i

The Impact of Self-administered Areas

on the National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar

BY

Myo Min Thein

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

at the

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JAPAN

2017
 ii

The thesis of Myo Min Thein is approved by the Thesis Examining Committee.

________________________________
Professor Kyohei Yamada (Examiner)

________________________________
Professor Maung Aung Myoe (Supervisor)

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JAPAN

2017
 iii

Acknowledgement
I would like to express my deepest thanks to my supervisor, Professor Maung

Aung Myoe, and my examiner, Professor Kyohei Yamada, for all of their great

supports, instructions, suggestions and constructive comments during my hard time of

doing the research until today. Also, thank you all Professors for making my most

important duty in IUJ accomplished. I would like to express my very profound gratitude

to my parents U Aung Myint Oo and Daw Htay Htay Nwe, and sister Zin Nwe Aung,

and especially to my wife Win Pa Pa Minn and my dearest daughter Hay Thar Nan Sint

for providing me with unconditional love, unfailing support and continuous

encouragement throughout my two years of study and through the process of

researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible

without them.

I express again my warm thank to Professor Maung Aung Myoe for giving me a

good opportunity pursue my Master Degree in IUJ and his invaluable supports and

guidance to us. My sincere thanks to JICA for providing scholarship and other generous

supports. The very supportive arrangement of JICA helps me comfort to study in Japan.

Also, my deepest thanks to the Tatmadaw for giving me a good opportunity.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends, colleagues, and classmates, all my

classmates and Myanmar Community in IUJ especially Ph.D students Kaung Htet San

and Yin Yin Mon for their warmly helps, cares, encouragement, friendship, and

compliments during these years. I am very thankful to those who are being with me and

shared pain and joy with me during these long journey.

 iv

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Impact of Self-administered Areas

on the National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar

By

Myo Min Thein

Master of Arts in Public Management

International University of Japan, 2017

Professor Maung Aung Myoe, Supervisor

The purpose of the study is to scrutinize how Self-administered Areas (SAAs) impact
on the national reconciliation process in Myanmar. This study seeks to understand why
national reconciliation has emerged as a major issue on the political agenda of the
Myanmars democratization process and how some ethnic minority areas have adapted
as a Self-administered Area in Myanmars constitution. Methodologically, this study
attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of the Self-
administered Areas. The study assumes that there is a correlation between the
governance practice, regulation, administrative history, decentralization, geopolitical
dimension and national reconciliation process and the Self-administered Areas in
Myanmar. Moreover, this study verifies how does interrelate between the leading body
of the Self-administered Areas and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) whose are not
only non-signatories in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) but also currently
as combatants in some Self-administered Areas. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
is found to be an essential step of the Myanmars national reconciliation process.
However, this study does not describe in detail of earlier peace process and all ethnic
armed conflicts in Myanmar. Last, this study concludes with the scrutinized significant
impacts of Self-administered Areas, and it would be argued that all the Self-
administered Areas do not help the national reconciliation process because of
governance practice, regulation, administrative history, decentralization, geopolitics,
and recent and ongoing national reconciliation process in Myanmar.
Keywords: Governance practice, regulation, administrative history, decentralization,
geopolitics, Self-administered Areas and national reconciliation
 v

Table of Contents
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. viii
LIST OF ABBRIVATION..........................................................................................................ix
CHAPTER ONE.......................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Objective and Scope of the Study ................................................................................ 3
1.3 Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Conceptual Framework and Research Question ........................................................ 8
1.5 Research Methodology and Organization of Chapters .............................................. 9
CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................... 11
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE, REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 11
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 11
2.2 Governance Practice ................................................................................................... 11
2.2.1 Myanmars Military [Tatmataw] ................................................................................ 15
2.3 Regulation .................................................................................................................... 17
2.4 Administrative History ............................................................................................... 19
2.5 Self-administered Areas (SAAs) ................................................................................ 24
2.5.1 Naga Self-administered Zone ..................................................................................... 27
2.5.2 Danu Self-administered Zone..................................................................................... 27
2.5.3 Pa Laung Self-administered Zone .............................................................................. 27
2.5.4 Pa-O Self-administered Zone ..................................................................................... 28
2.5.5 Kokang Self-administered Zone................................................................................. 29
2.5.6 Wa Self-administered Division .................................................................................. 30
2.5.7 Issues in the SAAs...................................................................................................... 30
2.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 31
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................. 35
DECENTRALISATION, GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION ............................................. 35
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 35
3.2 Decentralisation ........................................................................................................... 35
3.2.1 Political Decentralisation ........................................................................................... 37
3.2.2 Administrative Decentralisation ................................................................................. 38
3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation ............................................................................................... 39
 vi

3.2.4 Issues in Decentralisation ........................................................................................... 41

3.3 Geopolitical Dimension ............................................................................................... 41
3.3.1 Chinas Policy on the NRP and the SAAs ................................................................. 48
3.3.2 Issue in Geopolitical Dimension ................................................................................ 51
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................................... 53
RECENT AND ONGOING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS ................... 53
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 53
4.2 Armed conflicts............................................................................................................ 53
4.3 Issues of the Armed Conflicts ..................................................................................... 59
4.4 Recent and Ongoing National Reconciliation Process ............................................. 60
4.4.1 Overview of the National Reconciliation Process (2010 to 2016) ............................. 61
4.4.1 Statement of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ................................................... 63
4.4.3 Summary of the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong) .......................... 64
4.4.4 Myanmars Military [Tatmadaw] ............................................................................... 66
4.4.5 EAOs Coaliation ........................................................................................................ 68
4.5 Issues in the National Reconciliation Process ........................................................... 71
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 73
CHAPTER FIVE....................................................................................................................... 76
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 76
5.1 Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 76
5.1.1 Governance Practice ................................................................................................ 76
5.1.2 Regulation ................................................................................................................. 77
5.1.3 Administrative History ............................................................................................ 78
5.1.4 Decentralization........................................................................................................ 79
5.1.5 Geopolitical Dimension ............................................................................................ 80
5.1.6 National Reconciliation Process and Armed Conflicts in the SAA ...................... 81
5.1.7 Concluding Remarks................................................................................................ 83
5.1.8 Recommendation and Policy Implication ............................................................. 84
5.2 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 87
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 89
 vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Administrative History of the SAAs...........21
Table 4.1 Significant of SAAs and Relation with Ethnic Armed Actors....56
Table 4.2 Major Armed Conflicts per EAOs in the SAAs..............................................57
Table 4.3 Significant Inter-armed Conflict Between EAOs near the SAAs...58
Table 4.4 EAOs Expansions (20112016)......................................................................59
Table 4.5 Participation of all stakeholders in UPC (21st Century Panglong).....66
Table 4.6 Coalition of EAOs in 2015..69
Table 4.7 Influencing at the SAAs and Response to NRP by the EAOs.73
 viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework....................................................................................9
Figure 2.1 Self-administered Areas (SAAs) in Myanmar...12
Figure 2.2 Natures of Policies and Governance in Myanmar..13
Figure 2.3 Right of Legislation of the SAAs...17
Figure 2.4 Level of Residual power and the SAAs.....18
Figure 2.5 Self-administered Zones and Self-administered Division..19
Figure 2.6 Keys Governance Practice of the SAAs.24
Figure 2.7 General Tasks and Duties of Leading Body of the SAAs..26
Figure 3.1 Presence of GAD Administrative Decentralisation...38
Figure 3.2 Form of Fiscal Decentralisation and Responsibilities....40
Figure 3.3 Share of the Union budget to State/Region budgets (FY 2013-14)...40
Figure 3.4 Chinas Border Trade with Myanmar....47
Figure 4.1 Armed Clashes between EAOs and Tatmataw (2013-2016).54
Figure 4.2 Percentage of Armed Clashes in the SAAs (2013 to 2016)...55
Figure 4.3 Significant Development of the NRP (2010-16)....61
Figure 4.4 Key Summary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement......63
Figure 4.5 Union Governments Roadmap for NRP...65
Figure 5.1 The Impact of SAAs on the NRP ......85
 ix

LIST OF ABBRIVATION
Ethnic Armed Organizations
AA Arakan Army
CNF Chin National Front
DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
KDA Kachin Defense Army
KNDA Karennni National Defense Army
KNG Kayan National Guard
KNPLF Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front
KNU Karen National Union
MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
NDA-K New Democratic Army (Kachin)
NDAA National Democratic Alliance Army
PSLF Palaung State Liberation Front
PMF Peoples Militia Force
PNA Pa-O National Army
Parties and Organization
ALP Arakan Liberation Party
KNLP Kayan New Land Party
KIO Kachin Independence Organization
PSLP Palaung State Liberation Party
KNPDP Karenni National Peace and Development Party
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party (Hoya)
KNSO Karenni National Solidarity Organization
KPC Karen Peace Council
LNDP Lahu National Development Party
NMSP New Mon State Party
NNC Naga National Council
NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak Muivah
 x

NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang

PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization
PNO Pa-O National Organization
PSLO Palaung State Liberation Organization
Others
BGF Border Guard Force
DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DNDP Danu National Democracy Party
FU Federal Union
FUA Federal Union Army
IDP Internally displaced person
NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NRP National Reconciliation Process
SAAs Self-administered Areas
SAD Self-administered Division
SAZ Self-administered Zone
LB-SAAs Leading Body of the SAAs
 1

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background

Myanmar has been faced bitter experiences of the colonial administrative machinery,

and when the country regained independence, it was in chaos alongside the internal

disagreements which indeed was the evil legacy of colonialism. 1 Thus, the country

holds the record for the worlds longest ongoing civil war and it is undergoing profound

changes from conflict-ridden to a more unified country under the peace building

process.2

In April 2009, the Union Government also dropped its earlier demand for the

Ethnic Armed Organizations3 EAOs to convert into Border Guard Forces (BGF)4.

Nevertheless, the process included the failed policies for both ethnic minorities and the

EAOs. Since the end of 2011, due to reforms and democratization process, the Union

Government has started peace talks with all EAOs and national reconciliation and peace

have been becoming more consideration in the country. Thus, the Union Government

focused on national reconciliation approach to achieve national unity and sustainable

peace as well as to support ethnic minority areas development.

In 2012, initial peace agreements had been reached with the 13 EAOs, most of

whom already agreed to a ceasefire with the previous government the State Peace and

1
The Global New Light of Myanmar, First Anniversary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement held.
Official News Paper. Ministry of Information of Myanmar . 2016. Vol III. No 183.
2
Cullen Hendrix and Marcus Noland, Myanmar: Cross-Cutting Governance Challenges, Asian
Development Bank., 2015, accessed December 28, 2016, at http://hdl.handle.net/11540/4020.
3
Specifically referring to ethnic national opposition groups which maintain ceasefires, or are actively
fighting with government forces.
4
Border Guard Force (BGF) is as a regular military force and has a military structure like the Tatmataw
Regiment. Although the Regiment commander is from the ethnic armed group. The BGF has a total of
326 personnel of which 30 soldiers from Tatmadaw, including commanding officers and other rank
officers.
 2

Development Council (SPDC)5.6 In the process of national reconciliation, the Union

Government and representatives of 17 EAOs participated in drafting the Nationwide

Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), and the draft was approved as the final document of the

agreement on 7 August 2015. After that, the Union Government and only 8 EAOs

signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2015 in the presence

of local and international witnesses. Typically, the NCA is essential for the correct path

to maintain all-round stability in Myanmar and it was recognized as the historic

foundation for the entire peace process of Myanmar. However, the NCA did not bring

lasting peace and the armed conflicts continue in various regions especially in the ethnic

minority areas.

Moreover, there are several other challenges emerging from the negotiation for

the NRP that have opened space for renewing armed conflicts and territorial disputing

among the ethnic minority areas. Thus, despite the ongoing national reconciliation and

peace process, the renewed conflicts were obviously started not only in the some SAAs

but also the conjoined areas such as northern part and north-east part of Myanmar. The

resumption of fighting has also increased and notably in the Palaung ethnic minority

area and also in the Kokang ethnic minority area. Thus, it could be seen that a

5
From 1988 to 1997, the SPDC was known as State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which
had replaced the role of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). In 1997, SLORC was abolished and
reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
6
Burma Centurm Nederland, Ending Burma Conflict Circle?, Prospect for Ethnic Peace, Burma Policy
Briefing Nr 8, transnational institute, February 2012, accessed November 2, 2016, http://www. Burma
library .org/docs13/ Ending_Burmas_Conflict_Cycle-TNI_BCN-red.pdf.
 3

correlation existed between the Self-administered Areas7 (SAAs) and the outlooks of

the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).

In fact, Myanmar is a Union and any Regions and States in the Union are home

to all ethnic, not for a single ethnic specifically. Some ethnic have a larger number of

population but some are the smaller number of population. Although there are

differences in the size of states, population, and demographic patterns, the Union

Government has been supported to all the ethnic peoples for enjoying equal rights and

anyone is not favoured.

Hence, if it takes a long time for implementing the national reconciliation and

peace processes, people will face loss of life and property as well as the country will be

lagged behind development. In practice, the dozen of armed conflicts have displaced

many civilians and have led to great mistrust among the ethnic population. it is

necessary to achieve successfully implementing the national reconciliation and peace

processes as well as to stop the ongoing armed conflicts between and among

Myanmars Military [Tatmadaw] and the EAOs in northern Myanmar, especially in the

SAAs.

1.2 Objective and Scope of the Study

Therefore, National Reconciliation Process (NRP) has emerged as a major issue on the

political agenda of the Myanmars democratisation process. In fact, it might be assumed

that there are some correlations between the incentive and beliefs of the Leading Body

7
An administrative unit that under the 2008 Constitution has been designated for specific national races
(meaning officially recognized ethnic groups). This is the generic umbrella term from the 2008
Constitution for both SAZs and SAD.
 4

of the SAAs (LB-SAAs)8 and Myanmars national reconciliation process have existed.

Because the existing actions of the EAOs and beliefs of some ethnic politicians or

leaders who are led in SAAs are willing to build both Federal Union9 and Federal

Union Army10 as for getting the division of power and self-determination. In that scene,

the Myanmars government has been facing not only the diverse challenges from among

the SAAs but also several obstacles for the inclusively signing the NCA.

On the other hand, for getting an efficient policy or roadmap of national

reconciliation, Myanmars government has been required a pragmatic federal culture

with a sense of coexistence and division of power among the Union and State/Region

and SAAs with a great deal. However, due to the recent results of peace process, the

various challenges of the SAAs are somewhat impacting on the current situation for

reconciliation. Thus, the objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of the Self-

administered Areas on the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) and to support the

process of national reconciliation and union peace effectively. Therefore, this study will

attempt to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of the SAAs

and how they relate to the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) within 2011 to 2016.

In particular, this study has to concern with the governance practice, regulation,

administrative history, geopolitical dimension and its consequences for the both the

national reconciliation, union peace and the SAAs in Myanmar.

8
which is something similar to an executive committee in the respective Self-administered Areas and it
led by Leading Body respectively.
9
United Nationalities Federal Council, which is a EAOs coalition team wants to establish a Federal
Union based on equal rights and self-determination, multi-party system and an equal federal scheme in
Myanmar and also want to be establish a Federal Union Armybased on several ethnic units in one
armed forces, see UNFCs objectives, Myanmar Peace Monitor, on February 16, 2011, accessed
November 11, 2016, http://www.mmpeace monitor.org/stakeholders/unfc.
10
Ibid.
 5

1.3 Literature Review

For Myanmar case, Smith argued that some of the ethnic community leaders and ethnic

politicians in Myanmar are mainly emphasis on the need for federalism or so-called

Genuine Federalism11 because of ethnic state and ethnic leaders can only occupy an

inferior position in the Union and the right of ethnic people are not fully respected by

the Myanmar government and the military. 12 He also stated what the way of some

conservative ethnic leader is that ethnic area are either undeveloped or exploited

compared with the some similar local administrative structure as well as they has been

trying to get self-determination authorities on both its ethnic minority area and their

respective innocent ethnic people. They thought that their area has been lacking

infrastructure and economic opportunities and also their natural resources are extracted

in such a way that the local ethnic people are by passed in term of decision-making and

benefits.13 Likewise, Martin Smith discussed that Myanmar has been facing a complex

diversity of challenges in the peace process. However, if there is any single issue, which

is become both the key to the political failure of the past and an essential priority for the

progressive future. Thus, it become a question of national reconciliation as well as

ethnic inclusiveness in the process of Myanmars democratic reform.14

Likewise, Kramer contended that ethnic conflict has ravaged in Myanmar since

independence, and it cannot be solved overnight. He conducted that the recognizing and

protecting ethnic land rights are important elements to solving the countrys decades-old

11
Alan Smith, Ethnicity and federal prospect in Myanmar, in Federalism in Asia, edited by Baogan he,
brian galligan and takashi inoguchi, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009), 203.
12
Ibid., 204-205.
13
Ibid, 204-5.
14
Martin Smith, Ethnic participation and National Reconciliation in Myanmar: Challenges in a
Transitional Landscape, (Australia; Singapore; Asia Pacific Press, 2006), 39.
 6

civil war, and discussions and agreements on ethnic land rights should be key

components of the peace process.15

On the other hand, Yoichi Funabashi contended that there is no universal

formula for reconciliation. In addition, he recommended that we need more discussion

on how to resolve these problems realistically with a common vision. In general,

whatever vision is pursued, the process of reconciliation over the past will not move

forward without appropriate political leadership among them as well as lacking proper

political transaction.16

In case of self-government or self-administration, Yash Ghai stated that

autonomy can be granted under different legal forms and it is a device to allow ethnic

minority groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of

special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity those powers which cover
17
common interests. On the other hand, Martin Dent supported that federal political

system is an instrument for the division of power usually through exclusive or

concurrent lists of subjects together with a concept of residual power.18

In Myanmar political transaction, the role and standing of Myanmars military

[Tatmadaw] also has been affecting on the entire Myanmars democratization process.

Myoe argued that according to the role of Tatmadaw, which must be a strong, highly

15
Tom Kramer, Ethnic conflict and lands rights in Myanmar, Social Research, 82(2), (2015): 355.
16
Yoichi Funabachi, Reconciliation in the Asia-pacific, (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2003), 178.
17
Yash Ghai, Autonomy and ethnicity: negotiating competing claims in multi-ethnic states, (Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 8.
18
Martin Dent, Ethnicity and Territorial Politics in Nigeria, in Federalism: the multiethnic challenge,
edited by Smith, Graham, (Routledge, 2002), 128.
 7

capable and modern19 force and still involving in restoring and maintaining internal

security and suppressing insurgency. Also, he discussed that over a period of nearly six

decades, the Myanmar Military transformed itself from essentially a counter-insurgency

force into a force for fighting in the limited conventional war to ensure the security of

Myanmars land, sea and air. 20 Likewise, Jolliffe discussed that a country without a

strategic and well-measured approach to affecting change in the conflict-affected area,

such domestic and international actors face abundant risks and challenges.21 As well,

some scholar discussed for Myanmar case that, the conflict is one of the most serious

threats to peace since President U Thein Seins government came to power in 2011.22

For instance, fighting in Kachin areas began afresh in June 2011, breaking a 17year

ceasefire and it threatening to Myanmars democratization process.

However, what remaining in the literature is that the threatening of internal

armed conflicts, escalation of the reformatting actions of the EAOs, geopolitical

weakness and the context of Union governments democratization process are causes as

the challenges on the Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP). On the other

hand, due to the geopolitical circumstances and rearranging action of the EAOs, the

present status of the SAAs causes an impact on the Myanmars peace and reconciliation

efforts. In fact, unresolved ethnic conflicts and the demand of ethnic minorities for

obtaining greater regional autonomy have also become strongly tied to debates about

Myanmars Constitution, and it's pushing the question of federalism to the forefront of

19
Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar armed forced since 1948. Vol. hard.
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies press, 2009), 193.
20
Ibid, 193-4.
21
Kim Joliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, (The Asia Foundation,
2015), 91.
22
Della-Giacoma, Jim and Richard Horsey. "A House Divided: Finding Peace in Multiethnic Myanmar."
World Politics Review 10, (2013).
 8

the national agenda. As a result, the debating among all stakeholders are better informed

on theories and models of federalism and the constraints of the current constitutional

framework is still remain. Also, many questions remain about how a pragmatic

governance and administrative decentralization system could best distribute power in a

way seen as legitimate from both the Union, regional and ethnic perspectives.

1.4 Conceptual Framework and Research Question

Based on the above conditions, despite the Myanmar government has been

implementing the National Reconciliation Process (NRP), the EAOs which are NCA

non- signatories have been increasing military action concurrently in the some SAAs

especially Palaung, Kokang and Wa. Thus, the main research question of this thesis is

how does SAAs support the national reconciliation in Myanmar? To answer the main

research question, the thesis will address the following sub-questions; what is the role of

the SAAs in both Myanmar democratisation and National Reconciliation Process?

Could the constitution structure of the SAAs address the fundamental and legitimate

concern of ethnic minority people? What is the current national reconciliation

arrangement of Myanmar? How does relation between the EAOs and the beliefs of the

LB-SAAs?

For answering the research questions, this study has to conceptualise the

framework of the thesis with the following parts. Firstly, it might be assumed that there

must be some beliefs of the LB-SAAs are support to enhance the impacting on the

current national reconciliation and peace process. Second, there must be correlated with

the several EAOs that encourage the influencing in the process of the National

Reconciliation Process (NRP). Third, there must be some particular reason of why the
 9

LB-SAAs aspire to get self-determination and federalization instead of choosing other

option. Fourth, the arrangements of the ethnic political parties and their relevant EAOs

must be a major factor for the impacting of Self-administered Areas on the National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar. Moreover, there must be some geopolitical

situation, which enhances the LB-SAAs concerning their belief and linking action with

their relevant EAOs.

Based on preliminary research, it has hypothesised that the Self-administered

areas do not help the National reconciliation process because of the governance

practice, regulation, administrative history, decentralization, geopolitics and the

presence of the National Reconciliation process in Myanmar.

Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework

1.5 Research Methodology and Organization of Chapters

This thesis is a qualitative study and it will be a focus on examining and analysing the

data related to the research question. The most reliable data can be obtained from the

documents of the current governments national reconciliation action and the

governments reports. Also, secondary sources of the data such as book, journal,

articles, reports, newspapers, and official website of government and organisations are

used as major sources.

 10

This thesis is organised into one introductory chapter and four subsequent

chapters each addressing separate but interrelated topic directed towards the research

question presented above. Following the introductory chapter, it will deal with the

background where a brief history of SAAs and Myanmars National Reconciliation

Process (NRP) up to 2016, especially between 2011 and 2016. The second chapter will

discuss how the context of Myanmars governance practice, regulation, and

administrative history as well as the SAAs. The third chapter will focus mainly on how

the decentralisation system had been applied by the Myanmar Government and examine

how did support on the belief of both Leading Body of the SAAs and the EAOs. After

that, the chapter will examine what is geopolitical circumstance between Myanmar and

China and how did support on both SAAs and the EAOs. The fourth chapter logically

follows from the second and third and will analyse recent and ongoing National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) as well as the state of the armed conflicts. Finally, the

fifth chapter is allotted for the analysis and conclusion.

 11

CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE, REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY

2.1 Introduction
Having the sub questions for supporting the main research question is that could the

constitution structure of the SAAs address the fundamental and legitimate concern of

ethnic minority people? What is the role of the SAAs in both Myanmar democratisation

and National Reconciliation Process? Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to consider the

context of the Myanmars government with its governance practice and regulation

which are pertinent to the self-administered Areas (SAAs). Firstly, this chapter will

provide what present governance state in Myanmar is and examines how governance

practice in the Self-administered Areas. Next, this chapter examines what are the

existence of the SAAs and what are the issues in both Union government and the

Leading body of the SAAs (LB-SAAs) which are something similar to an executive

committee concerning the regulation.

2.2 Governance Practice

Myanmar officially the Republic of the Union of Myanmar which is an ethnically

diverse nation with 135 distinct ethnic groups officially recognised by the government.

These are grouped into eight major national ethnic races (Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin,

Bamar, Mon, Rakhine, Shan). 23 In governance practice, Myanmar has a constitution

based parliamentary democracy system and the head of the union is the President. The

legislature called the Union Parliament [Pyidaungsu Hluttaw] which is bicameral and

made up of two parliaments. There are 224 seats National Parliament [Amyotha

Hluttaw] and 440 seats Peoples Parliament [Pyithu Hluttaw]. The Pyithu Hluttaw

23
David Steinberg, Burma: the state of Myanmar, Vol. pbk, (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University
Press:2001), p 12.
 12

consists of 440 members of which 330 are directly elected and 110 are appointed by the

Tatmadaw while the Amyotha Hluttaw consists of 224 members of which 168 are

directly elected and 56 are also appointed by the Tatmadaw.24

Moreover, the three branches of sovereign power consist of legislative power,

executive power, and judicial power which are separated, and check and balance among

themselves. The three branches of sovereign power are shared among the government.

Consequently, Myanmar is divided into 21 administrative subdivisions, which include 7

states and 7 regions, 5 Self-administered Zones and 1 Self-administered Division and

Naypyitaw Council Region.25 Figure 2.1 illustrates the responsible areas of each SAAs.

Figure 2.1 Self-administered Areas (SAAs) in Myanmar

Source: the Constitution of Myanmar, 2008, p.18

So, why the SAAs Act has been amended by the Union Government in the 2008

Constitution. Historically, part of the new movement in Myanmar involved negotiation

with former separatist groups, including those that emerged following the mutiny of the

Burmese Communist Party (BPC).26 Two of the factions that arose out of the BPC split

were the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the

United Wa State Army (UWSA), both of which were able to acquire ceasefire group

status from the Union government in the 1990s and other EAOs also followed,

including the Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO) or Ta 'ang National

24
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), 3-12.
25
Ibid., 13-14.
26
Monir Hossain Moni, "Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar," Asian
Journal of Political Science (2017): 1-2.
 13

Liberation Army (TNLA) and Pa-O National Organization (PNO). The process of

ceasefire negotiation brought with it special economic concessions, the promise of

development assistance and semi-autonomous control over territory. Over a dozen

detachments of militia, nearly all organised along ethnic lines, controlled significant
27
swaths of land via ceasefire arrangement with the SPDC government. This

arrangement was shifted once more by the 2008 Constitution and 6 Self-administered

Areas were created including for those two Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).28

During the President U Thein Seins Government, the Union government has

treated some policies for nation-building efforts and tried to ensure consolidate peace,

modernization and development for the emergence of a disciplined democracy in the

nation within 2011 to 2015 as shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Natures of Policies and Governance in Myanmar

Source: The Global New Light of Myanmar, volume II, no. 197 and III, no. 183.

Thus, the Union government invited all EAOs to negotiate with the government

in 2013, concluding in the signing of NCA in October 2015. However, the NCA was

signed only 8 EAOs and those EAOs which are MNDAA, UWSA, TNLA) are omitted.

27
Ibid., 3.
28
Ibid., 4.
 14

On the other hand, the Tatmadaw also deeply participated in the peace process with

upholding their three main national causes to consolidate national unity.

In 2016, the President U Htin Kyaws Government has treated some new

policies and has been working hardly for these non-signatories EAOs to sign NCA

because the Union government needs to go forward to future peace talks based on the

NCA. For supporting the NCA, the President U Htin Kyaws Government keeps the aim

of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party to hold political negotiations and

the principle of finding solutions through the guarantee of equal rights, mutual respect,
29
and mutual confidence between all ethnic nationalities. Moreover, the Union

government pointed out that the NCA is the first step not only towards peace, but

towards the establishment of the long hoped for Genuine Federal Democratic Union30

which based on the principles of freedom, ensuring the fair distribution of profits from

natural resource extraction, equal rights and self-determination, and resolving problems

between ethnic groups through dialogue based on mutual respect.

In the National Reconciliation Process (NRP), some EAOs have already signed

the NCA, but some EAOs also have not yet signed because of their various reasons. As

future political dialogue needs to be based on the NCA, the government has been

making every effort to bring about the inclusively participation of the non-signatories

EAOs. Moreover, the current government stated that the national reconciliation is the

concern of all the citizens of Myanmar and it must include all stakeholders in the NRP.

29
Speech at the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Pang Long), State Councellar Aung San Suu
Kyi, (Nay Pyi Taw, August 31, 2016) , MICC, accessed November 20, 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.
gov. mm/ en/node/247.
30
Ibid.
 15

2.2.1 Myanmars Military [Tatmataw]

This subsection provides an overview of the significant of Tatmadaw in the

governance practice. Tatmadaw has been keeping loyal to the nation and the people and

it has been transforming into a strong, fully efficient and modern defense services to
31
protect land, water and air territories of the Nation. As mandated by the 2008

Constitution, Tatmadaw plays an essential role in politics. Representatives nominated

by the Commander-in-Cheif have been serving in the parliaments, with 25% of the total

number of seats at both the Amyotha and Pyithu Hluttaw, and the Region/State level as

well as the Leading Body of the SAAs.32 Moreover, Tatmadaw also has the significant

role in the governance practice such as the Commander-in-Cheif as a supreme

commander of all armed forces, he shall nominate for three ministerial posts (Home

Affairs, Defense and Border Affairs). Moreover, The one is the power of the Union

shall be transferred to the Commander-in-Cheif in the state of emergency in the whole

country. So, what is the standing of the Tatmadaw for National Reconciliation Process

(NRP)? In 2017, Commander-in-Cheif Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing

speech at the New Year Greeting that:

Tatmadaw will continue cooperation in ensuring peace and stability of the

State, undertaking development and emerging the Union based on democracy
and federal system.33 Moreover, he said at the 72nd Anniversary Armed Forces
Day that based on the Tatmadaw Spirit, we are responsible to prevent those
actions are done on the pretext of the political situation as well as religious or

31
Speech at the Parade of the 70th Armed Forces Day, Commander-in-Chief Senior General
Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing, (Nay Pyi Taw, March 27, 2015), Nay Pyi Taw Parade Ground, accessed
November 20, 2016, http://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/speech-delivered-by-commander-in-
chief-of-defence-services-senior-general-thayaysithu-min-aung-hlaing-at-the-parade-of-the-70th-armed-
forces-day-held-on-27th-march-2015/.
32
Maung Aung Myoe, The soldier and the state: the Tatmadaw and political liberalization in Myanmar
since 2011, Southeast Research 22, no. 2 (2014), p. 238-239.
33
Speech in the NewYear Greeting, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung
Hlaing, (Nay Pyi Taw, On Jaunary 1, 2017), accessed January 22, 2017,
http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q =news/1/01/2017/id-9521.
 16

racial issues in our country because they can harm the sovereignty of our
country34.

Moreover, he assured that the Tatmadaw will work with national people in

harmony and unison and in oneness for further enhancing peace and stability and

prosperity of the country. In practice, the Tatmadaw also has been working on ways to

achieve peace and it continues to support the peace process based on the three national

causes of recognition of peace and stability, national reconciliation, and development. 35

In accord with the duties assigned by the Constitution and its traditions, the Tatmadaw

in the service of the nation will shoulder the national task well in cooperation with the

upcoming government and the citizens. It means that Tatmadaw has truly and deeply

cooperated with the government effort in the NRP. Thus, Tatmadaw has adopted and

upholds six-point peace policy in its strenuous efforts for building true, permanent

peace.

Moreover, the six-point peace policy is the awareness of the Tatmadaw from its

historic experiences of peace struggle in successive periods while it is also the reality

to strengthen the peacebuilding process. The policy could support a way from peace to a

genuine democratic union based on the federal system as well. It is also the answer to

serve the interest of the people and union without presenting any trouble to any force.

For that reason, Tatmadaw call for concerning these policies and urge the EAOs to sign

the NCA.

34
Speech in the 72nd Anniversary Armed Forces Day, Commander-in-Chief Senior General
Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing, (Nay Pyi Taw, On March 27, 2017, accessed March 30, 2017,
http://www.moi. gov.mm /moi:eng/?q=news/28/03/2017/id-10321
35
Speech at the Pang long Conference, Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing, (Nay Pyi Taw,
August 31, 2016), MICC, accessed January 20, 2017, http://www.mmtimes.com/ index.php/national-
news/22255-speech-highlights-from-panglong-conference-opening-ceremony.html.
 17

2.3 Regulation
This section provides an reviews of constitution and regulation, which are

significant to the SAAs. Due to the 2008 constitution, the legislative power is shared

between the bicameral Pyidaungsu Hluttaw at the union level, and unicameral

State/Region Hluttaws. The Hluttaws are made up of elected civilian members and

representatives of the Tatmadaw nominated by the Commander-in- Chief, the latter

comprising up to 25% of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and the State/Region Hluttaws. The

civilian representatives in each State/Region Hluttaws are elected to represent different

townships as well as the ethnic minority groups.36

Figure 2.3 Right of Legislation of the SAAs

Source: Myanmar Constitution, 2008, p.191.

Due to the section 196 of the 2008 constitution, all the SAAs have the

legislative power relating to the matters listed in the Schedule 3 for respective Divisions

or Zones are allotted to the LB-SAAs as shown in Figure 2.3.37 In theory, most of the

federal countries designate that the distribution of residual power is included in the

constitution typically.38 Likewise, in Myanmar, the legislative duties, powers and rights

36
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), 27-70.
37
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), 72.
38
Lori Thorlakson, "Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six Federations." West
European Politics 26, no. 2 (2003): 1-22.
 18

of the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Amyotha Hluttaw, the Region/State Hluttaws and the LB-

SAAs are clearly illustrated by the section 198 of 2008 constitution as shown in Figure

2.4.

Figure 2.4 Level of Residual power and the SAAs

Source: Myanmar Constitution, 2008,73-74.

Thus, all the local government may pass legislation as regards certain narrowly

defined sectors in the Constitution. In general, under the legislation and regulation, the

formal link of administration for public service delivery has being established between

the various levels of governments and the General Administration Department

(GAD)39of the Ministry of Home Affairs.40 It resulted that the regulating decision does

not fully match with the constitution. In practice, although the 2008 constitution

presented legislative powers over the regulation of the State/Region levels as well as the

SAAs, it could not clearly realize the right to regulate regarding economic development,

social security and natural resources extraction. Moreover, the State/Region Hluttaws

have opened up new spaces for public debate, and the civil society and local media are

also increasingly participating in the discussion on local governance.41

39
The General Administrative Department is an civil service body that staffs all level governments in
Myanmar and provides administration for the country's myriad districts and townships.
40
Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Matthew Arnold. Administering the State in Myanmar: An Overview of the
General Administration Department. MDRI-CESD and the Asia Foundation, 2014.
41
Naina Patel, Alex Goodman and Naomi Snider, Constitutional Reform in Myanmar: Priorities and
Prospects for Amendment, working paper, (London, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law: 2014), 46,
 19

Figure 2.5 Self-administered Zones and Self-administered Division

Source: Myanmar Information Management Unit, 2013.

2.4 Administrative History

Historically, Myanmar has experienced a complex set of conflicts between the Union

government and ethnic minority groups for seeking autonomy. When the State Law and

Order Restoration Council took over, huge parts of the north and east region were under
 20

the control of ethnic armed groups. For instance, in what is today northern Sagaing,

there were also under the control of Naga separatists. In 1989, the CPB collapsed, and

its various factions formed ethnic armed groups in their areas, becoming primarily

concerned with securing autonomy42.

In fact, due to the effort of the Union Government in the past decade, the several

ethnic armed groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Union government

and they have been granted de facto administrative authority over their areas in 1989.

The Union Government provided the ethnic armed groups territories with low level of

autonomy and these territories were designated as Special Regions 43. Totally, there are

12 Special Regions in the administrative history in Myanmar. Especially, For the most

powerful groups, they have enjoyed in a large territory.

After that, the Union government suspended the 1974 constitution and called a

National Convention for getting a constitution of the country in 1993. As the discussion

result of the National Convention in 1994, the issue of creating self-administered areas

(SAAs) for specific ethnic minorities was raised, leading to a flurry of requests from

ethnic delegates for various administrative territories. Danu, Intha, Akha, Lahu, Kayan,

Pa-O, Kokang, Mro/Khami, Lisu/Rawang/Tai-Hkamti, and Naga representatives all

requested SAAs. Wa representatives called for an autonomous region encompassing no

less than 17 townships. Similarly, Shan, Chin, and Karen representatives called for

SAAs for their groups in states and divisions where they were the minority 44 . The

National Convention concluded in 2007, and the 2008 Constitution was adopted the

42
Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,16-20
43
A loosely defined territory designated to a specific armed group as part of a ceasefire deal between
1989 and 1994. The level of autonomy practiced in such regions varies.
44
Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,18-19.
 21

following year. The constitution introduced six self-administered areas (SAAs) for the

Pa-O, Kokang, Palaung, Danu, Wa, and Naga peoples and the subnational

administration systems created under the new administrative arrangements in Myanmar

in 2008 45 . As the administrative reformatting arrangement in Myanmar, Shan state

Special Region (1), (2), (6) and (7) have directly transformed into self-administered

Areas as the 2008 constitution.

Table 2.1 Administrative history of the SAAs

Source: Adapted from Kim Joliffe, 2015, p.18.

However, by considering on the each of SAAs, the Pa-O ethnic minority area

was controlled by the Pa-O National Organization since 1991. The PNO signed a

ceasefire in 1991, was awarded Shan State Special Region (6) for the area. The PNOs

role in local governance is enhanced significantly, though less formally, through its

large and well-organized the Pa-O National Army, which maintains its own

administration system in the SAZ. The Palaung ethnic minority area was controlled by

the Palaung ethnic armed group. The armed group signed a ceasefire in 1991, was

awarded Shan State Special Region (7) for the area. However, in practice, the ethnic

minority group established the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) since 2011and the

PSLF has been rapidly gaining territory in the SAZ and surrounding area, and has

established a notable own administration system. Moreover, kokang was kept under its

own administration since the British administration period. After Independent, the

45
Ibid, 20-21.
 22

centralization of administration in 1962 following the military coup in Myanmar

affected the self-administration status of kokang. The kokang ethnic armed group signed

a ceasefire in 1989, was awarded Shan State Special Region (1) for the area. The armed

group governed the region from 1989 until 2009 under a ceasefire agreement 46 .

However, the leader of kokang who was dissatisfied with the new administrative set-up

and they have tried for self-administration and non-interference in their internal affair.

Furthermore, the Wa ethnic armed group also signed a ceasefire in 1989, was awarded

Shan State Special Region (1) for the area. The 1989 ceasefire arrangements that

provide the UWSP with authority over the area as a special region have not been

formalized either, despite being referenced in recent ceasefire documents. Also, despite

the formal politics in the Naga SAZ has seen no involvement of any of the Naga armed

groups, numerous territories within the SAZ are controlled by Naga Armed Groups.

Besides, the Danu ethnic nationality has never formed an armed group and the Danu

SAZ Leading Body has representatives from the newly formed Danu National

Democracy Party.

The majority of major ethnic armed actors in Myanmar currently maintain

access to govern territories as a result of ceasefires which have led their authority over

certain areas. There are two general types of ceasefire territories in Myanmar. The first

type Special Region was awarded explicitly as part of ceasefire agreements in the

1980s and 1990s, while the second type Self-administered Area has emerged as the

2008 constitution. both types were accepted by the Union government in the country

administrative history.

Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Matthew Arnold. Administering the State in Myanmar: An Overview of the
46

General Administration Department, 40-41.

 23

However, the lack of clearly mandated territorial arrangements have supported

as a great burden on the releavant ethnic minorities. both types of the administrative

arrangement in the history are highly vulnerable to renewed conflict and provides no

basis for comprehensive governance, economic, rule of law or other reforms. Moreover,

the leader of Special Regions has engaged in business activities with some localized

autonomy and authority. In the Special Regions (1) and (2), the larger ethnic armed

groups like the MNDAA and UWSA those on the Chinese border were allowed by the

Union government regarding greater autonomy to administer and control their

designated areas almost no intervention by the Union government. Furthermore, they

are enjoyed in illegal border trade, including drug production and trafficking and also

dissatisfied on the reforming political arrangement of the country.

Thus, as the seeking of the ethnic minority groups for getting the autonomy,

Myanmar has experienced a complex set of conflicts between the Union government

and ethnic minority groups in the countrys administrative history. The Union

Government has provided autonomous territories so-called Special Region to the

some ethnic armed group (e.g. MNDAA, UWSA, TNLA, PNO) as well as and the

government provided socio-economic development in the rural area which have been

influenced by the some small ethnic minority armed groups (e.g. NSCN-K) or ethnic

minority groups (e.g. DNDP). Moreover, as the present administrative arrangement of

the Union Government, the government has provided socio-economic development in

all SAAs since the U Thein Sein administration. However, For Naga, PaO and Danu,

the SAZ status could make satisfy them and the administrative authority they are

enjoying is half full since the current status is much higher than the previous one. In

contrast, the same status of the SAZ is half empty for the remaining areas of Kokang,
 24

Wa and Palaung as they have never fallen under any administration of the successive

governments of Myanmar since colonial period until the 2008 constitution has been

activated.

2.5 Self-administered Areas (SAAs)

This section provides the context of the present SAAs and how dose governance

practice in the Self-Administered Areas. As per the 2008 Constitution, the SAAs have

been designated a different administrative status as well as it is something similar to

executive committee and have been granted greater devolution. The 5 Self-administered

Zones are that of the Naga in Sagaing Region, and the Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang in

Shan State. The Wa Self-administered Division is also located in Shan State as show in

Figure 2.5. One of the reasons that more than 5.8 million of population are scattering in

Shan State with 35.23 % of Shan, 11.44 % of Bamar, 8.94 % of Pa-O, 7.06 % of

Palaung, 6.41 % of Wa, 4.46 % of Danu, 3.22 % of Kokang, 4.05 % of Lahu, 2.35 % of

Jaingphaw and 16.84 % of other ethnics.

So, what are the keys governance practice of the SAAs and how has the SAAs

been managing to achieve providing the better public services in these areas? Figure 2.6

illustrated that what keys governance are performing in the SAAs.

Figure 2.6 Keys Governance Practice of the SAAs

Source: Pyidaungsu Institute, 2015.

 25

Furthermore, all the SAAs are administered by the LB-SAAs respectively and it

is consists of at least 10 members and includes State/Regional Hluttaw members elected

from townships in the SAA, representative of the ethnic minority and other members

nominated by the Tatmadaw. A Chairperson is head of each LB-SAAs. The LB-SAAs

has some executive authorities and legislative powers. However, the LB-SAAs not

enjoyed as their insufficient authorities and power in the governance. As mention in the

Figure 2.1 Schedule 3 of the constitution, leading bodies can only pass legislation in the

10 areas of governance. However, although the ethnic minorities have long claimed

autonomy , the list of Schedule 3 excluded some important areas of governance such as

social security, education, and natural resource mining.

On the other hand, as the LB-SAAs has included a majority of locally elected

MPs and they could provide a basis for addressing the issue of ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, the LB-SAAs did not provide public service sufficiently because their

limited capacity and they could not address the fundamental and legitimate concern of

the ethnic minority peoples. moreover, if a Chairperson of the LB-SAAs cannot carry

out his duties efficiently, the President of the Union may direct him to resign from

office. The Chairperson of the LB-SAAs is responsible to the State Chief Minister, and

to the President through the Chief Minister. Members of the LB-SAAs are also

responsible to their Chairperson.

However, laws adopted by the LB-SAAs must only be within the areas listed in

Schedule-3 and they can also be extended to matters delegated to it by any additional

law of the Union or State Hluttaw. Also, the LB-SAAs is responsible to assist the Union

Government in preserving the stability of the Union, community peace and tranquillity
 26

and prevalence of law and order. At the same time, the Union government has a

constitutional duty to cooperate and coordinate with the LB-SAAs to help it to be

effective and successful. In fact, the person in charge of General Administration

Department (GAD) of the SAA serves as the Secretary and of the LB-SAAs, and the

GAD serves as the office of the SAA. The LB-SAAs particularly has general tasks and

duties as shown in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 General Tasks and Duties of Leading Body of the SAAs

Source: Ministry of Home Affair of Myanmar, General Administrative Department, 2012.

The LB-SAAs may also perform other functions occasionally assigned by the

Union or the Region/State government. One of the significant is the existence of the

Leading Body as a peoples representative. In practice, some of the LB-SAAs have

established some local administrative systems that are not mandated by the 2008

constitution. These are overlapping with the typical administrative system of the SAAs.

Most of the villages in the SAAs are typically governed entirely by EAOs and they

provide basic services, justice and security, taxation and recruitment with their own

regulation. Moreover, some leaders of EAOs who are closely interlinked with the LB-

SAAs and political leader of SAAs are demanded to Union government regarding

equality of rights, self-administration, full autonomy in internal administration in

Frontier Areas.47 Because, they want to control of strategic and commercial interests,

such as strategic area, highways, hydropower dams, and natural resources extraction.

47
Hein Ko Soe,The federal state debate, frontiermyanmar, on May 10, 2016, accessed March 16, 2017,
http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-federal-state-debate.
 27

Also, they proposed a resource sharing issue and expressed their views that the

countrys resources should be equitably shared among all ethnic peoples for the

development all regions and the taxation be managed systematically.48

2.5.1 Naga Self-administered Zone

The Naga SAZ is delineated in the 2008 Constitution, grouping Leshi, Lahe and

Namyun townships in Sagaing Division. The Naga SAZ was officially announced by

decree on 20 August 2010. In practice, the Union and Region government have been

providing to achieve socio-economic development and human capacity development of

the Naga SAZ. 49 However, there is a limit to development in the region as the

mountainous areas are not easily accessible. Parts of the townships belonging to the

Naga SAZ are among the poorest and least developed of Myanmar.

2.5.2 Danu Self-administered Zone

The Danu SAZ was officially announced by decree on 20 August 2010 and it

consists of Pindaya and Ywangan Township in Taunggyi District. The zone has been

self-administered by the Danu ethnic Leader. 50 In practice, the Union and State

government have been supporting to achieve socio-economic development of the Danu

SAZ.

2.5.3 Pa Laung Self-administered Zone

The Pa Laung SAZ was formed by the 2008 Constitution and it consists of

Mantong Township which is formerly part of Mu-Se District and Namhsan Township

48
The Global New Light of Myanmar, Step closer to peace. Official News Paper. Ministry of
Information of Myanmar . 2016. Vol III. No 108.
49
The Global New Light of Myanmar, Food, medical supplies airlifted to Naga SAZ . Official News
Paper. Ministry of Information of Myanmar, 2016. Vol III, No 125.
50
The Global New Light of Myanmar, Chairman of Leading Body of Danu Self-administered Zone
appointed, 2016. Vol III, No 80.
 28

which is formerly part of Kyaukme District in the Shan state. The zone has been self-

administered by the Palaung ethnic Leader of Palaung State Liberation Organization

(PSLO). Unfortunately, the zone has been suffering from the dozen of armed conflicts

between and among TNLA, SSPP-SSA and Tatmadaw since the end of 2012. The

TNLA is the armed wing of the PSLO and wants to promote self-determination for the

Taang or Palaung people.51 In fact, The SSPP-SSA is the armed wing of the Mon-

Khmer ethnic minority and want to get territorial authorities of Palaung SAZ. In fact,

the ethnic minority group has enjoyed in opium poppy cultivation. Due to the state-

owned Myanma Alin newspaper on 12 March 2016, one of the significant financial

sources of TNLA and SSPP-SSA come from opium poppy cultivation and it has been

increasing in the SAZ. 52 In fact, although the Union government has applied opium

eradication projects in the SAZ but it continues to fail. In practice, the ethnic minority

groups have to pay opium tax to EAOs especially during harvest time.53

2.5.4 Pa-O Self-administered Zone

As stipulated by the 2008 constitution, the Pa-O Self-administered Zone consists

of Hopong, Hsi Hseng, and Pinlaung Township. The SAZ has been governed by the

ethnic minority leader of the Pa-O National Organization (PNO).54 the Pa-O ethnic

minority groups also enjoyed in opium poppy cultivation. To bridge the income gap

between poppy and traditional crops, the Union government has been promoting the

51
The Global New Light of Myanmar, Poppy: drug scourge of lifeline?, 2016. Vol III, No 197.
52
The Myanma Alin, drug and arm, [in Burmese]Offical Nwes Paper. Ministry of Information of
Myanmar,2016, Vol 55, No 164.
53
Ibid.
54
Yola Verbruggen, In Pa-O zone, no end to opium cultivation, the Mynamar time, on December 16,
2015, accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/18157-in-pa-o-zone-
no-end-to-opium-cultivation.html.
 29

cultivation of coffee in the Pa-O SAZ. 55 However, due to the report of Pa-O Youth

Organisation (PYO), it has found that the Governments opium eradication projects

continue to fail because of the taxation of villagers by ethnic armed groups, the

difficulty of growing and finding a market for other crops, a lack of land as a

consequence of land confiscations, and insufficient treatment of governance practice.56

2.5.5 Kokang Self-administered Zone

The Kokang Self-administered Zone consists of Konkyan and Laukkaing

Township and it is also delineated in the 2008 Constitution. The SAZ has been

administered by the ethnic minority leader of Kokang ethnic who is closely interlinked

with the National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In history, the MNDAA was

formerly part of the Burmese Communist Party (BPC) and signed a bilateral cease-fire

agreement with the government in 1989 and enjoyed the ceasefire from 1989 to 2009.

At the time, this area so-called Kokang Special Region and it under the leadership of

Phon Kya-shin who is the leader of MNDAA. In August 2009, the Kokang incident was

a violent armed conflict with Tatmadaw that broke out in Kokang Areas. As a result of

the conflict, the MNDAA lost control of the area and became an unofficial EAO. In

2015, the MNDAA made again military operations in the kokang SAZ. Several armed

clashes between the Tatmadaw and MNDAA had taken place in 2015. In that case, the

MNDAA's allies, the Arakan Army (AA) and Taang National Liberation Army

(TNLA) were also fighting alongside the MNDAA. 57 Moreover, some sources

indicated that the KIA, UWSA, and NDAA were also involved in the 2015 Kokang

55
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 65 acres of poppy fields destroyed in Hopong, 2016. Vol II. No
318.
56
Yola Verbruggen, In Pa-O zone, no end to opium cultivation,
57
The Global New Light of Myanmar, Tatmadaw accelerates military operations in Laukkai , 2015,
Vol I, No 150.
 30

incident. Significantly, as the MNDAA posted the first funding request on its official

website on April 22, 2015, The MNDAA has received more than 3.5 million yuan in

donations during 2015 to 2016.58 Thus, some of the Chinese interest groups have

supported as the financial assistance of the MNDAA during the armed conflict.

Moreover, the SAZ has been using the Chinese currency and operating on China time,

and they have increasingly oriented themselves towards China.

2.5.6 Wa Self-administered Division

The Wa SAD is an only Self-administered Division in Myanmar and it consists

of Hopang, Mongmao, Pangwaun, Namtit, Panlong which are formerly part of Hopang

District and Matman, Pangsang and Namphan townships which are formerly part of

Matman District. The area has been governed by the United Wa State Party (UWSP).

Moreover, one of the EAOs which is United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the military

wing of the UWSP founded in 1989 with members of Wa National Council (WNC),

which represent the former members of the BCP and Wa ethnic minority. The UWSA

has signed a ceasefire with the Union government in 1989. In practice, the Wa SAD are

mostly under the Chinese radar. Because, the using of Chinese language, Chinese

currency and Chinese culture in the entire Wa SAD. Moreover, the UWSA is also said

to be heavily involved in the narcotics trade.

2.5.7 Issues in the SAAs

As examined the section of regulation, the accountability between and among

the LB-SAAs, the State/Region government, the Union governmant and the Hluttaws

are still unclear, and governance remains centralized obviously in practice. Moreover,

58
Yun Sun. The Kokang Conflict: How Will China Respond? The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2015,
accessed January 16, 2017, http://www.irrawaddy.com /contributor/ kokang-conflict-will-china-
respond.html.
 31

despite the establishment of LB-SAAs, strong intra-sectoral hierarchies of executive

authorities and upward accountability constrain the adjustment of regulation to the local

needs and priorities.59 Thus, most State/Region and the LB-SAAs could stipulate very

few laws and regulations to deal with local issues. By considering the general tasks and

duties of the LB-SAAs, they may supervise the functions of the civil service within its

territory and could cooperate and coordinate with the local ethnic people. However, due

to the less capacity, overlapped administration between and among LB-SAA, GAD and

EOAs, the formal right to regulate is not functioned and most of the areas in the SAAs

are still rural and underdeveloped.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the context of the Myanmars government with its

governance practice and regulation which are pertinent to the SAAs and also considered

on the countrys administrative history. In the first section of the chapter, this study

examined what present governance state in Myanmar is, and observed how does

governance practice in the SAAs by the Union government. Consequently, this chapter

scrutinised that the Myanmar government and Tatmadaw are deeply committed to peace

and have done well to navigate Myanmars democratic transaction at the same time.

Due to the practice of Myanmars governance, the SAAs role is restricted to a few areas

of governance and it ultimately depends on both of the General Administrative

Department (GAD) and the State government. Thus, if the Myanmar government

practices pragmatic self-sufficient general administration structure for each SAA then it

would be able to have sufficient administrative powers and management for the LB-

59
UNDP Myanmar, the state of local governance: trends in Mandalay, Yangon, Myanmar, 2015a,
accessed March 30, 2017, http://www.mm.undp.org/content/myanmar/ en/home/library/poverty/TheState
ofLocalGovernanceChin/the-state-of-local-governa nce--trends-in-mandalay.html.
 32

SAAs in their respective areas. However, as the existing governance practice, the SAAs

are likely as a vulnerable area for strengthening the EAOs as well as it is most likely as

a reinforcement area for the relevant EAOs. Moreover, this study observed that some

sufficient regulations regarding natural resources, local economic development, social

security and education should be included in the broadening the scope of SAAs

accountabilities. Moreover, for strengthening the role of leading body of the SAAs, the

government is a necessity to review the present governance and need to scrutinise

pragmatically that how the existing condition of the SAAs is.

Generally, the governance through persuasion is one of the methods of

governance to achieve advantages in the targeted area. This means encouraging the LB-

SAAs to change their behaviour through law and regulations along with persuasions in

matters like persuading them to improve satisfaction and to be engaged in their existing

administrative activities. In fact, to be able to fully enjoy rights of power and

opportunities, the LB-SAAs must carry out legislative processes through different levels

of Hluttaw. Moreover, this study explored that for achieving a suitable federal model

with greatest satisfying of all citizens, the Union government is a necessity to reconsider

on both governments policy and the aspirations of LB-SAAs.

By the second section of this chapter, the study observed that what are the

existence of the SAAs and what are the issues in both Union government and the SAAs

by concerning the regulation. In regulation, as the distribution of residual of power is

shared to particular State/Region government under the Schedule 2 of 2008 Constitution

as well as Schedule 3 for the SAAs, all these are expressed as a federal system.

Moreover, for supporting the provision the role of Region/State government and the
 33

LB-SAAs, this study examined that the Union government should improve a pragmatic

framework and regulations regarding financial and administration. In fact, due to the

less functional executive authorities, the LB-SAAs might benefit from their illegal

business such as poppy cultivation, and drugs trafficking as well as it is likely to support

the improvement of financial development in their relevant EAOs. Thus, it has been

eaxmined that both Union government and LB-SAAs are necessary to eliminate poppy

cultivation in the SAAs as the income of the EAOs gain from it.

In the third section of this chapter, As the seeking of the ethnic minority groups

for getting the autonomy, Myanmar has experienced a complex set of conflicts between

the Union government and ethnic minority groups in the countrys administrative

history. The Union Government has provided autonomous territories so-called Special

Region to the some ethnic armed group (e.g. MNDAA, UWSA, TNLA, PNO) as well

as and the government provided socio-economic development in the rural area which

have been influenced by the some small ethnic minority armed groups (e.g. NSCN-K)

or ethnic minority groups (e.g. DNDP). Moreover, as the present administrative

arrangement of the Union Government, the government has provided socio-economic

development in all SAAs since the U Thein Sein administration. However, For Naga,

PaO and Danu, the SAZ status could make satisfy them and the administrative authority

they are enjoying is half full since the current status is much higher than the previous

one. In contrast, the same status of the SAZ is half empty for the remaining areas of

Kokang, Wa and Palaung as they have never fallen under any administration of the

successive governments of Myanmar since colonial period until the 2008 constitution

has been activated.

 34

Lastly, due to the presence of Union government, the NRP is necessary to built

on a spirit of mutual trust between and among the government, the Tatmadaw, ethnic

minorities, EAOs and political parties. Critically, due to the unwillingness of EAOs to

disarm or transform into BGF and having the benefit from the SAAs, the armed conflict

has continued since 2011 in the SAAs especially in Kokang and Palaung SAZs. In the

empirical analysis, this study realises how the EAOs gain the inspiration of the SAAs.

For resolving these condition, the Union government is a necessity to build for

achieving equitable development of all regions as well as to deliver the needs of the

SAAs by implementing short-term and long-term plans regarding social security,

transportation, educational development, electricity supply, health, and agricultural

growth.
 35

CHAPTER THREE
DECENTRALISATION, GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION
3.1 Introduction
According to the conceptual framework, this chapter now studies both decentralisation

and geopolitical aspect on the self-administered Areas. In the beginning, this chapter

emphasis on current decentralisation process relevant to the SAAs the purpose for

finding how does current decentralisation process effect on the SAAs. After that, the

second part of this chapter emphasis on politic between Myanmar and China mainly

focus on both Myanmar-China border and the SAAs from the geopolitical perspective.

Moreover, the purpose for the finding is what are Chinas politic and practice on the

Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP) and the SAAs specifically Wa SAD

and Kokang SAZ based on geographical factors and what is the reality?

3.2 Decentralisation
In recent years, Myanmar has gone through historic changes in its decentralisation. It is

consist of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation. As a part of the

decentralisation, Fritzen and Lim argues that the political decentralisation (or

devolution) is referred to attempts to devolve powers to democratically elected local

governments or, to attempts to make local governments more accountable to

60
communities through the establishment of oversight board . Second, the

administrative decentralisation refers to the transfer of policy-making from central to

local levels such as planning, management and responsibilities. There are two sub-types

of administrative decentralisation, deconcentration and delegation. Deconcentration

means in which branches of the central government are geographically dispersed, but

60
Allen Scott, Fritzen and Patrick W. O. Lim, Problem and prospects of decentralization in developing
Countries, Public Administration and Public Policy, National University of Singapore, May 2006, 1,
accessed December 16, 2017, http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/wp16_06.pdf.
 36

no real authority is transferred to lower levels 61 . Despite the deconcentration,

delegation means in which authority for certain functions is transferred to lower levels
62
that remain substantially accountable to the central level . Lastly, fiscal

decentralisation broadly refers to efforts to changes to revenue sources available to local

governments through taxes as well as modify the distribution and sources of resources

available to local governments.63

In the Myanmar case, if this study continuously focus on the relationship

between decentralisation, conflict and national reconciliation in Myanmar, an aspiration

among ethnic minority groups for greater subnational autonomy has been a key factor

behind civil conflict and social strife in Myanmar since independence. And, it is central

to EAOs negotiating positions in the current peace and National Reconciliation Process

(NRP).

Thus, it is important to be aware that insufficient decentralisation could increase

social divisions, conflict, and political instability. On the other hand, decentralisation

can potentially accentuate differences between geographical areas/ethnic groups and

decrease citizens identification with the nation as a whole, thereby encouraging

politicians and leaders of armed groups to adopt increasingly strong positions for greater
64
subnational separation. Overall, although there is a clear need for further

decentralisation in Myanmar, it is not a full solution for solving the current Myanmar

armed conflict and but it still partially effects on the National Reconciliation Process

61
Ibid, 2.
62
Ibid, 2.
63
Ibid, 2-3.
64
Joseph Siegle and Patrick OMahony, Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict
Mitigation
Strategy, (USAID, 2006),1.
 37

(NRP). Additionally, civil society organisations and the media also openly discuss

subnational governance issues, including debates over the meaning of federalism.

3.2.1 Political Decentralisation

Nixon argues that political decentralisation involves granting decision-making

power to subnational authorities that are accountable to their citizens, and this often

includes elected subnational governments in democratic countries. 65 So far, political

decentralisation in Myanmar has been limited. The chief ministers are still centrally

appointed, and at least 25 percent of MPs in each State/Region are nominated by the

military. Moreover, also, Schedule 2 of the 2008 Constitution is vague and only clearly

grants legislative power to States/Regions on a narrow range of activities. State/Region

legislative activity has covered issues such as motor vehicle regulation, forestry,

fisheries, local industry, water transport, and agricultural concerns. Likewise,

Parliaments and States/Regions with large populations have tended to be more active

legislators.66 The current NLD governments public commitment to a Genuine Federal

Democratic Union67 and the importance of federalism to EAOs, many political parties,

and many citizens, means that an increase in the level of political decentralisation is

highly likely at some point. It is currently not clear when this will occur, but it seems

unlikely to happen within the next few years. It is also currently unclear to what extent

this decentralisation will be decided through the peace negotiations, and to what extent

it will be decided in the Union Hluttaw. Nevertheless, it is important to remark here that

these expected future decisions will change the expenditure responsibilities of

65
Hamish Nixon and others, State and Region Governments in Myanmar, 4.
66
Ibid, 64-65.
67
Speech at the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Pang Long), State Councellar Aung San Suu
Kyi, MICC, (Nay Pyi Taw, August 31, 2016).
 38

subnational entities, and financial arrangements will need to be designed by these

responsibilities.

3.2.2 Administrative Decentralisation

Myanmars 2008 Constitution provided a formal framework under which

decentralisation could begin. Some notable moves have included towards

decentralisation process in Myanmar. From early 2011 onwards, partially elected

parliaments have been functioning in each State/Region, and these governments now

have some control over budget allocations and service provision. Especially, the

governments have also been introduced five Self-administered Zones, and one Self-

administered Division68 in the 2008 Constitution. The five Self-Administered Areas are

Naga in Sagaing Region, and the Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang and Wa are located in

Shan State.

Figure 3.1 Presence of GAD Administrative Decentralisation69

Source: Ministry of Home Affair of Myanmar, General Administrative Department, 2011.

As per the 2008 Constitution, the SAAs have been designated a different

administrative status to that of State/Regions, and have been granted greater devolution.

In fact, greater decision-making powers have been granted to Township authorities

68
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 56.
69
David Hook, Tin Maung Than and Kim Ninh, Conceptualizing Public Sector Reform in Myanmar,
(Singapore, the Asia Foundation: 2015), 14, accessed February 5, 2017, https://asiafoundation.org/
resources/pdfs/PSRFullreportENG.pdf.
 39

controlled by the General Administrative Department 70 (GAD) under the Ministry of

Home Affairs. Figure 3.1 shown that the presence of administrative decentralization

from Union to street level administration by the GAD.

Particularly, all the SAAs are distinct from all other administrative units in

Myanmar in that they organised with the explicit aim of providing greater self-

governance to specific ethnic nationalities. The SAAs could also represent a key step

towards addressing the issue of minorities that exist within states representing other

minorities. Typically, the SAAs are nominally under the authority of LB-SAAs, which

are made up of distinct from all other administrative units. However, due to the

Myanmars 2008 Constitution, there is frequently a lack of clarity as to which services

are the responsibilities among the Union and States/Regions level and also

decentralisation of service provision has so far been quite limited in practice especially

in all SAAs. For instance, the administrative authority overlapped among SAAs leading

body and the GADs street level bureaucrats.

3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation

According to the 2008 Constitution, budget department of the Ministry of

Finance is responsible to draw not only the Union Budget & State/ Region Budgets but

also SAAs budget. To fulfill this responsibilities, the Budget department opened

fourteen State/Region Budget offices, one Self-administered Division Budget office and

70
MOHF, Total List of Districts, Townships, Sub-townships, Towns, Wards, Village-tracts and Villages
in Regions and States, General Administration Department, Ministry of Home affair, Myanmar,
accessed February 1, 2017, http://www.gad.gov.mm/en/content/total-list-districts-townships-sub-
townships-towns-wards-village-tracts-and-villages-regions#overlay
 40

five Self-Administered Zone Budget offices in 2010.71 Figure 3.2 shown that the current

formation of fiscal decentralisation and responsibilities in the Myanmar.

Figure 3.2 Form of Fiscal Decentralisation and Responsibilities

Source: Ministry of Finance, Myanmar, 2011.

However, the 2008 Constitution lists 19 categories of taxes and fees controlled

by State/Region governments, but they currently collect little revenue through these

instruments. As a result, although subnational governments in Myanmar are responsible

for spending only a small portion of total public expenditure, they are highly reliant on

financial transfers from the Union government. For instance, Figure 3.3 displayed that

only 3.6 percentage of the Union budget transferred to state/region budgets in FY 2013-

14.72

Figure 3.3 Share of the Union budget to State/Region budgets (FY 2013-14)

Source: Ministry of Finance of Myanmar, 2013.

71
Ministry of Finance, Budget Department, Myanmar, accessed February 7, 2017, http://www.mof.
gov.mm/en/content/budget-department.
72
Cindy Joelene, Hamish Nixon, Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, Thet Aung Lynn and Matthew Arnold, State and
Region Governments in Myanmar, the Asia Foundation, 2013.
 41

3.2.4 Issues in Decentralisation

In the current decentralisation process, there are strong political pressures for

further decentralization such as minority right, equal status and division of power, and

this is expected to happen at some point in the future. Actually, decentralisation can

offer a range of possible benefits for Myanmar political transaction, including making

government more responsive, accountable, and efficient in providing services to its

citizens, reducing abuses of power by officials, reducing conflict, improving political

stability, and raising political competition.

Nevertheless, an inappropriately designed decentralisation process can result in

adverse effects such as rising violation based on the interests of local elites, increasing

corruption, overspending by subnational governments. Thus, it resulting in budget

deficits and macroeconomic instability, and lower quality public services and finally it

will become fuel for armed conflict and civil war. Thus, this study argues that

applicable decentralisation is significantly important to the future national reconciliation

and stability of the country as well as to become a Genuine Federal Democratic

Union 73 . Moreover, this study argues that further decentralisation reforms are

necessary to arrange in line with proper administrative and fiscal arrangements which

should associate with the aspiration of the ethnic minorities as well as the countrys

political transaction.

3.3 Geopolitical Dimension

The purpose of this section is to observe both Myanmar-China border and the SAAs

from the geopolitical perspective. First, this section will examine Chinas role and

Speech at the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Pang Long), State Councellar Aung San Suu
73

Kyi, MICC, (Nay Pyi Taw, August 31, 2016).

 42

interests in Myanmars peace and National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Second, this

section will find out the significant issue of the geopolitical realities on the SAAs

relevant with the Chinas politics and Chinese business interest. The study based on

both some official statement of Myanmar and Chinese government as well as formal

reports and interviews of EAOs and peace process interest groups.

Thus, before focusing on the geopolitical realities, we need to clarify exactly

how the relation between Myanmar and China? Theoretically, the scholar Maung Aung

Myoe stated that since the establish of diplomatic relations between the two countries,

the logic of Myanmars China policy has been firmly based on Myanmars historical

legacies, internal security challenges, geopolitical realities, and regional security

context.74 Moreover, he argued that:

China as a source of security challenge to Myanmar is nothing new to

Myanmar political elites.75
So, what are Chinas politic and practice on the Myanmars National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) and the SAAs specifically Wa SAD and Kokang SAZ

based on geographical factors and what is the reality? Generally, the Myanmar

governments political transaction regarding the peace and National Reconciliation

Process (NRP) is closely interrelated with the stability of the Countrys border. Mainly,

four of Myanmars neighboring countries India, China, Thailand and Bangladesh are all

critical players and stakeholders in the countrys ethnic politics.Among the four of the

neighboring countries, China is a more significant player in Myanmars ethnic puzzle as

its powerful neighbor to the north and northeast of the Myanmars border.

74
Maung Aung Myoe, "The Logic of Myanmars China Policy." Asian Journal of Comparative
Politics 1, no. 3 (09/01; 2017/03, 2016): 283-298.
75
Ibid, 284.
 43

From 2011 onwards, due to the Chinas foreign policy, the country maintains its

noinvolvement policy in Myanmars internal affairs and calls for a peaceful solution76

for not only to secure its economic and strategic interests but also to support Myanmars

National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Moreover, the Chinas foreign policy has

included significant factors for Myanmar such as border security, protection of Chinese-

funded projects in Myanmar, the US rebalancing strategy and strengthening strategic

partnership and maintenance of stability in Myanmar to implement various connectivity

projects. Evidently, China has expressed concern for stability in Myanmar-China border

areas and security of their energy pipelines and several hydro-power projects in

Myanmar. In fact, China has to deal with its history of supporting the Communist Party

of Burma (CPB) and the shared ethnic populations across the border.

Firstly, focusing on location with the political perspective, Myanmar have

geostrategic positions and interest with China, USA, ASEAN etc. Geopolitical reality is

an important element in Myanmars China policy. Myoe argued that Myanmar is

sandwiched between two populous and powerful countries, China and India. from a

geopolitical perspective, Myanmar could be considered as a geopolitical pivot that could

dictate the behaviour of a geostrategic player like China.77 Currently, China is serious

players and stakeholders in the countrys ethnic politics and as a major player in several

fields such as energy sector projects, banking, finance and trading. The China also seeks

a direct access route to Myanmar seaports from which it can export products to South

Asia, the Middle East and Europe that avoid the Malacca Strait in the event of a conflict

76
China says no involvement in Myanmar's domestic issues, Xinhua net, Beijing, on September 10,
2009, accessed February 15, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2009-09/10/content
_12031433.htm.
77
Maung Aung Myoe,"The Logic of Myanmars China Policy," 288-289.
 44

in the South China Sea and would reduce transport costs and time significantly.

Obviously, among the big coalition projects, Kyaukphyu gas pipeline is linking

Myanmar deep-water port of Kyaukphyu with Kunming in the Yunnan province of

China and it will have a capacity of 12 million tons of crude oil per year. This pipeline

would provide an alternative route for China to get access to the Indian Ocean via

Myanmar and is of strategic importance for Chinese interest in the 21st century. In fact,

the armed conflicts in northern Myanmar are potential obstacles to Chinas grand

strategic ambition, such as the One Belt One Road initiative78. Chinas overall design

is to build connectivity projects and transportation networks throughout Myanmar into

South Asia and Southeast Asia. The armed conflicts have negative effects that challenge

Chinas strategic ambitions. Because of the ethnic conflicts act as a barrier to Chinas

strategic ambition along the border even before its projects can reach the west coast of

Myanmar.

Second, focusing on demography with the political perspective, historically,

China is sources of cultural influence in Southeast Asia. sharing a border with the same

ethnic populations living on both sides means that Myanmars ethnic problems also

affects them. Especially, Chinese in Yunnan Province have very close connections with

the ethnic groups living along its border with Myanmar. The Wa SAD , Kokang SAZ

and Mong La regions are probably better connected to Yunnan with roads and economic

activity than they are to Myanmar itself. Morover, Trading is conducted in Chinese

78
One Belt and One Road, or the Belt and Road initiative, is a development strategy and framework
proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 that focuses on connectivity and cooperation between
China and the rest of Eurasia. See Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, State Council of China,
March 30, 2015, assessed January 20, 2017, http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content
_281475080249035.htm.
 45

currency and the major language of these regions is Chinese.79 In history, China had

close connections with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which broke up into

several ethnic armed groups such as UWSA and MNDAA. In 2015, when an armed

conflict broke out in the Kokang SAZ, one open letter sent by the MNDAA appealing

to the Chinese people to support their cause created further mistrust.80 Specifically, The

Kokang (MNDAA) and Wa people (UWSA) are ethnic Chinese of Yunnanese descent

and they mostly inhabit the Kokang and Wa SAAs in Myanmar. For instance, UWSA

has the closest ties with and elicits the most sympathy from China, to the extent that

some local officials in China regard UWSA as Chinas illegitimate child. In fact, the

issues of shared ethnic populations, border management and the spillover of conflict

were discussed during Aung San Suu Kyis visit to China in 2015.81 Because of the

conflict, over 60,000 Myanmar refugees took shelter in China.

However, China supports the tacit leadership role of UWSA among the ethnic

armed groups in northern Myanmar. UWSA enjoys a traditional, de facto alliance with

the NDAA given its geographic proximity and historical affinity. In fact, the UWSA

includes many Chinese mercenaries evidently. However, such participation is not an

organized scheme by any Chinese authority, but instead motivated by the higher salary

79
Priscilla A. Clapp, Chinas Relations with Burma, United State institute of peace, Congressional
Testimony,(4/2015): 4.
80
North Myanmar peace imperative for China, Global Times, on February 16, 2015, accessed
February 16, 2017, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0216/c90883-8851288.html.
81
Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi wraps up China visit, The Star, on June 14, 2015,
accessed February 20, 2017, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2015/06/14/Myanmar-opposition-
leader-Aung-san-Suu-Kyi-wraps-up china-visit/.
 46

that UWSA offers over the average income in Yunnan.82 In addition, UWSA has at least

two weapons factories producing light weapons based on Chinese models.

If the study continuous to focus on the Kokang ethnic of MNDAA, the Kokang

people are the descendants of Han refugees from the Ming dynasty who fled to the

Kokang area when the Qing dynasty took over Kunming in 1659. 83 Unlike the Kachin

and the Wa, the Kokangs ethnic tie with China is with the majority ethnic group as the

Han people. The MNDAA is under the leadership of Phon Kyar Shin (Peng Jiasheng) ,

who was born in Kokang and was an active member of the Communist Party of Burma

(CPB) during the Cultural Revolution. The 2009 Kokang incident resulted in Phon Kyar

Shins loss of control in the region and his exile for the following five years in Thailand,

China, and Mongla controlled by NDAA. In 2015, MNDAA launched offensives in the

Kokang region against the Myanmar Armed Forces with assistance from KIA and

UWSA. In the meantime, MNDAAs media and online appeal for support from the

Chinese Kokang people invoked great sympathy among the Chinese public. Yunan

government allowed MNDAA troops to use Chinese territory to outflank the

Tatmadaw. 84 Significantly, Chinese authorities allowed MNDAA to open a bank

account in Beijing to collect donations from the Chinese public.85

Third, focusing on resources with the political perspective, both Shan and

Kachin state have strong economic links across the border into Yunnan Province. Shan

82
Yun Sun, China and Myanmars Peace Process, United State institute of peace, Special Report
401,(3/2017).
83
Han Descendants from Ming Dynasty in Myanmar: The Kokang People [in Chinese], Peoples Daily,
January 27, 2015, http://history.people.com.cn/n/2015/0127/c372326-26458099.html.
84
Yun Sun, The Kokang Conflict: How Will China Respond? The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2015,
www.irrawaddy.com /contributor/kokang-conflict-will-china-respond.html.
85
Dare humanitarian assistance official acceptance of donation account [in Chinese], on April 22, 2015,
Sina, accessed January 16, 2017, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9ce88e820102vey2.html.
 47

State has major reserves of gold, silver, iron and gems, including the worlds largest

ruby deposit. It is also the site of significant copper reserves and a large silver mine at

Namtu.

Economically, Myanmar has 15 border trade points officially with China,

Bangladesh, India and Thailand. Among them, the 4 border gates are Muse in northern

Shan state, Lwejel in Kachin state, Chin Shwehaw in northeastern Shan state and

Kanpite Tee in Kachin state. And, Muse border gate stands the largest trade zone with

maximum trade value transacting between the two countries. Figure 3.4 shown the

import and export between Myanmar and China based on border gate.

Figure 3.4 Chinas Border Trade with Myanmar

6000

5000

4000
Million US$

3000

2000

1000

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

exports to Myanmar Imports from Myanmar

Source: Toshihiro Kudo, Chinas Policy toward Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects, 2012. P 5.

Typically, bilateral trade between Myanmar and China is heavily dependent on

their border trade. Therefore, there are 11 major border gates officially established on

the Yunnan side along the border between Myanmar and China, while there are only 4

border gates, Muse, Lweje, Chinshwehaw and Kanpite Tee officially established on the

Myanmar side. 86 Why is this the case? Since many border gates established on the

86
Kudo, Toshihiro, Chinas Policy toward Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects, IDE-Jetro, 2012, 5,
accessed March 14, 2017, http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201209_kudo.html.
 48

Myanmar side are in the SAAs (kokang and Wa) over which ethnic minorities have

control and which are not recognized as official border gates by Myanmar government.

3.3.1 Chinas Policy on the NRP and the SAAs

Chinas official policy on the Myanmar peace process is persuading for peace

and facilitating dialogues. 87 For Myanmar-China relation, the scholar Myoe argued

that:

Both sides spoke highly of the Pauk-Phaw friendship between the two
countries, and agreed that as joint initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence, Myanmar and China will adhere to the above principles and work
together for progress in bilateral relations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual
trust, equality and mutual benefit.88
So, how does the Chinas policy on the Myanmars peace and National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) in practice? Officially, China appreciates Myanmar

governments visions and policies to promote national reconciliation. Obviously, China

appointed Wang Yingfan in 2013 as the first special envoy for Asian affairs, stipulating

the sole mandate of mediating the armed conflict between the Myanmar government

and ethnic armed groups.89 Shortly after this appointment, China organized two rounds

of dialogue between KIA and the Myanmar government in the Chinese border town of

Ruili. 90 Since then, the Chinese special envoy has consistently participated in and

87
Li Keqiang Met with Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi [in Chinese], Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/zgwj/t1390098.htm.
88
Maung Aung Myoe, "The Logic of Myanmars China Policy," 290.
89
Beijings First Special Envoy for Asia to Focus on Myanmar, South China Morning Post, March 12,
2013, accessed January 16, 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/ article/1188814/beijings-first-special-
envoy-asia-focus-myanmar.
90
Yun Sun, Chinas Intervention in the Kachin Conflict, Asia Pacific Bulletin, February 20, 2013,
accessed January 16, 2017, www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/ default/files/ private/apb200_0.pdf.
 49

observed nationwide ceasefire dialogues on Myanmar. In July 2016, Wang Yingfan

attended the ethnic summit in Mai Ja Yang of Kachin state.91

During Aung San Suu Kyis visit to China, the issue of ethnic reconciliation was

high on the agenda. Due to the Joint Press Release between China and Myanmar,

published on August 20, 2016, China committed to supporting Myanmars efforts to

realize peace and to ensure national reconciliation through political dialogues, and

Myanmar recognized that Chinas role and efforts in supporting Myanmars course of

national reconciliation and peace are positive and constructive. Both sides agreed to

enhance cooperation to ensure peace and stability, and strengthen law-based

management in the border region.92 Two days after Aung San Suu Kyis China visit,

Chinese special envoy Sun Guoxiang visited UWSA and the NDAA to ensure the two

groups participation in the Union Peace Conference (UPC). 93 Overall, the China

practised to strengthen cooperation and to ensure the prevalence of peace and stability

in its border areas.94

On the other hand, during the armed conflicts occurred in the kokang SAZ,

China deployed missile units and fighter jets to protect its sovereignty. Also, China

warned to Myanmar that it will take a firm and decisive action in the case of any

91
Lun Min Mang, Ethnic Unity Urged as Summit Kicks off in KIA-held Mai Ja Yang, Myanmar Times,
July 27, 2016, accessed January 17, 2017, www.mmtimes.com/ index.php/national-news/21583-ethnic-
unity-urged-as-summit-kicks-off-in-kia-held-mai-ja-yang.html.
92
Joint Press Release between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on August 20, 2016, accessed January 17, 2017
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t1390889.shtml.
93
Sean Gleeson, Beijing Reps Meet with Border Armed Groups as Peace Conference Nears, Frontier
Myanmar, August 29, 2016, accessed January 20, 2017, http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/news/beijing-reps-
meet-with-border-armed-groups-as-peace-conference-nears.
94
"Joint Press Release between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Peoples Republic of
China," statements and releases, Myanmar President Office, 2016, accessed February 8, 2017,
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/statements-and-releases/2016/08/22/id-6528.
 50

incident in china for protecting their sovereignty .95 In June 2015, live-fire exercises

were conducted along the border of the kokang SAZ.96

Specifically, Yunnan officials and intelligence agents from Yunnan province

maintain largely informal contacts with some of the EAOs, namely the KIO/KIA,

UWSA, TNLA, MNDAA and NDAA.97 Moreover, Yunnan province of China plays a

crucial role in ensuring and providing for both the livelihood and survival of these

groups such as economic assistance, trading, provision of electricity, water and

telecommunications and unofficially accepting refugees. Currently, the Chinese city of

Ruili on the border has also been an important venue for several meetings between the

UNFC and Myanmar governments peace team for peace and national reconciliation.

From SAAs perspective, the leading body of Wa enjoys very close relations with

China because of most of its leaders, being former Communist guerrillas, were trained

in China in the 1960s and 1970s. The UWSA is disliked over the government's drive to

get all ethnic militias to join a military-sponsored Border Guard Force. At the same

time, the UWSA has started producing and resembling weapons such as rifles, machine-

guns, pistols, revolvers and grenades , under an "informal franchise" after allegedly

making a huge annual payment to factories in China to use their designs and obtain

production-level support.98

95
China has responsibility, ability to safeguard China Myanmar borders stability, Peoples Daily, on
March 15, 2015, accessed on December 5, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0315/c90883-8863243.html.
96
Bi Shihong, Exercise sends message to whole of Asia, Global Times, on June 14, 2015, accessed
February 8, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/927002.html.
97
Yun Sun, China and Myanmars Peace Process, 7.
98
Ibid., 12.
 51

3.3.2 Issue in Geopolitical Dimension

As Myanmars major neighbor, China has been and will remain a critical player

in the Myanmar peace and National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Myoe, who is an

expert on Myanmar-China relation argued that an important aspect of geopolitical

reality is the asymmetry of power between China and Myanmar. 99 So, the strategic

location of a country is important in maneuvering its national interest either negatively

may face thread from neighbors or positively may gain economic opportunities

especially its neighbouring region. This study pointed out that Myanmar is come to be a

strategic geographical location as a vital gateway for China to Indo-Pacific regional

order. Given its considerable influence over the EAOs on Chinas border, its influenced

could be a significant impact positively and negatively on ground dynamics and the

peace and National Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar.

3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the current decentralisation process on the SAAs and

observed both Myanmar-China border and the SAAs from the geopolitical perspective.

In the first section of the chapter, this study examined that current decentralisation

process has multiple potential benefits for Myanmar. In fact, an inappropriately

designed decentralisation process can result in various adverse effects. Hence, this study

observed that the leading body of SAAs is not full linked up with public service

delivery mechanism in term of budget allocation, administrative decision making.

Moreover, under the current decentralisation process, ethnic identity issues and

orientation toward China , and illegal extraction over natural resources or some self-

99
Maung Aung Myoe, The Logic of Myanmars China Policy, 288.
 52

development projects are remain outside the framework of decentralisation, especially

in all SAAs. Besides, as the less apacity of the SAAs to go along with the countrys

political reform, it is likely to recognize that the SAAs are not yet ready to set up with

the decentralization process of Myanmar.

By the second section of this chapter, the study obviously pointed out why the

EAOs especially the KIA, the UWSA, the TNLA and the MNDAA were unwilling to

sign the NCA from geopolitical perspective? As the current Chinas role and interest,

this study indicates that Chinas interest is focused on the EAOs especially the KIA, the

UWSA, and the MNDAA along the border in Kachin and Shan states. Because of these

EAOs have historical and cultural ties with ethnic groups across the border in China as

well as economic and political connections. Also, despite China has played an active

role in persuading the EAOs to join the Union Peace Conference in 2016, this study

would be implied that its future policy and role will strongly depend on the

improvement of bilateral relations and the evolving definition of Chinas national

interests. In fact, in spite of China official position follows the principle of non-

interference and its formal policy is persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues,

this study would be argued that its attitude has been more ambiguous in practice.

Furthermore, although China has supported the peace process, its continued relations

with the EAOs are seen by many as providing the life support for the groups survival

and armed struggle. Most importantly, the revenues generated by mining, logging, and

other illicit economic activities directly fuel the war economy and prolong the conflict.

Thus, this study would conclude that Chinas role is complicated as the behaviour of

Chinese special interest groups who direct financial support for the EAOs.
 53

CHAPTER FOUR
RECENT AND ONGOING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS
4.1 Introduction

This chapter now considers both current armed conflicts and National Reconciliation

Process (NRP). So, the chapter takes the following approach. Initially, this chapter focus

on current armed conflicts from 2011 to 2016 with the purpose of finding which issues

are driving on the current armed conflicts specifically in the SAAs. After that, this

chapter emphasis on recent and ongoing Myanmars National Reconciliation Process

(NRP) from 2011 to 2016 with the purpose of finding how the mutual interaction

between issues of current armed conflict in the SAAs and the issues of NRP.

4.2 Armed conflicts

Firstly, focusing the discussion on armed conflicts, there are several dynamics of

internal armed conflicts that caused the conditions for over 60 years of civil war in

Myanmar. So, looking at the armed conflicts from the historical perspective, several

significant factors are taken into long-standing armed conflicts such as histories of

previous, unsuccessful ceasefire, the prevalence of drugs and lawlessness, perceptions

of discrimination on the part of minority communities, political economies and

perceptions of federal union. Also, despite the having long-standing armed conflicts,

Myanmar is now reaching at a sensitive stage in its political transition. So, this section

initially examines the current state of ethnic armed conflicts in Myanmar from 2011 to

2016.
 54

Figure 4.1 Armed Clashes between EAOs and Tatmataw (2013-2016)

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11
2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process, 2016.

As shown in Figure 4.1, there are a number armed clashes between EAOs and

Tatmadaw from 2013 to 2016. During 2013 to 2014, the number of armed clashes was a

gradually increased at most nearly 40 armed clashes per month. In 2015, the number of

armed clashes has increased significantly at most almost 50 armed clashes per month,

although the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) still going by initiating the

Myanmars government. In the meantime, despite the Myanmar's political

transformation and NLDs government was elected, the number of armed clashes has

been gradually declined again by the early of 2016. However, despite the making of

Union Peace Conference (21st-century Panglong), the number of armed clashes have

increased significantly by the end of 2016 as shown in Figure 4.1. Therefore, we could

imply that the implementation of the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) could not

cover the occurring of armed clashes between EAOs and Tatmadaw.

Further, the official announcement of the Ministry of information of Myanmar,

the statistic of the Myanmar Peace Monitor and due to the report of Burma News

International, the percentage of armed clashes between EAOs and Tatmadaw are

radically increased in the SAAs since 2013 to 2016 as shown in Figure 4.2. In 2013,
 55

Only 32 percentage of armed clashes are occurred in the SAAs. However, the

percentage of armed clashes in the SAAs has increased from 2014 to 2016 and the

increasing in 2015 is nearly 100 percentage100. As a result, it can see that despite the

overall armed conflicts between several EAOs and Tatmadaw, most of the armed

clashes are significantly occurred in the SAAs and we should consider that why the

EAOs have been availed the SAAs for armed conflicts. In other words, what are the

interrelation between the SAAs and the relevant EAOs and which are support to make

the armed action in the SAAs or near the SAAs?

Figure 4.2 Percentage of Armed Clashes in the SAAs (2013 to 2016)

Armed Clashes 2013 Armed Clashes 2014

32% Others 48% Others

In SAAs 52% In SAAs
68%

Armed Clashes 2015 Armed Clashes 2016

3%

21%
Others Others
In SAAs In SAAs
97% 79%

Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process,2013,2014, 2016.

100
Burma News International (BIN), Deciphering Myanmars peace Process, Burma News
International, Myanmar Peace Monitor, 2016, accessed February 8, 2017,
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/ images/ books/dm%20peace%20 process %20a%
20reference%20guide%2020 16.pdf.
 56

As mentioned above, for understanding the interrelation between the SAAs and

the relevant EAOs, the study now focuses on the tangible relation between the SAAs

and the EAOs. Although the administration and decentralisation system of the SAAs are

functioned, some of the existing leading body of SAAs are significantly connected to

the some EAOs as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Significant of SAAs and relation with ethnic armed actors101

Source: Kim Joliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, 2015, p.52.

For instance, some MPs from Ta-Aung National party are from the former rebel

group Palaung State Liberation Party and which is closely connected to Ta-Aung

National Liberation Army. Likewise, some MPs in the kokang leading body are former

MNDAA members and are interconnected to Border Guard Force (BGF 1006)102. As

well, all member of the leading body of the Wa SAD are from United Wa State Party

and the belief and ideas are defiantly equal with the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

However, Naga and Da-Nu SAZs are not significantly interrelated to current conflicted

EAOs. But, they still demanding more self-determination and right to power by political

Kim Jolliffe, Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,56-58.

101
102
Established in 2009 and transformed from MNDAA as the 2008 constitution of Myanmar, Border
Guard Force 1006 was leaded by Maj. Yang Xao Kying, who is also former MNDAA members. 2008
Constitution as a legal basis for the transformation of ethnic armed groups into Border Guard Forces
(BGF).
 57

dialogue. Likewise, Pa-Os leading group also still attached to the Pa-O National Army

(PNA) and it still have armed organization and based in the Pa-O SAZs.

Once more, as discussed briefly both increased percentage of armed clashes in

the SAAs and the interrelation between the SAAs and the relevant EAOs, the study now

emphases on the significant armed conflicts which are occurred in the SAAs near the

Sino-Myanmar border as shown in Table 4.2. During 2011 to 2016, most of the major

armed conflicts have significantly occurred in the some SAAs and they used new

collaboration strategy and well availed the advantage of geographical factors.

Table 4.2 Major Armed Conflicts Per EAOs in the SAAs103

Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process, 2016, 40-48.

Specifically, resumed major fighting between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw in

the Kokang SAZ at the Shan State since February 2015, which was particularly

occurred from February to June that year and again in October 2015. Moreover, in Shan

State especially near the Pa-laung SAZs, there have been sporadic clashes between

Tatmadaw and the TNLA and between that group and the SSA-South. There have also

been clashes between Tatmadaw and the SSA-North, of particular intensity from

103
Burma News International (BIN), Deciphering Myanmars peace Process. 56.
 58

October to November 2015 and in August 2016 as shown in Table 4.3.104 Furthermore,

UWSA also conducted military exercise in the Mongla special region and showed the

sign of dissatisfaction on NDAAs support of NCA as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Significant Inter-armed conflict between EAOs near the SAAs105

Source: International Crisis Group, Myanmars Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, 2016.

Moreover, among the several EAOs, some of the EAOs which are closely

relating to the leading body of SAAs have been expanded their strength significantly

during 2011 to 2016 as shown in Figure 4.4. For instance, the strength of the UWSA has

been significantly increased estimate from 20000 to 30000 and expanded to Mongla.

Likewise, the strength of the TNLA has been obviously increased and expanded to both

in the Pa-laung SAZs and outside of its. As well, the strength of the MNDAA also has

been regrouped and resumed major fighting in the kokang SAZs. In fact, those EAOs

have been discussed with the Myanmars government based on the political dialogue for

getting peace and ceasefire agreement concurrently. Additionally, some of the EAOs,

AA, TNLA and MNDAA have been rejected by the Tatmadaw for negotiation as the

standing of their armed organization and their attitudes.

104
International Crisis Group, Myanmars Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, Crisis Group
Asia Briefing, On October 19, 2016, accessed January 13, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-
east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-peace-process-getting-political-dialogue.
105
Ibid., 4.
 59

Table 4.4 EAOs expansions (2011 2016)

Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process, 2016, 70-76.

4.3 Issues of the Armed Conflicts

Actually, the Myanmars government has been facing ceaseless fire in most of the

countrys border areas, particularly in the Myanmar-China border. Several EAOs also

have being participated in the most of the armed clashes either directly or indirectly.

Thus, the all-inclusive ceasefire and complete reconciliation process are so far and wide.

In fact, both the combatant EAOs and non-signed EAOs which strength are larger and

they still dominate on other lesser EAOs. The dominance EAOs leader has used the

single context dialogue Federal Union and Federal Union Army in the negotiation

for getting the National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Sadly, the hostilities with the

KIA, TNLA, RCSS and MNDAA have continued. So, first, we can clearly see that the

interrelation of the leading body of SAAs and the combatants and non-signed EAOs.

Second, these EAOs are used the SAAs as a battlefield because of the vulnerability of

the geopolitics and lack of governance and insufficient decentralisation process. Most of

the innocent ethnic citizen who is staying in the Pa-laung and kokang SAZs, have been

suffering from an undeveloped environment and lawless society. In fact, in the Wa SAD,
 60

whatever the current leading body was building up their Wa region, most of the ethnic

citizen are under the armed command and need to stay under their special rule, thus

nobody could survive from the umbrella of Wa administration.

So, this study would be argued that due to the expansion of EAOs and the

interrelation between the leading bodies of SAAs and EAOs, the SAAs are still as a

vulnerability point for the ceasefire. Moreover, whether the leading body are likely or

not, they still as a defenselessness situation and at least they could have back channel.

Moreover, currently increasing the number of armed conflicts which are still occurring

in the Pa-laung SAZ and kokang SAZs at the Myanmar-China border, the SAAs are still

as a critical area for the strategic decision-making of EAOs, and financial opportunity

and obtainable human resource for the strengthening of the EAOs. Furthermore,

concrete holding single context dialogue Federal Union and Federal Union Army of

the EAOs, they preserve their strong belief and they might not agree to take on the

governments national reconciliation roadmap.

4.4 Recent and Ongoing National Reconciliation Process

The purpose of this section is to examine the overview of Myanmars peace and

National Reconciliation Process (NRP) and this study will find out the significant issue

of the process. Thus, before focusing on the Myanmar peace and National

Reconciliation Process (NRP), we need to clarify what is the National Reconciliation

Process? Theoretically, Marianne Heiberg, in his article, There is no Single Trust

argued the process of reconciliation seems to consist of two stages. 106 The first state is

106
Marianne Heiberg, There is no Single Trust, Reconciliation in the Asia-pacific, edited by Yoichi
Funabashi, (Washington, NJ: United States Institute of Peace Press: 2003), 198-199.
 61

the initial concrete agreement and the second is turning this agreement into sustainable

peace. He continuously discussed that first stage is required both good timing and

strong leadership and the second stage is also required a political reaction and an

understanding of history. In fact, he questioned how to achieve the sustainable peace in

practice. Regarding that question, he contended that practical policymaking needs to

have the creation of mutual trust and the management of history at the community level.

In Myanmar case, the term National Reconciliation is just easy to utter but so

difficult to define. Generally, peace is reconciliation and the peace process is a part of

the National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Typically, it is a process of building trust

and reconstituting all radical and ethnic groups that are segregated in the Myanmar. On

the other hand, it is interlinked with development, peace building and a transaction to

democracy in that country.107

4.4.1 Overview of the National Reconciliation Process (2010 to 2016)

First of all, the question is what are significant developments of the Myanmar's

National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Figure 4.3 presented the significant

development of the process during 2010 to 2016.

Figure 4.3 Significant Development of the NRP (2010 to 2016)

Source: Ministry of Information of Myanmar, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

107
Aung Naing Oo, Pathway to peace: An insiders account of the Myanmar peace process, (Yangon,
NJ: Mizzima Media Group Press: 2016), 26-28.
 62

In early 2009, in accordance with the 2008 Constitutional rule forbidding armed

forces independent of the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar government had demanded that the

ceasefire EAOs either turn their armed forces into a border guard force (BGF) with

reduced strength and truncated command structure or local militia108 before the new

constitution comes into force. The BGF structure opposed by the ceasefired groups (Wa,

Shan, MNDAA and Kachin), whose autonomous units comprised even brigades with

heavy weapons. Tensions had been rising between those four major ceasefired EAOs

and the Tatmadaw on account of this BGF issue. On 18 August 2011, the peace process

initiated by President U Thein Sein with an offer to all Ethnic Armed Organizations

(EAOs) to enter into peace talks remained at the ceasefire stage.

Since 2013, as for the ceasefire EAOs, the Myanmar government engaged them

more or less bilaterally the NCA which has been under negotiations. 109 Meanwhile,

several armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs occurred throughout 2014 in

Kachin State and Shan State, whose territories include borders with China.

Before the 2015 elections, the President U Thein Seins Government with high

hopes for peace through a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with all the major

EAOs from among the many EAOs seen by as the most serious hard security threat of

the day. from 2016 onwards, despite the NCA has been faced a challenge as the

unresolved conflict is also challenging the legitimacy of the government and the 2008

Constitution, the NLD government has being attempting to achieve national

reconciliation successfully.

108
lower status and smaller units than the BGF
109
Aung Naing Oo, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement: Myanmars road to peace, Myanmar Times
online, 31 October 2013, available at http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/8643-
nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-myanmar-s-road-to-peace.html.
 63

4.4.1 Statement of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

On 15 October 2015, the government of Myanmar and 8 EAOs signed the

Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the presence of local and international

witnesses, which was drafted by all parties and was approved unanimously by the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and it was an important historic milestone of peace efforts. The

government and representatives of 17 EAOs participated in drafting the agreement, and

which included 7 chapters and 33 majors points as shown in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 Key Summary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

Source: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, 2015.

For the NCA signed EAOs, during the one years period after signing of the

agreement, all parties to the agreement tried as much as they could to implement the

provision of the agreement. According to the NCA, joint implementation of the peace

process is being carried out phase by phase such as based on trust build on patience,

mutual understanding and respect. To ensure that military rules and code of conducts

(CoC) included in the NCA, the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was

formed and monitoring efforts are being exerted in an accountable and transparent

manner. As developing a roadmap to implement the entire peace process due to the
 64

NCA, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) was formed to hold all-

inclusive political dialogues and operation is being carried out. These are also one of the

significant developments of the Myanmar's national reconciliation process as shown in

Figure 4.3.

In fact, the Myanmars government and the Nationwide Ceasefire Negotiation

Team (NCCT)110, which represented 16 EAOs ( signed and non-signed EAOs), started

talking in late 2013. By late 2015, all these groups agreed on the content of the NCA, a

17-page document that included various military and political agreements. As a result, a

framework for political dialogue was drawn and the initial Union Peace Conference

(UPC) was held from 12 to 16 January 2016. After that, the Union Peace Conference

(21st Century Panglong) was also held in 2016 and the Myanmars government

officially stated the roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace. Nevertheless,

the process is going.

4.4.3 Summary of the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong)

Moving the discussion on to the Union Peace Conference (21st Century

Panglong), the conference was successfully held from 31 August to 3 September 2016.

It was turning a new chapter to implement the entire peace and National Reconciliation

Process (NRP). The conference was all-inclusive and discussions were made

independently. By respecting the provisions of the NCA and finding political solutions

through political dialogues peacefully, further steps will be taken to move forwards on

the way to build a union based on federalism. Furthermore, the provisions of the NCA

110
The NCCT was formed on 2 November 2013 with 16 armed ethnic organizations (all except KIO had
signed bilateral ceasefire agreements). It had appointed 13 individuals from the member organizations to
negotiate with the government.
 65

are resolving conflicts and as an important step towards a union based on democracy

and federalism can be built in accordance with the outcomes of the union peace

dialogues. After the UPC (21st Century Panglong), the Myanmars government

officially announced the The governments roadmap for national reconciliation and

union peace"111 on 15 October 2016 as shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5 Union Governments Roadmap for NRP

Source: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2016, Vol III, No 183.

In the UPC (21st Century Panglong), Over 1000 participants attended including

Tatmadaw, political parties, EAOs, the government and MPs and observers. All the

groups debated the exchange of opinions on the protracted armed conflict in the country

and on ways forward to establish a Federal Democratic Union. This is indeed a very

first step and most of the issues ranged from the geographical composition of the Union

to the formation of a Federal Union Army versus Union Army, under the civilian

government through the delivery of a series of speeches and papers. Furthermore, the

conference produced the space for ethnic nationalities from EAOs, political parties and

civil society to express both concerns and solutions towards resolving the long conflicts

and achieving peace. The Table 4.5 shown the participation of all stakeholders in the

conference.

The governments roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace, official News Paper, The
111

Global New Light of Myanmar, 2016, Vol III, No 183, Front page Col 2.
 66

Table 4.5 Participation of all stakeholders in UPC (21st Century Panglong)112

Source: the Irrawaddy, 2016.

Visions for the new Federal Democratic Union. As the NCA and Deed of

Commitment promise to establish a union based on the principles of democracy and

federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue, deciding the type of

federalism and how the country will divide its power and resources remains a daunting

task. Given Myanmars controversial 135 ethnic groups, multiple religious groups and

conflicting interest groups, finding the right structure to appease the entire population is

critical in achieving meaningful national reconciliation and preventing future conflict.

In other words, the current Myanmar government mainly emphasized in order to have

true national reconciliation and move towards federal democracy.

4.4.4 Myanmars Military [Tatmadaw]

In the Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP), the standing of the

Tatmadaw also very cleared that they would stick to their six-point peace agenda

which calls on the ethnic groups to give up arms absolutely and to come under the

institutional arrangements of the 2008 Constitution. Significantly, what is the standing

of Tatmadaw on changing the constitution as indicated by the Commander-in-Chief in

his address on 27 March 2014 at the military parade commemorating the Armed Forces

Day:
112
Nyein Nyein, 21st Century Panglong Conference Kicks Off in Naypyidaw, the Irrawaddy, on
August 31 2016, accessed March 1, 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/21st-century-
panglong-conference-kicks-off-in-naypyidaw.html.
 67

According to the 2008 constitution, the Tatmadaw is mainly responsible for

safeguarding the constitution, which can only be amended in accordance with
chapter 12.113

He also pointed out that the 2008 Constitution was systematically formulated by

a combined effort of all ethnic representatives and experts and it not a copy of other

countries democracy.114

In fact, the Tatmadaw plays a decisive role in the peace process and retains

partial control of national politics while the threat of internal conflict remains. Its

attitude towards EAOs and insurgents as enemies of the state has deep roots in the

countrys long history of civil war. With democratic reforms beginning in 2010 and

President U Thein Seins renewed peace process the following year, the military has

since made more effort to understand the ethnic struggle for self-determination and

minority right. Over the course of the NCA negotiations, it has come to be more

accepting of several demands from the ethnic side, namely the notion of federalism. It

has also agreed to cooperate with Aung San Suu Kyi to host the UPC (21st Century

Panglong) and supports the mainstream peace process in finding a political settlement to

appease all interest groups in Myanmar.

However, the Tatmadaw has been faced a serious challenge in the ceasefire

negotiations.115 It is a form to establish a Federal Union Army as a component of a

113
Commander-in-Chief Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing Speech at the Parade of the 69th
Armed Forces Day (Nay Pyi Taw, March 27, 2014), Nay Pyi Taw Parade Ground, accessed November
25, 2016, http://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/speech-delivered-by-commander-in-chief-of-def
ence-services-senior-general-thayaysithu-min-aung-hlaing-at-the-parade-of-the-69th-armed-forces-day-
held-on-27th-march-2014/.

Commander-in-Chief Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing, Speech at Passing Out Parade
114

Of DSA 59Th Intake, Myanma Alin, 6 December 2014, p. 6, accessed November 25, 2016, http://
www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/6.Dec_.14_mal.pdf
 68

federal political system demand by the EAOs. It was directly effected on the

Tatmadaws structural integrity and look going to the opposite way. 116 In that case,

Maung Aung Myoe who is an expert on Myanmars military affairs pointed out that:

Tatmadaw is not yet prepared to tolerate any structural changes that might
undermine its national political role, the basic principles for national unity and
solidarity set out in the 2008 Constitution or its institutional autonomy. 117

The Tatmadaw s aspiration is to bring peace and national reconciliation in a

lawful manner. In fact, the UNFCs concept of Federal Union Army is unacceptable

to the government and Tatmadaw leaders. Because, the Commander-in-Chief also

pointed out that the Tatmadaw already has a federal character in its multi-ethnic

composition of officers and other ranks. Moreover, he also affirmed that the 2008

Constitution does not allow the existence of any other armed force apart from the

Tatmadaw and the FUA would be an unacceptable anomaly.118

4.4.5 EAOs Coaliation

This subsection now observes on coalitional behaviour of the EAOs and what

action on the current National Reconciliation Process (NRP). The United Nationalities

Federal Council (UNFC)119 was founded on 16 February 2011 and is the latest coalition

of Ethnic Armed Organizations in Myanmar. In 2015, The UNFC took a leading

115
Tin Maung Maung Than, Tatmadaw and Myanmars Security Challenges, Asia Pacific Security
Outlook and Its Implications for the Defence Sector, NIDS Joint Research Series No.5, Tokyo: National
Institute for Defence Studies, Japan, 2010,124-142.
116
Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmars 2010 Election: Continuity and Changes. Southeast Asian
Affairs, 2011(1), 190-207.
117
Maung Aung Myoe, The soldier and the state: the Tatmadaw and political liberalization in Myanmar
since 2011,234.
118
Commander-in-Chief Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing, Speech at Passing out Parade of
DSA 59Th Intake, Myanma Alin, 6 December 2014, 6.
119
The UNFC is an umbrella group formed on 16 February 2011 and based in Chiang Mai, Thailand. It
has 11 member organizations and is dedicated to establishing a federal system of government in Myanmar
state. It is currently chaired by the KIO vice chairman.
 69

position in the NCCT that represented the ethnic side in drafting the NCA but refused to

sign the final draft, citing the need for all EAOs to be included as shown in Table 4.5. In

the negotiation process, the core demands of the UNFC are bilateral ceasefire, equitable

composition of participation, all-inclusive participation and Federal Union Army. 120

UNFC want to resolve military conflict first by the Myanmar military is to stop all

military offensives within 24 hours and EAOs follow within 48 hours with the strong

agreement that includes all EAOs. Moreover, the UNFC want more political guarantees

for the establishment of Federal Union protecting self-determination and nationwide

equality. Furthermore, the UNFC want more details on political dialogue decision-

making mechanism.

Table 4.6 Coalition of EAOs in 2015

Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process, 2016, 80-83

In fact, the UNFC have a pointed out that the current framework involves seven

groups of stakeholders (government, parliament, Tatmadaw, political parties, ethnic

representatives, EAOs, and special guests), which gives the Tatmadaw as a bigger

120
Sai Wansai, Finalizing incomprehensible framework for political dialogue: Is UNFC to be blamed?,
BNI and SHAN, Burma Link, on October 24 2016, accessed December 1, 2016,
http://www.burmalink.org/ finalizing-incomprehensible-framework-political-dialogue-unfc-blamed/.
 70

presence and unfair advantage. Thus, they want a form that advocated a tripartite

dialogue involving, the government, political parties and EAOs. Moreover, the UNFC

want to get allowing to include the 6 EAOs such as TNLA, LDU, AA, MNDAA, WNO

and ANC that the government has refused to sign.

Moreover, from early 2011 onwards, due to the interest and belief of the both

signed and non-signed EAOs, 4 meeting of EAOs held in the Wa SAD and 2 meeting of

EAOs held in the one of the UNFC members headquarter. Generally, all the results of

the meeting are clearly proclaimed to approve all-inclusive, to build a Federal Union,

to implement federal army and increase their self-determination and equal status.

21 August 2016, The UNFC proposed nine points to add to the NCA but the

government agreed only 4 point such as to build a federal union with result achieved

from the UPC (21st Century Panglong), Agreement of tripartite/political dialogue

composition, drafting and promulgation of constitutional law based on the outcome of

the UPC (21st Century Panglong) and developmental projects to be tackled according

to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, in cooperation with the public and the

EAOs121.

The proposed Federal Union, the main objective of the UNFC want to get a

high level of authority and autonomy with their own government and legislature, as well

as a Federal Union Army which EAOs could join without losing their identity and

control of their troops. To that end, the UNFC announced it had taken steps to form a

121
Myanmar Peace monitor (MPM), United Nationalities Federal Council, September 2016, accessed
December 4, 2016, http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/ stakeholders/ unfc.
 71

Federal Union Army (FUA) with their coalition EAOs. 122 The objective is to

strengthen their defence corporation for help each other if one is attacked by the

Tatmadaw. During 2015 to 2016, the FUA started hostile action on civilian target as

well as border trade area, which are situated in the kokang SAZ and near the Pa-laung

SAZs. The reason is to give a military pressure to Tatmadaw for getting their

demanding facts which are significantly included in the National Reconciliation Process

(NRP).

4.5 Issues in the National Reconciliation Process

As this study metioned in overview of the National Reconciliation Process (NRP)

section, those who expected the peace and national reconciliation process which invited

all EAOs to peace negotiations and was initiated by President U Thein Seins

government, to reach a conclusion in 2014 through the signing of the NCA, were

partially completed and still progress. 123 however, negotiations for a single text draft

agreement remained deadlocked after several rounds of formal and informal meetings

between the Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) and the Ceasefire

Coordination Team (NCCT) in the present. So, the current government provides more

support for the round of talks between the UPWC and NCCT and it still running to

finalize the elusive single text agreement which could a concrete foundation for the

Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP).

122
Saw Yan Naing, Ethnic Alliance Ponders Future Federalism, Creates Federal Union Army, the
Irrawaddy, 9 December 2014, accessed December 3, 2016, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/ethnic-
alliance-ponders-future federalism-creates-federal-union-army.html.
123
Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmars Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2014
(BNI: Chiang Mai, 2014). 68.
 72

In fact, as this study metioned in the statement of the Nationwide Ceasefire

Agreement section, the NCA would mark a potentially historic step towards achieving

peace and national reconciliation. This agreement has been partially supported to trust

establishment through the negotiations. The NCA has emerged as an essential

foundation for an inclusive, transparent, and meaningful political dialogue, which

remains the core requirement for lasting peace and National Reconciliation Process

(NRP). However, the NCA includes two critical parts to maintain the ceasefire and to

implement political dialogue. Also, the government has chosen a two-track approach in

the NCA process. One is to reach out to signatories of the NCA to ensure that the NCA

implementation in on track, the other is to engage with non-signatories to bring them

into the process. Due to the second critical part of the NCA, the government is working

closely with the non-signatories EAOs to ensure that the political dialogue is

meaningful and fruitful. Nevertheless, some of the Ethnic Representatives and EAOs

especially who are the member of UNFC and FUA are significantly pointed out that the

formation of a Federal Union Army under the civilian government and thus the need

to amend the Myanmars 2008 Constitution.

Hence, overall, it can be seen that the significant of the EAOs beliefs and

attitudes, and obvious issue of the Myanmars peace and reconciliation process. There

are the non-signed EAOs are continuously building the armed organisation for

strengthening and well develop, closely interrelating with the leading body of the SAAs

and influencing at the SAAs as shown in Table 4.7, and the non-signed EAOs concrete

holding the concept of the Federal Union and Army. Moreover, frequently making the

ethnic summits in one of the townships of SAAs and they still unaccepting the
 73

government NCA and peace process, that are significantly interrupted on the current

National Reconciliation Process (NRP).

Table 4.7 Influencing at the SAAs and Response to NRP by the EAOs

Note: Strength Level 1= 0-1000, level 2= 1000-2500, level 3= 2500-5000, level 4= 5000-10000, level 5=
10000-20000, PO= Pa O SAZ, NG= Naga SAZ, PL= Palaung SAZ, KK= Kokang SAZ, WA= Wa
SAD, SL= State level ceasefire; UL = Union level ceasefire ; NCA = Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement; DoC = Deed of Commitment; NCCT = Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team; DPN
= Delegation for Political Negotiation; CT = Coordination team; PD = Political Dialogue; PS1=
Panghsan Summit (1-6/5/2015); LKL = Law Khee Lar Summit (2-9/6/2015); PS2 = Panghsan
Summit (1-3/11/2015); PS3 = Panghsan Summit (26-28/3/2016); MJY = MijaYen Summit (26-
30/07/2016); PS4 = Panghsan Summit (22-24/2/2017); UPC 1 = Union Peace Conference; 2 =
Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong
Source: Burma News International (BNI), Deciphering Myanmar peace process,2013,2014, 2016.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has considered identifying the state of armed conflicts in the SAAs, and the

interrelation between leading body of the SAAs and EAOs are how the impact on the

ongoing National Reconciliation Process (NRP). Firstly, for Myanmar to achieve a true

solution for peace and national reconciliation, the government of Myanmar must

demonstrate an understanding of the depth and breadth of factors that are presently

impeding the peace and national reconciliation process. The NCA also offers a real
 74

opportunity for all of the key stakeholders to end their hostilities and make peace for the

first time in Myanmars modern history, which will turn lead to political dialogues.

Ultimately, the NCA can represent a turning point for the Myanmar, a chance for

political leaders on all sides to leave a legacy of peace for those generations to come. In

the NRP, the political parties and some of the ethnic representatives have obviously

examined that the regional development and self-determination for their minority ethnic

area. It is important that the NCA should be genuine and acceptable to all the ethnic

nationalities, relevant political parties and all EAOs. Here, one of the crucial elements

of the NRP is trust building.

In fact, the idea of inclusive is heavily affecting for actively including all EAOs

in the UPC (21st Century Panglong) and could be closely discussed for their

contributions to the peace process. So, it seems that where Myanmar who did not want

real peace and reconciliation are forced to rely more heavily on EAOs and conflict

action. Accordingly, the EAOs who can increase their strength and financial condition

have proved far more difficult for Myanmars government to success the National

Reconciliation Process (NRP). The nature of the conflict and negotiation, which involve

multiple stakeholders, is such that no one knows when the dialogues can conclude.

Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP) is an absolute necessity for the

consolidation of democracy in the Myanmars political transaction. The National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) is not a political system but can be a political process

bringing all disparate groups together to build a shared future.

Moreover, due to the critical interrelation between EAOs and the SAAs as well

as the increasing of armed clashes in the SAAs, the government should identify the way
 75

of an interrelation between EAOs and the SAAs, the way of unsigned EAOs and what

are the strategic plan by using the SAAs for making several armed conflicts. In other

words, Myanmar government should have to have political reconciliation as well as try

to solve to those segments to have reconciliations. The entire Myanmars National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) of the past five years, despite the process, has been an

incredibly complex, it still going to have a valuable national reconciliation result. In fact,

it is important why the large EAOs are still against by using armed action and

vulnerable of the relevant regions of the SAAs. It is not only necessary to create a

favourable environment in which peace dialogue and negotiation but also the

government should retrace and review the past situation of governance, regulation and

the real conditions of the SAAs.

 76

CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Analysis

This study is unique for the reason that most studies have examined above the history of

the armed conflicts in order to analyse the effect of ethnic armed conflicts on the peace

process. Moreover, some of the previous studies analyze the resolution of the conflict

on the Myanmar ethnic armed conflicts. However, there has not been any studies that

explore the effect of SAAs on the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar

beforehand. Thus, the study has considered the impact of the SAAs on the National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar. The empirical analysis is not only for

exposure of the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) but also for the vulnerability of

the Myanmars governance, regulation and decentralisation process of both perspectives

on the Union Government and the SAAs. Furthermore, the study has empirically

explored on both the effects of geopolitics on the SAAs and the posture of China.

Therefore, this chapter aims to evaluate the main factors of conceptual

framework presented from chapter two to four that show the implications of Myanmars

governance practice, regulation, decentralisation, geopolitical dimension and ongoing

National Reconciliation Process (NRP).

5.1.1 Governance Practice

In the constitution, could the constitution structure of the SAAs address the

fundamental and legitimate concern of ethnic minority people? What was the role of the

SAAs in both Myanmar democratisation and National Reconciliation Process (NRP)?

From the governance perspective, this study initially scrutinised that the Myanmar

government and Tatmadaw are deeply committed to peace and have done well to
 77

navigate both Myanmars democratic transaction and the National Reconciliation

Process (NRP) at the same time. For precision on the SAAs, due to the practice of

Myanmars governance, the chapter two of the study has identified that the SAAs role is

restricted to a few areas of governance and it ultimately depends on both of the General

Administrative Department (GAD) and the State government. Thus, this study would

argue that if the Myanmar government creates pragmatic self-sufficient general

administration structure for each SAA then it would have sufficient administrative

powers and management in their respective area. In fact, the chapter two examined that

as the existing governance practice had been supporting to the SAAs, it is likely as a

vulnerable area for strengthening the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the

ethnic minority groups as well as it is probably as a reinforcement area for the EAOs

who are non-signatories in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Moreover, this

study observes that sufficient regulation concerning natural resources, local economic

development, social security and education should be included in the broadening the

scope of SAAs responsibilities. Moreover, for strengthening the role of leading body of

the SAAs, this study would argue that the government should to review the present

governance and need to examine pragmatically that how the existing condition of the

SAAs is.

5.1.2 Regulation
For provision the role of Region/State government and SAAs leading body, the

current governance should be priorities in upcoming negotiations. This study examines

that the EAOs would be unwilling to fully cooperate the peace process unless there is a

commitment to change the 2008 constitution as their desire to build Federal Union and

Federal Union Army. Actually, as the Union government has welcomed all ethnic
 78

minorities and all EAOs, and it likely to realize that the more fabvour of the Union

government support to the more demands of all ethnic minorities in term of distribution

of residual power and division of authorities. Moreover, as the NRP has supported some

insignificant ethnic minority armed groups to negotiate at the Union Level, the LB-

SAAs and the relevant EAOs have unsatisfied. In fact, this study observes that the

Myanmar government and the Tatmadaw also unwilling to change the constitution until

national reconciliation is achieved.

For regulation insight, this study would argue that the government should

improve a pragmatic framework and regulations regarding financial and administration.

In fact, due to the less functional division of authorities and responsibilities, the leading

body of the SAAs would enjoy in their illegal business and drugs trafficking as well as

it is likely to support the improvement of financial development in their relevant EAOs.

5.1.3 Administrative History

As the seeking of the ethnic minority groups for getting the autonomy, Myanmar has

experienced a complex set of conflicts between the Union government and ethnic

minority groups in the countrys administrative history. The Union Government has

provided autonomous territories so-called Special Region to the some ethnic armed

group (e.g. MNDAA, UWSA, TNLA, PNO) as well as and the government provided

socio-economic development in the rural area which have been influenced by the some

small ethnic minority armed groups (e.g. NSCN-K) or ethnic minority groups (e.g.

DNDP). Moreover, as the present administrative arrangement of the Union

Government, the government has provided socio-economic development in all SAAs

since the U Thein Sein administration. However, For Naga, PaO and Danu, the SAZ
 79

status could make satisfy them and the administrative authority they are enjoying is

half full since the current status is much higher than the previous one. In contrast, the

same status of the SAZ is half empty for the remaining areas of Kokang, Wa and

Palaung as they have never fallen under any administration of the successive

governments of Myanmar since colonial period until the 2008 constitution has been

activated.

5.1.4 Decentralization

The Early section of chapter three has considered the current decentralisation

process on the SAAs. Due to the current decentralisation, chapter three has examined

that current decentralisation process would have multiple potential benefits for

Myanmar. In fact, if the inefficient decentralisation process can result in a various

backlash. Hence, this study discovers that the leading body of SAAs could not fully be

linked up with the achievement of the delivery of better public services in term of

financial and administrative decision making. Moreover, as the less apacity and

unwillingness condition of the SAAs to follow the countrys political reform, it is likely

to realize that the SAAs are not yet ready to set up with the government

decentralization process.

Furthermore, this study has recognised that current decentralisation should be

based on a functional framework between the Union government and the leading body

of the SAAs on the distribution of political power and economic benefits at all levels.

Thus, this study would argue that efficient decentralisation effort of the Myanmar

government is not only significantly important to the future national reconciliation and

stability of the country but also essential to become a Genuine Federal Democratic
 80

124
Union . Moreover, this study recommends that it would be better if the

decentralisation of the Myanmar government is in line with proper administrative and

fiscal arrangements which has associated with the aspiration of the ethnic minorities in

the SAAs as well as the countrys political transaction.

5.1.5 Geopolitical Dimension

What is the current national reconciliation arrangement of Myanmar, what are

the leading causes of impacting on national reconciliation by Self-administered Areas in

Myanmar? To response, the sub-question, second section of chapter three has observed

both Myanmar-China border and the SAAs from the geopolitical perspective. Especially,

the study obviously pointed out why the EAOs especially KIA, UWSA, TNLA and

MNDAA were unwilling to sign the NCA from geopolitical perspective?

From the perspective of geopolitics, this study would argue that China will be

remaining as an integral player in National Reconciliation Process (NRP) of Myanmar.

Evidently, the chapter three pointed out that as Myanmars largest neighbour, China has

been supporting in Myanmar' peace process, but it would not believe that the

comprehensive peace would not attain in the foreseeable future. Because, Chinas role

in the peace process had been complicated by the behaviour of special interest groups

and individuals in China who have offered direct financial support for EAOs in

Myanmar, which include the KIA, UWSA, and MNDAA. These relationships will have

contributed materially to their ability to sustain their autonomous presence and it would

reinforce the perception of both EAOs (KIA, UWSA, TNLA and MNDAA) and the

Speech at the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Pang Long), State Councellar Aung San Suu
124

Kyi, (Nay Pyi Taw, August 31, 2016) , MICC.

 81

Leading Body of the SAAs. Chinas role is further blurred by the widely assumed but

ambiguous central-local disparity. Most importantly, the revenues generated by mining,

logging, and other illicit economic activities directly fuel the war economy and prolong

the conflict. Thus, this study would conclude that Chinas role is complexed as the

behaviour of Chinese special interest groups who support as the financial assistance of

the EAOs (UWSA, and MNDAA) and Leading body of the SAAs (Wa and Kokang).

The situation in the three SAAs which are in northeast Shan and Kachin states

hold the key to Myanmars peace process. This study would argue that Myanmar

government needs to focus their attention on those areas. Because, armed conflicts

between TNLA, MNDAA and Tatmadaw frequently taking place in those areas

especially in Kokang and Palaung SAZs. The weapon used by TNLA and MNDAA in

the armed conflicts with the Tatmadaw are coming from Was arms factory as well as

from some interest group in the Yunan Province of China. Moreover, due to the

empirical analysis of the study in chapter four, apart from those two SAAs, even no

armed conflict took place in the Wa SAD, it has highly tensioned with the Tatmadaw.

Moreover, there are evidenced that UWSA has been producing small weaponry

applying technology illegally transfer from China.

5.1.6 National Reconciliation Process and Armed Conflicts in the SAA

Having the subquestions of the main research question that how does relation

between the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the political belief of the Self-

administered Areas leading body and what is the current national reconciliation

arrangement of Myanmar? For answering the subquestions, Chapter four has examined

the real relations between the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the political
 82

belief of the Self-administered Areas leading body and how the peace and National

Reconciliation Process (NRP) emerges as a part of the political reform initiated by the

Myanmar government.

Looking back at the peace process over the past four years, the NCA has laid a

solid foundation for peace and it has shown that how the government intends to fully

reconcile with ethnic groups remains unclear and it is complicated by the ethnic groups

lack of clearly articulated aims. As a result, the coalition of EAOs also plays a vital role

in the armed conflicts at the SAAs. Consequently, it is stated here that the SAAs which

are located at the Myanmar-China border are driven by the EAOs. Thus, this study

would conclude that the SAAs has been situating as an advantage area for the non-

signatories EAOs. Furthermore, the Myanmars national reconciliation roadmap could

not be achieved because it needs to sign union agreement inclusively. Thus, the

implementation of the roadmap of national reconciliation could be delayed as well as

the political transitional arrangement also could be postponed. But, to achieve national

reconciliation and peace in the country, the Union government should to take a more

conciliatory approach by focusing on building trust and mutual respect on both desire.

Furthermore, in the Palaung SAZ, Kokang SAZ and Wa SAD, the holding

power of the relevant EAOs and the current administrative system have overlapped.

Because, despite the relevant, EAOs have controlled resources and applied own rule in

some part of the SAAs, the LB-SAAs have also tried to improve the public service

delivery and it seem like a Diarchy.

 83

5.1.7 Concluding Remarks

Regarding the main research question of the study, it has scrutinised how Self-

administered Areas impact on the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar.

For getting the result of the research question, this study has initially provided to

understand why national reconciliation has emerged as a major issue on the political

agenda of the Myanmars democratisation process and how some ethnic minority areas

have adapted as a Self-administered Area in Myanmars constitution. Methodologically,

this study has attempted to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the problem

of the Self-administered Areas. After that, the study has assumed that there is a

correlation between the governance practice, regulation, decentralisation, geopolitical

dimension and National Reconciliation Process (NRP) and the Self-administered Areas

in Myanmar. After that, this study has highlighted how challenging the current practice

of governance, regulation and decentralisation in these SAAs will be and has provided a

basis for necessary future work to develop workable policy recommendation for the

SAAs and to overcome fragility and vulnerability of the SAAs. Moreover, this study has

verified how the leading body of the Self-administered Areas and Ethnic Armed

Organisations which are not only non-signatories in the Nationwide Ceasefire

Agreement but also currently as combatants in some Self-administered Areas are

interrelated. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is also found to be an essential step

of the Myanmars National Reconciliation Process (NRP). However, this study did not

describe in detail of earlier peace process and all ethnic armed conflicts in Myanmar.

Furthermore, if the SAAs could address the fundamental and legitimate concern of the

ethnic minority people, it would be no reason for the EAOs to exit. Last, this study has

concluded with the scrutinised significant impacts of Self-administered Areas, and it

 84

would be argued that the Self-administered Areas do not help the National

reconciliation process because of the governance practice, regulation, administrative

history, decentralization, geopolitics and the presence of the National Reconciliation

process in Myanmar.

5.1.8 Recommendation and Policy Implication

There might be a question of why there is a need to discuss SAZs politics and

what impacts on the Myanmar National Reconciliation Process (NRP) and peace.

Looking back at the national reconciliation and peace process over the past four years,

from Presidents Thein Seins olive branch to the EAOs in 2011, to the first UPC held in

2016, Myanmar has come a long way. Especially, the NCA has laid a solid foundation

for peace. The peace and national reconciliation are now in motion and the momentum

needs to be maintained. Moreover, for safeguarding the sovereignty of the State, the

spirit of the Tatmadaw under the supervision of the government also needs to protect

any kinds of encroachments on the government regulations and to participate in

establishing everlasting peace accordingly with the Six Peace Principles. However, this

study would argue that the Myanmar government should consider adopting a less rigid

timeframe and less unilateral approach and take steps to ensure it has the necessary

support capacity in place. Myanmar National Reconciliation Process (NRP) necessities

a more inclusive political process with the everybodys interests and a genuine political

dialogue with all ethnic groups is also essential for getting national reconciliation.

A governing entity of the country, it is necessary for the current government to

try and find the answer correctly based on the root of the countrys problem and in

consideration of the aspirations and true attitude of the ethnic nationalities. Current
 85

regulation of the Myanmar government is a constitutional system of dual spheres of

government with power divided between them for the complex intergovernmental

mixing and mingling that federalism entails. For decentralisation, the particular basic

principles and institutional requirements of federalism and power sharing among the

union, state and regional governments and SAAs, decentralisation should be

restructured based on previous lessons. This study recommends that the limitation of

the capacity of the SAA leading bodies as well as other States and Region legislatures

has caused the legislative tasks of the respective governing bodies and it leads to the

lack of laws which could allow them to collect taxes and revenues. Particularly, the

SAAs stand out as the exceptional area in Myanmar. It is very likely that the

implementation of the Roadmap for the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) might

delay as well as achieving all-inclusiveness might be challenging as shown in Figure

5.1.

Figure 5.1 The Impact of SAAs on the NRP

 86

From the geopolitical perspective, China has played an optimistic role in

persuading EAOs to join the Union Peace Conference in 2016, but its future policy and

role will depend on the progress of bilateral relations and the evolving definition of the

national interests of China. In particular, the ongoing support of China is crucial. Thus,

this study would propose that using a policy of active engagement with China is needed

to more secure peace and stable.

Moreover, the Union government thought that the current decentralization may

solve the problems. However, due to the presence of the SAAs, despite the Naga SAZ,

PaO SAZ and Danu SAZ have a great deal as almost half full, the Palaung SAZ,

Kokang SAZ and Wa SAD have no sufficient deal as almost half empty. Thus, the

Union government is a necessity to identify which factors should priorities for

improving the implementation of NRP. Moreover, depending on the pre-existing

conditions of all SAAs, the using of the approach of the Union Government should be

different.

For Myanmar, national reconciliation could be interpreted as a return to national

harmony. It is likely to be a problematic and complex task that the Myanmar

government is taking on as major challenges and a high priority. Moreover, Myanmars

political momentum is necessary to truly address these challenges that are truly

committed to building a stable and peaceful nation. Theoretically, democracy is a

system in which the majority wish is observed under the law and the minority wish

respected. For achieving NRP and establishing the Genuine Federal Democratic
 87

Union125 in Myanmar, the theUnion government is a necessity to reconsider on both

Governments policies and the aspirations of Myanmars national minorities for

achieving a suitable federal model with greatest satisfying of all citizens.

Finally, due the differing problems of the SAAs, the Union government should

take different approach to the relevant SAAs depending on the nature of the

problems.especially, the Union government should persuade the Chinese central

government to persuade the Yunnan province government to eliminate the actions of

Chinese interest groups who are supporting the current armed conflict in Myanmar.

5.2 Conclusion

Myanmars recent progress toward democracy has been incredible, but the country still

has some major hurdles to overcome, and all the level of governments should commit in

the Myanmars democratisation process. In fact, Myanmar is making progress toward

national reconciliation and political reform, although the process is fragile and the

advances uncertain. Especially, most remarkably the ongoing armed conflicts between

the EAOs and the Tatmadaw that has experienced over 6 decades of internal armed

conflict, nothing is more important than the achievement of lasting peace and national

reconciliation. Thus, this study has concerned that why there is a need to discuss the

SAAs circumstance and what impacts on the Myanmar National Reconciliation Process

(NRP) and peace. Based on preliminary research, the study has hypothesised that if the

existing state of Self-administered Areas would affect the present Myanmars National

Reconciliation Process (NRP), then it would be argued that the impact of the Self-

administered Areas is failing to support the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) in

Speech at the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Pang Long), State Councellar Aung San Suu
125

Kyi, (Nay Pyi Taw, August 31, 2016).

 88

Myanmar. As the result of the empirical analysis, this study has supported the

hypothesis. Moreover, the research shows that for achieving all-inclusiveness in the

NCA might be challenging and it is very likely that the implementation of the NRPs

Roadmap also might delay. However, although the thesis has reached its objective, there

were some unavoidable limitations. First, the study was conducted only on governance

practice, regulation, decentralisation, geopolitical dimension, and examining the state of

armed conflicts and ongoing national reconciliation process within 2011 and 2016.

Therefore, it is regrettable that the study should have involved more factors in the

conceptual framework. Second, the study on geopolitical dimension only emphasised on

the official relations between China and Myanmar, and some scholarly works, and if

more data could be collected, the result would be somehow different from the existing

conclusion. The data and information accumulated seem not to provide enough evidence

of the Chinese interest groups' actual behaviour on the LB-SAAs and the relevant EAOs.

Last, some of the necessary data and information were not able to be collected as much

as the study has intended. Field study and personal interviews with the prominent actors

could not be conducted, and the classified document of both the government and the

ethnic armed groups were not able to access. In addition, further studies should seek to

produce greater insight into the triangle relations between and among the Leading body

of SAAs, actors of Ethnic Armed Organisations and ethnic political actors and those

actors how support the ongoing political negotiations and the building of trust which are

also crucial parts of the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) in Myanmar.

 89

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