Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Fall Meeting
Gyeongju, Korea, October 24-25, 2013
Reliability Analysis of I&C Architecture of Research Reactors Using Bayesian Networks
Rahman Khalil ur a, Jinsoo Shina, Gyunyoung Heo a*, Hanseong Son b
a
Kyung Hee Univ., Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, 446-701, Korea
b
Joongbu Univ., Chubu-myeon, Geumsan-gun, Chungnam, 312-702, Korea
*
Corresponding author: gheo@khu.ac.kr
1. Introduction
This research is the continuation of study to analyze
the reliability of single channel of Reactor Protection
System (RPS) using Bayesian networks. The focus of
research was on the development of architecture for
low power research reactors. What level of reliability is
sufficient for protection, safety and control systems in
case of low power research reactors? There should be a
level which should satisfy all the regulatory
requirements as well as operational demands with
optimized cost of construction.
Scholars, researchers and material investigators from
educational and research institutes are demanding for
construction of more research reactors. In order to meet
this demand and construct more units, it is necessary to
do more research in various areas. The research is also
needed to make a standardization of research reactor
I&C architectures on the same lines of commercial
power plants.
The research reactors are categorized into two broad
categories, Low power research reactors and medium
to high power research reactors. According to IAEA
TECDOC-1234, Research reactors with 0.250-2.0 MW
power rating or 2.5-10 x 1011 . flux are termed
low power reactor whereas research reactors ranging
from 2-10 MW power rating or 0.1-10 x 1013 . results based on the component failure data. BN
are considered as Medium to High power research
reactors [1]. Some other standards (IAEA NP-T-5.1)
define multipurpose research reactor ranging from
power few hundred KW to 10 MW as low power
research reactor [2, 3].
The objective of this research project is to identify a
configuration of architecture which gives highest
availability with maintaining low cost of
manufacturing. In this regard, two configurations of a
single channel of RPS are formulated in the current
article and BN models were constructed. Bayesian
network analysis was performed to find the reliability
features. This is a continuation of study towards the
standardization of I&C architecture for low & medium
power research reactors [4].
2. I&C Architecture Configurations
RPS is a safety system which consists of sensors, bi-
stable processors (BP), logic, and other equipment
necessary to monitor selected reactor conditions and to
provide reliable and rapid reactor protective action if
monitored conditions approach specified safety system
settings. Reactor protection system has redundancy and
this redundancy varies from plant to plant based on
design features. Usually RPS consists of four channels
in high power reactors with trip logic of 2/4 whereas
three redundant and physically separated channels may
work 2/3 trip logic for small or low power reactors.
Instead of overall reactor protection system, only
architecture of a single channel is articulated with two
different configurations to see the impact of failure of
reactor protection system. The results of single
channel I&C system can directly lead towards the
designing of an optimized architecture from reliability
point of view.
Generally architecture is constituted of Sensor (TR),
Pressure/level Transmitter (PT), Analog Input (AI),
Digital Input (DI), Bi-stable Processor (PB),
Coincidence Processor (CP), Digital Output (DO),
Shunt Circuit (ST), Under Voltage circuitry (UV). The
signal/relay finally activates actuation through Circuit
Breaker (CB) and secondary circuit breaker (SCB).
Architecture-I is designed to have one BP and one CP
in channel while in architecture-II bi-stable processor,
coincidence processor were added in the channel
architecture.
2.1. Bayesian network models
Bayesian network technique was used for the
probabilistic analysis as it has potential to generate real
models preserving all the functions and logics of
architecture-I and architecture-II were modeled with
two failure states for each component which are 0 and
1. State 0 represents the failure state and 1 represents
the perfect operational state. The model, shown in
figure 1 and 2, show the propagation of failure from
transmitter & Sensor to circuit breaker actuation.
Figure 1: BN model of I&C architecture without
redundancy in BP & CP (Architecture-I)
Bayesian network analysis was performed for the
availability and sensitivity analysis of two
configurations of RPS channel architecture. Sensitivity
studies viz. Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and Risk
Reduction Worth (RRW) of I&C components were
performed. RRW can be calculated by, equation 1,
 Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Fall Meeting
Gyeongju, Korea, October 24-25, 2013

taking the ratio of the total failure probability each component. RAW and RRW of architecture-I & II
(unavailability) to failure probability of system with can be observed in figure 3 & 4 respectively. With
for ith component set equal to 0. perspective of RAW, CP and DO are highlighted risk
QCHNL ( ) significant by architecture-I whilst these are
RRWi = (1)
(QCHNL ( = 0))i highlighted as less risk sensitive compared to SCB and
UV in architecture-II. RRW indicator designates CP as
highly sensitive in architecture-I and ST & UV as
sensitive components in architecture-II.
5

Risk Reduction Worth

4 Architecture-I
Architecture-II
3

1
Figure 2: BN model of I&C architecture with
redundancy in BP & CP (Architecture-II) 0
In order to determine RAW, the failure probability PT DI AI BP CP DO ST UV CB SCB
for ith component is set equal to 1 and system failure is
calculated, which means that ith component will surely Figure 4: RRW results of I&C components in
fail. architecture-I & II
(QCHNL ( = 1))i Based on the reliability features, it can be
RAWi = (2) decided that architecture-II has good reliability features
QCHNL ( ) such as high availability, less risk sensitive components,
as shown by RAW and RRW. Cost parameters will be
3. Results and Discussions
incorporated to optimize architecture.
Architecture unavailability P(x=0|) and success
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
probabilities (availability) P(x=1|) have been
calculated using simulated by BN models, as presented
This work was supported by Advanced Research
in table 1. The system unavailability decreases from
Center for Nuclear Excellence (ARCNEX) program
1.9751E-04 to 3.1596E-07 for architecture-I and
funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and
architecture-II respectively, which almost 100%
Technology (Grant Number: 2011-0031773).
(double) decrease.
Table 1: Architecture availability results
REFERENCES
Architecture CHNL P(x=0|) P(x=1|)
I (1BP, 1CP) 1.9751E-4 9.998E-01 [1] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), The
II (2BP, 2CP) 3.1596E-7 0.9999996 application of research reactors, IAEA TECDOC-
1234, Vienna, August 2001.
6000 [2] In-Cheol LIM, Sang-Ik WU et al, Review of the
Status of Low-Power Research Reactors and
Risk Achievement Worth

5000 Considerations for its Development, Transactions

Architecture-I
of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn Meeting,
4000 Architecture-II Gyeongju, Korea, October 25-26, 2012.
3000 [3] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Specifi c Considerations and Milestones for a
2000 Research Reactor Project, IAEA Nuclear Energy
Series No.NP-T-5.1, Vienna, 2012.
1000 [4] Rahman Khalil ur, et al, Architecture dependent
availability analysis of RPS for Research Reactor
0 Applications, Transactions of the Korean Nuclear
DI AI PT BP CP DO SCB UV CB ST Society spring Meeting, Gwangju, Korea, May 30-
31, 2013.
Figure 3: RAW results of I&C components in
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
architecture-I
Evaluation of Reliability Data Source, IAEA
The failure probability was set to 1 for each
TECDOC-504, Vienna, 1998.
component and P(x=0|=1) was determined using BN
model, to calculate RAW. For RRW equal to 0 is is
taking as granted success and P(x=0|=0) is found for