The Lessons of The Hole Argument

The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
The Lessons of the Hole Argument

Author(s): Robert Rynasiewicz
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 407
-436
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of
Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687673
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Brit.I. Phil.Sci.45 (1994), 407-436 Printedin GreatBritain
The Lessons of the Hole Argument

ROBERT RYNASIEWICZ
1 Introduction
2 TheHole Argument
3 IsomorphismClosure
4 'Newton'Equivalence
5 ModelSelectivism
6 LeibnizEquivalence
7 RadicalLocalIndeterminismand the Inscrutabilityof Reference
8 A Parable
9 TheIdentificationGroup
10 Comparisons,Autonomy,and Determinism
11 Applicationsto SpacetimeTheories
12 Conclusion
I INTRODUCTION
Earlierin this century substantivalism was commonly viewed as a gratuitous

metaphysical imposition on physical theory-'a mystical philosophical super-
structure', as Reichenbach put it. But with the decline of positivism and the
emergence of scientific realism, space and time (or spacetime) came to be seen
as no more suspect in principle than any other 'theoretical' entity. Substanti-
valism could be regarded as a physical doctrine to be accepted or rejected on
scientific grounds. And an impressive array of foundational and historical
studies argued persuasively for such grounds, whether in the context of
seventeenth-century mechanics or twentieth-century relativity.
Earman and Norton [1987], however, have presented a subtle and
sophisticated argument-the so-called 'hole argument'--endeavoring to
show that spacetime substantivalism is committed to the impossibility of
determinism. Determinism may be false, they say, but:it should not be judged
so a priori because of a commitment to 'substantival properties'. 'If a
metaphysics, which forces all our theories to be deterministic, is unacceptable,
then equally a metaphysics, which automatically decides in favor of indeter-
minism, is also unacceptable' (p. 524).
The reactions to the hole argument have been various. Norton [1987]
maintains that the argument impugns substantivalism but not spacetime
realism, although he does not explore how it is possible to be a spacetime realist
408 RobertRynasiewicz
without in turn being committed to substantivalism. Earman[1989] draws an
implicitly anti-realist conclusion: what is needed is 'a conception of space-time
that fits neither traditional relationism nor traditional substantivalism' (p.
208). His own vision is that reality has the form of an abstract algebra and the
spacetime manifold provides only an indirect representation of this reality in
terms of the ring of continuous real-valued functions on the manifold. Maudlin
[1989] believes the hole argument shows only that substantivalists should
adapt Kripke's essentialist doctrines to the metric properties of spacetime.
Butterfield[1987, 1989a, 1989b] argues that substantivalists should apply a
variant of David Lewis's counterpart theory to spacetime.
As salutary as the hole argument has been in pumping new life into the
substantival-relational debate, in what follows I am not primarilyconcerned
with its import for this controversy. The greater virtue of the argument is that
it forces a more fundamental issue: how can one understand, in terms of the
models of a theory, what the theory alleges to be physically possible?I first set
out some of the intricacies of this problem by exploring various difficulties
inherent in the responses to the hole argument mentioned above. A
comparison of the hole argument with permutation arguments given by
Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and others for the inscrutability of reference
suggests the problemis intimately related to that of determining when a pair of
interpretationsfor a language count as co-intended. Proceeding fromthis clue,
I set out a solution to the problem, developing the underlying principles in
detail sufficient to draw definite conclusions concerning the success or failure
of determinism in the usual variety of spacetime theories.
2 THE HOLE ARGUMENT
Earman and Norton's argument has two parts. The main argument shows
that a particular thesis regarding the relation between the models of a theory
and the possible situations they supposedly represent has the unwanted
consequence that determinism fails miserably in any spacetime theory. A
subsidiary argument then seeks to associate substantivalism with that thesis.
Let me first review the main argument in slightly more general terms than
those provided by Earman and Norton and then turn to the subsidiary
argument.
But first some terminology, a spacetimetheoryis understood to have models
of the general form (M,01, . . .,On>,where M is a differentiablemanifold and
the Oi'sare geometric object fields defined everywhere on M. If 9Y= (M,01, ..
.,On) and h is a diffeomorphismof M on to manifold M', let h.el = (M',h*O01,..
.,h*O,), where h*Oiis the 'carryalong' of the objectfield Oiunder h.' If M= M',
i.e. if h is a diffeomorphismof M onto itself, then h is called a Leibnizshift. A hole
diffeomorphism is a Leibnizshift other than the identity map which, for some
' The exact definition of varies from object to object. See Waldh[1984]. pp. 437-8.
i*,
TheLessonsof the Hole Argument 409
proper neighborhood H c M (called a 'hole'), agrees with the identity on all

points not in H. If the object fields of 9Y impose metric structure or establish a
connection on M, then for any proper neighborhood H there is a hole
diffeomorphism h such that h,•I W # I, and so WIand
h,•I
will disagree at
various points in the interior of H although they necessarily agree at all points
not in H. Arguably, any physically interesting spacetime theory meets this
condition.2
The general form of Earman and Norton's main argument is this. Let Tbe a
physically interesting spacetime theory. Assume two things about T.
Isomorphism Closure:If 9J is a model of T and WIis isomorphic to T9', then WI'

is also a model of T.
Model Literalism: Each model represents a possible physical situation, and

distinct models represent distinct situations.
However stringent the laws of T, it follows that T cannot be deterministic. For

let 9• be a model of T. Choose any neighborhood H of the manifold of WIand let
h be a hole diffeomorphismfor H such that h*m # WJ.Since h•WIis isomorphic
to WJ,h•W•is a model of T. And, since #09, WIand representdistinct
situations which h,*9J
h*9,J but for certain
physical agree everywhere spacetime points in
the interior of the spacetime region represented by H. Hence, we have what
Earman and Norton call radicallocal indetermninism: the physical state of any
region, no matter how small, can never be determined by the total state of the
remainder of spacetime.
The threat of radical local indeterminism is avoided if, instead of Model
Literalism, we assume:
LeibnizEquivalence:Isomorphicmodels representthe same physical situation.
This appears to be the course followed by Einstein in late 1915 after laboring
for several years under the assumption of Model Literalism.3If WIis described
using some particular coordinate chart, then a coordinate transformation
expressing the diffeomorphismh yields a description of in the same chart.
h,*9J
Such descriptions, Einstein explained to Ehrenfest that December, 'refer to
exactly the same thing' (quoted in Norton [1987], p. 169). Some of the more
prominent recent textbooks on general relativity also contain statements
naturally read as endorsements of LeibnizEquivalence.4Earman and Norton
2 The property in question fails, for example, if each of the Oi's is a constant scalar field.
3 Between 1913 and 1915 Einstein formulated versions of an argument he referredto as the
'hole argument' [Lochbetrachtung]. The argument of Earman and Norton is a generalization of
John Stachel's interpretation of Einstein's original hole argument. See Stachel [1989] and
Norton [19871 for details.
4 Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 73; Sachs and Wu [1977]. p. 27: and Wald [1984], p. 260.
41o RobertRynasiewicz
argue, however, that substantivalists cannot follow this path. For no matter
how the doctrine of substantivalism is formulated, they say, the various
formulations
mustall agreeconcerningan acidtestof substantivalism,drawnfromLeibniz.If
everythingin the worldwere reflectedEastto West(or better,translated3 feet
East),retainingall the relationsbetweenbodies,would we have a different
world?Thesubstantivalistmustansweryes sinceall the bodiesof the worldare
now in differentspatiallocations,even thoughthe relationsbetweenthem are
unchanged.([1987], p. 521}
They claim, moreover, that a diffeomorphismof the manifold on to itself is the
formal counterpart of such a rearrangement of bodies. Thus, substantivalists
must maintain that for any Leibniz shift h, 9I and h*WJrepresent distinct
physical situations, in accordance with Model Literalism.
The hole argument is formulated against the backdropof a general picture
as to how the notion of 'physical possibility' attaches to theories. That picture
posits, in addition to the models of theories, a realm of possible physical
situations, together with a map from models to physical situations designating
which models represent which situations. The hole argument establishes that
one thesis concerning the nature of this representation relation, viz., Model
Literalism,leads to intuitively unacceptable consequences. In the next several
sections, I want to show that the alternatives in this framework, including
LeibnizEquivalence, are equally unacceptable.
In order to keep the discussion well regimented, I will assume that models
are purely mathematical structures living in the universe of Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, or some other foundational alternative. Moreover,I'll assume that
such principles as Model Literalism and Leibniz Equivalence are to be
construed as applying not just to the class of models of a given theory, but to
the entire class of structures of the same mathematical type as those models.
Thus, if *XT is the class of models of T and X' the class of all structures of the
same mathematical type, then ModelLiteralismasserts that distinct structures
••1, WJ22e- represent distinct physical situations, while Leibniz Equivalence
demands that if 9IJ1is isomorphic to 91J2,then they representthe same physical
situation. If 9JI~E' but TJI T,this is interpreted to mean that the physical
situation representedby 9)3,though logically possible, is not physically possible
according to T.
3 ISOMORPHISM CLOSURE
A crucial assumption in the hole argument is that the spacetime theories of

interest to us satisfy the condition of Isomorphism Closure. It might seem,
however, this is not a secure assumption. Earman and Norton suggest it is
common to regard Newtonian and special relativistic theories as dealing with
TheLessonsof the Hole Argumenlt 411
a single spacetime, viz., Newtonian or Neo-Newtonian spacetime in the former
case, Minkowksi spacetime in the latter. One might take this to mean that the
models of such theories employ a common manifold together with an
invariant subset of object fields characterizing the fixed geometric structure of
the spacetime in question. A special relativistic theory, for example, then has
models of the form
W= <N,,,hb..**)
where N is some particularmanifold held fixed across models (diffeomorphicto
R4 with the standard atlas) and rabis a Lorentzsignature metric of vanishing
curvature identically the same every model. Hence, if a Leibnizshift h is not an
isometry (i.e. h*tlab=lab),
# then the structure is not a model. And since no
hole diffeomorphismof the sort that leads toh.9*radical local indeterminism is an
isometry of this Minkowski spacetime, the hole argument fails to create a
difficulty for Model Literalismon this portrayal of special relativity.
Earman and Norton pose the hole argument for a restrictedclass of theories,
called localspacetime theories, and Newtonian and special relativistic theories
formulated in this fashion lie outside that domain. Specifically, a local
spacetime theory T meets two requirements. First, the models of T all satisfy a
set of field equations setting various tensor quantities to zero. Second, there is a
completeness condition to the effect that if 9 is a structure of the same
mathematical type as the models of T and 9N satisfies the field equations of T,
then 9N is also a model of T. (This entails that the class of models of T is closed
under isomorphism.) Earman and Norton claim, however, that it suffices to
consider only local spacetime theories since (i) 'All known formulations of
general relativity are local spacetime theories or formulations which reduce to
one', (ii) 'virtually every other classical spacetime field theory can be
formulated as a local spacetime theory', and (iii) there are reasons to prefer
that spacetime theories be formulated as such:
What is worrisomeaboutthis alternateportrayalof specialrelativityis that it

startsout bymakingunnecessaryglobalassumptions... Cosmologyhas always
been a far riskierenterprisethan local physics.Sincethe time of Aristotle,we
have foundthat the weakestpartof a physicaltheoryis the globalcosmological
assumptionsit makes.We have learnedto our cost that it is betterto do local
physicsfirstandbuildone'scosmologyfromit, ratherthanthe otherway round.
In renderingtheoriesas a localspacetimetheory,we abideby this heuristic.We
determineall the fieldson the manifoldby local field equations,not global
stipulation,andwe allowthe possibilityof globaltopologiesotherthan the usual
standbyof R".(p. 518).
These claims are problematic on several counts.
On any of its usual formulations, even general relativity is not, strictly
speaking, a local spacetime theory. Even when the theory is formulated
directly in terms of the Einsteinfield equations it is standard to restrictthe class
412 Robert Rynasiewicz
of models to those whose manifolds are connected spaces. Some authors

introduce other global assumptions, for example, that the models are
maximal,5 or that the spacetimes are temporally orientable (Sachs and Wu
[1977], p. 27), or that they are globally hyperbolic" (Penrose [1979]).
Moreover,some formulations starting from variational principles,such as the
Hamiltonian formulation, require at the outset that the spacetime is strongly
causal and partitioned into a family of Cauchy surfaces (Wald [1984],
Appendix E.2).
More to the point, we are left with the false impression that whether or not
Model Literalism leads to radical local indeterminism depends critically on
whether the theory in question imposes certain global restrictions. Quite the
contrary, all that is required is Isomorphism Closure, and whether or not
Isomorphism Closureis met is entirely independent of the presence or absence
of global assumptions. To see this, suppose that T makes certain global
assumptions. Let T' be obtained from Tby closing the class of models of Tunder
isomorphism. On the one hand, T' does not remove any of the global
assumptions of T since for any model of T' there is a model of T with the same
global characteristics. On the other, since T' satisfies isomorphism closure, it
can be subjected to the hole argument. Conversely, suppose that T is a local
spacetime theory. Let T' be a theory obtained from ' by removing all but a
single model from each isomorphism class of the models of T.On the one hand,
T' fails to introduce any global assumptions since now for any model of Tthere
is a model of T' with the same global features. On the other, it is impossible to
find a pair of models of T' related by a hole diffeomorphism.
Now contrary to what was suggested about the predecessors of general
relativity, it strikes me that we should assume as a matter of course that
spacetime theories, whether 'local' or not, satisfy Isomorphism Closure. By 'a
model of a theory' we mean a structure satisfying certain specifiedequations or
conditions, and our notion of satisfaction is standardly one that does not
discriminate between isomorphic structures. Granted, nothing compels us to
adhere absolutely to standard usage. One is free to operate with non-standard
meanings of 'model' and 'satisfaction', and even to permit any arbitrarily
selected class of structures to count as a theory. ForModelLiteralism,however,
this has a price at least as high as that of embracing radical local
indeterminism. Let T be a spacetime theory satisfying Isomorphism Closure.
Suppose we strip away from the class of models of Tsufficientlymany models so
as to avoid radical local indeterminism, as well as any others that are
5 A relativisticspacetime (M,g) is maximal just in case there is no other (M',g') such that (M.g)
is isomorphically embeddable in (M',g'). Local spacetime theories have the property that for
any model 9WJ and any open neighborhood U of the manifold, the restriction of 9Wto U is also a
model. The restriction to maximal models is assumed if the intent is to describe, not arbitrary
spacetime regions, but entire universes.
6 I.e. possess a Cauchy surface.
unwanted for whatever other reasons. Labelthe resulting 'theory' T1.Now, for
each manifold M of some model of T1,choose a hole diffeomorphismhMof the
sort that leads to radical local indeterminism for T. Let 'theory' T2be given by
the class of models of the form hM*9J3such that 9Wtis a model of T1. The
'theories' T1and T2 are formally incompatible, since they have no models in
common. According to Model Literalism, they are, moreover, substantively
incompatible since they agree nowhere as to what is physically possible.But on
what conceivable grounds could one 'theory' be preferredto the other? Our
instinct is to deny there is any substantive conflict and to regard the models of
T1and T2 simply as notational variants on one another.
4 'NEWTON' EQUIVALENCE
How then should we understand talk of Newtonian or Minkowski spacetime

in the singular? In mathematics, we commonly speak of 'the' two-element
Boolean algebra, or 'the' quaternion group, even though there are numerically
distinct algebras answering the description, even on the same set of objects. In
each case, the expression referspromiscuously either to an entire isomorphism
class or else to an arbitrarilyselected representative from the class. Similarly,
we can understand 'Minkowskispacetime' to refer either to the isomorphism
class of pairs of the form <N, rq,) or to some chosen representative.
Ofcourse, this does not sufficeif the question concerns the physicalspacetimes
of Newtonian and special relativistic theories. According to Model Literalism,
there are innumerably many distinct physical spacetimes admitted by any one
of these theories. Newton may have granted we would have a different
situation if all bodies were 'Leibnizshifted' in space, but he would have denied
that 'Leibnizshifting' the geometry of absolute space and time produces a new
and distinct spacetime. In the manuscript De Gravitationehe writes:
Forjustas thepartsofdurationderivetheirindividualityfromtheirorder,so that
(forexample)ifyesterdaycouldchangeplaceswithtodayandbecomethe laterof
the two, it would lose its individualityand would no longerbe yesterday,but
today;so the partsof spacederivetheircharacterfromtheirpositions,so that if
any two couldchangetheirpositions,they wouldchangetheircharacterat the
sametimeandeach wouldbe convertednumericallyintothe other.Thepartsof
durationandspaceareonlyunderstoodto be the sameas theyreallyarebecause
of theirmutualorderand position;nor do they have any hint of individuality
apartfromthat orderand positionwhich consequentlycannotbe altered.(Hall
and Hall[1962], p. 136)
We might abstract from this the following alternative to Model Literalism.7
We isolate those geometric object fields of the models of the theory which
characterize the 'mutual order and position' of the points of spacetime. Call
7 I do not offer this as an explication of Newton's views.
these G1,..., Gkand the remaining fieldsP1,...., P1.If a Leibnizshift h: M-- M is
a geometric symmetry in the sense that h*Gi= Gifor each i, then h preserves
the 'mutual order and position' of the points of M. If h is not a geometric
symmetry, then, under h each point p is 'numerically converted into' its image
h(p) in virtue of the way in which h alters the 'mutual order and position' of the
points. Assuming the Gi's are the same up to isomorphism from model to
model, this means that the physical situations represented by the various
models of the theory involve the same physical spacetime. The theory permits
distinct physical situations on this spacetime if it has distinct models 9J1and
h*9J such that h is a geometric symmetry. If h is not a geometric symmetry,
then 9Y and h*92 represent the same situation, since, for any region U of the
manifold, each object field Pi is 'situated' with respect to U exactly as h*Pi is
situated with respect to the region h[U] into which U has been 'converted
numerically'.
This removes the threat of radical local indeterminism for Newtonian and
special relativistic theories. The strategy can also be extended to general
relativity by assuming that the spacetime metric characterizes the 'mutual
order and position' of the points of spacetime. Unfortunately, the proposal is
internally inconsistent if the models of the theory have non-trivial geometric
symmetries. This can be shown with the help of a construction due to Norton
([1989], pp. 60-1). Let h be a geometric symmetry of model 9Y (say a spatial
translation) that is not also an automorphism of Y. According to the proposal,
1 and consequently represent distinct situations. However, h can be
h,*9finto a
decomposed pair of Leibnizshifts hi and h2such that h = h2ohl although
neither hi nor h2 is itself a geometric symmetry. Now, since hi is not a
geometric symmetry, M and h1i*91represent the same situation. Similarly,
hl,*9l and h2,(hl*9n) represent the same situation. Hence, 9Y and h2,(h1*9jl)
represent the same situation. But
h2*(hi*92f)= (h2ohl)*931l
= h*,
yielding a contradiction.
5 MODEL SELECTIVISM
The contradictionis removedif hl*9~1,instead of representingthe same
situationas representedby9I, representsnothingat all. LetModelSelectivism
be the thesisthat somemodelsmayfailto representany situationwhatsoever,
although distinct models which do representsituationsrepresentdistinct
situations. Both Maudlin [1989] and Butterfield[1987, 1989a, 1989b]
proposeversionsof ModelSelectivism,althoughon differentgrounds.
Maudlinarguesthatcertainofthe propertiesofspacetimepointsareessential
properties. If model m represents a physical situation and h is a Leibnizshift
that does not preserve the essential propertiesof the spacetime points of that
situation as portrayed by 91, then h*9JIdescribes these very same points as
having propertiescontrary to their essences, and hence describesno possibility
at all. For relativistic theories, Maudlin alleges that the spacetime metric
characterizes these essential properties.
Butterfieldproceeds from the premise of David Lewis's doctrine of counter-
parts that no individual exists in more than one possible world. Taking this to
apply to spacetime points, Butterfieldargues that if the manifolds of D1 and 9)1'
have a non-empty intersection, then, assuming 9W1 represents a possible world,
W•U'must fail to, on of
pain populating distinct worlds with the same spacetime
points.
Neither proposal has much appeal for anyone not already sympathetic to
either de re essentialism or modal realism. Maudlin and Butterfield,I suspect,
would like us to see their suggested resolutions of the hole argument as offering
additional motivation for these metaphysical doctrines. Each view does
provide a way of avoiding radical local indeterminism: if h is a hole
diffeomorphism of 9W, then 91 and h*91 cannot both represent physical
situations. But each raises other worries about determinism.
Maudlin's position risks ruling in as deterministic certain clear cases of
indeterminism. Imagine a relativistic theory with globally hyperbolic models
(M,g, ... ) and (M,g',... ) agreeing to the letter up through some particular
time slice but diverging thereafter. If there is no global isometry carrying g on
to g', then the 'past' does not determine the 'future' even up to isomorphism.
Applying Maudlin's metric essentialism, however, we are forced to conclude
there is no violation of determinism since at least one of the models portrays
the spacetime points represented as having properties contrary to their
essences.8
On Butterfield'sproposal, no two situations can have a common past, and
thus he must worry that determinism is true a priori.Butterfieldadmits this is a
'disadvantage' but suggests that it can be minimized by construing the basic
idea of determinism in terms of a comparison of counterparts. But what
counterpart relation is the appropriate one to use? If regions R1 and R2 can
count as counterparts if there is a diffeomorphismfrom the one on to the other,
then we can resuscitate the hole argument by composing a hole diffeomor-
phism with an isomorphism onto another model with a differentmanifold. If it
is required that there exist a complete isomorphism of the object fields on R1
and R2as well, radical local indeterminismis avoided, but at the cost of making
that particulardistributionof fieldson the regions a necessary one. As Maudlin
points out, the position then flunks the Earman-Norton 'acid test' for
substantivalism ([1989], p. 90). And if it is only necessary that R1 and R2be
isometric, then the worries of metric essentialism mention above are inherited.
Apart from these, there is a difficulty common to any version of Model
8 This
objection is due to Earman [1989]. p. 202.
Selectivism that avoids radical local indeterminism.Let # be the class of those
models that representsome physical situation or other. Foreach manifold M of
a member of X, choose a hole diffeomorphism hM.Let Sk' be the class of
models of the form hM*9J1such that 9JIWe.If radical local indeterminism is to
be avoided, no member of X' represents even a metaphysically possible
situation. In virtue of what do the members of t rather than the members of
,' represent genuine possibilities?9It might be answered that this is an
unreasonable demand for explanation-there is simply a surd metaphysical
fact of the matter. At this point, however, it is fair to compare the Model
Selectivist to the Model Literalist who proposes to avoid radical local
indeterminism by giving up Isomorphism Closure. Take T1to be the 'theory'
with models *1 and T2to be the 'theory' with models *2. The Literalistwants
to insist that T1and T2are not just notational variants on one another, but are
substantively rival theories. The sole differencebetween the Literalistand the
Selectivist, though, is that what for the former is a representation of mere
physical impossibility is for the latter a representation of metaphysical
impossibility.To the extent that it is intolerable to think that T1and T2are rival
'theories', it is intolerable to think there is a surd metaphysical fact of the
matter as to whether it is XI or S2 whose models represent genuine
possibilities.
6 LEIBNIZ EQUIVALENCE
It may seem that LeibnizEquivalence is the ineluctable conclusion of the hole

argument. 'But,' as Earman writes, 'drawing circles around groups of space-
time models and labeling them equivalence classes does not show that there is
a viable alternative to substantivalism' ([1986b], p. 237). In particular, it
needs to be shown how LeibnizEquivalence is a consequence of certain more
basic assumptions. If these assumptions involve an anti-realism concerning
spacetime, then the models of a spacetime theory will be seen to contain a
certain amount of descriptive fluff. Distinct models which agree modulo this
fluffcan then be claimed to represent the same physical situation. Although it
remains to be established just what is fluffand what is not, it is at least clear in
outline why distinct models may fail to represent distinct situations.
It is not so clear how LeibnizEquivalencecould be derivedwithout giving up
spacetime realism. Let me mention two potential difficulties.First, suppose a
is the physical situation represented by model 9m. A spacetime realist is
presumably committed to holding that this involves a one-to-one correspon-
dence f between the points in the manifold of M21and the spacetime points of a
such that the way that the object fields of 9NJare distributedon its manifold
9 This is essentially what Norton calls the problemof the 'real' model and the 'imposter'([ 1989],
pp. 62-3).
TheLessonsof the Hole Argumenlt 417
reflects under this correspondence the way the physical fields of a are
distributed on its spacetime. Now the Model Literalistand the Selectivist can
agree that for any Leibnizshift h, also represents a in the sense that the
h*9,J
distribution of object fields in h*9J matches the distribution of physical fields
in a under the correspondence function foh-'. If this is all that Leibniz
Equivalence demands, then the thesis is completely trivial. In order to have
bite, it must be interpretedto demand that there is no other possible situation
which h*J can represent. In particular, it must be denied that under the
correspondence function f, represents anything at all. Hence, the realist
h*,l9
who wants to subscribe to a non-trivial version of LeibnizEquivalence must
either argue that the situation a' which the Model Literalistimagines h*9Jlto
represent under f is nothing at all, or else must explain why h*931fails to
represent a' underf. The latter is clearly hopeless. And to take up the formeris
to revert to Model Selectivism.
Second, if U and V are distinct open neighborhoods of the manifold of 9NU, the
realist is presumably committed to holding that the substructures9~Ilvand
obtained by restricting 9) to U and V, respectively, represent distinct 9.•1V
subsituations of a. Suppose, however, that 9)Nhas non-trivial automorphisms
or that its object fields are uniform on some region of the manifold. Then U and
V can be chosen so that 9NIJu is isomorphic to 1.'"1LeibnizEquivalence then
demands that they represent the same situation. •.J 1
Earman [19 77, 1986b, 1989] opts for anti-realism, although of a form quite
differentfrom traditional relationism. Any spacetime model can be character-
ized up to isomorphism in terms of an algebra starting with an algebraic ring
isomorphic to the ring of continuous real-valued functions on the manifold.
Earman suggest that these Leibnizalgebras, as he calls them, correspond
directly to physical reality. A spacetime model only indirectly represents a
possible physical situation in virtue of realizing, in a precise mathematical
sense, the Leibniz algebra directly representing that situation. Since each
Leibnizalgebra is realized by each of the members of an isomorphism class of
spacetime models, isomorphic spacetime models represent the same physical
situation.
I have argued elsewhere (Rynasiewicz [1992]) that this program does not
yield a viable version of anti-substantivalism. The basic reason is that
isomorphic spacetime models have the same algebraic structure only in the
sense of 'same up to isomorphism'. Thus, the proliferation of isomorphic
1i f is a non-trivial automorphism, let U be any neighborhood on which ( differs from the

If
identity map and let V= h[U]. Ifthe fieldsof 3Mare uniform on region R. let U and V be any pair
of distinct neighborhoods contained by R.
" Note that if the
theory in question is a 'local' spacetime theory, these substructures are also
models of the theory. The difficulty cannot be overcome by restricting the applicability of
Leibniz Equivalence to maximal models. The hole argument applies whether the models in
question are maximal or not.
spacetime structures on which the hole argument feedsis matched by an equal

proliferationof isomorphic Leibnizalgebras, and the argument can be directed
against the latter as easily as the former. In fact, for the category of theories of
physical interest, the algebraic and the spacetime approaches are mathemati-
cally equivalent. The program of Leibnizalgebras is substantivalism cast in a
differentlanguage.
I also argued there that the very motivation for the program, namely,
LeibnizEquivalence,is flawed. Leibnizhad a second demonstration to 'confute
the fancy' of the Newtonians. If time were something 'distinct from things
existing in time', it could be asked 'why God did not create everything a year
sooner' (Alexander [1956], pp. 26-7). Now suppose we interpret the act of
creation not as the implantation of anything into spacetime, but as a transition
from a static 'ground state' to one of varied activity. Furthermore,remove God
from the scene, so that the question is not why he started up the universe at
time to rather than at to minus a year, but why the universe turned itself on at
that time. Let Y2represent this universe. I expect widespread agreement that
any spacetime theory having M for a model is to be judged an indeterministic
theory. Let T be the theory whose only models are those isomorphic to M.
According to LeibnizEquivalence, these other models all represent the same
situation as 9N, and hence T admits only this one situation as a physical
possibility. But how can T fail to be deterministic if it recognizes no other
physical possibilities?
By treating this example as a Cauchy initial value problem, relativity
theorists would conclude that determinism breaks down. This shows that,
despite what they might say, in practice they employ a criterion subtler than
LeibnizEquivalence. We will see what this is in due course. By now the reader
should have sufficientdoubts that there is a resolution to the problemraised by
the hole argument within the general framework commonly presumed. We
need a fresh start.
7 RADICAL LOCAL INDETERMINISM AND THE INSCRUTABILITY OF

REFERENCE
The problem the hole argument presents is not that substantivalism involves
an a prioricommitted to indeterminism as Earman and Norton have charged.
To be sure, the argument succeeds in showing that Model Literalism
(conjoined with Isomorphism Closure)implies radical local indeterminism for
physically interesting spacetime theories. But even if it is granted that
substantivalism requires Model Literalism (something I would hesitate to
grant), it follows that substantivists are a priori committed to indeterminism
only if they hold a priorithat some spacetime theory or other is true.
Now this may seem a bit of a quibble. For what would substantivalism
amount to if one didn't believe the proposition that some spacetime theory or
other is true? My guess is that few today who would call themselves
substantivalists do believe a priorithat some spacetime theory is true. Rather, I
think most would urge that the case for substantivalism depends on the
available evidence for this or that particular theory or narrower class of
spacetime theories and that their belief that there exists a true spacetime
theory is based on a posterioribeliefs about the truth or approximate truth of
specifictheories (as opposed to, say, theological considerations). And if so, their
commitment to indeterminism (if substantivalism really so committed) is also a
posteriori.
The hole argument can be used to pose a dilemma only to the extent there is
wide agreement that radicallocalindeterminism is obviously absurd, and thus
false a priori. Otherwise it might be suggested that we should weigh the
experimental evidence for or against it and begin looking for crucial tests, in
analogy with the correlation experiments targeted at Bell's Inequality. But
unlike the genuine failure of determinism in quantum mechanics, radical local
indeterminism strikes us as physically phony. The hole argument shows that
Model Literalismis suspect, not because it is committed a priorito indetermi-
nism, but because it saddles us with a bogus sort of indeterminism.
Nor is the involvement of spacetime theories essential. The dominant decay
mode of the neutral pion is nro-*2y, where the two photons are usually
observed only indirectly via pair production y-* e+ +e-. A specific instance of
this chain of events was observed in the first detection of the Q- particle. The
particular electrons and positrons produced are identifiable from the bubble
chamber photograph reproducedin the published report(Barneset al. [1964]).
Call one of these electrons 'Murray'and the other 'Yuval'. Now, according to
Model Literalism, determinism would fail even if all the relevant probability
amplitudes were zero or one. Take any descriptionof the cascade such that the
models of the description contain elements corresponding to each of the
fundamental particles.Let %be one of these models and let 0 be a permutation
of the domain of which interchanges the elements corresponding to the
electrons Murray%. and Yuval. This defines a model of the description
distinct from %, which coincides with % up through 0*,Isome time
slice, but
thereafter diverges. Thus assuming these two models represent distinct states
of affairs, determinism fails.
These sorts of permutation arguments are familiar to the readers of Quine,
Davidson, and the 'new' Putnam in connection with the so-called inscrutabi-
lity of reference.The strategy of these writers, however, is to argue not that any
complete description admits distinct but indiscernible states of affairs, but
rather that, given any complete descriptionof a single state of affairs,there are
hopelessly many distinct but indiscernibleways of construing the extensions of
the descriptive terms of the language on the domain of discourse in question.
More specifically, a scheme of referenceor interpretationfor a language is an
assignment of extensions to the primitive predicates and names from some
domain of individuals.The semantics for a language is presumedto derive from
a scheme of referencein a recursive fashion. If a is a scheme of referenceand 7ra
permutation of the domain of discourse, then 7rcan be used to define a scheme
nr*a in general distinct from 0.12 Given certain general and plausible
assumptions, it can be shown that for any sentence 0, the truth conditions for
on the scheme a are equivalent to the truth conditions for / on the scheme
n7r7.Thus, the reference of the descriptivevocabulary is radically underdeter-
mined by the truth conditions for the sentences of the language.
The hole argument can be recast as a special instance of this. Assume the
truth conditions for the sentences of the language of relativity are fixed. Take a
to be an interpretation on the set of actual spacetime points consistent with
these truth conditions. Considera permutation 7rwhich happens to leave fixed
the interpretation of such predicates as 'open neighborhood' and 'smooth
curve' and agrees with the identity map everywhere except for some small
region. The interpretation 7r*( yields equivalent truth conditions for the
language but assigns differentextensions to such predicates as 'x is space-like
separated from y'. Thus, even keeping fixed the interpretation of the
'topological' vocabulary, the truth conditions leave underdetermined the
interpretation of the remaining vocabulary, even if it has been specified
everywhere but for some small 'hole'.
It might be claimed that there could be grounds for distinguishing between
interpretations more finely grained than the truth conditions for whole
sentences of the language. Whatever these grounds might be, though, our
intuitions about radical local indeterminism set an upper limit on how
discriminating these grounds can be. For if we have some means to distinguish
the interpretation a from 7r*a,those very same means allow us to distinguish
between a situation conforming to ocand one conforming to Thus, to the
7*,a.
extent we think we can discriminate between interpretations of a spacetime
theory related by a hole diffeomorphism, we should be inclined to accept
radical local indeterminism as a genuine violation of physical determinism.
Now, a mathematical model can be converted into a scheme of abbreviation
by a bijection of the domain of the model onto a set of actual individuals. Thus,
the class of cases in which Model Literalism leads to an objectionable
postulation of distinct but indiscernible physical situations coincides with the
class of cases in which there exist underdetermined schemes of reference
according to the inscrutability arguments. Put slightly differently, in those
cases in which we want to deny that a given pair of models represent distinct
situations, each model has the status of an unintended interpretationrelative
to the other. If we take the pair to be co-intended,then we are committed to
12 If c is an individual name and a is the designation of c under then is the designation oft
x. mr(a)
under r*x. If P is an n-adic predicate, then the tuple (a ..... n) is in the extension of P under
.
iff (l-'a. ..., [-'a,,) is in the extension of P'under t.
,*x
TheLessonsof the Hole Argument 42I
regarding the difference between them as indicative of a real difference in
possibilities.
8 A PARABLE
Where, it may be asked, does this get us? Assume we deny that radical local
indeterminism is a genuine species of physical indeterminism because the
models in question represent, not rival situations, but variant underdeter-
mined schemes of reference for describing the same situation. How, then, do
we, or could we, ever know which scheme is the one we are using?
The problem raised is a pseudo-problem. If the question as to which is the
'correct' interpretation is posed as a factual one, then the various competing
schemes must be describablein a way definite enough to say which is which.
Otherwise, the question as to whether i, for example, is the 'correct'scheme is
comparable to the question 'Is P true?' If the specifications of the schemes are
independent of the language under interpretation, as is the pretense in the
inscrutability arguments, then a user of the language may very well be in the
dark as to which specificationis the 'correct'one. However, if the specifications
are given in terms of the language being interpreted,then one of the schemes
can be uniquely identifiedas the 'correct'one simply in virtue of the way it has
been specified.Consequently, if there is no way of identifying which scheme is
which independently of the resources of the language under consideration,
then either it is obvious which scheme is 'correct'or else there is nothing to be
known.
An illustration may help. Imagine a logic aptitude experiment set up as
follows. The subject is told that three items will be shown in succession and
that each item is either red or green. After the items are displayed, the subject
is to write down a description of the situation whose deductive closure is
complete in the first-orderfragment of English containing the predicates 'red',
'green', and 'is after'.The intelligent subject knows beforehand that, given the
constraints of the experimental setup, most of the work can be done ahead of
time. One will have the sentence which expresses that there are exactly three
things, the axioms for a total linear ordering, and a dichotomy axiom for 'red'
and 'green'. All that remains to be determinedby the experimental run is how
to fill in, for n= 1, 2, 3, the first-orderequivalent of the schema
The nth item is
with either 'red'or 'green'. Since there are eight ways to do this, there are eight
possible complete descriptions.The intelligent subject also knows that for each
complete description there are six distinct interpretations on a given domain
satisfying the description.
So, when the sequence of items in the experimental run turns out to be a red
item followed by a red item followed by a green one, the subject fills in the
instances of the schema accordingly and remarksto the experimenter, 'I know
I gave the correct first-orderdescription, but what is the correct scheme of
reference for the domain of individuals shown to me?'
'What do you mean?' she replies.
'Letal, a2,and a3be the items displayed.On one scheme of reference,aI is red
and is the first item, a2 is red and is the second item, and a3 is green and is the
third. On another scheme, al is red and is the first item, a3 is red and is the
second, and a2 is green and is the third ... Which is the correct scheme?'
The experimenter is a bit baffled. 'Well, if a1 is the first item, a) the second,
and a3 the third, then the first scheme is correct. If aI is the first item, a3 the
second, and a) the third, then the second scheme is correct ...
Unsatisfied,the subject presses. 'But is al the first item, a) the second, and a3
the third; or ... ?'
'You tell me!' she blurts back.
The subject realizes he has yet to pose a factual question. Had he done so to
begin with, say by identifying aI, a), and a3 as the first, second, and third items
respectively, he would have answered for himself which of the six interpreta-
tions is the correct one.
But, it may be asked, since the subject can identify a unique intended
interpretationsatisfying the descriptionin question, does it follow that there is
really only one possible experimental outcome admitted by the description?
We should resist the notion that there is an absolute fact as to the variety of
possibilities that is not correlative to some assumption about the means
available for distinguishing the items in question one from another. If it is
assumed that the experimenter as well can identify the displayed items only in
terms of their ordinal positions, say, because the items in question are
computer generated images, we conclude there is one possible outcome per
description. If we suppose, however, that she can identify the items
independently of their order and color, and thus can formulate for herself six
distinct co-intended interpretationsper description,we will maintain there are
six corresponding possibilitiesin each case. Assuming the subject continues to
be restricted to identifying the items ordinally, we might speak in terms of the
number of possibilitiesrelative to the subject or experimenter,respectively. But
the number of possibilitiesrelative to the subject is an uninteresting one if his
means of identification are artificially constrained. In the conduct of science
our verdict as to how many possibilities there 'really' are is guided by what
means of identification are conceivably available to the experimenter. Keep in
mind, though, that in earlier centuries it was common to liken ourselves to
subjects of a single Experimenter.
This vignette might leave the false impression that one has always either
feast or famine in the number of co-intended interpretations satisfying a
complete description. Suppose the items displayed are computer generated
images, so that there is no question of identifyingthem apart from their ordinal
positions. Suppose, however, that the language of description contains the
triadic predicate 'x is between y and z' instead of the dyadic predicate 'x is after
y'. Given the same experimental run, both subject and experimenter can
produce a pair of co-intended interpretations satisfying the complete descrip-
tion in this new language of the sequence produced. One of these, the
interpretation-first item red, second item red, third item green-corresponds
to the actual experimental run. The other interpretation--first item green,
second item red, third item red--corresponds to an alternative possibility
admitted by the same maximal description.
Our goal now is to develop a general account of how the number of co-
intended interpretations per maximal description derives from the means of
identification assumed, and to adapt this account to the determination of the
co-intended models of a physical theory.
9 THE IDENTIFICATION GROUP
In what follows, I will limit myself to those contexts in which interpretations

are 'underdetermined'at best only up to isomorphism. I will also need some
preliminary technicalities.
For a given language Y and a scheme of reference i for Y, let P(i) be the set
of all permutations of the domain of discourse of x.Define.~i "(~)to be the set of
all interpretations for [ on the domain of i isomorphic to i. Call 4"('x) the
permutationclass of i in virtue of the fact that
7CEP(l)'.
~"'(7c)='71{*,c:
Let Y+ be the expansion of Y obtained by introducing a new individual
constant a for each element a in the domain of i. For each flcP"(i), let #/3 be
the expansion of p which assigns to each new constant a the element a. The
diagramof fl, denoted A(#), is the set of atomic sentences and negations of
atomic sentences of ~+satisfiedby pf. For each permutation rceP(i),define Af
to be the corresponding permutation of the set of new constants such that
f7(d)= 7o(a).Ain turn induces a permutation of the set of sentences of f
+ such
that for each sentence ,, is the result of uniformly substituting i•(a) for d,
7•,,that for
for each new constant. Note any PE3j CX),the image of A(#) under f7is
A(r*fl).
It should be evident from the examples of the preceding section that if P is
adopted as an intended interpretation,this mandates that a certain subset I(P)
of the diagram of # be satisfied (in #f) simply in virtue of the way in which
the individuals of the domain are identified so as to make # an intended
interpretation. Call this subset the identificationdiagramof Pf.In our experi-
mental examples, if the ordinal positions of the individuals exhaust the means
of identifying them, then in the case of the first language considered, I(/) is
the restriction of A(/) to the language of the order predicate. In the case of the
second language, I(f) is the restriction of A(P) to the language of the

betweenness predicate.If the individuals are identifiableindependently of their
order and color, then I(f) is empty in each case. Whatever the means of
identification, the basic sentences of Y + satisfied in consequence must be the
same up to permutation across interpretations of the same permutation class,
i.e. for any the image of I(fl) under 7fis I(71:*3).
Now a pair ne7'o'I"(X),
of interpretations#I, f2bef'(x) will count as co-intended if there
is no disagreement between them concerning which individual has been
identified as which. In other words, Pi and #2 are co-intended just in case
I(]/1)= I(f2). Thus, the relation of co-intendedness on .?"(cx)is an equivalence
relation and partitions '"(() into subclasses of co-intended interpretations.
The relation of co-intendedness can be equivalently defined in an alternate
way which will be more useful as we proceed. Obviously, for each PfElk"(a),
P(#)= P(i). Note also that P(P) forms a group under the composition of
permutations. Define G(P) to be the set of those permutations in P(#) which
preserve the identification diagram of fi, i.e.
=
G(=) !rcfEP(fl): I(*r./) I(fl)
Since G(fl)is a subgroup of P(f), call it the identificationgroupof Pf.If Aut(fl)is
the automorphism group of fl, then
c (1)
Aut(fl) G(fl)cP(P).
Although P(f)= P(i), it need not be the case that G(l)= G(c). None the less,
the identification groups of the members of fi"'(c) are systematically related.
For each nmP(-), the conjugate group of G(Jf)by 71is defined
G"(fl)= df{ EP(a): iooon- '1G(f)}.

It follows from the definition of the identification group that
= GW(), (2)
CG-1(7,)
or equivalently,
= G"- '().
G(•*)
(This parallels the behavior of the automorphism group.) Now let R be the
relation on X'"(x)such that PfI RP2just in case there exists a ncG(fl) such that
n*#f1 = #2. From (1) and (2) alone it can be shown that R is an equivalence
relation. From the definition of G,.it follows that R is the relation of being co-
intended.
The identification group of an interpretation is also linked to the identifica-
tion groups of its subinterpretations, although in a less complete fashion.
Suppose P is a subinterpretation of a. Since the domain of # is a subset of the
domain of a and ftagrees with on this subdomain, the identificationdiagram
of f is a subset of the identification diagram of c. Consequently, for any nmeG()
if the restriction of 7nto the domain of fl is a permutation tn'eP(fl),then n'eG(fl).
We want now to extend this analysis to the mathematical models of physical
theories. There are two hurdles. First,although we often have tolerablyprecise
characterizations of the models themselves, we seldom have a precisely
characterized language for which those models serve as interpretations.
Second, we do not always have available an appropriate set of actual
individuals on to which we can map the domains of the models. Theories
expressing putative laws of nature, however, are addressed to certain
categories of entities generically conceived, and implicitly associated with such
are generic identification criteria. Hence, we can proceed by supposing that to
the extent that a theory has a definiterange of intended applications,we tacitly
associate with each model 91of the theory an identificationgroup G(91)subject
to the following minimal constraints.
(I) Aut(9I) e G(91) e P(91).
(II) If f is an isomorphism of 91 onto 3, then
G(%1)= {meP(1) :fon of-I eG( 3)}.
(III) If I%is a substructure of 3 and tc'eP(g1) is a subpermutation of n~eP(3),
then ''eG(91)if
n•G(93).
Structures 1,and $2 from the same permutation class k" are co-intended
if and only if there exists a ~n~G(931)
such that =0 2. As we saw above, (I)
7*.31
and (II) entail that this is an equivalence relation on t(". Call the equivalence
classes of the relation co-intentionclasses, or co-classesfor short. Any pair of
distinct models from the same co-class are to be counted as 'representing
distinct physical situations'.'1
Considernow a permutation class ,"' of structures in isolation from the rest.
If the identification group of each structure in t"' coincides with the
permutation group, then all the members of t" are co-intended. At the other
extreme, if the identification group coincides with the automorphism group,
then each co-class is a singleton set and the members of t" count as
notational variants on one another, representing the same physical situation.
Suppose, however, that the identification group is strictly intermediate
between these two cases. Then there are many co-classes with a multiplicity of
structures per co-class. For each e-X,'",let $(gI) denote the co-class of I91.If
93e-"P, then there exists a permutation such that n*=ZI = 3. Further-
n•eP('L)
more,
Thus, any pair of distinct co-classes can be put into a one-to-one correspon-
13 The quotation marks are used to disavow any commitment to an ontology of possible
situations. Since the repeated use of quote marks can be clumsy, I will frequently drop them in
what follows.
dence by some permutation. Such a permutation providesa rule telling us how
the members of the one class can be systematically interpreted as notational
variants on the members of the other. Officially,a resolutionof 9I to 93 is a
suchthat(i)p*9l= ~ and(ii)eitherpoG(9I)orelsep is the
permutationpeP($21)
identitypermutation.Inresolving91to 93,p alsoresolveseachmemberof H(%I)
to a memberof #(3), and so I shall say that p resolvesthe one class to the
other.If~#(U)= (5), then thereis a uniqueresolution,namelythe identity
permutation. If ?(•I) $ W(j) and the identification group is strictly larger
than the automorphism group, then (9I) can be resolved to (Q) in
multiple ways. Each resolution is an alternate convention for establishing
notational equivalence.
A riggingof a permutation class *k" is a function 91 which assigns to each
ordered pair (f~1,
h 2) of co-classes a resolution p w. , 2 of *2 on to such
that for any 42, #2, and V3
(i) .. 2= •y, -• 1
poI- t2.
(ii) PwPl,.W #,2. 3= P.#1.?
2OP# 3"
Any rigging91gives rise to an equivalencerelation on fk",such that
a:,•
The significanceof 91 93is that, in the old mannerof speaking,I91and93

=
representthe same situationaccordingto 91.
I hastento emphasizethat if the identificationgroupis strictlyintermediate
betweenthe automorphismgroupand the permutationgroup,then thereare
differentriggings yielding distinct equivalencerelations, and the choice
betweenthemis an arbitraryone.Thismeansthat,exceptin limitingcases,the
projectof roundingup modelsintofixedequivalenceclassesis an idleone. The
importantenterpriseis to understandunderwhatconditionsit is permissible to
construea givenpairof modelsas 'representing the samesituation'.Ifit is not
permissibleto construe them as such, i.e. if we are obliged in those
circumstancesto takethemas 'representing distinctsituations',I shallsay that
the two modelsseparate.
IO COMPARISONS, AUTONOMY, AND DETERMINISM
Consideringa permutationclass in isolation,distinctmembersof the class

separatejust in case they are co-intended.SinceI am (artificially)restricting
myselfto thosecasesin which the 'underdetermination' of referenceis at best
to
up isomorphism,non-isomorphic models on the same domainshouldbe
assumedto separate.But what if the domainsof models%91and 912do not
coincide?If91,and912arenot isomorphic,obviouslywe shouldexpectthemto
separate. However, if they are isomorphic, there is no way to answer the
question except with referenceto some assumed comparison of their respective

domains. Now, in order to do this it is not necessary that we postulate an
ontology of possible individuals and set out to resolve issues of transworld
identity. How the domains of %I1and %92compare is a matter of what we want
to imagine 91, and 912 as representing. And since we have no handle on
'sameness' or 'difference'of representation except in terms of structures on a
common domain, this means we need to embed the domains of 91Iand 912into
some common domain. Specifically, a comparisonof 91, with 912 involves four
components: a pair of structures 31 and 32 sharing the same domain and a
pair of isomorphic embeddings f, and f2 of 91 into 01 and 912 into 32
respectively. 911and 912separate under a given comparison just in case there is
no resolution of the image of 91t under fi to the image of 912under f2.
This definition entails that if 911and 912are not isomorphic, they separate
under any comparison. If 9t1 is isomorphic to 912,then whether or not they
separate depends on the purposes and details of the comparison. If we want to
compare 91 with 912 apart from their representational relation to other
structures, we can embed 91Wisomorphically onto itself and 912 onto some
member of the permutation class of 911.Whether or not WI1 and 912 are thereby
to
required represent distinct situations depends on whether the image of 912 is
co-intended with 911. We may, however, want to compare %1 and 92 as
representations of fragments of certain larger situations. This is done by
embedding %I1and 912into 01 and 1S2respectively as proper substructures.
The definition of separation entails the following for particular cases. If we
choose 1= 32, then %1 and 9I2 separate just in case the comparison maps
them onto distinct substructures. If 31 and 932 are isomorphic but not co-
intended, then, even though 31 and 932can be taken to represent the same
situation, 911and 912separate if no resolution of 31to 23when restrictedto the
domain of the image of 911resolves 911to 912. Or, if 3I and 02 separate, and
thus represent distinct situations, 911and 112may fail to separate, and hence
may be taken to represent a common subsituation of the two. Finally, note that
even if 121,and 912 are co-intended models of the same permutation class, they
can always be compared in such a way that they fail to separate.
The general strategy of performing comparisons is first to fix in mind a
definite spectrum of situations by focusing on the separation relation for
structures on a common domain, considered in isolation. Then we specify for
the structures to be compared, independently of one another, what subsitua-
tions we intend them to represent by means of the embedding functions. The
relation of separation for structures on the host domain then informs us as to
whether or not these substructures must be regarded as distinct.
The order of comparison can also be done in an inverse fashion. Suppose we
fix a spectrum of situations involving some set of imagined individuals in terms
of the separation relation on a class of models on a given domain. We then seek
to determine, for some larger set of individuals, the range of situations of which
the initially given situations are subsituations. It may seem that the way to do
this is to select some super-domainof the domain of the originally given class of
structures and then simply to examine the separation relation on the class of
extensions to that super-domain. There are two hitches, however. Suppose 91
is a structure in the originally given class. First,the procedurepresupposesthat
what represents is to be imagined antecedently and independently of
whatever9W.the various extensions of 91might be imagined to represent. Second,
it is presumed that, whatever situation 91 has been imagined to represent, it
continues to represent that very same situation qua substructure of its various
extensions.
Take the second of these first.Suppose 93 and 932 are both extensions of 9t to
the super-domain in question. If 01 is not resolvable to 02, then evidently 93
and 93 must be taken to represent distinct situations. Suppose however that p
resolves 03 to 0-2. Unless the restriction of p to the original domain is a
resolution of I1 to itself, 91 fails to represent qua substructure of 93 what it
represents qua substructure of 0), and hence, in one of the two cases, fails to
representwhat 9Wwas antecedently imagined to represent.So, in general, if 9BI
and 912are members of the originally given class of structures, and ~1and 32
are extensions of 931 and 32 respectively, we must demand that •31 and 02 fail
to separate only if there is a resolution of 931 to 932 whose restriction to the
original domain resolves I9, to IN2.
The first hitch mentioned above involves considerations about the identifi-
cation of individuals that go beyond what was needed to motivate the
introduction of the identification group. If 91 is a substructure of 0, then, in
order to imagine the situation represented by WfL qua substructure of 93
antecedently and independently of whatever situation we might imagine 93 to
represent, the individuals of the situation that represents must be
identifiable antecedently and independently of any9W. additional individuals
present in the situation that 0 is taken to represent. We cannot assume that
this will automatically be the case. Reconsider the domain of items presented
in the experimental parable above. If these items are identifiableonly in virtue
of their ordinal positions, the subdomain consisting of the first and third items
fails to meet the requirement, since the identification of the third item depends
on the identification of the second item, which lies outside the subdomain in
question.
Let us say that a (sub)domain of individuals is autonomousjust in case each
member of the domain is identifiable without presupposing the identification
of any individual not in the domain. For interpretations a and # of a given
language on some actual set of individuals, we can then say that a is an
autonomoussubinterpretation of f if a is a subinterpretationof # and the domain
of a is autonomous. It should be clear that the identification groups of the
interpretations for a given language need not suffice to determine the relation
of subinterpretation autonomy. For example, taking the language of identity
(containing no predicates other than the identity symbol), the permutation
group and the automorphism group of any interpretation coincide, and hence
the identification group yields no information as to which (sub)domains are
autonomous.
Now, the notion of an autonomous (sub)domain cannot be carried over
directly to theories with mathematical models, since a given subset of elements
of a domain may hang together in one structure so as feasibly to represent a
situation whose members constitute an autonomous domain, but in another
structure may be scattered about in a way inappropriatefor the representation
of an autonomous subdomain. None the less, we suppose, in analogy with
what we did with the identification group, that, to the extent that a theory has
a intended range of application, it is tacitly specifiedwhich substructures of a
model are autonomous substructures. This is also subject to certain minimal
constraints. Writing II-<39 to indicate that 1I is an autonomous substructure
of 3:
(IV) If and 3<z(, then 91- i.
91•<•5
(V) If 9t 93and f is an isomorphism of 93onto C, then f*~a%C, where f*91 is
the image of 9 under f.
The motivation for these constraints is self-evident.
In its most general form, an inverse comparison of 01 with 0-2 (with the
same domain) involves four components: a pair of structures VI1and 912on a
common domain and a pair of isomorphic embeddingsf, and f2 of f91 and '12
into 91 and 0- respectively such thatJ:]*NI1-< 1 and f2*912- B2. Si and 2
separate under a given comparison just in case there is no resolution p of •93 to
032 such that f20opofl-1 resolves to f2*912. We considered above the
fi,*91I
special instance in which 9•I and 912 are autonomous substructures andf and
f) are the identity embeddings.
Inverse comparisons standardly come into play in determining whether or
not a given theory is deterministic. However, before we set out a formal
explication of how this is done, we had better touch base on the pre-analytic
concept to be explicated. I follow John Earman in taking inspiration from
William James's pithy characterization: 'What does determinism profess? It
professesthat those parts of the universe already laid clown absolutely appoint
and decree what the other parts shall be' (quoted in Earman [1986a], p. 4). We
need to generalize this and recast it in the jargon we have been using. Replace
'the universe' with 'a possible physical situation' and 'the parts ... already laid
down' with 'any set of initial conditions'. I will take it for granted that a set
of initial conditions from a physical situation is to be understood as an
autonomous subsituation meeting certain other constraints. The sense of
determinism in question co-varies with what these other constraints are taken
to be. The resulting characterizationof when a theory Tis deterministicis then:
for any physical situation s admitted as possible by T and any initial condition
sub-situation s' of s, s' is a subsituation of no other situation admitted by T
involving the same individuals as s.
Purging this of reference to a Pickwickian realm of possible situations and
individuals, the physically possible situation s is replacedby a model I~ of Tand
the subsituation s' by an autonomous initial condition substructure '. The
question as to whether there is no 'other situation' of the sort in question is
settled by examining whether 9I separates from some other model 0' on the
domain of 0 under the inverse comparison involving ' and the identity
embedding. In other words, Tis deterministicjust in case for any model 9I and
any initial condition 3~ia91,there is no model I91'of T such that (a) the domain
of 1I' coincides with the domain of 9I and (b) there is no resolution of I91'to 'I
whose restriction to the domain of is the identity permutation.
By invoking the appropriate comparisons, this definition can be stated
equivalently, although less perspicuously,without demanding either that 3 be
a substructure of I or that V' have the same domain as I. Sufficeit to say that
if the identification group coincides with the automorphism group, then
determinism demands: if 3 is an initial condition structure compatible with T
andf andf2 are isomorphic embeddings of into models L91and 912of T,then
there is a model 93 and isomorphic embeddings gI and g2 of III and 912into 0
respectively such that gl ofi = 9g2f2. If we have a notion of maximal models as
well, this in turn is equivalent (assuming Zorn's Lemma) to the requirement
that any extension of 91to a maximal model of Tis unique up to isomorphism.
11 APPLICATIONS TO SPACETIME THEORIES
The identification groups implicitly associated with the models of the standard
categories of spacetime theories, as customarily used, are as follows.
* General relativistic theories: the isometry group.
* Special relativistic theories: the isometry group.
* Newtonian theories:the group of diffeomorphismswhich leave invariant (a)
the temporal separation of events, (b) the spatial separation of simultaneous
events, (c) the class of inertial frames, and (d) the absolute rest frame, if one
is posited.
In the first case, the metric uniquely determines the stress-energy tensor. So
normally, the identification group coincides with the automorphism group. In
the other two cases, the metric and affine features of the spacetime usually fail
uniquely to determine the other object fields posited. Consequently, the
identification group is strictly intermediate between the automorphism group
and the permutation group. In all three cases, the autonomous substructures
are those having topologically connected domains. Before discussing the
rationale behind these determinations, let us see how the quandaries raised in
the first half of the paper are now resolved.
First, reconsider the hole argument. Let h be a hole diffeomorphism for
model 9N1. The argument assumes that h is not an automorphism of Mand that
the 'hole' H in question is not the entire manifold. In the case of general
relativity, the first assumption entails that hoG(921). For special relativistic and
Newtonian theories, the second assumption yields the same conclusion. Now
the complement H of the 'hole' is either topologically connected or it is not. If it
is not, then we cannot use the common restrictions of 9J3and he*Wto H for an
inverse comparison. So the question as to whether 931and h*2 represent
distinct situations is to be answered by asking whether9'S and h*9YJare co-
intended members of their permutation class. Since hoG(T9R), the answer is no.
If H is connected, then we can ask whether 9JYand h*9J separate under the
inverse comparison. Since h was defined to be the identity on H, it
automatically resolves 9N to h*92 while resolving the common restriction to H
to itself. Thus, M9I
and h*WIfail to representdistinct situations under the inverse
comparison to be used in judging whether determinism holds.
Consider next the construction used to show the incoherence of 'Newton'
equivalence. Recall that that construction began by taking an isometry h of
Minkowski spacetime and then decomposing h into diffeomorphismsh1 and h12
such that h-ohl = h although neither hi nor h2 is itself an isometry. An
inconsistency resulted since 'Newton' equivalence demands that W9and h, *9JI2
representthe same situation and that hi *92fand h2a(h- representthe same
situation, although 9J3and ,*9M•)
represent distinct situations.
(i.e. h2*(hl*9.*I))
Given the principles developed h*,2f
above, though, the paradox is only apparent.
Since the identification group in this case is strictly intermediate between the
automorphism group and the permutation group, there are a number of
riggings of KP(MJR) yielding distinct equivalence relations, and whether or not
two models from distinct co-classes represent the same situation is relative to
the rigging chosen. 9JIand hl•*9il represent the same situation relative to a
rigging resolving to $K(MJT) via h -', while hI *91 and 11*91represent
the same situationY(h1,*9)3)
relative to a rigging resolving (hl*91) to IJ(931) via
As a challenge to the consistency of spacetime realism with Leibniz h_1.
Equivalence, I raised a merological problem. A model 9M!may have distinct
isomorphic submodels 9)1 and 9312.Realism demands that 9MI1and 9J)12
represent distinct situations. LeibnizEquivalence demands they represent the
same situation. For general relativistic theories, I have endorsed Leibniz
Equivalence to the following extent. Distinct isomorphic models with the same
domain represent the same situation, considering their permutation class in
isolation. Isomorphic models with disparate domains represent the same
situation under any comparison embedding the one on to any member of the
permutation class of the other. Comparedin this way, 39.1land 9JiZ1 represent
the same situation. But under such a comparison, 931,and are compared as
independent models of the theory. Comparing them qua••21 substructures of 9.
under the identity embeddings, they represent distinct situations.
I also argued that Leibniz Equivalence, even in the context of general
relativity, cannot be maintained without qualification, since we can generate
examples of genuine failures of determinism even if the models are determined
up to isomorphism. The example I extracted from Leibniz'ssecond argument
against the Newtonians posed a theory with a model 9Mlwhich persists in a
static 'ground state' up through a given time slice. We can now see why
determinism fails for such a theory. Take any model M' in the permutation
class of 9Wdiffering from •Wby a time translation. The two models share a
common substructure 3 consisting of an initial segment of the static 'ground
state' of each. Fixing first the initial condition situation 3 is imagined to
represent, it follows that 9)1and cannot in consequence represent the same
global situation. Under the 9V.'
inverse comparison embedding 3 into 9N and 9•IW'
via the identity map, 9N1and 2' separate.
As a final application, consider a case not yet mentioned. Relationists are
supposed to insist that all motion is merely the relative motion of bodies. In
particular,a body cannot be said to be in a state of acceleration absolutely, but
only relative to some other body or system of bodies. Stein [1977] argues,
however, that without an absolute criterion of interial motion, it is impossible
to formulate a set of deterministic laws of particle motion. The argument is a
variant on the hole construction. Suppose 0U1 is a model of whatever laws are
proposed. If there is no criterion of absolute acceleration, then, for any time to,
we can define a diffeomorphism0 agreeing with the identity up through tobut
diverging thereafterin such a way as to preserve relative temporal and spatial
separations. If V is the set of world lines of the particles, then 4 maps V on to a
new set *)*V of trajectories.The resulting model 4*91Dis isomorphic to TI, and
hence satisfies the same laws. Thus, the histories of the particles up through
time to fail to uniquely determined their future behavior. Earman [1986b]
notes that the relationist can avoid the apparent failure of determinism by
claiming that M2)and 4*92flreally represent the same possible world, as urged
by Leibniz Equivalence. Do we or do we not have here a genuine failure of
determinism?The answer depends on what we take the identificationgroup to
be. If it is the group of diffeomorphismswhich preserve spatial and temporal
separations, determinism fails. If it is the automorphism group, there is no
failure of determinism.
How do we determine the appropriateidentification group for a spacetime
theory? The question deserves more attention than I shall give it here,
although my remarksshould make it clear that the above assignments are not
ad hoc. The most obvious means of identifying spacetime points is in terms of a
coordinate system or chart. So the question becomes one of how we establish a
definite coordinate system. In the Newtonian and special relativistic cases, we
can appeal to the sorts of operational procedures commonly cited. One relies,
for example, on test particles to pick out inertial motions, and then
coordinatizes an inertial frame starting from a given point by means of an
ensemble of comoving rigid rods and ideal clocks. If we assume that the test
particles, rods, and clocks are not themselves parts of the system modeled, it is
clear that the identification group consists exactly of those transformations
which leaves this chart adapted to the inertial and metric structure posited.
This yields just the groups cited above. I take it that, in the ordinary
applications of these theories, the assumption is realistic enough.
If, however, these theories are appliedcosmologically, the devices employed
for the spacetime identifications are themselves part of the systems to be
modeled, and the models themselves fully portray how each point is identified.
Transformationsother than automorphisms generate conflicting portrayalsof
how the points are identified, and the identification group collapses to the
automorphism group. Thus, under the supposition that these means of
identification are exhaustive, Leibniz is correct in concluding that reflecting
everythingEast to West or translating everything three feet to the East yields
not a differentworld, but the same world describedalternatively. Newton and
Clarke, though, would have denied the supposition. Even if these means are
exhaustive for us. they are not for God:'He endures forever, and is everywhere
present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and
space' (General Scholium, Book III, Principia).According to Newton, because
space and time are 'as it were an emanent effect of God' (De Gray.in Hall and
Hall [1962], p. 132), the parts of space and time are identifiableto him merely
in terms of 'their mutual order and positions'.
In general relativity, coordinate charts are established in physical terms
with the aid of the spacetime metric. For example, given a point and the set of
tangent vectors at that point, the exponential map yields the Reimannian
normal coordinates for any neighborhood on to which the map is one-one.
Similarly, given a spatial hypersurface. the metric can be used to define a
system of Gaussian normal coordinates (synchronous coordinates). (See, e.g.
Wald [1984], pp. 41-2, for details.) Hence, diffeomorphismswhich are not
isometries undo the chart established and lead to a variant identificationof the
spacetime points. It should be noted, however, that in certain applications the
isometry group, and hence the identification group, is treated as strictly larger
than the automorphism group, for example, if the stress-energy tensor of the
system modeled is dominated by that of a background system which is taken to
fix the metric. In this way, one might do, say, neutrino physics in curved
spacetime.
The notion of spacetime 'immutability'pops up frequently in the philosophi-
cal literature as a feature which distinguishes earlier spacetime theories from
general relativity. One explication of 'immutability' is that in each model
the geometry of the spatial hypersurfaces (assuming the spacetime can be
partitionedinto such) remains constant. Another is that both the topology and
the metric of spacetime is the same (up to isomorphism) from model to model.
Neither of these quite captures what is intended 'in the sense that the object
fields which characterize the structure of spacetime are not given ab initio but
are regarded as dynamic objects on a par with the other fields' (Earman
[1986b], p. 235). How is this to be understood? Barring theological
hypotheses, the structure of spacetime even in Newtonian and special
relativistic physics cannot be entirely independent of its 'contents' since the
identification means depend on at least some of the 'contents'. What
distinguishes general relativity from it predecessors is that the 'contents'
cannot be neatly separated into subsystems, one of which suffices to identify
the spacetime points while the others are allowed to vary. The spacetime of
these earlier theories is 'immutable' in the sense that it is imagined that it is
feasible to have such an 'immutable' system of identification.
Finally, let me remark on the determination of the relation of substructure
autonomy for spacetime theories. In general relativity, the points of a
connected region can be identified from a given point without reference to
points outside the region by covering the region with a set of convex
Reimannian normal charts beginning with the initial point. If the region is not
connected, then, from a given point, the points in a disconnected component
cannot be identified without the identification of intermediate points of the
spacetime in which the disconnected components are embedded. Since the
exponential map requires for its definition only the existence of a connection,
these remarks suffice for the Newtonian and special relativistic cases as well.
12 CONCLUSION
If spacetime substantivalism is assumed to hold that the identificationgroup of

a spacetime theory is the diffeomorphismgroup of the manifold, then the hole
argument demonstrates that the price of substantivalism is indeed high. This is
an outlandish view to hold even apart from the hole argument. It might be
claimed that general relativity nevertheless forces substantivalism into such
an awkward position since the metric, a.k.a. the gravitational field potentials,
is part of the contents of spacetime, and the substantivalist must maintain that
the parts of spacetime are identifiableindependently of its contents. The second
half of this claim is a familiar relationist complaint in disguise: space and time
are ontologically suspect because they are not directly observable. As for the
firsthalf of the claim, it should be asked why we must impose fromthe outside a
dualism of 'contents' and 'container'. If it is said that the substantival/
relational controversy cannot be formulated without it, I suggest we re-
examine why we think that that debate deserves to be carried over into
twentieth-century physics.
1)epartmertof Philosophy
Johns HopkinsUniversity
The Lessons of the Hole Argumnent 435
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The Lessons of the Hole Argument

The Lessons of the Hole Argument

Earlierin this century substantivalism was commonly viewed as a gratuitous

2 THE HOLE ARGUMENT

proper neighborhood H c M (called a 'hole'), agrees with the identity on all

Isomorphism Closure:If 9J is a model of T and WIis isomorphic to T9', then WI'

Model Literalism: Each model represents a possible physical situation, and

However stringent the laws of T, it follows that T cannot be deterministic. For

LeibnizEquivalence:Isomorphicmodels representthe same physical situation.

A crucial assumption in the hole argument is that the spacetime theories of

What is worrisomeaboutthis alternateportrayalof specialrelativityis that it

of models to those whose manifolds are connected spaces. Some authors

How then should we understand talk of Newtonian or Minkowski spacetime

It may seem that LeibnizEquivalence is the ineluctable conclusion of the hole

1i f is a non-trivial automorphism, let U be any neighborhood on which ( differs from the

spacetime structures on which the hole argument feedsis matched by an equal

7 RADICAL LOCAL INDETERMINISM AND THE INSCRUTABILITY OF

9 THE IDENTIFICATION GROUP

In what follows, I will limit myself to those contexts in which interpretations

second language, I(f) is the restriction of A(P) to the language of the

G"(fl)= df{ EP(a): iooon- '1G(f)}.

The significanceof 91 93is that, in the old mannerof speaking,I91and93

IO COMPARISONS, AUTONOMY, AND DETERMINISM

Consideringa permutationclass in isolation,distinctmembersof the class

question except with referenceto some assumed comparison of their respective

11 APPLICATIONS TO SPACETIME THEORIES

If spacetime substantivalism is assumed to hold that the identificationgroup of

STACHEL, J. [198911:'Einstein's Search for General Covariance, 1912-191 5', in D.

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