
the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious
freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors

of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment,
as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice
on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of

mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom

is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear
and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the
right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates

the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right
to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility
they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the
management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of

the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore,
the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised,
the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of
one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the
RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy.

RULING:

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not

have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not

present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to
be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected
by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because

medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.