112 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 BAR The British Army Review
BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 113
Why Did The Allied
Powers Fail At Gallipoli?
Major Rob Smith SCOTS AFPRB in PS10(A), MoD Main Building.
Despite being ensconced in remuneration and personnel policy,
the recent 100th anniversary of Gallipoli seemed an appropriate
moment to review the campaign and offer some analysis as to
what went wrong.
The Gallipoli campaign of April 1915 to January
1916, from the perspective of the Allied Powers,
was a failure in that few, if any, of the military
objectives set were achieved; that it cost the
lives of over 50,000 Allied soldiers, and resulted
in the evacuation of all Allied troops.
It was a military failure for a number of reasons:
weak command and leadership; ill-defined
goals and poor planning; insufficient resources -
especially equipment and logistics; inexperienced
troops; strength of the opposition - and Allied
overconfidence. By analysing the causes of failure, we
are able in turn to identify lessons to learn for the future.
Three lessons are of particular prominence, both for their
repetition throughout military history but so too for the
Support troops from the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade wait behind Quinn's
Post, Gallipoli, after it was retaken on 29 May 1915. IWM (HU 50622). importance that they played during the campaign and
the legacy that they left: the necessity to learn and
the impact this had on subsequent operations;
the need for Joint or combined operations1,
and the influence on the outcome of a campaign that
can be directly apportioned to command and leadership,
especially by senior commanders.
Context
Why Gallipoli? It is necessary and appropriate at this point
to provide the context for how and why the Allied Powers
became embroiled in this infamous campaign.
I dont know whats to be done.this isnt war,
wailed the War Secretary, Lord Kitchener.2 Four months
after the outbreak of hostilities, the British Army was at
stalemate with the German Army in the trenches of the
Western Front that ran from the North Sea to the Swiss
border. British military tactics had become redundant. The
British military command believed that the vital ground
and key to success lay in the Western Front and that any
action that reduced the pressure or gave the impression of
reduction from this theatre would lead to German success
- thus the stalemate remained. However, an ambitious
young politician was able to proffer an alternative to the
slaughter of the Western Front. Winston Churchill was
First Lord of the Admiralty. He demanded a plan from
the Royal Navy that sought to attack Germany through
the back door.3 The opportunistic plan sought to send
a naval force through the straits of the Dardanelles to
attack Constantinople4 , the capital of Turkey (and the
Ottoman Empire), Germanys principal ally. By harassing 1
ADP Ops Ch 4.
Turkeys capital Germany would be obliged to send troops 2
Quoted in Gray of
to support her ally, troops that would otherwise have Fallodon, Twenty-Five
Years, vol.I, pp.71-2
been destined for the Western Front to face the Allies.
3
Paxman, Jeremy, Great
Additionally, were Constantinople to fall, Turkey and the Britain's Great War,
Ottoman Empire would be knocked out of the war. This Penguin UK, 2013
would then allow Britain and France to open up a supply 4
Modern day Istanbul
114 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016
This map of the Gallipoli Invasion was created by Geographx with research assistance from Damien
Fenton and Caroline Lord. It originally appeared in Damien Fenton, New Zealand and the First World
War, Penguin Auckland 2013. This version, updated 14 August 2014 is from the New Zealand Ministry
for Culture and Heritage, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/gallipoli-invasion-map.
route to their suffering ally, Russia, and likely increase the
pressure on Germanys Eastern Front. The plan also had
geo-political benefits for Britains Empire. By defeating
Turkey, safety would be ensured for British-controlled
Egypt and likely force the neutral Baltic states off the
fence.5 Thus the soft underbelly of Britains enemies
presented an alternative to the stagnation of the trenches
and too good an opportunity to miss.
Causes Of Failure
How then, did such a logical opportunity end in such
failure? Hindsight would argue that it was always a risky
plan; the Allies had to navigate the Dardanelles, the
narrow strip of water that runs for 40 miles on route to
Constantinople. This critical entry point was guarded by
Turkish forts, but risk, when considered and calculated
5
Ibid, p.101 correctly, is part of military operations. Conversely,
a gamble lacks the appropriate considerations and
planning and depending on definition arguably places
greater emphasis on chance.
Ill-defined goals and poor planning: Failure
in part lay in the stages prior to the execution. The Allies
had not correctly defined the goals of the operation
and, in turn, planning was insufficient for the demands
faced. It was not until mid-February that the idea of
a purely naval mission was redefined with Kitchener
agreeing that ground troops would be sent; the naval
attack of the straits and critical forts began only a week
later on 19 February. There is little evidence to suggest
any comprehensive joint or combined planning occurred
ahead of beginning the operation, other than to say that
the Royal Navy would clear the straights and then the
Army would land at Gallipoli.
Overconfidence compounds poor planning:
What happened next illustrates the lack of defined goals
and planning. Three of the Royal Navys largest warships
were sunk and another disabled as a result of striking
mines that had not been planned for. The thicket of
mines coupled with fire form the Turkish shore batteries
prevented the Royal Navy from clearing a route through
the Dardanelles and achieve a landing point at Gallipoli.
The result was that what had been assumed (and planned
for) as a relatively simple operation was now becoming
yet another military disaster in a war filled with few
successes by 1915 - an indictment of overconfidence by
the Allies, assuming that the Turkish forces would not be
particularly effective.
The Army contribution to the planning and early
stages was equally unimpressive. The general appointed
to lead the land operation was Sir Ian Hamilton. Despite
an impressive imperial record of soldiering, his comments
in the aftermath would reinforce the lack of planning:
my knowledge of the Dardanelles was nil; of the Turk nil;
of the strength of our own forces next to nil.6 The only
research material he used in preparation was a guidebook
and collection of travellers tales.7 This example also
provides an insight to the quality of those leading the
campaign, a point we shall return to in detail later.
With the naval component having been a failure,
Hamiltons intent was to run the original plan in reverse;
conduct the land operation first, followed by the naval
bombardment. Again, if we reflect on recent combined
and joint operations, there was no central command
and control - it was in effect, two distinct, singe Service
operations. Separate single Service operations alone is
not necessarily a cause of failure, however, in the case
of Gallipoli a lack of combined planning undermined
the effectiveness of each component: maritime followed
by land. An unfortunate side effect of the failed naval never heard a shot fired in anger; many arrived with
campaign was delay and the loss of surprise. This in turn
allowed the Turks to reinforce and prepare their defences.
An opposed landing had not been foreseen, the Allies
discounted the fighting ability of the Turkish soldiers.8
Additionally, Hamilton chose to land his forces at several
landing sites, rather than applying a well-known principle
of war - concentration of force.9 This therefore allowed
the defenders to keep Allied forces hemmed in at the
landing sites from a superior tactical position; under such
circumstances success would be difficult to achieve. There
are arguably some minor examples that illustrate that the
BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 115
A burial party at work on the Gallipoli Front. IWM (Q 13361).
Allies did try to plan and prepare; some practice landings
were conducted in April on nearby islands but this alone
is not a compelling argument in support of planning.
Inexperienced troops: Despite high casualties
rates, landing sites were achieved at Helles and Anzac
Cove;10 so what of the quality of the Allied soldiers
who achieved this foothold? As previously discussed,
the Grand Strategic focus of the war remained the
Western Front. Therefore what remained of the small
professional army of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) remained fixed, this meant that Gallipoli presented
the first opportunity and blooding for Kitcheners
6
General Sir Ian
New Army. Many of the soldiers of the New Army had Hamilton, Gallipoli
diary, 2 vols, (London,
1920), vol. I, p.18
diarrhoea or dysentery. The divisions sent were poorly
7
Paxman, p.102
trained with significant gaps in their training.11 In short,
this volunteer New Army was inexperienced and found 8
Haythornthwaite, Philip
J. Gallipoli 1915: frontal
wanting. This manifested itself in many of those landing, assault on Turkey, Vol.
8. Osprey Publishing,
being paralysed with fear without the necessary training 1991, 2004, p.343
and experience to succeed. To add insult to injury, some 9
ADP Ops (2010), 2A-4,
had been ordered not to load their rifles; those that did 02A7
found that their rifles jammed from exposure to seawater 10
The affectionate name
given to the landing
and sand. This compares differently to the Normandy site where ANZAC
Landings nearly 30 years later; no plastic bag to cover forces landed
the weapon from such menaces; no build up training 11
Paxman, p.102
116 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016
and rehearsals over months with lessons analysed after
each exercise utilising air, land and maritime components.
There were examples of positive performance by the Allied
forces, in particular the ANZAC Divisions, achieved limited
success and this has since become an integral part of the
history and ethos of both nations militaries. However, such
examples are in the minority for a force that was ultimately
found wanting, in part, due to inexperience.
Insufficient resources: If the Allied troops
inexperience was a cause of failure, so too was
insufficient resources - especially equipment and logistics.
12
Ibid p.107
The high temperatures and desperate conditions meant
13
Cameron, David., that many had exhausted their supply of water and the
Gallipoli, Big Sky
Publishing, 2011, p.147 chaotic planning of the landing sites compounded the
14
Burt, Raymond A. lack of an established supply chain from landing point to
British battleships, fighting echelons. Other critical equipment was lacking;
1889-1904, Naval Inst
Pr, 1988, pp.158-159 for example much of the equipment of the 34th Field
The scene at Suvla Point ('A' West Beach) prior to the evacuation.
Ambulance unit remained on the dockside in England.12
Manpower, artillery and ammunition were also lacking.
Hamilton had requested another 95,000 troops on 17
August to resuscitate the campaign and attempt to
break the stalemate, yet this was only met with 25,000
reinforcements due to the decision by the Dardanelles
Committee on 20 August to support a planned French
offensive in the autumn in France. Any ship-to-shore
supply and naval fire support became diminished with
the torpedoing of HMS Goliath on 13 May.14 For much
of the land campaign, most of the Allied warships were
therefore kept at Imbros, but this protection arguably
came at a cost of limited supply to the land forces.
Perhaps greater investment in the campaign, combined
planning, resources and commitment in troop numbers,
would have gone some way to setting the conditions for
success. Likewise, the issue of resourcing illustrates the
need to accord any priority the right priority.
Note the 'beetles' in the harbour constructed by 5th Anglesey
Company, Royal Engineers, December 1915. IWM (Q 13660).
Strength of the opposition: Whilst Allied
overconfidence has been discussed, acknowledgement
of the enemy must be given. The various battles and
skirmishes throughout the land campaign provide ample
examples of bravery on both sides. Casualty rates were
comparably high - approximately 250,000 each.
After the landings and despite taking initial objectives at
both Helles and Anzac Cove, the Allies failed to exploit
the situation. With momentum having been lost, the
Turks were able to reinforce15 and swiftly the depressing
attritional nature of trench warfare once again formed.
One other factor is worth noting: the Turks were well led;
General Otto Liman von Sanders had been head of the
Military Mission sent to Turkey as advisors.16 So too, many
of the senior officers in the Fifth Army were also German;
that is not to suggest Turkish leadership was lacking17,
but the two combined well to provide an effective
command and control of the defences; this was arguably
the difference between success and failure. This therefore
links to the discussion of the final and pre-eminent cause
of failure.
Weak command and leadership: The Allied
forces were poorly led at Gallipoli. That is not the say
that examples of leadership did not exist, but those in
key command positions were wholly ineffective. Those
selected to command had been an odd choice. Kitchener
was under pressure from General Sir John French not to
deprive him of his more capable commanders from the
Western front.18 Major General Frederick Hammersley
was a veteran of various imperial conflicts but had
suffered a minor nervous collapse before the outbreak.
His replacement, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick
Stopford, who had retired in 1909, chose to command
from his sloop, the Jonquil, and spent much of the
assault asleep.19 These were not the most qualified men
- both physically and mentally, to command a complex
amphibious operation in a mechanised total war20 on
foreign soil.
Perhaps a more battle-hardened force would have
had greater success, but any frontal assault against
an entrenched enemy defending their home soil was
likely to prove difficult. The critical issue was lack of
leadership. When investigating the reasons for failure
by 11th Division, Hamilton concluded that a lack of
offensive spirit was to blame. He saw the issue not so
BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 117
much as the fighting ability of the New Model Army,
but the quality of those leading it from the old Army
of yester-year. His concerns were confirmed by the
Germans. One German officer noted that No energetic
attacks on the enemys part has taken place.the
enemy is advancing timidly.21 An operation that had
been thoroughly planned, commanded and led by
capable leaders may have resulted differently. In a
twist of irony, Kitchener cabled Hamilton instructing
him to sack Stopford, as this is a young mans war
we must have commanding officers that will take full
advantage of opportunities22 Ironic given Kitchener
had selected Stopford precisely because he did not
wish to deprive French of more current and competent
commanders on the Western Front. Hammersley had to
be evacuated, not due to a nervous background, but
because of a blood clot in his leg. It is noteworthy that
when General George S Patton wrote his dissertation
on the Gallipoli campaign some twenty years later, the
thrust of his argument and focus of criticism was at the
British commanders. It was not the Turkish Army which
defeated the British - it was von Sanders, Kemal, Pasha,
and Major Wilmer who defeated Hamilton, Stopford
and Hammersely.Had the two sets of commanders Perrett, Bryan (2004),
15
For Valour: Victoria
changed sides it is believed that the landing would have Corss and Medal
of Honour Battles,
been as great a success as it was a dismal failure.23 London: Cassel Military
Paperbacks, p.192
Whilst one has to acknowledge the sentiment and
possible anti-British tone of Pattons analysis, it points 16
Carlyon, Les, Gallipoli,
Pan Macmillan
towards the importance that the British leadership Australia, Sydney,
New South Wales
had on the outcome of the campaign. Further yet, it (2001).p.83
indicates the importance the factor of leadership alone 17
One of the most
can have on the outcome: good leadership equals commonly referenced
examples being
greater chance of success; conversely, weak or poor Mustafa Kemel Ataturk,
later to become
leadership sets the conditions for failure. In the case of founder of modern day
the Dardanelles not only can one draw the conclusions Turkey
that poor leadership had a detrimental impact on the 18
Paxman, p.105
campaign from the Allies perspective, but that it was 19
Ibid p.106
of pre-eminence. It affected not only the planning of 20
As in the Clausewitzian
the operation, but also the execution. Perhaps, given sense of total war
from On War (Date);
the significant literature on leadership24, one should Clausewitz, Carl Von
be unsurprised with this deduction. However, what is 21
Ibid p.108
of significance is the extent to which this factor was of 22
Paxman p.105
importance in this campaign. Similar historical examples
23
Ibid p.106
would include Balaklava, Islandlawana, and Spion Kop.
But, in a modern mechanized total war, the outcome Northouse, Peter G.,
24
Leadership: Theory and
was even less forgiving. practice. Sage, 2012
118 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 119

impact on the development of amphibious operational
planning. The campaign has since been studied by military
planners prior to operations such as the Normandy
Landings and Falklands War.29 The campaign became the
focus of amphibious warfare study during the inter-war
period with previous perceptions that opposed landings
could not exist being overcome during WWII, in part due
to the application of the lessons learned from Gallipoli.30
Gallipoli therefore shows the importance and need to learn
and the direct impact this had on future military success.
Joint or Combined Operations: Secondly, the
Gallipoli campaign illustrates the necessity for combined
or joint operations. Gallipoli should have represented the
combination of naval and land forces in a coordinated
and planned operation; had this been the case then the
fiasco that proceeded may have been avoided. Instead it
Command and leadership: Thirdly and finally,
Gallipoli shows how command and leadership are such
important factors on the outcome of what is, at core,
a most human endeavour. Those selected for higher
command were unfit for the demands placed upon
them. The link between command and leadership and
the performance of the Allies at Gallipoli is clear; other
factors have been shown to be of importance, but
none with such reverberations on military capability
and performance. To conclude, despite varying
interpretations, many would argue that Gallipoli was a
military failure. The causes of failure were varied and
29
Holmes, Richard, ed.,
lay between the individuals charged with planning The Oxford companion
and executing the operation through to the lack to military history.
Oxford, New York, NY:
of investment of the campaign, and of course the Oxford University Press,
2001, p.343
enemy always has a vote. The lessons identified are
significant; the future will indicate whether or not they Hart, Peter, Gallipoli,
30

Oxford University Press,

represented single Service compartmentalised operations are re-learned. 2011, 46-462

that therefore reduced the utility of military power.

A British soldier fires a machine gun with periscope
attachment in the trenches at Gallipoli. IWM (Q 13450).

A Royal Irish Fusilier attempts to draw the fire of a Turkish sniper to

reveal the enemy position, Gallipoli, 1915. IWM (Q 13447).

An Alternative To Failure?
Was it all bad news; was there any success to be transports, 44 supply ships and 148 sailing vessels at a
gained from Gallipoli? Historians are divided over their cost of eight Allied submarines.28 Yet despite this tactical
conclusions of the campaign. Some would argue that it success, the Allied attempt at securing a passage through
25
Carlyon, 2001, p.518 was a defeat for the Allies, whilst others would suggest the Dardanelles proved unsuccessful; so too the aim of a
26
Haythornwaite, 2004,
the overall result was a stalemate.25 Others go further successful invasion at Gallipoli.
p.40 suggesting it was a disaster for the Allies.26 In raw
27
Grey, Jeffrey, A military numbers, the campaign was as destructive for the Turks Lessons Learnt
history of Australia,
Cambridge University as it was the Allies; arguably the Allies were in a better What then can be learnt? Many lessons can be
Press, 1999 position to sustain the losses than the dwindling Ottoman drawn, but three in particular are identified due to the
28
USN, Captain John Empire.27 One area of success was British and French importance they played on the outcome of the campaign
FO'connell, and
John F. O'Connell, submarine operations in the Sea of Murmara. This forced and legacy on future military thinking.
Submarine Operational
Effectiveness in the
the Ottoman Empire to abandon the sea as a transport
20th Century: Part One route. British and French submarines were able to sink Necessity to learn: Paradoxically, one of the key
(1900-1939), iUniverse,
2010.p.78 one battleship, one destroyer, five gunboats, 11 troop lessons is that the Gallipoli campaign had a significant