Strawson

We have a certain conceptual framework through which we talk and think about the world. The

world is thought of as occupied by independently existing particular objects and events. Strawsons goal

in chapter one of Individuals is to exhibit the structure of this conceptual scheme. His overarching

project is to show that, given the nature of the conceptual scheme we have, material bodies are the basic

particulars in it. In this paper I shall outline the main ideas Strawson presents in favor of his view. I will

then follow up by considering a possible objection which arises from Strawsons loose characterization of

what actually counts as a particular. While such a loose characterization seems to be cause for concern at

first glance, I believe the concern arises from conflating Strawsons thesis with a metaphysical one. Once

this conflation is cleared up, I believe it becomes clear why Strawsons loose characterization is much

less problematic than it first appears.

Strawson begins by considering how successful speaker-hearer identification of particulars is

possible. In successful communication, we somehow fit our various perspectives and descriptions of the

world into a unified picture, allowing us to pick out the same particulars within a shared field of

experience. When is it that we know that what has been referred to by a speaker has been successfully

identified by the hearer? The answer, according to Strawson, is when the particular being referred to is

known to be identical to some particular which the individual knows an individuating fact about, a fact

which is true of one and only one particular. For example, one can be said to have successfully identified

the particular to which I refer to as North Fork if they know it is identical with the town they know to be

the town at the exact geographical center of California. Of course, a skeptic might claim that no matter

how detailed of a description we may offer, we can never be certain we are in possession of a truly

individuating fact. For example, suppose I ask you, Hand me the black pen. Though thousands of

identical black pens are produced every week, the obstacle to successful identification is overcome by

supplementing such descriptions with demonstratives. According to Strawson, this allows us to uniquely

relate any given particular to our reference point. For example, though there is no pen uniquely satisfying
the definite description, the black pen, both you and I can know that there is only one that satisfies, the

black pen on that desk.

For Strawson, the fact that we can successfully refer to and identify particulars in this way

indicates there is a single conceptual framework that underwrites successful speaker-hearer identification.

Through the use of demonstratives we can relate any new particular we learn about to particulars which

are directly locatable within our perceptual field. This allows us to corroborate our pictures of the world

in such a way as to conclusively identify referred to particulars. For example, in learning about Europa,

though not visible to my unaided eye, I can relate it to a particular heavenly body directly locatable in

space. This strongly suggests that the spatiotemporal framework is the conceptual framework which

underwrites successful speaker-hearer identification. For Strawson, within the system of spatiotemporal

relations, every particular of which we learn is necessarily uniquely related to or has a place in this

framework. We can thereby uniquely relate it to our point of reference.

Strawson observes that the nature of our actual capacities informs us as to certain features our

conceptual scheme must have. For example, we sleep and cannot observe everything at once. Particulars

have a place in and move throughout an interrelated and changing system of particulars which outstrips

our observational powers. Given our discontinuous and limited observational capacities, successful use of

the spatiotemporal framework presupposes the ability to re-identify particulars. Therefore, we must have

the capacity to distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity. For example, if we had no such

capacity, astronomy would be impossible. Observation of the heavens is discontinuous in more ways than

one. Without the capacity to reidentify particulars, we could establish nothing more than qualitative

identity between observed points of light. The spatiotemporal framework quite literally provides a space

for continuously existing particulars to be housed when not observed.

Strawson turns his attention to whether there is a class of particulars which are basic within our

conceptual scheme. For Strawson, a class of particulars would be basic if it could be shown that there

were at least some classes of particulars which it would not be possible to identify without. Furthermore,
these basic particulars could not ultimately rely on any other kind of particular to be successfully

identified. Strawson notes that the way in which we use expressions in identifying particulars in many

cases suggests that the identifiability of some classes is dependent on the identifiability of others. For

example, conclusive identification of Imagine seems to hinge on identifying John Lennon. This,

together with the fact that any additional particular can be uniquely identified by demonstrative reference

to particulars within our perceptual field, suggests that some particulars are basic.

According to Strawson, there are certain kinds of particulars which can be ruled out of the search

since identification of them must necessarily be supplemented by reference to other kinds of particulars.

For example, private particulars, such as sense data and sensations, are dependent on the class of

particulars persons. Suppose I am suffering from a toothache and say, This toothache is a doozy.

Successful identification of such a particular ultimately relies on identifying the person to whom it

belongs. Any particular toothache can be identified because it is implicitly understood as the toothache

that some person has. This brings up an important point for Strawson. Since our framework is

spatiotemporal, whatever the basic particulars are, they must have a kind of spatiality in order to confer

the proper characteristics on the framework. However, it is not enough that the basic particulars simply be

observable. After all, we can speak of the observability of private particulars such as sense data. For

example, a red after-image is observable in a certain sense. For Strawson, objective particulars have a

kind of publicity. Their objectivity obtains in their being at least possible objects of perceptual experience

for any other normally functioning individual in relevantly similar circumstances. For example, you

may not see to whom I refer to as the man behind that curtain. However, as an objective particular, the

man could be seen by you or anyone else that might sneak a peek.

Simply because a particular is a public object of perception or can be directly located without

mediating reference to any other kind of particular does not by itself tell us that it is basic. Within the

realm of objective particulars are events, processes and states on one hand and material bodies on the

other. Strawson points out that not only are events, processes and states sometimes directly locatable
public particulars, they also appear capable of anchoring successful speaker-hearer identification. For

example, suppose there is a clock tower at the center of our village. When the clock chimes at one

oclock, an expression like that chime successfully and directly locates it, with no reference to any other

kind of particular. We can imagine cases where successful speaker-hearer identification is anchored in

various events such as the chimes of the village clock. For example, the steeple might be successfully

identified by the villagers as the place where the chime occurs.

Though there are cases where events, processes and states are directly locatable or locatable in

such a way as to make no reference to any other kind of particular, these are highly restricted cases. Their

limitation is that they fail to deliver the kind of consistency required for a stable framework. For example,

while venturing outside the village, a foreign traveler might ask directions to a particular church which

just so happens to be in my village. If there is more than one village in the area, each of which has a

steeple, saying that the church is the place next to where the chime occurs simply will not do. For

Strawson, it is simply an inevitable fact that not every event, process or state will be such that we can

identify it without reference to any other kind of particular. The individuating facts which conclusively

underwrite successful speaker-hearer identification of such particulars will ultimately turn on identifying

material bodies. For Strawson, the stranger in our example will only be able to successfully and

conclusively identify the church when she knows that it is the building next to the place where the chime

occurs in that village (perhaps pointing to the village in the distance). Lastly, there will simply be many

kinds of events, processes and states which are necessarily dependent on bodies because they are things

which happen to bodies or things which material bodies do or undergo. For example, while there are

particular states of sleep, any particular sleep state is necessarily the state of a particular being.

Most importantly, it is not that we have a certain conceptual framework with which we run into

problems of identification and so then look to a class of particulars which can resolve the problem. The

basic particulars are constitutive of the framework within which the very idea of identification and

reidentification are possible. According to Strawson, identification and reidentification of a given

particular, rests on locating it within or relative to a unified spatiotemporal framework. In order for a

class of particulars to constitute or anchor that framework, they must be capable of giving it

spatiotemporal characteristics. For Strawson, it follows from this that the basic particulars must be

temporally persistent material bodies. Whereas events and processes satisfy the criteria of identification

and reidentification only in special circumstances, it is simply the normal condition of material bodies that

they satisfy these conditions. They have a relatively stable and temporally enduring existence capable of

producing a type homogenous framework of reference.

Before giving his account, Strawson gives a list of things he excludes from being admitted as

particulars. Among these he lists things such as numbers and species. He goes on to say that he will

not attempt to explicitly define particular. Strawson seems to believe that we can work with a familiar

core of particulars even if the concept lacks the precision required to determine what counts as a

particular beyond these core cases. Such imprecision might appear objectionable. Though we are able to

look at the particular examples Strawson presents and see the plausibility of the thesis concerning them, it

is difficult to abstract away and gain a sense of the scope of the thesis. If we are unclear as to both, the

boundaries of the category particular, and the scope of the thesis, how can we be certain about the

basicness of material bodies? Perhaps a certain class of abstract particulars, either ruled out or neglected

in Strawsons account, will serve to undermine his thesis. Justifying the strength of his claim as to the

basicness of material bodies seems to warrant a stricter definition.

Given the nature of Strawsons account, I do not believe such worries to be founded. We must

first distinguish Strawsons account from a purely metaphysical thesis. If Strawsons thesis was that

material bodies are ontologically basic, then leaving our understanding of particulars at the level of

common sense would be problematic. It is certainly possible that there could turn out be particulars of

which we are ignorant or which we do not fully understand which are nevertheless ontologically basic.

However, even if material bodies were in fact ontologically basic (for example, even if events, processes

and states just were changes in bodies) this would not be sufficient for Strawsons purposes. Basic here
is in terms of what anchors identification within a shared conceptual scheme and is intimately bound up

with interpersonal communication. What underwrites successful speaker-hearer identification need not be

what is ontologically basic.

I take it that Strawson takes it as a given that we do in fact engage in successful speaker-hearer

identification. The framework that allows us to fit our various perspectives and descriptions of the world

into a unified picture is a shared framework. Therefore, though we may not be able to explicitly define

particular, whatever it is that anchors such a shared framework must be a class of particulars broadly

recognized and consistently referred to as particulars. Since the framework allows us to collaborate in

such a way as to have successful speaker-hearer identification, it seems that the basic particulars which

constitute that framework cannot be such that their status as particulars is a matter of serious contention or

comprise a class of which we are completely unaware. For example, suppose I believed that things like

species belonged to a class of abstract particulars I believed to be basic. Furthermore, suppose you were

unsure or otherwise rejected the existence of such particulars and believed material bodies held that

distinction. For me, individuating facts would ultimately rest on identifying abstract particulars, while for

you this simply could not be the case. We could not conclusively settle the question of whether or not you

knew an individuating fact about any particular I made an identifying reference to, because our standards

of identification would be incommensurable. The basic particulars, if they anchor the framework that

actually underwrites successful speaker-hearer identification, must be more or less generally accepted as

particulars in the way material bodies, events and processes are. Therefore, it seems Strawson need only

examine the particulars which are clearly and un-contentiously held to be particulars.

Even if we were to admit as abstract particulars things such as species, such particulars seem

somewhat irrelevant as to the question of basicness. On Strawsons account, it appears that the basic

particulars must be susceptible to demonstrative identification. After all, in our actual conceptual

framework, it is our ability to supplement a description with demonstrative reference to basic particulars

that ultimately grounds identification. Whether or not this is possible in the case of supposed abstract
particulars like species or numbers is not nearly as important as the fact that it is a question in the first

place. If such abstract particulars were basic in the spatiotemporal framework we actually have, one

would have to know at least roughly where to point to relate things to them. For obvious reasons, such

problems are even worse in the case of classes of particulars of which we are ignorant. Whatever class of

particulars that we might suspect as undermining material bodies as basic, they must be a class of

uncontentious and known particulars that are susceptible to demonstrative reference. They must be so in

order to ground the interpersonal enterprise of successful speaker-hearer identification we actually in

engage in.