LEDESMA V.

CLIMACO

Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of
Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and
instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion
to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied.

Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict
between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as
counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity
to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an
opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his profession is not
contingent upon the payment of his fees.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later
on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten
wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These
respondents were represented by Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank,
'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but
is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the
shares of respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It
goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant
and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the
Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact,
the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the
filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which
the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process.
But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a
different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of
the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no
sides.
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTS
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some
students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter,
Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty.
Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which
provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with
a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and
he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty.
Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents compromise
agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and
to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise
agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty.
Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that
the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics

HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having
ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty.
Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case
filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact.
However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without
at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being
represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member
of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation
of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

COBB PEREZ vs LANTIN

A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to pay a
debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to
conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by Damaso
as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin,
issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second
writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock
approximately worth P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the
public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of
the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated
for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but
said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme
Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If
there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of
the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must
be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence despite the
patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his
client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit
of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

IN RE SOTTO

Facts:

Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily
newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be
charged with contempt of court.

Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and
imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost
good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this
high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked,
or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the
respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto is guilty of misconduct? Yes
Ratio:

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the

decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded
it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not
well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An
attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys
as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

FACTS
Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC).
Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of
its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of
majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund
amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed
its name to Precedent.
Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for
Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then
on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in
Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even
helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client
relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed
by them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt
push through.
After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for
the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez
explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know
that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first
900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued
communicating and he continued sending her money for the case.
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his
family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail,
as follows:

Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and
lawyer.
------------
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very
well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands
off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all
the work.
-----------
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give
him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise.
TRUST me! ----
Candy

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never
happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to
evade him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUE
Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELD
Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting
interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually
led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to
complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she
was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties
who had been referred to her by the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was
either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing
the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as
counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-
dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him
legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez
impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was
also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that
she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

Facts:

Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief
executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985.

Hocorma Foundation further alleged that in 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action for quieting of title an
d damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of a client.

Issue:

whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the
CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

Ruling:

Yes. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is und
eniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after termi
nating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another cli
ent, without the foundations written consent.

This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyers part does not
make it inoperative.

Atty. Richard Funk was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

LICUANAN V. MELO

Facts:
Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics. Atty. Melo
was Licuanans counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to
her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was
only after a year from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because
a demand made by the latter.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals collected
Held:
Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.
Ratio:
The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1 year period, the
mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is deprived of its use, and
withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyers
Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melos
professional misconduct, he has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melos
unprofessional actuations considered, the SC finds him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character.

BAUTISTA V. GONZALES

Facts:
Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales
agreed to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the
property in litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados
is valid

Held:
No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados.
However, the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between
Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public
policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer
and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions

MANALANG V. ANGELES

FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and
separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the
National Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in
the amount of P6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without
authority from his clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the
amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles
refused and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650.
Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they
insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount
discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees
and other administrative expenses." Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition
meant that he "would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.

ISSUE:
 Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of
law because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.

HELD
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not
meant solely to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed
of that good moral character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and
continuing in the practice thereof.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise
effected by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned . A client has every right to expect
from his counsel that nothing will be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly
applied. By compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only
went against the stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the
interest of his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so
doing, he violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of
and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear
breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and
other administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory.
Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's
liens. The records of this case are barren of any statement of respondent's claims for lien or payment
of his alleged disbursements. Nor did respondent present any showing that he caused written
notices of his lien on the money judgment to be served upon his clients and to the losing party
His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative
of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which
he had no right. He appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity
should refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by way
of mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months suspension
appears to us in order.

GARCIA V. CA

FACTS:

Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ring which they bought from
Rebullida.
Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea restaurant, she
recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she bought it, which Garcia
answered from her comadre.
Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Garcia
handed the ring to Guevara and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of
Guevarra, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, Garcia and her attorney
proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question.
Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded
that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to Garcia
who despite a written request failed to deliver the ring to Guevara.
Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it
was lost.
Garciass defense was that they denied having made any admission before Guevara or Mr.
Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring was purchased by her from Mrs.
Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring,
who was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring
plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner
the big diamond was never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to
weigh 2.57 cts, unlike the one claimed by Guevara spouse.
Apparently Garcias own counsel admitted through an answer that the ring in question
was the same ring, which is being claimed by the Guevara spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth of certain facts

HELD:
NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made by her
counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such, has the
authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose
of the litigation... Garcias proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is futile
because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with
another ring of the same value, was rather remote.
The rings identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose testimony is
entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business
Indeed, Garcia made no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and
stock card told Guevara that that was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of
demand,asserting ownership.
None of the people whom she mentioned, was able to corroborate the story of how she
bought the ring.

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA

Facts:
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of nullity of
certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter his charging lien
equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as atty fees. The court granted and the
attys lien was annotated on the TCTs. The cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance
of the plaintiffs therein. Thus the Bank now had the TCTs in its name and the attys lien was carried
over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted the motion
and fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the lien?

Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings.
A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a
condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to
fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were
rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no
authority to fix a charging lien.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in
the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money
claim.