LEDESMA V.

CLIMACO
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

FACTS:
Hon. Rafael Climaco, a judge denied the petition of Adelino Ledesma to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio in one of the pending cases in the Provincial Court. The motion for withdrawal was filed after
Ledesma was appointed as an Election Registrar. He claimed that his petition for withdrawal should be granted
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service plus the pressure of the
work of the petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ledesma be granted withdrawal as counsel de oficio.

RULING:
No. Ledesma should not be granted withdrawal as counsel de oficio.

A member of the Bar has the indispensable responsibility to defend the accused. He betrayed by his
actions, lack of enthusiasm, the task that was entrusted to him. The court emphasized that the duty of a
member of the bar to the court and to the client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

IN RE: SYCIP
July 30, 1979

FACTS:
Two separate Petitions were filed, both were petitions for authority to use the firm names which
includes the name of partners who had already passed away. These petitions were made by the surviving
partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and the partners of Atty. Hermino Ozaeta.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the firms be granted authority to use current firm names with names of deceased partners.

RULING:
No. The petitions for authority to authority to use current firm names with names of deceased partners
shall not be granted. They were advised to drop the names of deceased partners but the names of deceased
partners may be included in the listing of individuals who had been partners of the firm, indicating the years
that they served.

The court had stated that unlike other professions, the legal profession upholds with high degree the
spirit of public service. The legal profession was not placed for personal gain but for the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind.

BARRIENTOS VS DAAROL
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

FACTS:
The complainant, Victoria Barrientos was a single, college student who was 20 years of age, had a
relationship with the respondent, who was 41 years old and the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative. Daarol had been known by the Barrientos Family for quite sometime. After having
intimate moments, Barrientos became pregnant. When the responded was made aware, Daarol proposed for
abortion of the baby. But Barrientos continued the pregnancy and later on found out that Daarol was, in fact,
already a married man. Daarol was estranged from his wife for 16 years and he even had a son from the said
marriage. A fact that the respondent had left undisclosed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Daarol should be disbarred due to deceit and gross immoral conduct.

RULING:
Yes. Daarol should be disbarred due to deceit and gross immoral conduct.

His misrepresentation of himself when he never informed nor even attempted to inform Barrientos of
his real status as a married man, constitutes deceit in satisfaction of his sexual desire. His moral values had
been so seriously impaired when he claimed that he did nothing wrong with being in a relationship despite
being married and by suggesting abortion.

Daarols acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to satisfy his sexual desires demonstrated his moral
delinquency. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting
standards of mental and moral fitness. Therefore, the Courts imposed upon him the most severe disciplinary
action disbarment.

PEOPLE VS TUANDA
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

FACTS:
Fe Tuanda was suspended from the practice of law after the courts had found her guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, a crime involving moral turpitude. She appealed to the courts to lift her suspension
and claimed that the penalty of suspension on top of the penalty imposed for the violations made were too
much. She added that she intended no damage to the complainant, Herminia Marquez.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tuandas suspension from the practice of law be lifted.

RULING:
No. Tuanda should still be suspended from the practice of law because she was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Tuanda had been correctly susupended from the practice of law as stated in Sections 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

Sec. 27. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude

IN RE: PUNO
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

FACTS:
Armando Puno, respondent, and Flora Quingwa, complainant, were engaged to be married. However,
before the date of marriage, Puno invited a reluctant Quingwa to a hotel where the latter proposed to have an
act of carnal knowledge. Puno reassured Quingwa of his promise of marriage which made her gave in. After
the act, Quiangwa reminded Puno of his promise of marriage until she gave birth to a child. However, Puno
still refused to comply with the said promise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Puno should be disbarred for being guilty of gross immorality and misconduct.

RULING:
Yes. Puno should be disbarred and his name should be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Puno had committed grossly immoral act and has violated the fundamental ethics of the legal
profession. Members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standard of morality, as stated in
paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration
of justice.

PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the
private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Fule agreed to his friends
request and made his appearance as a private prosecutor after he secured permission from the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services.

The appearance of City Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused.
Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna and a ruling stated that when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law,
he ceased to engage in private law practice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fule is engaged in private law practice.

RULING:
No. Ariston Fule is not engaged in private law practice.

Private practice of law means that one had presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his services. Moreover, Fule had been given permission by his immediate
supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a friend.

CAYETANO VS MONSOD
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

FACTS:
Christian Monsod, the respondent, was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April
25, 1991. Renato Cayetano, the petitioner, opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
Commission on Appointments later on confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of COMELEC. On he
took his oath of office and on the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Cayetano challenged the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments on Monsods
nomination, and filed instant petition for certiorari and prohibition that the said confirmation of nomination and
subsequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Monsod as Chairman of Comelec violate Section 1(1), Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
No. Monsods appointment did not violate Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960.
He has been paying his dues as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts.

Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. He got acquainted with the laws of countries who
were negotiating loans and other project works during his stint with the World Bank Group. He worked with
Meralco as the chief executive offer of an investment bank. He became knowledgeable of election law when
he worked as Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL. He made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body that conducted numerous hearings. He was a
member of the Constitutional Commission and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public.

ULEP VS THE LEGAL AID CLINIC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

FACTS:
The Legal Aid Clinic had published several advertisements which made several law practitioners
displeased. Mauricio Ulep, the petitioner, claimed that the advertisements published are unethical, and
demeaning to the law profession. Additionally it destroys the confidence of the community of the integrity of
the members of the bar.
 The Legal Aid Clinic admitted the publication of the advertisements but claimed that they are not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Legal Aid Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and that the said advertisements
be allowed.

RULING:
Yes. The Legal Aid Clinic is engaged in the practice of law but the said practice is not allowed.

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Under Philippine jurisdiction, the services being offered by Legal Aid Clinic which
constitute the practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person who is duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

IN RE: CUNANAN
March 18, 1954

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the
law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. The said
law, provided different passing marks per year: 1946-1951, 70%; 1952, 71%; 1954, 73%; and 1955, 74%.
And provided however that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall
be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grades shall be included in the computation of the
general average in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.

Section 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates.
IN RE: INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR
January 9, 1973

FACTS:
The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and
consistently with the views and counsel received from its the Commissions Board of Consultants, as well as
the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that the Honorable Supreme
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation
of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in Administrative Case No. 526 formally prays to the Court to order
the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUE:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

RULING:
Yes. On all issues.

The Court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of
the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the data contained in the report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines. It has been made as a means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.

ROYONG VS OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963

FACTS:
The complainant, Josefa Royong claimed that she was allegedly raped by the respondent, Ariston
Oblena. However, investigation concluded that the carnal knowledge that happened was actually consensual
sex. In view of the findings of the investigations, although, Oblena was not guilty of rape, he was guilty of
another misconduct. Oblena had been living martially with Briccia Angeles and at the same time, he had an
illicit affair with Royong. Petitioner claimed that Oblena be disbarred.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Oblena should be disbarred for having an illicit affair with Royong while cohabiting with
Angeles.

RULING:
Yes. Oblena should be disbarred for his misconduct.
 The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.

Oblenas conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.

IN RE: ARGOSINO
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyers Oath and to
sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing
incident. He was, later on, granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court that he
would be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. He presented no less than fifteen
(15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious order to prove that he has the required good moral character. In addition, he, together with the
others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys,
and practice law.

RULING:
Yes. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice law.

Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the good moral character that was required
before taking the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. He was reminded that the Lawyers Oath is
not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had
started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

TAN VS SABANDAL
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

FACTS:
Nicolas Sabandal, respondent, passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in
view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. He filed for petitions to be
allowed to take his oath.

The executive judge of the province was asked by the Courts about Sabandals moral fitness and he
stated that he is not aware of any acts committed by Sabandal that would disqualify him to be admitted to the
Bar. However, he added that the respondent had a pending civil case for cancelation proceedings for a parcel
of land on which he secured a free patent, was actually a swampland and is not subject for acquisition. The
land was mortgaged to the bank but was forclosed and sold to a public auction. The case was resolved
through amicable settlement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sabandal may be admitted to the practice of law after a testimonial regarding his good
moral character and his pending civil case had been terminated.

RULING:
 No. Sabandal should not be allowed to practice law.

The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

Sabandal had worked as the Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. This allowed him to procure the
free patent title over the property that was actually a public land. This was a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in public service which cannot be erased although the case is terminated. Moreover, his failure to reveal
the pending civil case to the Court while he was submitting several petitions and motion for reconsideration
revealed lack of candor and truthfulness.

TAPUCAR VS TAPUCAR
A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998

FACTS:
Remedios Ramirez-Tapucar, complainant, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena Pea under
scandalous circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time
the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in
Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tapucar be disbarred on the ground of gross immoral conduct.

RULING:
Yes. Tapucar must be disbarred for exhibiting gross immoral conduct.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to the society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As a member of the profession
charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities
of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral character. To
achieve this, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and
thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

IN RE: GUTIERREZ
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

FACTS:
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the crime of murder of Filemon Samaco. After serving a
portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the
condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case
against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a
doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
RULING:
Yes. Gutierrez must be disbarred for committing murder despite being pardoned by the President.

The pardon granted to Gutierrez was a conditional one. It merely remitted his sentence. It did not
reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to
the pardon. The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position as the municipal mayor at that time(and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being removed from the
profession.