In Re Able Laboratories

Case 2:05-cv-02681-JAG-MCA Document 66-1 Filed 06/19/2006 Page 1 of 108
GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.

Stuart M. Grant
Megan D. McIntyre
James R. Banko (JB-9686)
Sharan Nirmul
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 N. Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Telephone: (302) 622-7000
Facsimile: (302) 622-7100
MURRAY, FRANK & SAILER LLP

Brian P. Murray
Bradley P. Dyer
Scott Levy
275 Madison Avenue
8th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (212) 682-1818
Facsimile: (212) 682-1892
Co-Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiffs and the Class
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
In re ABLE LABORATORIES Master File No. 05-CV-2681 (JAG) (MCA)

SECURITIES LITIGATION
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

This is a securities class action brought by Lead Plaintiffs Denver Employees Retirement
Plan and Deka International (Ireland) Limited (together, Lead Plaintiffs), by and through their
attorneys, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. and Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP, on behalf of all persons
and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired securities issued by Able Laboratories, Inc.
(Able or the Company), between October 30, 2002 and May 18, 2005, inclusive (the Class
Period). Lead Plaintiffs and the class are collectively referred to herein as Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege the following upon information and belief, except as to those allegations
concerning Lead Plaintiffs which are alleged upon personal knowledge. Plaintiffs information
and belief is based upon, among other things, their investigation, conducted by and through their
attorneys, into the facts and circumstances alleged herein including, without limitation: (a)
review and analysis of statements made in certain filings by Able with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); (b) review and analysis of certain press releases,
public statements, news articles, regulatory reports, and other publications disseminated by or
concerning Able and related parties; (c) review and analysis of statements made at certain Able
press conferences, analyst conference calls and conferences, and on Ables corporate website; (d)
review and analysis of securities analyst reports concerning Able and its operations; (e) review
and analysis of United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) materials; (f) review and
analysis of certain other information, documents, and materials concerning Able and the
Defendants named herein; and (g) interviews with former Able employees.
Plaintiffs believe that further substantial evidentiary support will exist for the allegations
in this Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the Complaint) after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery. Many of the facts supporting the allegations contained herein are known only to the
Defendants or are exclusively within their custody and/or control.

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. Plaintiffs bring this securities fraud action against former Able officers and/or
directors Dhananjay G. Wadekar, Shashikant C. Shah, Robert J. Mauro, Garth Boehm, and Iva
Klemick (collectively, the Defendants) to recover damages sustained in connection with the
Defendants fraudulent material misrepresentations, omissions, and conduct regarding Ables
purported profitability, FDA compliance, adherence to quality control, and ability to manufacture
marketable generic drugs.
2. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants falsely presented Able as a
turnaround story reporting triple-digit increases in revenues and earnings. Revenues grew
from less than $20 million in 2001 to over $100 million in 2004. Unbeknownst to investors,
however, the turnaround was a fiction sustained through Defendants misrepresentations and
non-disclosures concerning Ables compliance with federal regulations and statutes governing
testing, manufacture, labeling, storage, record keeping, drug approval, and quality control.
Defendants issued false and misleading statements throughout the Class Period proclaiming the
purported success of Ables product pipeline and its ever-increasing sales and profitability, all
the while concealing from investors and regulators that it had obtained FDA approvals for its
products through falsification and manipulation of test results and submission of incomplete and
inaccurate reports to the FDA, and that the stability and strength of its products were not as
represented. Once the truth was revealed to the public, the Company was forced to withdraw all
of its products from the market and shutdown its operations, and the price of Ables common
stock plummeted.
3. As a result of the Defendants fraud and misrepresentations, Plaintiffs purchased
Able securities at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiffs suffered
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significant losses when the price of these securities collapsed after the Defendants fraud was
revealed.
II. JURISDICTION & VENUE
4. This action arises pursuant to Sections 10(b), 18, 20(a), and 20A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78r, 78t(a) and 78t-1; and Rule
10b-5 promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. The
jurisdiction of this Court is based on Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa; and on
Sections 1331 and 1337(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a).
5. Venue is proper in this District under Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
78aa, and Section 1391(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1391(b). The principal executive
office of the Company is located in this District and many, if not all, of the acts and transactions
complained of herein, including the preparation and dissemination of materially false and
misleading information, and the underlying violations of FDA regulations by the Defendants,
occurred in this District. Further, the majority of the individual defendants are believed to reside
in this District, including Garth Boehm, Shashikant C. Shah, and Iva Klemick.
6. In connection with the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendants, directly and
indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including the United
States mails and the facilities of the national securities exchanges.
III. PARTIES AND RELEVANT NON-PARTIES
A. Able Laboratories, Inc.
7. During the Class Period, Able was a New Jersey-based company that was
engaged in the development, manufacture, and sale of generic drugs in the form of tablets,
capsules, suppositories, and liquids. It provided products for pain relief, tension headaches,
muscle relaxant, anxiety disorder, anti-diarrhea, hemorrhoids, rheumatoid arthritis, manic-
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depressive illness, attention disorder, bacterial vaginosis, anti-angina, urinary tract analgesic,
obesity, and nausea. The Company was organized in 1988 under the name DynaGen, Inc., and
changed its name to Able Laboratories, Inc. in 2001. In May 2005, the Company suspended
manufacturing and distribution of its entire product line, and recalled all of its products, because
an investigation had uncovered severe laboratory testing and quality control problems. On July
18, 2005, Able filed a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, Trenton Division.
Able committed numerous violations of Sections 10(b) and 18 of the Exchange Act, and but for
its bankruptcy, Able would be named as a defendant herein.
B. Lead Plaintiffs
8. Lead Plaintiff Denver Employees Retirement Plan (DERP) is a defined benefit
plan which provides retirement benefits to qualified members of the City and County of Denver
and Denver Health and Hospital Authority. DERP has more than 17,000 members and more
than $1.84 billion in assets.
9. Lead Plaintiff Deka International (Ireland) Limited (Deka) is a fund
management company which directs and controls investments in various securities around the
world on behalf of about 600 funds it manages and administers. Deka has EUR3.5 billion under
management.
10. Lead Plaintiffs each purchased shares of Able common stock during the Class
Period, as set forth in the Certifications previously filed with the Court, and suffered substantial
damages as a result of the wrongful conduct complained of herein.
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C. Defendants
11. Defendant Dhananjay G. Wadekar (Wadekar) was, at the time of Ables
product recalls in May 2005, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer,
and Secretary of the Company. He had served as Chairman of the Board of Directors since April
2002, CEO since October 2001, and Secretary since November 1998. In addition, Defendant
Wadekar was an Executive Vice President at Able from November 1991 until March 2001,
Treasurer from November 1998 until November 2002, and President from March 2001 until
April 2004. The Company announced Wadekars resignation on May 19, 2005, within hours
after announcing the suspension of sales of all of its products. Wadekar signed each of the
Companys Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings with the SEC during the Class Period.
12. Defendant Robert J. Mauro (Mauro) was President, Chief Operating Officer,
and a Director of Able from April 2004 through the end of the Class Period. Defendant Mauro
assumed the role of Interim CEO after the resignation of Defendant Wadekar on May 19, 2005.
Shortly thereafter, on July 7, 2005, Mauro resigned as President, Interim CEO, and a director of
the Company. Mauro signed the Companys 2004 Form 10-K, filed on March 15, 2005.
13. Defendant Shashikant C. Shah (Shah) joined Able in 1999 and served as Vice
President of Quality Control and Regulatory since February 2000. Defendant Shahs duties
included ensuring that Able complied with FDA and DEA regulations, filing and receiving FDA
approvals for Ables Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) submissions, and
maintaining high quality products. Defendant Shah resigned from his executive position in
December 2004, but continued to serve as a Quality Control consultant to the Company after that
date, with compensation of $150,000 per year. The Companys public statements regarding its
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quality controls and regulatory compliance during the Class Period, including statements in its
SEC filings and press releases, were prepared by or under the direction of Shah.
14. Defendant Garth Boehm, Ph.D. (Boehm) served as Senior Vice President and
Chief Scientific Officer of Able from April 2004 through the end of the Class Period, a position
placing him in charge of directing all research and development activities. Defendant Boehm
has over 23 years experience as a research and development executive, and he holds a Ph.D. in
Physical & Inorganic Chemistry from the University of Adelaide, Australia.
15. Defendant Iva Klemick (Klemick) was Ables Director of Regulatory Affairs
from January 1, 2000 through April 2005. Previously, from November 1999 until January 2000,
she was the Companys Director of Quality Affairs and Quality Controls. In April 2005,
Klemick was appointed Vice President of Compliance. in charge of ensuring the Company
followed federal, state and local regulations. As Vice President of Compliance, Ms. Klemick
reported directly to the President and Chief Operating Officer, Defendant Mauro.
16. The Defendants, by reason of their management positions and/or membership on
Ables Board of Directors, were at all relevant times controlling persons of Able within the
meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Defendants had the power and influence to
cause Able to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct alleged herein, and did exercise such
power and influence.
17. As a direct result of the positions they held within the Company, the Defendants
had access to the material adverse information that went undisclosed in the Companys
documents filed with the SEC and published in various press releases throughout the Class
Period. Given their positions, the Defendants had access to internal corporate documents
(including the Companys operating plans, budgets and forecasts, correspondence with the FDA,
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and reports of actual operations compared thereto), conversations and connections with other
corporate officers and employees, attendance at management and Board of Directors meetings
and committees thereof, and via reports and other information provided to them in connection
therewith.
IV. CONFIDENTIAL WITNESSES
18. Numerous former Able employees have provided Lead Plaintiffs with information
concerning Ables fraudulent scheme to conceal its grave quality control problems and falsify
quality control results during the Class Period. These witnesses gave information on a
confidential basis, and each is designated herein as CW__, as stated below.
19. CW1 is a former Quality Control Laboratory Instrumentation Supervisor who
worked at Able from 2003 through October 2005.
20. CW2 is a former Quality Compliance Auditor and Documentation Control
Analyst who worked at Able from August 2000 through June 2005.
21. CW3 is a former Quality Assurance inspector who was employed at Able in 2001.
22. CW4 is a former Senior Analytical Chemist and Supervisor who was employed
by Able from 1997 through December 2004.
23. CW5 is a former Compliance Supervisor in Quality Control who was employed at
Ables South Plainfield facility from January 2003 through June 2005.
V. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
24. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all persons who purchased or
otherwise acquired Ables publicly traded securities between October 30, 2002 and May 18,
2005, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are Able and the
Defendants; members of the immediate family of any of the Defendants; all subsidiaries and
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affiliates of Able; the directors, officers and employees of Able and its subsidiaries, affiliates or
insurers; all entities in which any excluded person has a controlling interest; and the legal
representatives, heirs, successors, assigns or insurers of any excluded person.
25. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. As of February 15, 2005, there were approximately 18,425,000 shares of Able
common stock outstanding. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs
at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Able reported in its Form
10-K filed on March 15, 2005, that on February 15, 2005, there were approximately 1,786
holders of record of common stock, and that it believed there to be a substantial number of
additional holders who held their stock in street name through brokerage firms. As such,
Plaintiffs believe that the Class members number in the thousands. Record owners and other
members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Able and/or its transfer
agents and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using a form of notice similar
to that customarily used in securities class actions.
26. Lead Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, as
all members of the Class were similarly affected by Defendants wrongful conduct in violation of
the Exchange Act as complained of herein.
27. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the
Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.
28. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the
questions of law and fact common to the Class are:
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(a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants acts and
omissions as alleged herein;
(b) whether Defendants participated in and pursued the common course of
conduct complained of herein;
(c) whether documents, press releases, and other statements disseminated to
the investing public and the Companys shareholders during the Class Period misrepresented
material facts or omitted to state material facts;
(d) whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the
Class Period misrepresented and/or omitted to disclose material facts;
(e) with respect to Plaintiffs Section 10(b) claim, whether Defendants acted
with scienter;
(f) whether the market price of Ables common stock during the Class Period
was artificially inflated due to the misrepresentations and omissions complained of herein; and
(g) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the
proper measure of damages.
29. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as
the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and
burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually
redress the wrongs done to them. Plaintiffs foresee no difficulty in the management of this suit
as a class action.
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VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Historical Background Regarding the Company
30. Ables predecessor, DynaGen, Inc. (DynaGen), was formed in 1988. From
1988 through 1996, DynaGen focused primarily on developing new drugs and licensing the
resulting products and technologies to other companies. Beginning in 1996, however, DynaGen
began to shift its focus to manufacturing and distribution. To this end, DynaGen acquired the
company then known as Able Laboratories, Inc. (Old Able Labs), a generic drug development
and manufacturing business which, prior to its acquisition by DynaGen, was a subsidiary of
ALPHARMA, Inc. Then, in 1997 and 1998, respectively, DynaGen acquired Superior
Pharmaceutical Company (Superior) and Generic Distributors, Inc. (GDI), both of which
were distribution operations. Old Able Labs, Superior, and GDI each became subsidiaries of
DynaGen.
31. DynaGen had trouble competing in both the manufacturing and distribution fora.
As an initial matter, Superior and GDI mainly sold the products of DynaGens competitors and
thus were doing little to help DynaGen succeed. Moreover, the combination of Old Able Labs
manufacturing business and the Superior and GDI distribution businesses did not yield the
strategic advantages that DynaGen had anticipated. On the contrary, DynaGen found that this
combination caused both financial and managerial division.
32. In 2000, DynaGen decided to divest itself of its distribution operations and
continue solely as a developer and manufacturer of generic drugs. To this end, DynaGen sold
GDI and Superior in December 2000 and February 2001, respectively.
33. On May 18, 2001, DynaGen merged with its remaining subsidiary, Old Able
Labs, and the combined company assumed the name Able Laboratories, Inc. Able continued its
business as a manufacturer and developer of generic drugs in tablet, capsule, and suppository
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form. At the time of the merger, Able had received approvals of eight ANDAs from the FDA
and was awaiting FDA approval for twelve additional ANDAs.
34. Armed with a new name, Able tried to shake off the failures of the DynaGen era
and quickly began to portray itself as a corporate turnaround story. The dissolution of a consent
decree under which Old Able Labs had been operating since April 8, 1992 was critical to its
ability to sell that story. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey had
entered the consent decree against Old Able Labs based on its failure to comply with the FDAs
current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs).
35. The cGMPs for finished pharmaceuticals, codified at 21 C.F.R. 211, et seq., are
FDA regulations setting forth the minimum current good practices for preparation of drug
products for administration to humans. They regulate such matters as the organization and
responsibilities of manufacturers quality control units; the qualifications and responsibilities of
personnel involved in the manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of drug products; the
design and construction features of drug manufacturing, processing, packing, and holding
facilities; requirements for control systems to prevent contamination or mix-ups; criteria to be
met by equipment used in the manufacture, processing, packing, and holding of drug products;
control and testing of components and drug product containers and closures; production and
process controls, including testing, to ensure that drug products have the identity, strength,
quality, and purity they are represented to possess; packaging and labeling controls; laboratory
controls; testing of each batch of drug product prior to release for distribution; stability testing;
and the maintenance of records and reports.
36. On March 20, 2002, Able proudly announced the dissolution of the consent
decree. In a press release announcing the dissolution, Able assured the investing public that the
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Company had reformed its operations, and that the events that had led to the entry of the consent
decree would not be repeated. Specifically, the Company stated:
Able has been subject to a consent decree entered by the court on

April 8, 1992 in United States v. Able Laboratories, Inc., Civ. No.
91-4916 (D.N.J.) based on the alleged failure to comply with FDA
current good manufacturing practices (cGMP). Able has been
operating under this consent decree since April 1992. The
individuals named in the original court order are no longer
employed by Able. Over the past three years, the Companys
management has made substantial commitments, both
operationally and financially, to enhance the plant and equipment
and, thereby improve its operations. In order to ensure continued
cGMP compliance, Able made key management changes, hired
individuals who were knowledgeable and committed to cGMP
compliance, and instituted operational procedures that enforce
cGMP compliance. In addition, the Company initiated and is
continuing to provide cGMP training on a regularly scheduled
basis to its employees.
We are extremely pleased to have the consent decree dissolved,

stated Jay Wadekar, President and Chief Executive Officer of Able
Laboratories, Inc. We have added key members to our
management team who are committed to cGMP compliance. The
dissolution of the consent decree is a recognition of our efforts
and continued commitment to maintaining the highest possible
quality in our products and operations.
(Emphasis added).
37. Following the dissolution of the consent decree, Able posted impressive increases
in earnings and revenues and succeeded in bringing a number of new products to market. These
significant changes did not go unnoticed in the financial community. In fact, Able secured a spot
on the NASDAQ SmallCap Market effective November 19, 2002, trading under the symbol
ABRX. Soon thereafter, in February 2003, the Companys stock began trading on the
NASDAQ National Market. Ables common stock was also listed and traded on the Boston
Stock Exchange (under the symbol AAB) from the beginning of the Class Period until
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November 4, 2003, when the Company withdrew it from that exchange due to its listing on the
NASDAQ National Market.
38. On June 30, 2003, the Company announced a private placement of common stock
at $19 per share. This private placement generated $30.4 million in gross proceeds for the
Company.
39. In a further vote of confidence for the Companys apparent success, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) began listing options in the Companys common stock
under the ticker symbol QAF on August 1, 2003.
40. On September 24, 2003, Able announced that it had signed a lease for a new
facility at One Able Drive, Cranbury, New Jersey (the Cranbury Facility). The Company
stated that it intended to consolidate all of its operations including manufacturing, quality
control, research & development, and its executive offices into the Cranbury Facility during the
second half of 2004.
41. By November 2003, Ables business appeared to be doing so well that it was
added to the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index effective November 24, 2003. To qualify for
inclusion on that index, securities must meet minimum requirements including market value,
average daily trading volume, and among other things, must have been seasoned on NASDAQ
or another recognized market for at least 6 months.
42. Also during 2003, Able became interested in entering the market for liquid
pharmaceuticals. To this end, it purchased the assets of LiquiSource, Inc., a privately held
developer and manufacturer of prescription generic liquid pharmaceuticals, on November 18,
2003. Soon thereafter, in December 2003, Able purchased the facility at 6 Hollywood Court,
South Plainfield, New Jersey (the South Plainfield Facility), which it had previously leased for
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its manufacturing operations and administrative offices, as the future site for its liquid
pharmaceutical manufacturing operations.
43. Following the LiquiSource acquisition, Able hired a number of executives to
assist in the Companys continued growth. On April 27, 2004, Able announced the hiring of
defendant Mauro to fill the position of President and Chief Operating Officer, and of defendant
Boehm as Senior Vice President and Chief Scientific Officer. Defendant Wadekar made clear
that Boehm would play a substantial role in the Companys research and development activities,
stating:
We are delighted to have a person of Garths caliber join Able.

We are expanding our research and development scope to include
modified release solids and liquids. Garths experience and
knowledge of various drug delivery systems, product development
and regulatory strategies will allow us to address more complex
formulations . . . Garth will be directing all our research and
development activities.
44. On September 7, 2004, Able announced that it had hired Joan Janulis as Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs. Janulis took that position over from defendant Shah, who was
forced to resign effective December 30, 2004.
45. On May 6, 2005, Able announced that it had signed an exclusive Development
Agreement with InvaGen, Inc. for generic pharmaceutical products. The Agreement with
InvaGen related to six products with an estimated market of $10.3 billion. Wadekar touted the
benefits Able could expect to receive from the InvaGen agreement, stating:
The six products with InvaGen represent a substantial market for

generic products expected to be launched over the next three to
four years. With this collaboration as well as other business
development efforts in conjunction with our own internal
development portfolio we hope to further strengthen our position
in the generic pharmaceutical market.
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46. While the Company seemed unstoppable, its operations would quickly grind to a
halt during the latter half of May 2005. As set forth below, the Companys seemingly strong
business was a house of cards built upon a shaky foundation of regulatory violations, intentional
misconduct, false statements, and fraudulent omissions.
B. Defendants Fraudulent Concealment of Severe Quality Control and Product

Testing Deficiencies and of its Non-Compliance With Regulatory Standards
47. To obtain approval to manufacture and market a generic drug, a company must
submit an ANDA to the FDA. Generic drug applications are termed abbreviated because they
generally do not require clinical or animal research data to establish their safety and
effectiveness. Instead, generic drug applicants must provide scientific evidence that their
product and the brand name drug are bioequivalent (i.e., they perform in the same manner);
contain the same active ingredients; are identical in strength, dosage form, and route of
administration; have the same use indications; and meet the same batch requirements for identity,
strength, purity, and quality. Bioequivalence may be demonstrated by laboratory or human
studies demonstrating that the dissolution rate (i.e., the time it takes for the drug to be absorbed
into the body) falls within acceptable limits as compared to the brand name product. The
applicant must also demonstrate that its product is manufactured in accordance with the FDAs
strict cGMP regulations.
48. After a drug application is approved, federal regulations require the manufacturer
to continue testing its products, and to submit certain post-approval reports, including reports of
adverse drug experiences and out of specification test results. 21 C.F.R. 314.80, 314.81.
Reports of out-of-specification (OOS) results, known as NDA-Field Alert Reports, must be made
within three working days after the company becomes aware of a problem, even if the problem
has not been confirmed. In addition, the applicant must submit annual reports to the FDA each
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year following approval of an ANDA, containing any test results or other information from the
previous year that might affect the FDAs previous conclusions about the safety or effectiveness
of the product.
49. Making prescription medicine is a study in precision. The smallest detail -- room
temperature, blending speed, drying time, tablet compression, coating thickness -- can
significantly affect strength or purity. Laboratory testing makes the system work, and it allowed
Able to exploit the system in various ways. Samples taken at each step -- scoops of chemicals
from blending vats and drying ovens, and handfuls of tablets and capsules from batches of
finished product -- are supposed to be tested to ensure their compliance with specifications.
Dozens of people must sign off in log books, reports, and validation statements regarding the
testing process and results. When samples do not meet specifications, chemists and laboratory
technicians are supposed to document the deviation and produce an explanation.
50. As Defendants and Able knew, in light of the number of drug manufacturers in
the United States and the limited resources of the FDA, it is impossible for [the] FDA to
achieve uniformly intensive CGMP inspectional coverage for all registered drug facilities. See
Risk-Based Method for Prioritizing CGMP Inspections of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Sites
A Pilot Risk Ranking Model, p. 4.1 Indeed, since 1980, the number of drug-manufacturing
plants the FDA regulates has increased fourfold, while budget cuts have reduced the number of
cGMP human drug inspections by more than 60 percent. In or around 2004, New Jersey -- the
epicenter of the global drug industry had only 50 FDA inspectors responsible for more than
4,000 pharmaceutical, cosmetics, medical device, and processed-food plants across the state.
With more than 80 facilities per FDA inspector, the FDA relied heavily on scientists and
1
http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp2004/risk_based.pdf
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technicians to submit truthful and accurate reports, while the FDA followed a risk-based
approach to its on-site cGMP inspections, focusing primarily on manufacturers of vital
medicines and those that posed the most risk to consumers.
51. For nearly three years, from mid-2002 until May 2005, the Defendants conspired
to falsify test results, tamper with computer data, forge records, and submit false and incomplete
data to the FDA. In numerous ANDAs submitted during the Class Period, Able fabricated in-
house test data to meet FDA standards. Once the applications were approved, the Company
misrepresented the strength and shelf life of its products in its post-approval reports, with
supervisors manually altering test results in the Companys computer databases to conceal non-
compliance with specifications. This allowed the Company to continue selling its products, and
to report ever-increasing sales and profits, despite serious and unresolved problems with the
quality of its products.
52. A staple of every drug laboratory is the dissolution test, in which mechanical
paddles stir canisters of liquid to test how fast active ingredients are released. At Able, results of
dissolution tests were routinely manipulated so the Company could report passing results, even
when actual results showed that its products failed the tests miserably. For example, an FDA
report issued after the end of the Class Period revealed that, during the Class Period, the
Companys dissolution testing of one of its batches of Atenolol 25 mg tablets showed a
dissolution rate of 30.9%, where the FDA standards required the rate to be not less than 85%. In
its FDA reports, the Company had represented the test result as 102.8%.
53. Another standard piece of testing equipment, called a chromatograph, helps
measure a medications precise chemical composition and shelf life. Results of Ables
chromatograph tests were also manipulated to conceal failing test results. For example, FDA
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specifications call for 30-milligram tablets of acetominaphen and codeine phosphate tablets (the
equivalent of Tylenol with codeine) to contain less than 6% codeine phosphate. According to an
FDA report issued after the end of the Class Period, Ables testing found 8.3%, but the lab
reported the result as 5.5%.
54. In January and February of 2004, an FDA inspector visited the South Plainfield
Facility to determine the Companys compliance with Postmarketing Adverse Drug Experience
(PADE) reporting requirements, and concluded that the Company had failed to comply with
Section 505(k)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and 21 C.F.R. 314.80. In
particular, the FDA found that:
(a) The Company failed to report to the FDA regarding 27 adverse drug
experience reports the Company received between January 2002 and January 2004; and
(b) The Company had not developed adequate written procedures for the
surveillance, receipt, evaluation, and reporting of PADEs to the FDA.
55. In a warning letter to Able on April 19, 2004 regarding the results of its January-
February 2004 inspection, the FDA stated: The specific violations noted in this letter are
serious and may be symptomatic of serious underlying problems. You are responsible for
investigating and determining the causes of the violations identified above and preventing
recurrence of similar violations.
56. The FDA was correct that the problems identified in its early 2004 inspections
were symptomatic of serious underlying problems. In particular, they were symptomatic of a
flagrant disregard for FDA regulations, and for the safety of consumers. However, the Company
did not heed the FDAs warning and did nothing to address those systemic problems.
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57. The nature and extent of the malfeasance by Defendants and Able is perhaps best
understood by reference to the FDAs report of Inspectional Observations on Form 483, dated
July 1, 2005 and amended on July 6, 2005 (the Form 483). The Form 483 was issued six
weeks after the end of the Class Period, after Able had ceased operations and recalled its entire
product line, and after four FDA inspectors had made 29 visits to the Company over eight weeks
in response to reports of quality control problems at Able. During those visits, the FDA
inspectors compared annual reports -- summaries of data about stability, purity, consistency, and
adverse reactions -- against a number of laboratory notebooks and chemical-validation tests.
Ultimately, the FDA issued the Form 483 containing 12 observations regarding deficiencies in
Ables quality control system, reporting, laboratory control system, and production, which had
existed during the Class Period.
58. The FDAs first observation was that Ables quality control unit lacked authority
to fully investigate errors that occurred. As a result, the Company released products into the
marketplace that did not meet FDA specifications. As the FDA explained:
The Quality Unit and Senior Management failed to assure all drug
products distributed have the safety, identity, quality and purity
that they are represented to possess. The Quality Unit failed to:
review electronic data as part of batch release, review computer
audit trails in the Waters Empower Data Acquisition System and
provide adequate training to analytical chemists. These practices
led to the Quality Unit releasing batches of drug products which
failed to meet in-process, finished product and stability
specifications. These practices also led to the submission of
erroneous data in Annual Reports and Prior Approval Supplement
#004, for ANDA 75-838, which requested discontinuance of Blend
Uniformity testing for Propoxyphene Napsylate and
Acetaminophen 100mg/650 mg Tablets. The lack of Quality
oversight resulted in: the ceasing of manufacturing on [May 19,
2005], the ceasing of distribution of all drug products on [May 13,
2005], the recall of all batches (3,184) of drug products and the
withdrawal of at least five Abbreviated New Drug Applications.
20
59. In its second observation, the FDA found that Able failed to reject drug products
which should have been rejected due to failure to meet established standards, specifications, and
quality control criteria. As the FDA explained, these products were instead re-tested until
satisfactory results were obtained, whereupon the Company reported those results and failed to
disclose the earlier testing failures:
Samples of drug products were routinely resampled, and re-

injected or reprocessed in the Waters, Empower Data Acquisition
System during testing in the QC Laboratory when out of
specification (OOS) results were obtained. There were no
Laboratory Investigations into OOS results or notebook
documentation available to explain the re-injection or retesting of
in-process, finished product and stability samples which did not
meet specifications. The OOS results were not reported and within
specification results from reprocessed or re-injected samples were
reported on: In-Process Specification, Product Specification and
Stability Study Specification Release Reports and Stability
Summary Reports.
60. The Form 483 went on to identify 22 batches of drug products which were
released after receiving out of specification (OOS) test results, most of them with multiple OOS
results:
PRODUCT/BATCH SAMPLE SPECIFICATION ORIGINAL OOS REPORTED

RESULT RESULT
Acetaminophen & In-Process RSD 5.0% Codeine Phosphate Codeine Phosphate
Codeine Phosphate Blend RSD: 5.4% RSD: 3.8%
Tablet, 300/30mg Uniformity
Batch 502022 Testing
Acetaminophen & Finished RSD 6.0% Codeine Phosphate Codeine Phosphate
Codeine Phosphate Product Content Uniformity: Content Uniformity:
Tablet, 300/30mg Testing 8.3% 5.5%
Batch 407148
Atenolol 25 mg Stability Not less than 85% Dissolution, Tablet Dissolution, Tablet
Tablet Validation Sample D5 = 83.7% D5 = 98.9%
Batch 408107A 3 mo RT D6 = 83.8% D6 = 98.7%
Atenolol 25 mg Stability Not less than 85% Dissolution Testing Dissolution Testing
Tablet Validation Sample Tablet D6 = 30.9% Tablet D6 = 102.8%
Batch 408107B 3 mo RT
Atenolol 25 mg Stability Not less than 85% Dissolution, Tablet Dissolution, Tablet
Tablet Sample D5 = 83.7% D5 = 98.9%
Test Batch TB-203E 3 mo RT D6 = 83.8% D6 = 98.7%
21
Bethanechol Chloride Stability 90% - 115% Assay Assay

10 mg Tablet Sample A1 = 89.6% A1 = 99.5%
Validation Batch 9 mo RT
404042A
Diphenoxylate HCl In-Process 85% - 115% Blender Location: Blender Location:
and Atropine Sulfate Blend BR1 = 128.5% BR1 = 99.5%
Tablets Uniformity ML2 = 158.3% ML2 = 101.6%
Batch 404006 Testing TL2 = 117.6% TL2 = 108.3%
Diphenoxylate HCl In-Process 85% - 115% Blender Location: Blender Location:
and Atropine Sulfate Blend TR1 = 145.9% TR1 = 96.9%
Tablets Uniformity
Diphenoxylate HCl Stability 80% - 120% Assay Assay
and Atropine Sulfate Sample A1 = 78.4% A1 = 90.4%
Tablets 21 mo RT A2 = 78.7% A2 = 90.8%
Batch 301068A
Tablets 21 mo RT A2 = 77.5% A2 = 89.8%
Batch 301068B
Tablets 21 mo RT A2 = 78.4% A2 = 90.7%
Batch 301068C
Dytan Suspension Finished 90% - 110% Assay Beginning Assay Beginning
25mg/5ml Product A2 = 89.2% A2 = 97.9%
Batch L409001 Testing
Methylphenidate HCl Finished 25% - 45% Tablet: Tablet:
Tablets, 20 mg Product (Dissolution, 1 D1 = 48.9% D1 = 43.4%
Extended Release Testing hour) D2 = 49.0% D2 = 43.3%
Batch 303087 D3 = 48.2% D3 = 42.4%
Methylphenidate HCl Finished 93% - 107% Assay Assay
Tablets, 5 mg Product A1 = 90.0% A1 = 98.4%
Batch 412184 Testing A2 = 90.0% A2 = 98.5%
Nitroglycerine 0.4mg Finished 90% - 115% Assay Assay
Sublingual Tablets Product A1 = 75.8% A1 = 101.5%
Prochlorperazine Stability Not more than Unknown impurities Highest unknown
Suppositories, 2.5 mg Sample 0.2% 0.52% impurities
Batch 308029A 12 mo RT 0.73% 0.04%
Prochlorperazine Stability Not more than Unknown impurities Highest unknown
Suppositories, 5 mg Sample 0.2% 0.44% impurities
Batch 308030A 12 mo RT 0.56% 0.14%
Propoxyphene Stability Not less than 80% Dissolution Dissolution
Napsylate and APAP Sample D1 = 72.8% D1 = 98.5%
Tablets, 100/650 mg 12 mo RT D5 = 73.2% D5 = 96.9%
Batch 303110A
Propoxyphene Stability 90% - 110% Assay Assay
Napsylate and APAP Sample Propoxyphene Propoxyphene
Tablets, 100/650 mg 6 mo RT A2 = 89.9% A2 = 95.9%
22
Batch 104026B
Validation Batch
Propoxyphene Stability 90% - 110% Assay Assay
Napsylate and APAP Sample Propoxyphene Propoxyphene
Tablets, 100/650 mg 24 mo RT A1 = 89.9% A1 = 100.5%
Batch 201016C Assay APAP Assay APAP
A1 = 88.7% A1 = 98.9%
Propoxyphene Finished 85% - 115% Content Uniformity Content Uniformity
Napsylate and APAP Product Propoxyphene Propoxyphene
Tablets, 100/650 mg Testing CU5 = 117.8% CU5 = 104.2%
Batch 312015
Propoxyphene In-Process 90% - 110% Propoxyphene Propoxyphene
Napsylate and APAP Blend TL1 = 238.5% TL1 = 103.2%
Tablets, 100/650 mg Uniformity TR1 = 80.5% TR1 = 104.0%
Batch 310158 Testing APAP APAP
TL1 = 218.9% TL1 = 105.6%
61. The third observation by the FDA concerned Ables non-disclosure of adverse
information in post-approval reports submitted to the FDA. Specifically, the FDA noted that the
annual reports prepared by Able did not include reports of investigations involving chemical or
physical properties which, as new information, might affect FDAs previous conclusions about
the safety or effectiveness of the drug. The FDA found that, in five annual reports and one prior
approval supplement prepared by Able concerning ANDAs, Able did not include out of
specification results, and instead included only passing data points. Because of the erroneous
data submitted by Able, it eventually withdrew the applications for these proposed new drug
products. These included:
a. ANDA #75-838 (Proxyphene Napsylate and APAP tablets, 100/650mg),
for which the annual reports submitted on November 6, 2002 and August 24, 2004 failed to
report OOS results from stability sample testing, and for which the Prior Approval Supplement
#004 submitted on March 16, 2004 failed to report OOS results from finished product content
uniformity and in-process blend uniformity testing;
23
b. ANDA #76-032 (Methylphenidate HCl tablets, 20 mg extended release),
for which the annual report submitted on June 9, 2004 failed to report OOS results from finished
product testing;
c. ANDA #40-407 (Prochlorperazine suppositories, 2.5 mg), for which the
annual report submitted on August 11, 2004 failed to report OOS results from stability sample
testing; and
d. ANDA #40-404 (Methylphenidate HCl tablets, 5 mg), for which the
annual report submitted on May 26, 2005 failed to report OOS results from stability sample
testing.
62. The FDAs fourth observation was that [a]n NDA-Field Alert Report was not
submitted within three working days of receipt of information concerning a failure of one or
more distributed batches of a drug to meet the specifications established for it in the application.
The FDA explained: Field Alerts were not routinely filed when drug products did not meet the
specifications listed in the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). There is no SOP
covering the issuance of Field Alerts. The FDA went on to identify eight instances in which
batches of drug products failed to meet stability specifications and the Company failed to submit
the requisite Field Alerts.
63. The FDAs fifth observation concerned Ables failure to include in its laboratory
records complete data derived from all tests necessary to assure compliance with established
specifications and standards:
The QC Laboratory notebooks and binders lacked data from all

analytical testing conducted in the QC Laboratory. Laboratory
records did not include all data such as out of specification (OOS)
results, chromatograms, sample weights, and processing methods.
OOS results were substituted with passing results by Analysts and
Supervisors. The substitution of data was performed by cutting
24
and pasting of chromatograms, substituting vials, changing sample

weights and changing processing methods. For example:
Product/Batch Number Lack of Complete Data

Products and batches OOS results not documented in
listed in FDA-483, laboratory records. Unreported
point #2 OOS results found in electronic
data files.
Propoxyphene Napsylate Changed chromatogram headers
and APAP Tablets, by cutting and pasting, so during
100/650mg review all sample injections would
Batch 303110A appear to be in sequence, for
Dissolution Testing of Tablets D1
and D5
Propoxyphene Napsylate Original Sample Weights not
and APAP Tablets, recorded in notebook. Sample
100/650mg weights were changed by the
Batch 104026B analyst until a passing result was
Validation Batch obtained for Assay (A2)
Acetaminophen & Processing methods changed by
Codeine Phosphate analyst until the processing method
Tablets, 300/30mg resulted in a passing result.
Batch 407148 Original processing method not
recorded in laboratory notebook.
64. In its sixth observation, the FDA found that Able did not check the input and
output from computers and other records for accuracy. Able did not conduct audits of the
instruments used during the analysis of drug products, and [s]ample injections, processing
methods, and sample weights were not reviewed or verified for the accuracy of reported sample
results during the testing of in-process, finished product and stability samples.
65. As a seventh observation, the FDA concluded that Able did not make written
records of investigations into unexplained discrepancies and the failure of a batch or any of its
components to meet specifications. Although the Companys Quality Control Procedure SOP #
QC-021-06 required a laboratory investigation to be conducted when out of specification results
were generated, no such investigations were conducted. The FDA cited the OOS results
25
referenced in its second observation as examples of such results that were not investigated by
Able.
66. In its eighth observation, the FDA found: Employees are not given training in
current good manufacturing practices and written procedures required by current good
manufacturing practices regulations. In particular, the FDA found that the Companys QC
Laboratory analysts were not routinely trained in Quality Control procedures such as those
requiring investigations into OOS results, and that [t]his lack of training and oversight by
management contributed to the non-reporting of OOS results in the QC Laboratory.
67. In its ninth observation, the FDA noted that, when Able did prepare written
records of investigations into unexplained discrepancies or OOS results, those reports did not
always include the conclusions and follow-up. The FDA noted as an example the Companys
incomplete investigation into the failure of Batch 303087A of Methylphenidate HCl extended
release tablets (20 mg) to meet the 18-month stability test. The Companys investigation
concluded that the original failing results were invalid due to an analyst technique issue, but
provided no documentation to justify the invalidation of the failing results. Nor was there any
documentation to show that corrective measures had been completed, or any review of data
acquired by the same analysts when testing other batches of the same product. Thus, the FDA
found the Companys investigation to be incomplete.
68. The FDAs tenth observation was that the responsibilities and procedures
applicable to the quality control unit were not in writing and were not fully followed. In
particular, the FDA noted that:
a. The Laboratory Records SOP #QC-022-04 effective

06/25/04, specified numerically ordered notebooks will be
issued and a log maintained. Notebook issuance logs
26
showed large gaps in numbering of notebooks issued,

which were not accounted for in the log....
b. SOP Method Number I-037, approved 10/18/00, General

Guidelines for sample Logging for Analytical Laboratory
using Winsamp software did not include procedures and
responsibilities to be followed by personnel authorized to
enter samples into the Winsamp database.
c. There was no SOP describing the use of (SP) special

samples tested in the Analytical Laboratory
69. The FDA found in its eleventh observation that Able did not follow established
laboratory control mechanisms. For example, the Company retested samples without first
conducting an investigation as required by SOP # QC-011-03, and then used the results of the
retesting as its reported test results. Additionally, SOP # QC-006-01 required the Company,
prior to initiating testing, to document the number of retests to be performed, so as to establish a
definite limit beyond which no additional testing would be permitted. Able did not document the
number of retests to be performed as required by this procedure. The Company also failed to
follow procedures under the same SOP requiring retests to be conducted by the original chemist
and a second chemist, where the second chemist conducts at least 60% of the tests, or
alternatively by two chemists other than the one producing the original result. Further, the FDA
documented the Companys failure to complete an investigation within 30 working days as
required by standard operating procedures. Investigation 04-OOS-031, initiated December 8,
2004 and completed February 18, 2005, exceeded 30 working days.
70. In its last observation, the FDA noted that Able had not established control
procedures which validate the performance of those manufacturing processes that may be
responsible for causing variability in the characteristics of in-process material and the drug
product. Specifically, the FDA found:
27
a. There is no assurance that results for in-process physical

testing are recorded accurately. For example, the Pre-
Validation batch record (TB-110) for Hydrocodone
Bitartrate and Acetaminophen Tablets, USP 5mg/325mg
shows the specification for tablet thickness range as 0.308
to 0.358; this range was crossed out and the correct range
of 0.210 to 0.260 was handwritten in the batch record.
The in-process tablet thickness results show all tablets were
within the corrected thickness specification of 0.210
0.260 during compression on 10/15/01. The Research and
Development (R&D) In-Process Data Sheet shows the
thickness of 60 tablets to be within a thickness range of
0.330 and 0.334 which corresponds to the tablet
thickness specification which was incorrectly written on the
Master Batch Record. Retains from this batch were tested
on 6/10//05, and the results show the thickness of the
tablets were between 0.210 and 0.260, which was the
correct specification that was handwritten on the Master
Batch Record.
b. Manufacturing Investigations into rejected batches of drug

products did not included an evaluation of the validated
manufacturing process. For example, seven of nine batches
(78%) of Methylphenidate ER 20 mg Tablets,
manufactured between May 2003 and November 2004
were investigated in the laboratory, due to initial OOS
results or out of trend results. Two of the seven lab
investigations, resulted in the rejection of batches 411021
and 310004. Manufacturing Investigation 04-008, for
batch 310004, and Manufacturing Investigation 05-001, for
batch 411021 did not include an evaluation of the validated
manufacturing process for Methylphenidate ER 20 mg
Tablets.
c. There is no assurance that manufacturing processes for

drug products are validated in that out of specification
(OOS) results were generated, but not reported.
71. Until the truth eventually came out in mid-2005, these catastrophic failures of the
Companys quality control and manufacturing functions were concealed by Able and the
Defendants, who instead made glowing public statements about the Companys drug pipeline
and results of operations during the Class Period. This enabled the Company to eclipse Wall
Streets expectations, while leaving an untold portion of the more than one billion tablets,
28
capsules, and suppositories made by Able too weak, too potent, or lacking the advertised shelf
life. Had the truth been told during the Class Period, investors would have understood that
Ables past financial results had been achieved through violations of FDA regulations, and that
the Company had severe problems which would prevent it from continuing to realize such
positive results, and would likely lead to the Companys downfall.
C. Defendants Materially False And Misleading Statements Issued During The

Class Period
72. The Class Period begins on October 30, 2002. On that date, Able issued a press
release entitled Able Laboratories Reports 2002 Third Quarter Results. Therein, the Company,
in relevant part, stated:
ABLE LABORATORIES, INC. (OTC BB: ABLA, BSE: AAB),

today announced financial results for the three months ended
September 30, 2002. For the third quarter of 2002, the Company
reported net sales of $15.0 million, a 20% increase from net sales
of $12.5 million reported in the 2002-second quarter, primarily due
to higher demand for the Companys larger product family.
Third quarter 2002 net income was $3.0 million, an increase of

28% over the 2002-second quarter. The Company reported net
income applicable to common stockholders of $2.9 million, or
$0.25 per basic share, compared with net income of $2.2 million,
or $0.19 per basic share, in the second quarter of 2002. Diluted
earnings per share increased to $0.19 per share for the 2002 third
quarter compared with $0.15 per share for the 2002-second
quarter.
The third quarter 2002 cost of sales was $7.7 million, resulting in
gross margins of 49%. This compares favorably with cost of sales
of $6.6 million, and 47% gross margins reported in the prior
quarter. The slight increase in gross margins is due to increased
manufacturing efficiencies realized from higher production
volumes.
Research and development expenses increased 30% to $2.2 million

in the third quarter of 2002 from $1.7 million in the prior quarter.
The increase is primarily due to additional research and coinciding
biostudies conducted to develop the Companys product pipeline.
29
In October 2002, the Company received three ANDA approvals

and currently has 17 ANDAs pending approval by the FDA.
Selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses for the 2002

third quarter decreased to $1,756,000 from $1,803,000 in the prior
quarter. SG&A accounted for 12% of net sales, compared with
14% of net sales in the prior quarter. This improvement resulted
from increased sales and cost controls.
The Company had cash and cash equivalents of $1.8 million and
working capital of $9.0 million as of September 30, 2002.
We are very pleased with our financial progress as Able Labs

continued to increase earnings and execute on our strategy during
the third quarter, commented Jay Wadekar, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Able Laboratories. We are focused on
managing our growth, controlling our costs and look forward to
finishing off the year on a strong note.
73. In its October 30, 2002 press release, the Company also set forth several
corporate highlights from the third quarter of 2002, including the FDAs approval of ANDAs
for several drugs including Acetaminophen and Codeine Phosphate Tablets, USP 300mg/30mg,
which are equivalent to Tylenol with Codeine. As discussed above, these tablets had failed to
meet the requisite specifications in several respects during laboratory testing, but a Company
analyst had changed the processing method until a passing result was achieved, without reporting
the original test results as required by the FDA. The Company failed to disclose this critical fact.
74. On November 13, 2002, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-
Q for the third quarter of 2002, which was signed by defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q
repeated the Companys previously announced financial results for the quarter. The Form 10-Q
further stated that, during the quarter ended September 30, 2002, the Company had 15 FDA-
approved product families in 25 different strengths available for sale, compared to 12 FDA-
approved product families in 21 different strengths in the prior quarter. Additionally, the Form
10-Q stated that Able had received FDA approval for three new products during the third quarter
30
and three additional products in October 2002, and had 20 new products pending FDA approval.
The Form 10-Q contained a certification signed by Wadekar, stating, inter alia: Based on my
knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report.
75. The statements regarding Ables performance in Ables press release dated
October 30, 2002 and in Ables Form 10-Q dated November 13, 2002 together with Wadekars
certification, were materially false and misleading when made for at least the following reasons:
(a) Defendants failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results
for the third quarter 2002 had been achieved through the production and sale of products that did
not comply with FDA specifications;
(b) Defendants failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results
and ANDA approvals during the Class Period had been achieved through the use of procedures
which did not comply with cGMPs;
(c) Defendants touted the Companys success in obtaining ANDA approvals
for new drug products and bringing those products to market, without disclosing its failure to
ensure that those products had the safety, identity, quality, and purity that they were represented
to possess and that they were required to possess in order to warrant FDA approval;
(d) Defendants failed to disclose that the Companys testing, reporting, and
manufacturing processes violated FDA regulations in numerous respects, as alleged above;
31
(e) Defendants failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations of
FDA regulations and its products non-compliance with FDA specifications were discovered,
they would severely undermine its ability to continue as a going concern; and
(f) Contrary to his certification, Wadekar knew about material false
statements and omissions in the Form 10-Q.
76. On December 10, 2002, defendant Wadekar commented on the Companys
performance during a CCBN Virtual Healthcare Conference, stating in pertinent part:
In the third quarter 2002, we reported net sales of $15 million and
net income of $3 million, This translates into an earnings per share
of 25 cents on a basic (ph) and 19 cents fully diluted.
We currently have 275 employees. And our growth has been

driven by approximately 22 FDA approvals we received since the
year 2001. Almost 18 of these approvals have been received in the
last 15 (ph) months, which has really fueled the growth that you
see.
We have a robust pipeline, with approximately 12 (ph) ANDAs

under review by the FDA currently. Theyre pending approval.
And our objective is to continue to be aggressive in R&D.
***
We have had an excellent track record with the FDA. Our facility
is fully compliant with the current good manufacturing practices.
And we have been receiving approvals in an average of about nine
to 10 months.
***
We have had about five or six [regulatory] inspections in the last
two years. The last three inspections took place within six months -
the last six months. All of them were clean. There were no
observations that were given to us by the FDA. And no form 483
(ph), which contains those observations, was issued to us.
Our track record with the FDA, as we discussed earlier, is pretty

good. We received one approval within five and a half months
from the time of filing. Our average is running about nine to 10
months.
32
Able Labs main facility used to be under a consent decree (ph)

that was entered by previous ownership in going back to 1992.
And in February, we were able to have that consent decree (ph)
removed. And were very proud of the fact that we were able to
show the FDA the level of quality that we have in the operation.
And the FDA recommended to possess this (ph) department of a
fall to (ph) consent decree (ph). And that was removed as well.
(Emphasis added.)
77. Wadekars statements were materially false and misleading for at least the
following reasons:
(a) he failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results for the
third quarter of 2002 had been achieved through the production and sale of products that did not
comply with FDA specifications;
(b) he failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results and
ANDA approvals during the Class Period had been achieved through the use of procedures
which did not comply with cGMPs;
(c) he touted the Companys success in obtaining ANDA approvals for new
drug products and bringing those products to market, without disclosing its failure to ensure that
those products had the safety, identity, quality, and purity that they were represented to possess,
and that they were required to possess in order to warrant FDA approval;
(d) he failed to disclose that the Companys testing, reporting, and
(e) he misrepresented that the Company was complying with cGMPs and
proclaimed that its regulatory inspections were all clean, when the Company was materially
non-compliant with cGMPs and other FDA requirements and had engaged in wrongful conduct
in connection with the submission and approval of ANDAs, and thus was at risk of incurring
severe penalties; and
33
(f) he failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations of FDA
regulations and its products non-compliance with FDA specifications were discovered, they
would severely undermine its ability to continue as a going concern.
78. Able again reported impressive results for the quarter and year ended December
31, 2002. On March 5, 2003, the Company issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports Record Sales of $52.9 million for 2002, which stated, in relevant part:
ABLE LABORATORIES, INC. (Nasdaq NMS: ABRX, BSE:

AAB), today announced financial results for the three months
ended December 31, 2002 and for the year ended December 31,
2002. For the year ended December 31, 2002, the Company
reported diluted earnings per share of $1.44, which includes the
one-time, non-recurring net tax benefit from a net operating loss
carryforward. Adjusted for this one-time net tax benefit and other
non-recurring items, the Company earned $0.63 per diluted share
for 2002.
Fourth Quarter 2002 Financial Results
The Company reported net sales of $16,101,638 for the quarter

endded December 31, 2002, a slight increase over net sales
reported for the third quarter of 2002 of $15,024,914 and a 127.9%
increase from sales of $7,066,599 for the quarter ended December
31, 2001.
Gross margins were $7,999,806, or 49.7% of net sales, versus

$7,348,151, or 48.9% of net sales, for the third quarter of 2002 and
$3,010,248, or 42.6% of net sales, for the fourth quarter of 2001.
Operating income for the quarter was $3,347,419, or 20.8% of net

sales, versus $3,377,255, or 22.5% of net sales, for the third
quarter 2002 and operating income of $546,932, or 7.7% of net
sales, for the fourth quarter of 2001.
***
Fiscal 2002 Financial Results
For the year ended December 31, 2002, the Company reported net
sales of $52,930,121, a 170.1% increase from net sales reported for
2001 of $19,594,231. After adjusting for net sales of $3,067,567
34
from our former distribution subsidiary, which was sold in

February 2001, net sales at the Able facility increased 220.3%.
Gross margins were $25,568,511, or 48.3% of net sales for 2002,

versus $7,060,791, or 36.0% of net sales, for 2001.
Operating income was $10,869,406, or 20.5% of net sales for

2002, versus a reported loss of ($1,201,120) for 2001 and an
adjusted loss for 2001, excluding the operations of our former
distribution subsidiary, of ($874,669). The increase in operating
income resulted from the Company achieving increased net sales
and gross margins, which exceeded the greater selling, general and
administrative expenses incurred to support continued Company
growth.
***
R&D expenses increased to $6,944,952, or 13.1% of net sales for

2002, versus $2,355,666, or 12.0% of net sales, for 2001. The
increase for the year is primarily due to additional research and
coinciding bio-studies conducted to further develop the Companys
product pipeline. During 2002, the Company received 10 ANDA
approvals.
***
We are pleased with Ables financial progress, as we continued to

increase net sales and earnings while executing on our strategy
during the fourth quarter 2002, commented Jay Wadekar,
President and Chief Executive Officer. Our 2002 results were
driven primarily by our ANDA approvals and market penetration
into certain key accounts. Our fundamentals and pipeline are
strong as we are awaiting approvals on several promising ANDAs.
Additionally, we have an aggressive R&D program and we believe
2003 will be an overall up year for the Company. Our continued
growth, especially on a quarter-to-quarter basis, will also depend
upon the timing of pending ANDA approvals some of which could
be first-to-market opportunities. We continue to focus on
managing our growth and controlling our costs and look forward to
an exciting 2003.
79. On March 25, 2003, Able filed its annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC for
2002 (the 2002 Form 10-K), which was signed by Wadekar. The 2002 Form 10-K reaffirmed
the Companys previously announced financial results and discussed the process by which the
35
Company obtained FDA approvals for new drugs, stating: We use biostudies to demonstrate
that the rate and extent of absorption of a generic drug are not significantly different from that
achieved by the corresponding brand-name drug. These biostudies are subject to rigorous
standards set by the FDA. The Form 10-K further represented that Able was in compliance
with all FDA manufacturing regulations:
Federal and state regulations impose certain requirements on

the testing, manufacture, labeling, storage, recordkeeping,
approval, advertising and promotion of our products. In order to
conduct clinical tests and produce and market products for human
diagnostic and therapeutic use, we must comply with mandatory
procedures and safety standards established by the FDA and
comparable state and foreign regulatory agencies.
To obtain an NDA, or FDA, approval for a new drug or generic

equivalent, a prospective manufacturer must, among other things,
comply with the FDAs current Good Manufacturing Practices, or
cGMP, regulations. The FDA may inspect the manufacturers
facilities to assure such compliance prior to approval or at any
other reasonable time. We must follow cGMP regulations at all
times during the manufacture and other processing of drugs. To
comply with the requirements set forth in these regulations, we
must continue to expend significant time and resources in the areas
of development, production, quality control and quality assurance.
We must obtain FDA approval, in the form of an ANDA, before

we can market a generic equivalent of a previously approved drug.
The process of obtaining an ANDA approval is set by the
provisions of the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984, which established a
statutory procedure for the submission and FDA review and
approval of ANDAs
***
Penalties for wrongdoing in connection with the development or

submission of an ANDA were established by the Generic Drug
Enforcement Act of 1992, authorizing the FDA to permanently or
temporarily bar companies from submitting or assisting in the
submission of an ANDA. The FDA may also temporarily deny
approval and suspend applications to market generic drugs. The
FDA may also suspend the distribution of all drugs approved or
developed in connection with certain wrongful conduct and, under
certain circumstances, also has the authority to withdraw approval
36
of an ANDA and to seek civil penalties. We do not expect the law

to have a material impact on the review or approval of our
ANDAs.
(Emphasis added.)
80. The 2002 Form 10-K listed the Companys 25 products, which included six of the
products as to which the FDA would later (in 2005) find that the Company had failed to comply
with cGMPs: Acetaminophen and Codeine Phospate Tablets, USP 300mg/30mg (equivalent to
Tylenol with Codeine); Diphenoxylate and Atropine Sulfate Tablets (equivalent to Lomotil);
Methylphenidate HCl Tablets (equivalent to Ritalin); Methylphenidate HCl Extended Release
Tablets (equivalent to Metadate-SR); Prochloroperazine Suppositories (equivalent to
Compazine); and Proproxyphene Napsylate and Acetaminophen Tablets (equivalent to
Darvocet). Thus, nearly one-quarter of the Companys products had received ANDA
approvals and/or were being marketed and sold in violation of FDA regulations a fact which, if
known to the FDA and/or investors, would have called into question the Companys entire
product line and, thus, its viability as a going concern.
81. The 2002 Form 10-K included a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter
alia: Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this annual report.
82. The statements in the Companys 2002 Form 10-K regarding the Companys
operating performance, compliance with FDA regulations and cGMPs, and Wadekars
certification, were materially false and misleading because, among other reasons:
37
(a) The statements failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial
results for the fourth quarter and year end 2002 had been achieved through the production and
sale of products that did not comply with FDA specifications;
(b) The statements failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial
results and ANDA approvals during the fourth quarter and year end 2002 had been achieved
through the use of procedures which did not comply with cGMPs;
(c) The statements touted the Companys success in obtaining ANDA
approvals for new drug products and bringing those products to market, without disclosing its
failure to ensure that those products had the safety, identity, quality, and purity that they were
represented to possess and that they were required to possess in order to warrant FDA approval;
(d) The statements failed to disclose that the Companys testing, reporting,
and manufacturing processes violated FDA regulations in numerous respects, as alleged above;
(e) The statements misrepresented that the Company was complying with
FDA requirements and should not be materially affected by the law providing for penalties in the
event of wrongful conduct in the submission of ANDAs, when the Company knew it was
materially non-compliant with FDA requirements and had engaged in wrongful conduct in
connection with the submission and approval of ANDAs, and thus was at risk of incurring severe
penalties;
(f) the statements failed to disclose the risk that if the Companys violations
of FDA regulations and its products non-compliance with FDA specifications were discovered
(g) contrary to his certification, Wadekar knew about material false statements
and omissions in the 2002 Form 10-K.
38
83. On May 6, 2003, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories Reports
First Quarter 2003 Results, which stated in relevant part:

ended March 31, 2003. For the first quarter of 2003, the Company
reported net sales of $15.0 million, a 61.2% increase from net sales
of $9.3 million in the first quarter of 2002, primarily due to higher
demand for the Companys expanded product family. The
Company also reported operating income of $2.0 million for the
first quarter of 2003, a 16.4% increase from the first quarter of
2002 of $1.7 million. Research and development expenses
(R&D) were $2.1 million for the first quarter of 2003, a 108.5%
increase, compared with $1.0 million for the first quarter of 2002.
Gross profit was $6.5 million for the quarter, an increase of 52.7%,
versus $4.3 million for the first quarter of 2002.
***
R&D expenses increased substantially to $2.1 million from $1.0

million for the first quarter of 2002, or 108.5%. The increase
results from additional research and coinciding bio-studies
conducted to further develop the Companys product pipeline.
The Company received 4 [ANDA] approvals during the first
quarter of 2003 (and an additional 2 ANDA approvals in April
2003 ) and currently has 13 ANDAs pending approval by the
[FDA] representing approximately $500 million in total market
size. In addition, the Company has 23 projects currently under
development addressing a total market of approximately $2.9
billion.
***
We are pleased with Ables progress during the first quarter of

2003 as we are investing in our future by building the Companys
R&D pipeline, commented Jay Wadekar, President and Chief
Executive Officer. Our first quarter 2003 reduced gross margins
resulted primarily from unabsorbed direct manufacturing costs
incurred while the Company underwent expansion of its
manufacturing capacity to support future anticipated growth. Our
fundamentals and pipeline continue to be strong as we are awaiting
approvals on several additional promising ANDAs.
39
84. On May 14, 2003, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for
the first quarter of 2003, which was approved by Companys Board of Directors and signed by
defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q repeated and reaffirmed the Companys previously
announced quarterly financial results, and stated that the Company received FDA approvals for
four new products during the quarter and two additional products in April 2003, and had thirteen
more products pending FDA approval. The Form 10-Q also contained a certification signed by
Wadekar stating, inter alia: Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report.
85. The statements in Ables Form 10-Q for the first quarter 2003 (including
Wadekars certification) and those contained in Ables press release reporting Ables first quarter
2003 results were materially false and misleading for at least the following reasons:
results for the third quarter 2003 had been achieved through the production and sale of products
that did not comply with FDA specifications;
results and ANDA approvals during the Class Period had been achieved through the use of
procedures which did not comply with cGMPs;
represented to possess, and that they were required to possess in order to warrant FDA approval;
40
(e) The statements failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations
of FDA regulations and its products non-compliance with FDA specifications were discovered,
86. On July 28, 2003, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories Reports
Record Second Quarter 2003 Results, which stated in relevant part:

ended June 30, 2003. For the second quarter of 2003, the
Company reported net sales of $18.9 million, a 51.6% increase
compared to net sales of $12.5 million for the second quarter of
2002, primarily due to higher demand for the Companys expanded
product family and new product approvals. The Company also
reported operating income of $4.5 million for the second quarter of
2003, an 83.9% increase compared to operating income for the
second quarter of 2002 of $2.4 million.
versus $5.9 million for the second quarter of 2002.
The Company received 5 [ANDA] approvals during the second

quarter of 2003 and currently has 11 ANDAs pending approval by
the [FDA] representing approximately $300 million in total market
size. In addition, the Company has 23 projects currently under
development addressing a total market of approximately $2.9
billion.
***
Excluding the provision for income taxes, the Company earned

$4.0 million for the second quarter of 2003 versus second quarter
of 2002 pre-tax income of $2.3 million. This represents a 72.0%
increase in pre-tax income when compared to the second quarter of
2002.
41
***
We are pleased with Ables progress during the second quarter of

2003 as we continued to invest in our future by building our R&D
pipeline, commented Jay Wadekar, President and Chief Executive
Officer. After focusing on the Companys manufacturing
expansion during the first quarter of 2003, our second quarter
reflected improved operating efficiency. Our fundamentals and
pipeline continue to be strong as we are pursuing approval of
several additional ANDAs.
87. Also on July 28, 2003, during a conference call with analysts, Defendant Wadekar
commented on the Companys performance stating in part:
. . . Im going to talk about our capacity and the Companys

expansion plans. This is a question I routinely receive now, when
we talk to you investors. We completed our last phase of
construction at the end of first quarter, which increased our
manufacturing, R&D, as well as quality control capacity. We
expect that at the current location, we will be able to manufacture
and meet the demand of our potential growth for the next three
quarters. Beyond that well need to add additional manufacturing
capacity. We believe that operating out of the current four - and
actually does not to come five [sic], as again temporarily taking
some space. Locations will take away operating efficiencies and
margins. Therefore, were actively pursuing the option of leasing a
single location, where we can consolidate all the Companys
operations. Based upon discussions with the FDA and our own
experience in building out manufacturing space, we believe well
be able to consolidate most of the operations within twelve months
from entering into the new lease space.
88. This statement was materially false and misleading at the time it was made
because Defendants knew quality control capacity had not been increased but rather remained
virtually non-existent.
89. On August 14, 2003, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-Q
for the second quarter of 2003, which was approved by Companys Board of Directors and
signed by defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q repeated and reaffirmed the Companys
previously announced quarterly financial results and stated that the Company received FDA
42
approval for seven new products during the quarter and had 15 new products pending FDA
approval. The Form 10-Q also contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter alia:
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
this report.
90. The statements in Ables Form 10-Q for the second quarter 2003 (including
Wadekars certification) and those contained in Ables press release reporting Ables second
quarter 2003 results were materially false and misleading for at least the following reasons:
43
(e) The statements failed to disclose the risk that if the Companys violations
91. On November 4, 2003, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports Third Quarter 2003 Results, which stated in relevant part:

ended September 30, 2003. For the third quarter of 2003, the
Company reported net sales of $20.9 million, a 38.9% increase
compared to net sales of $15.0 million for the third quarter of
2002. This increase is primarily due to higher demand for the
Companys expanded product family and new product launches.
The Company also reported operating income of $4.2 million for
the third quarter of 2003, a 24.7% increase compared to operating
income for the third quarter of 2002 of $3.4 million.
Gross profit was $10.0 million for the quarter, an increase of

35.8%, versus $7.3 million for the third quarter of 2002. The
increase in gross profit is attributable to increased product net
sales.
. . . The Company received 2 [ANDA] approvals, during the third

quarter of 2003, and currently has 17 ANDAs pending approval by
the [FDA] representing approximately $400 million in total market
opportunity. In addition, the Company has over 20 projects
currently under development addressing a total generic and
branded market of approximately $1 billion.
***
Operating income for the quarter was $4.2 million, or 20.2% of net
sales, versus $3.4 million, or 22.5% of net sales, for the third
quarter of 2002. This dollar increase was primarily attributable to
increased sales partially offset by increased SG&A and R&D
expenses.
Net income for the third quarter of 2003 was $2.5 million, or $0.13
per diluted share.
44
Excluding the provision for income taxes, the Company earned

$4.2 million for the third quarter of 2003 versus third quarter of
2002 pretax income of $3.0 million. This represents a 41.1%
increase in pre-tax income when compared to the third quarter of
2002.
We are proud of Ables progress during the third quarter of 2003

as we continued to invest in our future by building our product
pipeline through an increasing commitment to R&D. This is
exhibited by the growth in ANDAs pending with the FDA from
11 last quarter at this time to 17 currently, commented Jay
Wadekar, President and Chief Executive Officer. Our strong
balance sheet and new leased facility position the Company well
for fixture growth.
92. On November 14, 2003, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-
Q for the third quarter of 2003, which was approved by Companys Board of Directors and
signed by defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q repeated and reaffirmed the Companys
previously announced financial results for the third quarter, and stated that the Company had
received FDA approval for three new products during the quarter and has 17 ANDAs still
pending approval. The Form 10-Q also contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating,
inter alia: Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
period covered by this report.
93. The statements in Ables Form 10-Q for the third quarter 2003 (including
Wadekars certification) and those contained in Ables press release reporting Ables third
quarter 2003 results were materially false and misleading for at least the following reasons:
45
(e) The statements failed to disclose the risk that if the Companys violations
94. On February 26, 2004, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports Record Sales and Operating Income For 2003, wherein it announced its financial
results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2003. The press release stated in relevant
part:
The Company reported net sales of $22,752,442 for the quarter

ended December 31, 2003, a 41.3% increase over net sales
reported for the fourth quarter of 2002 of $16,101,638. This
increase is primarily due to higher demand for the Companys
expanded product family and to new product launches.
Gross profit was $10,678,888 for the quarter, an increase of 33.5%

over $7,999,806 for the fourth quarter of 2002. The dollar
46
increase in gross profit is directly related to the increase in net

sales
Operating income for the quarter was $3,628,352, an increase of

8.4% over $3,347,419 for the fourth quarter of 2002. Increased
sales contributed most significantly to the improvement in
operating income.
***
Net income applicable to common stockholders for the fourth

quarter of 2003 was $2,388,220, or $0.14 per basic share, and
$0.13 per diluted share.
sales of $77,561,115, a 46.5% increase over net sales of
$52,930,121 reported for 2002.
Gross profit was $36,205,923 for 2003, an increase of 41.6% over

$25,568,511 for 2002. As a percent of net sales, the Companys
gross margin for 2003 was 46.7% versus 48.3% for 2002. The
increase in gross profits is directly related to the increase in net
sales, while the decrease in gross margin was due to changes in
product mix and expenses incurred in connection with the new
Cranbury, New Jersey facility.
Operating income for 2003 was $14,296,641, an increase of

31.5%, over $10,869,406 for 2002. This dollar increase was
primarily attributable to increased sales, partially offset by
increased SG&A and significantly increased R&D expenses.
***
R&D increased 61.4% to $11,212,418 for 2003 from $6,944,952

for 2002. The increase over the prior year primarily results from
additional research and related bio-studies conducted to further
develop the Companys product pipeline. The Company
received 13 ANDA approvals during 2003 versus 10 for 2002 and
filed 13 new ANDAs in 2003.
***
income applicable to common stockholders of $8,212,989, or
$0.46 per diluted share.
47
***
We are pleased with Ables financial progress, as we continued to

increase net sales and earnings while executing on our strategy
during the fourth quarter of 2003, commented Jay Wadekar,
President and Chief Executive Officer. Our 2003 results were
driven primarily by our 13 ANDA approvals and market
penetration into certain key accounts.
This year, the Company crossed another significant milestone by

producing over 1 billion total tablets, capsules and suppositories.
Our expansion into the new 225,000 square foot Cranbury facility,
beginning in late 2004, will allow us to increase production
capacity substantially, which we believe is necessary both to meet
our current manufacturing needs and to support the Companys
aggressive current and future R&D pipeline. Also, our entry into
the prescription liquid products market allows us to expand our
product portfolio and improve overall operating margins,
concluded Mr. Wadekar.
95. During an earnings conference call on February 26, 2004, defendant Wadekar
commented on Ables earnings guidance for 2004, stating:
As weve stated earlier, were expecting about 10 to 12 ANDAs in

2004. Starting with the Metamflomine that we received, were
looking at about two to four in the first half of this year and the
remainder coming in the latter part. The growth in sales is
expected to come from the approval as we anticipate steady core
business with flat to slightly declining pricing for the existing
products. These expected approvals represent $462 million in
market sales as per the recent IMS data, and is expected to provide
the topline revenue growth for the year of approximately 30 to 35
percent or between $100 to $105 million of net sales for 2004.
Our move to the Cranbury facility is expected to provide operating

efficiencies and allow us to leverage our, fixed overhead, lowering
our costs and potentially increasing gross margin. Further, our first
to market strategy provides us with better than average margin and
both these factors are expected to come into play throughout the
year, but more prominently in the second half of the year. Also,
for 2004, we estimate R&D expenses to be approximately $15 to
$17 million and an estimated effective income tax rate of 39
percent.
48
96. On March 15, 2004, Able filed its annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC for
the year ended December 31, 2003 (the 2003 Form 10-K), which was signed by Wadekar. The
2003 Form 10-K repeated and reaffirmed the Companys previously announced financial results
for 2003, contained a similar description of the Companys FDA approval process as the 2002
Form 10-K. Further, the 2003 Form 10-K stated we believe that we are currently in compliance
with all applicable FDA requirements and [w]e do not expect the law [providing for penalties
for wrongdoing in connection with the development or submission of an ANDA] to have a
material impact on the review or approval of our ANDAs.
97. Of the 33 FDA-approved drugs identified in Ables 2003 Form 10-K, seven
(21%) would later be found by the FDA to have been approved through violations of cGMPs:
Acetaminophen and Codeine Phospate Tablets, USP 300mg/30mg; Diphenoxylate and Atropine
Sulfate Tablets; Methylphenidate HCl Tablets; Methylphenidate HCl Extended Release Tablets;
Nitroglycerin Sublingual Tablets; Prochloroperazine Suppositories; and Proproxyphene
Napsylate and Acetaminophen Tablets.
98. The 2003 Form 10-K contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter
alia: Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
period covered by this annual report.
99. The statements in Ables 2003 Form 10-K (including Wadekars certification) and
in Ables February 26, 2004 press release announcing the results for the fourth quarter of 2004
were materially false and misleading when made because, among other reasons, they:
49
(a) Failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results during the
Class Period had been achieved through the production and sale of products that did not comply
with FDA specifications;
(b) Failed to disclose that the Companys positive financial results and ANDA
approvals during the Class Period had been achieved through the use of procedures which did
not comply with cGMPs;
(c) Touted the Companys success in obtaining ANDA approvals for new
those products had the safety, identity, quality, and purity that they were represented to possess
(d) Failed to disclose that the Companys testing, reporting, and
(e) Misrepresented that the Company was complying with FDA requirements
and should not be materially affected by the law providing for penalties in the event of wrongful
conduct in the submission of ANDAs, when the Company knew it was materially non-compliant
with FDA requirements and had engaged in wrongful conduct in connection with the submission
and approval of ANDAs and thus was at risk of incurring severe penalties;
(f) Failed to disclose the risk that if the Companys violations of FDA
regulations and its products non-compliance with FDA specifications were discovered they
would severely undermine its ability to continue as a going concern; and
(g) Contrary to his certification, Wadekar knew about material false
statements and omissions in the 2003 Form 10-K.
50
100. On April 26, 2004, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports First Quarter 2004 Results, which stated in relevant part:
For the first quarter of 2004, the Company reported net sales of
$21.5 million, a 43.0% increase from net sales of $15.0 million in
the first quarter of 2003, primarily due to the Companys expanded
product family. The Company also reported operating income of
$3.0 million for the first quarter of 2004, a 48.9% increase from
the first quarter of 2003 of $2.0 million. Research and
development expenses (R&D) were $3.5 million for the first
quarter of 2004, a 66.8% increase, compared with $2.1 million for
the first quarter of 2003.
versus $6.5 million for the first quarter of 2003.
R&D expenses increased substantially as noted above. The

increase results from additional research and development
conducted to further develop the Companys product pipeline and
costs associated with strategic alliances. R&D accounted for
16.5% of net sales for the first quarter of 2004 versus 14.2% of net
sales for the first quarter of 2003. The Company received one
[ANDA] approval during the first quarter of 2004 and currently
has 18 ANDAs pending approval by the [FDA] addressing a total
market size of approximately $630 million. In addition, the
Company has 25 solid dose and six liquids projects currently under
development addressing a total market size of approximately $850
million.
***
Operating income for the quarter was $3.0 million, or 13.9% of net
sales, versus $2.0 million, or 13.4% of net sales, for the first
quarter of 2003. This percentage increase was primarily
attributable to increased net sales partially offset by increased
R&D and SG&A expenses.
Net income applicable to common stockholders for the quarter was

$1.8 million versus $1.0 million for the first quarter of 2003. Fully
diluted earnings per share for the quarter was $0.10 versus $0.06
for the first quarter of 2003.
Jay Wadekar, President and Chief Executive Officer commented:

We are pleased with Ables progress during the first quarter of
2004 as we continue investing in our future by building the
Companys R&D pipeline and constructing our new manufacturing
51
facility in Cranbury, NJ. We anticipate several product approvals

over the next 4-6 months, one of which could be a first-to-market
product. We currently have 18 ANDAs on file with the FDA and
anticipate filing additional ANDAs, for solid dose and liquids
products, throughout the year. Also, we intend to continue our
commitment to R&D by increasing the number of new products
entering development, both utilizing our internal expertise and
leverage our expertise by collaborating with our technology
licensing partner.
101. On April 27, 2004, during a conference call, defendant Wadekar reiterated Ables
earlier 2004 guidance of a 30% to 35% increase over 2003 sales, or between $100 million and
$105 million net sales for the year 2004.
announced financial results for the quarter and stated that the Company had received FDA
approval for one new product during the quarter and had 18 ANDAs pending approval. The
Form 10-Q further stated that its research and development costs had increased during the
quarter due, in part, to increased activity in supporting a higher number of research projects,
and that [t]hese support activities include[d] quality assurance, stability testing and regulatory
support. The Form 10-Q stated that the Company had approximately 40 quality and regulatory
employees providing support function for the primary research and development activity.
These statements created the false impression that the Companys quality assurance, stability
testing, and regulatory functions were performing properly, when in fact there were numerous
deficiencies in those areas.
103. The Form 10-Q for the first quarter of 2004 disclosed that the FDA had initiated
an inspection of the South Plainfield Facility in January 2004, and had issued to [the Company]
a Form 483 notice concerning our compliance with cGMP, including certain observations by the
52
inspectors related to our failure to report adverse drug events in accordance with applicable rules
and regulations. The Form 10-Q reported that the Company was reviewing those observations,
that it expected to be able to address them in a timely and effective manner, and that we believe
that the warning letter may not materially affect our operations, pointing out that the Company
had received four ANDA approvals since receiving the letter. These statements gave the false
impression that any violations of FDA regulations would be promptly resolved, when in reality
there were numerous other undisclosed and ongoing cGMP violations at Able. The Form 10-Q
contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter alia: Based on my knowledge, this
report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
104. The statements in Ables April 24, 2004 press release, the statements made by
Defendant Wadekar in the April 27, 2004 conference call, and the statements contained in Ables
Form 10-Q for the first quarter 2004 (including Wadekars certification) were materially false
and misleading because, among other reasons, they:
53
(e) Downplayed the impact of the Companys product recalls and FDA
warning letter, without disclosing the existence of numerous other ongoing violations of FDA
regulations which, if discovered, would necessitate additional product recalls;
105. On July 27, 2004, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories Reports
Second Quarter 2004 Results, which stated in relevant part:
For the second quarter of 2004, the Company reported net sales of
the second quarter of 2003, primarily due to the Companys
expanded product family. The Company also reported operating
income of $3.7 million for the second quarter of 2004, compared to
operating income of $4.5 million for the second quarter of 2003
Operating income for the second quarter was affected by a 53.5%
increase in research and development (R&D) expenses, which
were $3.5 million for the quarter compared to $2.3 million for the
second quarter of 2003, as well as increased selling, general and
administrative (SG&A) expenses and approximately $810,000 of
expenses related to the Companys new facility and certain one-
time expenses ...

20.1%, compared to $9.0 million for the second quarter of 2003.
R&D expenses increased substantially, as noted above. The

54

costs associated with development partnering arrangements.
The Company received five [ANDA] approvals during the second
quarter, with one approval received during the first quarter and
four additional approvals during July 2004. The Company
currently has nine ANDAs pending approval by the [FDA]
addressing a total market size of approximately $400 million. In
addition, the Company has 25 solid dose and 6 liquid projects
currently under development addressing a total market size of
approximately $850 million.
***
Jay Wadekar, Ables Chief Executive Officer, commented: We

are pleased with Ables progress during the second quarter of 2004
as we continue investing in our future by building the Companys
R&D pipeline and continue to make good progress building out
our new manufacturing facility in Cranbury, New Jersey. We are
in the process of moving several departments into the Cranbury
location. Shortly, we will have the vast majority of our staff
located there.
We anticipate several additional product approvals over the next

few months in addition to the 10 approvals received to date in
2004. We currently have nine ANDAs on file with the FDA and
anticipate filing additional ANDAs, for solid dose and liquids
products, throughout the remainder of the year. Also, we plan to
continue our commitment to R&D by increasing the number of
new products entering development, both utilizing our internal
expertise and continuing to leverage our expertise by collaborating
with technology partners.
106. On August 6, 2004, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-Q for
the second quarter of 2004, which was approved by Companys Board of Directors and signed
by defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q repeated and reaffirmed the Companys previously
announced quarterly financial results, and repeated the statements from the Form 10-Q for the
previous quarter regarding the Companys quality assurance, stability testing, and regulatory
support functions. It also stated that the Company had received FDA approval for six new
products during the quarter and thirteen more in July 2004, and that it had four ANDAs still
pending approval. Additionally, the Company again made reference to the FDAs January 2004
55
inspection, and stated: We expect to be able to address the FDAs observations in a timely and
effective manner, and we believe the warning letter may not materially affect our operations.
Since receiving the warning letter, we have received 14 new ANDA approvals. The Form 10-Q
contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter alia: Based on my knowledge, this
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
107. The statements contained in Ables Form 10-Q for the second quarter of 2004
(including Wadekars certification) and in Ables press release announcing Ables second
quarter 2004 results were materially false and misleading because, among other reasons, they:
56
108. On August 2, 2004, the Company issued a press release announcing that it had
received FDA approval of its ANDA for Atenolol Tablets, USP 25mg, 50mg and 100mg, which
are therapeutically equivalent to Tenormin Tablets, USP 25mg, 50mg and 100mg of Astra
Zeneca Pharmaceuticals LP. The Company further stated that the total sales for the Atenolol
Tablets were estimated to be approximately $100 million according to recent market data. The
Company failed to disclose that its 25mg Atenolol Tablets had repeatedly received out-of-
specification results during the Companys dissolution testing, including one batch that showed a
30.9% rate of dissolution when the FDA standard required a rate of no less than 85%. Nor did
the Company disclose that these failing results had been concealed from the FDA.
109. On November 2, 2004, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports Third Quarter 2004 Results, Able Achieves Record Sales, Operating Income and
Earnings Per Share. The press release stated, in relevant part:
For the third quarter of 2004, the Company reported net sales of
the third quarter of 2003, primarily due to the Companys
income of $7.3 million for the third quarter of 2004, a 73.3%
increase as compared to operating income of $4.2 million for the
57
third quarter of 2003. This included an increase in Research &

Development (R&D) expenses of $1.0 million, or 31.7%, for the
third quarter, of 2004 versus the third quarter of 2003. Diluted
earnings per share (EPS) increased to $0.23 for the third quarter
2004 as compared to diluted EPS of $0.13 for the third quarter of
2003.

49.3%, compared to $10.0 million for the third quarter of 2003.
R&D expenses increased subsantially, as noted above. The

costs associated with development partnering arrangements.
The Company received 10 [ANDA] approvals during the third
quarter. The Company currently has five ANDAs pending
approval by the [FDA] addressing a total market size of
approximately $300 million. In addition, the Company has over 25
projects currently under development addressing a total market
size of over $3 billion.
***
Jay Wadekar, Ables Chief Executive Officer, commented: We

had a very good quarter in which we achieved record results. We
are pleased with Ables progress during the quarter as we received
several ANDA approvals and launched new products as a result.
We continue investing in our future by building the Companys
R&D pipeline.
To date, we have moved approximately one-half of our staff into

the Cranbury facility. In addition, during the third quarter, we
installed a new Oracle Enterprise Resource Planning system. The
Oracle system will provide us with increased capabilities and assist
the Company in handling anticipated growth while also better
enabling management to maintain stringent controls over the
business.
We anticipate additional product approvals over the next few

months in addition to the 16 approvals received to date in 2004.
We currently have five ANDAs on file with the FDA and
anticipate filing between 15 and 20 additional ANDAs during the
remainder of the year and through the first half of 2005. These
products represent a total market size of approximately $1.5 to
$2.0 billion. Of these products to be filed, five to seven could be
first to market based on exclusive API sourcing. Finally, we plan
to continue our commitment to R&D by increasing the number of
58
new products entering development, both by utilizing our

expanded internal capabilities and through collaboration
agreements with others.
110. On November 9, 2004, Able filed its quarterly report with the SEC on Form 10-Q
for the third quarter of 2004, which was approved by Companys Board of Directors and signed
by defendant Wadekar. The Form 10-Q repeated and reaffirmed the Companys previously
announced quarterly financial results and stated that, as of September 30, 2004, the Company
had 28 FDA-approved product families, in 73 different strengths, compared to 21 product
families in 47 different strengths as of September 30, 2003. It stated: In 2004, we expect to
continue to increase our sales of generic drug products by attempting to increase sales of our
existing products and by obtaining [ANDA] approvals from the FDA for new products, and
noted that the Company had five ANDAs pending approval and expected to file 15-20 more
ANDAs over the next several months. The Company again stated that its research and
development costs had increased due, in part, to increased activity in support functions such as
quality assurance, stability testing, and regulatory support, and that the Company was up to
approximately 59 quality and regulatory employees. Further, the Company repeated its prior
assurances regarding the FDAs warning letter stemming from its January 2004 inspection. The
Form 10-Q contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter alia: Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
111. The statements contained in Ables Form 10-Q for the third quarter of 2004
(including Wadekars certification) and in Ables press release announcing the results for the
third quarter of 2004 were materially false and misleading because, among other reasons, they:
59
regulations which, if discovered, would necessitate additional product recalls; and
(f) Failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations of FDA
112. On March 7, 2005, Able issued a press release entitled Able Laboratories
Reports Financial Results for 2004, Fourth Quarter and Full Year, which stated in relevant part:
60
For the fourth quarter of 2004, the Company reported net sales of
the fourth quarter of 2003, primarily due to the Companys
income of $8.5 million for the fourth quarter of 2004, a 135.6%
increase compared to operating income of $3.6 million for the
fourth quarter of 2003. Diluted earnings per share increased to
$0.32 for the fourth quarter of 2004 compared to diluted earnings
per share of $0.13 for the fourth quarter of 2003.

54.7%, compared to $10.7 million for the fourth quarter of 2003.
The Company currently has six ANDAs pending approval by

the [FDA] addressing a total market size of approximately $500
million. In addition, the Company has 18 projects currently under
development addressing a total market size of approximately $2.6
billion.
***
sales of $103.2 million, a 33.0% increase from net sales of $77.6
million for the year ended December 31, 2003.
Gross profit was $51.8 million for 2004, an increase of 43.0%,

compared to $36.2 million for 2003. The Companys gross profit
margin was 50.2% for 2004, compared to 46.7% for 2003. Gross
margin increased as a percentage of net sales primarily as a result
of selling newly-approved products at higher gross margins.
Research and development expenses increased by $4.0 million, or

35.8%, to $15.2 million for 2004 compared to $11.2 million for
2003. Research and development expenses were 14.8% of net
sales for 2004 versus 14.5% of net sales for 2003. The Company
received FDA approval for 16 new products during 2004.
***
Operating income for 2004 was $22.5 million, or 21.8% of net

sales, versus $14.3 million, or 18.4% of net sales, for 2003. The
operating income increase is attributable to increased sales and
higher gross profit margins partially offset by the $7.3 million
increase in operating expenses Net income applicable to
61
common stockholders for 2004 was $14.6 million compared to

$8.2 million for 2003. Fully diluted earnings per, share increased
63.0% to $0.75 for 2004 versus the $0.46 reported for 2003.
At December 31, 2004, the Company had cash and cash

equivalents of $11.7 million and working capital of $52.0 million
compared to cash and cash equivalents of $20.1 million and
working capital of $47.1 million at December 31, 2003. During
2004, we invested approximately $24.3 million in new property
and equipment.
113. In the same March 7, 2005 Press Release, Defendant Wadekar commented on the
Companys performance:
We achieved record sales and earnings in the fourth quarter and for
the year. Supported by our 16 ANDA approvals in 2004, we have
also seen increased acceptance of our products by several key
customers as a result of the efforts of our sales management team.
Last year was a transition year for us as we began relocating to the

new facility. We also enhanced our growth prospects by making
several key additions to our management team. We are excited
about our R&D plans and partnership agreements, which we
believe, will provide us with opportunities for significant long term
growth.
114. On March 15, 2005, Able filed its annual report for 2004 on Form 10-K (the
2004 Form 10-K), which was signed by defendants Wadekar and Mauro. The 2004 Form 10-
K repeated and reaffirmed the Companys previously announced financial results for 2004, and
stated that the Company had 16 new products pending approval by the FDA. It explained that
research and development costs had increased, in part, because of increased activity in
supporting a higher number of research projects, including quality assurance, stability testing
and regulatory support, and that the Company had 40 quality and regulatory employees devoted
to providing support for the primary research and development activity.
115. The 2004 Form 10-K described Ables testing and FDA approval process as
follows:
62
Federal and state regulations impose certain requirements on

the testing, manufacture, labeling, storage, recordkeeping,
approval, advertising and promotion of our products. In order to
conduct clinical tests and produce and market products for human
therapeutic use, we must comply with mandatory procedures and
safety standards established by the FDA and comparable state
regulatory agencies. Typically, standards require that products be
approved by the FDA as safe and effective for their intended
indications prior to being marketed for human use. We believe we
are currently in compliance with all applicable FDA
requirements.
We must obtain FDA approval before we make or sell a generic

equivalent of an existing reference listed drug. We obtain such
approvals by submitting abbreviated new drug applications, or
ANDAs. Each of our proposed generic drug products must be
therapeutically equivalent to the corresponding referenced listed
drug. Generic drug products are considered therapeutically
equivalent if they are pharmaceutical equivalents, and meet the
requirements for bioequivalence, when required, and stability
throughout the proposed shelf life.
***
To obtain approval of ANDAs, we must also comply with the

FDAs current Good Manufacturing Practices, or cGMP
regulations
Penalties for failure to comply with cGMP standards can include

suspension of manufacturing approval, the seizure of drug products
or the FDAs refusal to approve additional applications. The
FDA can also significantly delay the approval of a pending ANDA
under its Fraud, Untrue Statements of Material Fact, Bribery, and
Illegal Gratuities Policy. The FDA may also suspend the
distribution of all drugs approved or developed in connection with
certain wrongful conduct and, under certain circumstances, also
has the authority to withdraw approval of a new drug application
and to seek civil penalties. We do not expect the law to have a
material impact on the review or approval of our ANDAs.
(Emphasis added.)
116. With regard to the FDAs April 2004 warning letter, the 2004 Form 10-K stated:
We believe that we have responded to the FDAs observations in a timely and effective manner
and do not expect this event to materially affect our operations.
63
117. Of the 44 FDA-approved drugs identified in Ables 2004 Form 10-K, nine (over
20%) would later be found by the FDA to have been approved through violations of cGMPs:
Acetaminophen and Codeine Phospate Tablets, USP 300mg/30mg; Atenolol Tablets;
Bethanechol Chloride Tablets; Diphenoxylate and Atropine Sulfate Tablets; Methylphenidate
HCl Tablets; Methylphenidate HCl Extended Release Tablets; Nitroglycerine Sublingual
Tablets; Prochloroperazine Suppositories; and Proproxyphene Napsylate and Acetaminophen
Tablets.
118. The 2004 Form 10-K contained a certification signed by Wadekar stating, inter
alia: Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report.
119. The statements contained in the March 7, 2005 Press Release and in Ables 2004
Form 10-K (including Wadekars certification) were materially false and misleading when made
because, among other reasons, they:
64
(e) Misrepresented that the Company was complying with FDA requirements
and should not be materially affected by the law providing for penalties in the event of wrongful
conduct in the submission of ANDAs, when the Company knew it was materially non-compliant
with FDA requirements and had engaged in wrongful conduct in connection with the submission
and approval of ANDAs, and thus was at risk of incurring severe penalties;
(f) Downplayed the impact of the Companys product recalls and FDA
(g) Failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations of FDA
would severely undermine its ability to continue as a going concern;
(h) Failed to disclose that the Company had forced Defendant Shah into
retirement and hired new staff to oversee quality controls because of a mess in the Companys
management and oversight of quality controls;
(i) Failed to disclose that the Company had been forced to recall certain
products in January and February 2005 because of breakdowns in quality controls stemming
from the Companys poor oversight of quality controls and lack of cGMP compliance; and
(j) Contrary to his certification, Wadekar knew about material false
statements and omissions in the 2004 Form 10-K.
65
120. On May 5, 2005, the Company announced its financial results for the first quarter
of 2005. Again, the Company reported strong results, most notably a 43.1% increase in net
sales, a 75.2% increase in net profit, and a 140% increase in diluted earnings per share. In a
press release entitled Able Laboratories Reports Financial Results for First Quarter 2005, the
Company stated, in relevant part:
For the first quarter of 2005, the Company reported net sales of
$30.7 million, a 43.1 % increase from net sales of $21.5 million in
the first quarter of 2004 due to the Companys expanded product
family. The Company also reported operating income of $7.5
million for the first quarter of 2005, a 151.2% increase compared
to operating income of $3.0 million for the first quarter of 2004
These results included an increase in research and development
expenses of $1.2 million, or 33.1%, compared to the first quarter of
2004. Diluted earnings per share increased to $0.24 for the first
quarter of 2005 compared to diluted earnings per share of $0.10 for
the first quarter of 2004.
Gross profit was $16.7 million for the first quarter of 2005, an
increase of 75.2%, compared to $9.5 million for the first quarter of
2004.
The Company currently has six ANDAs pending approval by

the [FDA] addressing a total market size of approximately $500
million. In addition, the Company has approximately 15 projects
currently under development addressing a total market size of
approximately $2.5 billion.
***
In the first quarter, we continued to expand our, base business

with our current customers while selectively exploring
opportunities for increasing our market penetration said Jay
Wadekar, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Able
Laboratories, Inc. As we look to the second half of the year and
expected approvals of our pending ANDAs, we anticipate
continued growth. Our sales and marketing team has created a
solid foundation for our future growth based on our internal
pipeline and our partnership agreements.
121. In the earnings conference call on May 6, 2005, Jay Wadekar assured the public
of the Companys continuing success. Wadekar reported that the Company had six ANDAs
66
pending with the FDA with a market size of approximately $500 million, and that the Company
expected to file 15 ANDAs in 2005 with total sales of $2.5 billion. He stated that the Companys
future growth will come primarily from new approvals and that the Company was maintaining
its earlier projection of 25 to 30% growth in its top line or $125 to $130 million in net sales for
2005.
122. During the call, an analyst asked Wadekar to comment on what impact the recall
of Promethazine suppositories, which had occurred in February of that year, had on Ables
business. Wadekar assured the listeners that the impact was fairly contained and that the recall
would have no impact on the second quarter. Tim Bishop, an analyst at BI Research who was on
the call, recalled feeling reassured and that the recall was no big deal after hearing Wadekars
response.
123. On May 6, 2005, Able closed at $25.59, or 6.2% higher than its previous day
close of $24.09. By Monday, May 9, 2005, Ables stock price reach an all-time high closing
price of $25.65.
announced quarterly financial results. Additionally, the Form 10-Q contained the following
discussion of product recalls:
Product Recalls and Creation of New Officer Position
During the quarter ended March 31, 2005, we conducted voluntary

product recalls affecting three product families: metronidazole
capsules, 375 mg, for noncompliance with labeling requirements
for antibacterial drug products, promethazine hydrochloride
suppositories, 12.5mg and 25mg, for stability failure, and
prochlorperazine suppositories, USP, 2.5mg and 5mg, for stability
failure. Recently we also decided to recall one batch of
67
methylphenidate ER 20 mg tablets, for improper laboratory

practices and noncompliance with standard operating procedures.
As a result of our internal review of these events, and as part of our
ongoing efforts to maintain our regulatory compliance and the
quality and integrity of our operations, we have initiated a
thorough internal evaluation of our operating practices with the
knowledge of the FDA. To aid us in achieving this objective we
have created a new executive officer position, Vice President,
Compliance, and promoted Iva Klemick, our former Director of
Regulatory Affairs, to serve in this position, reporting directly to
our President and Chief Operating Officer. We have also retained
the services of a highly reputable outside consulting firm to assist
us in this initiative. Our consultants will review current practices
and historical data and make recommendations for improvements
and/or corrective action, and will also train employees in our new
Compliance Group to perform these activities in the future. Over
the next several months we expect to continue this effort to assess
our practices and identify and address any issues, working
proactively with our internal management resources, our outside
consultants and the FDA.
125. This innocuous disclosure that the product recalls of earlier in the quarter were
being addressed through a rigorous review of Ables quality controls affirmed investors
confidence in Ables ability to achieve managements lofty expectations for the Company. For
the next several days, the Companys stock price hovered at its all time high.
126. The Form 10-Q contained a certification signed by Wadekar, stating, inter alia:
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
this report.
127. The statements contained in Ables May 5, 2005 press release, in Wadekars
statements in the May 6, 2005 conference call, and in the Form 10-Q for the first quarter of 2005
(including Wadekars certification) were materially false and misleading when made because,
among other reasons, they:
68
(f) Failed to disclose the risk that, if the Companys violations of FDA
would severely undermine its ability to continue as a going concern;
(g) With respect to Wadekars claim that the recalls of Promethezine
suppositories would have no effect going forward, failed to disclose that the Companys inquiry
into serious discrepancies in its quality controls would have a material impact on the Companys
operations going forward; and
69
(h) Contrary to his certification, Wadekar knew about material false
D. The Truth Begins To Emerge And The Company Collapses
128. On December 31, 2004, Shah formally resigned as Vice President of Quality and
Regulatory at Able. The Company spun his termination as a transition from Vice President of
Quality and Regulatory to Quality Control Consultant. According to a January 3, 2005 Form
8-K:
On December 30, 2004, Able Laboratories, Inc. entered into an

amendment to the employment agreement between the Company
and Shashikant C. Shah, the Company's Vice President of Quality
and Regulatory, in connection with Mr. Shah's transition to the
position of Quality Control Consultant. Under the terms of the
amendment, Mr. Shah will continue to be employed by the
company through June 2006 at a salary of $150,000 per year and
will continue to receive employment benefits in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. The amendment also provides for
severance pay if his employment is terminated under certain
circumstances without cause.
129. In fact, undisclosed to the public, but known to Ables employees, Shahs
resignation came amidst a widely acknowledged mess with Ables quality controls and
regulatory reporting. According to CW1, soon after Shahs departure, David Chesbro, Associate
Director of Quality Control (Chesbro), reported to Boehm widespread discrepancies between
the actual data maintained on Ables computer records and the quality control notebooks
disclosed to the FDA.
130. On January 17, 2005, less than three weeks after Shahs resignation, and
following Chesbros reporting of discrepancies in Ables quality control records, Michael
Solimene was hired as Quality Control Manager and assumed full oversight of Ables quality
controls. David Chesbro remained Associate Director of Quality Control. Solimenes resume
70
reveals that he was [h]ired on 1/17/05 to improve the overall quality and cGMP compliance of
laboratory personnel in the QC Laboratory.
131. Within a week of Solimenes hiring and a month after Shahs resignation, Able
initiated its first recall since 2001. The January 2005 recall involved 75,000 bottles of
Metronidazole capsules and tabletsan anti-bacterial drug used to treat infectionsrecalled
because of Ables failure to properly label the drugs in accordance with FDA regulations that
govern the disclosures required for anti-bacterial drug products. The recall, however, was not
disclosed to investors.
132. By February 2005, Ables senior managers had determined that drugs in Ables
stable that had been approved by the Companys bench chemists under the leadership of Shah
could not be trusted and that the Companys quality control problems were endemic. Less than
two weeks after the Metronidazole recall, on February 11, 2005, Able initiated a nationwide
recall of over 2 million units of Promethazine Hydrochloride suppositoriesan antihistamine
used for the treatment of allergies--because of stability failure. Again, this recall was not
disclosed to investors.
133. According to CW2, by March 2005, Ables management had distributed a letter to
all staff announcing that outside auditors from Lachman Consultants had been retained to review
the Companys quality control records.
134. On April 5, 2005, Able initiated a nationwide recall of approximately 29,000
packages of Prochroloperazine suppositoriesan anti-nausea medication used for cancer
patients and also used for the treatment of certain psychotic symptoms--due to impurity
failures. On the same day, Able initiated a Florida and Ohio recall of 3,034 packages of
71
Atenolol tabletsa beta-blocker used to treat high blood pressure and heart attackdue to the
product being subpotent and having insufficient stability.
135. On May 2, 2005, the FDA began an inspection of Ables quality controls and
found numerous instances of egregious misconduct, as would ultimately be reflected in its Form
483.
136. The foregoing events of early 2005 relating to quality control problems at the
Company were not disclosed to the public until May 19, 2005. Instead, the Company issued a
press release on May 5, 2005 which presented glowing report of the Companys financial results,
and during a conference call the following day, Wadekar downplayed a product recall earlier in
the quarter. In the Companys May 10, 2005 Form 10-Q, the Company simply indicated that it
was undertaking an internal evaluation of its operating practices, with the knowledge of the
FDA, as part of the Companys ongoing efforts to maintain regulatory compliance and the
quality and integrity of its operations. No indication was given that there were problems of such
a nature or magnitude as would have a material impact on the Companys operations. As a
result, the Companys stock price did not falter, and reached an all-time trading high of $26.49
on May 18, 2005, before closing at $24.63.
137. On May 19, 2005, however, Able dropped a bombshell when it disclosed that it
was suspending the sales of all its products. The Companys May 19, 2005 press release titled
Able Laboratories, Inc. Updates Status of Internal Review, Withdraws Guidance, stated:
Through [the internal evaluation announced in the May 10, 2005

Form 10-Q], the Company has identified apparent departures from
standard operating procedures with respect to certain laboratory
testing practices. As a result of these observations, the Company
will be recalling additional products in the future.
[T]he Company has thus far been unable to confirm the extent
to which testing of its products adhered to or departed from
standard operating procedures and good manufacturing practices.
72
As a precaution, the Company has decided temporarily to suspend

shipment of each of its products until such time as it can assure
itself that the product has been manufactured and tested in
compliance with standard operating procedures and current good
manufacturing practices. The Company does not, at this time,
know what further actions it may have to take or what actions the
FDA may undertake.
This disruption in shipment, even if temporary, is expected to have

a material effect on the Companys ability to meet its sales goals
and operating objectives. Therefore, the Company is withdrawing
its prior guidance as to its financial performance.
138. As devastating as this press release was, it was only the first of two blows
delivered to investors that day. Just two hours later, the Company announced the resignation of
Wadekar, who had steered Able through its seemingly meteoric rise as its CEO and Chairman,
and that Mauro, Ables President and COO, would assume the role of Interim Chief Executive
Officer. Although not expressly stated in the press release, Wadekars resignation was clearly a
result of the revelation of quality control problems at Able. In response to these announcements,
Ables share price collapsed 75% from its previous day close of $24.63 to close at $6.26, on
volume of 31.6 million shares, or 98 times average trading volume. Thus, in the span of only 24
hours, the Company had lost $340 million of its $455 million in market capitalization.
139. Things got even worse. Four days later, on May 23, 2005, in a press release titled
Able Laboratories, Inc. Suspends Manufacturing Operations, Announces Product Recall -- To
Withdraw Certain Abbreviated New Drug Applications, the Company announced that the
quality control problems with its products were so severe that it was recalling all of its products
and that it would withdraw previously approved ANDAs in light of data upon which the
Company was no longer willing to rely:
After announcing several product recalls earlier this year due to

various improper laboratory practices and noncompliance with
standard operating procedures, Able notified the FDA and began
conducting an internal review of its operating practices, as initially
73
announced in its quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter

ended March 31, 2005. Working with internal management
resources, outside consultants and the FDA, the Company
identified apparent departures from standard operating procedures
with respect to certain laboratory testing practices. As a result of
these observations, the Company recently suspended shipment of
its products.
As an additional precaution while its investigation proceeds, the

Company has now decided to take to take [sic] the further step of
suspending the manufacture and distribution of its products until
such time as it can assure itself that its products are manufactured
and tested in compliance with standard operating procedures and
current good manufacturing practices. The Company has also
notified the FDA that it is initiating a recall of all of its products.
The Company also intends to withdraw seven of its approved

Abbreviated New Drug Applications filed with the FDA for
various reasons, including commercial reasons and the
identification, in certain applications, of data upon which the
Company is no longer willing to rely. As part of its ongoing
investigation, Able will continue to review its entire ANDA
portfolio and will withdraw other previously approved and pending
ANDA applications if it identifies further data upon which the
Company is not willing to rely.
The Company does not, at this time, know what further actions it
may have to take or what actions the FDA and other government
officials may undertake. This disruption in business is expected to
have a material adverse effect on the Companys business and
results of operations.
140. The Companys stock price fell further in response to this news, closing at $5.05
on May 23, 2005. Meanwhile, analysts covering the Companys debt put their ratings under
review, and on May 25, 2005, the Companys primary bank lender, Citizens Bank, shut down
Ables revolving $20 million credit facility. By the close of trading on May 25, the stock was
trading at $4.24.
141. On May 27, 2005, Able announced that it was laying off 200 people, or half of its
workforce, because of its suspension of manufacturing activities. The Company stated that it
could give no assurance as to when it will be able to resume manufacturing operations.
74
Further, the Company said in a tape-recorded message on a special recall hot line that laboratory
testing problems raised the possibility that some of its products may be sub or super potent.
The FDA issued an announcement recommending that persons placed on any of Ables drugs
seek replacement products from their pharmacists or physicians.
142. By June 10, 2005, what would have seem impossible a month earlier was now
reality. As one health care analyst noted: Their pipeline is gone. They laid off most of their
staff. They are essentially out of business.
143. On July 7, 2005, the day after the amended Form 483 was issued but before its
public disclosure, the Company announced Mauros resignation as the Companys President,
interim Chief Executive Officer and director.
144. On July 8, 2005, the Company announced that it had received the Form 483 from
the FDA, although the contents of the Form 483 were not disclosed until the document was
posted on the Companys website on July 11, 2005. The Companys stock price dropped to
$2.88 on July 8, and to $1.48 on July 11.
145. Ray H. Abrahams, New Jerseys FDA compliance director, has said that the Form
483 paints a shocking picture of fraud. Indeed, the Form 483 documents the Companys
persistent retesting of drug batches that failed the initial testing procedures, without complying
with requirements to disclose the initial test results and investigate the reasons for those testing
failures. The Form 483 also reflects blatant alteration and falsification of testing data by analysts
and supervisors, including cutting and pasting of chromatograms, substituting vials, changing
sample weights and changing processing methods until passing results were obtained.
75
146. The FDAs findings were not limited to problems with quality control,
production, compliance, and regulatory issues. The FDA specifically singled out failures by
Ables management, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Management failed to provide the quality control unit with the authority to
fully investigate errors (Observation 1);
(b) Senior Management failed to assure that all drug products had the safety,
identity, quality and purity that they were represented to possess
(Observation 1);
(c) No standard operating procedure was in place covering the issuance of

Field Alerts alerts that drug manufacturers are required to submit when
one or more batches of drugs that fail to meet specifications established
for them in ANDAs are distributed to the consuming public (Observation
4);
(d) Management failed to train laboratory employees in cGMPs, contributing

to the non-reporting of out-of-specification results (Observation 8);
(e) Management failed to document procedures for issuance of laboratory

notebooks in which logs relating to the testing of unfinished and finished
products were supposed to be kept (Observation 10); and
(f) Management failed to ensure that procedures regarding who could enter
data regarding laboratory sampling were followed (Observation 10).
147. By July 15, 2005, Able was down to 104 full-time employees, from 444 full-time
employees as of May 24, 2005.
148. On July 18, 2005, Able filed a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
149. On July 22, 2005, Able announced that it had received notice that the Companys
securities would be delisted from the NASDAQ National Market, effective as of the opening of
business on July 28, 2005. At the time of the announcement, Ables stock, which had traded as
high as $26.49 per share in May 2005, was trading at less than $2 per share. All in all, more than
$450 million in shareholder value had been wiped out.
76
150. On August 7, 2005, The Star-Ledger published a news article by George E.
Jordan entitled The drug company and the bogus data - Able put out bad pills in front of FDA
for years, (the August 7, 2005 Article), which was written after a 2-month investigation
including interviews with two dozen people familiar with the Company. The August 7, 2005
article paints a vivid picture of Defendants fraud:
As far back as July 2002, Able falsely claimed in drug applications and
annual reports the ability to make certain medications to FDA standards.
As a generic manufacturer, Able was supposed to reproduce chemical
compounds in brand-name drugs and mass-produce cheap copies. In at
least six drug applications, Able simply fabricated in-house test data to
meet FDA standards.
The fudging continued once drugs hit the companys assembly line. To do
this, Able relied on a group of inexperienced and improperly trained
chemists recruited from Asia and employed on work visas. The scientists
misrepresented the strength and shelf life of products because they were
motivated to keep the plant humming. Working was the only way they
could stay in the United States.
Certain supervisors duped FDA inspectors. If a batch of pills didnt meet

standards and a scientist noted that in paper logs, supervisors often simply
changed the numbers when entering results into computerized
databases.
Five FDA inspections since 2002, the most recent in February [2005],
validated quality-control practices the Company later confessed were
corrupt. Those on-site visits, and six others related to new drug
approvals, failed to detect that computer data and other records had been
fabricated.
(Emphasis added).
151. On August 15, 2005, the Company issued a press release stating:
Able now believes that as a practical matter it will not be able

to return any of its products to market, and therefore produce any
revenue or cash flow, for a significant period of time. Able has
determined that the best course of action to preserve value for its
creditors and others would be to immediately reduce overhead and
expenses as much as possible and to initiate the process of selling
the companys business and assets to one or more third-party
purchasers rather than attempting to obtain financing to permit it to
77
resume manufacturing and marketing on its own. While it is

possible for shareholders of the companys common stock to
receive proceeds from such a sale or sales, there can be no
guarantee that this will occur and, in fact, Able believes it is
unlikely to occur, because the aggregate sale proceeds would, in
Ables view, be insufficient to pay all of the liabilities owned to
secured and unsecured creditors of the company. Accordingly, in
Ables view, it is not likely that the common stock has any value.
(Emphasis added).
152. On November 1, 2005, Able entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc., a subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited (SPIL),
whereby SPIL agreed to purchase substantially all of the assets of Able for $23,145,000. The
sale price was less than could have been recovered but for Defendants fraud. By way of
example, in 2005, Teva Pharmaceuticals, an Israeli generic drug maker, paid more than $7.4
billion to acquire U.S. generic drug maker and rival Ivax. The purchase price equated to
approximately 22.5 times Ivaxs annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA). By way of comparison, 22.5 times Ables EBITDA for fiscal year
2004 is approximately $500 million many times greater than the $23 million Able received in
the sale of its assets to SPIL.
153. On November 10, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court issued an Order approving the sale
subject to certain modifications.
154. On March 3, 2006, the Company announced that it had filed a proposed Plan of
Reorganization and Disclosure Statement with the United States Bankruptcy Court. The Plan
and Disclosure Statement stated that the Companys equityholders will not receive any
distributions unless all general unsecured claims and subordinated claims are paid in full, which
is extremely unlikely, and that the equity of the Company has no value.
78
155. On May 14, 2006, an article in The Star-Ledger quoted Nicholas Buhay, acting
director of the FDAs Division of Manufacturing and Product Quality which oversees the drug
industrys compliance with cGMPs, as stating that Able meant to deceive and they did. The
FDAs investigation into the Able debacle remains ongoing.
VII. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANTS SCIENTER
156. Each of Defendants Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah occupied supervisory roles and
had direct knowledge of and responsibility over the Companys quality controls, quality
assurance, and regulatory reporting. Able had a history of quality control failures during the
tenure of each of these defendants, and the Company was warned by the FDA a year before the
truth about Ables fraudulent quality control practices were revealed, that there was grave
problems with Ables controls.
157. Defendants Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah were active, culpable, and primary
participants in Ables fraudulent scheme alleged herein, by virtue of their receipt of information
concerning Ables quality control problems and/or their failure to review information they had a
duty to monitor, their issuance and control over Ables false and misleading statements, and their
association with the Company which made them privy to confidential information concerning the
Company. Ables fraudulent scheme could not have been perpetrated over a substantial period
of time, as it was, without the knowledge and complicity of the personnel at the highest level of
the Company, including Defendants Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah.
158. Defendants Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah knew or recklessly disregarded that the
Companys quality controls, quality assurance, and regulatory reporting were seriously deficient,
that the concealment of that information would adversely affect the integrity of the market for
the Companys securities and would cause the price of the Companys securities to be artificially
79
inflated, and that disclosure of the truth would cause the value of the Companys securities to
fall.
159. In addition to the foregoing and other acts alleged herein, the following facts
provide evidence that Defendants Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah acted with actual knowledge or, at
a minimum, with extreme recklessness, in connection with the fraudulent practices alleged
herein.
A. Wadekar, Mauro, and Shah Occupied Direct Supervisory Responsibility

Over the Companys Quality Controls and Regulatory Reporting
160. Wadekar was Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer, and
Secretary of the Company. He was intimately aware of Ables inability to effectively meet
quality controls and regulatory standards. He personally recruited employees from India on
work visas, many of whom were inadequately trained and worked with minimal supervision once
they were hired. Wadekar met frequently with Shah, Mauro, Boehm, Klemick, and other
members of the Companys management to discuss the status of Ables regulatory compliance,
testing, and quality controls. Wadekar was forced to resign within hours of the Company
announcing that the FDA was forcing the suspension of sales of all of Ables products.
161. Shah was Vice President of Quality and Regulatory, with responsibility over the
personnel and functions of the Companys Quality Control Lab (the QC Lab). His specific
duties were to ensure Ables compliance with FDA and DEA regulations, to file and receive
FDA approvals for Ables ANDA submissions, and to maintain quality controls. He met
frequently with the heads of regulatory, quality control, and quality assurance. Because of his
failure to properly manage these departments, he was forced into retirement in December 2004.
Both Shah and Wadekar were intimately involved in the personnel decisions and running of the
Quality Control, Quality Assurance, and Regulatory departments.
80
162. Mauro was Chief Operating Officer and presided over Ables regulatory
compliance. He was also the President and a Director. Evidencing his wholesale knowledge of
the Companys operations, Mauro assumed the role of Interim CEO after the resignation of
Defendant Wadekar on May 19, 2005. Mauro himself was forced to resign on July 7, 2005,
shortly after the FDA issued its scathing Form 483 which rebuked Ables senior management
for failing to employ or implement proper quality controls.
B. Ables History Of Quality Control Problems And Specific Warnings By The

FDA Put The Individual Defendants On Notice Of The Problems With
Quality Control
163. Quality control and quality assurance had historically been a problem at Able and
had mired the Company in long-standing regulatory and legal problems. In April 1992, the
FDA secured a court order placing Old Able Labs under a Consent Decree in a case titled United
States v. Able Laboratories, Inc., Civ. No. 91-4916 (D.N.J.), due to its wholesale failure to
comply with cGMPs. Old Able Labs, and then Able, operated under court supervision for ten
years until 2002 when it petitioned the FDA to dissolve the Consent Decree.
164. In seeking dissolution of the Consent Decree, Able represented to the FDA and to
the public that it had made substantial operational and financial commitments to improve the
Companys plant, personnel, and equipment in order to effect an improvement in Ables quality
controls. Indeed, Ables Form 10-K for fiscal year ending December 31, 2000, signed by
Wadekar, declared that the Company had made key management changes to retain individuals
who have knowledge of and commitment to compliance with cGMP in order to ensure continued
cGMP compliance and had provided cGMP training on a regularly scheduled basis to Able
employees.
81
165. In fact, however, at the time these representations were made, and at all times
thereafter, Ables quality control and quality assurance practices were critically lacking. CW3
described the utter failure by managers in the Quality Assurance division to follow up on quality
assurance problems detected by line workers. According to CW3, when she reported variances
in the thickness of pills that she was in charge of inspecting, she was told to change the reported
result to reflect an in-range measurement. CW3 also indicated that when Ables label generating
machines produced inaccurate label production numberswhich were reportable incidentsshe
was told by managers to alter her report to reflect the normal label quantity count.
166. Indeed, within two years after Able had assured the public that its quality control
problems were a thing of the past, the FDA once again was forced to warn Able about
deficiencies in quality controls. On April 19, 2004, following an FDA inspection of the
Companys South Plainfield facility, the FDA wrote to Wadekar informing him that Ables
protocols for reporting adverse drug experiences (ADE) by users of its drugs were seriously
lacking. According to the FDAs inspection, between January 1, 2002 and January 15, 2004,
Able had failed to properly record and report 27 ADEs.
167. The FDA warning letter specifically noted that all of the deviations unearthed in
the FDAs inspection had been presented to and discussed with Wadekar. In addition, the letter
noted that the FDA inspector had discussed the deficiencies in the Companys quality controls
with Shah. The letter informed Wadekar that the specific violations noted in this letter are
serious and may be symptomatic of serious underlying problems. You are responsible for
investigating and determining the causes of the violations identified above and preventing the
recurrence of similar problems. Yet, the FDAs warnings were ignored and Ables quality
control and regulatory deficiencies were left unaddressed.
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C. It Was Widely Acknowledged Within the Company That Chemists in

the Quality Control Lab Were Under-Trained and Overworked
168. Ables quality and regulatory controls were the linchpin to ensure that the
Company could continue manufacturing generic drugs. By March 2003, 35% of Ables
employees, or 100 out of 288, worked in the areas of quality and regulatory control. By
February 2004, Able had assigned 155 of its 407 employees to quality and regulatory control, or
38%.
169. With the Companys increasing manufacturing workload, however, its QC Lab
faced ever-increasing demands. According to CW4, beginning in 2003, Able ratcheted up its
production to meet growing demand for its products. Because of the tremendous production
increases, the QC Lab was running more and more batches resulting in chemists being
overworked and stressed. To address the strain on the Companys quality control resources,
Wadekar personally recruited new, young chemists from India, but as Wadekar, Shah, and the
other Defendants knew from their observations of these chemists, these new hires lacked
adequate training and frequently made errors.
170. According to CW5, the QC Lab managers who were charged with reviewing all
bench chemist test results and conducting random reviews seldom, if ever, performed these
supervisory tasks. Thus, final reports emanating from the QC Lab were approved without
independent testing or verification. Shah was ultimately demoted in December 2004 due to the
widely acknowledged mess in the departments that he managed, including Quality Control.
171. Rather than address the problems in the number and quality of personnel in
Ables Quality Control Lab, the Defendants reduced the staff in the QC Lab. By February 15,
2005, the proportion of employees dedicated to quality and regulatory control had fallen from
38% of employees to less than 27% (113 of Ables 421 full-time employees).
83
D. A Culture of Dishonesty Fostered by Shah
172. During Shahs tenure as the Vice President of Quality and Regulatory, he fostered
a culture of dishonesty according to CW1.
173. Under Shahs tutelage, bench chemists willfully misreported adverse quality
control results and doctored lab notebooks. Shah himself openly flouted established rules,
admitting to the FDA in 2004, as evidenced by the warning letter, that he never, during his tenure
as the Quality Control director, reported Adverse Drug Events as the FDA policies required.
174. Despite Shahs deficient and dishonest management of the QC Lab, he was
allowed to remain in control over the Labs operation. Even after David Chesbro assumed the
role of Director of the QC Lab in March 2003, Shah continued to actively manage the laboratory.
According to CW1, until December 2004, Shah was in charge of everything.
175. Shortly after Shah was divested of his control over the QC Lab in December
2004, Ables fraudulent scheme began to unravel.
E. The Scope of Ables Problems and Small Size of Its Operations Creates A
Strong Inference of the Individual Defendants Scienter
176. The massive fraud committed by Ables quality control department in masking
the results of quality control tests for an entire stable of products over an extended period of
time, combined with the small size of Ables operations, creates a strong inference that Wadekar,
Mauro, and Shah knew about or recklessly disregarded the undisclosed quality control problems
within the Company.
177. Until the summer of 2004, all of Ables operations were situated in a single
facility in South Plainfield, New Jersey. Thereafter, Able began operations out of its new
Cranbury, New Jersey factory. At the start of 2004, the total number of employees in the entire
Company was approximately 400. The total staff managed by Shah, as head of the Quality
84
Control, Regulatory, and Quality Assurance departments was approximately 100 employees.
Many of the quality control bench chemists staffing the QC Lab were personally recruited by
Wadekar.
178. Moreover, defendants Mauro, Boehm, and Klemick were familiar with the
personnel staffing the QC Lab and the procedures for testing batches of drugs. According to
CW2, prior to the opening of the new facility in Cranbury, all of Ables quality control,
regulatory, and research and development chemists worked together in a single laboratory.
F. The FDAs Inspection Demonstrates that Ables Quality Control Problems

Were the Result of the Failures of Senior Management to Develop Testing
Protocols or Follow Established Procedures
179. The problems with Ables quality controls were a direct result of reckless
managers who failed to ensure that protocols were followed, or in some cases, even adopted.
180. The FDA Form 483 specifically identifies Ables senior managers as the culpable
parties in causing the quality control problems at the Company:
According to Observation 1, the Quality Unit and Senior Management failed to
assure that all drug products distributed have the safety, identify, quality, and
purity that they are represented to possess.
According to Observation 8, employees were not given training in cGMPs and
written procedures required by cGMP regulations. The report concludes: This
lack of training and oversight by management contributed to the non-reporting of
[out of specification] results in the QC Laboratory.
181. Indeed, many of the failures identified by the FDA were the result of there not
being any procedure whatsoever for certain quality controls. According to the Form 483:
85
There is no [Standard Operating Procedure] governing the issuance of Field
Alerts. Field Alerts were required when the managers received information that
drug products did not meet the specifications that were listed in the ANDA.
There was no SOP describing the use of (SP) special samples tested in the
Analytical Laboratory.
182. Other methods of altering test data were so blatant and systemic that it would
have been impossible for senior managers reviewing QC Laboratory notebooks, absent
recklessness, to not detect the manipulation of results. For example, according to Form 483, out
of specification results obtained in the QC Lab were substituted with passing results by
Analysts and Supervisors The substitution of data was performed by cutting and pasting of
chromatographs, substituting vials, changing sample weights and changing process methods.
(emphasis added).
183. In addition, the Form 483 concluded that established laboratory control
mechanisms were not followed, suggesting that any approvals given by senior managers over
the results of tests were perfunctory at best. For example, Observation 11 of the Form 483 noted
that while the number of retests was required to be documented prior to initiating retesting to
establish a definite limit beyond which no additional testing would be permitted, Ables
documentation of testing revealed that there was no documentation of the number of retests to
be performed as required by the SOP. Likewise, procedures that required documented testing
by more than one chemist were not followed. Absent severe recklessness or intentional fraud,
these departures from the Companys standard operating procedures would have been recorded
and corrected by the Defendants.
86
G. The Company Secured Non-Disclosure Agreements by All Employees

Involved in the Investigation of the Companys Fraud
184. Lead Plaintiffs investigation into the facts and circumstances of Ables implosion
have been impeded by non-disclosure agreements that the Company executed with senior
employees who were involved in the internal investigation leading up to Ables complete recall
of its products from the market. According to a Quality Control Manager hired in January 2005
to address deficiencies in Ables quality controls, all employees who survived the first layoffs in
July 2005 were required to sign a non-disclosure agreement preventing them from revealing to
anyone the internal happenings at Able Labs. These employees have been informed that the
non-disclosure agreements are binding even though Able Labs has since discharged them and the
Company is in bankruptcy.
H. Defendants Insider Trading
185. The Defendants motive to commit fraud included their ability to profit from the
sales of Ables stock at artificially inflated prices. While Ables stock price was inflated as a
result of the Defendants fraud, the Companys insiders exercised tens of thousands of options to
purchase shares at prices ranging from $0.15 to $3.75, and immediately sold the shares for
substantial profits at prices between $18.12 and $24.01. Defendants Wadekar and Shah sold a
total of 148,000 shares of Company stock during the Class Period for proceeds exceeding $2.9
million and profits exceeding $2.5 million:
Pre- Post %
Sale
Defendant Date # Sold Proceeds Profits Trans. Trans. Holdings
Price
Holdings Holdings Sold
Wadekar 12/1/04 15,000 21.63 324,450.00 296,325.00 19,800 4,800 75.76
9/1/04 15,000 21.73 325,950.00 297,825.00 19,800 4,800 75.76

6/2/04 4,088 18.40 75,219.20 67,554.20 8,888 4,800 45.99
87
Pre- Post %
Sale
Price
6/1/04 5,912 18.42 108,899.04 97,814.04 14,800 8,888 39.95
4/1/04 10,000 19.38 193,800.00 175,050.00 15,600 5,600 64.10
2/2/04 10,000 18.12 181,200.00 162,450.00 15,600 5,600 64.10
12/1/03 10,000 18.61 186,100.00 178,850.58 15,600 5,600 64.10
10/2/03 10,000 18.24 182,400.00 180,900.00 15,600 5,600 64.10
333 21.55 7,176.15 7,126.20
403 22.05 8,886.15 8,825.70
8/8/03 7,577
268 22.00 5,896.00 5,855.80 5,600 26.09
403 22.10 8,906.30 8,845.85
570 22.17 12,636.90 12,551.40
683 21.20 14,479.60 14,377.15
1,365 21.25 29,006.25 28,801.50 10,989
8/7/03 7,577 31.05
682 21.30 14,526.60 14,424.30
682 21.35 14,560.70 14,458.40
8/6/03 1,357 22.25 30,193.25 29,989.70 13,363
10,989 17.77
1,017 21.70 22,068.90 21,916.35
724 24.01 17,383.24 17,274.64
8/4/03 15,600
855 23.30 19,921.50 19,793.25 13,363 14.34
658 23.05 15,166.90 15,068.20
Total 90,000 1,798,826.68 1,676,077.26
Shah 12/1/04 5,000 21.63 108,150.00 89,400.00 5,000 0 100.00

9/1/04 5,000 21.73 108,650.00 89,900.00 5,000 0 100.00
6/2/04 4,088 18.40 75,219.20 59,889.20 4,088 0 100.00
6/1/04 5,912 18.42 108,899.04 86,729.04 10,000 4,088 59.12
4/1/04 10,000 19.38 193,800.00 156,300.00 10,000 0 100.00
2/2/04 10,000 18.12 181,200.00 143,700.00 10,000 0 100.00
12/1/03 6,000 18.61 111,660.00 89,160.00 6,000 0 100.00
10/2/03 6,000 18.24 109,440.00 86,940.00 6,000 0 100.00
200 21.55 4,310.00 3,560.00
242 22.05 5,336.10 4,428.60
1,186
8/8/03 161 22.00 3,542.00 2,938.25 0 100.00
241 22.10 5,326.10 4,422.35
342 22.17 7,582.14 6,299.64
8/7/03 410 21.20 8,692.00 7,154.50 2,048 1,186 40.85
819 21.25 17,403.75 14,332.50
88
Pre- Post %
Sale
Price
410 21.30 8,733.00 7,195.50
409 21.35 8,732.15 7,198.40
8/6/03 814 22.25 18,111.50 15,059.00 4,658
3,234 30.57
610 21.70 13,237.00 10,949.50
434 24.01 10,420.34 8,792.84
8/4/03 6,000
513 23.30 11,952.90 10,029.15 4,658 22.37
395 23.05 9,104.75 7,623.50
Total 58,000 1,129,501.97 912,001.97
186. In contrast to these substantial insider sales during the Class Period, in the year
before the Class Period only Defendant Wadekar sold stock, and he sold only 15,000 shares.
187. The insider trading profits realized by Wadekar and Shah far exceeded their other
compensation from the Company. Wadekars total annual compensation from Able was
approximately $280,000 in 2003 and $600,000 in 2004, while his insider trading profits were
nearly $1.7 million for only the 15-month period from August 2003 through December 2004.
Shahs total annual compensation was approximately $200,000 in 2003 and $218,000 in 2004,
while his insider trading profits exceeded $912,000 for the 15-month period from August 2003
through December 2004.
VIII. APPLICABILITY OF PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE UNDER THE

FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET DOCTRINE
188. In connection with Plaintiffs claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, Plaintiffs will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance
established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, in that:
a. Defendants made public misrepresentations and failed to disclose

material facts during the Class Period;
b. the omissions and misrepresentations were material;
89
c. the misrepresentations and omissions would tend to induce a

reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Companys
securities;
d. Ables securities traded in an open and efficient market; and
e. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class purchased Ables securities

between the time Defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented
material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without
knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts.
189. At all relevant times, the market for Ables stock was an efficient market for the
following reasons, among others:
a. Ables stock, until it was delisted after the end of the Class Period,
met the requirements for listing, and was listed and actively traded
on the NASDAQ National Market System, a highly efficient and
automated market;
b. As a regulated issuer, Able filed periodic public reports with the

SEC and NASDAQ;
c. Able regularly communicated with public investors via established

market communication mechanisms, including through regular
disseminations of press releases on the national circuits of major
newswire services and through other wide-ranging public
disclosures, such as communications with the financial press and
other similar reporting services;
d. Able was followed by several securities analysts employed by

major brokerage firms who wrote reports which were distributed to
the sales force and certain customers of their respective brokerage
firms. At least 72 research reports were written on Able during the
Class Period. Each of these reports was publicly available and
entered the public marketplace;
e. The average weekly trading volume of Ables stock during the

Class Period was in excess of 1,000,000 shares, or more than 5%
of the total outstanding shares; and
f. At least as of November 2003, Able met the minimum

requirements for listing on the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index,
including market value, average daily trading volume, and
seasoning as a public company.
90
190. As a result of the foregoing, the market for Able securities promptly digested
current information regarding Able from all publicly-available sources and reflected such
information in the Companys stock price.
191. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Ables securities during the Class
Period suffered similar injury through their purchase of Ables securities at artificially inflated
prices, and a presumption of reliance applies.
192. Additionally, throughout the Class Period, Plaintiffs and the Class justifiably
expected the Defendants to disclose material information in connection with the Companys
securities. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class would not have purchased the Companys
securities at artificially inflated prices if Defendants had disclosed all material information,
including Ables lack of FDA compliance, lack of adherence to quality control, and lack of
ability to manufacture marketable generic drugs. Thus, reliance by Plaintiffs and the Class
should be presumed with respect to Defendants omissions and material misrepresentations.
IX. LOSS CAUSATION
193. During the Class Period, as detailed herein, Defendants engaged in a scheme to
deceive the market and a course of conduct that artificially inflated Ables stock price.
Defendants conduct operated as a fraud and deceit on Class Period purchasers of Able stock
because it misrepresented the Companys business success and future business prospects.
Defendants achieved this facade of growth and strong future business prospects by
misrepresenting, and failing to disclose material adverse facts regarding, the efficacy of its core
products and its compliance with FDA regulations.
194. Defendants false and misleading statements had the intended effect and caused
Ables stock to trade at artificially inflated levels throughout the Class Period. For example:
The day following Ables October 30, 2002 press release announcing its third
91
quarter 2002 results (which was released after the close of the market), Ables
stock closed at $6.37, up from the previous days close of $6.25. The next day,
on November 1, 2001, Ables stock closed at $6.75. By November 7, 2001, the
stock price closed at $8.10.
On February 24, 2003, following Ables press release announcing the expansion
of its credit facilities by $5.7 million, the Companys stock price closed at $14.00,
up from the previous trading days close of $13.85. By February 28, 2003, the
stock closed at $14.80.
On July 28, 2003, following Ables press release announcing its second quarter
2003 results, the stock price closed at $24.19, up from the previous trading days
close of $23. On August 1, 2003, the stock closed at a high of $24.69.
On February 26, 2004, following Ables press release announcing fourth quarter
and year-end results for 2003, its stock price closed at $18.93, up from the
previous days close of $18.17.
The day following Ables July 27, 2004 press release announcing its second
quarter 2004 results (which was released after the close of the market), Ables
stock price closed at $18.58, up from the previous days close of $18.15. By July
30, 2004, the stock closed at $20.60.
The day following Ables May 5, 2005 press release announcing its first quarter
2005 results (which was released after the close of the market), Ables stock price
closed at $25.59, up from the previous days close of $24.09.
195. Later, when these problems were revealed, the Companys stock price fell
precipitously as the prior artificial inflation came out of the price. On May 19, 2005 (the day
92
after the end of the Class Period), when Able issued a press release disclosing its problems with
FDA compliance and that it was suspending the sales of all of its products as a result of those
problems, the Companys stock sunk to close at $6.26, down from the previous days close of
$24.63. The loss to investors was enormous -- the stock lost almost three-quarters of its value
that day. As additional information came out regarding Ables previously undisclosed problems
with FDA compliance and with the trustworthiness of its products, the stock price continued to
decline.
196. The decline in Ables stock price after the end of the Class Period was a direct
result of the nature and extent of Defendants fraud finally being revealed to investors and the
market. This drop removed the artificial inflation from Ables stock price, causing substantial
economic losses, i.e., damages, to investors who purchased the stock during the Class Period.
197. The damages suffered by Lead Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were a
direct result of Defendants fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate Ables stock price, and the
subsequent significant decline in the value of the stock when Defendants prior
misrepresentations and other fraudulent conduct were revealed.
X. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
For Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and

Rule 10b-5(b) Promulgated Thereunder,
Against Defendants Wadekar, Mauro and Shah (the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants)
198. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth above as if fully set
forth herein.
199. This Claim is brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder, on behalf of Plaintiffs and all other members of the Class,
against the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants.
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200. As alleged herein, throughout the Class Period, the Company and the Rule 10b-
5(b) Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use of the means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the mails and/or the facilities of a national securities
exchange, made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts
necessary to make the statements made not misleading, in connection with the purchase or sale
of the Companys securities.
201. The false and misleading statements and omissions by the Company and the Rule
10b-5(b) Defendants included, inter alia:
a. verbal statements by Wadekar during quarterly earnings conference calls
and at the CCBN Virtual Healthcare Conference, as alleged herein;
b. statements and omissions in the Companys 2002 Form 10-K, which were
prepared by or under the direction of (among others) Wadekar and Shah, and were approved and
signed by (among others) Wadekar;
c. statements and omissions in the Companys 2003 Form 10-K, which were
prepared by or under the direction of (among others) Wadekar and Shah, and were approved and
signed by (among others) Wadekar;
d. statements and omissions in the Companys 2004 Form 10-K, which were
prepared by or under the direction of, and signed by, Wadekar and Mauro (among others);
e. statements and omissions in the Companys Form 10-Q filings during the
Class Period, all of which were prepared by or under the direction of (among others) Wadekar
and Shah, signed by Wadekar, and approved by the Companys Board of Directors, which
included Wadekar throughout the Class Period and Mauro from April 2004 through the end of
the Class Period;
94
f. statements in the certifications signed by Wadekar with respect to the
Companys Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings during the Class Period;
g. statements in the Companys press releases, which were prepared under
the direction of, and approved by, Wadekar and Shah (and Mauro during and after April 2004),
and which contain direct quotes from Wadekar; and
h. Defendants failure to inform investors about recalls in early 2005 which
were due to the discovery of discrepancies in the reporting of Ables quality control results.
202. The Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants were individually and collectively responsible for
making the false and misleading statements and omissions in the documents alleged herein to be
materially false or misleading, by virtue of having approved, signed, and/or overseen the
preparation of those documents.
203. As described above, the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants false and misleading
statements and omissions were made knowingly and intentionally, or in such an extremely
reckless manner as to constitute willful deceit and fraud upon Plaintiffs and other members of the
Class who purchased Able securities during the Class Period.
204. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants false and misleading
statements and omissions were intended to and did, as alleged herein, (i) deceive the investing
public, including Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class; (ii) artificially create, inflate and
maintain the market for and market price of the Companys securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiffs
and the other members of the Class to purchase the Companys securities at inflated prices.
205. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants conduct violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder.
95
206. In ignorance of the false and misleading nature of the Companys and the Rule
10b-5(b) Defendants false and misleading statements and omissions, and relying directly or
indirectly on those statements and/or upon the integrity of the market price for Ables securities,
Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class purchased Able securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period. But for the fraud, they would not have purchased the securities at
artificially inflated prices.
207. The market price of Ables securities declined materially upon the public
disclosure of the facts that had previously been misrepresented or omitted by the Company and
the Rule 10b-5(b) Defendants, as described above.
208. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were substantially damaged as a
direct and proximate result of their purchases of Able securities at artificially inflated prices and
the subsequent decline in the price of those securities when the truth was disclosed.
COUNT II
For Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and

Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Promulgated Thereunder,
Against Defendants Wadekar and Shah
(the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants)
forth herein.
210. This Claim is brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder, on behalf of Plaintiffs and all other members of the
Class, against the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants.
211. As alleged herein, throughout the Class Period, Able and the Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c) Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use of the means or
96
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the mails and/or the facilities of a national securities
exchange:
a. employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; and
b. engaged in acts, practices, and a course of conduct that operated as a fraud
or deceit upon Plaintiffs and other members of the Class.
212. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants devices, schemes, and
artifices to defraud, and other conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiffs and the
Class, included, inter alia:
a. Defendant Shahs ensuring that the Company met regulatory reporting
requirements and increased its revenues by falsifying quality control data and by issuing false
regulatory reports to the FDA;
b. Defendant Shahs orchestrating the misreporting of quality control data to
the FDA by instructing bench chemists under his direct supervision to falsify the results of
quality control tests;
c. Defendant Shahs failing to report adverse drug events to the FDA
throughout his tenure at the Company;
d. Defendants Shah and Wadekars hiring inexperienced and poorly trained
bench chemists and fostering a culture of dishonesty to conceal adverse quality control results;
e. Defendant Wadekars complicity with Shah to conceal adverse quality
control results from the FDA even after the FDA warned of grave problems in Ables quality
controls; and
97
i. Defendants Wadekars and Shahs sales of the Companys stock at
inflated prices knowing that the stock price was inflated because the Company was able to
improve sales by selling products that failed to meet minimum FDA quality control standards.
213. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants devices, schemes and
artifices to defraud, and their acts, practices and course of conduct that operated as a fraud and
deceit upon Plaintiffs and the Class, were in connection with the purchase or sale of the
Companys securities.
214. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants conduct was intended
to and did, as alleged herein, (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiffs and the other
members of the Class; (ii) artificially create, inflate, and maintain the market for and market
price of the Companys securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class to
purchase the Companys securities at inflated prices.
215. As described above, the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants conduct was
undertaken knowingly and intentionally, or in such an extremely reckless manner as to constitute
willful deceit and fraud upon Plaintiffs and other members of the Class who purchased Able
securities during the Class Period.
216. The Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants conduct violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder.
217. In ignorance of the Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants
fraudulent conduct, and relying directly or indirectly on the integrity of the market price for
Ables securities, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class purchased Able securities at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. But for the Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a)
98
and (c) Defendants fraudulent conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class would not have purchased the
securities at artificially inflated prices.
218. The market price for Ables securities declined materially upon the public
disclosure of the Companys and the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Defendants fraudulent conduct, as
described above.
219. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were substantially damaged as a
direct and proximate result of their purchases of Able securities at artificially inflated prices and
the subsequent decline in the price of those securities when the truth was disclosed.
COUNT III
Violation of Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act

Against Wadekar and Shah
(the Insider Trading Defendants)
220. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully
set forth herein.
221. This Claim is brought pursuant to Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
78t-1, against the Insider Trading Defendants, on behalf of Plaintiff Deka and all members of the
Class who purchased Able stock contemporaneously with the Insider Trading Defendants sale
of Able stock during the Class Period.
222. Each of the Insider Trading Defendants sold substantial numbers of shares of
Able common stock during the Class Period, representing significant proportions of their
holdings, while in possession of material, adverse, non-public information. This conduct
violated Section 10(b) and 20A of the Exchange Act.
223. Defendant Wadekar received almost $1.8 million in proceeds from the sale of
90,000 shares of Able common stock during the Class Period. Between August 4, 2003 and
August 8, 2003, he sold 64.1% of his holdings. He again sold 64.1% of his holdings on each of
99
October 2, 2003, December 1, 2003, February 2, 2004, and April 1, 2004, followed by 67.57%
on June 1-2, 2004. On each of September 1, 2004 and December 1, 2004, Wadekar sold in
excess of 75% of his holdings in Able stock. In 2003, Wadekar sold all of the 30,000 of the
shares he acquired upon the exercise of his stock options that year, and in 2004 he sold all of the
60,000 shares he received through the exercise of stock options that year.
224. Defendant Shah received almost $1.13 million in proceeds from the sale of 58,000
shares of Able common stock during the Class Period. Between August 4, 2003 and August 8,
2003, he sold 100% of his holdings. He thereafter acquired additional shares through the
exercise of stock options and promptly sold those shares, resulting in sales of 100% of his
holdings on each of October 2, 2003, December 1, 2003, February 2, 2004, April 1, 2004, June
1-2, 2004, September 1, 2004, and December 1, 2004. In 2003, Shah sold all of the 18,000
shares he acquired upon the exercise of stock options that year, and in 2004 he sold all of the
40,000 shares he received through the exercise of stock options that year.
225. The Insider Trading Defendants sales of stock during the Class Period were
unusual in amount because, inter alia, they represented significant proportions of the Insider
Trading Defendants holdings. These sales also netted the Insider Trading Defendants profits
which were substantial in comparison to their overall compensation from the Company, and
represented significant deviations from pre-Class Period behavior. These defendants were
repeatedly exercising stock options and immediately selling all of the shares obtained therefrom.
These sales indicate that the Insider Trading Defendants knew the Companys stock price was
artificially inflated during the Class Period as a result of material adverse information known to
the Insider Trading Defendants but not to the investing public, and that rather than hold their
shares in anticipation of future success of the Company and resulting increases in the stock price,
100
they repeatedly sold off their holdings in order to profit from the artificially inflated price before
the adverse information became public.
226. As set forth in its Certification previously filed with the Court, Deka purchased
61,076 shares of Able common stock on October 2, 2003.
227. Defendant Wadekar, while in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic
information, sold 10,000 shares of Able common stock on October 2, 2003.
228. Defendant Shah, while in possession of material, adverse, nonpublic information,
sold 6,000 shares of Able common stock on October 2, 2003.
229. Numerous other Class members also purchased Able common stock
contemporaneously with the Insider Trading Defendants sales of stock during the Class Period
based on material, adverse, non-public information.
230. Under Section 20A of the Exchange Act, the Insider Trading Defendants are
liable to Plaintiffs and the Class for all profits gained and losses avoided by them as a result of
these contemporaneous transactions.
COUNT IV
Violation of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act

Against Wadekar
231. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully
set forth herein.
232. This Claim is brought pursuant to Section 18 of the Exchange Act against
Wadekar, on behalf of Plaintiff DERP and all members of the Class.
233. As set forth above, Able and Wadekar made or caused to be made statements
which were, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which they were made, false or
101
misleading with respect to material facts, in Ables 2003 Form 10-K. As a signatory of the 2003
Form 10-K, Wadekar is responsible for making the statements contained therein.
234. In connection with the purchase of the Companys securities, DERP and other
members of the Class specifically read and relied upon false statements in the Companys 2003
Form 10-K, including the statements alleged herein to be materially false or misleading.
235. Among other false statements, DERP and other members of the Class read and
relied upon the following false statements from Ables 2003 Form 10-K:
(a) The statement that we believe that we are currently in compliance with
all applicable FDA requirements and [w]e do not expect the law [providing for penalties for
wrongdoing in connection with the development or submission of an ANDA] to have a material
impact on the review or approval of our ANDAs;
(b) The assertion that the following ANDAs had been approved by the FDA
in accordance with sound cGMPs: Acetaminophen and Codeine Phospate Tablets, USP
300mg/30mg; Diphenoxylate and Atropine Sulfate Tablets; Methylphenidate Hydrochloride
Tablets; Methylphenidate Hydrochloride Extended Release Tablets; Nitroglycerine Sublingual
Tablets; Prochloroperazine Suppositories; and Proproxyphene Napsylate and Acetaminophen
Tablets;
(c) The certification by Wadekar that Based on my knowledge, this annual
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
and
102
(d) Ables reported financial results, including but not limited to its net sales
and net income figures.
236. DERP and the other members of the Class reasonably relied on the foregoing
statements, not knowing that they were false or misleading. DERP and other members of the
Class also relied on the Companys statements in the 2003 Form 10-K as being materially
complete, and as not omitting material information.
237. When the truth began to emerge about the false and misleading statements and
omissions that were contained in the 2003 Form 10-K, Plaintiffs and all other members of the
Class were significantly damaged by the resulting drop in the value of the Companys stock.
238. As a direct and proximate result of Ables and Wadekars wrongful conduct,
DERP and the other members of the Class suffered damage in connection with their purchases of
the Companys stock.
239. By virtue of the foregoing, Able and Wadekar have violated Section 18 of the
Exchange Act.
COUNT V
Control Person Liability Pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act,

Against Wadekar, Mauro, Shah, Boehm, and Klemick (the Section 20(a) Defendants)
forth herein.
241. This Claim is brought pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Section 20(a) Defendants, on behalf of Plaintiffs and all members of the Class.
242. As alleged herein, Able violated Section 18 of the Exchange Act by filing the
2002 Form 10-K, the 2003 Form 10-K, and the 2004 Form 10-K with the SEC, all of which
103
contained materially false and misleading statements. Plaintiffs and other Class members read
and relied on those false and misleading statements when purchasing Able securities.
243. As further alleged herein, Able violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5(a), (b), and (c) promulgated thereunder by making false and misleading statements in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities and by participating in a fraudulent scheme and
course of business or conduct in connection with falsification of quality control data to
improperly pass FDA inspections and thereby to maintain the Companys artificially inflated
stock price. This fraudulent conduct was undertaken with scienter, because Able is charged with
the knowledge and scienter of its employees and managers who knew of or recklessly
disregarded the falsity of the Companys statements and the fraudulent nature of its scheme.
244. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class who purchased Able securities
during the Class Period suffered damages in connection with their purchases of those securities,
as a direct and proximate result of Ables primary violations of Section 18, Section 10(b), and
Rule 10b-5.
245. Defendant Wadekar was a controlling person of Able during the Class Period due
to his position as the Companys Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, his
signatures on and approvals of Ables false and misleading statements, his position as the
Companys primary spokesperson for purposes of press releases and conference calls, and his
supervision and control over all of the Companys employees and functions, including but not
limited to the quality assurance and quality control functions and the FDA and SEC reporting
functions.
246. Defendant Mauro was a controlling person of Able from April 2004 through the
end of the Class Period due to his positions as a director of the Company and as its President and
104
Chief Operating Officer, his signatures on and/or approvals of Ables false and misleading
statements, and his supervision and control over all of the Companys employees and functions,
including but not limited to the quality assurance and quality control functions and the FDA and
SEC reporting functions.
247. Defendant Shah was a controlling person of Able at all relevant times through the
end of 2004 due to his position as Vice President of Quality and Regulatory. As such, he was
responsible for, inter alia, ensuring Ables compliance with FDA regulations; filing ANDAs;
ensuring the quality of Ables products; and supervising the employees within the Companys
Quality Control group.
248. Defendant Boehm was a controlling person of Able from April 2004 through the
end of the Class Period due to his position as the Companys Chief Science Officer. As such, he
was in charge of directing all of the Companys research and development activities, and had
responsibility for, inter alia, overseeing the Companys product testing to ensure compliance
with FDA specifications; communicating with the FDA regarding the Companys ANDAs; and
the Companys submission of reports to the FDA.
249. Defendant Klemick was a controlling person of Able during the Class Period due
to her positions as Director of Regulatory Affairs until April 2005, and as Vice President of
Compliance thereafter. In both positions, Klemick was responsible for ensuring the Companys
compliance with FDA regulations.
250. By virtue of the foregoing, each of the Section 20(a) Defendants had the power to
influence and control, and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making
of Able, including its quality control function and/or the content and dissemination of the false or
misleading statements complained of herein.
105
251. Each of the Section 20(a) Defendants was a culpable participant in Ables primary
violations of Section 18, Section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5. As set forth in detail above, Wadekar,
Shah, and Mauro acted with scienter in knowingly issuing false and misleading statements to the
public and were, therefore, culpable participants in Ables fraudulent conduct.
252. During Klemicks tenure at Able, the Company was wholly deficient in its
compliance with FDA requirements for cGMP and Klemick was alerted to these problems no
later than April 2004 with the issuance of the FDAs warning letter. Under Klemicks watch,
however, the Company continued to violate FDA regulations, failed to address the deficiencies
in quality controls that the FDA identified, and concealed known quality control problems from
investors. In December 2004, when Shah, Klemicks immediate supervisor, was forced to
resign from his position as Vice President of Quality and Regulatory, Ables quality control
failures were made even more evident to Klemick. Yet, she permitted Able to continue to
misleading investors about its compliance with FDA regulations. As such, Klemick was a
culpable participant in Ables fraudulent conduct.
253. During Boehms tenure as Ables Senior Vice President and Chief Scientific
Officer from April 2004 through the end of the Class Period, he oversaw Ables development of
new drugs and the submission of ANDAs to the FDA. In this capacity, Boehm was responsible
for ensuring that Able conformed with FDA regulations and cGMPs in developing new drugs
and submitting them to the FDA for approval. Yet, throughout his tenure, as evident from the
FDAs warning in April 2004 of Ables grave quality control problems, and Ables failure to
remediate them during Boehms tenure, Boehm was a culpable participant in Ables fraudulent
conduct.
106
254. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons of Able, the Section 20(a)
Defendants are each jointly and severally liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
with and to the same extent as Able, for Ables primary violations of Section 18, Section 10(b),
and Rule 10b-5.
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, as follows:
A. Declaring this action to be a proper Class action and certifying Plaintiffs
as class representatives pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23;
B. Awarding compensatory damages against all of the Defendants, jointly
and severally, in favor of Plaintiffs for all losses and damages suffered as a result of the
Defendants wrongdoing alleged herein, in an amount to be determined at trial, together with
interest thereon;
C. Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this
action, including a reasonable allowance of fees for Plaintiffs attorneys and experts; and
D. Awarding Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.
XII. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable.
107
Dated: June 19, 2006
GRANT & EISENHOFER, P.A.
By: s/ James R. Banko

Stuart Grant
Megan D. McIntyre
Sharan Nirmul
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 N. Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19081
Telephone: (302) 622-7000
Facsimile: (302) 622-7100
MURRAY, FRANK & SAILER LLP

Brian P. Murray
Bradley P. Dyer
Scott Levy
275 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, New York 10016
Telephone: (212) 682-1818
Facsimile: (212) 682-1892
Co-Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class
108
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, James R. Banko, hereby certify that:
On June 19, 2006, I caused the Consolidated Class Action Complaint to be electronically
filed with the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey using the USDC
CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel:
Samuel Kadet: skadet@skadden.com

Daniel Winters: dwinters@reedsmith.com
Glenn Kerner: gkerner@goodwinprocter.com
I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any
of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
Dated: June 19, 2006
s/ James R. Banko_______

In Re Able Laboratories

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Case 2:05-cv-02681-JAG-MCA Document 66-1 Filed 06/19/2006 Page 1 of 108

GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.

MURRAY, FRANK & SAILER LLP

Co-Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiffs and the Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

In re ABLE LABORATORIES Master File No. 05-CV-2681 (JAG) (MCA)

CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Defendants or are exclusively within their custody and/or control.

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

Defendants fraudulent material misrepresentations, omissions, and conduct regarding Ables

marketable generic drugs.

2. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants falsely presented Able as a

3. As a result of the Defendants fraud and misrepresentations, Plaintiffs purchased

II. JURISDICTION & VENUE

States mails and the facilities of the national securities exchanges.

III. PARTIES AND RELEVANT NON-PARTIES

A. Able Laboratories, Inc.

muscle relaxant, anxiety disorder, anti-diarrhea, hemorrhoids, rheumatoid arthritis, manic-

its bankruptcy, Able would be named as a defendant herein.

8. Lead Plaintiff Denver Employees Retirement Plan (DERP) is a defined benefit

than $1.84 billion in assets.

9. Lead Plaintiff Deka International (Ireland) Limited (Deka) is a fund

damages as a result of the wrongful conduct complained of herein.

11. Defendant Dhananjay G. Wadekar (Wadekar) was, at the time of Ables

Physical & Inorganic Chemistry from the University of Adelaide, Australia.

16. The Defendants, by reason of their management positions and/or membership on

power and influence.

IV. CONFIDENTIAL WITNESSES

confidential basis, and each is designated herein as CW__, as stated below.

19. CW1 is a former Quality Control Laboratory Instrumentation Supervisor who

worked at Able from 2003 through October 2005.

20. CW2 is a former Quality Compliance Auditor and Documentation Control

by Able from 1997 through December 2004.

representatives, heirs, successors, assigns or insurers of any excluded person.

to that customarily used in securities class actions.

the Exchange Act as complained of herein.

questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

omissions as alleged herein;

(b) whether Defendants participated in and pursued the common course of

conduct complained of herein;

(c) whether documents, press releases, and other statements disseminated to

material facts or omitted to state material facts;

Class Period misrepresented and/or omitted to disclose material facts;

proper measure of damages.

adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as

VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Historical Background Regarding the Company

combination caused both financial and managerial division.

GDI and Superior in December 2000 and February 2001, respectively.

and was awaiting FDA approval for twelve additional ANDAs.

current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs).

responsibilities of manufacturers quality control units; the qualifications and responsibilities of

facilities; requirements for control systems to prevent contamination or mix-ups; criteria to be

and the maintenance of records and reports.

decree would not be repeated. Specifically, the Company stated:

Able has been subject to a consent decree entered by the court on

We are extremely pleased to have the consent decree dissolved,

NASDAQ National Market.

under the ticker symbol QAF on August 1, 2003.

second half of 2004.

or another recognized market for at least 6 months.

developer and manufacturer of prescription generic liquid pharmaceuticals, on November 18,

pharmaceutical manufacturing operations.