Virtue Ethics > Util

Virtue controls the internal link to happinessthis means virtue

outranks happiness.
Jones n.d.1
Mill holds that virtue is not only valuable as a means to pleasure, but in fact as an end in itself. Virtue and
happiness are perceived to be different, but Mill attempts to show that this is superficial. It is by seeking virtue
disinterestedly and for its own sake that virtue can become part of pleasure, Mill claims.
One can value virtue as an end for its own sake because the parts of happiness [is] are various, and not a

single, abstract whole. The mind that is most capable of aiding the
general happiness is the mind which values virtue in and of itself . If
one lives in a society where each individual is acting according to virtue, then
the happiness of that individual will be greater, as [she]he can learn to appreciate[s] the quality of this

pleasure, and the happiness of the society will be greater . The reason
that Mill thinks this is true is because of his belief that one is not the most happy when one is not
acting conscientious of virtue. It is an example of a pleasure of high quality, one of the pleasures that
swine are incapable of, because beings of faculties not sufficiently high enough be able of holding a conception of virtue
can not experience the happiness it can produce.

Ethics must be grounded in human nature epistemology.

Voytinsky 112
Kant (1965, 41) himself pointed out that all our knowledge begins with experience. We would
not even have the knowledge that 2 and 2 is 4 if not for the admittedly contingent fact that, in general, if we take two
things and two other things, we get four things (although this is not the case for many cases involving two things and two
other things such as two goldfish and two piranhas where, in short order, we will have less than four things). This does
not make mathematical truths any less a priori, any less logically necessary, but these truths would not exist in any sense
putting
meaningful to us if we did not observe certain contingent, a posteriori truths. To put this in another way,
together two things and two other things will usually, but not always, result in
four things. This is an a posterior truth. But without observing this a posteriori
truth, the a priori truth of mathematical 2+2=4 would not become
known to us. Likewise, the idea that it is wrong to harm others would not have
occurred to us if not for contingent facts about our psychology. There
is no logical necessity about us having empathy for others and that we are
psychologically averse to certain actions does not demonstrate that those

1 Jones, Paul. [MA in Philosophy, Rutgerss University] "Mills Utilitarianism and Virtue." Web log post. Paul
Jones at Rutgerss University. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 June 2017. <http://eden.rutgers.edu/~pmj34/?page=%2FPapers
%2FJ.S.%20Mill%2F%2FMill%27s%20Utilitarianism%20and%20Virtue.md>. Bracketed for grammar and
efficiency. //PZ
2 Voytinsky, Michael. [MA in Philosophy, University of Wales] Utilitarianism as Virtue Ethics. September 2011.
Web. 10 June 2017. //PZ
 actions are wrong but rather is the ground of their being wrong . For instance, we
can imagine beings, intelligent like ourselves in many ways, who care no more for their young than do salmon. That we
are not such beings is a purely contingent matter, and it is the contingencies of evolutionary development that resulted in
us expending a great deal of care on our young. But what motivates us to take care of children is not our knowledge of
evolutionary biology however our moral motivation is the result of evolutionary
biology. Explaining why it is morally wrong to abandon an infant in terms of our evolutionary development would
make no sense but our contingent biology is the ground that makes moral knowledge possible. Guilt, like the rest of our
moral experience, has its ground, but not its logical foundations, in our biology. It is part of our moral experience and
there is no reason to dismiss it simply because without our evolution having followed a certain path, it would not exist.

A priori ethics must remain , necessarily, ethics of human beings

and not ethics of abstract intelligent beings.

Ethics is uncodifiable; strict adherence to rules is blind

fanaticism. Only virtue ethics can account for the particularisms
of the real world.
Voytinsky 113
The insistence that some particular ethical theory must be fully appl[y]ied in
every conceivable (and perhaps even unconceivable) circumstance [is] can be rightly described as
fanatical. But if we reject fanaticism with regard to application of ethical theories the rejection being a very
appropriate response to it we implicitly accept the view that no ethical theory is adequate for
every possible circumstance. Mutatis mutandis, we can never have an adequate theory as to what
constitutes fanaticism that we can use to identify fanaticism in every circumstance. One could be a fanatic even in
no ethical theory can be applied without taking
combating fanaticism. In other words,
into account the larger context that is unstated and can never be fully
stated without falling into infinite regress. Without this context, or
more precisely without a person aware of this context and capable of
applying it, that is without a good person, no ethical system will be
adequate. But this context must necessarily exist prior to the ethical theory. If a deontologist were to suggest that
there is no moral difference between someone killing an innocent person for their wallet, and someone killing an equally
innocent person in order to prevent multiple deaths, they could be reasonably accused to fanaticism. A Kantian could
well point out that such a deontologist would be mistaken, failing to consider that the killer-for-profit was clearly lacking
in good will (the only thing that can, in Kantian terms, be described as good (Kant 1952, 256), while the killer for the
greater good was, although misguided, at least attempting to do good. But the only way we have to determine the
presence of good will is through external signs and consequences are very important if not the most important external
signs possible. So even within a deontological framework, utilitarian consequences are a consideration. As compelling as
Williams arguments against utilitarianism are, we cannot entirely avoid utilitarian reasoning which may well account
for utilitarianisms staying power despite two centuries of constant criticism, frequent lack of mainstream acceptance, and
the often noted disconnected between it and human ethical experience. The resolution of this paradox utilitarianisms
inevitability, as well as its irrelevance and even incoherence lies in changing the way utilitarianism is understood.
good lies
Rather than regarding it as consequentialist ethics, I propose regarding it as virtue ethics. The essence of
not in following some set of rules, but in understanding and being able to apply ethical rules,
and discard them when they are inappropriate in a particular case. In
other words, the essence of good lies in being a good person .

Consequences are a sign, not the essence, of good . Being a

3 Voytinsky, Michael. [MA in Philosophy, University of Wales] Utilitarianism as Virtue Ethics. September 2011.
Web. 10 June 2017. //PZ
 good person cannot depend on regarding as true some
ethical theory.

Only a virtue ethics resolves the inevitable flaws of util.

Promoting ethical character is lexically prior to any set of rules.
Voytinsky 114
Utilitarianism, as ordinarily understood, is both deeply flawed and unavoidable. It does not
resemble moral reasoning as it actually occurs. It places all acts, in and of themselves, on the same
moral level, and treats all pleasure, however obtained, as a good even the pleasure of
a most depraved sadist whose methods, but not goals, are morally
objectionable. It fails to make clear how one is to proceed with moral heuristics if
every act is, in principle, as good as any other then there is nothing except contingent consequences to
make selfless charity stand out from depraved sadism. It [and] cannot
even prescribe any particular moral outlook or moral decision-making process since there is no
strong link between adherence to any particular moral outlook and good outcomes.It is also unavoidable - two centuries of
continued debate with no sign of progress by either side are a testament to that. As consequences of deontology become
severe enough, it becomes more difficult to continue maintaining that some actions must (or must not) be taken, no
This state of affairs is likely to
matter what. But with less pressure, utilitarianism becomes pointless.
remain[s] unless the way utilitarianism is seen changes. One such possible change is regarding it not
as a consequentialist ethics, but as virtue ethics. One must be a good person rather than

subscribe to any particular ethical system and no ethical system will lead[s] to anything

worthwhile unless applied by a good person which means that the good must

be prior to the rules . One must be a good person, and treat others accordingly. If one fails to treat
another as a person, and treats them as a thing instead, then one is not, with regard to that particular act, a good person.
Consequences, however good in themselves, cannot erase whatever evil has been done to
achieve them. But since morality deals with relationships between people,
there can be no moral relationship when one treats another as a thing.
It makes no sense to tell someone, Well, you have to understand that we are killing you for the greater good. If you had
the necessary objectivity, you would not mind. This means that there can be no obligation of self-sacrifice, and that
someone on the wrong end of an attempted sacrifice will act morally in their attempt to prevent being sacrificed, without
inquiring about the greater good which will mean nothing in their particular context. This means that good people can
be at odds without either of them being in any meaningful sense wrong. Any non-destructive resolution of such a
conflict must involve not dialectics, but mutual changes in context. To put it in another way, us against them, I am right
and you are wrong approach implicit in dialectics (not to mention violent conflict) will often be very unpromising. This
understanding of utilitarianism is consistent with J.S. Mills description of utilitarianism Mill praised virtue and love of
humanity and did not lay out any particular procedure for moral decision making.The greater good does not cancel out
lesser evil. Strictly consequentialist utilitarianism offers no mechanism to recognize the lesser evil by treating all acts
It takes a
as, in and of themselves, morally equivalent, and leaves us with little guidance in moral heuristics.
good person, to recognize the lesser evil and utilitarianism offers little help in that regard
so a utilitarian has to be, first and foremost , a good person.

4 Voytinsky, Michael. [MA in Philosophy, University of Wales] Utilitarianism as Virtue Ethics. September 2011.
Web. 10 June 2017. Bracketed for grammar and efficiency. //PZ
Util devolves into virtue ethics because virtues are most likely to
maximize utility.
Crisp 925
Once we have made a clear distinction between the criterion of rightness and decision procedures, there is no reason, on
the face of it, why [biographicalutil itarianism] should not recommend a life of virtue as that
life most likely to meet the BU criterion.43 BU and UV are not inconsistent. BU is an objective theory about what makes a
Utilitarianism of the
way of living - acting, feeling, possessing dispositions and so on - right or wrong. [
virtues] is a subjective theory about what will maximize utility. It concerns that part of a life which consists in
one's decision-making procedures, using that phrase broadly to include one's moral character. In
other words, the objectively right way to live will not necessarily be that which maximizes expected utility, nor that which
utilitarianism] recommends [utilitarianism of the virtues] as
consists in living virtuously. [Biographical
the most likely means to the end of maximizing utility.

Prefer virtue ethics:

First, virtues are well established circumvents revision.

Crisp 26
One obvious consideration in favour of UV is that the notion of the virtues and, for some of us, the virtues themselves
are already established. Radical revision in our practical reasoning, which
would be dangerous and unlikely to succeed, is not required.

Second, the value of virtues has strong epistemic grounding in

human well-being.
Crisp 37
First, the virtues clearly have some intimate connection with human well-
being. The UV theorist will argue that, in the case of each genuine moral virtue [has], we
should be able to locate some prudential 'core' as the source of any value which that virtue may have. This
core may be found in value accruing either to the virtuous agent or to others. If we take the virtue of
prudence[s], for example, much of its value will consist in the effects prudence will
ha[s]ve on the life of the prudent person. Even in this case, however, a certain amount of
benefit is likely to accrue to others (the prudent person, for example, may have a family to support). If we consider
generosity, however, the story differs slightly. The generosity which is an everyday part of flourishing close personal
relationships is usually of advantage to both giver and receiver. The relationship itself will benefit both parties, and the
good transferred, even if the parties are equally well off, may well acquire additional value through its being a gift.44
Generosity to those more distant to one, however, which might also be described as impartial benevolence, is likely to
benefit the recipients at the expense of the giver. But there is no reason to think that human beings cannot be brought up
to give easily to strangers, and even with pleasure. And if they cannot, then it is not anyway required by the kind of theory
under consideration, which respects the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'.

5 Crisp, Roger. [Fellow in Philosophy, St. Annes College] "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue." The
Philosophical Quarterly 42.167 (1992): 139-60. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2220212.pdf?
refreqid=search:8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>. Bracketed for clarity. //PZ
6 Crisp, Roger. [Fellow in Philosophy, St. Annes College] "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue." The
Philosophical Quarterly 42.167 (1992): 139-60. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2220212.pdf?
refreqid=search:8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>. //PZ
7 Crisp, Roger. [Fellow in Philosophy, St. Annes College] "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue." The
Philosophical Quarterly 42.167 (1992): 139-60. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2220212.pdf?
refreqid=search:8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>. Bracketed for grammar and efficiency. //PZ
Third, virtues escape the practical impossibilities of util.
Crisp 48
A second point in favour of the virtues is that they can serve to limit the damage that would be
wreaked by the unstinting practice of [subjective biographical utilitarianism]. The virtuous
person, having various dispositions to act in different circumstances, will not waste vast amounts of
valuable time in computation. Nor will his or her aims conflict with the facts of
human motivation. He or she will establish close personal relations with a few people, less close relations
with a larger group and, one would expect, still have something left to give for others as a whole. The value of close
relationships will not be lost, nor will he or she be left apathetic. I am inclined to think that BU would
give benevolence slightly greater weight - especially in moral education - than many theories of the virtues. But
demands could not be made beyond the point at which self-
defeatingness sets in. In the case of a single individual, brought up in the ordinary way, this point would
arrive fairly quickly.51 We cannot undo our own moral psychology to any great degree. But what we can do, preferably as a
group, is change the way we bring up our children. Reflection about the course moral education should take, then, is one
occasion when direct reference to BU may be useful.52 It will also help in the resolution of conflict at the lower level.53
conflicts will be resolved by reflection which is itself that
But it is important to note that the
of a virtuous person. It is, as Bernard Williams suggests, impossible to rise above our everyday
attachments, commitments, dispositions and so on, in order to survey the world from an utterly
impartial point of view.4

Fourth, practical wisdom is uniquely key to understanding the

nature of well-being.
Crisp 59
I have suggested anyway that the global nature of values rules that out; but what the virtues provide us with -
and might provide an archangel with - is sensitivity to the intricacies of human well-
being and the multiplicity of its sources. Aristotle spoke of moral sensitivity as phronesis, or
practical wisdom, and it is a notion that has been made much of in some recent writing on the virtues.55 The claim is that
the virtuous person is sensitive to morally salient features of a situation, and that this inarticulate sensitivity is not to be
understood as the application of rules or principles to situations. Rules and principles have their place, but they are too
unsubtle and unwieldy to offer anything but a rough guide to decision-making and moral reflection. There is much
plausibility in this account of moral psychology. Moral theories, whether utilitarian or deontological, which suggest that
rules or principles are over-systematic. Simple
we do or could or should think morally only by applying

introspection suggests that we do not think like this. When a

person collapses in front of me in the street, I do not act
only after consulting a rule . In more complex decisions, prima facie rules and principles may
be something of an aid in one's moral thinking, but it is often helpful to describe the phenomenology here in visual terms.
One sees what to do and why to do it immediately, as it were, rather than through the application of rules. The [ virtue]

8 Crisp, Roger. [Fellow in Philosophy, St. Annes College] "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue." The
Philosophical Quarterly 42.167 (1992): 139-60. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2220212.pdf?
refreqid=search:8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>. Bracketed clarity. PZ
9 Crisp, Roger. [Fellow in Philosophy, St. Annes College] "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue." The
Philosophical Quarterly 42.167 (1992): 139-60. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2220212.pdf?
refreqid=search:8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>. Bracketed clarity. PZ
 theorist can take over this notion of sensitivity, and redescribe it as a sensitivity to aspects
of well-being which could not be understood from an external point of view.

Epistemic humilityI cant believe its not Bostrom! Only virtue

ethics can account for the developmental nature of moral
goodness.
Kilcullen 8310
The theory [virtue ethics] does not require blindness to the undesirable
consequences of the current code, or forbid revision . The morality one was brought
up on is the starting point, but as circumstances change and consequences are reassessed the code should also change.
Virtue preempts calculation in the sense that particular decisions do not depend upon calculation, but it need not prevent
calculation. If it is indeed true that the benefits resulting from the guarantee compensate for what is lost in the odd case
then the virtuous person will coolly disregard the loss, but if it ceases to be true, or never was true, nothing should prevent
him from becoming aware of it. Now dispositions and other guarantees cannot be simply turned off or redirected at will,
and anything that could be cannot serve as a guarantee. But in time, as experience presses in, perhaps with effort, and not
without some outward signs of change, dispositions and other guarantees can be modified. Outward signs of change are
important: we can rely on people whose dispositions we know may change provided we believe we would notice the
change in good time. Truthfulness and fidelity to undertakings are important also, as basic parts of a flexible character: if
we believe that someone will not deceive us about his moral code and will meet our legitimate expectations or compensate
us if he cannot, then we can rely on him even though he regards his whole code as revisable, provided we believe that he is
not likely to revise the rules of truthfulness and fidelity suddenly and drastically. Guarantees cannot and need not be
absolute and eternal.

10 Kilcullen, John. [Visiting Fellow, Australian National University] Utilitarianism and Virtue. Ethics 93.3 (1983):
451-66. Web. 10 June 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2380624.pdf?refreqid=search
%3A8ef559b465e3be6fe02bb511887f889e>.Bracketed for clarity. //PZ