CASE DIGESTS
LEGAL SEPARATION WON the respondent Judge committed
I solemnized a marriage between two
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March
8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-
706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO,
petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,
Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the
lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four
children were born out of that marriage.2
On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.3 When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same
was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand,
claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he
knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.4 According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was
married, he would have advised the
latter not to marry again; otherwise, he
(Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass
him.
Issue:
gross ignorance of the law when he
contracting parties who were both bound
by a prior existing marriage.
Held:
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of
marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for
at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must
be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit
stating that they have lived together for
at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute
a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present
in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed
on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were
"separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to
know that a subsisting previous marriage
Page 1 of 47
is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and
void.7
The fact that Manzano and Payao had
been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained
a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such
a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of
time between two individuals who are
legally capacitated to marry each other
is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the
law excuses no one" has special
application to judges,8 who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative
that judges be conversant with the law
and basic legal principles.9 And when the
law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
II
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs.
GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent
GR 132592
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided
Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing
among others the legal separation
between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground
of the latters sexual infidelity; the
dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net
conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents one-half share in the net
conjugal assets in favor of the common
children; the payment to petitioners
counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
attorneys fees to be taken from
petitioners share in the net assets; and
the surrender by respondent of the use
and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle
and the smaller residential house
located at Maria Luisa Estate Park
Subdivision to petitioner and the
common children within 15 days from
receipt of the decision.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-
parte motion to modify said decision,
while respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida
Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify
the decision on October 1, 1996 by
approving the Commitment of Fees
dated December 22, 1994; obliging
petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the
equivalent of 5% of the total value of
respondents ideal share in the net
conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioners counsel,
Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of
P100,000 as advance attorneys fees
chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4]
In another motion to modify the
decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought
moral and exemplary damages, as well
as litigation expenses. On October 9,
1996, she filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel
Baez filed a consolidated written
opposition to the two motions, and also
prayed for the reconsideration of the
October 1, 1996 order.
After several exchanges of petitions and
motions, the CA rendered a decision
setting aside the October 1, 1996
decision and further denying the motions
Page 2 of 47
for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence,
she filed the instant case before the SC
alleging that the CA erred in setting
aside the questioned order. She further
alleged that an action for legal
separation is among the cases where
multiple appeals may be taken.
According to her, the filing of a record on
appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in
this case. However, since respondent
failed to file the record on appeal within
the reglementary period as provided
under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule
50), the same should be dismissed
Issue:
WON multiple appeals may be allowed
in an action for legal separation?
Held:
NO
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in
special proceedings, in actions for
recovery of property with accounting, in
actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of
eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind allowing
more than one appeal in the same case
is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court
and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by
therein petitioner that may allegedly be
the subject of multiple appeals arose
from the same cause of action, and the
subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the
parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in
that case would only be violative of the
rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for
legal separation. The issues involved in
the case will necessarily relate to the
same marital relationship between the
parties. The effects of legal separation,
such as entitlement to live separately,
dissolution and liquidation of the
absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal
separation.[19] They are not separate or
distinct matters that may be resolved by
the court and become final prior to or
apart from the decree of legal
separation. Rather, they are mere
incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus,
they may not be subject to multiple
appeals.
Petitioners alternative prayers that in
case we do not dismiss the appeal, we
return the records to the trial court and
require respondent to file a record on
appeal, or we return the records to the
trial court and retain only the pleadings
and orders relevant to the appeal, are
untenable. If we grant the first, we are
effectively saying that the instant case is
one involving multiple appeals, which it
is not. If we allow the second, we are
effectively applying by analogy, Section
6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court, without petitioner
showing support therefor in law or
jurisprudence.
III
PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete
were married on April 30, 1938 and had
a child. Enrico contracted a second
marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion.
Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979.
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on
October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile
husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation between her and Pacete,
accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she
was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that
Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete
was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within
which to file an answer, which the court
partly granted. Due to unwanted
Page 3 of 47
misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to
file an answer on the date set by the
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a
motion to declare the defendants in
default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs
evidence during the hearings held on
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. CFI
granted legal separation, conjugal
properties half-and-half. Thus, this
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON CFI gravely abused its discretion in
decreeing the legal separation of Enrico
Pacete (P) and PR, and held to be null
and void ab initio the marriage of P and
Clarita Concepcion
HELD:
Yes, The Civil Code provides that no
decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment. In case of
non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there
is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for
the intervention of the state attorneys in
case of uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article
58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must
in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition, obviously in order to provide
the parties a cooling-off period. In this
interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above
substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion
of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. Therefore, if the
defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no c
collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
IV
SABALONES vs CA
GR 106169
Facts:
Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a
diplomat was assigned in different
countries and left to his wife the
administration of some of their conjugal
properties for 15years. After his
retirement he returned to the Philippines
but not to his wife and children.
After 4 years he filed an action for
juridical authorization to sell their
property in San Juan which belongs to
the conjugal partnership and would use
the proceeds of the sale for his hospital
and medical treatments.
Respondent (wife) opposed the
authorization and filed an action for legal
separation. Respondent alleges that that
the house in San Juan was being
occupied by her and their children and
the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to
Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband
never returned to them being the
legitimate family and lived in a separate
house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng
and their children.
Judge Umali found that petitioner
contracted a bigamous marriage with
Thelma Curameng. Court granted the
decree of legal separation and the
petitioner is not entitled to share in the
conjugal properties and he is not entitled
to support from his respondent wife.
Decision of lower court was appealed
and was granted the writ of preliminary
injunction filed by the respondent to
enjoin the petitioner from interfering in
the administration of their properties.
Page 4 of 47
Petitioner argues that the law provides
for joint administration of conjugal
properties and no injunctive relief can be
issued against the other because no
right will be violated.
Issue:
WON article124 is applicable as regards
to joint administration of conjugal
properties
Held:
Grant for preliminary injunction is valid;
it is necessary to protect the interest of
the respondent and her children and
prevent the dissipation of the conjugal
assets. Injunction has not permanently
installed the respondent as the
administrator of the whole conjugal
assets
Presence of 2 requirements of valid
injunction:
Existence of rights of the
respondents to a share of
the conjugal estate
There is evidence that
entrusting the estate to
the petitioner may result
to the irresponsible
disposition of assets that
would cause injury to his
wife and children
Primary purpose of the provisional
remedy of injunction is to preserve the
status quo of the subject of the action of
the relations between the parties and
thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs
respecting these matters during the
pendency of the suit.
Twin requirements of valid injunction:
Existence of a right
Actual or threatened
violation
Article 61: after further petition for legal
separation has been filed, the trial court
shall in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple would
appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd
person to act as the administrator.
V in favor of Rosanna.
ONG VS ONG
VI
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H.
AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal
Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 165546 February
27, 2006
Facts:
Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996.
Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H.
Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her
claim that Pablo was likewise survived
by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for
monthly pension was settled.
In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn
letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac,
Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas
claim for death benefits. She alleged
that Rosanna abandoned the family
abode approximately more than six
years before, and lived with another
man, and that Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna.
The SSS suspended the payment of
Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension.
In an investigation, it was reported that
the deceased had no legal children with
Rosanna and that Rosanna left the
deceased six years before his death and
lived with Romeo while she was still
pregnant with Jenelyn.
Rosanna was advised to refund to the
SSS the amount representing the total
death benefits released to her and
Jenelyn. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a
claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with
the Social Security Commission (SSC).
Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be
the child of the deceased and Rosanna,
now joined them as claimant.
SSC rendered a decision denying the
claims for lack of merit and ordering
Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS.
On Appeal, the CA rendered a decision
Page 5 of 47
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled
to the pension benefit.
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the
photocopy of her birth certificate which
bears the signature of Pablo. Under
Article 164 of the Family Code, children
conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case,
there is no showing that Pablo
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn
during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns
status as a legitimate child can no longer
be contested.
The presumption of legitimacy under
Article 164, however, can not extend to
Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Such presumption
may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis. Respondents
submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged
birth certificate. However, the Court
cannot give said birth certificate the
same probative weight as Jeylnns
because it was not verified in any way by
the civil register.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears
stressing that for her to qualify as a
primary beneficiary, she must prove that
she was "the legitimate spouse
dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must
therefore establish two qualifying
factors: (1) that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent
upon the member for support.
Rosanna presented a copy of their
marriage certificate verified with the civil
register. But whether or not Rosanna has
sufficiently established that she was still
dependent on Pablo at the time of his
death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a
husband and wife are obliged to support
each other, but whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other is
something that has to be shown; it
cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.
The obvious conclusion then is that a
wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that
the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it
would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of
providing for herself.
Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of
Pablo, as it was established that she is
his legitimate child. On the other hand,
the records show that Janet was merely
"adopted" by the spouses, but there are
no legal papers to prove it; hence, she
cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate
wife of Pablo, she is likewise not
qualified as a primary beneficiary since
she failed to present any proof to show
that at the time of his death, she was
still dependent on him for support even
if they were already living separately.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE
VII
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO JR
(G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985)
Facts:
Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen and
Richard Upton, an American citizen,
were married in Hongkong in 1972. After
the marriage, they resided in the
Philippines and begot two children. In
1982, the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States. Alice has re-
married in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice
with the RTC stating that her business in
Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the
parties. He asks that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of that business,
and that Richard be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Alice
Page 6 of 47
moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.
In her petition, Alice contends that
Richard is estopped from claiming on the
alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court
that they had no community of property;
hence, barred by prior judgment.
Richard avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national
policy; the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not Richard still has the right
over the alleged conjugal properties.
Ruling:
There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on Richard as an
American citizen. It is true that owing to
the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
Richard from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law,
Richard is no longer the husband of
Alice. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as her husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of
his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that, under our laws, Alice
has to be considered still married to
Richard and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109 of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Alice should not be
obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support
to Richard. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.
VIII
PILAPIL vs IBAY SOMERA
GR 80116
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and Private Respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. The
couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980.
After about three and a half years of
marriage, such disharmony eventuated
in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and
that they had been living apart since
April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property.
On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local
Court promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. However, on June 27, 1986,
or more than five months after the
Page 7 of 47
issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Issue:
Whether or not the complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
Held:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of
power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time
of the institution of the criminal action
for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.
Thus, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
IX
LIMBONA vs COMELEC
GR# 181097 / JUNE 25, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
(Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.
Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent
Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao
del Norte for May 2007 National and
Local Elections. Malik filed a petition for
disqualification against Mohammed on
the ground that it failed to comply with
the one-year residence rule. COMELEC
disqualified Mohammad. Consequently,
Norlainie filed a new certificate of
candidacy as substitute candidate for
Mohammad.
Issue:
WON Norlaine is disqualified for running
as mayor on the ground of failure to
comply with one-year residence.
Ruling:
We note the findings of the Comelec that
petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing,
Lanao del Norte, which is also her place
of birth; and that her domicile by
operation of law (by virtue of marriage)
is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec
found that Mohammad, petitioner's
husband, effected the change of his
domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since
it is presumed that the husband and wife
live together in one legal residence, then
it follows that petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on
November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69
of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix
the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from
living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply
if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. Considering that
petitioner failed to show that she
maintained a separate residence from
her husband, and as there is no evidence
Page 8 of 47
to prove otherwise, reliance on these
provisions of the Family Code is proper
and is in consonance with human
experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the
residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However,
petitioner's disqualification would not
result in Malik's proclamation who came
in second during the special election.
X
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789
x------------------------------------------------
---------x
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808
Facts:
Once again we see the sad tale of a
prominent family shattered by conflicts
on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio,
the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some
years ago, filed a petition with the Court
of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire
to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was
consolidated with another case3 filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children,
Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving
visitation rights to his wife, asserting
that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of
merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify
the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving
visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's
motion to reconsider the decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case
for preliminary conference on October
11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without
requiring the mandatory presence of the
parties.
Issue(s):
The Court laid down the issues to be
resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a
physical and medical examination of
petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will
conduct the same.9
Held:
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall
discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she
was not compelling Potenciano to live
with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an
issue. However, the very root cause of
the entire petition is her desire to have
her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda
cannot now deny that she wanted
Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K.
Ilusorio sought custody of her husband
was that respondents Lin and Sylvia
were illegally restraining Potenciano
Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of
property rights out of pure greed.14 She
claimed that her two children were using
their sick and frail father to sign away
Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia.
She also argued that since Potenciano
retired as director and officer of Baguio
Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Page 9 of 47
Telecommunications, she would logically
assume his position and control. Yet, Lin
and Sylvia were the ones controlling the
corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been
proved during the hearing at the Court
of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16
Potenciano himself declared that he was
not prevented by his children from
seeing anybody and that he had no
objection to seeing his wife and other
children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband
suffered from various ailments. Thus,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself.
Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano
be brought before the Supreme Court so
that we could determine his mental
state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano
Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to
choose whether to see his wife or not.
Again, this is a question of fact that has
been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact
taking control of the corporation, these
are matters that may be threshed out in
a separate proceeding, irrelevant in
habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently
convince the Court why we should not
rely on the facts found by the Court of
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts
mentioned in the decision were
erroneous and incomplete. We see no
reason why the High Court of the land
need go to such length. The hornbook
doctrine states that findings of fact of
the lower courts are conclusive on the
Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not
for the Court to weigh evidence all over
again.18 Although there are exceptions to
the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this
is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound
to live together and care for each other.
We agree.
The law provides that the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of
empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed
and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving
adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.22
XI
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
Facts:
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many
years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and
Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for
Page 10 of 47
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the
other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had
six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age
52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon
Potencianos arrival from the United
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about
five (5) months in Antipolo City. The
children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged
that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg
instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his
doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition[10] for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano
Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents[11] refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.
Issue(s):
May a wife secure a writ of habeas
corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is
no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus.
Held:
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[13] or by
which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It
is available where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there
is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but
are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.[14] It is
devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no
actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does
not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions.
Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make
choices. In this case, the crucial choices
revolve on his residence and the people
he opts to see or live with. The choices
he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices
which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of
Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With
that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no
Page 11 of 47
reason to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled
with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will
run against his fundamental
constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its
authority when it awarded visitation
rights in a petition for habeas corpus
where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right. The ruling is not consistent
with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of
visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under
penalty of contempt in case of violation
or refusal to comply. Such assertion of
raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact
that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to
the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the
Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS
the petition and nullifies the decision of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K.
Ilusorio. No costs.
XII
RAMONG ONG vs. CA
Facts:
Plaintiff Ramong Ong filed a complaint
for the annulment of auction sale of a
parcel of land, allegedly owned
conjugally by the plaintiff and his former
wife Teodora Ong, in favor of Francisco
Boix. The auction sale was made due to
failure of the wife to pay her loan
obtained from Francisco Boix who lent
her money in relation to her own logging
business in Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff argued that the subject property
is really conjugal which the wife in the
case at bar could not legally bind, and
considering that the indebtedness was
contracted by the wife only, the levy of
the subject property not owned
exclusively by the wife owned jointly
with the husband is improper.
Plaintiff based his argument on the fact
that the property was "declared, under
Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora
B. Ong while the house erected thereon
was declared under Tax No. 06022 in the
name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B.
Ong (Exhibits "B", "2-B", "2-C, "4")
(Decision, p. 4). It was the contention of
the plaintiff that since the surname
"Ong" (which is the surname of the
husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by
Teodora in the aforesaid declaration,
that indicates that the subject property
was acquired during the marriage. By
reason thereof, the property in dispute is
presumed to be owned jointly by both
spouses.
Issue:
WON the property is conjugal.
Held:
NO, it is paraphernal.
The mere use of the surname of the
husband in the tax declaration of the
subject property is not sufficient proof
that said property was acquired during
the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It
is undisputed that the subject parcel was
declared solely in the wife's name, but
the house built thereon was declared in
the name of the spouses. Under such
circumstances, coupled with a careful
scrutiny of the records of the present
Page 12 of 47
case, We hold that the lot in question is
paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for
the personal debts of the wife.
The presumption that property is
conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers
to property acquired during the
marriage. When there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by a
spouse, the fact that the title is in the
spouse's name is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said
spouse.
As correctly pointed out by the
respondent Court, the party who invokes
the presumption that all property of the
marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code)
must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al.
vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose
Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same
manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court
of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that:
When the property is registered in the
name of the a spouse only and there is
no showing as to when the property was
acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this
presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil
Code cannot prevail when the title is in
the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
Furthermore, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the property in
dispute is conjugal, the same may still
be held liable for the debts of the wife in
this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil
Code, the wife may engage in business
although the husband may object (but
subject to certain conditions). It is clear
from the records that the wife was
engaged in the logging business with the
husband's knowledge and apparently
without any objection on his part. The
acts of the husband show that he gave
his implied consent to the wife's
engagement in business. According to
Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
in her concurring opinion, the rule that
should govern in that case is that the
wife's paraphernal properties, as well as
those of their conjugal partnership, shall
be liable for the obligations incurred by
the wife in the course of her business
(Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil
Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited
in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial
Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised
Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever
profits are earned by the wife from her
business go to the conjugal partnership.
It would only be just and equitable that
the obligations contracted by the wife in
connection with her business may also
be chargeable not only against her
paraphernal property but also against
the conjugal property of the spouses.
XIII
GO vs CA
G.R. No. 114791
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married
on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The
video coverage of the wedding was
provided by petitioners at a contract
price of P1,650.00. Three times
thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim
the video tape of their wedding, which
they planned to show to their relatives in
the United States where they were to
spend their honeymoon, and thrice they
failed because the tape was apparently
not yet processed. When they return,
however, they found out that the tape
had been erased by petitioners and
therefore, could no longer be delivered.
Furious at its loss, private respondents
filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint
for specific performance and damages
against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch
33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted
trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy
Go jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C.
Ong.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,
Page 13 of 47
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
trial courts decision.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the husband, petitioner Alex Go is
jointly and severally liable with his wife
Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary
liabilities imposed
HELD:
No. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from
any liability to private respondents and
that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable
to said private respondents for the
judgment award. Under Article 117 of
the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the
Family Code), the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the
husband.
In the instant case, SC is convinced that
it was only petitioner Nancy Go who
entered into the contract with private
respondent. Consequently, SC rules that
she is solely liable to private
respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that
contracts produce effect only as
between the parties who execute them.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUNSBAND AND WIFE
XIV
AGAPAY VS PALANG
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first
marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on
July 16, 1949. A few months after the
wedding, in October 1949, he left for
work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only
child, Herminia Palang, was born on May
12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the
Philippines, he stayed with his brother in
Zambales. The trial court found that as
early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to
divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good in 1972, Miguel
refused to stay with Carlina but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old
Miguel contracted a second marriage
with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in
Binalonan, Pangasinan was also
purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee, but
this was disclaimed by the notary public
saying that the money used to buy the
property was given by Miguel. On
October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia
Palang executed a deed of donation as a
form of compromise agreement. The
parties agreed to donate their conjugal
property to their only child, Herminia
Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son,
Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and
Erlinda were convicted of concubinage
upon Carlinas complaint. Two years
later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her
daughter Herminia filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of
the Riceland and house and lot both
located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The
RTC dismissed the case and ruled in
favour of Agapay. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the trial
courts decision and declared Carlina
and Herminia Palang the owners of the
properties in question.
Issue:
WON the house and lot in Pangasinan is
a valid donation by Miguel to Erlinda.
Held:
With respect to the house and lot,
Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The
testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this
claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel Palang provided the money
Page 14 of 47
for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the
vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of the
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family
Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between
spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out
to be better than those in legal union.
XV
ARCABA VS BATOCAEL
XVI
Romana Locquiao- Valencia and
Constancia L. Valencia, petitioners,
VS
Benito A.Locquiao, now deceased
and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao,
Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of
Deeds of Pangasinan, respondents.
G.R. No. 122134
Facts:
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and
Raymunda Locquiao(donor) executed a
deed of donation propter nuptias which
was written in the Ilocano dialect,
denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in
favor of their son, respondent Benito
Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito)
and his prospective bride, respondent
Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed,
the donees were gifted with four (4)
parcels of land, including the land in
question, as well as a male cow and one-
third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house
of the donor parents, in consideration of
the impending marriage of the donees.
Respondents- donees took their
marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the
fact of their marriage was inscribed at
the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. They
registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with
the Office of the Register of Deeds on
May 15, 1970. In due course, the original
title was cancelled and in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
84897 was issued in the name of the
respondents Benito and Tomasa.
When the donor died, the 6 heirs left ,
including Respondent Benito, executed
a Deed of Partition with Recognition of
Rights on March 18, 1973 wherein they
distributed among only three (3) of
them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left
by their common progenitors, excluding
the land in question and other lots
disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier.
Disagreements arose among them.
Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed
a Complain for the annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897
against respondents Benito and Tomasa
before the RTC of Pangasinan on
December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged
that the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title was fraudulent; that
the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that
the notary public who notarized the
document had no authority to do so,
and; that the donation did not observe
the form required by law as there was no
written acceptance on the document
itself or in a separate public instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation propter
nuptias is valid?
Held:
Yes the donation propter nuptias is valid.
Unlike ordinary donations,
donations propter nuptias or donations
by reason of marriage are those made
before its celebration, in consideration of
the same and in favor of one or both of
the future spouses. The distinction is
crucial because the two classes of
donations are not governed by exactly
the same rules, especially as regards the
formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code,
donations propter nuptias must be made
in a public
instrument in which the property don
ated must be specifically
Page 15 of 47
described. However, Article 1330 of the
same Code provides that acceptance
is not necessary to the validity of
such gifts. In other words, the
celebration of the marriage between the
beneficiary couple, in tandem with
compliance with the prescribed form,
was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old
Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are
different. Article 127 thereof provides
that the form of donations propter
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of
Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which
contains the Statute of Frauds requires
that the contracts mentioned thereunder
need be in writing only to be
enforceable. However, as provided in
Article 129, express acceptance is
not necessary for the validity of
these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the
time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto and not later statutes,
unless the latter are specifically intended
to have retroactive effect. Consequently,
it is the Old Civil Code which applies in
this case since the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the
New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950. As a consequence,
applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil
Code in the determination of the validity
of the questioned donation, it does not
matter whether or not the donees had
accepted the donation. The validity of
the donation is unaffected in either case.
SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
XVII
SUNGA CHAN vs CA
GR 164401
Facts:
In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto
Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas
Appliance Center (Shellite). After
Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow,
Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan,
continued with the business without
Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent
repeated demands for accounting and
winding up went unheeded, prompting
him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of
a Partnership Affairs, Accounting,
Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua,
and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan
solidarily liable for any and all claims of
Chua. RTCs judgment was upheld by the
CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and
sold at public auction Sunga-Chans
property in Paco, Manila, over which a
building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-
Chan questions the levy on execution of
the subject property on the ground that
it is an absolute community property
with her husband Norberto Chan.
Issue:
Whether the absolute community of
property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan
and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made
to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan
under the judgment.
Held:
Yes.
The records show that spouses Sunga-
Chan and Norberto were married after
the effectivity of the Family Code.
Withal, their absolute community
property may be held liable for the
obligations contracted by either spouse.
Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code
pertinently provides: Art. 94. The
absolute community of property shall be
liable for: x x x (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the community, or by both spouses, or
by one spouse with the consent of the
other; (3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited.
Absent any indication otherwise, the use
and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-
Chan of the assets of Shellite even after
the business was discontinued on May
30, 1992 may reasonably be considered
to have been used for her and her
husband's benefit.
Page 16 of 47

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
General Provisions
XVIII
PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS
RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA,
petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA
RETUYA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143286
Facts:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the
legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya,
having been married to the latter on
October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children,
namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon,
Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya
resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During
their marriage they acquired real
properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant,
Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City which he
inherited from his parents Esteban
Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land
in Mandaue City. In 1945, defendant
Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the
only person who received the income of
the above-mentioned properties
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the
time she started living in concubinage
with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had
no properties of her own from which she
could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and
cannot talk anymore. Natividad Retuya
knew of the physical condition of her
father because they visited him at the
hospital. From the time defendant
Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on
January 27, 1985 and until the present, it
is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of
Nicolas illegitimate children who has
been receiving the income of these
properties. Witness Natividad Retuya
went to Procopio to negotiate because at
this time their father Nicolas was already
senile and has a childlike mind. She told
defendant, Procopio that their father was
already incapacitated and they had to
talk things over and the latter replied
that it was not yet the time to talk about
the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the
Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no
settlement was reached, hence, the said
official issued a certification to file
action. Written demands were made by
plaintiff, through her counsel, to the
defendants, including the illegitimate
family asking for settlement but no
settlement was reached by the parties.
Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad
Retuya, testified that the parcel of land
covered by tax declaration marked
Exhibit "T" was the property bought by
her father from Adriano Marababol for at
the time of purchase of the property,
defendant Pacita Villanueva had no
means of livelihood.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject properties are
conjugal.
HELD:
Petitioners claim that the subject
properties are exclusive properties of
Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which
they claim is Pacitas exclusive property.
This issue is easily resolved. The Family
Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before the effectivity of Family
Code. Article 105 of the Family Code
explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. Thus, under the Family Code,
if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they
are conjugal. The burden of proof is on
the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must
first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal. Petitioners argue
Page 17 of 47
that Eusebia failed to prove this pre-
requisite. We disagree.
The question of whether the subject
properties were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate
courts agreed that the subject properties
were in fact acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax
declarations covering the subject
properties, along with the unrebutted
testimony of Eusebias witnesses,
establish this fact. We give due
deference to factual findings of trial
courts, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court. A reversal of this finding
can only occur if petitioners show
sufficient reason for us to doubt its
correctness. Petitioners in the present
case have not.
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is
conjugal or not, the answer came from
petitioners themselves. Nicolas and
Eusebia were married on 7 October
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot
No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No.
152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the
subject properties are not conjugal. The
presumption in Article 116, which
subsists "unless the contrary is proved,"
stands as an obstacle to any claim the
petitioners may have. The burden of
proving that a property is exclusive
property of a spouse rests on the party
asserting it and the evidence required
must be clear and convincing.
Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
The cohabitation of a spouse with
another person, even for a long period,
does not sever the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Otherwise, the law
would be giving a stamp of approval to
an act that is both illegal and immoral.
What petitioners fail to grasp is that
Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot
work to the detriment of Eusebia, the
legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia continued to exist
regardless of the fact that Nicolas was
already living with Pacita. Hence, all
property acquired from 7 October 1926,
the date of Nicolas and Eusebias
marriage, until 23 November 1996, the
date of Eusebias death, are still
presumed conjugal. Petitioners have
neither claimed nor proved that any of
the subject properties was acquired
outside or beyond this period.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article
148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A
reading of Article 148 readily shows that
there must be proof of "actual joint
contribution" by both the live-in partners
before the property becomes co-owned
by them in proportion to their
contribution. The presumption of
equality of contribution arises only in the
absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition
that actual joint contribution is proven
first. Simply put, proof of actual
contribution by both parties is required,
otherwise there is no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal sharing.
Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
contribution by Pacita in the acquisition
of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed
to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152
with her own money, or that she actually
contributed her own money to acquire it.
XIX
De Leon v. De Leon
GR# 185063
Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon,
then single, and the Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a 191.30
square-meter lot situated in Fairview,
Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in
a civil rite officiated by the Municipal
Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this
union were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost
Page 18 of 47
price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC
executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed
of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
173677 was issued on February 24, 1972
in the name of Bonifacio, "single."
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000,
sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita,
and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa
(Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The
conveying Deed of Sale dated January
12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas
registered the Deed of Sale. They
secured the issuance in their names
from the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a
reconveyance suit before the RTC in
Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita
and her children alleged, among other
things, that fraud attended the
execution of the Deed of Sale and that
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show
that he was still the owner of the parcel
of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred
that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was
his exclusive property inasmuch as he
was still single when he acquired it from
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not
aware of the supposed marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time
of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC
ruled in favor of Anita and her children.
CA held that the Tarrosas failed to
overthrow the legal presumption that the
parcel of land in dispute was conjugal.
Issue:
WON the property in question is part of
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and
Anita.
Ruling:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the
governing provision in effect at the time
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage,
provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife. For the
presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v.
Court of Appeals teaches, even
necessary to prove that the property
was acquired with funds of the
partnership. Only proof of acquisition
during the marriage is needed to raise
the presumption that the property is
conjugal. In fact, even when the manner
in which the properties were acquired
does not appear, the presumption will
still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what
was once a PHHC lot and covered by the
PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to
Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well
settled that a conditional sale is akin, if
not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In
both types of contract, the efficacy or
obligatory force of the vendors
obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a
future and uncertain event, usually the
full payment of the purchase price, so
that if the suspensive condition does not
take place, the parties would stand as if
the conditional obligation had never
existed. In other words, in a contract to
sell ownership is retained by the seller
and is not passed to the buyer until full
payment of the price, unlike in a
contract of sale where title passes upon
delivery of the thing sold.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the
1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence of the husband alienating
or encumbering any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes
consent. To a specific point, the sale of a
conjugal piece of land by the husband,
as administrator, must, as a rule, be with
the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not
valid. So it is that in several cases we
ruled that the sale by the husband of
property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the
wife is void ab initio, absent any showing
that the latter is incapacitated, under
civil interdiction, or like causes. The
nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
from the fact that sale is in
contravention of the mandatory
requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
consent of the wife before the husband
may alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership, it
follows that the acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory
Page 19 of 47
provision are void except when the law
itself authorized their validity.
As a final consideration, the Court
agrees with the CA that the sale of one-
half of the conjugal property without
liquidation of the partnership is void.
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse
in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate,
and does not ripen into a title until it
appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation
and settlement.26 The interest of each
spouse is limited to the net remainder or
"remanente liquido" (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the
affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution
of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ,
SR., namely: SERGIA V. HERNANDEZ
(Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V.
HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA
LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES
CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND
QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 146548
FACTS:
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a
piece of real property in 1958 by the
PHHC as part of the governments
housing program at the time. Title over
the said property was issued in 1966 in
the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full
payment for the property was received
by the PHHC.
Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr.,
took possession of the said property. On
the other hand, the [respondents] took
possession of the said property in 1966
and are in actual and physical
possession thereof up to the present,
and have made considerable
improvements thereon, including a
residential house where they presently
reside.
From 1966 (the time when the
[respondents] were able to possess the
property) to 1983 (the time when the
[petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT
in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had
already been cancelled by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a
span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995
(the time when the Heirs filed the
original action) is a period of another 12
years.
The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed
by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisuras favor,
expressly states that the former, in
consideration of the amount of
P6,500.00, transfers his rights over the
subject property to the latter. Notably,
such deed was simultaneously executed
with the SPA on February 14, 1963.
Petitioners contend that the lack of
consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez
(the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the
deed of sale fictitious, hence null and
void in accordance with Article 1409 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consent of the
spouse is necessary for the validity of
alienation of conjugal property?
HELD:
No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez,
Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus,
the sale of his share in the conjugal
property was valid. With regard to the
consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to
the sale involving their conjugal
property, the trial court found that it was
lacking because said wifes signature on
the SPA was falsified. However, Sergias
lack of consent to the sale did not render
the transfer of her share invalid.
It bears stressing that the subject matter
herein involves conjugal property. Said
property was awarded to Domingo
Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed
Page 20 of 47
SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964.
Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez,
Sr. covering the subject property was
issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the
property to Melanie Mingoa and the
issuance of a new title in her name
happened in 1978. Since all these events
occurred before the Family Code took
effect in 1988, the provisions of the New
Civil Code govern these transactions. We
quote the applicable provisions, to wit:
Art. 165. The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction
or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. If
she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same. x x x.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her
consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held
that:
The Family Code, which took effect on 3
August 1988, provides that any
alienation or encumbrance made by the
husband of the conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the wife
is void. However, when the sale is made
before the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides
that the disposition of conjugal property
without the wife's consent is not void but
merely voidable.
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to
file with the courts an action for
annulment of the contract during the
marriage and within ten (10) years from
the transaction necessarily barred her
from questioning the sale of the subject
property to third persons.
XXI
PHILIPS MATTHEWS vs BENJAMIN
and JOSELYN TAYLOR
GR 164584
Facts:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin
A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-
year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while
their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294
square-meter lot (Boracay property)
situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in
consideration of P129,000.00. The sale
was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the
latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation and
tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben
Bow Inn. All required permits and
licenses for the operation of the resort
were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a
falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn
executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect
to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease
(Agreement) involving the Boracay
property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties
and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of
Page 21 of 47
the property and renamed the resort as
Music Garden Resort.
Issue(s):
The marital consent of
respondent benjamin taylor is not
required in the agreement of
lease dated 20 july 1992.
Granting arguendo that his
consent is required, benjamin
taylor is deemed to have given
his consent when he affixed his
signature in the agreement of
lease as witness in the light of the
ruling of the supreme court in the
case of spouses pelayo vs. Melki
perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8,
2005.
The parcel of land subject of the
agreement of lease is the
exclusive property of jocelyn c.
Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the
light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r. no.
74833, january 21, 1991.
The courts a quo erroneously
applied article 96 of the family
code of the philippines which is a
provision referring to the absolute
community of property. The
property regime governing the
property relations of benjamin
taylor and joselyn taylor is the
conjugal partnership of gains
because they were married on 30
june 1988 which is prior to the
effectivity of the family code.
Article 96 of the family code of
the philippines finds no
application in this case.
The honorable court of appeals
ignored the presumption of
regularity in the execution of
notarial documents.
The honorable court of appeals
failed to pass upon the
counterclaim of petitioner despite
the fact that it was not contested
and despite the presentation of
evidence establishing said claim.
Held:
We find and so hold that Benjamin has
no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
the designated vendee in the Deed of
Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if
we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition.
By entering into such contract knowing
that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement
for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question
the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in
so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a substantial interest and
right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to
have.
Claiming that the Agreement was null
and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent,
Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and
the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that
his funds were used in the acquisition
and improvement of the Boracay
property, and coupled with the fact that
he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property
required his consent.
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered
into between Joselyn and petitioner
cannot be nullified on the grounds
advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold
its validity.
Page 22 of 47
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it
unnecessary to address the other issues
raised by the petitioner.
XXII
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
Respondent.
GR 159310
Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was
assigned by his employer to work here in
the Philippines where he met respondent
Antonietta Descallar, a separated
mother of two boys, with whom he had a
live-in relationship with. During the
course of their relationship, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was issued in their favor
by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a
house and lot where they transferred
and lived together. When the deed was
presented before the Registry of Deeds
for registration, a Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued only in the name of
respondent and the registration was
refused on the part of Jambrich on the
ground that he was an alien and could
not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name
was erased from the deed of sale. In the
meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of
respondent. However, not long after, the
couple broke up and lived separately
without settlement of their properties.
While still in the Philippines, Jambrich
met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with
whom he was indebted in the amount of
P150,000 relative to the purchases he
made from the latter which he was not
able to pay. Believing that his interest in
his property with the Agro-Macro
Subdivision still exist, he sold the same
by way of Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment to petitioner. When
petitioner was about to register the
deed, he discovered, however, that the
property was already transferred in the
name of respondent and had already
been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for recovery of the real
property. Petitioner alleged that the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the
properties which identified both Jambrich
and respondent as buyers do not reflect
the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo
of the purchase price and was not in fact
a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his
exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the
real and absolute owner of the
properties; and, that petitioner acquired
absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed
of Absolute Sale/Assignment which
Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the
allegation that she did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price. On the
contrary, she claimed that she "solely
and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase
price of the subject lots in question," and
that Jambrich, being an alien, was
prohibited to acquire or own real
property in the Philippines.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The decision was however
reversed by CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner as the successor-in-
interest of Jambrich, who is a resident
alien, has validly obtained the right over
the subject property without violating
the prohibition under the Constitution.
HELD:
YES.
As the rule now stands, the fundamental
law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private
lands, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the
transfer of land from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been
declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In
United Church Board for World Ministries
v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling in a number of cases31
that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
Page 23 of 47
the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. Applying
United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase
of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab
initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being
a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these
properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino
citizen from him, has cured the flaw in
the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in
United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent
cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens
is intended to preserve the nations land
for future generations of Filipinos, that
aim is achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization
or those transfers made by aliens to
Filipino citizens. As the property in
dispute is already in the hands of a
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there
would be no more public policy to be
protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands
in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Exclusive Property of Each Spouse
XXIII
VILLEGAS vs LINGAN
GR 153839
FACTS:
Isaac Villegas was the registered owner
of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. In order to secure the payment
of a loan from the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), Isaac constituted a
real estate mortgage over the said
parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said
loan and mortgage was subsequently
transferred by the DBP to the Home
Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).When
the Isaac failed to settle his loan, the
real estate mortgage he constituted over
the property was foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction and,
as the HMDF was itself the highest
bidder at such public auction, a
certificate of sheriffs sale was issued
and, thereafter, registered with the
Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996.
By virtue of a power of attorney
executed by Villegas wife, Marilou C.
Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the
latter redeemed the property from the
HMDF.
On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral
(Catral), by virtue of the same power of
attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in
favor of respondent.
Isaac claims that the power of attorney
executed in favor of Catral, his mother-
in-law, created a principal-agent
relationship only between his wife,
Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as
principal, and Catral, as agent, and then
only for the latter to administer the
properties of the former; that he never
authorized Catral to administer his
properties, particularly, herein subject
property; and that Catral had no
authority to execute the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent,
since from the very wordings of the
power of attorney, she had no special
authority to sell or convey any specific
real property.
On December 19, 1996, the RTC
dismissed the Complaint and on appeal,
CA affirmed in toto the RTC Judgment.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the wife of the petitioner
Isaac, as successor-in-interest,
may validly redeem the property
in question
(2) WON the petitioner husband
Isaac has a cause of action
against his respondent wife
Marilou
HELD:
1. YES.
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that
in all cases in which an extrajudicial
sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his
successors-in-interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said
debtor, or any person having a lien on
Page 24 of 47
the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which
the property is sold, may redeem the
same at any time within the term of one
year from and after the date of sale; and
such redemption shall be governed by
the provisions of section 464 to 466,
inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure,
in so far as these are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that real
property sold as provided in the last
preceding section, or any part thereof
sold separately, may be redeemed in the
manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons: xxxx a)The judgment
obligor, or his successor-in-interest in
the whole or any part of the property;
The successor-in-interest of the
judgment debtor referred to in the above
provision includes a person who
succeeds to his property by operation of
law, or a person with a joint interest in
the property, or his spouse or heirs.
Under the above provision, petitioner
could have redeemed the property from
Marilou after she had redeemed it. The
pleadings filed and the records of this
case do not show that petitioner
exercised said right. Consequently, as
correctly held by the CA, Marilou
acquired ownership of the subject
property. All rights and title of the
judgment obligor are transferred upon
the expiration of the right of redemption.
And where the redemption is made
under a property regime governed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, Article
109 of the Family Code provides that
property acquired by right of redemption
is the exclusive property of the spouses
redeeming the property.
2. NO.
A cause of action is an act or omission of
the defendant in violation of the legal
right of the plaintiff.
A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains three essential
elements:(1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation
of the defendant to respect such right;
and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant violates the right of the
plaintiff.
In the present case, there is no property
right that exists in favor of the
petitioner, and, with more reason, no
such obligation arises in behalf of the
defendant, herein respondent, to respect
such right.There was no violation of a
legal right of the petitioner.
It must be stressed that there is no
allegation or proof that Marilou
redeemed the property in behalf of the
petitioner. Marilou did not act as agent
of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
the right of redemption in her own right
as successor-in-interest of the petitioner.
Under the circumstances, should there
be any right violated, the aggrieved
party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The
property in question was the exclusive
property of Marilou by virtue of her
redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid
cause of action against the respondent.
Divested of all interest over the
property, the petitioner has ceased to be
the proper party who may challenge the
validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a
rule, the agency, as a contract, is
binding only between the contracting
parties, then only the parties, as well as
the third person who transacts with the
parties themselves, may question the
validity of the agency or the violation of
the terms and conditions found therein.
This rule is a corollary of the foregoing
doctrine on the rights of real parties in
interest. xxxxx Petition is denied.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
XXIV
PISUEA vs HEIRS OF PETRA
UNATING
GR 132803
Facts:
Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are
the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar. They claimed that the land in
dispute known as Lot 1201 was
registered in the name of Petra Unating
married to Aquilino Villar. However,
sometime in 1950, after the death of
Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered
into an oral partnership agreement for
ten years with Agustin Navarra involving
Page 25 of 47
the swampy portion of the lot in question
consisting of around four hectares which
was converted into a fishpond with the
investment capital of Agustin Navarra
and the net income shall be divided
equally between Aquilino Villar and his
children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on
one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the
other hand.
In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the
heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the
land in question until the defendant
Jessie Pisuea, son-in-law of Agustin
Navarra, disturbed their possession
sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime
in 1982, the defendant, with the
company of several men, including
policemen, forcibly took physical
possession of the said land from the
heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed
the instant action for recovery of
possession and ownership of a parcel of
land against Jessie Pisuea.
On the other hand, defendant countered
that the whole land in dispute was sold
by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to
Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by
Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and
his wife purchased the said land from
the heirs of Agustin Navarra.
After trial, the court a quo ruled that
since the disputed lot was the conjugal
property of Spouses Petra Unating and
Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix
and Catalina Villar, to Agustin Navarra
could be considered as valid. However,
this validity pertained only to the share
of the late Petra Unating considering
that at the time of the sale, Aquilino
Villar was still alive. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the said decision.
Issue:
W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal
property of Petra Unating hence would
be covered by the CPG.
Held:
The Court ruled that the lot in dispute
can properly be considered as a
paraphernal property of Petra Unating.
Concededly, properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal. However, this prima facie
presumption cannot prevail over the
cadastral courts specific finding,
reached in adversarial proceedings, that
the lot was inherited by Petra Unating
from her mother.
Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of
Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina
effectively transferred to Agustin
Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title
over their two-thirds share in the
disputed lot. However, they could not
have disposed of their fathers share in
the same property at the time, as they
were not yet owners. At the most, being
the only children, they had an inchoate
interest in their fathers share. When
Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without
disposing of his one-third share in the
disputed property, Felix and Catalinas
inchoate interest in it was actualized,
because succession vested in them the
title to their fathers share and,
consequently, to the entire lot. Thus,
that title passed to Agustin Navarra,
pursuant to Article 1434 of the present
Civil Code, which was already in force at
the time of Aquilinos death in 1953.
XXV
CHING vs CA
GR 124642
XXVI
Ferrer vs Ferrer
GR No. 166496
Facts:
Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer,
a half- brother of Respondents. She filed
a Complaint for payment of conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and
damages. She alleged that before her
Page 26 of 47
marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a
piece of lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He
applied for a loan with the SSS to build
improvements thereon, including a
residential house and a two-door
apartment building. However, it was
during their marriage that payment of
the loan was made using the couples
conjugal funds. From their conjugal
funds, petitioner posited, they
constructed a warehouse on the
lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that
respondent Manuel occupied one door of
the apartment building, as well as the
warehouse; however, in September
1991, he stopped paying rentals
thereon, alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue of
a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in
favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael
and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was
cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued
and registered in the names of
respondents.
According to petitioner, that when
Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or
at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, she had the right
to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements on Alfredos lot. She
alleged that the cost of the
improvements amounted
to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof
should be reimbursed and paid by
respondents as they are now the
registered owners of Alfredos lot.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right
to be reimbursed for the cost of
improvements under Article 120 of the
Family Code?
Held:
No. Petitioner was not able to show that
there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate
her right. The right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the
Family Code to be reimbursed for the
cost of the improvements, the obligation
to reimburse rests on the spouse upon
whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the
part of the purchaser of the property, in
case the property is sold by the owner-
spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution
in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement; otherwise,
said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement. The subject property
was precisely declared as the exclusive
property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the
respondents, despite the allegations
contained in the Complaint that they are
the buyers of the subject premises, are
not petitioners spouse nor can they ever
be deemed as the owner-spouse upon
whom the obligation to reimburse
petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or
the spouse who expended the acts or
efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to
be reimbursed.
XXVII
MBTC vs PASCUAL
GR 163744
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot
with a three-door apartment standing
thereon located in Makati City. The
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
covering the purchased lot (Lot no.
156283) was issued in the name of
Page 27 of 47
Florencia married to Nelson Pascual
a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the
Quezon City RTC in 1995. In the same
decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the ex-
spouses conjugal partnership of gains,
w/c the latter failed.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira
Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan
from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros executed several real estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties,
including one lot no. 156283. Due to the
failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros
to pay their loan obligation, MBTC
foreclosed the property.
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before
the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare
the nullity of the mortgage of the
disputed property, alleging that the
property, which is still conjugal property,
was mortgaged without his consent.
MBTC alleged that the disputed lot,
being registered in Florencias name,
was paraphernal. Florencia was declared
in default. The RTC rendered judgment
finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed
the RTC but deleted the award moral
damages and attorneys fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is
conjugal partnership property under
Article 116 of the Family Code.
Held:
The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The
disputed property is conjugal.
While Metrobank is correct in saying that
Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of
the Family Code, is the applicable legal
provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the
Family Code, it errs in its theory that,
before conjugal ownership could be
legally presumed, there must be a
showing that the property was acquired
during marriage using conjugal funds.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership,
unless it be prove[n] that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
This article does not require proof that
the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which
the property was acquired does not
appear.
As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof
obtains on the acquisition of the
property during the existence of the
marriage, then the presumption of
conjugal ownership applies. Proof of
acquisition during the marital coverture
is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. When there is no
showing as to when the property was
acquired by the spouse, the fact that a
title is in the name of the spouse is an
indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse.
XXVIII
MUOZ vs RAMIREZ
GR 156125
FACTS:
Subject of the present case is a seventy-
seven (77)-square meter residential
house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio
Street, Mandaluyong City (subject
property), covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in
the name of the petitioner. The
residential lot in the subject property
was previously covered by TCT No. 1427,
in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married
to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April
6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal
Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No.
1427, with Erlindas consent, to the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing
loan, payable within twenty (20) years,
Page 28 of 47
through monthly salary deductions of
P1,687.66. The respondents then
constructed a thirty-six (36)-square
meter, two-story residential house on
the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject
property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated
consideration of P602,000.00. On
September 24, 1993, the respondents
filed a complaint with the RTC for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale,
claiming that there was no sale but only
a mortgage transaction, and the
documents transferring the title to the
petitioners name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April
1992, the petitioner granted them a
P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a
first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00
advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage,
and made her sign a document
purporting to be the mortgage contract;
the petitioner promised to give the
P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda
surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS
mortgage cancelled, and submits an
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he
waives all his rights to the subject
property; with the P200,000.00 advance,
Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel
the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in
May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the
petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but
returned Eliseos affidavit, unsigned;
since Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the
petitioner refused to give the
P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the
mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda
return the P200,000.00 advance; since
Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00
advance because it had been used to
pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept
the title; and in 1993, they discovered
that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in
the petitioners name, cancelling TCT
No.1427 in their name.
The petitioner countered that there was
a valid contract of sale. He alleged that
the respondents sold the subject
property to him after he refused their
offer to mortgage the subject property
because they lacked paying capacity and
were unwilling to pay the incidental
charges; the sale was with the implied
promise to repurchase within one year,
during which period (from May 1, 1992
to April 30, 1993), the respondents
would lease the subject property for a
monthly rental of P500.00; when the
respondents failed to repurchase the
subject property within the one-year
period despite notice, he caused the
transfer of title in his name on July 14,
1993.
In a Decision dated January 23, 1997,
the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
found that the subject property was
Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property
that was inherited from her father.
The CA decided the appeal on June 25,
2002. Applying the second paragraph of
Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA
held that the subject property, originally
Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property,
became conjugal property when it was
used as collateral for a housing loan that
was paid through conjugal funds
Eliseos monthly salary deductions; the
subject property, therefore, cannot be
validly sold or mortgaged without
Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124
of the Family Code. Thus, the CA
declared void the deed of absolute sale,
and set aside the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is
paraphernal or conjugal.
HELD:
As a general rule, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that
Erlinda inherited the residential lot from
her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of conjugal ownership.
Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse, during
the marriage, shall be excluded from the
Page 29 of 47
community property and be the
exclusive property of each spouse. The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas
exclusive paraphernal property.
The court held that they cannot
subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance
on Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas.
As the respondents were married during
the effectivity of the Civil Code, its
provisions on conjugal partnership of
gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations.
However, with the enactment of the
Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil
Code provisions on conjugal partnership
of gains, including Article 158, have
been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).
Article 105 of the Family Code states:
x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. Thus, in determining the
nature of the subject property, we refer
to the provisions of the Family Code, and
not the Civil Code, except with respect
to rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which
supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the
spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts
of either or both spouses. Under this
provision, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one
of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time
of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo
paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. From
April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo
paid about P60,755.76, not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus
interest, since the petitioner advanced
the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to
cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of
the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of
the residential lot is considerably more
than the P60,755.76 amount paid by
Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the
exclusive paraphernal property of
Erlinda at the time she contracted with
the petitioner; the written consent of
Eliseo to the transaction was not
necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos
signatures in the special power of
attorney and affidavit were forgeries was
immaterial.
XIX
Imami v. MBTC
GR # 187023/Nov. 17, 2010
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani
(petitioner) signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P.
Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo,
Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr.,
and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As
sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained
loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45,
respectively. The loans were evidenced
by promissory notes signed by Cesar and
Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made
several demands for payment upon
CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted
Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein
petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of
Page 30 of 47
Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with
the RTC a motion for execution, which
was granted on December 7, 1999. A
writ of execution was issued against
CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff
levied on a property covering a lot
registered in the name of petitioner.
Petitioner argued that the subject
property belongs to the conjugal
partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by
CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be
subject of levy on execution or public
auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for
the nullification of the levy on execution
and the auction sale, as well as the
certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.
Issue:
WON or not the property in question is
conjugal.
Ruling:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who
invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to
the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
the time when the property was
acquired is material. Similarly, the
certificate of title could not support
petitioners assertion. As aptly ruled by
the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no
proof that the property was acquired
during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already
existing.
CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
XXX
AYALA INVEST AND DEVT CORP. vs
CA
GR 118305
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
a loan from Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). As
added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of
PBM, executed security agreements
making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM's indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the
court rendered judgment ordering PBM
and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount of
P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending
appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the
lower court issued a writ of execution
and the Deputy Sheriff caused the
issuance and service upon spouses
Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three
(3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses
Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin
the auction sale alleging that the
judgment cannot be enforced against
the conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that, among others, the subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of
the said conjugal partnership.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the
conjugal partnership of gains of spouses
Ching is not liable for the payment of the
debts secured by the husband Alfredo
Ching.
Issue:
Whether the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety
agreement entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer.
Held:
Yes.If the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services
to be used in or for his own business or
his own profession, that contract falls
within the term ". . . obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It
is enough that the benefit to the family
is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or
Page 31 of 47
services to be rendered to the business
or profession of the husband.
On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of "obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or
his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters
into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family
Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except to the
extent that they redounded to the
benefit of the family. Here, the property
in dispute also involves the family home.
The loan is a corporate loan not a
personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry
or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the
family.
XXXI
HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent.
GR 146504
Facts:
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed
on October 13, 1994 that in October
1989, respondent and his wife Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached
him and requested him to advance the
amount of US$25,000.00 for the
purchase of a house and lot located at
#19952 Chestnut Street, Executive
Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro
Manila. To enable and assist the spouses
conduct their married life independently
and on their own, petitioner, in October
31, 1989, issued a check in the name of
a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the
property, who acknowledged receipt
thereof.1 The amount was in full
payment of the property.
When petitioner inquired from the
spouses in July 1991 as to the status of
the amount he loaned to them, the latter
acknowledged their obligation but
pleaded that they were not yet in a
position to make a definite settlement of
the same.2Thereafter, respondent
expressed violent resistance to
petitioners inquiries on the amount to
the extent of making various death
threats against petitioner.3
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a
formal demand for the payment of the
amount of US$25,000.00 but the
spouses failed to comply with their
obligation.4Thus, on October 13, 1994,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection
of a sum of money and damages against
respondent and his wife before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch 172, docketed as Civil Case No.
4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner
asked for the payment of the
US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its
equivalent in Philippine currency plus
legal interest from date of extra-judicial
demand.5Petitioner likewise claimed
moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit from
respondent.6
As they were separated in fact for more
than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, respondent and his wife filed
separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo admitted securing a loan
together with her husband, from
petitioner.7She claimed, however, that
said loan was payable on a staggered
basis so she was surprised when
petitioner demanded immediate
payment of the full amount.8
In his separate Answer, respondent
admitted receiving the amount of
US$25,000.00 but claimed that:
a. Defendant (respondent)
xxx revived that otherwise
dormant construction firm
H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION
of herein plaintiff which
suffered tremendous setback
Page 32 of 47
after the assassination of income on contracts obtained
Senator Benigno Aquino; by defendant;
b. Working day and night and
almost beyond human Respondent denied having made death
endurance, defendant threats to petitioner and by way of
devoted all his efforts and compulsory counterclaim, he asked for
skill, used all his business moral damages from petitioner for
and personal connection to causing the alienation of his wifes love
be able to revive the and affection, attorneys fees and costs
construction business of of suit.10
plaintiff;
c. Little-by-little, starting with On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial
small construction business, Court rendered a decision in favor of
defendant was able to obtain petitioner.
various construction jobs
using the name H.L. CARLOS Issue:
CONSTRUCTION and the
income derived therefrom The court of appeals erred in
were deposited in the name finding insufficient evidence to
of such firm of plaintiff, prove that the amount of
d. Defendant xxx was made us$25,000.00 was a loan
to believe that the earnings obtained by private respondent
derived from such and his wife from petitioner.
construction will be for him
and his family since he was The court of appeals erred in
the one working to secure holding that the us$25,000.00
the contract and its was given as private
completion, he was allowed respondents share in the profits
to use the facilities of the of H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc.
plaintiff; and that the filing of the
e. The plaintiff seeing the complaint is a hoax.
progress brought about by
defendant xxx to his The court of appeals erred in
company proposed a profit nullifying the award of damages
sharing scheme to the effect for lack of proof thereof.
that all projects amounting to
more than P10 million shall Held:
be for the account of plaintiff;
lower amount shall be for Early in time, it must be noted that
defendants account but still payment of personal debts contracted by
using H.L. CARLOS the husband or the wife before or during
CONSTRUCTION. the marriage shall not be charged to the
f. But, to clear account on conjugal partnership except insofar as
previous construction they redounded to the benefit of the
contracts that brought family. The defendants never denied
income to H.L.CARLOS that the check of US$25,000.00 was
CONSTRUCTION, out of which used to purchase the subject house and
defendant derived his lot. They do not deny that the same
income, plaintiff gave the served as their conjugal home, thus
amount of US$25,000.00 to benefiting the family. On the same
defendant to square off principle, acknowledgment of the loan
account and to start the made by the defendant-wife binds the
arrangement in paragraph (e) conjugal partnership since its proceeds
supra; redounded to the benefit of the family.
g. That, the said Hence, defendant-husband and
US$25,000.00 was never defendant-wife are jointly and severally
intended as loan of liable in the payment of the loan.
defendant. It was his share of

Page 33 of 47
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a
defense that the amount of US
$25,000.00 was received as his share in
the income or profits of the corporation
and not as a loan. Firstly, defendant-
husband does not appear to be a
stockholder nor an employee nor an
agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos
Construction, Inc. Since he is not a
stockholder, he has no right to
participate in the income or profits
thereof. In the same manner that as he
is not an employee nor an agent of H. L.
Carlos Construction, Inc., he has no right
to receive any salary or commission
therefrom. Secondly, the amount
advanced for the purchase of the house
and lot came from the personal account
of the plaintiff. If, indeed, it was to be
construed as defendant-husbands share
in the profits of the corporation, the
checks should come from the
corporations account and not from the
plaintiffs personal account, considering
that the corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of its
stockholders and officers.
Even granting that the checks amount to
US $3,000.000.00 given by the plaintiff
to the defendant-spouses was their
share in the profits of the corporation,
still there is no sufficient evidence to
establish that the US $25,000.00 is to be
treated similarly. Defendant-husband in
invoking the defense of compensation
argued that if indeed they were indebted
to the plaintiff, the latter could have
applied their share in the proceeds or
income of the corporation to the
concurrent amount of the alleged loan,
instead of giving the amount of
P3,000,000.00 to them. This argument is
untenable. Article 1278 of the Civil Code
provides that compensation shall take
place when two persons, in their own
right, are debtors and creditors of each
other. As its indicates, compensation is a
sort of balancing between two
obligations. In the instant case, the
plaintiff and the defendant-husband are
not debtors and creditors of each other.
Even granting that the defendant-
husbands claim to the profits of the
corporation is justified, still
compensation cannot extinguish his loan
obligation to the plaintiff because under
such assumption, the defendant is
dealing with the corporation and not with
the plaintiff in his personal capacity.
Hence, compensation cannot take place.
The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in
finding that respondents liability was
not proved by preponderance of
evidence. On the contrary, the evidence
adduced by petitioner sufficiently
established his claim that the
US$25,000.00 he advanced to
respondent and his wife was a loan.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal
partnership pursuant to Article 121 of
the Family Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership
shall be liable for:
xxx
(2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient
to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Xxx
While respondent did not and refused to
sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the
conjugal home of respondent and his
family. Hence, notwithstanding the
alleged lack of consent of respondent,
under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he
shall be solidarily liable for such loan
together with his wife.
We also find sufficient basis for the
award of damages to petitioner, contrary
to the findings of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is not entitled thereto.
XXXII
SBTC vs MAR TIERRA CORP.
GR 143382
Facts:
Page 34 of 47

Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation,
through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000
credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company
(SBTC). Petitioner approved the
application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation.
It was secured by an indemnity
agreement executed by individual
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel
J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment
of the loan. The respondent corporation
finally availed of its credit line and
received P9M. Out of that amount, it was
able to pay about P4M while the
remaining balance remained outstanding
as the corporation suffered business
reversals and eventually ceased
operating. To enforce its claim against
the corporation on the remaining
balance of the loan, petitioner filed a
complaint for a sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment
against respondent corporation and
individual respondents in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC
rendered a decision holding respondent
corporation and individual respondent
Martinez jointly and severally liable to
petitioner for the remaining balance of
the loan including interest and attorneys
fee. It, however, found that the
obligation contracted by individual
respondent Martinez did not redound to
the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on
the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses Martinez.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision,
petitioner appealed to the CA but the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts
decision in toto. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be
held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party?
HELD:
NO.
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8
the conjugal partnership is liable for "all
debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." But when are debts and
obligations contracted by the husband
alone considered for the benefit of and
therefore chargeable against the
conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation
contract entered into by the husband in
favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in
acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership
as the benefit is clearly intended for a
third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we
ruled that, if the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
direct recipient of the money and
services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction
falls within the term "obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." In
other words, where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the
family business, there is a legal
presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. [11]
On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or
entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. [12] It is for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. No presumption is
raised that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be
presented to establish the benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
[13] In the absence of any showing of
benefit received by it, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the
Page 35 of 47
husband to accommodate a third party.
[14]
In this case, the principal contract, the
credit line agreement between petitioner
and respondent corporation, was solely
for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual
respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent
corporation was similarly for the latters
benefit. Petitioner had the burden of
proving that the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that
burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable
for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of
the Civil Code to protect the solidarity
and well being of the family as a unit.
[15] The underlying concern of the law is
the conservation of the conjugal
partnership. [16] Hence, it limits the
liability of the conjugal partnership only
to debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
XXXIII
BUADO vs CA
GR 145222
Facts:
Spouses Buado filed a complaint for
damages against Erlinda Nicol with
Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, which originated
from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising
from the criminal offense of slander filed
against her by petitioners. RTC rendered
a decision ordering Erlinda to pay
damages. It became final and executory
and later on issued a a writ of execution.
Finding Erlinda Nicols personal
properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a
notice of levy on real property on
execution addressed to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of
sheriffs sale was issued. Two (2) days
before the public auction sale on 28
January 1993, an affidavit of third-party
claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was
received by the deputy sheriff prompting
petitioners to put up a sheriffs
indemnity bond. The auction sale
proceeded with petitioners as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
issued in favor of petitioners.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994,
Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda
Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners
and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as
plaintiff therein, alleged that the
defendants, now petitioners, connived
and directly levied upon and execute his
real property without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no
proper publication and posting of the
notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent
claimed that his property which was
valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a
very low price of P51,685.00, whereas
the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol
was only P40,000.00. The case was
assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of
Imus, Cavite.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on
the basis of a valid writ of execution.
Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners
claimed that respondent should have
filed the case with Branch 19 where the
judgment originated and which issued
the order of execution, writ of execution,
notice of levy and notice of sheriffs sale.
RTC dismissed respondents complaint
and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction
over the case. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held
that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on
the complaint filed by appellant. Hence,
the instant petition attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
WON the obligation of the wife arising
from her criminal liability is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership
Held:
No.There is no dispute that contested
property is conjugal in nature. Article
122 of the Family Code explicitly
Page 36 of 47
provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system
of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no
duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of
imagination can it be concluded that the
civil obligation arising from the crime of
slander committed by Erlinda redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be
held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.
ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
XXXIV
ROXAS vs. CA
GR 92245
Facts:
Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to
Antonio Roxas, but are living separately.
Melania found out that Antonio had
entered into a contract of lease with
defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a
portion of their conjugal lot situated in
Quezon City without her previous
knowledge, much less her marital
consent. Apparently, she was to put up a
flea market in the lot and has already
filed for a Mayors permit but the same
was denied on renewal because
Cayetano also applied for the same
permit and was earlier granted. She then
filed a complaint for annulment of the
contract of lease entered into without
her consent against Cayetano, who filed
a motion to dismiss the same on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
Issue:
W/N a husband, as the administrator of
the conjugal partnership, may legally
enter into a contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the
knowledge and consent of the wife.
Held:
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art.
165. The husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership," in view of the
fact that the husband is principally
responsible for the support of the wife
and the rest of the family. If the conjugal
partnership does not have enough
assets, it is the husband's capital that is
responsible for such support, not the
paraphernal property. Responsibility
should carry authority with it.
The husband is not an ordinary
administrator, for while a mere
administrator has no right to dispose of,
sell, or otherwise alienate the property
being administered, the husband can do
so in certain cases allowed by law. He is
not required by law to render an
accounting. Acts done under
administration do not need the prior
consent of the wife.
However, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal
assets unhampered, he cannot alienate
or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus,
under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife
has been declared a non-compos mentis
or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property
of the conjugal partnership the wife's
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel
her to grant the same." This rule
prevents abuse on the part of the
husband, and guarantees the rights of
the wife, who is partly responsible for
the acquisition of the property,
particularly the real property. Contracts
entered into by the husband in violation
of this prohibition are voidable and
subject to annulment at the instance of
Page 37 of 47
the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil
Code)
XXXV
GUIANG vs CA
GR 125172
XXXVI
JADER MANALO vs CAMAISA
GR 147978
Facts:
Petitioner made a definite offer to buy
the properties to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the
knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent Norma Camaisa . After some
bargaining, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
price of the property to be paid on
installment basis. Such agreement was a
handwritten by petitioner and signed
by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed
out the conjugal nature of the
properties, Edilberto assured her of his
wifes conformity and consent to the
sale.
The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell
were thereafter prepared by
petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the
formal signing of the typewritten
Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed
the contracts, petitioner delivered to
him two checks. The contracts were
given to Edilberto for the formal affixing
of his wifes signature.
The following day, petitioner received a
call from respondent Norma
(wife), requesting a meeting to clarify
some provisions of the contracts. During
the meeting, handwritten notations were
made on the contracts to sell, so they
arranged to incorporate the notations
and to meet again for the formal signing
of the contracts.
When petitioner met again with
respondent spouses for the formal
affixing of Normas signature, she was
surprised when respondent spouses
informed her that they were backing out
of the agreement because they needed
spot cash for the full amount of the
consideration. Petitioner reminded
respondent spouses that the contracts to
sell had already been duly perfected and
Normas refusal to sign the same would
unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma
refused to sign the contracts prompting
petitioner to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages against
respondent spouses before the Regional
Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a perfected
contract to sell of the conjugal property?
Held:
There is no perfected sale.
The properties subject of the contracts in
this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
The law requires that the disposition of a
conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife,
otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by
Page 38 of 47
the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Underscoring
ours.)
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly
did not give her written consent to the
sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for
its validity. Significantly, petitioner
herself admits that Norma refused to
sign the contracts to sell. Respondent
Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent.
XXXVII
UY vs CA
GR 10955
XXXVIII
VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG
GR 159889
Facts:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera
Chiong were married sometime in
January 1960 but have been separated
in fact since 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at
Poblacion, Dipolog City. Sometime in
1985, Florentino sold the one-half
western portion of the lot to petitioners
for P8,000, payable in installments.
Thereafter, Florentino allowed
petitioners to occupy the lot and build a
store, a shop, and a house thereon.
Shortly after their last installment
payment on December 13, 1986,[5]
petitioners demanded from respondents
the execution of a deed of sale in their
favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign
a deed of sale. On May 13, 1992,
Florentino executed the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioners. On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in
its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of
absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and
ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and
remove all improvements therein. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Issue:
(1) Is the subject lot an exclusive
property of Florentino or a conjugal
property of respondents?
(2) Was its sale by Florentino without
Elisera's consent valid?
Ruling:
Anent the first issue, petitioners'
contention that the lot belongs
exclusively to Florentino because of his
separation in fact from his wife, Elisera,
at the time of sale dissolved their
property relations, is bereft of merit.
Respondents' separation in fact neither
affected the conjugal nature of the lot
nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.
Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the
separation in fact between husband and
wife without judicial approval shall not
affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature. Anent the
second issue, the sale by Florentino
without Elisera's consent is not,
however, void ab initio. In Vda. de
Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda
v. Villaranda, we held that without the
wife's consent, the husband's alienation
or encumbrance of conjugal property
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 is not void, but
merely voidable.
Applying Article 166, the consent of both
Elisera and Florentino is necessary for
the sale of a conjugal property to be
valid. In this case, the requisite consent
of Elisera was not obtained when
Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985
and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale
on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the
contract entered by Florentino is
annullable at Elisera's instance, during
the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, conformably
with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera
timely questioned the sale when she
filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991,
perfectly within ten years from the date
of sale and execution of the deed.
XXXIX
DELA CRUZ vs SEGOVIA
GR 149801
Page 39 of 47
Facts:
Jose Consuegra, in his lifetime married
twice, to Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937
and on May 1, 1957, to Basilia Berdim,
while the 1st marriage was still
subsisting. He fathered 2 children (both
already dead) from Rosario and 7 from
Basilia. When he died on Sept 26,1965,
the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance
policy were paid to Basilia and their
children being the beneficiaries stated in
the policy. Rosario on the other hand
filed a claim over the retirement
insurance policy proceeds claiming to be
Joses only legal heir. Basilia also filed a
similar claim asserting that. as
beneficiaries named in the life insurance
policy, the retirement insurance policy
likewise belong to them. GSIS ruled that
Rosario and Basilia are both Joses wives,
therefore the proceeds must be given to
them, 1/2 portion each. Dissatisfied,
Basilia filed a petition for mandamus
with preliminary injunction to CFI praying
that she and her children be declared as
the exclusive beneficiaries of the said
retirement insurance proceeds. Trial
Court, quoting Lao vs Dee held that
When 2 women innocently and in good
faith are legally united in holy
matrimony to the same man, they and
their children, born of said wedlock, will
be regarded as legitimate children and
each family be entitled to of the
estate. Basilia appealed. Hence this
case.
Issue:
To whom should this retirement
insurance benefits be paid, when no
beneficiary was designated.
Held:
To both wives. GSIS intended that the
life and retirement insurance be
separate and distinct therefore,
beneficiary of one insurance is not
automatically the beneficiary of the
other. Since the defendants first
marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void, the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not
ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir
of her husband under the NCC, she is
entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir she has an interest
in the husbands share in the property
here in dispute quoting Trial Courts
decision. And with respect to the right of
the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of
its nullity the only just and equitable
solution is to recognize the right of the
2nd wife to her share of in the property
acquired by her and her husband and
consider the other half as pertaining to
the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.
XL
RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE
GR 160708
Facts:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille
and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and
wife. They have four children, who are
also parties to the instant case and are
represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-
square meter parcel of land
denominated as Lot 7, located at
Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision,
Matina, Davao City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
88674 in their names. Said lot is
adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and
which is registered solely in his name
under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the
proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7
and Pedros lot. The house was finished
in the early 1980s but the spouses
continuously made improvements,
including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began
to neglect his family. Mary Ann was
Page 40 of 47
forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the
studies of her children. By himself,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the
two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia
and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified the petitioners of her
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary
Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears
on the said deed that Mary Ann did not
sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was
outside the house and the four children
were in school, Pedro together with
armed members of the Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and
acting in connivance with petitioners
began transferring all their belongings
from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid
Villa Abrille came home, they were
stopped from entering it. They waited
outside the gate until evening under the
rain. They sought help from the Talomo
Police Station, but police authorities
refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that
the incident caused stress, tension and
anxiety to her children, so much so that
one flunked at school. Thus,
respondents Mary Ann and her children
filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and
Attorneys Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and
herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the
RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the
house was built with his own money.
Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that
they bought the house and lot from
Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner
Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles
when they bought the property.
Issue:
The court of appeals erred when
it declared x x x the sale of lot
covered by tct no. 88674 in favor
of spouses ravina, together with
the house thereon, as null and
void since it is clearly contrary to
law and evidence.
. wife, or (b) in case of one spouses
The court of appeals erred when
it ruled that petitioners
patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo
ravina are not innocent
purchasers for value, the same
being contrary to law and
evidence.
The court of appeals erred when
it ruled that petitioners
patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo
ravina are liable for damages, the
same being contrary to law and
evidence.
Held:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides, All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
There is no issue with regard to the lot
covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was
an exclusive property of Pedro, having
been acquired by him before his
marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot
covered by TCT No. T-88674 was
acquired in 1982 during the marriage of
Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was
adduced to show that the subject
property was acquired through exchange
or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists
in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
Petitioners bare assertion would not
suffice to overcome the presumption
that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during
the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is
conjugal. Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint
efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct
the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of
conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of
the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without
the consent of both the husband and the
Page 41 of 47
inability, the authority of the court.
Article 124 of the Family Code, the
governing law at the time the assailed
sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil
Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the Family Code.
It is thus clear that alienation or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute
community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the
wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge
but without the approval of the wife,
thereby resulting in a disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the instance of
the wife who is given five (5) years from
the date the contract implementing the
decision of the husband to institute the
case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed
the action for annulment of sale within
five (5) years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to
the conjugal house and lot and does not
include the lot covered by TCT No. T-
26471, a property exclusively belonging
to Pedro and which he can dispose of
freely without Mary Anns consent.
On the second assignment of error,
petitioners contend that they are buyers
in good faith. Accordingly, they need not
inquire whether the lot was purchased
by money exclusively belonging to Pedro
or of the common fund of the spouses
and may rely on the certificates of title.
The contention is bereft of merit. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a
purchaser in good faith is one who buys
the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice
of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. To establish his
status as a buyer for value in good faith,
a person dealing with land registered in
the name of and occupied by the seller
need only show that he relied on the
face of the sellers certificate of title.
But for a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied
by the seller whose capacity to sell is
restricted, such as by Articles 166 and
173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of
the Family Code, he must show that he
inquired into the latters capacity to sell
in order to establish himself as a buyer
for value in good faith.
In the present case, the property is
registered in the name of Pedro and his
wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
knowledge that during the time of the
sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary
Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity
did not appear in the deed. Even
assuming that petitioners believed in
good faith that the subject property is
the exclusive property of Pedro, they
were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of
her objection to the sale and yet they
still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Anns written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the
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ones in actual, visible and public
possession of the property at the time
the transaction was being made. Thus,
at the time of sale, petitioners knew that
Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the
subject properties and yet they failed to
obtain her conformity to the deed of
sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now
invoke the protection accorded to
purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled,
the restoration of what has been given is
proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if
subsequently annulled must always be
characterized and punctuated by good
faith and fair dealing. Hence, in
consonance with justice and equity and
the salutary principle of non-enrichment
at anothers expense, we sustain the
appellate courts order directing Pedro to
return to petitioner spouses the value of
the consideration for the lot covered by
TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners
cannot claim reimbursements for
improvements they introduced after
their good faith had ceased. As correctly
found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Patrocinia Ravina made improvements
and renovations on the house and lot at
the time when the complaint against
them was filed. Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the
pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is
applicable. It provides that, (h)e who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to
indemnity.
On the last issue, petitioners claim that
the decision awarding damages to
respondents is not supported by the
evidence on record.
The claim is erroneous to say the least.
The manner by which respondent and
her children were removed from the
family home deserves our
condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while
respondent was out and her children
were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting
in connivance with the petitioners
surreptitiously transferred all their
personal belongings to another place.
The respondents then were not allowed
to enter their rightful home or family
abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the
doctrine that: Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. When
a right is exercised in a manner that
does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrong doer must be held
responsible. Similarly, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages
caused. It is patent in this case that
petitioners alleged acts fall short of
these established civil law standards.
LI
AGGABAO vs PARULAN
GR 165803
Facts:
Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a
sale of two parcels of land with their
improvements considered as conjugal
property by presenting a special power
of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly
executed by respondent husband
Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma.
Elena was made in favor of the spouses
vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted
in good faith and paid the full purchase
price, despite the showing by the
husband that his signature on the SPA
had been forged and that the SPA had
been executed during his absence from
the country and while he and Ma. Elena
have been estranged from one another.
When Dionisio learned about the alleged
sale, he filed for an action for the
declaration of the nullity of the
deed of absolute sale executed by
Page 43 of 47
Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of
the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his
favor and declared that the SPA was
forged. The decision of the RTC was
affirmed by the CA. Hence the present
case filed by petitioners imputing error
to the CA for not applying the ordinary
prudent mans standard in determining
their status as buyers in good faith. The
petitioners submit that Article 173 of the
Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family
Code, governed the property relations of
the respondents because they had been
married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; and that the second
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code should not apply because the other
spouse held the administration over the
conjugal property. They argue that
notwithstanding his absence from the
country Dionisio still held the
administration of the conjugal property
by virtue of his execution of the SPA in
favor of his brother; and that even
assuming that Article 124 of the Family
Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified
the sale through Atty. Parulans counter-
offer during the March 25, 1991
meeting.
ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code
and Article 124 of the Family Code
should apply to the sale of the conjugal
property executed without the consent
of Dionisio.
Held:
NO
To start with, Article 254[27] the Family
Code has expressly repealed several
titles under the Civil Code, among them
the entire Title VI in which the provisions
on the property relations between
husband and wife, Article 173 included,
are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March
18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled
that any alienation or encumbrance
of conjugal property made during
the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the
Family Code.[28]
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 256[29] of
the Family Code, the provisions of the
Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired.
In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court
rejected the petitioners argument that
the Family Code did not apply because
the acquisition of the contested property
had occurred prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, and pointed out that
Article 256 provided that the Family
Code could apply retroactively if the
application would not prejudice vested or
acquired rights existing before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
however, the petitioners did not show
any vested right in the property acquired
prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted
their situation from the retroactive
application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to
substantiate their contention that
Dionisio, while holding the
Page 44 of 47
administration over the property, had
delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan,
the administration of the property,
considering that they did not present in
court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan
the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the
power of administration does not
include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of
strict ownership. As such, an
authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and
vice versa, for the two powers may
only be exercised by an agent by
following the provisions on agency
of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to
Article 1878).
Specifically, the apparent authority of
Atty. Parulan, being a special agency,
was limited to the sale of the property in
question, and did not include or extend
to the power to administer the property.
[31]
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that
Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer
during the March 25, 1991 meeting
ratified the sale merits no consideration.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code,
the transaction executed sans the
written consent of Dionisio or the proper
court order was void; hence, ratification
did not occur, for a void contract could
not be ratified.[32]
On the other hand, we agree with
Dionisio that the void sale was a
continuing offer from the petitioners and
Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer
was withdrawn by either or both Ma.
Elena and the petitioners. The last
sentence of the second paragraph of
Article 124 of the Family Code makes
this clear, stating that in the absence of
the other spouses consent, the
transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
Dissolution of the Conjugal
Partnership Regime
LII
PARTOSA JO vs CA
GR 82606
Facts:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo,
admits to having cohabited with three
women and fathered fifteen children.
The first of these women, Prima Partosa-
Jo, claims to be his legal wife whom he
begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other
women and their respective offspring are
not parties of this case. In 1980, Prima
filed a complaint against Jose for judicial
separation of conjugal property. The RTC
rendered a decision and in the
dispositive portion it stated support but
not the separation of conjugal
properties. On appeal, The petitioner
contends that the respondent court has
misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191
of the Civil Code. She submits that the
agreement between her and the private
respondent was for her to temporarily
live with her parents during the initial
period of her pregnancy and for him to
visit and support her. They never agreed
to separate permanently. And even if
they did, this arrangement was
repudiated and ended in 1942, when she
returned to him at Dumaguete City and
he refused to accept her.
Issue:
WON the refusal of the husband to
accept his wife constitutes abandonment
which is a ground for the dissolution of
their property regime.
Ruling:
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of
the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact
between husband and wife without
judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned
the wife without just cause for at least
one year, she may petition the court for
a receivership, or administration by her
Page 45 of 47
of the conjugal partnership property or
separation of property.
Abandonment implies a departure by
one spouse with the avowed intent never
to return, followed by prolonged absence
without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one's
family although able to do so. There
must be absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. 6 This
idea is clearly expressed in the above-
quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned
the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention
of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942,
the private respondent had already
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied
admission to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City when she returned from
Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not
accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship.
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action
for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial
support to the petitioner. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled with
the refusal by the private respondent to
give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
LIII
ALIPIO vs CA
GR 134100
Facts:
Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5
hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on
Sep. 12, 1990. In June 19, 1987 til the
end of the lease period, Jaring subleased
the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps
Manuel. The stipulated rent is
P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of
P300k and P185,600.00. The second
installment due on June 30, 1989.
Sublessees failed to pay entire second
installment, leaving a balance of
P50,600.00 w/c they failed to pay
despite Alipios demands. Thus, he filed
a case against said sublessees asking for
payment of the balance or rescission of
the contract should they fail to pay the
balance.
Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal
of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of
the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that
such was applicable since her husband
and co-sublessee passed away prior
tothe filing of this action. Said rule has
been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20,1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Trial court denied Alipios petition
because she was a party to the contract
& should be independently impleaded
together w/the Manuel sps. Death of her
husband merely resulted in his exclusion
from the case. Petitioner & Manuels were
ordered to pay balance and P10k attys
fees and costs of suit.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the case
and held that the rule invoked is not
applicable. The action for recovery of a
sum of money does not survive the
death of the defendant, thus the
remaining defendants cannot avoid the
action by claiming thatsuch death totally
extinguished their obligation. When the
action is solidary, creditor may bring his
action against any of the debtors
obligated insolidum. Alipios liability is
independent of & separate from her
husbands.(Climaco vs. Siy Uy, Imperial
vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de
Agcaoili)
Issue:
W/N a creditor can sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in anordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeableagainst the conjugal
partnership.
Held:
NO. Proper remedy would be to file
aclaim in the settlement of the
decedents estate or if none has
beencommenced, he can file a petition
either for the issuance of letters of
administration or for the allowance of
will, depending on whether
Page 46 of 47
itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by
lumping claim against Alipios with those
against the Manuels.

CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the

obligation of the Alipios is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership since
it was contracted by the spouses for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
When petitioners spouse died, their CPG
was dissolved & debts chargeable
against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in
accordance w/ Rule 73, Sec.2 w/c
provides that the community property
will be inventoried, administered, &
liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.

In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that

no complaint for collection of
indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can
be brought against the surviving spouse.
Claim must be made in the proceedings
for the liquidation & settlement of the
CPG. Surviving spouses powers of
administration ceases & is passed on to
court-appointed administrator. This was
affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where
Court held that lack of liquidation
proceedings does not mean that the CPG
continues. Creditor may apply for letters
of admin in his capacity as a principal
creditor.

Note that for marriages governed by

CPG, obligations entered into by sps are
chargeable against their CPG & the
partnership is primarily bound for the
repayments. Theyll be impleaded as
representatives of the CPG and concept
of joint/solidary liability does not apply.
At best, it will not be solidary but joint.

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