"What Is Philosophy?

" The Status of World Philosophy in the Profession

Author(s): Robert C. Solomon
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 100-104
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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 COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

"What Is Philosophy?"The Statusof World Philosophy

in the Profession

RobertC. Solomon
ofPhilosophy,
Department ofTexasatAustin
University

The question"Whatis philosophy?" is bothone ofthemostvirtuously self-effacing

and one ofthemostobnoxiousthatphilosophers todaytendto ask. Itis virtuously
self-effacinginsofaras it questions,withsome misgivings, itsown behavior,the
worthofthequestionsitasks,and thesignificance oftheenterprise It is ob-
itself.
noxiouswhen it refusesto questionitsown behaviorbutinsteadtakesthatsame
behavioras theexclusivestandard todelegitimize anyotheractivity thatdarestocall
itself"philosophy." Thus,formostofthiscentury, Anglo-American and mostEuro-
pean philosophers have simplyignored the rich philosophical traditions ofAfrica,
Asia, Latinand Native America, and the rest of the world. Some leadingAfrican
American and African Europeanphilosophers havedismissed"ethnophilosophy" as
"notphilosophy," to
presumably protect theirown analyticcredentials. Universities
as farflungas Singapore,SierraLeone,and New Delhi have pridedthemselves
on theirfidelity to Oxbridgephilosophy.It seems thatthe globalizationof free
market economicsgoes withtheglobalization ofone briefmomentin philosophy,
withsimilarly devastating effectson local cultures and therichvarieties of human
experience.
Philosophy might be thoughtofas madeup oftwocomponents: criticalthinking
and passionatevision.But"criticalthinking" does notnecessarily imply herme-
the
neuticsof suspicion,skepticism, or intellectual paranoia-all too oftenthetrade-
marksof the brightyoungprofessional philosopher. One can be "critical,"that
whileat thesame timebe committed,
is, reflective, even devoted,to an idea or a
way thinking. emphasis passionatevision,however,is justas essential,
of The on
and anyphilosophy thatdoesn'tincludebothcomponents justisn'tworthy of the
name.Withoutpassionatevision,we getthatutterly eviscerated focuson forms of
argumentation-philosophia minimalia-devoid of "empirical" content (that is to
say, content)and, as faras mostpeople are concerned,devoid of any interest.
Without we getgullibility
criticalreflection, and theworstof New Age philosophy,
acceptingofany kindof nonsense,justbecause itstirsthepassions.Butsimplyto
assumethatphilosophy mustbe as rigorously self-questioning as modernEuropean
and Anglo-American philosophyis a subtle form of ethnicchauvinism. Iteliminates
fromthe realmof philosophynotonlyAfricanethnophilosophy and Latinand Native
Americanand SouthPacificmythology buta good deal ofthephilosophyof religion,
the basis (forbetteror worse) of the developmentof Westernphilosophyover much
of the past two thousandyears.

100 PhilosophyEast & West Volume 51, Number 1 January2001 100-104

of Hawai'i Press
? 2001 by University

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 I have justwithdrawn froma recentdispute,in a respectable and supposedly
eclecticphilosophyjournal,in whichmyworstfearsin thisregardwere rather
bluntly confirmed. I had madethepointmentioned above-rathermatter-of-factly, I
if
thought-that (analytic) philosophy dismisses or ignores modes of thinkingthat are
notobviouslyself-critical and arepresented poetically insteadofbywayofpositions
to be arguedfor,thena good deal oftheworld'sphilosophy, including a good deal
ofWesternphilosophy, wouldbe leftoutofthearena.The journal'sboardreacted
indignantly, to putitmildly, to thesuggestion thatanything shouldcountas "phi-
losophy"thatwas notsufficiently injustthissense.Butwhataboutthe
self-critical
millennium or so of religiousphilosophyin the West?Does anyonebelievethat
thinkers likeAnselm,or AlvinPlantigaforthatmatter, are seriously skepticalofthe
truth ofChristianity, as theygo through theiradmittedly brilliantargumentative rou-
tines?Forthatmatter, to whatextentis theemphasison logicalformand argument
to in
subjected scrutiny contemporary analyticphilosophy? (Asone oftheforemost
practitioners ofthat art commented, "Metaphilosophy makes me sick.")
Some of the hostility to worldphilosophy, to be sure,turnson the conflict
betweenphilosophy and religion, whichmayhave itsoriginsin ancientand medi-
eval philosophy butemergesfull-blown withthe Enlightenment and itscampaign
against"superstition." Butmanypeople and a good manyculturesdo notdistin-
guishbetweenphilosophy and religion.Ifwe considertheword"philosophy"in
viewofitshistory and thecultural conditions ofitsdevelopment, itbecomesevident
thatphilosophy has a greatdeal in common with religion. We can also see howthe
current conceptofphilosophy emergedas a productoftheenlightenment campaign
againstreligious superstitionand how itthus became a celebration of reason.
critical
Butifwe are goingto be scrupulousaboutour languageand carefulaboutwhat
historical strictureswe imposeon theevaluationofwhat"we" philosophers do, it
would seem obviousthatwe shouldrecognizethisparticular conceptionof phil-
as and
osophy historically culturally bound, and not "essential" to philosophizing.
Whatwe do (andwhatthatis) really should be an item for serious and
self-scrutiny,
notjustbywayofeliminating thecompetition.
Ifwe continueto takeitas a necessary condition ofphilosophy thatitis critical
thinking, thenwe had betterbe careful thatwe do not confine "criticalthinking" to
thatlimitedand problematic epistemological history definedby Descartesand
Humeor theaggressive eighteenth-century effort to free scienceand societyfrom
theclutchesofsectarianreligion.Ifphilosophers say, with thisemphasison critical
thinking in mind,thatthebeliefsystems of most of the peoplesoftheworldare not
philosophy, thenthatbespeaksa profoundimpoverishment of philosophy. Why
shouldwe, of all people, allow ourselvesto be trappedand suffocated by our
own history? Ourcriticalscrutiny today should be turned on the word "philosophy"
itself,alongwithitshistory, to realizethatwhatwas once a liberating concepthas
today become a constricted,oppressive,and ethnocentricone. To demean African
"ethnophilosophy"as "not philosophy,"as many AfricanAmericanphilosophers
have done, is to buy uncriticallyintoenlightenment(and colonial) ethnocentrism.
The philosophyof SouthAsia is not,contraryto some Universitycurricula,the same

RobertC. Solomon 101

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 philosophy thatone findsat Oxford,Cambridge, and Princeton. Indeed,ifIndian
philosophers can be shownto have been practicing "analyticphilosophy" fortwo
millennia beforeFregecame on thescene,thenthatis all themorereasonforread-
ingIndianphilosophy witha keensenseof itsown traditions and peculiarities,not
just as a curious anticipation of Russell and Wittgenstein.
We shouldalso be particularly carefulnottotiethebondsof"criticalthinking"
too tightly to what(intheWest)is called"autonomy." We can thusincludeAfrican
philosophy and American Indian and
philosophy any numberof "non-Western"
(i.e.,pre-or post-Enlightenment) philosophies thathavetheirown stylesof internal
criticism, despite the fact that they are based on authority and notautonomy, do not
adopt what (in theWest) is called "the scientific
method," and do in
little thewayof
to
trying get "outside of" their own of
systems thought to see themfromafar.But,
then,manyanalyticphilosophers are similarly loatheto raisequestionsaboutthe
significance oftheirown pursuits (reflecting,perhaps,theirowntribalstatus).
The problem, as I havearguedin myrecentbook,TheJoyofPhilosophy, is the
way contemporary philosophy has rendereditselfso "thin,"cuttingitselfofffrom
context, history,and culture. The philosophical gamesbasedon a dubiousnotionof
"logicalpossibility" and the continuing insistenceon necessary and sufficientcon-
ditions, givingriseinevitably tothecounterexample contest, havebeen undermined
by recentworkinthephilosophy of language.Itis easyenoughto appreciatewhy
youngphilosophers continueto be enticedto join in such games,butfewpeople
outsideacademicphilosophy departments findanything ofinterest orsignificance in
them.Moreover, thecompulsivenatureofthegamesdistracts us fromconfronting
theproblems thatso-calledrealpeoplefaceintheirlives.How manymorecenturies
arewe to watchsomeofourbrightest youngmindslosethemselves in"internalism-
externalism," "realism-antirealism" debates?
Such debatesdo notarisein Chinesephilosophy, or in Africanphilosophy, not
because theChineseand theAfricans are unsophisticated and lackan adequately
rigorous epistemology butbecause the linguistic and ethnocentric distinctionson
whichsuch gamesdependdo notexistthere.Buttheemphasison rigorous argu-
mentsalso undermines oursenseof "ourown" philosophical tradition.
We define
"philosophy" in terms of the criticism of arguments and then read Plato,thegreat
myth-maker, dialectician,and dramaticplaywright, as the purveyor of bad argu-
ments.We limitourattention to thebare logicalbonesof Hume'sskepticism and
utterly ignore the fact that he was one of themost cultured men of theeighteenth
century. Thereis nowa new(andevidently verysuccessful) moveto logicizeHegel,
converting hisquasi-religious notionof "spirit"and hisinfamously voracious"dia-
lectic"intoa seriesofquasi-formal movesinsemantic and
analysis conceptrevision.
None of this,I hastento add, constitutes an attackor even an objectionto
"technical philosophy,"philosophythatcelebratesformalismand the sortsof puz-
zles that have dominatedthe "analytic" literatureforthe past halfcenturyor so.
Many of the mostbrilliantphilosophersworkingtodayenjoy and exemplifythisway
of doing philosophy.What I have objected to is the exclusivenessof thisapproach,

102 East& West

Philosophy

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notin thesense thatonlythose"in the know"have any interest or abilityin the
practice but in the much more damning sense that onlythose who practicesuch
esotericphilosophy are considered"serious"philosophers, or,forthatmatter, phi-
losophersat all. Thisnotonlyexcludesmostoftheworld'sgreatand lesserintel-
lectualtraditions and virtually all nonprofessionalized philosophers, but it also
utterly alienatesphilosophers from the rest ofhumanity, includingmost of theirown
students. Fascinating and intractableas itspuzzlesmaybe, discipline survive
no can
forlongas a publiclysponsoredactivity ifitrefusesto recognizeor giveequal foot-
ingto waysofthinking otherthanitsown.
Philosophy is in a crisis.Now, itcould be arguedthatphilosophy has always
been in a stateofcrisis,thatsuchis thenatureofthediscipline, thusexplaining the
ratherdesperatepronouncements of manyof our greatestphilosophers to "end"
philosophy or to have solved its unsolvable problems once and for all. Butthe
dominant of
paradigm Anglo-American philosophy-which has now been declared
"dead" manytimes-continuesto getmoreemaciatedand moreexclusive.Mean-
while,theglobalnatureofintellectual lifedemandsthatphilosophy accommodatea
of
greatmanyways thinking thathave not been taken or
seriously givena place
withintheAmericanPhilosophical Association.(A briefglanceat the program of
almostany APA meetingshowsa familiar picture:a core meetingwiththe usual
suspectsand puzzles,and a proliferating numberof "GroupMeetings," whichare
notpartoftheAPAproper,oftenscheduledat awkwardtimes.Manyofthesefocus
on "non-Western" philosophy.)
Thismustchange,butitis notjustrescheduling thatis required.The verycon-
ception of what counts as philosophy has to be seriouslyrevised.
This is notto say
thatdumbacceptanceofdoctrine nowcountsas philosophy, butitis to say,against
theenlightenment thatfaithand authority
tradition, have theirplace in thetentof
philosophy. Andthisis notto open ourflapsto anypoeticor literary production or
pretension, much less to sectarian proselytizing, without regard to its philosoph-
ical significance. Butit is to acceptmetaphor, mythologizing,conscientious ambi-
guity, and "analogicalthinking" as legitimate modesofphilosophizing. Muchofthis
makesanalytically trainedphilosophers suchas myself morethana bituncomfort-
able. Butas someofmyruderstudents wouldsay,"justgetusedto it."
Andas foranalyticphilosophy, itwas and continuesto be a healthy corrective
to the sometimesexcessiveromanticisms of our day, includingexcessivemulti-
culturalist and "postcolonialist" fervor. Butthisdoes notmeanthatwe shouldlook
at excessiveromanticism and analyticphilosophy as poisonand antidote,respec-
tively.Theyare two partsofa dialecticthat,at itsworst,causes mutualdefensive-
ness,self-righteousness, and mutualassuredmisunderstanding. Butat itsbest,and
whenitdoesn'tinsiston beingtheonlyvoice intheroom,analyticphilosophy still
clarifies,articulates,and opens up (ratherthan closes down) the world. It need not
be reductionistor materialistor overlyformal,self-absorbedin itsown techniques.
Nor need it be oblivious to content,context,culture,and history.Indeed, it has
always been the tensionbetween the need to speculate and the urgeto clarify-not

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 only in Europe,England,and Americabut aroundthe worldand across many
disciplines-thatcharacterizes
the history
of philosophy.
In otherwords,Yinand
Yang.And I
that, hope,summarizes the of
future worldphilosophyas well.

There's NothingWrongwithRaw Perception:A Responseto

Chakrabarti'sAttackon Nyaya's NirvikalpakaPratyaksa

StephenH. Phillips
ofTexasatAustin
University

In the lead articleof the fiftieth anniversary issue of PhilosophyEastand West

(January 2000), ArindamChakrabarti elaboratesseven reasonswhyNyayashould
jettison "indeterminate perception" viewall perception
and as determinate, thatisto
as an
say, having entity (a) as a
qualifiedby qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes,
Chakrabarti invitesa reply"so that,"as he says,"I mayknowwhyimmaculate
perception is neededbyNyayaafter all." Thefollowing is a responsethatshowsnot
so muchwhyindeterminate perception is needed by Nyayabutwhyitis identified
as a causal factornecessary to thearisingofsome (notall) determinate perception
definedas "perception ofan entity as qualified."HereI followGanrgesa Upadhyaya,
thefourteenth-century founder (withthehelpofa fewlesswellknownpredecessors
and contemporaries) of "New Logic,"Navya Nyaya.Garigeladevotesan entire
section(aboutone eighteenth) oftheperception chapterofhismonumental Tattva-
cintamani (Jewelof Reflection aboutEpistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksa,1 and
he is a chieftarget ofChakrabarti's chastisement.2
Now,first ofall, I wantto followGanrgesa's groundrules.The Naiyayikais not
concernedwithstrategies about how to look good in debates(withBuddhists or
anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not and
eristic, thus no reply will be given
to Chakrabarti's agonizingabouthow bestto showourselvesin controversies with
(in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars).Ganrge-a's reflections are
vada-and the sectionis rightly titlednirvikalpaka-vada, vada being "inquiries
among friends"-directed to uncovering realcausal factors, not towinning a debate
orcountering sophisms. or
Deception, counter-deception, issometimes appropriate-
forinstance, to protect a student orotherjudgefrom fallaciesadvancedbypeopleof
bad character.Butnothere.So I will lay out Ganrgela'sargument foridentifying
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa, and then run through Chakrabarti's listof reasons forreject-
ing it with an eye to the objection's salience to Ganrgesa's project. In other words,
Chakrabarti's objectionswillbe takenup withan eye to thetruth as itappearsto a
Naiyayika, notwithan eyeto howourteamshouldbestpresentitself to outsiders. I
have littleto sayaboutChakrabarti's complaints about appearances-in fact, I find
themdelightful. Don'tlethimfoolyou.There'sno greater Naiyayika enthusiast than
Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to a
distill controversy to show the wisdom

104 PhilosophyEast & West Volume 51, Number1 January2001 104-113

? 2001 by University
of Hawai'i Press

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