ANSELMONTRUTH

ThomasWilliamsandSandraVisser

I.INTRODUCTION

Agoodplacetostartinassessingatheoryoftruthistoaskwhetherthetheoryunder

discussionisconsistentwithAristotlescommonsensicaldefinitionoftruthfromMetaphysics4:

Whatisfalsesaysofthatwhichisthatitisnot,orofthatwhichisnotthatitis;andwhatis

truesaysofthatwhichisthatitis,orofthatwhichisnotthatitisnot.1Philosophersofa

realistbentwillbedelightedtoseethatAnselmunambiguouslyadoptstheAristotelian

commonplace.Astatementistrue,hesays,whenitsignifiesthatwhatisis.2Butthetheory

oftruththatAnselmbuildsonthisobservationisonethatwouldsurelyhaveconfounded

Aristotle.Fornomatterwhatthetopic,AnselmsthinkingalwayseagerlyreturnstoGod;and

theunchallengedcentralityofGodinAnselmsphilosophicalexplorationsisnowheremorein

evidencethaninhisaccountoftruth.Indeed,weseeinthestudentsopeningquestioninDe

veritatethattheentirediscussionhasGodasitsoriginanditsaim:SincewebelievethatGodis

truth,andwesaythattruthisinmanyotherthings,Iwouldliketoknowwhether,wherever

truthissaidtobe,wemustacknowledgethatGodisthattruth.3Thestudentthenreminds

AnselmthatintheMonologionhehadarguedfromthetruthofstatementstoaneternal

SupremeTruth.DoesthisnotcommitAnselm(thestudentseemstobeasking)toholdingthat

Godhimselfissomehowthetruthoftruestatements?Butwhatdefinitionoftruthcouldmake

senseofsuchanoddclaim?Anselmishappytotakeupthechallengeofshowingthathis

descriptionofGodasSupremeTruthisnomeremetaphor,buttheexpressionofthedeepest

insightintothenatureoftruth.Anaccountoftruthisjusttheologyunderadifferentname.

ThisfirstdistinctivecharacteristicofAnselmstheory,thecentralityofGodasSupreme

Truth,helpsaccountforaseconddistinctivecharacteristic:itsstronginsistenceontheunityof

truth.AlltrutheitherisGodorsomehowreflectsGod;thus,onesimplebeingprovidesthe

1 Aristotle,Metaphysics4.7(1011b258).
2 Deveritate2.Wewillhyphenatewhatisandwhatisnotforeaseofreading.

1
 normbywhichalltruthclaimsmustbejudged.AsG.R.Evansrightlynotes,WhenAnselm

makesdistinctions,ashefrequentlydoes,heintendstoshowmoreclearlytheunderlyingunity

ofwhatisbeingsubdivided.4Asweshallsee,Anselmwilldeploytheconceptofrectitudeto

assimilateallthevariousmanifestationsoftruthinstatements,opinions,wills,actions,the

senses,andthebeingofthingstoeachotherand,intheend,totheSupremeTruth.Indeed,it

willturnoutthattruthissomuchthesamethingineachofitsmanifestationsthatitisnot

strictlycorrecttospeakofthetruthofthisorthatthing.Thereisjusttruth,period;insteadof

speakingofthetruthofactionaandstatements,weshouldsaythatbothactionaandstatement

sareinaccordancewithtruth,period.

II.TRUTHANDRECTITUDE

Intheirsearchforadefinitionoftruth,theteacherandstudentwhoaretheinterlocutors

inDeveritatebeginwiththemostcommonsortoftruth:thetruthofstatements.Anselms

accountoftruthinstatementsisasortofdoublecorrespondencetheory.Astatementistrue

whenitcorrespondsbothtothewaythingsareandtothepurposeofmakingstatements.Of

course,thepurposeofmakingstatementsjustistosignifythewaythingsare,sothetwo

correspondencescannotpullapart.ButAnselmclearlytakesthefunctionofstatementsto

explainwhyweshouldcallthemtruewhentheycorrespondtoreality;theircorrespondingto

realitywouldnotbereasontocallstatementstrueunlesssuchcorrespondencewerewhat

statementswerefor:

TEACHER:Forwhatpurposeisanaffirmationmade?
STUDENT:Forsignifyingthatwhatisis.
T:Soitoughttodothat.S:Certainly.
T:Sowhenitsignifiesthatwhatisis,itsignifieswhatitoughtto.S:Obviously.
T:Andwhenitsignifieswhatitoughtto,itsignifiescorrectly(recte).S:Yes.
T:Nowwhenitsignifiescorrectly,itssignificationiscorrect(recta).S:Nodoubt
aboutit.
T:Sowhenitsignifiesthatwhatisis,itssignificationiscorrect.S:Thatfollows.
T:Furthermore,whenitsignifiesthatwhatisis,itssignificationistrue.
S:Indeeditisbothcorrectandtruewhenitsignifiesthatwhatisis.

3 Deveritate1.
4 G.R.Evans,AnselmandaNewGeneration(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1980),136.
2
 T:Thenitsbeingcorrectisthesamethingasitsbeingtrue:thatis,itssignifying
thatwhatisis.S:Indeed,theyarethesame.
T:Soitstruthisnothingotherthanitscorrectness(rectitudo).
S:NowIseeclearlythatthistruthiscorrectness.

Soforstatements,atleast,rectitude(correctness)isafundamentallyteleologicalnotion:

statementsarecorrectwhentheydowhattheyweremadefor.

Butmadebywhom?Anselmgoesontomakeadistinctionthatshowsclearlythatitis

nottheonewhouttersastatementwhomakesitinthesensethatisrelevanttodetermining

itsrectitudeortruth.Thedistinctionarisesoutofacleverobservationbythestudent:

S:Astatement...hasreceivedthepowertosignify(accepitsignificare)boththatwhatis
is,andthatwhatisnotisforifithadnotreceivedthepowertosignifythateven
whatisnotis,itwouldnotsignifythis.Soevenwhenitsignifiesthatwhatisnotis,it
signifieswhatitoughtto.Butif,asyouhaveshown,itiscorrectandtruebysignifying
whatitoughtto,thenastatementistrueevenwhenitstatesthatwhatisnotis.5

Tothistheteacherrespondsthatwedonotcustomarilycallastatementtruejustbecauseit

signifieswhatitreceivedthepowertosignify:butwecould.Statementshavetwotruthsortwo

rectitudes.Astatementssignifyingwhatitreceivedthepowertosignifyisinvariablefora

givenstatement:Itisday,forexample,alwayssignifiesthatitisday,andsoithasthatsort

ofrectitudenaturally.Butastatementssignifyingwhatisthecaseisvariable:Itisday

doesnotalwayssignifythatwhatisis,andsoithasthissecondsortofrectitudeaccidentally

andaccordingtoitsuse.Thisaccidentalrectitudeiswhatastatementhasbecauseitsignifies

inkeepingwiththepurposeforwhichitwasmade.AndhereiswhereAnselmmakesitclear

thatitisnotmadebyaparticularspeaker:

T:Forexample,whenIsayItisdayinordertosignifythatwhatisis,Iamusingthe
significationofthisstatementcorrectly,sincethisisthepurposeforwhichitwasmade;
consequently,inthatcaseitissaidtosignifycorrectly.ButwhenIusethesame
statementtosignifythatwhatisnotis,Iamnotusingitcorrectly,sinceitwasnotmade
forthatpurpose;andsointhatcaseitssignificationissaidnottobecorrect.
Notefirstthatthisspeechmakesitclearthatastatement(oratio)isatype,notatoken.

Thetokenisauseofthetype,andsuchauseiscorrectortruewhenthespeakerusesthe

typeinaccordancewiththepurposeforwhichthetypewasmade.Nowthepurposeofevery

5 Deveritate2.
3
statementtypeistosignifythatwhatisis,soagivenstatementtokeniscorrectwhenit

signifiesthatwhatisis.Thestatementtokenassuchhasnofurtherpurpose,beyondthatofthe

type,bywhichitcanevaluatedascorrectorincorrect,trueorfalse.

Onemightbetemptedtothinkthatthetokendoeshaveapurposeofitsown,namely,

thespeakerspurpose.ButAnselmsunderstandingoftruthasrectitudeprecludeshimfrom

identifyingthepurposeofastatementtokenwiththespeakerspurposeinutteringthattoken.

Forifthepurposeofthetokenreallyisthespeakerspurpose,theneverytoken(expectperhaps

thosethatinvolveFreudianslipsandotherkindsofmisspeaking,inwhichthespeakerfailsto

utterthewordsheintendedtoutter)willachieveitsintendedpurpose.Nowwhateverachieves

itsintendedpurposehasrectitudeand,therefore,truth.Soifthepurposeofthetokenisthe

speakerspurpose,almosteverysentencetokenwillturnouttobetrue.Strictlyspeaking,then,

thetokendoesnothaveapurpose.Thetokening(theactofutteringthetoken)hasapurpose,

butthetokenitselfissimplyaninstanceoruseofthetype,anditisthetypethathasapurpose.

Usingthetypecorrectlyisusingitforitsproperpurpose.

Ofcourse,thetokeningisanact,andasweshallsee,actshaverectitudeandtruthas

well.Onceagain,Anselmcannotholdthatthespeakerspurposeinutteringthetoken

establishesthepurposeofactsoftokening.Forinthatcase,anactoflyingwouldhave

rectitudeifthespeakersucceededinthedeceptionheintended,butanactoftruthtelling

wouldlackrectitudeifthespeakerfailedin,say,thepersuasionheintendedtoproduceinhis

audience.Hereagain,therefore,itseemsthatactiontypeshavepurposes(inthiscase,the

purposeofthetypetokeningstatementtypesisthatofusingsignificationcorrectly),and

particularactionsarerightwhentheyaccordwiththepurposeoftheactiontype.Thus,

speakerspurposeandagentspurposedonotmatterforrectitude.Rectitudeisamatterof

naturesortypes,anditisGodwhomakesnaturesandthusgivesthemtheirpurpose.

Creatureshavenogenuinepowertoconferpurposes.6

6Thisisnottosaythatcreaturesdonotactpurposivelysomeofthemobviouslydobutthatinacting
purposivelytheyperformactions,makestatements,andsoforth,whosegenuinepurposesare
determined,notbytheirownwills,butbyGodscreativeactivity.Forexample,mypurposeinmakinga
statementmaybetohurtacolleaguesfeelings,butitdoesnotfollowthatthatiswhatthestatementis
4
 Soitisstatementtypes,nottokens,thatweremadeinordertosignifythatwhatisis.

Weaskedearlier:madebywhom?BynowithasbecomeclearthatAnselmsansweris:by

God.7Thisanswercertainlyappearsstrange,sincethestatementtypesthatAnselmistalking

aboutherearenaturallanguagestatements,notthedenaturedpropositionsofcontemporary

philosophy.8Indeed,Anselmhasdoesnothaveournotionofproposition,inthesenseof

whateveritisthatisequallyexpressedbytheLatinDiesestandtheEnglishItisday.

ThestrangenessoftheviewliesnotinthemereclaimthatGodmakesnaturallanguage

statementtypes.Godsmakingthoseisinitselfnoodderthanhismakinganyothertype.The

strangenessliesinsteadintheteleologicalelementofAnselmsclaim.Godnotonlymakesthe

typeItisdaybutconfersonititspurposeofsignifyingthatitisday(when,infact,itisday).

SoiftheEnglishlanguagehaddevelopedinsuchawaythatweallusedItisdaytoexpress

whatwenowmeanbysayingItisobligatory,wewouldallbemisusingthatstatementtype.

WewouldbeviolatingGodswillforourlinguisticpractices.SinceEnglishisnotsomething

wearemakingup,wecangetitwrong.

Nowtherearewaysofmitigatingthestrangenessofthisview,butwewillnotpursue

themhere,sincetheyallinvolveaplatonismsolushandgiddythatevenAnselmoughtto

blanchatthem.9Theimportantpointisthatthereisnoneedtogotosuchlengthsinorderto

preservetheteleologicalnotionoftruthtowhichAnselmiscommitted.Onecanbuildthe

actuallyfor.
7AlthoughAnselmdoesnotstateexplicitlythatnaturallanguagestatementtypesweremadebyGod,

Anselmdescribesthepowersandpurposesofstatementsusingexactlythesamesortoflanguageheuses
todescribethepowersandpurposesofcreaturesgenerally.Thus,statementsreceivedthepowerto
signify(accepitsignificare)justasanangelcreatedbyGodreceivedthepowertowill(accepitvelle).
AndastatementssignifyingwhatitreceivedthepowertosignifyisnaturalAnselmsusualword
forwhatfollowsfromthenatureGodgaveathingjustas,ifanangelreceivedonlythepowertowill
happiness,itswillinghappinesswouldbenatural.InDeveritate5,infact,Anselmexpresslynotesthat
theinvariabletruthofstatementsisaninstanceoftherectitudethatactionshavewhenathingactsin
accordancewiththenatureGodgaveit:Forjustasfire,whenitheats,doesthetruth,sinceitreceived
thepowertoheatfromtheonewhogaveitbeing,soalsothestatementItisdaydoesthetruthwhenit
signifiesthatitisday,whetheritisactuallydayornot,sinceitreceivednaturallythepowertodothis.
8Anselmsusualword,aswehavenoted,isoratio.PropositiooccursafewtimesinDeveritate,butitisnot

distinguishedinsensefromoratio.
9WetaketheexpressionlushandgiddyplatonismfromWilliamE.Mann,SimplicityandProperties:

AReplytoMorris,ReligiousStudies22(1986):34353,at348.
5
teleologyintoourGodgivenpowertouselanguage,ratherthanintothestatementtypes

themselves.Suchamoveallowsonetorecognizetheconventionalityofnaturallanguagesto

acknowledge,inotherwords,thatitishumanbeingswhomakenaturallanguagestatement

typesbutinsistthatourabilitytomakeandusesuchlanguageswasgiventousbyGodfor

thepurposeofsignifyingthatwhatisis.Thus,weuseourpowerofspeechcorrectlywhenwe

useconventionalnaturallanguagestatementtypesinordertosignifythatwhatisis.

Unfortunately,Anselmhimselfcannottakethisapproach,sinceitinvolvesconcedingthat

creaturesdohavealimitedpowertocreatenaturesandconferpurposesonthem.

Inanyevent,thetruthofstatements(whichAnselmalsocallsthetruthof

signification)isonlythefirstmanifestationoftruththattheteacherandstudentconsider.

Theyturnnexttothetruthofthoughtoropinion,whichisalsoidentifiedwithrectitude,again

understoodteleologically:

S:Accordingtothereasoningwefoundpersuasiveinthecaseofstatements,nothingcan
bemorecorrectlycalledthetruthofathoughtthanitsrectitude.Forthepowerof
thinkingthatsomethingisorisnotwasgiventousinorderthatwemightthinkthat
whatisis,andthatwhatisnotisnot.Therefore,ifsomeonethinksthatwhatisis,heis
thinkingwhatheoughttothink,andsohisthoughtiscorrect.If,then,athoughtistrue
andcorrectfornootherreasonthanthatwearethinkingthatwhatisis,orthatwhatis
notisnot,itstruthisnothingotherthanitsrectitude.10

Scripturealsorequiresthatwespeakoftruthinthewillandinaction,11andtheseareanalyzed

inthesameway.Thereistruthinawillsolongasarationalcreaturewillswhatheought

i.e.,thatforthesakeofwhichhehadreceivedawill12;thereistruthinanactionsolongasthe

agent(whetherrationalorirrational)doeswhatitoughttodo,whichiswhateveritwascreated

10Deveritate3.NotethatifAnselmthoughtofpropositionsasakindofmentallanguage,assomelater
medievalthinkerswill,thenhewouldhavenoneedtosupposethatGodcreatesnaturallanguage
statementtypes.Forthenutteranceswouldexpressmentallanguageorthought,whichisthesameinall
humanbeingsbecauseitisafunctionofthepowersweweregivenbyGod.Inthiswaythetruthof
statementscouldbeanalyzedintermsofthetruthofthoughtormentallanguage.Unfortunately,
Anselmdoesnotthinkofpropositionsinthisway.
11FortruthinthewilltheteacherappealstoJohn8:44,whichsaysthatthedevildidnotabideinthe

truth.Itwasonlyinhiswill,theteachersays,thathewasinthetruthandthenabandonedthe
truth.FortruthinactiontheteacherappealstoJohn3:21:Hewhodoesthetruthcomestothelight.
12Deveritate4.

6
byGodtodo.13Thus,asthestudentnotes,truthinthewillisjustaspecialcaseofthetruthof

action.14Thereisalsoacloseconnectionbetweenthetruthofactionandthetruthof

signification,astheteacherarguesinchapter9:sincenooneshoulddoanythingbutwhathe

oughttodo,bytheveryfactthatsomeonedoessomething,hesaysandsignifiesthatheought

todoit.Andifheoughttodoit,hesayssomethingtrue;butifheoughtnot,helies.

Thusfar,Anselmsdiscussionoftruthposesnospecialphilosophicaldifficulties(apart

fromthestrangenessofthesuggestionthatnaturallanguagestatementtypesarecreatedby

God).Truthisrectitudeinfact,Anselmdefinestruthasrectitudeperceptiblebythemind

alone.15Rectitude,inturn,isamatterofsomethingsdoingorbeingwhatitoughttodoorbe.

Asappliedtostatements,thoughts,wills,andactions,thisaccountoftruthseems

straightforwardenough.Buttwofurtherapplicationsoftheaccountwillrevealdeep

philosophicalpuzzlesbeneaththesuperficialsimplicity.WhenAnselmturnstothetruththatis

inthebeingofthings,hefindsthatthenotionofwhatsomethingoughttobeisunexpectedly

complicated.AndwhenhefinallyturnstotheSupremeTruth,God,heinsiststhatGodis

rectitudebutdeniesthatwecanevercorrectlysaythatGodoughttobeanythingwhatever.

III.THETRUTHINTHEBEINGOFTHINGS

Havinganalyzedthetruththatisfoundinstatements,opinion,thewill,action,andthe

senses,Anselmturnsinchapter7ofDeveritatetoaconsiderationofwhathecallsthetruthof

thebeingofthings.Theteacherasks,Doyouthinkanythingis,inanytimeorplace,thatis

notinthesupremeTruthanddidnotreceiveitsbeing,insofarasithasbeing,fromthesupreme

Truth;orthatitcanbeanythingotherthanwhatitisinthesupremeTruth?Thestudent

replies,Thatisunthinkable.Nowisandbeingareusedverybroadlyhere:Anselmhasin

mindnotmerelytheexistenceofthings,buttheirbeingthewaytheyare,havingthe

characteristicstheyhave,andsoforth.Onthisunderstandingofisandbeing,wecan

13Deveritate5.
14Deveritate5.
15Thequalificationperceptiblebythemindaloneexcludesrectitudethatcanbeperceivedbythesenses,

suchastherectitude(thatis,thestraightness)ofastick.
7
identifyatleasttwodistinctclaimstowhichthestudentisagreeing:

(1)Everythingthatexists(isacertainway,isthecase)receiveditsexistence(itsbeing

thatway,itsbeingthecase)fromtheSupremeTruth.

(2)Necessarily,everythingthatexists(isacertainway,isthecase)exists(isthatway,is

thecase)intheSupremeTruth.

(1)issimplyanemphaticaffirmationofGodssovereigntyandprovidence.Anselms

formulationis,asalways,verycareful.HedoesnotsaythatGodcausesthebeingofallthings,

butthatallthingsreceivetheirbeingfromGod.ForthereareevilsthatGodpermitsbutdoes

notbringabout;butitisneverthelesslegitimate,Anselmargues,tosaythatthoseevilsare

receivedfromGod.16

What(2)meansislessclear.Whatexactlyisitforsomethingtoexistinortobea

certainwayintheSupremeTruth?Bywayofanexample,supposeJohnisyoung.According

to(2),JohnisyoungintheSupremeTruth.ThiscannotsimplymeanthatGodknowsthatJohn

isyoung,oreventhatJohnsyouthexistsasanobjectofawarenessforthedivinemind.For

AnselmwillarguethatJohnsbeingyoungiscorrectorrightthatitisasitoughttobe,and

henceistruebecauseitisintheSupremeTruth.Nowitwouldmakenosensetosaythat

JohnsbeingyoungisasitoughttobebecauseGodknowsthatJohnisyoungorbecauseJohns

youthisanobjectofawarenesstothedivinemind.Thenotionseemstobe,rather,thatJohns

beingyoungisinaccordancewithGodsplanorpurpose.Ifthisisacorrectunderstandingof

(2),thenthereisacloseconnectionbetween(1)and(2).(1)saysthatthingsreceivedtheir

existenceandtheircharacteristicsfromGod;(2)saysthatwhattheyreceivedfromGod

necessarilyaccordswithhisplanforthem.Thus,accordingto(2),thereisrectitudeinall

things,becauseallthingsaccordwithGodsplanforthem.Whateveris,isright.

Inchapter8Anselmaddressesanobviousobjection.BothwhatGodpermitsandwhat

Godcausesequallyoughttobe,accordingtoAnselm,becauseGodinhisperfectionwouldnot

alloworcauseanythingthatoughtnottobe.AndyetamongthethingsthatGodpermitsare

evilactions.Hence,thestudentasks,Buthowcanwesay,withrespecttothetruthofathing,

16 SeeDecasudiaboli20.
8
thatwhateverisoughttobe,sincetherearemanyevildeedsthatcertainlyoughtnottobe?

Anselmarguesthatsuchthingsbothoughttobeandoughtnottobe:

T:Iknowyoudonotdoubtthatnothingisatall,unlessGodeithercausesorpermitsit..
..WillyoudaretosaythatGodcausesorpermitsanythingunwiselyorbadly?
S:Onthecontrary,IcontendthatGodalwaysactswiselyandwell.
T:Doyouthinkthatsomethingcausedorpermittedbysuchgreatgoodnessand
wisdomoughtnottobe?
S:Whatintelligentpersonwoulddaretothinkthat?
T:Therefore,bothwhatcomesaboutbecauseGodcausesitandwhatcomesabout
becauseGodpermitsitoughtequallytobe.
S:Whatyouaresayingisobviouslytrue.
T:Thentellmewhetheryouthinktheeffectofanevilwilloughttobe.
S:Thatsthesameasaskingwhetheranevildeedoughttobe,andnosensibleperson
wouldconcedethat.
T:AndyetGodpermitssomepeopletoperformtheevildeedsthattheirevilwills
choose.
S:Ifonlyhedidnotpermititsooften!
T:Thenthesamethingbothoughttobeandoughtnottobe.Itoughttobe,inthatGod,
withoutwhosepermissionitcouldnotcomeabout,actswiselyandwellinpermittingit;
butifweconsidertheonewhoseevilwillinstigatestheaction,itoughtnottobe.

Anselmspositionhassomeapparentlyunwelcomeconsequences.First,Anselmcannot

arguethatoneofthewaysoflookingatasituationisprivilegedandthusmitigatethe

awkwardnessofsayingthatthesameactionbothoughttobeandoughtnottobe.Iftherewere

aprivilegedwayoflookingatthesituation,itwouldsurelybeGodsway.ButGodlooksat

everysituationinatleastthesamevarietyofwaysthathumansdo.(Tospeak

anthropomorphically,hemustaskOughtJohntokillSamantha?inonewaywhenassessing

hisprovidentialplan,andinquiteanotherwaywhenassessingthepunishmentthatmightbe

duetoJohn.)Whichwayisrelevantdependsentirelyonthecircumstancesinwhich,orthe

reasonsforwhich,wewanttoknowtheanswertothequestion,OughtStohavedoneX?or

OughtStodoX?

SinceAnselmappliesthisanalysistocanstatementsaswellastooughtstatements,

theviewhasasecondunwelcomeconsequence.Notonlywhethersomeoneoughttoperforma

certainaction,butalsowhethersomeonecanperformacertainaction,dependsonthewayin

9
whichoneisconsideringthecanstatement.Itmightbetrue,forexample,thatGertrudecan

bothwashhercartomorrowandrefrainfromwashinghercartomorrow,whenweignore

Godseternalplan.Butwhenweassessthesamethingwhileconsideringhisplan,Gertrude

canonlydooneortheother,dependingonwhatGodplannedtopermit.

OnemightobjectthatAnselmneednotembracetheseconsequences.Contrarytowhat

Anselmseemstothink,onemightargue,insuchcaseswearenotconsideringthesameaction

intwodifferentways.Instead,weareconsideringtwodifferentactions.Inthefirstexample,

wearenotevaluatingJohnsmurdering(consideredmorally)andJohnsmurdering(considered

intermsofprovidence);rather,weareevaluatingJohnsmurderingandGodspermittingJohn

tomurder,whichareclearlydistinctactions.Unfortunately,Anselmcannotdissolvethe

apparentparadoxsoeasily.Forheisinterestedinwhetherthesetwoactionsoughttohave

occurred,andherewecannotassessGodsactionofpermittingwithoutconsideringwhatitis

thatheispermitting,namely,JohnsmurderingofSamantha.AndsincewhateverGodpermits

oughttobe,thenJohnsmurderingofSamanthaoughttobe.17Yet,lookedatinanotherway,it

oughtnottobe.Therequirementthatweassigndifferenttruthvaluestooneandthesame

statementdependingonthewaysinwhichthestatementisconsideredcannotbeeliminated

afterall.

Sowhatisittoconsiderthetruthofoneandthesamestatementindifferentways?Itis

totakeintoaccountdifferentfeaturesoraspectsofrealitywhenassessingasentence.One

mightwanttoarguethatifthisisallthatismeantbywaysofconsideringthetruthof

statements,thenitisclearthatthereisaprivilegedway:theoneinwhichweconsider

everythingabouthowtheworldis.ButAnselmcannotgoalongwiththissuggestion,sinceit

impliesthatanyjudgmentoftheformXoughtnottobeis,ifconsideredintheprivileged

way,false.Forifweconsidereverything,thenweconsiderGodsplan;andifwedothat,then

whateveristhecaseoughttobethecase.Butthenthereseemstobelittlesenseleftinsaying

17WouldAnselmtheninferthatJohnoughttokillSamantha?Theanswerisnotaltogetherclearfromthe
text,butweareinclinedtosayyes.AnselmacknowledgesthatexpressionsoftheformSoughttodo
notalwaysimplythatSisunderanobligationto.SohecanconsistentlyaffirmboththatJohnisnot
underanobligationtokillSamantha(indeed,thatheisunderanobligationnottokillher)andthathe

10
thatoneoughtnottohavemurderedorliedorbeenspitefultoonesfriends,becausewhatever

onedidiswhatGodpermittedonetodoandthereforewhattakingeverythingintoaccount

oneoughttohavedone.AndclearlyAnselmisnotwillingtostripmoraljudgmentsoftheir

forceinthisway.Soweareleftwithatheoryoftruthaccordingtowhichoneandthesame

statementistrueorfalsedependingonthecontextofassessment.18

Intheend,thisoddfeatureofAnselmsviewisalmostinvisibleinDeveritate.Herarely

explicitlyreferstothecontextinwhichheassessesthetruthofnormativeandmodalclaims

perhapsbecauseitistypicallyobviouswhichcontextistherelevantonegiventhediscussionat

hand.Whenthereisambiguity,Anselmisquicktoletusknowwhattherelevantcontextis.

Nonetheless,theviewthatthetruthvalueofnormativeandmodalstatementsvariesdepending

onthecontextofassessmenthasimportantimplicationsforotherareasofhisthought.Wedo

nothavespaceinthisessaytopursuethoseimplications,butwewillnotethattherecanbeno

fullyadequateaccountofAnselmsviewsonhumanfreedom,grace,providence,anddivine

foreknowledgewithoutarecognitionthatmodalstatementsdonot,forAnselm,havecontext

independenttruthvalues.Indeed,ifAnselmsperspectivalismcanbedefended,itopensup

philosophicallypromisingavenuesfordiscussionsofthoseperenniallyvexingissues.

IV.THESUPREMETRUTH

InDeveritate29Anselmexaminesavarietyoftruthsandfindsthateachofthemcanbe

identifiedasrectitude.ItisthereforenosurprisethatwhenhecomestoGod,thesupreme

Truth,atthebeginningofchapter9,Anselmeasilywinshisstudentsagreementthatthe

supremeTruthisrectitude.ButAnselmimmediatelymakesitclearthatGodcannotbe

rectitudeinthesamesenseasalltheotherrectitudes:

T:YouwillsurelynotdenythatthesupremeTruthisrectitude.
S:Indeed,Icannotacknowledgeittobeanythingelse.

oughttokillher.
18Itisimportantnottoconfusethisclaimwiththesuperficiallysimilar(andrelativelyuncontroversial)

claimthatthepropositionalcontent,andhencethetruthvalue,ofanutterancecanchangedependingon
thecircumstancesoftheutterance.Anselmholdsthemuchstrongerandmorecounterintuitiveviewthat
oneandthesameutterance,withjustonedeterminatepropositionalcontentandinonedeterminatesetof
circumstances,canhavedifferenttruthvaluesaccordingtodifferentwaysofassessingtheutterance.
11
 T:Notethat,whilealltherectitudesdiscussedearlierarerectitudesbecausethethingsin
whichtheyexisteitherareordowhattheyought,thesupremeTruthisnotarectitude
becauseitoughttobeordoanything.Forallthingsareunderobligationstoit,butitis
undernoobligationtoanything.19

ByaffirmingthatthesupremeTruthisrectitude,Anselmcompleteshisassimilationof

alltruthstorectitude.ButbyinsistingthattherectitudeofthesupremeTruthisnotthesameas

therectitudeofallinferiortruths,heseemstorunupagainsttwoproblems.Thefirstiswhat

weshallcalltheproblemofsignificance:WhatcanAnselmmeanbycallingGodthesupremeTruth

orrectitude?Hecannotavoidsuchlanguage,sincebothScriptureandtheargumentsofthe

MonologionrequirehimtocallGodTruth,andtheearlierargumentsofDeveritaterequirehim

toidentifytruthwithrectitude.Andyettheearliersenseofrectitude,accordingtowhicha

thinghasrectitudeinvirtueofitsbeingwhatitoughttobeordoingwhatitoughttodo,cannot

applytoGod.SoitishardtoseewhatsignificanceAnselmcanattachtothislanguagethathe

nowhasnochoicebuttouse.

Thesecondproblemiswhatweshallcalltheproblemofunity:ByinsistingthatGodisnot

atruthorarectitudeinthesamesenseasallothertruthsorrectitudes,Anselmappearsto

abandonhisstatedaimofshowingthatthereisonetruthinalltruethings.Forthetruththat

weidentifywithGodisnotthesameasthetruthofstatements,actions,andtheothertrue

thingsanalyzedintheearlierchapters.Nowrecallthestudentsopeningquestion:Sincewe

believethatGodistruth,andwesaythattruthisinmanyotherthings,Iwouldliketoknow

whether,wherevertruthissaidtobe,wemustacknowledgethatGodisthattruth.Itappears

thatAnselmhasnowbackedhimselfintosuchacornerthathemustdenythatGodisthetruth

wherevertruthissaidtobe.

WeshallbeginwithAnselmssolutiontotheproblemofsignificance.Immediatelyafter

pointingoutthatthesupremeTruthisrectitude,butarectitudeofquiteadifferentsortfromall

theothers,theteachercontinues:

T:Doyoualsoseethatthisrectitudeisthecauseofallothertruthsandrectitudes,and
nothingisthecauseofit?

19moreliterally:...thesupremeTruthisnotarectitudebecauseitowessomething.Forallthingsowe
[something]toit,butitowesnothingtoanything.
12
 S:Iseethat,andInoticethatsomeoftheseothertruthsandrectitudesaremerelyeffects,
whileothersarebothcausesandeffects.Forexample,thetruththatisinthebeingof
thingsisaneffectofthesupremeTruth,anditisinturnacauseofthetruthofthoughts
andstatements;andthelattertwotruthsarenotacauseofanyothertruth.

ThisexchangestronglysuggeststhatwhatwemeanwhenwecallGodTruthisthatheisthe

causeoftheothertruths.

ThissuggestionisconfirmedbythenewspinAnselmgivestotheargumentfrom

Monologion18withwhichthestudenthadconfrontedhimatthebeginningofDeveritate.

AnselmhadarguedfromthetruthofstatementstotheexistenceofasupremeTruthwithout

beginningorend:

Letanyonewhocandosothinkofthis:whendiditbegintobetrue,orwhenwasitnot
true,thatsomethingwasgoingtoexist?Orwhenwillitceasetobetrue,andnolonger
betrue,thatsomethingexistedinthepast?Butifneitherofthesecanbethought,and
neitherstatementcanbetrueapartfromtruth,thenitisimpossibleeventothinkthat
truthhasabeginningorend.20

NowthatthestudentunderstandsthatthesupremeTruthisthecauseofothertruths,Anselm

says,heisinapositiontoappreciatethetrueforceofthatearlierargument:

[W]henIasked,whenwasitnottruethatsomethingwasgoingtoexist?Ididntmean
thatthisstatement,assertingthatsomethingwasgoingtoexistinthefuture,wasitself
withoutabeginning,orthatthistruthwasGod.

Instead,whathemeantwasthatnomatterwhenthestatementSomethingisgoingtoexist

mighthavebeenuttered,itwouldhavebeentrue.Therefore,thecauseofitstruthmustalways

haveexisted.And,Anselmcontinues,

Thesamereasoningappliestoastatementthatsayssomethingexistedinthepast.Since
itisinconceivablethatthisstatement,ifuttered,couldlacktruth,itmustbethecasethat
thesupremecauseofitstruthcannotbeunderstoodtohaveanend.Forwhatmakesit
truetosaythatsomethingexistedinthepastisthefactthatsomethingreallydidexistin
thepast;andthereasonsomethingexistedinthepastisthatthisishowthingsareinthe
supremeTruth.

SotoarguethatthesupremeTruthiseternalisnottoarguethatsomefeatureofstatementsis

eternal,butthatthecauseoftheirtruthiseternal.GodisthesupremeTruthbecauseheisthe

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causeofthetruthofallothertruethings.

Havingthussolvedtheproblemofsignificance,Anselmturnstotheproblemofunity:

Lets...askwhetherthereisonlyonetruthinallthethingsinwhichwesaythereistruth,or

whetherthereareseveraltruths,justasthereareseveralthingsinwhich(aswehave

established)thereistruth.21Suppose,forexample,thattherectitudeofsignificationdiffers

fromrectitudeofwillbecausetheoneisinthewillandtheotherinsignification.Itwould

followthatrectitudeofsignificationhasitsbeingbecauseofsignificationandvariesaccording

tosignification.Thestudentreplies:

Soitdoes.Forwhenastatementsignifiesthatwhatisis,orthatwhatisnotisnot,the
significationiscorrect;andithasbeenestablishedthatthisistherectitudewithout
whichthereisnocorrectsignification.If,however,thestatementsignifiesthatwhatis
notis,orthatwhatisisnot,orifitsignifiesnothingatall,therewillbenorectitudeof
signification,whichexistsonlyinsignification.Hence,therectitudeofsignificationhas
itsbeingthroughsignificationandchangesalongwithit.

Theteacherquicklyrejectsthiscommonsensicalposition.Therectitudeortruthof

significationdoesnothaveitsbeingthroughsignification,butinfactisaltogetherindependent

ofsignification.Forsuppose(theteacherargues)thatnoonewillstosignifywhatoughttobe

signified.Thentherewillbenosignification,buttherectitudeinvirtueofwhichitisrightfor

whatoughttobesignifiedtobesignified,andbywhichthisisdemanded,doesnotceaseto

exist.Theteacherconcludes:

T:Sowhenrectitudeispresentinsignification,itsnotbecauserectitudebeginstoexist
insignificationwhensomeonesignifiesthatwhatisis,orthatwhatisnotisnot;
instead,itsbecauseatthattimesignificationcomesaboutinaccordancewitharectitude
thatalwaysexists.Andwhenrectitudeisabsentfromsignification,itsnotbecause
rectitudeceasestoexistwhensignificationisnotwhatitshouldbeorthereisno
significationatall;instead,itsbecauseatthattimesignificationfallsawayfroma
rectitudethatneverfails.

Thus,therectitudeofsignificationdoesnotdependonsignification.Andthereisnothing

distinctiveaboutsignificationinthisregard:rectitudeofwilldoesnotdependonthewillor

rectitudeofactiononaction.Rectitudedoesnotdependonthethingsinwhichthereis

20 Monologion18,quotedverbatiminDeveritate1.

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rectitude:thereisoneneverfailing,unchangeablerectitudeforallthingsinwhichwesaythere

istruthorrectitude.

Theconclusionthatthereisonlyonetruthinalltruethingsseemstocometooquickly,

sinceitispossiblethattheneverfailingrectitudethatmakesitrightforwhatoughttobe

signifiedtobesignifiedisdistinctfromtheneverfailingrectitudethatmakesitrightforwhat

oughttobedonetobedone,andsoonforeachoftheothersortsofrectitudediscussedinDe

veritate.Inotherwords,theoriginalquestionaboutwhethertherearedistinctspeciesoftruth,

correspondingtothedistinctspeciesoftruethings,isnotansweredbytheteachersdiscussion

oftherectitudeofsignification,whichseemsdesignedtoshowthattherearenotdistinct

instancesofagivenspecies.Nonetheless,givenwhathehasalreadysaidindiscussingGodas

supremeTruth,Anselmisentitledtothisconclusion.ForweknowthatGodisthecauseofall

thetruths:

T:Doyoualsoseethatthisrectitudeisthecauseofallothertruthsandrectitudes,and
nothingisthecauseofit?
S:Iseethat,andInoticethatsomeoftheseothertruthsandrectitudesaremerelyeffects,
whileothersarebothcausesandeffects.Forexample,thetruththatisinthebeingof
thingsisaneffectofthesupremeTruth,anditisinturnacauseofthetruthofthoughts
andstatements;andthelattertwotruthsarenotacauseofanyothertruth.

Sotheoneandonlyneverfailingrectitude,inaccordancewithwhichwhateverisrightin

signification,thought,action,orwillcomestobe,isGod.ThesupremeTruthisinfacttheonly

truth.Asthestudentsuggestedattheoutset,wherevertruthissaidtobe,wemust

acknowledgethatGodisthattruth.

Butthenwhy,thestudentasks,dowespeakofthetruthofthisorthatparticularthing

asifweweredistinguishingdifferenttruths,wheninfacttherearentdifferenttruthsfor

differentthings?Theteacherrepliesthatsuchlanguageisnotstrictlycorrect:

T:Truthissaidimproperlytobeofthisorthatthing,sincetruthdoesnothaveitsbeing
inorfromorthroughthethingsinwhichitissaidtobe.Butwhenthingsthemselves
areinaccordancewithtruth,whichisalwayspresenttothosethingsthatareasthey
oughttobe,wespeakofthetruthofthisorthatthingforexample,thetruthofthe
willorofactioninthesamewayinwhichwespeakofthetimeofthisorthatthing

21 Deveritate13.
15
 despitethefactthatthereisoneandthesametimeforallthingsthataretemporally
simultaneous,andthatifthisorthatthingdidnotexist,therewouldstillbetime.For
wedonotspeakofthetimeorthisorthatthingbecausetimeisinthethings,but
becausetheyareintime.Andjustastimeregardedinitselfisnotcalledthetimeof
someparticularthing,butwespeakofthetimeofthisorthatthingwhenweconsider
thethingsthatareintime,soalsothesupremeTruthasitsubsistsinitselfisnotthe
truthofsomeparticularthing,butwhensomethingisinaccordancewithit,thenitis
calledthetruthorrectitudeofthatthing.

NotethatAnselmssolutiontotheproblemofunityisnotastandardPlatonicmaneuver

ofthesortthatweseeinhisaccountofgoodness.Thatis,heisnotarguingthatsincevarious

thingsaretrue,theremustbesomethingthatistrueinthehighestdegreeandhasitstruthfrom

itselfratherthanfromanother.22AnselminfactneverarguesinthiswaythatGodistrue,ashe

arguesthatGodisjust,good,andsoforth.(TheexpressiontrueGodiscommoninAnselmin

Christologicalcontexts,butheseldomusestrueofGodpredicatively.)Sotheunityoftruthis

nottheunityofapropertyinitsvariousinstances,butstrictnumericalunity.Thereisonetruth

becauseTruthisGod,whoisone.

V.CONCLUSION

WenowhaveacompletepictureofAnselmsviewoftruth.Wherevertruthissaidto

beinstatements,opinions,wills,actions,thesenses,andthebeingofthingsthattruthis

rectitude.Somethinghasrectitudebecauseitaccordswithitspurpose.Somethingreceivesits

purposefromwhatevercausedit.Godcausesallthings.Sowhateverissaidtobetrueistrue

invirtueofbeingcausedbyGodinaccordancewithhiswill,andGodisTruthbecausehe

causesallthingsandestablishesthestandardsbywhichtheyaretobeevaluated.

Toacontemporaryphilosopher,Anselmscommitmenttotheunityoftruthmightwell

seemgratuitous.Foronething,wewouldnottodayspeakoftruthinwills,actions,thesenses,

andthebeingofthings,sotheefforttotrytocaptureallthoseusesofthewordtrueina

singletheoryseemsneedlesslystrained.Andeveninthecaseswherewewouldspeakoftruth

instatementsandopinionstheelaboratetheoryAnselmdevelopsintheinterestofa

22 Fortheargumentconcerninggoodness,seesectionI.2ofJeffBrowerscontributiontothisvolume.
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unifiedtheoryoftruthaddsunnecessarycomplexitytohispromisinglycommonsensical

observationthatastatementistruewhenitsignifiesthatwhatisis.

ButinfactitisnotsodifficulttoseehowAnselmsGrandUnifiedTheoryofTruth

emergesoutofthedeceptivesimplicityoftheAristoteliancommonplace.Hisfirstaccountof

thetruthofstatementsisthatastatementstruthisitscorrectness,itsgettingthingsright.But

itsgettingthingsrightisnotsimplyamatterofitscorrespondingtothewaythingsare:itisa

matterofthestatementsdoingitsproperjob.Ifastatementhadsomepurposeotherthansaying

thatwhatisis,itssayingthatwhatisiswouldnotbeanyreasontocallthestatementcorrect.

(Wecallaclockrightwhenthetimeittellsistheactualtime,butonlybecauseclocksare

meantfortellingtime.)OnceAnselmstartsattendingtothenotionofgettingthingsrightin

thissense,however,itisperfectlynaturalforhimtoaskabouttheproperjobofthewill,of

actions,andofalltheotherthingswhoserectitudeheinvestigatesinDeveritate.Ineverycase,

theproperjobisthejobassignedbyGod.Allsortsofthingscanthereforebesaidtoberightor

correctortrueiftheydothejobassignedthembyGod.Contemporaryphilosopherswouldnot

putitthatway,ofcourse;wewouldprefertosaythatthingsareastheyoughttobe,rather

thanthattheyarecorrectortrue.Butourlinguisticconventionsshouldnotbeallowedto

obscureAnselmsfundamentalpoint,whichisthatthetruthwefindinstatementsisnota

propertylimitedtothedomainoflanguage.

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