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Insights Executive Education

Paradise questioned
Corporate governance in an era of turmoil

T
he financial crisis left many econo- makers, regulators, rating agencies, wishful
mies, including our own, in a disas- investors. Global imbalances exacerbated
trous twilight. Among the casualties the problems.
of the crisis are debunked ideas and
practices, failed institutions and tattered How should we address failures at so many
reputations. levels?
Smart Business talked to Timur Gk, an
instructor in the Department of Finance at We must address many issues simultane-
Northern Illinois University, about corpo- ously. We need more effective regulators,
rate governance mechanisms, risk manage- and we also need to revisit what role, if any,
ment practices and what the future may rating agencies should play in the future.
hold. As a first step, the balkanized U.S. regula-
tory system should be streamlined.
What is corporate governance? Subsequently, we should begin to see
greater regulatory scrutiny. The focus
Corporate governance is the set of rules should be on better regulation and not nec-
that shape and constrain how effectively essarily more regulation. At a moment like
corporate managers deliver on their prom- Timur Gk this, it is altogether too easy to overlook the
ises to investors in general and sharehold- Instructor, Department of Finance vital role financial markets and innovations
ers in particular. The rules may be explicit Northern Illinois University have played in creating vast material wealth
or implicit; they may be defined by laws, in Western nations. We must understand
regulations and social norms. For instance, fully why the system malfunctioned.
in the U.S. the fundamental promise is to What are some of the issues beyond per-
enhance the value of the firm. The financial formance and rewards that led us to where What about firms?
crisis is partly the outcome of failed gover- we are today?
nance mechanisms that led to the violation Firms must take an integrated view of
of that fundamental promise. Closely tied to the failure of performance corporate governance and risk manage-
and reward mechanisms is the failure of ment. This puts the onus on corporate
How do we ensure that promises made are corporate risk management. At the quanti- boards to provide better oversight. Board
promises kept? tative level, no one can any longer ignore the audit committees or a subset must directly
fundamental shortcoming of models that oversee corporate governance as well as
The basic problem is that shareholders to were built on the assumption that volatili- corporate risk management practices.
whom promises are made have limited ties and market declines that we experi- Under the direction of the board, corpora-
involvement in corporate decision-making, enced over a matter of days were supposed tions must take an integrated view of risk
are less informed about corporate actions, to happen once every million years! So, a financial, operating, hazard and strategic
and rely mostly on boards of directors to top priority is to develop and deploy better risks. We refer to such an integrated
manage and monitor corporate manage- quantitative tools. We also have to be much approach as enterprise risk management.
ment. Rules and sanctions support this sys- more diligent about systemic risks. We also need better risk management train-
tem, but they alone cannot solve our prob- However, better models and a heightened ing and skills, tighter controls and account-
lem. As any effective parent, teacher or awareness of systemic risks are unlikely to ability, and better reporting.
supervisor can tell us, the linchpin of the keep us out of trouble. Even with our limit-
system is incentives, and in the corporate ed tool-set, there were warnings about trou- What are some broader implications?
world, a big part of that is compensation. blesome trends, such as the real estate bub-
Poorly structured compensation schemes ble. Why were these warnings not heeded? Incentives and trust are two pillars of the
have led CEOs of several large financial This brings us to structural failures. Faulty free market system incentives to deliver
firms to take on ever greater risks to boost corporate governance systems allowed on promises and trust that promises will be
their short-term compensation at the some financial institutions to take on ever kept and, ultimately, enforced. This is an
expense of the long-term viability of their more risk while senior managers side- opportunity for us to mend the system by
firms and indeed of the entire system. stepped or dismissed risk managers and replacing what is broken and to restore con-
Corporate boards of directors approved boards of directors remained on the side- fidence in the system by dispelling the aura
and oversaw the compensation schemes. lines. Others were culpable as well: policy- of private gains and social losses. <<
We must revisit how compensation
schemes are designed and how perform- TIMUR GK is an instructor in the Department of Finance at Northern Illinois University. Since 2006, he has been the regional director
ance is monitored and rewarded. in Chicago of the Professional Risk Managers International Association (PRMIA.org). Reach him at (815) 753-6395 or tgok@niu.edu.

Insights Executive Education is brought to you by Northern Illinois University College of Business

2009 Smart Business Network Inc. Reprinted from the March issue of Smart Business Chicago.

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