DAVID VS ARROYO

489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over
Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and
the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of
arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of
martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that
the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP
to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been
met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.)
the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative
powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling
out power of the president by the president.

AMPATUAN VS PUNO
( G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing
the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed
the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which
amended the former AO (the term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring to the supervision of
the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to seize the regional governments powers. They
also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops
and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked
that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the Constitution
and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary
therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended
by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the
armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must
be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They
simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the
takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and
she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that
there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.
Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out
the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court
must respect the Presidents actions

LACSON VS PEREZ

357 SCRA 757 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Clause Cases Before the Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later
sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the time of the rub out was then the PNP
Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They were accused of multiple murder. The case reached the
Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975 also known as An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan,
Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was
authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad
faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which Lacsons cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending
incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under
the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law
by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established
precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class

The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under
R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since
it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has
to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.

Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of
those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
 Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
(GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016)
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may
undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed
upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose
entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution
105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from
general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as
citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court
as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the
disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither
an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.

Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit

No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its
incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify setting aside
the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art
XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or
facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine
whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a
public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise
its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the
requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read more

Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such and
(2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of
the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec
25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could
have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications
for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared,
in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.

BIRAOGO vs PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a
mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for
its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the
Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and
even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executives power to
create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition,
or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.