Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Katerina Rigas
5/12/13
2
Introduction
The German Question, or else what to do with the Germans, has been at the forefront
of European politics ever since Bismarcks attempt to unify the divided German
principalities into a consolidated nation state in 1871. The solution that was preferred
then was that of a Lesser Germany1, excluding the Austrians from the new state, a
situation that Hitler tried to remedy when he annexed Austria to the Third German
Reich. However, both these attempts have been more or less credited with the
power. The question of Germany, as Henry Kissinger once put it was that it was a
country too big for Europe yet too small for the world3.
At the end of the Second World War, the wartime allies had agreed that Germany
Plan,4aiming to deal with the issue of Germany decisively. However, a more mediocre
approach was finally adopted, that advocated the subjugation of German interests to
the European ones, based on the proposals of Winston Churchill.5 The aim of this
1
Veblen, Thorstein, and Joseph Dorfman. Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. New York: Viking P, 1954.
Print
2
Fischer, Fritz. Griff Nach Der Weltmacht. Dusseldorf: Droste, 2002. Print
3
Andreas Kluth. "The dilemma at the heart of Europe: Germany and the German
question". Juncture. IPPR. 2013. Web. 4/12/2013. < http://www.ippr.org/juncture/171/11201/the-
dilemma-at-the-heart-of-europe-germany-and-the-german-question >
4
Morgnthau Memorandum 1944 http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html
5
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
3
essay is to investigate to what extent the European Project, first proposed by Churchill
was a response to the German Question and how that has affected EU history.
The Past
A chronological narration of the steps towards European integration that might have
direct and perhaps less obvious aims, would not be able to define the European Union
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 burdened Germany with war guilt and reparations,
terms, apart from the reparation clause was suggested in the Morgenthau
memorandum, but there were three important developments that had to be considered
Firstly, the great European nation state whose prestige had been severely damaged
after the First World War had been completely destroyed after the Second World War.
The end of the First World War meant the end of the power balance system that held
in check European states during the 19th century7, and whatever power distribution
could be perceived in the interwar years had been totally upset by 1945. Europe no
longer determined world history, but was rather an object of world history.
Secondly, as apparent as it was that Europe was no longer the subject of world history
due to the devastation it suffered during the Second World War, one must not forget
the new international order that had emerged during the interwar years. The US
6
This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years. Marshall Ferdinand Foch
7
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.103
4
involvement in the First World War and the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917
hinted the inevitable bipolar world that would emerge, briefly interrupted by their
wartime alliance against Germany in the Second World War8. While Germany had
acted as a catalyst in consolidating certain interests shared by the great powers,9 at the
same time it provided the battlefront for a possible confrontation between them.
Lastly, the defeat of the nation state and the emergence of US and USSR as the
powers in a bipolar world led to the eventual replacement of the states by blocs with
delineated ideology and politics. The post-war international order was very much
identified by that conflict whose specific attribute was the avoidance of full
Taking into account the Cold War context and the fact that Germany was invaded by
both East and West, the division of Germany into a Western and Eastern state was the
first solution that reflected the interests of US and USSR. The wartime allies were
post war world, and the neutralization of Germany seemed achievable only through
this division, as Germany was considered far too important to be part only of one
bloc11.
8
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
99
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.397
10
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
11 11
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
5
However, Germany had a tradition of nationalism and militarism dating back to the
late 18th century and Frederick II of Prussia, so it was doubtful if the military defeat
that she suffered would render her unable to seek that power again. The very
defeat in both the First and Second World War. Up until the 19th century where we
have the gradual appearance of mass politics, the individual did not identify with the
states military defeat to such an extent. This forced the world to reconsider the terms
that would be applied to Germany and to structure them towards rehabilitation and not
punishment12.
The proposition to subordinate the German problems to the European ones, where
solution that might either blunt or sharpen the problem, as long as the East and West
family that would be based in the cooperation among France and Germany. 14 The
creation of a European community where all nation states would hold larger loyalties
to Europe was the solution to curb nationalism. Churchill original plan suggested the
integration of Germany with its principalities and not as an entity and he even referred
to the blueprint of the United States of America, according to which the United States
of Europe would be created. Churchill placed the blame for the outbreak of the war
on German nationalistic politics and considered the only remedy to the danger
12
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
13
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.394
14
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
6
speech we can trace elements that advocate that regional schemes are complementary
to the global arena, and as such he conceived the creation of the European Union.
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan are the terms that defined post-war
Europe even before the European Project took off. The Marshall plan aimed at the
consolidation of Western Europe through economics support from the US. The
Truman doctrine was a declaration that aimed to set the borders of Soviet influence in
Europe 16 . Through this was the creation of a union among European states
conceivable. In the cold war context, the reconstruction of Germany was a matter of
political and managerial control. The European Project started reluctantly with the
Coal and Steel Community where France and Germany agreed to pool their resources,
but it wasnt until The Suez Canal Crisis that France was forced to reconsider the
importance of its status and national sovereignty. France was all but defeated in a
conflict that turned to be a Cold War confrontation, and a Soviet threat was suggested
even in Europe. We must consider the possibility that Western Europe united against
the Soviet threat. NATO did provide the military support that the nation states were
reluctant and unable to provide, but as the new order referred to the creation of block
according to their political ideologies; a political union was very much needed.
15
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
16
Hans Speier: The Future of German Nationalism and Kurt Riezler: Comment,
The Present
Churchill made some remarks for the whole procedure of European integration that
very much described the EU politics up until recent. Firstly, raising the standard of
living in Europe doesnt solve the political problems of Europe. Secondly the political
center of Europe should always be either France or England. Thirdly, there should be
However, the global economic crisis of 2008 confronted Europe and Germany for the
matter with some serious questions. Germany, the most industrially developed and
economically advanced stated of the EU has reluctantly found itself in the position of
leadership. Whereas the economic prosperity was not of hinted until the 1990s, kept
in check by the bipolar division of power, and during the 1990s with the reunification
Germany has been accused of pursuing too national oriented policies 18 during the
crisis, aiming for tighter fiscal control and an eventual fiscal consolidation that would
be on German terms. Merkel claims that Europe is not only about freedom but also
about prosperity, and that translates into competitiveness that will be accomplished
through the imposition of austerity measures19. That has inevitably raised once again
the German Question, and whereas the fate of EU is based on the desired of Germany.
international leadership20. The two attempts at projecting power ended in two world
wars with devastating results. The German post-war economic miracle was induced
17
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
18
The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013
19
The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013
20
Europes Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist Jun 15 2013
8
under the protection of NATO, that is US military might and basically a neutralized
foreign policy of its own, up until the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A united federal
domestically. But the most important factor that has always characterized German
politics is the national obsession with price stability 21 and the constant fear of
hyperinflation that originates back to the interwar periods and Germanys collapse.
The Euro crisis has brought these issues into the surface again, the German reluctance
to lead, desire for integration and fear for instability, a reason why Germany has so
If the vision in Europe has become too technical and economical that it presides over
the political unification that was preached up until the crisis with its ultimate
manifestation with the creation of the Euro, is a matter that is connected with the
German Question pertains to the fact that European solidarity translates into German
cash. Amidst the crisis, Germany, the country who came to detest nationalism is
of Germanys interests to the European level has been managed so successfully that
21
Europes Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist Jun 15 2013
9
Bibliography
2. Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. New
4. Trachtenberg, Marc. The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic
Print.
7. Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946
8. The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013