G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the
Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010
and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili
(petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May
2010 elections. At the
heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had
complied with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials.
When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident
of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the
2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in
1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th
District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran
for the position of Representative of the 4th District of
Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa
City.2 However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his
COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then
staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San
Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent)
filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification"3 against him before the
COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing Section
78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code,4 private respondent alleged that petitioner made
material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and
likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his
COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two
years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010
local elections.
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the
following:
1. Petitioners COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1
December 20096
2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT
Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings thereon) in
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the
name of Bernadette Palomares, petitioners
common-law wife7
3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property
Holdings of properties under the name of
Bernadette Palomares8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent
Florencio Librea9
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de
Torres10
6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by
COMELEC Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12
8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on
Marriages regarding petitioner13
9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement
on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in
the name of petitioner14
10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette
Palomares15
11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No
Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City
registered in the name of petitioner16
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office
Certification that petitioner has no business
therein17
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of
petitioners daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili18
14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City
Division Certification that the names Bernadette
Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis
Meynard Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on
its list of graduates19
15. Certification from the Office of the Election
Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette Palomares, Mey
Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not
appear in its list of voters20
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23
19. Petitioners 2007 COC for Member of House of
Representative 24
For ease of later discussion, private respondents evidence
shall be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates regarding
ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration
and Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3)
petitioners COCs in previous elections; (3) Certifications
regarding petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of
Lipa City residents.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following
evidence to establish the fact of his residence in Lipa City:
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
1.
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26
3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27
4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-
ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade28
5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29
6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by
the parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong-ulan30
7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body
(AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter
of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.31
8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued
by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.32
9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with
Reactivation dated 6 June 2009 signed by Election
Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.33
10. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200734
11. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax
payment for 200735
12. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200836
13. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax
payment for 200837
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38
15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39
16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan
residents, including past and incumbent Pinagtong-
ulan officials.40
For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be
grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and
corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008;
(2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan;
(3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares;
and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors,
Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and
Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Ruling
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC
Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the
mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of
Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his
failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement
under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which
the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he
was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after
Page 1 of 98
garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other
position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the Resolution, which denied petitioners Motion for hand, the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend
COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact. Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was its own rules of procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A
allegedly not promulgated in accordance with the of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en
43
COMELECs own Rules of Procedure and, hence, violated its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
petitioners right to due process of law. before any of its offices."
Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no
prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.
Resolution was received by him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of this case is COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,49 petitioner claimed that
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10,
there was no valid promulgation of a Decision in an election
Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated 2010 Automated National and Local Elections), which was
protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the
National and Local Elections) requires the parties to be promulgated on 11 November 2009. Sections 6 and 7 thereof
parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for
notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the provide as follows:
the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of
Resolution.
SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as
SEC. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on follows:
Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The
a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by
decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of
of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become
registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means of communication.
final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for
communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider reconsideration shall be entertained.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof.
additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to
of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of
of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules implementation of the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.
promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice
of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a
17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner
of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the
attached to his Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case decision. Thus:
proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and
to the Commission en banc.
Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by
Canvassers, as well as a copy of his Oath of Office. He also The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for
44 45
which a decision is published, officially announced, made
attached to his Petition another Certification of Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
Residency46 issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain within three (3) days from the certification thereof. coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v.
Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May
SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante 201048 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
Order47 requiring the parties to observe the status quo 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the
433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of
prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation" in view
court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989,
Resolutions. Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive of "the proximity of the Automated National and Local
En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement
pleadings. Elections and lack of material time." The Order states:
imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of
Issues ORDER promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation.
Hence, We do not agree with petitioners contention that
The following are the issues for resolution: Considering the proximity of the Automated National and
there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The
Local Elections and lack of material time, the Commission
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision
hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated
discretion when it failed to promulgate its public. From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the
on November 11, 2009, which reads:
Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and
with its own Rules of Procedure; and Sec. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or petitioners (sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private
Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on respondent.
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently
the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered
compliance with the one-year residency objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the
mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of
requirement for local elective officials. failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the
communication."
promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC
The Courts Ruling
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the
1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of for immediate promulgation. promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the
discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the
SO ORDERED. parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the
17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of
Procedure Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said trial court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.
suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 2 of 98

Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,50 citing Macabingkil amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELECs
v. Yatco,51 we further held in the same case that failure to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in appreciation thereof.
receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the
not sufficient to set aside the COMELECs judgment, as long arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan,
as the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin
before judgment is rendered, viz: grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant
and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-
considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
the promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held
in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition that no such change in domicile or residence took place and,
sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that
the judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. constituted a misrepresentation that disqualified him from
to the deviation by the Comelec from its own made rules. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a running for Lipa City mayor.
However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in
the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of
the exigencies attendant to the holding of the countrys first appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the abode.53 As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof
automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such
COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, judgment, not of jurisdiction. relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the adequate to support a conclusion.54
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action
Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the The ruling on private respondents evidence
Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused thereby.
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the parties We begin with an evaluation of the COMELECs appreciation
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the of private respondents evidence.
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave a) Petitioners Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in
perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely
abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. previous elections
lodge a Petition with this Court.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs Petitioners Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the parties. It states, among others, that petitioner is a resident
granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it
issue of whether petitioner made a material of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a
issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of
misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months;
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second
to order its cancellation. Among others, petitioner pointed to and that he was so registered on 31 October 2009. The
assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on
the COMELECs inordinate emphasis on the issue of property information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC
the ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a
ownership of petitioners declared residence in Lipa City, its Election Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.
notice setting the date of the promulgation thereof.
inconsistent stance regarding Palomaress relationship to
Private respondent presented this document as proof that
2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to consider in the
petitioner misrepresented that he is a resident of Lipa City.
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance first instance the certification of residence issued by the
On the other hand, the latter presented this document as
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that
proof of his residency.
officials the COMELEC required "more" evidence to show the change
in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the issued by the COMELEC Election Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila,
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a
However, exceptions thereto have been established,
substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence. resident of Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is
including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation
Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the not the competent public officer to certify the veracity of this
of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into
COMELECs brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing claim, particularly because petitioners COMELEC
an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is
his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he is a resident of registration was approved only in October 2009.
compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and
Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law allows the
correct the COMELEC's error. 52
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on
filing of the ITR not only in the place of legal residence but,
21 June 1997 showing that he was a resident of Sico, San
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes that
Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June
2010), we explained that the COMELECs use of wrong or private respondents own evidence shows that petitioner has
1997 and March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence therein as
basis for filing his ITR therein. longer discussed by the COMELEC and rightly so. These
taint its action with grave abuse of discretion -
pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico,
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC San Juan, Batangas on the said dates are irrelevant as, prior
definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico,
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 3 of 98

consideration is that from April 2007 onwards, after Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly
petitioners alleged change of domicile. Palomares ownership of the Lipa property does not prove in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City63 which are registered jointly in
that she or and in view of their common-law relations, the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private
b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property
petitioner resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessors
The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioners common- Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court were
private respondent showed that the Lipa property was solely law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that
registered in the name of petitioners common-law wife, makes plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the
Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this and intent to reside in the area. locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not
document, the COMELEC reasoned that, being a "seasoned requirement of the Constitution.64
c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner
politician," he should have registered the Lipa property
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is
(which he claimed to have purchased with his personal funds) Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd,
nothing "wrong in an individual changing residences so he
in his own name. Such action "would have offered positive Lipa City Division, indicating that the names Bernadette
could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to
proof of intent to change actual residence" from San Juan, Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioners daughter) and
prove with reasonable certainty that he has
Batangas to Lipa City, considering that he had previously Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on the
declared his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his list of graduates of Lipa City. Private respondent also effected a change of residence for election law purposes for
domicile. Since Palomares and petitioner are common-law presented a Certification from the Office of the Election the period required by law."65
spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the property Officer of Lipa City that the names of these family members of
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents
relation between them is governed by Article 148 of the petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.
Family Code,55 where only the parties actual contributions Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta
As the issue at hand is petitioners residence, and not the
are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of Fernandez66 and Rodrigo Macasaet,67 who were also
educational or voting record of his family, the COMELEC
a property and residence in Lipa City through the registered residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did
properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving
ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa not reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in
at its Resolution.
City. the area. Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano,68 in his Affidavit,
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used
On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis
do not attend educational institutions in Lipa and are not for gatherings, he did "not recall having seen" petitioner in
that the COMELEC bestowed upon the question of whether
registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent69 and
the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for
maintain a business therein nor has property Eladio de Torres,70 both residents of Brgy. Calamias,
the reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses
reasoned that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City
that the issue should be residence, not property ownership. in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real
because he has no work or family there.
and substantial reason for his stay in Lipa City.
It is true that property ownership is not among the
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed
qualifications required of candidates for local As to the Dissents first assertion, it must be stressed that the
Resolution. It was correct in doing so, particularly
election.56Rather, it is a candidates residence in a locality children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even
considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by
through actual residence in whatever capacity. Indeed, we in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly
those presented by petitioner.
sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence decided by both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that
tending to establish a candidates domicile of choice the the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007, when petitioners Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the
mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a children were already well into college and could very well Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely seen" in the area, this
candidate in the same province where he ran for the position have chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City. does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In
of governor.57 In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Also, it is petitioners domicile which is at issue, and not that
on Elections,58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a Tribunal,71 we held that the averments of certain barangay
of his children. But even assuming that it was petitioner
candidates sparsely furnished, leased room on the health workers that they failed to see a particular candidate
himself (rather than his children) who attended educational
mezzanine of a feedmill could not be considered as his whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he was
institutions or who registered as a voter in a place other than
residence for the purpose of complying with the residency supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that
Lipa City, we have held that "absence from residence to
requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 59
the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
business at the time. The law does not require a person to be
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a
Palomaress name does not prove petitioners residence as it constitute loss of residence."62 In fact, Section 117 of the
week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to
formalities or payment of taxes. any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; The ruling on petitioners evidence
employment in private and public service; educational
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioners
activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the
this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining evidence:
army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police
petitioners residence. We have long held that it is not
force; or confinement or detention in government institutions a) Petitioners Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008
required that a candidate should have his own house in order
in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of residence.
to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below
that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or As to the Dissents second assertion, petitioner apparently showed that petitioner had been paying his Income Tax (2007
that of a friend or relative.60 What is of central concern then is does not maintain a business in Lipa City. However, apart and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In
that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the waving aside his Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that
where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite previous property owner) and Palomares swear was these were not indications of residence since Section 51(B)
period of time. purchased with petitioners own funds, the records also of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 4 of 98

it shall be filed in a persons legal residence, but that it may In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and petitioners common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation
alternatively be filed in a persons principal place of business. Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc.,75 we explained by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he and Palomares
that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the latters
In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue
in official records to be admissible in evidence: Affidavit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no
Code provides that the Income Tax Return shall be filed
72
independent collaboration.
either in the place where a person resides or where his (a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by
principal place of business is located. However, private another person specially enjoined by law to do so; Petitioner faults the COMELECs stand, which it claims to be
respondents own evidence a Certification from the City inconsistent. He argues that since the property regime
(b) It was made by the public officer in the
Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City showed that there between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the
performance of his duties, or by such other person
was no business registered in the City under petitioners Family Code (based on the parties actual contribution) as the
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
name. COMELEC stressed, then Palomaress Affidavit expressly
law; and
stating that petitioners money alone had been used to
Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was
an individual income tax return may only be filed either in the
knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact,
legal residence OR the principal place of business, as
must have been acquired by him personally or a declaration against interest.
prescribed under the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his
through official information.
Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had Petitioners argument that Palomaress affidavit was a
no business therein showed that he had actively elected to As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required "declaration against interest" is, strictly speaking,
establish his residence in that city. by the Local Government Code to "keep an updated record of inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest,
all inhabitants of the barangay."76 Regarding the second under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a "declaration
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City
requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
includes both San Juan and Lipa City, petitioners filing of his
Commission on Elections,77 that "it is the business of a interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan,
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own
Batangas - petitioners domicile of origin.
barangay." Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captains interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and exercise of powers and duties78 concomitant to his position made the declaration unless he believed it to be true."80 A
Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and 2008 shows that requires him to be privy to these records kept by the declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay
petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong- Barangay Secretary. rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the
ulan, Lipa City, rather than San Juan, Batangas.73 Hence, weight accorded to, testimonial evidence.82
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its
while petitioner may be submitting his income tax return in
failure to consider Honrades Certification on the sole ground Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioners claim that the
the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable.
that it was initially not notarized. COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion in being
Petitioner considers Lipa City to be his domicile.
inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the
b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been
barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan that petitioner is a resident
purchased solely with petitioners money. If the COMELEC
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the of Lipa City does not help petitioners case because it was not
accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to
Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain shown that the term "resident" as used therein carries the
be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in
Dominador Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been same meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily
favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter
residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This
to her (and her childrens) property interest.
oversight was raised as an issue in petitioners Motion for Court has ruled otherwise.
Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of
ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a COMELEC to believe that Palomares may have committed
Aborlans punong barangay that petitioner resides in his
notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had
barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile,
Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially perjured herself as an informant on the birth certificates of
inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the
identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan her children with respect to the supposed date and place of
Courts recognition that Mitra "might not have stayed in
Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason
Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because
sworn to before a notary public. propounded by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares
his office and activities as a Representative were in Manila."
affidavit.
We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay
Assuming that the barangay captains certification only
Captains Certification and find the same tainted with grave Moreover, it is notable that Palomares assertion in her
pertains to petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan,
abuse of discretion. affidavit that she and petitioner have been living in the
still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence
Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, in establishing petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan
other evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan
Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in since 2007.
barangay officials and neighbors.
evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.
c) Affidavit of petitioners common law wife
d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors,
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner certificate from parish and designation from socio-civic
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official also presented the affidavit of Palomares, wherein the latter organization
records made in the performance of his duty by a public swore that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in
The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance 2007, and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property
the Lipa house and lot) states that in April 2007, after she
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence were petitioners personal funds. The COMELEC ruled that
received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed
of the facts therein stated. the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 5 of 98

an agreement that petitioner would settle her bank ulan,88 who stated that she also sold a lot she owned in favor the Certificate of Appreciation was nothing more than an
obligations in connection with the said transaction, he and of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it acknowledgment of petitioners material and financial
Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The was adjacent to the Lipa house and lot they had earlier support, and not an indication of residence.
COMELEC brushed this Affidavit aside as one that "merely acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians
narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the resided in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since April
Brotherhood Memorandum and the Pinagtong-ulan Parish
property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares 2007, and that she knew this because her own house was very
Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioners
lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present."84 near the couples own. Macasaets Affidavit is a positive
residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless,
assertion of petitioners actual physical presence in Brgy.
We disagree with the COMELECs appreciation of the Suarez coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice been elected
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
Affidavit. Since she was its owner, transactions for the as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District
purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two of Batangas, which encompasses Lipa City, petitioners
knowledge. Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta Fernandez89 and involvement in the religious life of the community, as attested
regarding who shall pay for the property and when, if ever, it Rodrigo Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the
shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the Pinagtong-ulan parish for his "material and financial support"
statements impact positively on petitioners claim of area, these affidavits were controverted by the Joint affidavit as President of the Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as
residence. of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly well as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic
accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the affidavits of private sphere of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the
The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that
respondent91 and Eladio de Torres92 stating that petitioner is Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians
petitioner started living in the Lipa house and lot in April 2007
not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge
is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough
there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of of and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Such,
time to effect an actual and physical change in residence a
Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does after all, is the rationale for the residency requirement in our
month before the May 2007 elections when petitioner ran for
not contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan. elections laws, to wit:
representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the
Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent As to the Dissents second argument, the fact that the The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
transfer of ownership in the tax declaration was made, only in notarization of the deed of absolute sale of the property was qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in
August 2008. made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioners order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with
claim that he started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that
from the Affidavit of the propertys seller, Leonila Suarez, that all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies;
these were not the reasons adduced by the COMELEC in the
it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office
assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were
that a deed of absolute sale was not executed at the time. seekers qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for
the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up
Thus: xxx. 94
with its conclusions, such reasoning still exhibits grave abuse
of discretion. That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner
As to the Dissents first argument, it must be remembered
Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at
that a transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed
their mind, and after the couple settled all my loan obligations Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of
in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on
to the bank, they requested me to put the name of Ms. evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.
Elections, where the evidence showed that in 2008,
85
Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa
petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya Petitioners actual physical presence in Lipa City is
Sabili and Bernadette Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;
Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the established not only by the presence of a place (Pinagtong-
same locality a lot where he began constructing his house, That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the
we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan sometime in the month affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the
process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioners substantial
transfer in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his residence running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa
from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period of Batangas; City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of
required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an
Pinagtong-ulan house any less than we did Mitras transfer to registration, but also his participation in the communitys
agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili will be the one to
the Maligaya Feedmills room.1wphi1 socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his
settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and
ITR that he is a resident thereof.
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong- Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their
ulan residents, including former and incumbent barangay residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City; We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce
officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the
Pinagtong-ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections one-year residency requirement for local elective officials
month of April, 2007 up to this point in time; xxx93
such that it was where his coordinators for the May 2007 under the law.
elections went to meet him. Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the
86
In view of this Courts finding that petitioner has not
contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-ulan house when it COMELEC held that the Memorandum issued by the
misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan and the
was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter
duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether
family began living therein even while it was being merely declares the designation of petitioner in the
there was material and deliberate misrepresentation of the
renovated.87 Another Affidavit petitioner adduced was that of organization, without any showing that residence in the
residency qualification in his COC.1wphi1
Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong- locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile,

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 6 of 98

As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City
voters manifested their own judgment regarding the
qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him,
notwithstanding that the issue of his residency qualification
had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has
garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as
opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar
Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and
has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal
Mayor of Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections97 that "(t)o successfully challenge a
winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of
the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we
concluded that "when the evidence of the alleged lack of
residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position
is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the
victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect
to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner
sufficiently established his compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials under the
law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the
determination of the true will of the electorate should be
paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that
must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue
to hold sacred."99
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dated 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v.
Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED.
Private respondents Petition to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo
Ante Order issued by this Court on 7 September 2010 is
MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131421 November 18, 2002
GERONIMO DADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he
Court assailing the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of sustained. The post-mortem examination conducted on his
Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following
decision2 dated April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of results:
Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding
Gunshot wounds located at:
petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco
Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide. 1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a
diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially and
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo
exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the
Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged with
elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of Exit).
murder allegedly committed as follows:
No powder burns noted.
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay
Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan 2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at
Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the ischial
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with firearms, with spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did vessels and the surrounding tissues along the
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards
assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the toward the pelvic area through the inguinal canal
afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder
upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death. prostate gland, urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-
pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised
vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding
Penal Code of the Philippines, with the aggravating
was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3)
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3
pieces of irregularly shaped metallic slugs were
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his recovered from the body; one, silvery colored,
co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial thereafter followed. along the iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two,
copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses
substance; three, copper colored, embedded in
Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga are as follows: On the night of
5 6
blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor.
May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station
Hematoma noted along the penile area.
formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from
Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed No other injuries noted.9
of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound
Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited
that caused the death of the victim was the one
behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo
inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced
Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14
through and injured the organs in the pelvic region
armalite rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner,
where she found three irregularly shaped metallic
who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused
fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of
Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle.
the victim at that time of the shooting was higher
They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position
than the assailant considering that the trajectory of
and were about 2 arms length away from each other. At
the bullets was upwards. She added that the wound
around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody
on the victims right outer lateral arm alone, would
approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a
not bring about death, unless not immediately
moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he
treated.10
was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas
noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side, was Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad,
making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but the three metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound
before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed
armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately bullet, thus:
thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga,
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim
shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me")7 as he x x x x x x x x x
fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be Silvestre
"Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the 1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a
cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was fired through the
of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
saying, "Pare, this was not intentionally done and this was 2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the
merely an accident."8 lead core of evidence copper jacketed marked "SB-1".
x x x x x x x x x.11
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 7 of 98
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure
whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit
"SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the
victim are indeed parts of "SB-1" which is a part of a copper
jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the
incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He claimed
that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team
positioned themselves beneath a big hole from which a big
tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his
companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo
Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When he
heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired
upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single
shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced
and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized
somebody was shot.13
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the
rapid gun burst which he thought to be from their enemies
came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm
was then broken making it difficult for him to move. Thus,
when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front
of him. He declared that his purpose in firing his .45 caliber
pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to
demoralize their enemy.14
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and
accused Eraso of the crime of homicide. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco
Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Court hereby sentences the accused, SPO4 Geronimo
Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages
which was duly established in relation to the
expenses incurred for the complete funeral
services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary
damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death;
and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement
Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997.16 must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the
offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso
doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor
but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 11,
simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.23
1998, which became final and executory on March 30,
18
1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly
the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a
become final. spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan
to kill the victim. Simultaneity alone would not be enough to
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and
contending that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred:
purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of
(1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused
two or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar,
Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on
the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In
the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court the offense.24
of Appeals found that conspiracy attended the commission of
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or
the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and
omissions which can be proved to have been committed by
accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no
him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if
longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound
any, should be determined on an individual rather than on a
inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the
collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer for
act of all.
the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner shown that he participated directly and personally in the
will readily show that the prosecution failed to allege the commission of those acts. It becomes important therefore to
circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the determine whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that
information states: " x x x the said accused, armed with directly caused the death of the victim.
firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a
treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
bigger entrance wound as compared to a 5.56 mm. bullet
feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE
which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the
BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons,
inner thigh of the victim must have been caused by a .45
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which
caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than
caused his instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the
the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral
information does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy
arm.25 However, this conclusion is entirely devoid of basis
must be conveyed in "appropriate language." The words
20
because no evidence was presented to substantiate said
"conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in
conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic
concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives
Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad,
do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the
on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound
prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused
of the victim. Piedad found that one of said fragments,
contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged,
marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56
not merely inferred from the information. Absent particular
mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a
statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,"26 and not a part of a .45 caliber
concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the
bullet.27Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
same cannot be considered against the petitioner who must
perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
omissions.21 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court
first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
[a] piece of paper marked "A-1". This refer to the
against him. To ensure that the due process rights of an
very same Exhibit "A-1"?
accused are observed, every indictment must embody the
essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable A: Yes, sir.
particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and
xxxxxxxxx
place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances
thereof. 22
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your
findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you
information, the same cannot be considered against the
arrive?
petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a]
and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need not be copper jacket, that is upper part of the bullet, sir.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 8 of 98
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is
part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper
jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found
out that the lands and grooves of the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is
riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the
same lands and grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. PASOK:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the
composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that
of [an] armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45
caliber and that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a
caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this
Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be bullet
from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper
jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core
evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be
parts of the copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked
SB-1.29
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in
page 2 under the column, "Findings and
Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked
SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked [as] SB-1.
My question, you said could be part of copper jacket
marked SB-1, are you telling the Court, you are sure
that this Exhibits "SB-2" and "SB-3" [are] not part
of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the
copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition,
would you say that the same would be part of the
lead core of the copper jacket of a different caliber
or ammunition?
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56
and the lead core could be parts. We cannot
evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper
jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition
has copper jacket?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper
jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper
jacket, rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet
or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings
and conclusion that the evidenced (sic) marked as
SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead
core or the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked
as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that
correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper
putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles
is it that in your findings in Exhibit "2", particularly of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol
SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a copper fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral
a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56
mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I
compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper jacket
fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands
and grooves of the copper jacket and the standard
bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the
specimen marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45
lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and
grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber
5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber
.45 are very wide.30
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as
to whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit
"SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the
"SB-1", which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that
is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be
particles of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol
of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an
issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present
case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.
Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the
accused of the crime charged is found lacking.31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic
conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the
wound inflicted on the victims right outer lateral arm for the
certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability.
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner
fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the
attendant circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence
tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or
intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses
did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.32 Intent
to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that
Page 9 of 98
the use of firearms is dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi
must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt.34
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim,
petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal
Code.35 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to kill that person.36 Though
the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could
be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense
which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing
of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-
offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in
4606 reads:
the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal
discharge of firearm is punishable with prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years
and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886,
affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide
is SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado
guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and
Case No. 91-4607 reads:
eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially,
he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during
the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder
against accused was amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
and shoot with the said handgun Roland
John Chapman who war hit in the chest,
thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Roland
John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation, and by means of treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby
inflicting moral wounds which directly
caused the death of the said Maureen
Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the
head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds,
which ordinarily would have caused the
death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby
performing all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of murder
as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of cause or
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
causes independent of his will, that is, due
to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed
against accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder
of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by
accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his
arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the
prosecution manifested that it would present the surviving
victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on
the circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness
himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez
objected on the ground that the incident pending that day was
hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the
murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that
Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with
respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman would be
irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that
time would be wasted if the testimony of Leino would be
limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes
for which accused were charged involved only one
continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed
to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the
inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2)
frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the
prosecution wanted to present Leino to testify on all three (3)
charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused
on August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused
did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would still have
to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could
present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the
petition for bail until after arraignment of accused on the
condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the
same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The defense
counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3)
charges. The prosecution then started to adduce evidence
relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the
defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi
Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and
other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati.
The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past
midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10After an hour,
they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where
they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group
Page 10 of 98
returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2)
back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati. Chapman
tagged along. When they entered the village, Maureen
12
asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block
away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much
noise in going back to her house. She did not want her Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed
parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino at least three (3) people looking on and standing outside their
offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO
listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along
Mahogany Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero
and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type
Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came
up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked:
"Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused
only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at
pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and handed to accused his the house of their employer, while driver Mangubat was in his
Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not bother quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three
to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and (3) eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their
pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested
from behind Leino and inquired what was going on. He
stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are
you bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his
shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper
body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot
me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and
leave Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him
and asked: "Do you want a trouble?" Leino said "no" and took
a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen.
When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and
started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my
God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help
us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino
to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered
Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no
attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from
him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by
accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still.
She strayed to the side of accused's car. Accused tried but
failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase
lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down
beside Leino. 17
meters away and directly in front of them stood
accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the
two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the
minutes. They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati
upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 19
FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas
to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-
in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero
Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and
AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at
the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village. 23
respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero
Street to see what was happening, while Mangubat and
Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and
looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman)
sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the
sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a
woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and
Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because
of Florece's distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was
not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the control
numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the
gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white
("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number
of the getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the
car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat
saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas
was then a mere four (4) meters away from the gunman's
car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away
from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the
shooting took place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco
lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his
employer's house and went near the scene of the crime. He
noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man
on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested him to report
the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmarias
Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and
narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw.
Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted
the incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
the license plate control number of the gunman's car as
566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few
Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman
JAMES BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their
initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a
box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566.
They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village
Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two
(2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was
registered in the name of JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan
Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number PKX 566, and
another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.,
of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate
number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group
(SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked by then NBI Director
Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting.
Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house of Jose
Montao 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati police
and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin
tried to verify from Mrs. Montao whether the white Lancer
car registered in the name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate
number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montao denied and
declared they had already sold the car to Saldaa
Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben
Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao,
Quezon City. Mrs. Montao called up her husband and
informed him about the investigation. She also called up Conti
and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white
Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the NBI office for
investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin
inquired from Montao the whereabouts of his car on July 12
and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street,
Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning
of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa
Enterprises. Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received
the same confirmation from two (2) NBI agents who made a
countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request,
Montao left his car at the NBI parking lot pending
identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-
spot investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting
incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to
report to their office the next day for further
investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who
was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied
having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they
returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night
and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI
Page 11 of 98
office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also
talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at
#1350 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the scene
of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's
car was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami
was afraid and refused to give a statement about the incident.
The agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to
cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked
a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to
cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI
office as summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn
statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign
ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was
lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents
informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding
information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office.
Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case.
He was apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm
him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection,
Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to
Ranin. He described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer
with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI
parking lot where Montao's white Lancer car was parked to
identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montao's
was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was
different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the
parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the
color of the gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car.
Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to was not
white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman.
Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his
office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men
(Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from the NBI files. One of
the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture
(Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas
wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty.
Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down Cadenas'
statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati
Regional Trial Court to apply for a search warrant. After a
searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca
Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing
the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate
number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's
house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to
implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee,
mother of accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told
Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to
invite accused to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs.
Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the house A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out
at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and of the unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino
called up someone on the phone. 46 noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since
Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the extensive
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee
injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a
garage and secured accused's car. After a while, Mrs.
request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his
Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but
sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father.
she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's
The men in the lineup were herded back inside the house.
request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on the
After a couple of minutes, they again stepped out and none
phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the
was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified
NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would
accused as the gunman. 56
report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car
of accused to the NBI office. 47 The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared
and referred the cases of murder and double frustrated
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee,
murder against accused to the Department of Justice for
arrived at the NBI office and waited for accused. Accused
appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio
came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour.
did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
He informed them that he just came from the Makati police
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he
was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati
to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48 Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security guard Vicente
Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of
Dasmarias Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and
the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the shooting.
invited him to the Makati police station where his statement
Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a
(Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
few weeks back and was no longer functioning. The car had
been parked in his mother's house at Dasmarias Village The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado
since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group fetched Mangubat from his house and brought him to the
decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49 Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait
for a man who would be coming and see if the person was the
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila
gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at the
Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really happened at
second floor of the station. 59
Dasmarias Village. Accused said he did not see anything.
Lim apprised accused that he would be confronted with some After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police
eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50 Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat
and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor.
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused
While accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired
was requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men
from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially
and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining
declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the
room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the
man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that
lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused. 52 Accused
he was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by
merely stared at Cadenas. 53
a police Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if accused was the
and two (2) other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60Accused,
further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a
Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his
before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his safety, post at Dasmarias Village by other Makati
they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the policemen. 61
gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his
agreed. 54
employer's house and asked him again if accused was really
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the
at his house and escorted him and his father to a vacant affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no
house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier
minutes, Leino was brought out of the house and placed in a prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also
five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino
questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat
was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver.
if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could.
Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming
Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-
out of the house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
11) of different men and was asked to identify the gun gunman
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 12 of 98
from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of No demonstrable Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr.
accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's evidence of fracture. Isabela led a team who operated on her brain to arrest the
statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the Note of radioopaque bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues
next day to make a personal identification. 64 foreign body (bullet and retrieve the splintered bullets embedded in her brain.
fragments) along the Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her very
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's
superior alveolar unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
office in the presence of the media. At that time, accused's
border on the right. No undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery,
counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of
remarkable findings. Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained
then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the
unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for further
submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
observation.
since the cases against accused had already been filed in
Small hyperdensities
court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow
presumably bullet and
accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of out of Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface
bone fragments in the
accused should be made in the courtroom. Asst. Director covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain
right palatine, tongue
Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on- exposed. A second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to
and tonsillar regions
going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels repair Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia lata of
with associated soft
acquiesced but requested that identification be made without Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of the
tissue swelling.
the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The
explained that if accused is not identified n the lineup, the Anterior maxillary bone comminuted trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but
media coverage would favor accused. 65 fracture. Maureen developed infection as a result of the destruction of
her brain covering. Maureen developed brain abscess
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to Temporal lobe contusions with small
because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to
join the lineup at Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin was hematomata on the right side.
remove brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen
Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as Intact bone calvarium. Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen was shot at the left
the gunman. side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the
xxx xxx xxx 67
eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI
wrote finis to its investigation. 66 Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the
of Leino. After entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
injuries: his palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of
on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of the the most vital parts of the body, the brain. When Maureen was
FINDINGS:
brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic
temporal area, left. loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering
portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the of the brain. 75
= Wound, gunshot,
tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
entrance, circular in
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was
shape, 1.0 cm. in Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and swelling underneath the forehead brought about by edema in
diameter, located at the the gunman. He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was
upper lip, mouth, along case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion
the medial line, victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have been of her nose was also swollen. 76
directed backwards pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness and
and downwards, downward trajectory of the bullet. 69 A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to
fracturing the maxillary control the internal bleeding and remove the splintered
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main
bone and central and
Medical Center, operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was
lateral incisors, both
testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it was
sides, to the buccal
unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
cavity then lacerating
a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the
the tongue with
eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated.
fragments of the bullet
the left side of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70 Even if Maureen survived, she would have led a vegetating life
lodged in the right
and she would have needed assistance in the execution of
palatine, tongue and They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would have been
tonsillar region. her skull. She was also given a CT scan. The examination completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she
revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses
SKULL
There were several splintered bullets in her brain and the would have been modified and the same would have affected
CHEST FOR RIBS X-
major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for
RAY #353322
beneath her right jaw. 71 Maureen to return to normal. 79
July 13, 1991

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 13 of 98

Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at around 5:15
days of confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a then seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their
breathing soul on October 17, 1991. another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted house and informed them about the killings. 94
on the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment
men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
and alibi. Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was accorded to accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he
not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that
was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said
was then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, accused was not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up
investigation. 88
Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke accused's whereabouts. His complaint was investigated by
up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed
avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May by Congressman Concepcion. 95
house that fateful day. 80 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT.
car bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who
victims in the Dasmarias shooting when he read the In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he investigated the shooting.
newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation,
eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the
he learned from Mr. Jose Montao that he sold his white
before they identified him as the gunman. 81 bicycle driver and damage to his father's car, 90 especially on
Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending
its body. The timing of the engine became a little off and the
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben
car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable
gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the
Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month,
however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other
he brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar
condition after its involvement in an accident in February witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montao's white
Teehankee, at Dasmarias Village, Makati. He personally
1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his Lancer Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at
started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the shop
car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in the time of the incident. 96
in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig
Dasmarias Village. He has not used this car since then.
for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard
Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not
preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-
in good running condition, it could still be used. 82
Teehankee III claimed that from that time on, he was away car but could not give the central letters of the car's
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati prohibited by his father from using the car because of his license plate. Fernandez went to one of the houses at the
police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked the
Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask busy in school, no further repair on said car had been maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call,
him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his made. 91 the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of
mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to
police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself tried to get the maid's name but the latter refused. The
Anders Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen
to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the court
Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the
to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement
gunman may have been an overprotective father. This theory
negative for gunpowder nitrates. After the test, he asked
83 of the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13")
was formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard
the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he had prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag,
earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself
Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991
to Director Lim. 84
witness. when he and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmarias Village
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national.
He furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the
He and Vivian Hultman were married in the Philippines in At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted
Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against
1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes, accused and
his will. 85
one of whom was Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two company arrived. When accused passed by them, they
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children of instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he could
him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to their own. 92 identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused.
the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the
he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents shorter than accused. 98
crime in the initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that
forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the number
Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard
seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece in
him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the
could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke his presence. In said statement, Florece described the
lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
A second identification was made on the same day at a house "Daddy." 93
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
in Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test she conducted on
but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as
night out but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry
the gunman in a lineup. 87
just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of
celebrate with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 14 of 98

noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than
seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She
explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which
nitrate residues may not be removed by ordinary washing and
would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of
record, also took the stand for the defense. He testified that
in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with
Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency
where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed him that
Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and
was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada,
allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted
the defense did not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by
subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were
aware of the irregularities committed in the off-court
identification of their client. When asked what he did to
remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to
the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he
filed a petition for review raising this issue with the
Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith,
he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to
Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at that time.
He also declared that although they knew that arraignment
would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct
of the investigation and preliminary investigation, he and
Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts
reporting the progress in the investigation of the case. It
presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz:
Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and
Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza
of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's
Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of
defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the
testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times
identified two (2) news reports as having been partly written
by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T
ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"),
appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila
Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually
the product of collaborative work among several reporters.
They follow the practice of pooling news reports where
several reporters are tasked to cover one subject matter. The
news editor then compiles the different reports they file and
summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and
marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director
Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland
Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
three members of a family Estrellita identified two (2) newspaper clippings which were partly
Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19, written by him.
and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of
Exhibit "1-B" the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE
OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Police said that Chapman's assailant could
have been angered when Hultman, a 10th Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of
grader at the International School in Exhibit "3", thus:
Makati was escorted home by Chapman
Exhibit "3-a"
after going to a disco.
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the
Exhibit "1-C"
gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, before Chapman's shooting.
first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "3-b"
Exhibit "l-D"
But Ranin said they were also looking into
The same witnesses said Chapman and reports that Hultman was a dancer before
Leino were shot when they tried to escape. she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "1-E" Exhibit "3-c"
Other angles Investigations showed that the gunman
sped along Caballero street inside the
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles"
village after the shooting and was believed
in the Chapman murder.
to have proceeded toward Forbes Park
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the using the Palm street gate.
other is a "highly sensitive" matter that
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write
might involve influential people. 106
Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He just reiterated previous reports
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
content of the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D".
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled:
He just culled them from previous news reports of other
"TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which
newspapers. He admitted that the only portion he wrote
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily
based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco
Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
was Exhibit "I-E."
Exhibit "4-B"
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991
issue of the Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the
"RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked break in the case came when the witness
as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which were not showed up and said that the gunman was
written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "4-C"
Exhibit "2-a"
The witness said the gunman was standing
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS a few feet away near the car and was
director for the national capital region, talking to Hultman, who was shouting
claims, however, that another security "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110
guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On
the police that another man, not
cross-examination, Marfil admitted that the news
Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his
reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written
companions.
based on information available at that time. 111
Exhibit "2-b"
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news
The CIS official added that the absence of report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA
nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of
hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked
laboratory indicated that he may not have as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her information were
fired the gun. 108 several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 15 of 98
 Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed
NBI accounts that Teehankee was
arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining
owner of a car with plate control number
566 who had not been questioned,
voluntarily went to police headquarters
upon invitation of Makati police chief
Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the
alleged concerted effort of the investigators to implicate
accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other
suspects aside from accused and that someone whom
Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that
the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car
was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the
NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the
gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused and
thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal
identified the portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: ''I
WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991
issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the
source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the
defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most
unexpected occasion," Hultman said the
day after his 17-year old daughter was
cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional
hearing granted the Hultman family's
request for permission to visit Teehankee
in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come
out and is still hiding behind the curtain,"
Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can
take the curtain down and jail authorities
will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the
news item marked as Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote
Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga
Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was
quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit
interest in the Chapman-Hultman, 9). 123 He wrote the entire news account, 124 portions of which
Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:
because he belongs to a secret but very
influential multi-sectoral group monitoring
graft and corruption and other crimes in
high levels of government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit
"6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be
identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the
alleged blind and consuming personal rage and bias of
Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted
pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional
leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
identified the news account which appeared on the July 16,
1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article
(Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his information was Camp
Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a
white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
"566." The witnesses cannot tell the
plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on
the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS
DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit
"8"). The portions of said news item which he wrote were
marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service,
however, an investigator who asked not to
be identified insisted that the NBI got the
wrong man. The NBI has taken over the
case from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the
suspect killer whom he described as
"resembling Teehankee but looks much
younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime
witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw
everything that happened in the early
morning of July 13. The witness, however,
failed to identify Teehankee as the
gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS
GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which appeared on the
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day
after its so-called "surprise witness"
picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI
lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he
was not able to interview Mangubat himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses
kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby
(Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw
ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang
ituturo, said a red-faced Makati
investigator who, as usual, did not want to
be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the
entire article, entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD",
which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila
Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were
marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in
Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a
diplomat's plate number when a white
Lancer with plate number PKX-566
blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager
said Chapman's father is a
communications specialist. He said the
shooting could be the result of an
altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin,
identified the news account he wrote which appeared on the
July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER
SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item
were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of
armed men at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at
past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy
sparked the slaying of Chapman who was
killed in front of his friends on his way
home from a party. The armed men, on
Page 16 of 98
 board a white Lancer car, blocked the nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued damages in the sum of Five Hundred
path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine
inside the village before the shooting. nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores. Application of Currency;
vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132
Exhibit "22-a-1" (2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
The gunmen then alighted from their car
paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours from the time of the beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to
alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
alight from the car. They shot Chapman
of nitrate may still be found. 133 fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro
several times in the body, while his
Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer
companions identified as Maureen She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and
Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were reliability of the paraffin test. She related that she once
to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
seriously wounded when the gunmen attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00),
sprayed the car with bullets. accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents
Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two
fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They then
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine
Lim said he will announce later the names Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-
reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the
of the detained suspects after their initial Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83),
result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a
investigation. 128 Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
corroborative evidence and evaluated together with other
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00),
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT physical evidence. 134
Philippine Currency, for loss of earning
IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which appeared on the July 18,
The records show that the case was set for hearing on capacity of the said deceased; and One
1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the
October 29, 1992 for the presentation by the defense of sur- Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine
defense in evidence as follows:
rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled Currency, as moral, moderate and
Exhibit "23-a-1" hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135manifesting that it exemplary damages;
shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four (3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding
same being unneccesary. The defense, however, declared
men who blocked Chapman's car on accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its
Mahogany St. in the subdivision. beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
Exhibit "23-a-2" for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order not appear. The prosecution moved in open court that the sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
Chapman and his two companions, main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision penalty of eight (8) years of prision
Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a in view of the absence of defense counsels who had mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and
Finn, to get out of their car. manifested that they would no longer present their sur- one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties and to pay the said offended party the sum
Exhibit "23-a-3" were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
They identified the car used by the which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One
suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate not appear that the defense objected to this Order. The Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three
No. PDW 566. They added that they saw records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
the same car in the garage of the additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine
Teehankee family. 129 parties submitted their respective Memorandum. Currency, and another sum equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused as actual damages; an amount equivalent
two (a) stories was the NBI and they were based on CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138The in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as
information available to the NBI at that time 130 dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
loss of earning capacity of said offended
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE WHEREFORE, premises considered, the party; and One Million Pesos
MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he Court hereby renders judgment: (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding
Makati police station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty (4) In all these three cases ordering said
Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work in beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of accused to pay all the offended parties the
Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the Murder, qualified by treachery, for the sum of Three Million Pesos
identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
Baldado then said him he would no longer require him to sign and sentencing said accused to suffer and for attorney's fees and expenses of
the statement he prepared for him earlier. 131 imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and litigation; and
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Division of the NBI, was also presented as a prosecution sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,
rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus Consequently the petition for bail is hereby
hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder moderate or temperate and exemplary denied for utter lack of merit.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 17 of 98

 SO ORDERED. He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor
urges: compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for New Trial, 139alleging
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-
for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied
of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also house in Forbes Park was highly irregular.
totality of circumstances test where they consider the
the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new
newspapers before he identified him. criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
trial was denied.
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that: description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
writing.
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO,
It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the
CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE ONE Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the
evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed
WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his
jurisdiction over the investigation.
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN. misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO
appellant. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE bottles of beer he imbibed that night. be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by
AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND
identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped
PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for his
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO
vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been
IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of
FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF scientific forms of identification evidence such as the the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where
SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141 The causes suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be
TREACHERY. of misidentification are known, thus: done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN xxx xxx xxx and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146
GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND
Identification testimony has at least three Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF
components. First, witnessing a crime, heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he
EARNING CAPACITY.
whether as a victim or a bystander, personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN involves perception of an event actually July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he was
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE occurring. Second, the witness must shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators.
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00). memorize details of the event. Third, the He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures.
witness must be able to recall and He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
communicate accurately. Dangers of identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read
RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS
unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise any report relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is
AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE
at each of these three stages, for on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was
SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
whenever people attempt to acquire, unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
retain, and retrieve information suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of
PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
accurately, they are limited by normal his out-of-court identification by Leino.
DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE
human fallibilities and suggestive We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's
AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION
influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142 identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-
FOR NEW TRIAL.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of alone is brought face to face with the witness for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
three (3) eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-
by these eyewitnesses. done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since identification of appellant. When asked how sure he was that
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 18 of 98

replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted
else." 148 Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him. to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance
time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the
revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his
crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman.
sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw
Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's
especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by
car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver mettalic
day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential
gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for
physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of
Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he
inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with
overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman,
which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness the authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the
thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution
Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a
Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light
house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto
erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the
Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot.
was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with
Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias
statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It
Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not
evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short will not depart from this ruling.
in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin
in important details," there being no investigation whatsoever
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of
conducted by the police.
not borne out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed nitrates.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS
the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay as
HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the
given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas
newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the
said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of
gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO,
warrant a presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family
another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white
suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and
Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork. likewise extended protection. 155

We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.

We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE
incredible for Leino to have remembered appellant's face MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense witness Pat. Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because
when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he
Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman the considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents.
the picture of appellant. Experience shows that precisely first time he was brought to the Makati police station. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the
because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's
their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have
can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of police station. He averred that the day after he identified caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically
criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place of work in required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant was the laid to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard
of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion,
committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the Baldado said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been
assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach
from their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely statement previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which
no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati required a federal appellate court to "give judgment after an
appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to examination of the entire record before the court, without
other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do
appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit. suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have
cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He
Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we
contends that Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses
some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment examine its damaging quality and its impact to the
that when the Dasmarias security force and the Makati
while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of
than a congressional investigation. insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome
the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in
the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed II
prejudiced party. 161
Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied:
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e.,
"Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports
that the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution
anyone as to what he supposedly witnessed. That same night, about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the NBI error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory
the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting
involvement in previous shooting incidents for this appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 19 of 98

because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with person may have handled one or more of a number of prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
high credibility. substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates scrutiny and criticism." 173
or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have
The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these
omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
substances are present in the products of combustion of
positive identification of appellant. trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his several factors which may bring about the absence of
pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
cases. The state of the art of our communication system
vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves
brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the NBI office. at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
Again, the argument is negated by the records which show is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant. confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the
Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove
jury system whose members are overly protected from
condition. Even appellant's evidence show that said car could gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against
run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72)
the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and
drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable
wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed:
Dasmarias Village, in Makati, where it was result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been
"When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and
parked. 162 removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on
probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will
the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based
Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for
eyewitnesses' description of the color of the gunman's car. upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will
the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already
Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not
lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163Mangubat declared the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty
the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver III an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges
metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his
more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case
referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there
silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government
nature of the incident which happened before the break of
officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on
dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car
less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended characterized the investigation and trial of the case.
credence.
some of the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was still confined at standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
item 166 where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there were the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman spectators inside the courtroom clapped their hands and records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
(2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not back to his cell. acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
"Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that
the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly bias and he has not discharged the burden.
the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal We have minutely examined the transcripts of the
a reliable witness.
trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial judge
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he
he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or
view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during
unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the
is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press following:
It cannot be established from this test alone that the source does not simply publish information about trials but guards
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the
of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
defense counsel called the attention of the

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 20 of 98

court to the visible display of a placard
inside the courtroom. Acting on the
manifestation, the trial judge immediately
directed that the placard be hidden. Only
then did he order the start of the
arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel
asked for the exclusion of the media after
they had enough opportunity to take
pictures. The court granted defense's
request, noting that the courtroom was
also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo
Florece, an argument ensued between the
defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part
of the audience clapped their hands, the
defense counsel invoked Rule 119,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved
for the exclusion of the public. Assistant
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the
ground that the public was not unruly. The
trial judge noted that there were yet no
guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court
regarding media coverage of the trial
proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense
counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the
outpouring of sympathy by spectators
inside the courtroom has turned the
proceedings into a carnival. He also
manifested that he personally saw that
when accused was being brought back to
his cell from the courtroom, a group of
young people were pointing dirty fingers
at accused in full view of policemen.
Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he
could not be dissuaded by public
sentiments. He noted that the clapping of
hands by the public was just a reaction at
the spur of the moment. He then
admonished the audience not to repeat
it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the
parties again argued on the coverage of
the trial by the press. The defense alleged
that the media coverage will constitute
mistrial and deny accused's constitutional
right to due process. It invoked the
provision in the Rules of Court which
allows the accused to exclude everybody
in the courtroom, except the organic
personnel. The prosecutor, however,
argued that exclusion of the public can be
ordered only in prosecution of private
offenses and does not apply to murder
cases. He added that the public is entitled
to observe and witness trial of public
offenses. He quoted the U.S. case In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery
of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180 where it was was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and
held: "A responsible press is always the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman
regarded as the handmaiden of effective consciously and deliberately adopted particular means,
judicial administration especially in the methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant
criminal field. The press does not simply asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove
publish information about trials but guards treachery.
against the miscarriage of justice by
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having
subjecting the police, the prosecutors and
committed the crimes at bar with treachery and evident
judicial processes to extensive public
premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out
scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in
by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was
the courtrooms public property." The trial
merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street
judge then ruled that the media should be
since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa
given a chance to cover the proceedings
It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
before the trial proper but, thereafter, he
circumstance of treachery.
prohibited them from taking pictures
during the trial. They were allowed to We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
remain inside the courtroom but were killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established
ordered to desist from taking live the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified
coverage of the proceedings. 181 that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from
his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before
then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who
the hearing began, the trial judge gave the
they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him
media two (2) minutes to take video
his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked
coverage and no more. Trial then
what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the
ensued. 182
sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
trial judge again gave the media two (2) inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was
minutes to take pictures before the trial unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could
proper. Afterwards, the reporters were utter.
duly admonished to remain silent, to
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly
quietly observe the proceedings and just
and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then,
take down notes. 183
there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to
of the afternoon session, the judge insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk
admonished the media people present in to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of
the courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184 the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to
encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a
seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected
deliberate act of will. We have consistently ruled that mere
portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper
constitute treachery. 187Hence, absent any qualifying
clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and
circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for
which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot
Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992,
Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the
the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further
commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of
shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to
bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial
sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we directed
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went
the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put
administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct
some distance between them. After a minute or two,
of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against
appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino
the trial judge.
on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for
IV mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly,
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 21 of 98
appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely 4. In all three cases, appellant was also pesos even though
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an ordered to pay each of the offended there may have been
appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a mitigating
the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant total of three million pesos) for attorney's circumstances. In
used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the fees and expenses of litigation. addition:
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was
5. Costs of litigation. 188 (1) The defendant shall
thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant
be liable for the loss of
insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro
the earning capacity of
are concerned. v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of damages
the deceased, and the
recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
V and VI indemnity shall be paid
When the commission of a crime results in to the heirs of the latter;
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant.
death, the civil obligations arising such indemnity shall in
Appellant posits that the awards of moral and exemplary
therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . every case be assessed
damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen
. subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and and awarded by the
Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant.
of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, court, unless the
He likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's
Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and deceased on account
fees was excessive.
of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) of permanent physical
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil disability not caused by
heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman the following Code) the defendant, had no
damages: earning capacity at the
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a
time of his death;
1. For the murder of Roland John felony is also civilly liable." (Art. 100,
Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in (2) If the deceased was
the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty case the felony involves death, includes obliged to give support
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnification for consequential according to the
indemnity for death and the sum of Five damages (Art. 104, id.) and said provisions of article
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) consequential damages in turn include ". . 291, the recipient who
as moderate or temperate and exemplary . those suffered by his family or by a third is not an heir called to
damages. person by reason of the crime." (Art. the descendant's
107, id.) Since these provisions are inheritance by law of
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro
subject, however, as above indicated, to testate or intestate
Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay
certain provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e succession, may
the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty
will now turn to said provisions. demand support from
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
the person causing the
indemnity for death; Two Million Three The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
death, for a period not
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
In crimes and quasi- exceeding five years,
Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
delicts, the defendant the exact duration to be
Centavos
shall be liable for all fixed by the court;
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages;
damages which are the
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) (3) The spouse,
natural and probable
for loss of earning capacity of deceased; legitimate or
consequences of the
and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate illegitimate
act or omission
and exemplary damages. descendants and
complained of. It is not
ascendants of the
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, necessary that such
deceased may demand
appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty damages have been
moral damages for
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity foreseen or could have
mental anguish by
for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen reasonably foreseen by
reason of the death of
Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine the defendant. (Art.
the deceased.
Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos 2202)
(P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in The amount of P3,000 referred to in the
When, however, the crime committed
Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both above article has already been increased
involves death, there is Art. 2206 which
as actual damages; an amount equivalent by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People
provides thus:
in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino; The amount of P12,000.00 in the case of People
and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as damages for death v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated
moral, moderate and exemplary damages. caused by a crime October 11, 1968 190, and it must be
or quasi-delict shall be stressed that this amount, as well as the
at least three thousand amount of moral damages, may be

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 22 of 98

adjudicated even without proof of 2. As indemnity for loss civil action to recover
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the of earning capacity of civil liability has been
moral damages being "left to the the deceased an filed or when exemplary
discretion of the court, according to the amount to be fixed by damages are
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216) the court according to awarded).
the circumstances of
Exemplary damages may also be imposed 6. Interests in the
the deceased related to
as a part of this civil liability when the proper cases.
his actual income at the
crime has been committed with one or
time of death and his 7. It must be
more aggravating circumstances, such
probable life emphasized that the
damages being "separate and distinct
expectancy, the said indemnities for loss of
from fines and shall be paid to the offended
indemnity to be earning capacity of the
party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages
assessed and awarded deceased and for moral
cannot however be recovered as a matter
by the court as a matter damages
of right; the court will decide whether or
of duty, unless the are recoverable
not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
deceased had no separately from and in
In any event, save as expressly provided in earning capacity at addition to the fixed
connection with the indemnity for the sole said time on account of sum of P12,000.00 (now
fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is permanent disability P50,000.00)
cases wherein exemplary damages are not caused by the corresponding to the
awarded precisely because of the accused. If the indemnity for the sole
attendance of aggravating deceased was obliged fact of death, and that
circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages to give support, under these damages may,
to be adjudicated may be respectively Art. 291, Civil Code, the however, be
increased or lessened according to the recipient who is not an respectively increased
aggravating or mitigating circumstances," heir, may demand or lessened according
(Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss support from the to the mitigating or
or injury must exercise the diligence of a accused for not more aggravating
good father of a family to minimize the than five years, the circumstances, except
damages resulting from the act or exact duration to be items 1 and 4 above, for
omission in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest fixed by the court. obvious reasons. 191
as a part of the damages, may, in a proper
3. As moral damages We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of
case, be adjudicated in the discretion of
for mental anguish, ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys'
an amount to be fixed
fees and expenses of litigation, the same Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand
by the court. This may
may be recovered only when exemplary (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or temperate and
be recovered even by
damages have been granted (Art. 2208, exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman
the illegitimate
par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil was baseless.
descendants and
action.
ascendants of the We start with the observation that the trial court should not
Stated differently, when death occurs as a deceased. have lumped together the awards for moderate or temperate
result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
4. As exemplary
are entitled to the following items of (P500,000.00), without specifying the particular amount
damages, when the
damages: which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We
crime is attended by
shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
1. As indemnity for the one or more
death of the victim of aggravating The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos
the offense circumstances, an cannot be given as temperate or moderate damages for the
P12,000.00 (now amount to be fixed in records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor
P50,000.00), without the discretion of the can it be given as exemplary damages. The killing of
the need of any court, the same to be Chapman was not attended by either evident premeditation
evidence or proof of considered separate or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered
damages, and even from fines. as one for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New
though there may have Civil Code. 192 It states:
5. As attorney's fees
been mitigating
and expenses of Art. 2206. The amount of damages for
circumstances
litigation, the actual death caused by a crime . . . shall be at
attending the
amount thereof, (but least (fifty thousand pesos, under current
commission of the
only when a separate jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
offense.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 23 of 98

 xxx xxx xxx be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her
family's business took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate
were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23)
descendants and ascendants of the
doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without
deceased may demand moral damages for
abatement. They were forced to rely on the goodness of the
mental anguish by reason of the death of
gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from
the deceased.
other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her
aggression committed by appellant, we increase the amount demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen.
of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award
the death of Chapman. of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be
reasonable.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs
of MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN. Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is
called for by the circumstances of the case. Under Article
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen
2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral
should be awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her
damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be
natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New
adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in
Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is
the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to
not entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
Maureen should inherit from her.
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
already in effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression
Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by
snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her
the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by
xxx xxx xxx appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's
vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their
(2) When the parents, legitimate or families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition
illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from
of the adopted concur with the adopters, taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper.
they shall divide the entire estate, one-half Moreover, since the killing of Hultman was attended by
to be inherited by the parents or treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the new Civil
ascendants and the other half, by the Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
adopters; pesos as exemplary damages against appellant for the death
xxx xxx xxx of Maureen Hultman.
(5) When only the adopters survive, they We now review the award of One Million Pesos
shall inherit the entire estate; (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages
to victim JUSSI LEINO.
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was
survived by her natural father. During the trial of these cases, From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise
only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of suffered extensive injuries as a result of the shooting. His
damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone
favor has sufficient factual and legal basis. transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also
injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen were also affected. When he was discharged from the
Hultman of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed
exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his
exorbitant and should be reduced.
teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries
is amply justified by the circumstances. The records reveal and suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that
that Maureen recovered between life and death for ninety- distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation
seven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at
valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time, she the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to come and
underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace
never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the
go with death. She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to
parents had to be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled
seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had to over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to
Europe where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the
foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral
damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was
committed with treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the
New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable
for the payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos
as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to
compensate the LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not
necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is
gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money.
In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we awarded
to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning
capacity although he was still a medical student at the time of
injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga
was then a fourth year medical student at a reputable school;
his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial,
justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish
his course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor,
presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the
amount of income Cariaga would have earned had he finished
his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount,
equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty capacity of JUSSI
LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly
speculative and should be denied considering that Leino had
only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military
and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his
ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July
13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to
become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his first
year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a
mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial
evidence to justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would
have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club
and ultimately become a professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen
Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of
deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not
supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity,
the trial court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a
secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand
dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the estimate given by
Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that,
at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills
needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a
Page 24 of 98
secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for
Anders Hultman himself testified that there was uncertainty annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202Hence, using the resolution was appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution
as to Maureen's future career path, thus: formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify
of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience
ATTY. VINLUAN:
income which would have been received by the heirs as since all three (3) charges involved one continuing incident.
Q Mr. Witness, if support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of
Maureen would not deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with
been (sic) shot and she Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were
continued her studies, (P564,042.57). concerned. He argued that since the pending incident was
what professional the petition for bail with respect to the killing of Chapman, any
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award
career would she (sic) testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the life
like to pursue were recommended was irrelevant.
expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The
considering her
rule is well-settled that the award of damages for death is After arguments, the defense suggested that if the
interests and
computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, prosecution would present Leino to testify on all three (3)
inclinations?
and not the beneficiary. 205 charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on
WITNESS: August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on the condition
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's
that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time,
A That is very difficult to fees in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00),
hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
say. She has just turned claiming that the same is exorbitant.
17 and our projection is As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were
that, certainly she presented Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all three
represented by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio
would have been an (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of
artist in the creative
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's
side. She would have
and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were insistence that the hearings conducted by the trial court were
become an actress or a
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some limited to the petition for bail, viz:
movie producer or
hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The
probably she would 1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and
trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty
have been a college documentary evidence relative to the shooting incident,
(40) witnesses testified during the hearings. Several
graduate. including evidence in support of the claim for damages.
pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by
ATTY. VINLUAN: documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution.
the defense counsels. The defense never objected that
Incidents related to the trial of the cases came up to this Court
Q But if you would just evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its
for review at least twice during the pendency of the
say based on the salary intention was really to limit presentation of evidence to
trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort
of a secretary in appellant's petition for bail.
exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the
Sweden, how much
trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) 2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their
would she have much
pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just cases, the trial court issued an Order 211directing the
earned?
and reasonable. parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the
A. Not less than Two main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively
VII
Thousand Dollars a submitted for Decision and Resolution." After receipt of
month. 200 In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for
conducted on the cases, where no less than forty-one (41) extension of time to file the defense Memorandum. In
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen
witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial
million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen far
hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder court's Order submitting for decision the main case and
loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the petition for bail. Neither did it move for a
In any event, what was proved on record is that after the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it
graduating from high school, Maureen took up a short the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce still had witnesses to present.
personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel,
Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the process when the trial court considered all the cases
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and
time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to
Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's
received her first salary, for which reason she went out with present its surrebuttal evidence.
acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position
her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at that the hearing conducted was only on the petition for
the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was
the very first hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for
disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for
incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the decision was only his petition for bail, he would have only
Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use
murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, prayed that he be granted bail.
the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death
there was only one murder charge against appellant since
(October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos 4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment
Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of
(P118.00). 201
Allowing for reasonable and necessary from the trial court, the defense did not interpose any
the proceedings on October 17, 1991.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 25 of 98

 objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the (3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused CONTRARY TO ART. 335 OF THE RPC IN RELATION TO R.A.
defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable 7659.2
manifested that they were ready therefor. doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by
When arraigned on March 3, 1997, appellant pleaded not
treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the guilty. Trial ensued.
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
petition for bail were heard simultaneously and appellant
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen The prosecution presented the complainant and Dr. Alita
acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as Fetizanan Venturanza as witnesses.
additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the
the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded Complainant Elsa, 17 years old, declared on the witness
following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty
the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took stand that she had been repeatedly raped by her father since
Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his
the defense almost one and a half years to submit its she was eight years old, the first sexual molestation having
injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three
evidence. The defense presented more than twenty (20) been committed on November 23, 1988 and the latest on
Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was only November 16, 1996 when she was already sixteen years old.
(P118,369.84) and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that Around 8:00 in the evening of November 16, 1996, Elsa
U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
he filed a motion for new trial, 212 through his new counsel, testified that she was sleeping together with her two sisters
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two
Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint in one of the rooms of their house located at Subaan, Socorro,
Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition Oriental Mindoro. She woke up finding appellant lying beside
for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to (4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each her. He undressed her and, thereafter, inserted his penis in
present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note of the three (3) offended parties the sum of One Million her vagina. Elsa knew that her sisters were aware of the
that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not even Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million various times that their father raped her but they did not
identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses inform anybody about these incidents. Complainant herself
their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have of litigation; and did not tell their mother that their own father was raping her.
produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable However, after she was raped on November 16, 1996, she
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the was prompted by her conscience and her fear that her sisters
decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the SO ORDERED. might suffer the same fate in the hands of their father to reveal
trial court. her ordeal to her Lola Mercedes who in turn informed her Lola
Leonor. Both grandmothers brought her to the Municipal
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
G.R. No. 136849 October 23, 2003 Health Officer in Socorro and had her examined.3
MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court, dated
December 22, 1992, thus: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NESTOR Testifying on the physical examination she conducted on
CODERES y ABLAZA, appellant. Elsa, Dr. Venturanza confirmed her findings that
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused
complainants sexual organ had a "healed lacerated hymen
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable D E C I S I O N
with non-coaptible borders and retraction of the edges, 7
doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland
oclock position" which could have been caused by the
John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
penetration of a hard object, like a penis, or by the stretching
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) Before us for automatic review is the decision of the Regional
of the thigh.4
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro finding
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza guilty beyond reasonable Defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its lone
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs doubt of raping his daughter, Elsa Coderes y Mauhay, witness. He admitted that complainant Elsa is her daughter
of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering and that she was born in 1980. However, he denies her
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the him to indemnify Elsa in the amount of P50,000.00. accusations against him. Appellant testified that since the
victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as birth of Elsa, she stayed with her maternal grandmother,
moral damages. The criminal complaint,1 dated January 24, 1997, filed by Elsa Leonora Mauhay, whose house is located at Zone I, Socorro,
against herein appellant reads as follows: Oriental Mindoro. Complainant only went to live with her
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused
parents for one year in 1992. On November 17, 1996,
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable That on or about the 16th day of November, 1996 at 8:00
complainant returned to her parents house. She told her
doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for oclock in the evening, more or less, in barangay Subaan,
father that she eloped with her boyfriend four days earlier.
the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and municipality of Socorro, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Surprised by her daughters revelation, appellant hit her
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
telling her that she is still too young. Complainant answered
perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the Court, the above-named accused, NESTOR CODERES y
back saying, "Isinusumpa ko kayo bilang magulang".
following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as Ablaza, by means of force and intimidation, with lewd and
Thereafter, appellant returned complainant to the care of her
indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty unchaste design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
grandmother. On December 8, 1996, appellant came to know
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty- feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge of the
of the charges against him. He cannot think of any reason why
Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five undersigned complainant against her will and without her
her daughter accused him of raping her.5
Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and consent.
Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning That the commission of the crime is attended by the After evaluation of the evidence presented by the opposing
capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos aggravating circumstance of the victim being only 16 years parties, the trial court upheld the prosecution evidence and
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million old and the offender-accused is her own father and living in rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of rape,
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages. the same house. imposing upon him the penalty of death.6 Hence, this

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 26 of 98

automatic review under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court
and submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I complainant as evidenced by the unrefuted testimony of
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAD CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMPLAINANT, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP.7
We find the appeal meritorious.
In reviewing rape cases, we have always been guided by the
following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made
with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of
things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.8
In the case at bar, we find that the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. There was no evidence that
appellant forced or threatened Elsa in having carnal
knowledge with him on November 16, 1996. We quote
verbatim her testimony, thus:
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court why you
filed this case, in Court?
A: Because the reason behind is that even my sister
will be raped by him if I will not file this case sir.
Q: How about you, what did your father do to you
which compel you to file this case?
A: He often times injure me sir.
Q: Aside from bitting you or injuring your physical
body, what did he do to you?
A: He threatened me sir.
Q: What was done to you by your father, please tell
the Honorable Court.
A: He raped me sir.
Q: And the last time that you were raped by your own However, a review of the evidence presented in the present
father, when was that if you still remember? case discloses that the rule on moral ascendancy cannot be
applied in this particular case. We find that the trial court
A: November 16, 1996 sir.
failed to appreciate the fact that appellant could have hardly
Q: What time more or less, if you still remember? wielded any moral ascendancy or parental influence over
A: 8:00 oclock in the evening sir.
appellant that since her birth, Elsa lived with her grandmother
Q: In what place were you rape? and stayed in the house of her parents for only one year in
1992 when she was only twelve years old or four years before
A: At Subaan, Socorro sir. the complained incident. On November 16, 1996, Elsa was
Q: In whose house? already sixteen years old. Thus, she could hardly be
considered to be of such tender age that she would be easily
A: In our own house sir. conditioned or controlled into submitting herself to
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, how you appellants sexual desires specially so, when she lived with
were raped by your own father on November 16, appellant for only one year when she was twelve years old.
1996? In his Brief, appellant does not deny having sexual
A: He laid beside me in our room and undressed me intercourse with complainant. He claims that she consented
sir. to the sexual act. As earlier found by us, the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence to prove that complainant resisted
Q: And thereafter, what did he do? the sexual advances of appellant when she was allegedly
A: He again inserted his penis in my vagina sir. raped on November 16, 1996. The gravamen in the crime of
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or
Q: This time, after you were rape by your father on without her consent.14 We find nothing in the testimony of
November 16, 1996, what did you do in order to complainant to show that she offered any semblance of
protect your rights? resistance when appellant allegedly raped her. While it may
A: I reported this matter to my Lola Mercedes.9 be said that tenacious resistance from the victim is not a
requirement for the crime of rape, the lack of evidence
It is clear from complainants above-quoted testimony that signifying obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse,
while she claims that she was threatened and injured by naturally expected from an unwilling victim, could likewise
appellant, Elsa did not specify how she was threatened, why indicate that no rape has occurred.15 Nothing in private
she was threatened and on what particular occasion she was complainants testimony indicates that she struggled against
threatened by appellant. Thus, the prosecution failed to the sexual advances of appellant. There was no evidence of
establish that threat or injury was employed by appellant appellants use of force or threat in having sex with her that
during or on the occasion of the rape allegedly committed on evening of November 16, 1996.
November 16, 1996 as a means to force complainant to have
sex with him. So too, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that when a
woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all
In rape committed through force or intimidation under Article that is necessary to prove that rape was committed.
335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Moreover, there is no question that a rape by a father of his
Republic Act No. 7659), the prosecution must prove that own daughter is an odious and despicable crime that
force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant deserves condemnation in the strongest possible terms.
upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to
prosecutions cause.10 In the instant case, the prosecution In the present case, after scrutiny of the testimonies of
failed to establish the presence of sufficient force or complainant and appellant, we found certain facts and
intimidation that would have created a state of fear in the circumstances that evince reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
mind of Elsa so as to effectively prevent her from putting up a appellant. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to comprehend
the same.
determined resistance.
First, when complainant was asked, during her direct
It is true that in a long line of cases,11 the most recent of which
examination, as to what impelled her to inform her
is People vs. Servano,12 we held that in rape committed by a
father against his own daughter, the formers moral grandmother of the rape committed against her by appellant
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for on November 16, 1996, she testified as follows:
violence and intimidation; that ascendancy or influence Q: After you were raped by your own father on
necessarily flows from the fathers parental authority as well November 16, 1996 what prompted you to report
as the childrens duty to obey and observe respect towards this matter to your lola?
their parents; that such reverence and respect are deeply
A: Nakukunsensya po ako at baka gawin sa aking
ingrained in the minds of Filipino children; that abuse of both
by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing mga kapatid ang gahasain din ng aking magulang.16
her to do whatever he wants.13
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 27 of 98
During her cross-examination, she testified thus:
Q: And the reason why you finally revealed what
according to you, your father did against you was
that you were nakukunsensya, is it not?
A: Yes mam.
Q: And you were nakukunsensya because you know
for a fact that what you and your father were doing
was a sin against your mother, is it not?
A: Yes mam.17
While we find the last quoted question propounded
by the counsel for appellant to be downright
misleading under the Rules on Evidence, to which
the inattentive prosecutor unfortunately did not
object, private complainant could have easily
denied the same, if it were not really true. But she
did not. Although misleading, the question is simple
enough to be easily understood and evaluated by
Elsa who, on the date of her testimony was already
seventeen years old.
Her above-quoted statements are open to different
interpretations. Was she bothered by her
conscience ("nakunsiyensya") because she was
afraid that appellant would also rape her sisters; or
was she bothered by her conscience because she
realized that what she and her father were doing
was a sin against her mother?
In a criminal case, every circumstance or evidence
favoring a mans innocence must be taken into
account. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which is consistent with innocence and the other
with guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.18 Thus, the presumption of innocence
founded on the basic principle of justice as
embodied in our Constitution prevails in the present
case.
Second, appellants act of trying to settle the case
filed by Elsa against him cannot be considered in
this particular case as an implied admission that he
raped his daughter. During his cross-examination,
the public prosecutor propounded questions on him
to which he answered, as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, I would like you to listen very well
and understand my question before you answer,
because this is a grave offense charged against you
and if the Court will find you guilty, you maybe
included in the list of those who will be given lethal
injection. I would like to remind you that I filed this
case with a weak heart, bearing in mind that you are
the father of the complainant. And to remind you
clearly, when you and your wife was (sic) crying in
our office. Do you remember that?
A: Yes, sir. prosecution has failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence.21
Q: And you were pleading to your wife that you be
given pity and commensuration (sic). Is it not? WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the
A: Yes, sir.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinarnalayan, Oriental
Q: And that was for several occasion (sic). If I Mindoro in Criminal Case No. P-5586 is REVERSED and SET
remember right, there were 3-5 times coming to our ASIDE. Appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza is ACQUITTED
office and trying to settle the case between you and and his immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered,
your wife and Elsa? unless some other lawful cause warrants his further
detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this
A: Yes, sir.
Court immediately of the action taken hereon within five
Q: You will agree with me that your wife, at that time, (5) days from receipt hereof
as well as Elsa Coderes did not conform with the
Costs de oficio.
amicable settlement, for which reason, I was
constrained to file this case as actually you were SO ORDERED.
raping her since childhood. Is it not?
A: No, sir.
G.R. No. L-3544 April 18, 1952
Q: When Elsa Coderes testified here in Court, you
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
were present, and when I directed her to point at
EMETERIO SASOTA, ET AL., defendants;
you, she went down from that witness stand and
EMETERIO SASOTA and ALEJO SANCHEZ, defendants-
shouted to you, in this wise: "Ito po ang aking
appellants.
walang hiyang ama na gumahasa sa akin". Do you
still remember that? Sulpicio Platon for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor
A: Yes, sir.
Pacifico P. de Castro for appellee.
Q: And when you were pointed at, your head bowed
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
as if in acceptance. Is it not?
In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the two
A: No, sir.19
Sanchez brothers Pablo and Alejo, their nephew Juan
From the foregoing, it can be seen that while appellant admits Sanchez and one Emeterio Sasota were accused of murder
that he tried to settle the case filed against him by his for killing one Sabino Bucad. After trial, Emeterio Sasota and
daughter, he, nonetheless, denied that he raped her. Thus, Alejo Sanchez were found guilty of the crime of murder and
the fact that appellant admitted having tried to settle the case were sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, to jointly and
against him may not be used as a basis of his conviction in the severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabino Bucad
absence of competent evidence presented by the in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the proportional costs of the
prosecution that complainant was raped through force and proceedings. Their co-defendants Pablo Sanchez and Juan
intimidation. The prosecution may not rely on the weakness Sanchez died during the pendency of the case in the lower
of the evidence for the defense. Instead, it must depend on court and no motion of the Fiscal, the case was dismissed as
the strength of its own evidence and establish the guilt of against them. Alejo and Emeterio are now appealing from that
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This, the prosecution decision.
failed to do.
It is not disputed that Sabino Bucad was taken from his house
Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus by four armed men, and thereafter he was never again seen
probandi for a pronouncement of guilt beyond reasonable or heard from. The witnesses for the prosecution point to the
doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of two appellants and their two companions (Pablo and Juan
the accused will result in acquittal.20 Sanchez) as four the individuals who not only took Sabino
Bucad from his house to the Bato lake, ill-treating him all the
We need to emphasize however what we have enunciated
way, but upon reaching there, took him with them for about
in People vs. Eliarda, to wit:
ride on the lake, and while sailing, continued to ill-treat him
In an acquittal, an accused is set free not necessarily until he died, and presumably thereafter secretly disposing of
because he did not commit the offense but, more likely than his body.
not, because the exacting proof for conviction may not have
The two appellants disclaim any knowledge of, much less
been met. A person is presumed innocent of a crime unless
connection with the disappearance of Sabino, and insist that
his guilt has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt.
on the night of October 17, 1943, they were nowhere near his
Thus, an acquittal does not always mean that the defense
house. After hearing the testimony of the witnesses, both for
evidence is given full credence, but, rather that the
the prosecution and the defense, and observing their
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 28 of 98
demeanor while on the witness stand, the trial court gave Sabino with hands tied passed by the yard and Pablo of the deceased, because his body was never found, neither
credence to the testimony of the Government witnesses and recognized the accused because they were fellow members was the place where he was supposed to have been buried
disbelieved that of the defense. We have gone over the record of the guerilla organization. He secretly followed the group indicated corpus delicti was not established. In a case of
of the case and we see nothing in it to disapprove of this and upon reaching the lake he saw the four defendants place murder of homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or
attitude and disturb this finding of the trial court as regards Sabino in a boat with them and sail; in the direction of the to show where it can be found. There are cases like death at
to the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, we believe opposite shore. Villez took another banca and followed them sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible.
the story told by the witnesses for the prosecution to be more at a safe distance and he saw the four accused take turns in It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing it
natural and probable and therefore, more worthy of belief. beating Sabino who pleaded that he be forgiven because he be proven. There are even cases where said death and the
Moreover, we see no reason why this Government witnesses had not committed any fault, to which appellant Sasota intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be
should deliberately and falsely pin the killing on the two answered, "what forgiveness." Villez says that as a result of presumed or established by circumstancial evidence.
appellants and their co-defendants and accuse them of this the beating Sabino died. Villez is the same person who as Wharton in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 871,
serious crime of murder with its corresponding heavy already stated, three days later informed Arsenio Bucad that pp. 1505-1506, says:
penalty. he had seen his father being taken into a boat to the opposite
. . . the rule now established by the weight of
shore of the lake, in the meantime being maltreated until he
The evidence in the record shows that about ten o'clock in the authority is that the element of death in the corpus
died. Villez must have been the man who Barbacena had seen
evening of October 17, 1943, Sabino Bucad who was living delicti may be established by circumstancial
take a banca and follow the defendants as they sailed away
with his common law wife Maria Evalla and his 18-year old son evidence. Hence, in the case of the destruction of
with Sabino.
Arsenio Bucad in the barrio of Masoli, Bato, Camarines Sur, the body, or in the case of its disappearance, as in
was awakened by calls from outside his house. Lighting an oil Another witness Roman Arbo, after fishing in the lake that murder upon the high seas, where the body is
lamp, he took it to the window to see who was calling. Arsenio same evening was on his way home when he heard a noise at rarely, if ever, found, death may be proved
who was also awakened followed his father to the window and the bend of the road and he immediately took cover behind circumstantially. To establish the corpus delicti by
peeping, saw and recognized the two appellants herein with tall grasses. From his hiding place he saw appellant Sasota circumstancial evidence, facts are admissible, to
their two co-accused, Pablo and Juan, armed with bolos. puling Sabino whose hands were then tied, followed by Juan, show the impossibility of rescue, as at sea; to show
Sabino inquired from his nocturnal visitors why they came, Pablo and appellant Alejo. He saw Juan Sanchez beating the the existence and extent of wounds, and deceased's
and the group requested him to come down so that they could victim and he also heard Sabino asking for forgiveness. The condition of health; and to show that the wound was
all go to the house of the councilor. Reluctantly, Sabino following morning Arbo went to the house of Pablo Sanchez sufficient to cause death, and that the party was
complied with their request. According to Arsenio, as soon as and asked the latter's wife where her husband was because reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown by the
his father had gone down, the four accused grabbed his he had seen him the night before taking Sabino away. When testimony of a witness that he saw the flash and
hands and tide them and took him away. Not long thereafter Pablo returned home and was informed by his wife of the visit heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the
Arsenio heard the sound of beating and the groans of his of Arbo he got angry and that same afternoon, his wife went ground, declaring he was shot, and that accused did
father. Because he was scared he did not dare leave the to Arbo's house telling him that her husband was mad at him the shooting.
house to follow his father. Three days afterward Pablo Villez for gossiping and spreading the news. Fearing that Pablo may
Francisco in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. III section 27,
came and told him that his father had been taken to the lake do him harm because of his meddling, Arbo changed his
1517, also has the following to say:
by the four accused, placed in a banca and while sailing residence and with to live on the other side of the City of
toward the opposite shore, was maltreated and killed by Legaspi where he stayed until Liberation. A conviction of murder cannot be supported unless
them. the body has been found or there is equivalent proof
For the purpose of determining the criminal responsibility of
of death. The more modern rule is that the fact of
While on their way to the lake the four accused and their the appellants, it is unnecessary to ascertain and find the
death as well as the other branch of the corpus
victim Sabino Bucad were seen by a member of specific criminal acts of each. It is clear that they and their
delicti may be established by circumstancial or
the ronda organization of Agos, who possibly, because of the co-accused confederated and helped each other and acted
presumptive evidence. Thus is held that, where the
extra ordinary spectacle of a man with his hands tied being in concert from the time that they lured Sabino from his home
body has been destroyed or is not recovered, it is
led by four armed men and late at night, hastened to inform to come down and tied his hands until they reached the lake
competent to establish both elements by
the barrio lieutenant named Eladio Barbacena who forthwith where they placed him in a banca and then took turns in
presumptive evidence . . .
came and inquired from the four men what they intend to do maltreating their victim until he died. In other words there
with Sabino. The group was apparently, in no mood to answer was a conspiracy between all of them and consequently, Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason
questions or give explanations and Juan Sanchez even told appellants are responsible for the acts of each and every one. cases decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason
him to stop asking questions otherwise he would be next. the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he
The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that
had arrested or tortured or taken away, where the victims
Possibly, his curiosity and sense of responsibility as a barrio could not have committed the crime because in the day in
were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed
lieutenant prompted Barbacena to follow the group secretly, question, particularly that time of the night, they were
that they were killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or
hiding behind tall grasses until they came to the lake where elsewhere. The trial court has analyzed the evidence in this
liquidated by the accused, this, for the purpose of fixing the
he saw the accused place Sabino in a banca and take him regard and in our opinion correctly rejected this theory
penalty.
away in the direction of the opposite shore. He heard Sabino of alibi and we find no profit in further discussing it. Suffice it
groaning as if in pain and asking for forgiveness. Barbacena to say that aside from the inherent weakness of this kind of There is nothing in the record to show that the witnesses for
also saw a man in a banca follow the boat occupied by the defense, the appellants were clearly identified by no less than the prosecution had any reason for falsely imputing this
group and their victim. four witnesses as the persons who took away Sabino from his serious crime of murder to them. Of course, appellant Alejo
home and liquidated him. The important point raised by Sanchez insinuates that Arsenio Bucad had a motive to testify
Pablo Villez that same evening happened to be in the house
counsel for the appellants is that of corpus delicti. He claims against him because he (Alejo) was a witness against him in
of his father-in-law preparing to pound palay on the occasion
that inasmuch as there is no conclusive evidence of the death criminal case in the Justice of the Peace Court for physical
of the wedding of his sister-in-law. The four accused and

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 29 of 98

injuries where Arsenio was sentenced to arresto menor and Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and got mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each
to pay P60.00 damages. It turns out however that Alejo never convicted. The other seven (7) accused remain at large. other. Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge against
testified in said case for the reason that arsenio Bucad him. In 1982, they had an altercation during a volleyball game
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely,
pleaded guilty to the charge. held during the barangay fiesta. 5
Conrado Sombilon and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of
As regards motive behind the killing, there is evidence whom were residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte. After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the
showing that defendant Pablo Sanchez was maintaining illicit dispositive portion of which reads:
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at
relations with Sabino's common law wife, Maria Evalla, and
around seven o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused
that the former probably to have the woman all to himself,
sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond
liquidated Sabino. Now, why did his co-defendants help him
pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
in carrying out his dastardly plan? The reason is not far to
saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and Kidnapping With Murder. As kidnapping
seek. Alejandro Sanchez was his brother, and Juan Sanchez
taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then (and serious illegal detention) is penalized
was a nephew. As to Emeterio Sasota, he was a friend.
accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc with reclusion perpetua to death and
In view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo murder with reclusion temporal in its
the decision appealed from, except the amount of indemnity Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno maximum period to death, under Article 48
of P2,000.00 which should be raised to P6,000.00, the same Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while of the Code, the herein accused should be
is hereby affirmed, with cost against the appellants. So his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca punished with the maximum of the more
ordered. strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at serious crime, hereat the supreme penalty
the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded of death. Considering that the Constitution
on his way. With the exception of his wife, he did not inform of 1987 does not allow the imposition of the
G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994 anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2 death penalty, however, herein accused is
hereby sentenced to life imprisonment
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the
or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant. testimony of Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the
nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of
barangay Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to
ASMOLO, TEODULFO DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, P30,000.00. He is credited with the full
barangay Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five (25)
BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at period of his detention in accordance with
meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in
large), accused. Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his
amended, except if he did not sign an
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos
agreement to obey the prison laws, rules
Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did not
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant. and regulations at the inception.
recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while
Carlos Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, SO ORDERED.
Nogalada immediately left the place. 3
PUNO, J.: Hence this appeal.
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were never seen or heard from. In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court
charged with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points
Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto alibi. Roluna claimed that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroo, a and stresses that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by
Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. the prosecution. He submits, inter alia, that considering that
Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them They were informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia's
reads: Noroo, his wife's grandmother, was bedridden and seriously questionable and unexplained absence and disappearance
ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to Iluminada's should not be blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they probability, may still be alive.
in the municipality of Baybay, Province of arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He
Leyte, Philippines and within the boiled these plants and regularly applied them on Iluminada's In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) death and the culpability of accused-appellant were
above-named accused, conspiring, weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on
confederating and mutually helping with returned to their home in barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony the disputable presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3),
(sic) one another, with the use of firearms was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
and taking advantage of superior strength, and his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroo. The following shall be presumed dead for
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and all purposes, including the division of the
feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses estate among the heirs:
Moronia and take him away to a place Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him,
unknown up (to) this time whereat said testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of xxx xxx xxx
victim was killed. Anatalio Moronia. He claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon
(3) A person who has been in danger of
had a dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their barangay.
CONTRARY TO LAW. death under other circumstances and his
Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 30 of 98

 existence has not been known for four (4) the death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused
years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that
fateful day of May 27, 1984. During this time, Moronia, with his However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to
hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed the case at bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution
men. Clearly, he was then in danger of death. Since that day witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly take the
until the date of the trial (or for a span of six years), Moronia victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all the way to
has not been seen or heard from. The People urges that these the boat. While sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the
circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never
killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances
proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish the
death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative,
whether or not accused-appellants and his companions
could be held liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of
the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular
offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a compound
fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain
act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the
existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
result. 8
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this
case?
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he
was last seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back
and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows
that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact
that Moronia has been absent and unheard from since that
time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a
presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for
all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of
death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4)
years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution
would not be enough to hold accused-appellant responsible
for the death of Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the
conviction of the accused for murder although the body of the
victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that
in case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover
the body of the victim or show where it can be found. It is
enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death
is proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where
commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating
it may be presumed or established by circumstantial circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of the
evidence. crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present,
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as
maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed
on accused-appellant. 12
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight
found. illegal detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence
from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs
that they merely saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie
against accused-appellant.
up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction
of barangay Monterico and was never seen or heard from SO ORDERED.
since. At no point during the trial was it ever established that
any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid
a violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused 10 so
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L.
as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO,
by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed,
Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro
even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group
Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
for abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be
COMMISSION, respondents.
sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of BELLOSILLO, J.:
kidnapping with murder.
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable the State to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law,
presumption under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of which can be regulated, and the innate value of human
Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the liberty, which can hardly be weighed.
presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is
responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter. The Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar
Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption problem when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked
of death, it should be further presumed that the person with before this Court his "right to life and liberty guaranteed by
whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has
subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the been established to warrant the filing of an information for
latter. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious subversion against him." 1
We resolved the issue then and
crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel
the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are
As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve (12)
prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are years ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise
grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is
accused-appellant for the death of Moronia. recommended.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept
accused is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No and implication of probable cause, the existence of which is
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial
convict him. On the whole, the evidence adduced by the and for a trial judge to issue a warrant for his arrest. It is
prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before an
accused-appellant should be convicted for the serious crime information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued.
of kidnapping with murder. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a
warrant of arrest issued and a person consequently
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of incarcerated on unsubstantiated allegations that only feign
the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal probable cause.
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza,
committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are
Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado.
three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an
alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 31 of 98
have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with
murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the
sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard
Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine
Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the
alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van
Twest, a German national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession,
Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by
petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the
former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had
an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16
June 1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a
month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG
Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted
Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the
Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought
him to a "safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons.
Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After four (4)
days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe
house" together with petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato,
known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the
interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and
then made him sign certain documents. The following day,
Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite,
after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his
private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes
using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the
exact date when the incident happened, but he was certain it
was about a year ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the
operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued
by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided the two (2) dwellings of
Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other,
along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision,
Paraaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder
and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago
and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also
arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were
found to have in their possession several firearms and
ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC
operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task
Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of
Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings against
AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino,
SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren
Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado
and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom
with murder, and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the
State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson
charged that
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado Philippine National Police directing the submission of a report
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law and summary of actions taken thereon.
Offices . . . planned and conspired with
Not having been provided with the requested documents,
other suspects to abduct and kill the
petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective counter-
German national Alexander Van Twest in
affidavits denying the accusations against them. 9
order to eliminate him after forcing the
victim to sign several documents After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions
transferring ownership of several were additionally propounded, the case was deemed
properties amounting to several million submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could
pesos and caused the withdrawal of P5M resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation stating that
deposit from the victim's bank account. he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file
counter- affidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth,
Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor
justice and fair play" moved for the admissions of his counter-
Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to petitioners
affidavit 11confessing participation in the abduction and
informing them that a complaint
slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them
Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before
to appear on
petitioners could refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the
suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through
Department of Justice and to submit their counter-affidavits.
intimidation and duress.
Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits
executed by Umbal and members of the team who raided the On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5 twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio
that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the
facie case against them and that an information had already
subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of
been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of
other documents for examination and copying to enable him
Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the
to fully prepare for his defense and to submit an intelligible
resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that
counter-affidavit. Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was
6
afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information
interested in (a) the "several documents transferring
for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page
ownership of several properties amounting to several million
undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by
pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's
the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task
bank account," as stated in the complaint; (b) the complete
Force recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the
records of the PACC's investigation, including investigations
information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
on other suspects and their disposition, PACC's Order of
Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent
Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such other written
Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other
documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to
likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of petitioners' request, gave them until 8 February 1994 to
prosecutors, which was created to conduct the preliminary submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
investigation, on the ground that they were members of the against all the accused. 14 On 7 February 1994, petitioners
legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The following
impartiality. day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the
In its Order of 11 October 1993, the new panel of
8
Secretary of Justice seeking review and reversal of the
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito
undated resolution of the panel
R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M.
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner
Deynata as Members, confirmed that the motion for inhibition
Mendoza. 17 On
of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the
Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993
proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his
resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new
appeal before the Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even
panel granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the
date, respondent judge issued the assailed warrant of arrest
production of additional documents used or intended to be
against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15 February 1994,
used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in
petitioners filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and
compliance with the order, submitted only copies of the
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
request for verification of the firearms seized from the
accused, the result of the request for verification, and On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment
a Philippine Times Journal article on the case with a marginal on the petition and set the case for hearing on 28 February
note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 32 of 98
and respondent judge from conducting further proceedings
on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily
surrendered at the Headquarters of the Capital Command
(CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Bagong
Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they
were released on the basis of our temporary restraining
order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes,
principally contend that respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in
"whimsically holding that there is probable cause against
petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners and without even stating the
basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of
the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists
when the certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that
the records of the preliminary investigation which
respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish
probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors'
"clear sign of bias and impartiality (sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that the determination of probable cause is a function of the
judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain
facts to convince him that the accused probably committed
the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the
requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a
warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this
Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman
Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted." This definition is still
relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent
cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And as a
protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to
justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful
grounds for arresting the accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining
the existence of probable cause. While it appears in that case
that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge
seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the existence of
absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing
procedure that they can base their findings merely on their
personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this
permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them
arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the determination
of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal question
which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty
of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said
a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be,
well founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence
to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does
not mean "actual and positive cause" nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is it believed
that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support
of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue
injury to the government and whether the
same was done with manifest partiality or
evident bad faith can only be made out by
proper and sufficient testimony.
Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived
at when the case has already proceeded
on sufficient proof. 28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted
there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In
the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is
expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of
the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable
cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be
issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent
judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined
the records and we cannot find any support for his
conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons
why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for
a finding of probable cause against petitioners.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the
sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly
confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and
murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van
Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal
claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock
in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly
improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be
pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of
gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria
use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is
subjected to intense heat. 30 Thereafter, the remains undergo
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that
earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains
from the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the
government investigators did to the place of cremation but
could not find any? Or could it be that they did not go at all
because they knew that there would not be any as no burning
ever took place? To allege then that the body of Van Twest
was completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use
merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported
abduction on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by
cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992,
his counsel filed in his behalf a petition for review before this
Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993,
a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange
Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation
conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel again
manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated
in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to be
established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to
pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van
Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta
believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his
client is in fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his
client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to
inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the
name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners'
theory that the supposed death of Van Twest who is
reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact
substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is a
likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In
this regard, we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v.
Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his
body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to
the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from
material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, he said that
he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis
Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct Van
Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary investigation, he
stated that he was not part of the actual meeting as he only
Page 33 of 98
waited outside in the car for his companions who supposedly brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a [T]he Judge does not have to personally
discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37 warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong examine the complainant and his
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and
of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not the same functions as a commissioner for
conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter
been met. the taking of the evidence. However, there
signed various documents upon being compelled to do
should be a report and necessary
so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of
documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners
certification. All these should be before
the "safe house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence
the Judge.
thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the
documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on The extent of the Judge's personal
house," the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause examination of the report and its annexes
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the depends on the circumstances of each
exist? Or could the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to case. We cannot determine beforehand
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's
was not able to comply with the order of the prosecutors to the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already examination should be. The Judge has to
produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, decided. exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
what happened to the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by personal determination is vested in the
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall
petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest? Judge by the Constitution. It can be as
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
These and more remain unanswered. brief or as detailed as the circumstances
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
of each case require. To be sure, the judge
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or,
must go beyond the Prosecutor's
was supposedly triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may
certification and investigation report
September 1993, the application of the PACC operatives for disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
whenever necessary. He should call for
a search warrant to be served in the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
the complainant and witnesses
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
themselves to answer the court's probing
Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September 1993, a day
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features questions when the circumstances of the
before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the
of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of case so require.
application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in
probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the
their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by
provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge
although he was said to be already under their custody, showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has
and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The
Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If
preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V, subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional
judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of
Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39
protection would be demeaned and the people would be
probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
"secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's
the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On the contrary, the
of prosecutors also considered in filing the charges against certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there
petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any),
be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such
tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's
as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and
counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after certification which are material in assisting the judge in his
prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has
the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and
just been committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard.
And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit, prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial
Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
judge, after reviewing the information and the documents
extracted through duress and intimidation. warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves
or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the
his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public
confusion about their objectives. The determination of
lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The
the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the
preliminary investigation But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors
dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their
they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were
not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with
there may be bits of evidence against petitioners'
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings
the prosecutor. belief is not enough. They should have presented sufficient
of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners'
and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of
complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v.
probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the
far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 34 of 98

compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the
information and the inordinate interest of the government
cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the
termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that
the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and
secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail
and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is
laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's
counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners
the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered
the evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination
of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated
resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC
but was also recommended for approval by the head of the
PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround
in securing a copy of the resolution and the information
against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and
sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future
reform and be productive members of the community rests
both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence of
prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by
the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be
held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which
determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline
is that there is a standard in the determination of the
existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty
of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and
prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather
engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and
jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Pao 47 finds application
The purpose of a preliminary investigation
is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil.
216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to
withhold it would be to transgress of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to
constitutional due process (People v. prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales
Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed
order to satisfy the due process clause it of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it
is not enough that the preliminary is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of
investigation is conducted in the sense of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
making sure that the transgressor shall oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate
not escape with impunity. A preliminary protection to constitutional rights. 49
investigation serves not only for the
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if
purposes of the State. More importantly, it
petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the dictates
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and
of government. They would have been illegally arrested and
fair play which are birthrights of all who
detained without bail. Then we would not have the
live in the country. It is therefore
opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of
imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as
injustice are lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight
the case may be, to relieve the accused
for their liberty and freedom not otherwise available to those
from the pain of going thru a trial once it is
who cower in fear and subjection.
ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors
that no probable cause exists to form a and other government agents tasked with the enforcement of
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the the law that in the performance of their duties they must act
accused (emphasis supplied). with circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods
and practices cause a disservice to their office and maim
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they
their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We
showcase the seeming immensity of government power
thus caution government agents, particularly the law
which when unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive.
enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and
Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines
not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the
the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on
fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined
occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends
efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous
this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty
eagerness violate constitutional precepts which
unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can
circumscribe the structure of a civilized community.
be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort
inflicted by government agents is not reflective of responsible WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 28
their high and prestigious office, relieved of the common February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose
obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury. Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The
warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE and
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself
respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from
and its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper
proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim.
administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to
Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for
its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not SO ORDERED
confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The
right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for
government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its G.R. No. 180109 July 26, 2010
citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of
duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH
prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the "JOJO" V. GREY, FRANCIS B. GREY, and COURT OF
"multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to APPEALS-CEBU CITY, EIGHTEENTH
weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the DIVISION, Respondents.
right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and the D E C I S I O N
circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see
probable cause to order the detention of petitioners. 48 NACHURA, J.:
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. Rules of Court filed by the People of the Philippines, through
This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the
natural rights which include personal liberty and security nullification of the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City-
against invasion by the government or any of its branches or Eighteenth Division) Resolution1 dated March 13, 2007,
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill Decision dated May 8, 2007, and Resolution dated October
2 3
8, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558, entitled "Mayor Joseph
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 35 of 98
Jojo V. Grey and Francis B. Grey v. Hon. Roberto A. Respondents filed a Petition15 for Certiorari and Prohibition Petitioner argues that respondents committed forum
Navidad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of before the CA, alleging that Judge Navidad gravely abused shopping, which would warrant the outright dismissal of their
Calbayog City, Branch 32, and the People of the Philippines." his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order, and petition below. Petitioner alleges that respondents petition
seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of for change of venue before this Court and their petition for
On December 11, 2006, an Information for Murder was filed
preliminary injunction. They alleged that the filing of the prohibition before the CA actually involve the same subject
against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge,
murder charges against them on the basis of perjured matter, parties, and issues that of enjoining Judge Navidad
Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for
statements coming from their political opponents supporters from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case against
the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge
"smacks of political harassment at its foulest them.26 Moreover, these two proceedings have resulted in
municipal government, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
form."16 Respondents pointed out that the criminal complaint conflicting decisions, with this Court resolving to proceed
Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was
was filed barely two months after Joseph Grey declared his with the case and with the CA enjoining the same.27
accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion
intentions to challenge incumbent Congressman Reynaldo S.
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 4 Petitioner also argues against the CAs ruling that Judge
Uy, a former ally, in the May 2007 congressional elections.
Navidad failed to personally determine the existence of
Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Likewise, respondents claimed that one of the witnesses,
probable cause. It said that although the judge adopted the
Justice. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 41 Presiding Judge Rosario Urien Moloboco, who executed an affidavit before the
findings of the prosecutors as to the sufficiency of evidence
Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of Provincial Prosecutor, was the subject of an Alias Warrant of
constituting probable cause, the language of the Order
arrest. Judge Bandal found the prosecutions evidence to be Arrest for murder issued by the RTC of Gandara, Samar on
clearly reflects that the judge himself personally examined
insufficient to link respondents to the crime charged. She June 26, 2006, and, hence, was a fugitive from the law at the
the records and found that there was probable cause for the
directed the prosecution to present, within five days, time of the filing of the criminal complaint against
issuance of warrants of arrest.28Moreover, the judge was
additional evidence that would show that accused were the respondents. Respondents maintain that the fact that
correct in finding probable cause based on the sworn
assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped in Moloboco was not arrested when he executed his affidavit
statements of the witnesses submitted to the
the commission of the crime charged.5 before the prosecutor, spoke of the power and clout of the
court.29 Petitioner avers that the CA disregarded the fact that
witness protectors.17
The prosecution then filed an Omnibus Motion for the Information alleged conspiracy.30 In any case, petitioner
Reconsideration and a motion for the inhibition of Judge The CA Eighteenth Division issued a TRO on March 13, asserts that a perceived defect in the Information is not
Bandal.6 The judge inhibited herself but denied the motion for 2007.18 After oral arguments, the CA issued a jurisdictional as the same may be amended anytime before
reconsideration.7 Decision19dated May 8, 2007, making the TRO permanent, arraignment or with leave of court after arraignment.31
ordering that warrants of arrest be set aside, and dismissing
Thereafter, the provincial prosecutor filed a petition for Petitioner also claims that respondents had not shown any
the criminal case without prejudice.
change of venue before this Court, attaching thereto a letter clear and unmistakable right to the relief they sought. It said
from the victims wife expressing fear for her life and that of The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the that there are more than enough plain, speedy, and adequate
the other witnesses.8 constitutional mandate for him to personally determine the remedies available to respondents. Their constitutional
existence of probable cause.20 According to the CA, nowhere rights are amply protected in the enforcement of the warrants
The Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution dated January 4,
in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal of arrest. They can likewise apply for bail or move to quash
2007, dismissed the petition for review and respondents
assessment of the evidence before him and the personal the allegedly defective Information.32
counter charge of perjury. He found no error to warrant the
justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the
modification or reversal of the prosecutors resolution. The Petitioner also argues that this Court has laid down the rule
judge extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice ruled that the evidence adduced against that criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined, and any
Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of
respondents was sufficient to establish probable cause for exception to this rule must be convincingly established.33 On
Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was
the offense charged. Respondents motion for the other hand, the comparative injury to the People in
sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause.
reconsideration was denied on January 30, 2007.9 permanently enjoining a criminal case is beyond any of
The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to
respondents speculative claim of injury.
Subsequently, the prosecution withdrew their motion for personally determine the existence of probable cause before
change of venue before this Court, citing financial difficulties issuing warrants of arrest.21 Thus, petitioner is praying that the CAs May 8, 2007 Decision
in bringing witnesses to Manila.10 Respondents opposed the and October 8, 2007 Resolution be reversed and set aside,
Moreover, the CA also ruled that the Information was not
motion and prayed that all proceedings be suspended until and the writ of injunction be dissolved.34
supported by the allegations in the submitted affidavits.22 It
after the May 14, 2007 elections.11
pointed out that the Information charged respondents as In their Comment, respondents assert that the trial court
However, on February 19, 2007, respondents filed their own principals by direct participation, but the complaint-affidavit issued its February 20, 2007 Order in gross violation of the
petition for change of venue before this Court, alleging that and supporting affidavits uniformly alleged that respondents Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence on the
the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto were not at the scene of the shooting.23 The CA further found matter.35 Respondents claim that the trial courts violation is
Navidad, was a pawn in the political persecution being staged that the allegations in the complaint-affidavit and supporting evident in the "indecent haste" with which it issued the Order
against them.12 In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, this Court affidavits were insufficient to establish probable cause. It and Warrants of Arrest, and in its own admission in the Order
denied the petition for lack of merit and directed Judge said that there was nothing in the affidavits to show acts that itself.36 Respondents also maintain that the trial court acted
Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.13 would support the prosecutions theory that respondents whimsically, capriciously, and with grave abuse of discretion
were also charged as principals by conspiracy.24 when it concluded that there was probable cause to issue
Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary
warrants of arrest against respondents.37 Respondents
inquiry on the existence of probable cause, and, in an Order Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs May 8,
likewise assert that the trial court committed grave abuse of
dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable 2007 Decision was denied in a Resolution dated October 8,
discretion when it reversed the finding of Judge Bandal, who
cause was supported by the evidence on record. He then 2007.25 Hence, this petition for review.
first heard the case.38
issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one
of their co-accused.14 The petition is impressed with merit.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 36 of 98

Initially, we decide the issue of forum shopping raised by Court to set aside Judge Navidads February 20, 2007 Order Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
petitioner. and the corresponding warrants he issued.46 The TRO was persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
granted on March 13, 2007, and the CA Decision making the searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
Petitioner maintains that respondents committed forum
same injunction permanent and setting aside the warrants of purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
shopping when it filed a petition for change of venue before
arrest was promulgated on May 8, 2007, a few days before the of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
this Court and a petition for prohibition before the CA.
May 14, 2007 elections. determined personally by the judge after examination under
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
The CA correctly ruled that respondents were not guilty of
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
forum shopping when they filed the two actions. Respondents
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another searched and the persons or things to be seized.
raised different issues and sought different reliefs in the two
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
actions, although both were grounded on the same set of In Soliven v. Makasiar,49 the Court explained that this
certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or more
facts. constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
judge to personally examine the complainant and her
supposition that one or the other court would make a The issue in the petition for change of venue is whether the
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the
favorable disposition.39 trial of the case was to be moved to another court in light of
report and supporting documents submitted by the
respondents allegations that the same was being used as a
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and
tool for their political persecution. On the other hand, the
are present, and where a final judgment in one case will require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
issue in the petition for certiorari before the CA was whether
amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum Thus, in Soliven, we said:
Judge Navidad gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
February 20, 2007 Order and the warrants for respondents What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
arrest. personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two Thus, this Courts Resolution would not have amounted to res
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the judicata that would bar the petition for certiorari before the
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, CA.
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.40
We now resolve the substantive issues. doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former judgment must report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
Respondents, in their petition before the CA, questioned the
be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
alleged lack of personal determination of probable cause by
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
Judge Navidad in issuing the warrants for their arrest.
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject Judge Navidads Order reads: report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
matter, and cause of action.41 witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated existence of probable cause.
A reexamination of the two actions in this case, in light of the Inquiry conducted for the purpose of determining the
foregoing jurisprudence, is in order. sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, would by unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
In the petition for change of venue filed on February 19, 2007,
made a very careful and meticulous and (sic) review not only investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
respondents prayed for the transfer of the criminal case to
of the records but also the evidence adduced by the on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.50
any court in Metro Manila,42 alleging that the prosecution was
prosecution, particularly the sworn statements/affidavits of
politically motivated and designed to hamper the plan of What the law requires as personal determination on the part
Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco and Edgar Pellina.47
respondent Joseph Grey to run for a congressional seat in the of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the
May 2007 elections. They contended that "it would be The language of the Order clearly shows that the judge made
43 investigating prosecutor.51 This means that the judge should
extremely pernicious to the interest of justice if trial of this his own personal determination of the existence of probable consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor
case and (of) the other two cases are held in Samar, cause by examining not only the prosecutors report but also but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the
especially in the City of Calbayog, where the said his supporting evidence, consisting mainly of the sworn parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his
(Congressman) Reynaldo Uy is a resident and absolutely statements of the prosecutions witnesses. witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
wields power."44 They also asked the Court to hold the taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of
proceedings in abeyance until after the May 14, 2007
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the the Information.52
elections.
issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, the Court denied the investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the
petition for transfer of venue for lack of merit. It also directed should be held for trial or be released. The determination of complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and
Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.45 probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only
On March 5, 2007, while their petition for change of venue
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the
was pending before this Court, respondents filed a petition
accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of existence of probable cause.53 Otherwise, the judge may rely
for certiorari before the CA. They prayed, first, for the
the investigating prosecutor.48 on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that
issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to
he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support
prohibit Judge Navidad from proceeding with Criminal Case The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a
thereof.
No. 4916 and from causing the implementation of the warrant of arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the
warrants of arrest against respondents; and second, for the Philippine Constitution:

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 37 of 98

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret
gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the same. CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. out the truth.63 If, as respondents claim, there is no evidence
Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be
A perusal of the assailed Order bears out this fact.
1984, 128 SCRA 577); x x x granted. Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecutions and
It was only through a review of the proceedings before the the accuseds respective evidence may be tested during the
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against
prosecutor that could have led Judge Navidad to determine trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
that "the accused were given the widest latitude and ample will be determined. Whether the criminal prosecution was
has been denied (Salonga v. Pao, et al., L-59524,
opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder which merely a tool for harassment or whether the prosecutions
February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438)[; and]
resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of evidence can pass the strict standards set by the law and
Perjury."54 Likewise, his personal determination revealed no [k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the withstand the exacting scrutiny of the court will all be
improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful resolved at the trial of the case.
circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374,
The criminal Information in this case was filed four years ago
regularity in the performance of official functions.55 Thus, he August 1, 1953).58
and trial has yet to begin. The victims kin, indeed, all the
concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for the
Respondents insisted that political persecution by their parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will
issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct.56
political rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of amount to an injustice.
These statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge criminal charges against them, and used this as basis for
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court
Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for asking the appellate court to stop the proceedings in the trial
of Appeals Decision dated May 8, 2007 and Resolution dated
personal determination of probable cause before issuing the court.
October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558 are hereby
warrants of arrest.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Permanent Injunction is
The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in political persecution or political motives may have impelled hereby DISSOLVED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that injunction the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. Calbayog City, Samar, dated February 20, 2007, is hereby
will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public But this Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City,
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the Samar, is DIRECTED to proceed with hearing, and to decide
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.57 prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise Criminal Case No. 4916 with dispatch.
evidence to support the charges.59
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court SO ORDERED.
have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are: In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the
complaint and evidence before him, determined that there
a. To afford adequate protection to the
was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999
constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v.
provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file
95); ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial
Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR, respondents.
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
To establish political harassment, respondents must prove
actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
that the public prosecutor, not just the private complainant, ROMERO, J.:
Hernandez v. Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et
acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself
al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607); Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision 1 of
to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place
the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No. 42318 which affirmed the
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is respondents in contempt and disrepute.60 It must be shown
March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders 2 of the lower court
sub[-]judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); that the complainant possesses the power and the influence
granting accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying
to control the prosecution of cases.61
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and Invalidate Order of
excess of authority (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62); Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order
politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of May 5, 1995" confirming the hospitalization of accused-
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
of the informations where the existence of such motive has respondent.
ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil.
not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence
556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with
presented in support thereof.621avvphi1
rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion
(Sangalang v. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived political praying that he be released on bail which petitioner by
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The
offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, not shown any evidence of such a grand design. They have lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order,
1966, 18 SCRA 616); not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that the dispositive portion of which reads:
could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the WHEREFORE, the evidence not being
prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, way each of them did. In short, respondents are holding strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this
March 25, 1960); court is constrained to grant bail for the
tenuously only on the hope that this Court will take them at
provisional liberty of the accused
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and their word and grant the relief they pray for. This Court,
motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto v. however, cannot anchor its ruling on mere allegations.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 38 of 98

 Roderick Odiamar in the amount of The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower jeepney then driven by
P30,000.00. (Emphasis supplied) court granting used-respondent's application for bail which it the accused Roderick
justified through its summary of the evidence presented Odiamar in that evening
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as
during the hearing. Said order states, thus: of July 20, 1994 at
the evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed
about 8:00 o'clock from
the two abovementioned motions which the lower court Now going over the evidence adduced in
the Poblacion,
disposed of, thus: conjunction with the petition for bail filed
Lagonoy, Camarines
by the accused through counsel, the court
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May Sur the former knew
believes that the evidence so far
1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty. that it was for a joy ride.
presented by the prosecution is not
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are In fact, she did not even
strong. This is so because the crime of
hereby denied, for lack of merit. offer any protest when
rape is not to be presumed; consent and
the said jeepney
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition not physical force is the common origin of
proceeded to the Pilapil
before the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary acts between man and woman. Strong
Beach resort at
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of evidence and indication of great weight
Telegrafo, San Jose,
Appeals denied the petition reasoning thus: alone support such presumption. It is the
Camarines Sur instead
teaching of applicable doctrines that form
We have examined in close and of Sabang, same
the defense in rape prosecution. In the
painstaking detail the records of this case, municipality, where she
final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not
and find that the claim of the People that and Stephen Florece
necessarily because the untarnished truth
the respondent judge had over-stepped intended to go. And
is on its side but merely because it can
the exercise of his jurisdiction in issuing when the said jeepney
raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It
the questioned orders, is unimpressed was already inside that
has the right to require the complainant
with merit. We are not inclined to declare resort, Cecille even
(sic) strong evidence and an indication of
that there was grave abuse in respondent followed the accused in
great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-
court's exercise of its discretion in going down from the
31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant
allowing accused to obtain bail. There is jeepney also without
case, the reasonable doubt is on the
grave abuse of discretion where the power protest on her part, a
evidence of the prosecution, more so,
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic fact which shows
because the intrinsic nature of the crime,
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or voluntariness on the
the conviction or the acquittal of the
personal hostility amounting to an evasion part of the offended
accused depends almost entirely on the
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to party and, therefore, to
credibility of the complainant (People v.
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in the mind of the court
Oliquino, G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993).
contemplation of law. We do not find this to her claim of rape
Rightly so, because in the commission of
be so in this case. Our ruling is based not should not be received
the offense of rape the facts and
only on the respect to be accorded the with precipitate
circumstances occuring either prior,
findings of facts of the trial court, which credulity. On the
during and subsequent thereto may
had the advantage (not available to Us) of contrary, an insight into
provide conclusion whether they may
having observed first-hand the quality of the human nature is
negate the commission thereof by the
the autoptic preference and the necessary (People v.
accused (People v. Flores, L-6065,
documentary exhibits of the parties, as Barbo, 56 SCRA 495).
October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do
well as the demeanor of the witnesses on And it is only when the
presuppose that the evidence for the
the stand, but is grounded on the liberal testimony is
prosecution is not strong. More so,
slant given by the law in favor of the impeccable and rings
because in the instant case, the facts and
accused. Differently stated, in the true throughout where
circumstances showing that they do seem
absence of clear, potent and compelling it shall be believed
to negate the commission thereof were
reasons, We are not prepared to supplant (People v. Tapao, G.R.
mostly brought out during the cross-
the exercise of the respondent court's No. L-41704, October
examination. As such, they deserve full
discretion with that of Our own. 23, 1981). Rightly so,
faith and credence because the purpose
because the aphorism
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the thereof is to test accuracy and
that evidence to be
instant petition submitting the following sole issue: truthfulness and freedom from interest
believed must not only
and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH proceed from the
Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR mouth of a credible
circumstances brought up are as follow, to
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED witness but it must be
wit:
DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE credible in itself in
PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE a) That, when the conformity with the
PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT FOR THE CRIME offended party Cecille common experience
CHARGED. Buenafe rode in the and observation of

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 39 of 98

mankind is nowhere of was able to any way showing sign
moral relevance than in consummate the of grief regarding the
cases involving alleged offense of rape alleged commission of
prosecution of rape by removing the two (2) the offense of rape until
(People v. Macatangay, hands of the offended the jeepney reached
107 Phil. 188); party, placed them on the house of Roderick
her knee, separating Odiamar where the
b) That, in that resort,
them thereby freeing latter parked it. As in
when the accused
the said hand and other cases, the
Roderick Odiamar and
consequently pushed testimony of the
companions allegedly
the head of the accused offended party shall not
forced the offended
but the latter was able be accepted unless her
party Cecille Buenafe
to insert his penis when sincerity and candor
to drink gin, the latter,
the said offended party are free from suspicion,
at first, refused and
was no longer moving because the nature of
even did not swallow it
and the latter became the offense of rape is an
but later on voluntarily
tired. Neither evidence accusation easy to be
took four (4) shots there
has been presented to made, hard to be
shows that there (was)
show that the offended proved but harder to be
no force. And as
party suffered an injury defended by the party
regards the claim that
much less any part of accused though
the accused Roderick
her pants or blouse was innocent (People v.
Odiamar and
torn nor evidence to Francisco G.R. No. L-
companions allegedly
show that there was an 43789, July 15, 1981). It
forced the said
overpowering and becomes necessary,
offended party to inhale
overbearing moral therefore, for the
smoke, out of a small
influence of the courts to exercise the
cigarette, presumably
accused towards the most painstaking care
a marijuana, it becomes
offended party (People in scrutinizing the
doubtful because the
v. Mabunga, G.R. No. testimony of the
prosecution, however,
96441d, March 13, witnesses for the
failed to present any
1992) more so, prosecution (People v.
portion of that so-called
because force and Dayag, L-30619, March
small cigarette much
violence in the offense 29, 1974);
less did it present an
of rape are relative
expert witness to show e) That the offended
terms, depending on
that inhaling of smoke party, Cecille Buenafe
the age, size and
from the said cigarette had herself physically
strength of the parties
would cause dizziness. examined by Dr.
and their relation to
Rightly so, because Josephine Decena for
each other (People v.
administration of medical certificate
Erogo, 102077 January
narcotics is covered by dated July 27, 1994 and
4, 1994);
Art. 335, par. 2 Revised it states, among others,
Penal Code (People v. d) That, after the that there was a healed
Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. alleged commission of laceration on the
1434 cited in the rape at about 3:00 hymen, her laceration
Revised Penal Code, o'clock in the early might have been
Aquino, Vol.III, pp. morning of July 21, sustained by the said
392). As such, the 1994, the offended offended party, a
burden of proof rests party, Cecille, Stephen month, six (6) months,
with the prosecution Florece and the latter's and even a year, prior
but it failed to do so; companions all to the said examination
boarded the same and that the said
c) That, in that cottage
jeepney going back to laceration might have
where the accused,
the Poblacion of been caused by
Roderick Odiamar
Lagonoy, without the repeated penetration of
allegedly brought the
said offended party, a male sex organ
offended party, Cecille
protesting, crying or in probably showing that
Buenafe, the former

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 40 of 98

 the offended party well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Eight. The reliance by trial court on the
might have Solicitor General pointed out the following circumstances testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that
experienced sexual duly presented in the hearing for bail: the lacerations suffered by Cecille
intercourse. This piece "might have been sustained by the latter a
First. There was no ill motive on the part of
of testimony coming month, six (6) months or even a year prior
Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
from an expert, such to the examination" (Page 12 (e), Order,
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83
finding is binding to March 24, 1995) thus implying that
SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247
court (Rules of Court, respondent could not have committed the
SCRA 637 [1995]).
Moran, op.cit,vol 5, crime is highly misplaced.
1963, ed. pp. 413). Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist
Dr. Decena herself testified that she
who attended to Cecille testified that
f) That the offended cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal
based on her psychiatric examination of
party, Cecille Buenafe laceration" because she cannot indicate
the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic
accompanied by the when an old laceration was inflicted and
signs and symptoms such as unusual fear,
Station Commander of that from the size of the vagina she "could
sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts,
Lagonoy, Camarines not point the exact cause" (Pages 7-10,
psychomotor retardation, poverty of
Sur, proceeded to TSN, December 9, 1994). Nevertheless,
thought content as well as depressive
Naga City and upon the proof of hymenal laceration is not
signs and symptoms. These abnormal
suggestion of Gov. indispensable in indictments for rape as a
psychological manifestations, according
Bulaong, the said broken hymen is not an essential element
to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape
offended party of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257
incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22,
submitted for medical SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes
1994.)
treatment before the against chastity, the medical examination
same physician per Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise of the victim's genitalia is not an
medical certificate by respondent is an implied admission of indispensable element for the successful
dated August 1, 1994 guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]). prosecution of the crime. The examination
but according to the is merely corroborative in nature. (People
said physician the
Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).
weapon and rendered unconscious by
lesions near the
intoxication and inhalation of marijuana Ninth. With respect to the cigarette
umbilicus were due to
smoke. wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified
skin diseases but the
that the wounds could have been '"aused
said offended party Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim"
claim they were made (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail was
(Page 6, TSN, December 9, 1994) which
by the accused after recommended in the information"
confirms Cecile's testimony (quoted in the
the sexual acts. As constitutes "clear and strong evidence of
Order at page 9) that respondent burned
such, there were the guilt of (all) the accused" (Baylon v.
her "right side of the stomach" thrice.
contradictions on Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].
material points, it The above points are well taken and have impressed upon
becomes of doubtful Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re- this Court the merits of the instant petition.
veracity (People v. cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of
Palicte 83 Phil.) and it
deflowering her because she was already Rights provides:
also destroys the
testimony (People v. weak and dizzy due to the effect of the
All persons, except those charged with
Garcia, G.R. No. 13086, smoke and the gin. Her declarations
offenses punishable by reclusion
March 27, 1961). As to remain unrebutted.
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
the fact that the said Seventh. Cecille categorically testified shall before conviction, be bailable by
lesion was made by the that she performed acts manifesting her sufficient sureties, or be released on
accused subsequent to lament, torment and suffering due to the recognizance as may be provided by law.
the commission of the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried The right to bail shall not be impaired even
act, it is immaterial. As and complained about the incident. when the privilege of the writ of habeas
such, it has no Instead of helping her, Florece threatened corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
probative value. to harm her and her family. (Pages 9-13, not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not November 17, 1994). The statements of
In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee
strong. Cecille are positive statements which,
on bail and in accordance with its rule-making powers, 3 the
under existing jurisprudence, are stronger
Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted
The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower than the denials put forth by respondent
the following provision:
court. It opined that aside from failing to include some pieces (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
of evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some 334 [1996]).

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 41 of 98

 Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. 4 (Emphasis suppplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable in itself in conformity with common experience and
by reclusion perpetua to death. 5 As such, bail is observation of mankind."
discreationary and not a matter of right. The grant or denial
of an application for is, therefore, dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower should determine
in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of the
evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial
discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of
its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this
Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual.
whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is In overcoming such presumption, much depends on the
strong. 6 "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection credibility of the complainant.
has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a
well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the conclusion that
the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is
the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished
capitally if the law is administered. 7 "Presumption great"
exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the
inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong,
clear, and convinsing to an unbiased judgment and excludes
all reasonable probability of any other conlusion. 8 Even
though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused,
if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is
great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
refused. 9 (Emphasis and supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather
whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt.
As such, the court is ministerially bound to decide which
circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above. 10
This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to
mention and include some significant factors and
circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong,
clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr.
Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as
well as her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic
signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness,
suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of
thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptom." 11 This particular testimony should have been
considered and included in the summary as it was given by an
expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of compromise
by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which
should have been noted as an offer of a compromise is
generally considered as admissible evidence against the
party making it. 12
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of
evidence and testimonies, this Court has likewise observed
that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal
law. First, the lower court, in its order, intoned the following
doctrine that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed
According to the lower court, the credibility of the
complainant is suspect because she willingly went with
accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly
raped. In the scene of the crime, complainant allegedly
voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise,
never protested nor cried while they on their way to accused-
respondent's house. Because of those findings, the court
doubted the credibility of complainant and stated that the
crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual acts
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-
motive on the part of complainant in filing the rape charge
against accused-respondent. This should have been taken
into consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the
findings of the lower court is more credible:
It must also be stressed that Cecille
testified that she was forced by
respondent to drink gin with the help of his
friends by holding her hair and putting the
glass on her mouth (Pages 5-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994). More, respondent
and his friends blew smoke into her face
forcing her to inhale the intoxicating
smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave
the place, she was forced to sit down by
Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared
that she was threatened by Florece with a
gun (Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).
The requirement of force and intimidation
in the crime of rape are relative and must
be viewed in light of the victim's
perspective and the offender's physical
condition (People v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724
[1995]). Further, physical resistance need
not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim
and the latter submits herself against her
will because of fear for life and personal
safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405
[19951)
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5)
years old at the time of the incident in
question. At her age, it is reasonable to
assume that a shot of gin rendered her
tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin must have
rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and
deprived of will or reason. The resulting
weakness and dizziness which deprived
Cecille of reason, will and freedom must
be viewed in light of her perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of
the crime, and not by any hard and fast
rule because in "rape cases, submission
does not necessarily imply volition."
(Querido, 229 SCRA 745 [1994])
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille
went with the group of accused-respondent, she was of the
impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made
by the trial court that Cecille must have consented to the
sexual act because she acquiesced to go with them in the first
place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if
not non sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a
joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts
later committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the
offense of rape relative terms, depending on the age, size and
strength of the parties and their relation to each other." The
lower court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the
alleged rape was actually a consensual act since the
prosecution was unable to show the complainant suffered
any injury nor show any evidence that her pants or blouse was
torn. Neither was there any evidence that accused-
respondent exerted overpowering and overbearing moral
influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court
invoked the above doctrine, it readily concluded that
complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding
testimonies lending credence to complainant's allegation
that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered
weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana
cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the
prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or
intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her
blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect would
have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted
efforts to corroborate Cecille's claim by presenting the
physician who testified that Cecille suffered hymenal
lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area.
Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to ignore
these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation
that she was to smoke a small cigarette, presumably
marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much
less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of
Page 42 of 98
smoke from the said cigarette would cause the said offended
party to suffer weakness and dizziness." Said ratiocination is
trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as
complainant categorically asserted that what made her weak
and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating
effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke
alone. In any case, complainant could not be expected to
produce that "portion of that so-called small cigarette."
Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on
what is common knowledge - that four shots of gin have a
"weakening and dizzying" effect on the drinker, especially
one as young as the fifteen-year old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law
doctrines is the lower court's misinterpretation of the medical
findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies
which would have shown a very strong likelihood that
complainant could indeed have been raped. The following
pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order
are indications of misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical
certificate issued after complainant's physical examination.
On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended
party is already experienced in sexual intercourse, after the
examining physician had testified that the hymenal
lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or
even a year prior to the examination. Interestingly, the lower
court failed to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she
cannot tell "how old is an hymenal laceration" because she
cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that
from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact
cause."
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower
court with and agrees with petitioner, in accordance with well
established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is
not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen
is not an essential element of the crime. Further, in against
chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia is
not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution
of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in
nature. 13 And contrary to the theory espoused by the lower
court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that one is
experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr.
Decena to the effect the cigarette burns indicated that the
lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin
diseases. Notably, however, the lower court again failed to
mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that the
wounds could have been "caused by cigarette butts as
alleged by the victim" which corroborates Cecille's testimony
that respondent burned her "right side of the stomach"
thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the
lower court abuse its discretion and showed manifest bias in
favor of accused-respondent in determining which
circumstances are to be considered in supporting its
decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following
it must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 17which outlined the duties
granting or denying bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo 14 "is of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
exercised reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very
the application for bail or require him to
nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion.
submit his recommendation;
It is because of its very nature that the law has wisely
provided that its exercise be guided by well-know rules (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for
which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the bail regardless of whether or not the
operation of his own individual views, prevent them from prosecution refuses to present evidence
getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable to show that the guilt of the accused is
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. strong for the purpose of enabling the
Lord Mansfield, of the discretion to be exercised in granting court to exercise its discretion;
or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of
of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be
the accused is strong based on the
governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
vague and; but legal and regular."
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
been irregularly disregarded indicate that they have not been
discharge the accused upon the approval
considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This
of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should
irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication
be denied.
of the two criminal law doctrines cited to support the grant of
the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after
the lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the the hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must
evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by contain a summary of the evidence for prosecutions. 18 A
its non sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported summary is defined as "a comprehensive and usually brief
conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution abstract or digest of a text or statement." 19
evidence and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation,
There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the
of criminal law doctrines.
summary of the evidence in the order is an extension of the
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process
confirming complainant's allegation that accused- wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is
respondent burned the right side of her stomach with formally recognized as having been presented and most
cigarette butts, (2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of
complainant exhibited psychological manifestations which evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in
are "traceable to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount to
offer of compromise, are indications of the strength of the not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing,
evidence of guilt of accused-respondent. for the inference would be that they were not considered at
all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial
Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the
of due process, for due process means not only giving every
conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail" was
contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the
recommended in the information. According to Baylon v.
Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their
Sison, such recommendation constitutes clear and strong
15
evidence of guilt of the accused.
favor. 20 Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is
the for the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as
which circumstances and pieces of evidence are to be contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own
considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As accused is strong based on his discretion. 21 (Emphasis
reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalng, 16 discretion is guided supplied)
by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should
statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may
necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all
promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and
the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper.
justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While
that in crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua when conceding that some prosecution evidence were
evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not matter of right. This enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An
Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 43 of 98
evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a
reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the
prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is not a
summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the
absence of a summary in the order would make said order
defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order
containing an incomplete "summary" would likewise be
defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained
or be a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, 23 said
order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the
order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated
August 1, 1997 and the resolution dated December 22, 1997
in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated
March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void
for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The
court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest
of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and
thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said
case. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof, are challenged by
petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal
by certiorari through a petition which raises issues
centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be
admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly
charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in
Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of
members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in
Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at
the time. The original information, filed on October
6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog
City, 1 had initially indicted for multiple murder eight
accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John
Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged
conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son,
Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused,
Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from
prison. The others have remained at large up to the
present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely")
Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged
as a co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was
his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas
engaged the former's services as counsel in said
case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed
affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he later
retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as
the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of
the Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his
resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of
Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of
the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in
said criminal case in a second amended information
dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his
inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this
Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon,
Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en
banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the
Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set
to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be
served on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on
October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with
the trial court which set the same for hearing on
November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies
of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of
petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they
were submitting custody over the person of their
client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the
trial court that in accordance with the directive of
the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor
Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail and
that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court,
Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note
and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial
court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992,
petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to
travel by then, managed to personally appear
before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted
bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled
court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution
filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by
Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was
denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29,
1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent
Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari.
Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in
the decision now under review, on the ground that they were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at
the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was
not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently
because he filed his motion for admission to bail
before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart from the
circumstance that petitioner was charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact
that no bail was recommended by the prosecution,
for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was
doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution,
according to respondent court, was not afforded an
opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for
bail contrary to the requirements of due process.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling
of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al., 9 his
filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the
trial court effectively conferred on the latter
jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents
Page 44 of 98
and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In
petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused
of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court
is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and bring him within the
custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on
record negates the existence of such strong
evidence as would bar his provisional release on
bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the
waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further
presentation of evidence to oppose the application
for bail and whose representation in court in behalf
of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally
assert any claim to a denial of procedural due
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the
special civil action for certiorari was filed in
respondent court after an unjustifiable length of
time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles
applicable and the equities involved in this case, the
Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as
the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearing before any court as
required under the conditions specified in said Rule.
Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from
the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's provisional
liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody
over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary
surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a case "it
would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice whereby an accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefor. 13 Thus, in Feliciano
vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner
who had been charged with kidnapping with murder
went into hiding without surrendering himself, and
shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to
fix the amount of the bail bond for his release
pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for
admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons
who have either been arrested, detained, or other
wise deprived of their freedom will ever have
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by
the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional
release under the auspices of bail need not even
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed
against him as it is available to "all
persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule
is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation
that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in
the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either
by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under
Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112
of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b)
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the
proper authorities. 17in this light, the ruling, vis-a-
vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et
al., 18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before
the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel
what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was
at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from
serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she
expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-
parte motion and the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan
authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her personal
appearance in view of her physical incapacity and
as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold
departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a
recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In rejecting her
arguments, the Court held that she was clearly
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in
the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier
recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by
actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the
court, she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that
the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded
that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually and physically placed
under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in
the factual ambience therefore, be considered as
being constructively and legally under custody.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the
trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he
should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his
person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to
the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made
either by actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in
case of military offenders, by being "confined to
quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through
his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing
for bail that he could not personally appear as he
was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital for acute costochondritis,
and could not then obtain medical clearance to
leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial
court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of
the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted
a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon
him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest
effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of
the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and
under medication in a hospital bed just over a
kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in
the constructive custody of the law. Apparently,
both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on
that point since they never attempted to have him
physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control
over his person, firstly, by filing the application for
bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt
or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the
law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court,
up to the submission application for bail, and until
the day of the hearing thereof.
Page 45 of 98
 At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his
actual confinement at the hospital on account of an
acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested
as they were easily verifiable. And, as a
manifestation of his good faith and of his actual
recognition of the authority of trial court,
petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that
they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the
motion for admission to bail was filed not for the
purpose or in the manner of the former practice
which the law proscribes for the being derogatory
of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as
what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no
intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in
absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should
the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail,
except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now
provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted
to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be
waived considering its personal nature 21 and which, to
repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of
the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded
every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the
regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon
proper application for admission to bail, the court having
custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant
the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine
the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail
becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory
in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, 24 is required with the participation of
both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, Secondly, although it is now claimed that
the prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's
it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. 27 If the Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose
prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a office received its copy of the motion on the very day
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly
the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court
void. 28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross- that the prosecution was neither supporting nor
examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and opposing the application for bail and that they were
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, submitting the matter to its sound discretion.
the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the Obviously, what this meant was that the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case,
prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not was waiving the presentation of any countervailing
the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain
rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely whether or not that was the real import of the
objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily
thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that answered in the affirmative.
the law requires. 31
The following exchanges bear this out:
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be
PROSECUTOR
a violation of procedural due process when the court below
ERLINDO ABEJO:
allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the I was informed to
prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. appear in this case just
Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government now Your Honor.
prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who
COURT:
received his copy of the motion only on the day after the
hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution Where is your Chief of
now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to Office? Your office
waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition received a copy of the
to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the motion as early as
sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that October 28. There is an
the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to element of urgency
oppose that application for bail. here.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating
counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal I am not aware of that,
Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief Your Honor, I was only
State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through informed just now. The
radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the one assigned here is
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. State Prosecutor
This authorization, which was to be continuing until and Perseverando Arena,
unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and Jr. who unfortunately is
then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of in the hospital
Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca attending to his sick
Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional State son. I do not know
Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo about this but before I
Abejo to enter their appearance as collaborating government came I received an
prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue of instruction from our
this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Chief to relay to this
Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance court the stand of the
as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said office regarding the
case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its motion to admit bail.
receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State That office is neither
Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly supporting nor
represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November opposing it and we are
5, 1992. submitting to the sound
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 46 of 98
discretion of the It is further evident from the foregoing that the As to the contention that the prosecutor was not
Honorable Court. prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State given the opportunity to present its evidence within
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The
COURT:
oppose the motion for bail and this should be so records indicate that the Regional State
Place that notwithstanding the statement that they were Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the
manifestation on "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What application for bail on the very same day that the it
record. For the record, is of significance is the manifestation that the was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992.
Fiscal Abejo, would you prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing
like to formally enter sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more
your appearance in this could not be any clearer. The prosecution was than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it
matter? dispensing with the introduction of evidence en would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in
contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory circumstances, that period was more than
Yes, Your Honor. For hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon
the government, the satisfied itself that such was the position of the received his copy of the application only on
Regional State prosecution. November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already
Prosecutor's Office established, the Office of the Regional State
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it
represented by State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the
was stressed that where the trial court has reasons
Prosecutor Erlindo People.
to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not
Abejo.
opposing the application for bail is not justified, as 4. What finally militates against the cause of the
COURT: when he is evidently committing a gross error or a prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of of time that elapsed before it questioned before the
By that manifestation Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor respondent court the resolution and the omnibus
do you want the Court concerned as the nature of his evidence to order of the trial court through a special civil action
to understand that in determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the
effect, at least, the very recent administrative matter Re: First delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred
prosecution is Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable
dispensing with the de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of due to the attendant difficulties which
presentation of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of characterized the prosecution of the criminal case
evidence to show that Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the against petitioner. But then,
the guilt of the accused Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the
is strong, the denial . . . where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: motion of the accused, the trial court should case had ensued in the court below with the active
nevertheless set the application for hearing and participation of prosecution lawyers, including
I am amenable to that from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule
manifestation, Your whether the latter is really not contesting the bail now in that the special civil action
Honor. application. for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a
COURT: period of the three months, 38 the same to be
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due
reckoned by taking into account the duration of time
Final inquiry. Is the process, could therefore be attributed to the trial
that had expired from the commission of the acts
Prosecution willing to court here as regards its order granting bail to
complained to annul the same. 39
submit the incident petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
covered by this stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of
particular motion for November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November
resolution by this 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992
court? to procedural rules. As summarized in its and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional
aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: means to convince itself of the propriety of the court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
Yes, Your Honor. waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and
Moreover, the omnibus order contained the SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of
COURT: requisite summary of the evidence of both the the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Without presenting any prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
further evidence? through them did the court conclude that petitioner
SO ORDERED.
could be provisionally released on bail.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then
Yes, Your Honor. 34 and up to the present, petitioner has ever
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 47 of 98

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
DECISION
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility
CORONA, J.: of flight on his part.
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody
of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before
any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal
justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with
the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
"dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final
adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty
and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at
trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless,
on application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court
confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.5 Even if the
conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending
judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and
avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other
hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by
swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison
time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail
pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight
from court custody, the protection of the community from
potential danger and the avoidance of delay in
punishment.8 Under what circumstances an accused may
obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance
between the interests of society and those of the accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion
in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the
exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided
by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that
the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for consent of the bondsman.
bail.13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
only for strong reasons." Citing well-established
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing
circumstances:
or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. It found that petitioner (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that his continued confinement during trial will permanently
impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the (b) That he has previously escaped from legal
physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14
(c) That he committed the offense while under
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It
probability of flight if released on bail; or
made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made
a prima facie determination that there was no reason (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
guilt.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.15 party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
supplied)
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty
and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant granted.
pending appeal.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations
The Issue of procedural and substantive rules.
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial
court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail
any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only
where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 48 of 98
abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the
Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by
denying his application for bail on the ground that the
evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One,
pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged
by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse
of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In
other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for
bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its
judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed
to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of
Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its
discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail
pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a
thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for
the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined
whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised
a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise
its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal
rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals
erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of
certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this connection, circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
Lee v. People22 is apropos: circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that
supplied)
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over
the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another
acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
discretion correctible by certiorari.
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without bail becomes a matter of discretion.
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of
be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis
supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words,
first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully
conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in
of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional
fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to
pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
discretion will thereby be committed.
circumstances) not present. The second scenario
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
circumstances. for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
The implications of this distinction are discussed with
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any
erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme
of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial
114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate
law:
court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
an accused may be summarized in the following rules: exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants
case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
xxx xxx xxx
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the
wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may
not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any either allow or disallow bail.
other similar circumstance is present and
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 determination of the proof of the presence of any of the
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 49 of 98
circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice
This is so because the existence of any of those reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its that bail pending appeal be more accessible to those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the grave caution of less serious crimes?
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under
Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of
grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his
Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
use the less stringent sound discretion approach. punishment if his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction
of the particular case, such as the record, character and alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail
between the two different situations that are governed by the
reputation of the applicant,33 among other things. More pending appeal.
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner
importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or
insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under
disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at
of the said provision and trivializes the established policy Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal
the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
governing the grant of bail pending appeal. Procedure:
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments must be determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction
reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that by the Court of First Instance. After judgment by
Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but a municipal judge and before conviction by the
the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be
years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous admitted to bail as of right.
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking
advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the
one restricted to the determination of whether any of
more significantly, this comports with the very strong Court of First Instance. After conviction by the
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon
of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present,
discretionary power was sound,36specially since the rules on application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
pending appeal. criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense,
reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which,
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into
substantial error.37 under the law existing at the time of its commission,
a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five and at the time of the application to be admitted to
determining whether any of the five circumstances
situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule bail, may be punished by death.
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in
filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the custody for the commission of a capital offense shall
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant construction. However, the very language of the third strong.
is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the
interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections
court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were
present. rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in modified in 1988 to read as follows:
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
"choice."28 Choice occurs where, between "two alternatives
or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
"more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners under the law at the time of its commission and at
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
discretion.30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances strong.
body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense which,
is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed under the law existing at the time of its commission,
effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail and at the time of the application to be admitted to
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary." negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases The significance of the above changes was clarified in
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court follows:
imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail
pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 50 of 98

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to 1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his
bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the case indicate the probability of flight if released on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall bail; or
inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency
which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered
custody, shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a of the appeal, the accused may commit another
by this Court;
matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense crime.
or an offense which, under the law at the time of its 2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is Philippine National Police as the accused shall
(n)
strong. remain under confinement pending resolution of his
appeal; SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is
the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by 3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within
law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of
reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall
the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with
matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by
death. (4)
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall
the offense charged is strong. also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect
have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied) person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning Amendments were further introduced in Administrative
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit: Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
about important changes in the said rules as follows:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense (emphasis supplied)
which under the law existing at the time of its SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94
commission and at the time of the application for shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
to read as they do now.
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by The development over time of these rules reveals an
or of a lesser offense than that charged in the death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail
complaint or information, he may be allowed to to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
remain free on his original bail pending the released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court (3a) allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of strong reasons.
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by
the Rules of Court, as amended;
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after
2) When an accused is charged with a capital death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First
offense or an offense which under the law at the application, may admit the accused to bail. Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
time of its commission and at the time of the discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
application for bail is punishable by reclusion bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses
period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a
that charged in the complaint or information, the If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of
same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for
be applied; shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.39
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
3) When an accused is charged with a capital The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No.
the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
offense or an offense which under the law at the 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the
time of its commission and at the time of the (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
application for bail is punishable by reclusion or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-
placed in confinement pending resolution of his
or has violated the conditions of his bail without 94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on
appeal.
valid justification; applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
which are now pending appeal before his Court where the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of
probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended
laid down: Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 51 of 98

entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending
appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions
mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal
such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards
approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity
with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal?
Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
absence of any of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that
authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to
frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted
in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.41While this is of
course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that
our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that
in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards
the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect
to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but
with caution and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even
been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it
is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error
in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is
so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more
likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above
and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of
Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent order. She then directed Salvador Caducoy to transfer her
already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a brought her vehicle to the Toyota Service Center in Davao belongings from another vehicle.9
matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and replacement of parts that
were damaged due to a vehicular mishap.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up,
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
respondent went to Toyota-Davao on June 23, 2001 at around
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson M. Garao, a service advisor,
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
who told her that the vehicle would be released upon payment
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
of deductible franchise. Respondent allegedly refused to pay
by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
insisting that the same will be paid by the insurance company.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of She then asked to speak with the manager, herein
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional complainant, but the latter was in a meeting.
right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject
At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza,
to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
Toyota-Davaos Administration and Marketing Head.
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain to respondent that
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
the payment of the deductible franchise was upon instruction
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
of the insurance company but the latter got angry and raised
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This
her voice while demanding to see the manager.
judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,3 Service
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with Department Manager, who alleged that respondent heatedly
the trial courts initial determination that the accused should disagreed with him and shouted that she was a judge and
be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail insisted on seeing the manager. Upon being told that
despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our complainant was in a meeting, respondent furiously replied
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending that she should be given preferential treatment over said
appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the meeting.4
trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
presentation thereof, she paid the amount stated therein
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
under protest.
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail
too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time- Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal Release of Claim with Subrogation but she again refused. She
justice system and court processes. allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew
better than to sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
blanks but respondent curtly informed him that she will not
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and sign just the same.
decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio
Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car.
Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
On July 4, 2001, she filed a case for Replevin, Damages and
Costs against petitioner. Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Replevin.5
SO ORDERED.
In her Comment,6 respondent denied that she threw her
weight around and abused her judicial authority. She claimed
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005 that upon being informed by Garao about the deductible
franchise, she instructed the latter to communicate with her
MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LILY
insurer. After the lapse of two (2) hours, Garao told her that
LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
he could not contact the insurers office because it was
Kabacan, North Cotabato, Respondent.
closed on Saturdays. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez
DECISION but when no agreement was reached, she suggested that
they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: before she would pay.
On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco She eventually paid7 the deductible franchise under protest.
charged1 respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum2of the She averred that she requested for the execution of a demand
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabacan-Carmen, North letter8 to serve as proof of her claim for refund. Thereafter,
Cotabato with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office Garao brought out the vehicle and gave the key to her driver,
and/or gross ignorance of the law. who inspected the car to make sure that everything is in
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 52 of 98
When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a attorneys fees and litigation expenses imposed against
ran after them and told her that she needed to sign a release premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.20 petitioner for filing an unfounded suit in bad faith.
form.10 She was given a blank Release of Claim with
Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is
Subrogation11 form which she refused to sign. When
justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, commensurate under the circumstances.
Saragoza advised her that the vehicle will not be released,
together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank
she retorted that she will only sign if the form has been This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
form, did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial
properly filled up. The parties were at an impasse when Yez discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same
office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising
angrily said "di fill up-an!", then took back the form and went time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them
her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she
to his office but did not return.12 from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than
would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and
promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court
It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the would have lost the right to claim for refund.
could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation
Toyota-Davao premises. She wrote a letter13 to complainant
We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere
detailing her ordeal. The letter was received by a lady
sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no speculation.28
employee who gave her another demand letter14 stating that
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
in addition to the payment of deductible franchise, she is also WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative
litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good
required to sign a release form which she refused because complaint against respondent Judge Lily Lydia A.
faith.21
some portions were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
car. During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was Court, Midsayap, Cotabato City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for
absent when the event transpired on June 23, 2001,22which lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco is FINED in
On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant
means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of the the amount of P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and
and Joe Linaza (Linaza) from FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance,
incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she unfounded suit.
Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize. 15
claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct
SO ORDERED.
In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals of her own knowledge and belief.23Significantly, she also went
recommended16 the dismissal of the complaint for lack of to respondents office and apologized.
merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He
Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575 January 31, 2005
observed that respondents refusal to pay the deductible
ordinarily sought by the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears
franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be YOLANDA S. REYES, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARVIN B.
that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident that
attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. MANGINO, Municipal Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch
complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an
Had respondent grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or 1, respondent.
alleged "erring" member of the bench. Verily, the delay
Saragoza, they would not have gone to her office, together
militates against the veracity of their allegations. DECISION
with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.
Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices
after Toyota-Davao lost possession of the vehicle in favor of
recommendation with modification that complainant The instant administrative case arose when Yolanda S. Reyes
respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suit
Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this filed a verified Affidavit-Complaint dated January 16, 1998
she filed against them. More specifically, the instant
baseless harassment suit. The OCA opined that charging Judge Marvin B. Mangino with gross ignorance of
complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about eight (8)
complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated the law, extortion, graft and corruption, fraud and deception,
months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured
charges despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time relative to Criminal Case No. 200-97 entitled "People of the
the writ on July 4, 2001. As the Investigating Justice fittingly
and resources not only of respondent but also of the Philippines v. Spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes," for other
observed, "the timing couldnt be worse."24
Investigating Justice and this Court. deceits punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done Code.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.
in good faith. In complainants letter dated January 21,
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden 2002,25 she informed this Court about a similar complaint filed The complainant averred that she was one of the accused in
of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their before the Judicial and Bar Council "for the purpose of the said case. Upon receipt of the criminal complaint and
complaints.17 Administrative proceedings against judges are objecting to (respondents) application for appointment as after the filing of an ex-parte motion for the conduct of
by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabato or preliminary investigation, the respondent Judge issued a
by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of elsewhere". Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for warrant of arrest and a writ of preliminary attachment. No
proof required to support the administrative charges should the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons, preliminary investigation was, however, conducted. This
thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of prompted the complainant to post a cash bond, to file an ex-
reasonable doubt.18 degrading respondents reputation and exposing her to parte motion for the lifting of the preliminary attachment and
public ridicule. This should not be countenanced. to request the court to conduct a preliminary investigation.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained The respondent Judge merely directed the private
of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence In Retuya v. Gorduiz,26 this Court penalized respondent- prosecutor to oppose or comment on the motion, instead of
but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and lawyer for filing a groundless suit against a former client in setting the case for preliminary investigation as required
corruption.19 On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful order to harass and embarrass her by suspending him from under Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
conduct on the part of a person concerned in the the practice of law for six (6) months. complainant also alleged that the respondent Judge
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or convinced her and her husband not to pursue the issue of the
In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,27 we
to the right determination of the cause. It generally means absence of preliminary investigation and the lack of
affirmed the award of moral damages, exemplary damages,
jurisdiction of the court, on the assurance that he would

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 53 of 98

dismiss the case after their arraignment; double jeopardy
would then set in, to their advantage.
The complainant further narrated that at 11:00 a.m. of
September 18, 1997, the respondent and two unidentified
companions went to their residence in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Only their secretary, Chona Guzman, happened to be there.
She entertained and gave the visitors some snacks. Chona
Guzman contacted her through radio. The complainant was
apparently in Manila attending a conference at the
Department of Public Works and Highways, and Ms. Guzman
informed her that the respondent Judge and his two
companions were waiting for her. The respondent then spoke
to the complainant and told her that he wanted to see her
regarding the case, and suggested that they meet at the
lobby of the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. The complainant
acquiesced, and immediately contacted her lawyer, Atty.
Wilfredo Garcia at his office in Intramuros, Manila, to inform
him of the impending meeting with the respondent Judge. The
complainant narrated the succeeding events that transpired
as follows:
19. That at the scheduled place and time, I came
together with my counsel Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia. I
also instructed my Liaison Officer Nida Diokno to
proceed at the said place to bring some money for
expenses. At the Manila Hotel lobby, we met Judge
Marvin Mangino, who came ahead of us and seated
at the sofa with an unidentified male companion. He
again assured us of his commitment to dismiss the
case in our favor and this will happen immediately
after the prosecution had rested their case. He
further advised my counsel to file immediately a
Demurrer to Evidence which will be his legal basis
for dismissing the case. He further told us that in
order not to detect his biases in our favor, he
proposed that the Demurrer to Evidence will be
dismissed first, and after that he advised us not to
present our evidence or defense anymore and let
the case be submitted for early decision on the basis
of demurrer to evidence on file.
20. That with Judge Marvin Manginos personal
commitment and assurances done in the presence
of my counsel, my Liaison Officer Nida Diokno, who
all saw and heard Judge Marvin Mangino of his
promises and assurances, Judge Mangino
whispered to me for a "little representation" that he
needs, considering that he is on an official business
for three (3) days to attend the conference of judges
at Subic and he just beg (sic) off that day so that he
could see and talk to me personally about our case.
21. That I agreed to give him that "little
representation" in the amount of P20,000.00, which
I placed inside a white envelope in P1,000.00 peso
bill denomination. This matter of giving money
happened at around 3:00 p.m. after we had taken
our snacks at the coffee shop of the Manila Hotel, as
witnessed by our counsel and Ms. Diokno.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
22. Thereafter, the prosecution finished the 27. That again on November 24, 1997, Judge Marvin
presentation of their evidence and rested their Mangino called up and relayed to us not to appear
case. My counsel, Atty. Garcia, then submitted his anymore, as he would be waiting for an additional
Demurrer to Evidence which, after submission, sum of money in the amount of P40,000.00 in cash,
Judge Marvin Mangino ordered the denial of the as part of the "goodwill money" for the favor that he
same on the ground of prohibited pleadings or would be giving to us.
motions. Such order of the court is actually
28. That on November 27, 1997, heeding the advice
erroneous, because the rules on summary
of Judge Marvin Mangino to bring the P40,000.00
procedure do not include Demurrer to Evidence as
cash, I sent the same through Mr. Ruel de Castro,
one of those prohibitive pleadings. Such order by
my counsels liaison officer, who delivered the
Judge Marvin Mangino will show his gross
money at Judge Marvin Manginos chamber office.
ignorance of the law. Copy of the said Order dated
Upon receipt of the money, he promised Mr. de
October 20, 1997 is hereto attached as Annex "L"
Castro that he would just send the copy of the
and copy of the Demurrer to Evidence as Annexes
decision through mail, as it is no longer practical
"M," "M-1" to "M-5."
that he should promulgate the decision in open
23. That relying in good faith on Judge Marvin court. The matter of giving the P40,000.00 is
Manginos assurances and promises that he would contained in the affidavit of Mr. Ruel de Castro, copy
eventually dismiss the case on the arguments of which is hereto attached as Annexes "R" to "R-1."
raised at the Demurrer to Evidence, and this was
29. That having received the amount of P40,000.00
coupled by the fact that Judge Marvin Mangino even
plus the P20,000.00 initially requested when he
called me at our residence in Bulacan to convey his
visited our residence in Norzagaray, Bulacan, my
assurances of the dismissal of the case. He even
husband and I waited for the promulgation of
suggested not to appear anymore and just file the
judgment through mail as promised by Judge
manifestation of not presenting anymore our
Marvin Mangino.
defense evidence pursuant to the proposed
strategy he laid out. Then my counsel submitted the 30. That on December 23, 1997, surprise of all
said Manifestation dated October 29, 1997. Copy of surprises, I received a copy of the Decision through
the said Manifestation is hereto attached as Annex mail, stating that my husband and I were found
"N." guilty of the crime of Other Deceits and liable to pay
the civil liability of P7,969,033.62. These were
24. That on October 29, 1997, the court issued an
totally contrary to the promises and sweet words of
order noting the absence of the accused and the
Judge Marvin Mangino who has deceived, tricked
manifestation filed by our counsel of not filing any
and fooled us to get our trust and money with the
defense evidence other than the Demurrer to
total amount of P60,000.00.
Evidence, Motion to Dismiss and our respective
Counter-Affidavits as our defense evidences. Copy The complainant averred that the promulgation of judgment
of the said Court Order is hereto attached as Annex in the said case was a direct violation of Section 6, Rule 120
"O." of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires the
promulgation of judgment to be read in the presence of the
25. That prior to that, there is an earlier order of the
accused. Moreover, the order of conviction was bereft of
court dated October 27, 1997, stating that both
truth, factual and legal basis, and was issued in violation of
accused and counsel failed to appear. Whereupon,
their right to due process.
the prosecution moved that this case be deemed
submitted for decision based on the evidence The respondent Judge denied the complainants allegations
obtained. Which order will show that we were made in his Comment1 dated April 16, 1998. Contrary to the
to believe that Judge Marvin Mangino is following to allegations of the complainant, due process of law was
the letter his proposal that we dont have to appear applied in the instant case. The respondent explained that
and have the case submitted for decision without there was a valid criminal complaint and preliminary
any presentation of defense evidence. Copy of said examination considering that there was an application for a
Order is hereto attached as Annex "P." writ of attachment, a supersedeas bond for the said writ, as
well as for the accused. There was, likewise, an arraignment,
26. That on November 12, 1997, a Notice of
a pre-trial conference, and, thereafter, trial on the merits,
Promulgation of Judgment was sent by Judge
where the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the
Marvin Mangino to my counsel Atty. Garcia and
witnesses for the prosecution. While hearing was set for the
Private Prosecutor Atty. Teddy Macapagal, setting
accused-complainant to present her evidence, she failed to
the promulgation on November 24, 1997 at 1:30 p.m.
do so.
Copy of the said notice is hereto attached as Annex
"Q." The respondent Judge, however, admitted that on the
promulgation date of the decision, only the prosecutor, the
Page 54 of 98
complainant, the private prosecutor and the counsel for the
accused appeared, and agreed among themselves that they
would just receive copies of the decision. The respondent
stressed that the accused filed an appeal, which was given
due course, and the records, thereafter, forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac for review.
The respondent insisted that he only had the opportunity to
talk with the parties and their respective counsels at the
scheduled pre-trial conference. He claimed that the
complainants allegations were false, considering that even
the latters counsel would know that the practice of making
"assurances" to a party is a breach of professional ethics and
worse, a contemptuous one.2
The administrative matter was referred to Executive Judge
Arsenio P. Adriano, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, for
investigation, report and recommendation.3
The Executive Judge, thereafter, submitted a Report dated
February 14, 2001 and made the following findings:
With respect to the charge of gross ignorance, the judgment
of conviction by Judge Mangino was appealed to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 63, presided by the undersigned. The
undersigned rendered a decision acquitting the spouses
Felix and Yolanda Reyes. A copy of the decision is attached
with the records (Pages 122 to 125). This decision therefore
contains the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
undersigned which need not be repeated herein.
With respect to the charge of extortion, graft and corruption,
complainant Yolanda Reyes alleged that Judge Marvin
Mangino received from her P60,000.00 in consideration of a
favorable decision or acquittal.
Judge Mangino went to her house at Norzagaray, Bulacan on
September 18, 1997 but since she was in Manila, they agreed
to meet at the Manila Hotel, at 2:00 p.m. of the same day.
Judge Mangino received the P20,000.00 while at the Manila
Hotel.
Judge Mangino also received the sum of P40,000.00 from
Ruel de Castro, the liaison officer of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia,
then the lawyer of complainant.
To disprove the charge, Judge Mangino alleged that he could
not be at the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. of September 18, 1997
because he solemnized two marriages at 10:00 a.m. of that
day. He could not have reached Manila Hotel by 2:00 p.m.
since he has to travel from Tarlac City to Manila after the
solemnization of the marriages. The marriage contracts were
submitted as pages 65 and 66 of the records.
The undersigned set the hearing on February 5 and 12, 2001
but only respondent appeared. The complainant did not
appear although her lawyer, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia received
the notice personally on January 18, 2001, as shown by his
signature on the face of the notice.
The undersigned also wrote letters to the contracting parties
appearing in the marriage contracts namely:
1.-Ricky Quinto No transcript of the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David
and Vicente Lagadi, Jr. was taken because they were
Dulce David
hesitant to talk. Only after the undersigned assured them that
San Manuel, Tarlac City whatever they will tell will be treated with utmost
confidentiality that they started to talk.4
2.-Vicente Lagadi, Jr.
The Executive Judge then recommended that the respondent
Balete, Tarlac City
Judge be dismissed from the service.
It is the intention of the undersigned to verify from them as to
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2001, the Court resolved to
whether or not their marriages were solemnized by the
refer the said report to the Office of the Court Administrator
respondent Judge on September 18, 1997.
(OCA) for recommendation. The OCA, through Deputy Court
Since they have not appeared before the undersigned as of Administrator Jose P. Perez, opined that considering the
February 12, 2001, the undersigned personally went to see gravity of the offense charged, the Executive Judge should
them at their residences. have exerted earnest efforts to compel the attendance of the
complainant and the witnesses during the scheduled
The undersigned learned startling revelations. Spouses hearings.5 Pursuant to his recommendation, the case was
Ricky Quinto and Dulce David affirmed before the referred back to Executive Judge Adriano for a more
undersigned that they were married on September 4, thorough investigation.6
1997 solemnized by the respondent Judge and not on
September 18, 1997. They were positive that it was not on In his Report filed with the OCA on September 10, 2001, the
September 18, 1997 but on September 4, 1997 that was why Executive Judge made the following findings:
they were wondering why when they received the copy of the
The undersigned set the investigation to August 20 and 27,
marriage contract, which was given to them sometime after
2001 both at 10:00 a.m., so that notice was sent to Mrs.
September 4, 1997. Dulce David even invited the attention of
Yolanda Reyes, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia and Judge Marvin
her co-teachers on the error.1awphi1.nt She thought it was
Mangino. On August 20, 2001, only Judge Mangino appeared.
a mere typographical error.
He stated that since he already submitted a counter-affidavit,
Vicente Lagadi, Jr. and his mother Carmen Gabriel told the he has nothing more to add to it. At the expense of the
undersigned that the date of the marriage of Vicente Jr. and undersigned, the process server of the Court was requested
Eliza Bustamante is August 27, 1997 because this is the to serve the notice to the complainant. It was revealed that
birthday of Eliza Bustamante. It is not September 18, 1997 as the complainant did not receive the previous notices sent to
stated in the marriage contract. Vicente Jr. noticed the error her because the municipal officials of Norzagaray, Bulacan
because they received a copy of the marriage contract are her political opponents.1awphi1.nt
sometime after the marriage. He also thought that it was a
The undersigned sent another notice to Judge Mangino
mere typographical error. Vicente Jr. also showed me the
because of the assurance of Mrs. Reyes that she will attend
birth certificate of his daughter and the date of his marriage
the setting of August 27, 2001. Judge Mangino did not appear
with Eliza Bustamante as appearing therein is August 27,
on said date. Only Mrs. Yolanda Reyes and Atty. Wilfredo
1997.
Garcia appeared. The undersigned conducted clarificatory
The undersigned already received derogatory informations questioning on said date and the transcript of stenographic
about Judge Mangino. It is known that he solemnizes notes is attached herewith.
marriages even before the licenses are issued. Probably in
FINDINGS:
this case, he placed the date of the marriages as September
18, 1997 because that was the time he went to Manila and In view of the previous report submitted by the undersigned
received the P20,000.00 from the complainant. He did this to dated February 14, 2001, and the detailed findings of the
provide him with a ready alibi because he expected to be sued Honorable Court Administrator dated May 11, 2001, in his
by complainant as he never really intended to acquit her. Memorandum addressed to Hon. Jose A.R. Melo, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, there is nothing more that the
With these informations gathered personally by the
undersigned could add.
undersigned, it is not therefore true that Judge Mangino
solemnized two marriages on September 18, 1997 because The undersigned is now more convinced that the respondent
he went to Manila to meet the complainant and to receive Judge Mangino, indeed, demanded and received money from
the P20,000.00. the complainant. Mrs. Yolanda Reyes has no reason to
proceed with this administrative case considering that she
Further, the presence of Judge Mangino at the Manila Hotel
was already acquitted of the charge before the respondent
on September 18, 1997 was affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Garcia
judge (Decision, pages 122 to 125 of the Records). She was
and one who is a lawyer will not easily attest to it if it is not
only motivated by the truth of her charge. In the same
true. The law office of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia is near the Manila
manner, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia, has no sinister motive to
Hotel and he came there upon the request of complainant.
testify for the complainant, being a brother in the law
profession. His testimony that he was at the Manila Hotel on
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 55 of 98
September 18, 1997 and he saw the respondent Judge present a panoply of evidence in support of such an be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not
received the money from the complainant is worthy of belief. accusation.11 Inasmuch as what is imputed against the every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is
The undersigned complied with the instruction of Honorable
proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to
Deputy Court Administrator Jose Perez that the investigation
of proof required should be more than substantial.12 do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
be private and confidential. To repeat, the undersigned did
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
not reduce the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David. Said In this case, the complainant could have easily gathered
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
spouses were assured of the confidentiality of the enough extrinsic evidence, such as testimonies of waiters,
refuge.19
investigation. The other party whose marriage was restaurant employees, or other disinterested witnesses, to
solemnized allegedly by Judge Mangino on September 18, prove the alleged meeting with the respondent Judge. She Hence, the respondent cannot be held administratively liable
1997, Mr. Vicente Lagadi, Jr. also was reluctant to narrate the did not even present a receipt of the expenses she incurred on that ground.
truth that the date of his marriage was August 27, 1997 and when she and the respondent judge took "snacks" at the
However, the Court finds that the respondent Judge is liable
not September 18, 1997. coffee shop near the lobby of the Manila Hotel to at least
for gross ignorance of the law in not requiring the presence
prove that she had been there on September 18, 1997.
Also, Mrs. Reyes said something that respondent Judge of the accused during the promulgation of the decision in
Moreover, if the respondent had, indeed, made corrupt
attended on that date, September 18, 1997. It could be the Criminal Case No. 200-97, as admitted by him in his Comment
overtures and blatantly demanded money from the
conference for Municipal Trial Court Judges but the on the complaint.
complainant, good sense would dictate that the matter be
undersigned has no way of verifying this. Probably, the Court
immediately reported to the authorities to set up entrapment There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated
Administrator has a record of that conference and the names
operations against the culprit.13 The Court further notes that even without the personal presence of the accused: (1) when
of the Judges who attended the said conference. This will
the complainant even failed to present her liaison officer Nida the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the counsel
corroborate the claim of the complainant that Judge Mangino
Diokno, her secretary Chona Guzman, or her counsels for the accused or a representative may stand for him; and (2)
was in Manila on said date and he even attended the
liaison officer Ruel de Castro to testify as to the particulars of in cases where despite due notice to the accused or his
conference for MTC judges elsewhere.
the alleged extortion incident. bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to
The Executive Judge reiterated his previous appear at the promulgation of the decision. The evident
As a member of the bar, the complainants counsel should
recommendation that the respondent be dismissed from the purpose of this latter exception is to afford the offended party
know that even in administrative cases, the Rules of Court
service. the opportunity to enforce the award of civil indemnity which
requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave
could not otherwise be effected if the decision cannot be
We do not agree. It is settled that in administrative misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him
pronounced on account of the absence of the
proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The
accused.20 Criminal Case No. 200-97 does not fall under any
committed the acts complained of rests on the judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less.
of the exceptions, since the accused therein were charged
complainant.7 Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr .,8 a case involving a Before any of its members could be faulted, competent
and convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the
lawyer accused of blackmail and extortion who was evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in
Revised Penal Code, which is a less grave felony, the
exonerated of the charges against him for lack of evidence, is character.14 Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial
imposable penalty being arresto mayor.
instructive on this point. The Court ruled therein that it is officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such
enough for the respondent to deny complicity in the alleged is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is It bears stressing the importance of the promulgation of
blackmail or extortion, without more, for he is not under misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or decisions in criminal cases, considering that a judgment or
obligation to prove his negative averment, much less incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of sentence does not become a judgment or sentence in law
disprove what has not been proven by the complainant. Thus, evidence in criminal trials apply.15 until the same has been read or announced to the defendant
if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his or has become part of the record of the
Anent the conviction of the complainant and her husband in
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the court.21 Parenthetically, when there is no valid promulgation
Criminal Case No. 200-97, the rule is that only judicial errors
facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under of judgment, no right to appeal accrues.22
tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
no obligation to prove his exception or defense.9 Expounding
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is
further, the Court stressed
sanctioned.16 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity,
It is all too obvious from the foregoing that there is a dearth of office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or and independence" to maintain public confidence in the legal
evidence which would in any way prove the commission of interpret the law in the process of administering justice can system. He should so behave at all times as to promote
blackmail and extortion, much less incriminate respondent be infallible in his judgment.17As we held in Balsamo v. confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
for those offenses. Even the baseless postulations in the Suan :18l^vvphi1.net judiciary.23 When questionable orders are issued by a
affidavits would certainly not carry the day for complainants magistrate of law, casting doubt as to his integrity and
[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty
in view of their lack of evidentiary value. It is not difficult to impartiality, the erring judge must be sanctioned therefor,
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
manufacture charges in the affidavits; hence, it is imperative keeping in mind that the irresponsible or improper conduct of
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
that their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary, and, as
erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal
of thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that such, must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how
unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to thereof,24 in accordance with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case,
affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must Conduct.
the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
be excluded from the proceedings for being inadmissible and
administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, respondent
hearsay, as in this case. 10
error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court Judge Marvin B. Mangino is FINED in the amount of Ten
Indeed, considering that an accusation of bribery is easy to has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and is STERNLY WARNED that
concoct and difficult to disprove, the complainant must indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 56 of 98

a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more a condition. In the absence of neither modifying the decision actually preceded the perfection of
severely. aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, complainant's appeal of the judgment of conviction.
the penalty should be imposed in its
SO ORDERED. Under the Revised Rules of Court, Section 7 of Rule 120, the
medium period, i.e., 1 month and 1 day to
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the
6 months, and the medium period is 2
court rendering it before the judgment has become final or
months and 1 day to 4 months.
A.M. No. 2124-MJ September 11, 1980 appeal has been perfected. Under Section 3, Rule 122, the
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of appeal is perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal and
CARLOS LOPEZ, complainant, vs. HON. AUGUSTO H.
the decision is hereby modified as follows: serving a copy thereof on the adverse party or his attorney.
FERNANDEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the It is a well-settled rule that upon perfection of the appeal in
prosecution evidence measures up to the conformity with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 122, the
DE CASTRO; J.:
test of moral certainty for the conviction of trial court loses jurisdiction over the case.This Court, in the
Administrative complaint against municipal Judge Augusto the accused of the offense charged. He is case 6 of Director of Prisons, et al. vs. Judge Teodoro, et
H. Fernandez of Digos, Davao del Sur, charing him with sentenced to 2 months and 1 day of al., L-9043, July 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 391, had ruled that "as a
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P50, and the matter of principle, when an appeal has been perfected from
law" for having modified the judgment of conviction he costs. (Emphasis supplied) a judgment in a criminal case, the court from which the
rendered in a criminal case entitled, "People vs. Carlos appeal is made loses jurisdiction over the case, and this
It appears from the records that on January 22, 1979, the
Lopez," by increasing the penalty from imprisonment of 1 means both the record and the person of the accused-
same day the questioned order of modification of judgment
month and 21 days to 2 months and 1 day of arresto appellant.
was issued, the complainant herein filed a notice of appeal
mayor allegedly after the accused has perfect this appeal informing the court that "he is appealing to the Court of Evidently, there was no clear showing that the fixing of the
from the judgment of conviction.,
Appeals, Manila, from the decision rendered in the above- notice of appeal with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del
It appears that a criminal action for grave threats 1 under entitled case on January 8, 1979 convicting him of the crime Sur preceded in fact the hearing of the motion for
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against Carlos charged." The accused-complainant received the questioned reconsideration and the subsequent order modifying the
Lopez, the complainant herein, in the Municipal Court of order amending the decision on January 25, 1979. 4 judgment of conviction of the accused Carlos Lopez.
Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3418. Assuming arguendo that the filing of the notice of appeal
On February 22, 1979, Carlos Lopez filed the instant
actually preceded the order of modification of judgment of
After trial, respondent judge Augusto H. Fernandez rendered administrative complaint charging respondent with "grave conviction, the evidence on record does not show that there
a decision 2 dated January 8, 1979 convicting the accused abuse of discretion amounting to ignorance of the law" upon was service of the notice of appeal upon the adverse party or
Carlos Lopez of the offense charged, the dispositive portion the alleged modification of judgment increasing the penalty his attorney as specifically required under Rule 122, Section
of which treads as follows: after an appeal thereof was perfected, and praying that "the
3 of the Revised Rules of Court for perfection of an appeal,
respondent be removed from office." In his administrative
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the complaint, he alleged the following, to wit: nor was there publication of notice of appeal under Section 4
prosecution evidence measures up to the of Rule 122 if personal service cannot be made, nor a waiver
test of moral certainty for the conviction of xxx xxx xxx of the notice by the appellee under Section 5 of Rule 122.
the accused of the offense charged. He is Accordingly, this Court will not give due course to this
1. That he modified a judgment rendered
sentenced to 1 month and 21 days administrative complaint and subject the respondent judge to
by him in Criminal Case No. 3418 of his
of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P50. 00 removal from office when the act complained of was not
Court entitled 'People vs. Carlos Lopez, for
and the costs. established by reliable evidence to show that there was a
Grave Threats,' increasing the penalty
A motion for reconsideration dated January 17, 1979 was after the accused had perfected his total disregard of the rule, done whimsically, capriciously and
filed by private prosecutor Hermenegildo Cabreros praying appeal considering that the appeal was maliciously. As this Court succinctly pointed out in the case
for damages in the sum of P2,300.00 by way of attorney's fees duly filed on the same day but before the of Ludovico Ajeno vs. Hon. Inserto: 7
since no civil damages had been awarded, and alleging that motion for reconsideration was heard and
For serious misconduct to exist, there
in accordance with Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the submitted which prompted the
must be reliable evidence showing that the
penalty imposable upon the accused is arresto mayor in its modification in gross disregard of the rule
judicial acts complained of were corrupt
medium period, or 2 months and 1 day to 4 months, that he has lost jurisdiction over the case
or inspired by an intention to violate the
considering that there is neither mitigating nor aggravating perfection of the appeal.
law, or were in persistent disregard of
circumstance. Hearing was had on said motion for well-known legal rules. To hold therefore
In his comment to the charge or complaint, respondent judge
reconsideration on January 22, 1979, and subsequent liable the respondent judge
did not dispute the fact that he issued the order modifying the
thereto, respondent judge issued the questioned administratively for ignorance of the law,
decision on the same day the notice of appeal was filed by
order 3 dated January 22, 1979 modifying the decision dated there must be reliable evidence to show
complainant on January 22, 1979. However, he held the view
January 8, 1979 increasing the penalty to 2 months and 1 day that the judicial acts complained of was ill-
that complainant's appeal was perfected only on January 29,
of arresto mayor (increase of 10 days), but he denied the motivated, corrupt or inspired by an
1979 alleging "that it is the court that determines the date of
award of damages. Pertinent portion of the order reads: intention to violate the law or were in
the perfection of the appeal and not the accused-
The penalty imposable under paragraph 2, complainant. 5 persistent disregard of well-known rules.
Article 282, Revised Penal Code, is arresto None of these have been presented in this
The essential issue involved herein is a question of fact:
mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 if the Whether or not the issuance of the respondent's order case.
threat shall not have been made subject to

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 57 of 98

In the opinion 8 of the then Justice, subsequently Chief, the judicial branch, that judges should be conversant with the Investigation (NBI) on February 25, 19981 requesting for an
Justice, Makalintal, now retired, he pointed out with salutary law including its latest amendments which they are to apply investigation on the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft Law
emphasis, thus: to a given case. The judiciary needs judges who read, study and other illegal activities committed by respondent judge in
and ponder-judges who personify learning and equanimity. In the province of Quirino. On June 1, 1998, through an
To hold a judge administratively
the case at bar, respondent judge has been in the service of Indorsement Letter from the Office of the Court Administrator
accountable for every erroneous ruling or
the judiciary for 23 years and has opted to retire upon (OCA), the matter was referred to the NBI for discreet
decision he renders, assuming that he has
reaching his 65 years on December 3, 1979. 14 investigation. The NBI submitted its Investigation Report on
erred, would be nothing short of
July 27, 1999 to the OCA for information and disposition.2
harassment and would make his position Considering the respondent's 23 years of service in the
unbearable. judiciary, his judicial mind should have been tempered with The report stated that respondent judge usually asked for
the delicate intricacies of the law and procedure. There is money or parcels of land in exchange for favorable decision.
At most, the error of the respondent judge herein would
hardly any excuse for him to disregard the basic rule that There were incidents when respondent judge would carry his
partake of the nature of erroneous judgment correctible by
"appeal in criminal cases is deemed perfected upon filing a .45 caliber pistol while inside the courtroom, tucked in his
the remedies afforded by the Revised Rules of Court not
notice of appeal in court and by serving a copy thereof upon waist, for the purpose of intimidating others. According to the
through an administrative complaint.
the adverse party or his attorney", which is an express NBI, respondent judge was guilty of serious misconduct as a
Numerous administrative charges against erring judges have provision of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court clearly judge and committed the following acts:
come to this Court and We viewed them with utmost care, adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be well-
1) Extorting money from a party litigant who has a case before
because proceedings of this character, according to In re informed of the law and rulings affecting his
his court;
Horrileno 9 as set forth in the opinion of Justice Malcolm, are jurisdiction. 15 This, in the aforecited case of Ludovico Ajeno
in their nature highly penal in character and are to be vs. Hon. Inserto, 16 the Supreme Court said: 2) Using intemperate language unbecoming of a judge;
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The
xxx xxx xxx 3) Failure to pay debt;
charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. This 1922 decision has been subsequently adhered to Even in the remaining years of his stay in 4) Oppression or unwarranted display of authority;
in a number of cases decided by this Court. 10 the judiciary he should keep abreast with
5) Acting as counsel for all the parties with opposing interest
the changes in the law and with the latest
Undoubtedly, in the light of the evidence submitted to this on a parcel of land in pursuance of his personal self-interest.
decision and precedents. Although a
Court by the complainant, the charges of "grave abuse of
judge is nearing retirement he should not The NBI recommended disbarment and the filing of
discretion amounting to ignorance of the law" against the
relax in his study of the law and court administrative charges for serious misconduct and
respondent were not sufficiently substantiated by the
decision. Service in the judiciary means a inefficiency.
complainant who has the burden of proof in administrative
continuous study and research on the law
proceedings. The proofs presented were not sufficiently
11
The second case stems from the letter-complaint filed by
from beginning to end. In this respect
convincing to compel this Court to exercise its disciplinary Onofre G. Dulay with the OCA dated July 11, 1998.3Onofres
respondent judge has filed.
powers over the respondent judge mandated under Article X, charges against respondent judge can be summed up as
Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 12
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respondent judge is follows:
hereby reprimanded for ignorance of the law. Let a copy of
Where charges of grave abuse of discretion amounting to 1) Respondent judge arbitrarily cited him, his mother Victoria
this resolution be entered on the record of respondent judge
ignorance of the law were not substantiated, this Court, Gacote Dulay, and his aunt, Marita G. Rosal, for indirect
Augusto H. Fernandez.
nevertheless, would not give an imprimatur without warning, contempt in a civil case no longer pending in respondent
in view of the insistence of the respondent judge that he SO ORDERED. judges sala;
retained jurisdiction to modify the judgment even after
complainant the notice of appeal when in his comment 13 to 2) Corollary to the first charge, Onofres mother and aunt
the complaint he stated as follows: were each meted fines of P15,000.00 and imprisonment of 3
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516. July 14, 2005
months while Onofre was meted a fine of P30,000.00 and
V. Upon the perfection of the appeal on 29 ONOFRE G. DULAY and MGA UMAASANG MAMAMAYAN NG imprisonment of 6 months;
January 1979, the Court ordered the QUIRINO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ELIAS O. LELINA, JR.,
elevation of the records to the appellate 3) In Criminal Case No. 1395 filed against Onofre for Grave
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Cabarroguis,
court, Annex 6. It is the Court that Threats, respondent judge arbitrarily increased his bail from
Quirino, Respondents.
determines the date of the perfection of P50,000.00 to P200,000.00 and immediately issued a warrant
DECISION for his arrest;
the appeal and not the accused-
complainant. So that the charge of grave YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: 4) Respondent judge showed bias in resolving the matters
"abuse of discretion amounting to submitted to him in Civil Case No. 445;
ignorance of the law is without foundation Respondent Elias O. Lelina, Jr., presiding judge of the
and justification on the modified decision Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, 5) Respondent judge ordered Onofre to give him 160 square
was promulgated before the appeal was stands administratively charged for gross misconduct in two meters of a home lot in Cabarroguis, Quirino which
perfected." (Emphasis supplied) separate administrative complaints filed by the Mga respondent directed to be registered in the name of one
Umaasang Mamamayan ng Quirino, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI Agnes Mariano; and
The statement of the respondent judge is a clear indication of No. 99-860-RTJ, and Onofre G. Dulay, docketed as A.M. OCA
ignorance of a basic rule enunciated in the Revised Rules of IPI No. 99-588-RTJ. 6) Respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed in court by
Court which at least deserves a reprimand. It is imperative, to Onofres opponents in behalf of the latters counsel, Atty.
gain high respect towards and confidence in the members of An anonymous letter was sent by the Mga Umaasang Beltejar.
Mamamayan ng Quirino to the National Bureau of

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 58 of 98

In his comment4 dated February 12, 1999, respondent judge
denied the allegations and insisted that Onofre initiated the
complaint in retaliation for an unfavorable judgment
removing him as administrator of the estate of former
Governor Dulay. Respondent judges comment on each
accusation are as follows:
1) The subject civil case was transferred to his sala through
the directive of the Presiding Judge without any objections
from Onofres party.
2) Onofre, his mother and aunt were cited for contempt and
fined accordingly for their refusal to receive the processes
from the court and to answer the contempt charge filed
against them.
3) The bail set was reasonable considering that the charge
was for Grave Threats to Kidnap and Kill, which under the Bail
Bond Guide of 1997 is a non-bailable offense. Nonetheless,
respondent judge wanted to be fair and followed the
recommendation of the Provincial Prosecutor for the amount
of the bail.
4) Respondent judge proceeded with Civil Case No. 445 in
accordance with law.
5) The home lot being referred to does not even belong to the
late Governor Dulay or to his son Onofre. Likewise, neither is
respondent judge the registered owner of said lot.
6) Atty. Beltejar is a seasoned lawyer with a reputable
practice throughout the country. It is in fact Onofre who has
attempted to offer him money for a favorable judgment in his
case.
In a resolution dated December 15, 1999, the cases were
docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516 and were referred to then
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. for
report and recommendation. Investigative proceedings were
conducted. However, upon the appointment of Justice
Callejo, Sr. to the Supreme Court, the case was re-assigned
to Court of Appeals Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. per
resolution of this Court dated November 13, 2002.5
On the complaint filed by Mga Umaasang Mamamayan ng
Quirino, Justice Vasquez reported that the alleged
complainants never came forward nor did they execute any
affidavit or sworn statement to substantiate their claims. The
only evidence submitted to support the complaint was the
uncorroborated sworn statement of Editha Dumlao, who was
not presented as a witness during the investigation, and the
report of the NBI, which was based on second-hand
information. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the
complaint.
Anent the complaint filed by Onofre Dulay, Justice Vasquez
reported that Onofres statement of facts were not accurate;
that Onofre failed to prove that he was ordered to give 160
square meters of home lot to respondent judge. On the
contrary, evidence shows that Agnes Mariano is the
registered owner of the lot after Onofre gave her the property
as payment for his debts. Neither was Onofre able to prove
that respondent judge prepared the pleadings filed by his facts by Onofre, sufficient evidence however exists which
opponents. shows that respondent judge was guilty of gross misconduct.
However, the investigating justice found adequate evidence Although every office in the government is a public trust, no
showing that respondent judge committed improprieties in position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and
dealing with Onofre which warrants disciplinary sanctions. uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A
magistrate of law must comport himself at all times in such
Based on his findings, the investigating justice
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
recommended:
most searching scrutiny of the public.10 The New Code of
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary11 prescribes
recommended that the complaint of the Mga Umaasang that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
Mamamayan ng Quirino be dismissed for lack of merit. As for reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
the complaint of Onofre G. Dulay, it is further recommended reasonable observer.12 Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety
that, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge Elias and the appearance of impropriety in all their
O. Lelina, Jr. be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all activities.13Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family,
of the benefits as the High Court may determine, and social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the
public office, including government-owned or controlled impression that they are in a special position to influence the
corporations.6 judge.14 The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of
their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest,
We sustain the findings of the investigating justice.
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with performance of judicial duties.15
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards.
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
Despite knowledge of Onofre and Marianos intentions in
a conclusion.7 It must be remembered that while this Court
offering the business to his daughters, respondent judge
has the duty to ensure that judges and other court personnel
allowed his daughters to accept the offer of business
perform their duties with utmost efficiency, propriety and
partnership with persons who have pending cases in his
fidelity, it is also our obligation to see to it that they are
court.
protected from unfounded suits that serve to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice. Thus, Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct constituting
8
administrative complaints that are clearly motivated by violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is
intentions other than the advocacy of judicial competence administratively liable. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the
are promptly written off. Revised Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a serious charge
punishable by: 1) dismissal from service; 2) suspension from
As held in Pangan v. Ganay, et al.:9
office without salary and other benefits for more than three
Furthermore, even in an administrative case, the Rules of (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3) a fine of more than
Court require that if the respondent Judge should be P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. We find that
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the suspension from office for six (6) months without salary and
evidence against him should be competent and should be other benefits is commensurate penalty.16
derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which the
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr.,
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis,
members could be faulted, competent evidence should be
Quirino, Branch 31, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
presented, especially since the charge is penal in character.
is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without
Indeed, while it is our duty to investigate and determine the salary and other benefits. He is WARNED that the commission
truth behind every matter in complaints against Judges and of the same or similar infractions in the future will merit a
other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they more severe penalty.
are protected and exonerated from baseless administrative
SO ORDERED.
charges. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve
G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992
to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. SPOUSES VICENTE and GLORIA MANALO, petitioners, vs.
HON. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as
However, as to the complaint filed by Onofre Dulay against
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, JOSE
respondent judge, although the investigation revealed that
SARMIENTO as POEA Administrator, CAREERS PLANNERS
most of the allegations were based on misrepresentation of
SPECIALISTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and SPOUSES VICTOR
and ELNORA FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 59 of 98

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Court views with grave concern the alarming incidents of papers of petitioners processed by FILMAN because it was a
illegal recruitment which demonstrate all too clearly that sister company of CPSI, and private respondents Victor and
overseas employment has fast developed into a major source Elnora were officers in both agencies.
not only of much-needed foreign exchanged but also, for the
cunning and the crafty, of easy money.
In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a recover from them the SR 1,150 plane fare advanced by
couple to work as driver and tutor cum baby sitter,
petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went to Career a promissory note, and attorney's fees.
Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed
service contracting firm owned by private respondents, the
spouses Victor and Elnora Fernandez. After the requisite
interview and testing, they were hired to work for a family in
Saudi Arabia for a monthly salary of US$350.00 each.
According to petitioners, a placement fee of P40,000.00 was
imposed as a precondition for the processing of their papers.
They paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory
note for the balance. Then they were allowed by respondent
Elnora Fernandez to sign their contract papers but did not
issue a receipt for the placement fee despite demand.
Shortly before boarding their flight to Saudi Arabia,
petitioners were handed their contracts. According to Gloria,
she was surprised to discover that her position had been
changed to that of domestic help. However, a CPSI employee
assured her that the change was only for the purpose of
facilitating her departure and did not in any way alter her
employment as tutor. Incidentally, CPSI provided petitioners
with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) of Filipino Manpower Services,
Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment agency.
Contrary to the representation of her recruiter, Gloria was
actually hired as a domestic help and not as a tutor, so that
after working for only twenty-five (25) days in Jeddah, she
returned to Manila. Soon after, Vicente also resigned from his
work and followed her home. He could not stand the
unbearable working conditions of his employment. However,
before leaving, he had to execute a promissory note to cover
his plane fare which respondent Victor Fernandez advanced.
Vicente also had to sign a quitclaim in favor of CPSI and his
employer.
On 29 February 1988, petitioners sued private respondents
before the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) charging them with illegal exaction, false 1 less
adverstisement, 2 and violation of other pertinents laws, rules
and regulations. They demanded the refund of the amount
exacted from them, plus payment of moral damages and the
imposition of administrative sanctions. 3
Private respondents countered: (1) that Gloria applied as
domestic help fully aware that she could not be a tutor since
she did not speak Arabic; (2) that the promissory note for
P10,000.00 was required of petitioners because they were
hired without paying placement fees; (3) that it was unlikely
for petitioners, who were mature, educated and experienced
in overseas work, to part with P30,000.00 without securing a
receipt; (4) that Vicente executed a quitclaim in favor of CPSI
duly authenticated by embassy officials in Saudi Arabia; (5)
that there was no impropriety in having the employment
Private respondents prayed for the disqualification of
petitioners from overseas employment, and sought to
Victor for Vicente, P10,000.00 as placement fee evidenced by
Mainly, on the basis of the transcripts of petitioners'
testimonies in the clarificatory questioning before the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor in a related criminal case, 4 the POEA
issued its Order of 7 May 1990 giving more weight and
credence to petitioners' version thus
After a careful evaluation of the facts and
the evidence presented, we are more
inclined to give weight to complainants'
posture. Complainants' version of the case
spontaneously presented in their
pleadings is, to our mind, more convincing
than respondent's stand. Moreover, the
manner by which complainants narrated
the whole incident inspired belief in the
allegation that respondent Career is
indeed guilty of illegal exaction. Thus, the
actual expenses incurred by herein
complainants computed hereinbelow less
the allowable fees of P3,000.00 (P1,500.00
per worker, respondent being a service
contractor) should be returned to them.
Actual Expenses
P30,000.00
placement fees
14.00 application
form
300.00
psychological test
1,400.00 medical
exam
P31,000.00 total
3,000.00
processing fees at
P1,500.00 per
applicant
P28,714.00 amount 4 February 1991, POEA issued a resolution setting arise its
to be refunded
It appearing, however, that only
respondent Career Planners Specialist(s)
Int'l. Inc., took part in the collection of the
aforesaid amount, the same should be
solely held liable.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
We cannot likewise give credence to the
Final Quitclaim signed by complainant
Vicente Manalo before he left for the
Philippines and presented by respondent
as defense. While its genuineness may not
be in question, we believe that it has no
bearing on the issue at bar. The aforesaid
Quitclaim deals more with matters
concerning complainants' employment
abroad. However, the subject of the
instant claim is the refund of complainants'
expenses prior to their deployment to
Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, we hold FILMAN liable
for allowing its document such as the TEP
to be used by other agency. Respondent's
defense that there is nothing wrong in this
because FILMAN is a sister company of
CAREER does not merit consideration
because such practice is not allowed
under the POEA Rules and Regulations. A
check with our records, however, showed
that respondent FILMAN had been put in
the list of forever banned agencies
effective April 5, 1989.
Anent the claim for moral damages, this
Office has no jurisdiction to entertain the
same.
WHEREFORE, . . . the Authority of Career
Planners Specialist(s) International is
hereby suspended for four (4) months or in
lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 is hereby
imposed for illegal exaction on two counts
plus restitution of the amount of
P28,714.00 to herein complainants in both
instances.
Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby
meted a fine of P40,000.00 for two counts
of misrepresentation. Its perpetual
disqualification from recruitment activities
is hereby reiterated.
The claim for moral damages is dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent Career's counterclaim is
likewise dismissed or lack of merit. 5
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and on
earlier order stating that
It is worth mentioning at this point that our
sole basis for holding respondent Career
liable for illegal exaction was the
uncorroborated testimony of the
complainants.
Page 60 of 98
 As we have consistently held, (the) charge
of illegal exaction is a serious charge
which may cause the suspension or
cancellation of the authority or license of
the offending agency. Hence, it should be
proven and substantiated by a clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation of
complainant that the agency charged
more than the authorized fee will not
suffice to indict the agency for illegal
exaction unless the allegation is supported
by other corroborative circumstantial
evidence.
Thus, for lack of concrete evidence or
proof to support our initial findings, we are
inclined to reconsider the penalty imposed
upon respondent.
Foregoing premises, the penalty of
suspension imposed upon respondent
Career Planners Specialist(s)
International, Inc. pursuant to our Order
dated May 7, 1990 is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the alternative fine of
P40,000.00 which was paid under protest
by respondent is hereby ordered refunded
to them. 6
Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 5 July
1991, then Undersecretary of Labor Ma. Nieves Roldan-
Confesor (now Secretary of Labor) sustained the
reconsideration of POEA. Her Order reads in part
We find . . . no cogent reason or sufficient
justification to reverse or modify the
assailed Order.
Records reveal that the only basis for
holding respondent Career Planners
Specialist(s) International, Inc., liable for
illegal exaction, as held in the previous
POEA Order dated May 7, 1990 was the
uncorroborated testimony of the
complainants. There was no concrete
evidence or proof to support the POEA
Administrator's initial findings.
We take this opportunity to inform the
complainants that the charge of illegal
exaction is a serious charge which may
cause the suspension or cancellation of
the authority or license of a recruitment
agency. Therefore, said charge must be
proven and substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. A mere allegation
will not suffice to find an agency liable for
illegal exaction unless said allegation is
supported by other corroborative
circumstantial evidence. In this
connection, records show that in the lower court cannot be raised for the
complainants could not narrate the first time on appeal.
specific circumstances surrounding their
The alleged procedural lapse by respondent POEA was
alleged payment of the amount of
raised by petitioners only before Us, notwithstanding that
P30,000.00. They could not even
such ground was already existing when they appealed to the
remember the specific date when said
Secretary of Labor. Ironically, petitioners now question the
amount was paid to respondent agency. In
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor over the appeal which
addition, when complainants were
they themselves elevated to that office. When petitioners filed
separately questioned as to how the
their motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of
money was kept bundled together prior to
Labor, this procedural issue was not even mentioned.
being handed to respondent agency for
Clearly, it would be the height of unfairness and inequity if We
payment, Gloria Manalo said it was
now allow petitioners to backtrack after getting an
wrapped in a piece of paper while Vicente
unfavorable verdict from public respondents whose authority
Manalo said it was placed inside an
they themselves involved. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 10 We said:
envelope. 7
". . . we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
On the charge of petitioners that they were given jobs submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
(driver/domestic help) different from those advertised by judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
private respondents, the Undersecretary ruled that there jurisdiction, when adverse . . . ."
was no misrepresentation by way of false advertisement
In this regard, however, We find no procedural infirmity
because it was established that private respondents also
constituting reversible error.
caused to be printed in the same newspaper page a second
box looking for a couple driver/domestic help. The 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations 11 is divided into eight
(8) Books. Book VI, cited by petitioners, is entitled
In her Order of 9 October 1991, then Undersecretary Ma.
"Adjudication Rules". The procedure outlined therein relates
Nieves Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction exercised by POEA
reconsideration. 8
through its Adjudication Department "to hear and decide all
In the present recourse, petitioners claim that public cases involving employer-employee relations arising out of or
respondent POEA committed a fatal jurisdictional error when by virtue of a law or contact involving Filipino workers for
it resolved private respondents' motion for reconsideration in overseas employment," involving "[v]iolation of the terms and
violation of Rule V, Book VI of the 1985 POEA Rules and conditions of employment . . . . [d]isputes relating to the
Regulations directing the transmittal of motions for implementation and interpretation of employment contracts .
reconsideration to the National Labor Relations Commission . . [m]oney claims of workers against their employers and/or
(NLRC) for determination. Consequently, for want of legal their duly authorized agents in the Philippines or vice versa .
competence to act on said motion, the Order of 4 February . . . [c]laims for death, disability and other benefits arising out
1991, as well as the subsequent orders of public respondent of employment . . . . and . . . . [v]iolations of our non-
Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9 October compliance with any compromise agreement entered into by
1991, is null and void. and between the parties in an overseas employment
contract."
In Aguinaldo Industries Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue We ruled
9 On the other hand, Book II entitled "Licensing and
Regulations" of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations,
To allow a litigant to assume a different
notably Rule VI cited by private respondents, refers
posture when he comes before the court
particularly to the procedure for suspension, cancellation
and challenge the position he had
and revocation of Authority or License 12 through the POEA
accepted at the administrative level,
Licensing and Regulation Office (LRO).
would be to sanction a procedure whereby
the court which is supposed The controversy in the present case centers on the liability of
to review administrative determinations private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement
would not review, but determine and and violation of pertinent laws and rules on recruitment of
decide for the first time, a question not overseas workers and the resulting imposition of penalty of
raised at the administrative forum. This suspension of the Authority of respondent CPSI. Quite plainly,
cannot be permitted, for the same reason We are not concerned here with employer-employee
that underlies the requirement of prior relations, the procedure of which is outlined in Book VI;
exhaustion of administrative remedies to rather, with the suspension or revocation of Authority
give administrative authorities the prior embodied in Book II.
opportunity to decide controversies within
Evidently, no jurisdictional error was accordingly committed
its competence, and in much the same way
because in cases affecting suspension, revocation or
that, on the judicial level, issues not raised
cancellation of Authority, the POEA has authority under Sec.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 61 of 98
18, Rule VI, Book II, to resolve motions for reconsideration The POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, But even on the supposition that there was no payment of
which may thereafter be appealed to the Secretary of Labor. found that private respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00, it cannot be denied that private respondents
Section 18, provides: "A motion for reconsideration of an P30,000.00 as placement fees; consequently, it ruled that required petitioners to execute a promissory note for
order o suspension (issued by POEA) or an appeal to the there was illegal exaction. Surprisingly, without altering its P10,000.00 purportedly because petitioners were hired
Minister (now Secretary of Labor) from an order cancelling a findings of fact, POEA reconsidered its order. It held that without paying placement fees. The mere charging of
license or authority may be entertained only when filed with uncorroborated testimonies were not enough to conclude P10,000.00, standing alone, is enough to hold private
the LRO within ten (10) working days from the service of the that illegal exaction was committed, particularly so that this respondents answerable for illegal exaction because the
order or decision" (parenthesis supplied). might result in the suspension or revocation of respondents' allowable amount to be collected per contract worker
authority to engage in recruitment activities. The premise according to respondent POEA was only P1,500.00, or
Petitioners also argue that public respondents gravely
that testimonies of petitioners should be supported by some P3,000.00 for both petitioners.
abused their discretion when they violated petitioners' right
other form of evidence is, to say the least, fallacious.
to administrative due process by requiring clear and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
In Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 16where the appellate court
convincing evidence to establish the charge illegal exaction. Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July
reversed the findings of fact of the trial court by requiring a
This point is well taken. There was grave abuse of discretion. 1991 and 9 October 1991, as well as the Resolution of
higher degree of proof, We held
respondent POEA dated 4 February 1991, having been issued
In the administrative proceedings for cancellation,
. . . we find no strong and cogent reason with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule
which justifies the appellate court's jurisdiction are SET ASIDE, and the original Order of
requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by
deviation from the findings and respondent POEA dated 7 May 1990 is ordered REINSTATED
documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is
conclusions of the trial court. As pointed and AFFIRMED.
substantially proven. All administrative determinations
out in Hernandez v. Intermediate
require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing SO ORDERED.
Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in
evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents.
agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian
G.R. No. 102358 March 30, 1993
preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is court's findings of fact which went beyond
required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . the minimum evidentiary support SPOUSES VICENTE and GLORIA MANALO, petitioners, vs.
." 13 while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a demanded by law, that is, supported by HON. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as
mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a substantial evidence, are final and Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, JOSE
preponderance . . . ." 14 Consequently, in the hierarchy of conclusive and cannot be reversed by the SARMIENTO as POEA Administrator, CAREER PLANNERS
evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at appellate tribunal. SPECIALISTS' INTERNATIONAL, INC., and SPOUSES
the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, VICTOR and ELNORA FERNANDEZ, respondents.
The seeming discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses
preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that
(one saying the money was wrapped in paper, the other, that P.M. Castillo for petitioners.
order.
the money was in an envelope; neither testified on the
That the administrative determination of facts may result in specific date of the exaction), refers only to minor details.
Fides C. Cordero-Tan and Roberto M.J. Lara for private
the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not Perhaps it would be different if the variance refers to
respondents.
require a higher degree of proof. The proceedings are essential points, e.g., whether the amount of P30,000.00 was
administrative, and the consequent imposition of actually paid by petitioners to private respondents.
suspension/revocation of Authority/License does not make Consequently, whether the money was wrapped in paper, or BELLOSILLO, J.:
the proceedings criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are placed in an envelope, or unwrapped or whether the parties In Our Decision of 19 November 1992, We set aside the
administrative and, accordingly, their infliction does not give could not recall when there payment was effected is Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July
rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for unimportant. After all, the money could have been wrapped and 9 October 1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent
the same act. in paper and placed in the envelope, or placed in the envelope POEA of 4 February 1991, and reinstated instead its Order of
without being wrapped, or wrapped with use of an unpasted 7 May 1990.
Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
envelope that appeared to be the envelope itself. In either
Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. 15
case, petitioners, could have viewed them differently; but the Briefly, the facts in retrospect: Petitioners sued private
. . . it is sufficient that administrative difference is ultimately inconsequential. The crucial point to respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and
findings of fact are supported by evidence, consider is that the petitioners categorically and violation of other pertinent labor laws, rules and regulations.
or negatively stated, it is sufficient that unequivocally testified that respondents collected from them In its 7 May 1990 Order, POEA suspended the authority of
findings of fact are not shown to be the amount of P30,000.00 as their placement fees and that Career Planners Specialists' International, Inc. (CAREER), for
unsupported by evidence. Substantial they paid the amount demanded. In this regard, it may be four (4) months for illegal exaction on two counts or, in lieu
evidence is all that is needed to support an worth to emphasize that only substantial evidence, not thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 was imposed, plus restitution of
administrative finding of fact, and necessarily clear and convincing evidence, is required. P28,714.00 to petitioner-spouses Vicente and Gloria Manalo,
substantial evidence is such relevant Moreover, when confronted with conflicting assertions, the meted on respondent therein Filipino Manpower Services,
evidence as a reasonable mind might rule that "as between a positive and categorical testimony Inc. (FILMAN), also a fine of P40,000.00 on two counts of
accept as adequate to support a which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on misrepresentation, and reiterated its perpetual
conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of the other, the former is generally held to prevail . . . disqualification from recruitment activities. On 4 February
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; ." 17 applies. 1991, however, on the basis of the same facts, POEA
Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 reversed itself on the penalty imposed on illegal exaction,
[1984]. reasoning that a clear and convincing evidence was

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 62 of 98

necessary to justify the suspension of the authority/license of public respondent POEA executed a complete turn-about and Undersecretary's Order of 5 July 1991; see also p. 2, POEA
CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary Confesor sustained POEA adopted a different factual conclusion. This is grave abuse of Resolution of 4 February 1991).
in reversing itself and held that the charge of illegal exaction discretion.
As regards the failure of petitioners to state the exact date
should be supported by other corroborative circumstantial
Contrary to the present claim of respondents, there is nothing when the payment was made and their different versions on
evidence, and on 9 October 1991 denied the motion for
in the assailed orders which states that the version of private how the money was bundled together, public respondents
reconsideration of petitioners.
respondents has become more believable than that of may not now complain that these circumstances remain
In Our decision, We stressed that only a substantial evidence petitioners. For that reason, the position of POEA expressed unexplained. It should be noted that petitioners were
was required to establish administrative findings of fact. This in its original Order that the "complainants' version of the questioned separately and they were not told of the
holds true even if the determination may result in the case . . . is, to our mind, more convincing than respondent's discrepancies in each other's testimony. We consider it
suspension of authority or license to operate a particular line (sic) stand," and that "[m]oreover, the manner by which unjust for public respondents to expect petitioners to explain
of business and will not justify requiring a higher degree of complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in inconsistencies which were not brought to their attention, or
proof. the allegation that respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of of which they were given no chance to explain, and then
illegal exaction," remains unreversed, even up to now. discredit their testimonies on the basis of said
On the dispute regarding the failure of petitioners to state in
inconsistencies.
their testimonies the exact date of payment of the recruitment This view finds support in the fact that public respondents
fee of P40,000.00 and their conflicting versions on how the reconsidered only the penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 Public respondents may be correct in saying that where two
P30,000.00 cash was presented, even POEA must have fine to be imposed on CPSI, while the other orders, i.e., conflicting versions are supported by substantial evidence,
considered it trivial as it did not even touch on the issue. For, restitution of P28,714.00 to complainants and the P40,000.00 the administrative body may choose which to uphold and for
indeed, what is more important is that peso bills were fine on FILMAN, remained undisturbed. The assailed orders that reason even flip-flop on its factual findings without
delivered to and received by respondent-spouses. We further were virtually saying that while the testimonies of petitioners thereby incurring grave abuse of discretion. In this case
stated that with the payment of a check for P10,000.00, which met the substantial degree of proof requirement (otherwise however, public respondent reversed the penalty, not on the
remains undisputed, the charge of unlawful exaction was petitioners could not have been entitled to restitution), the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but
clearly established since according to POEA only P3,000.00 penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine could not be that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to
was legally chargeable. imposed on CPSI because the same testimonies did not meet be "more convincing than respondent's stand" and which
the clear and convincing evidence requirement. In short, "inspired belief," were not clear and convincing. Thus, to that
On 11 December 1992, private respondents Victor and Elnora
there was no change in the findings of fact, but only an extent, public respondents committed grave abuse of
Fernandez and CPSI (excluding FILMAN) filed a motion for
escalation of the degree of proof. discretion correctable by certiorari.
reconsideration primarily arguing that there was sufficient
legal and evidentiary basis for the order of reconsideration The tergiversation of the penalty imposed just because the Admittedly, an appellate court may not reverse an award for
issued by POEA as well as the orders of DOLE sustaining the testimonies were "uncorroborated" was a patent mistake. civil liability because an obligation was not established
same, and that this Court substituted its own discretion for There is no law, rule or jurisprudence that states that an beyond reasonable doubt for, in civil cases, only a
that of POEA and DOLE. uncorroborated evidence is ipso facto insufficient and the preponderance of evidence is required. Likewise, an
penalty of suspension or P40,000.00 fine may not be imposed administrative body may not require a degree of proof higher
On 15 December 1992, public respondents also filed their
for illegal exaction, even if the charge was substantially than the substantial evidence contemplated in Sec. 5, Rule
own separate motion for reconsideration arguing that "[t]he
proved and restitution of the money exacted was ordered. 133, of the Rules of Court, and the rules of administrative due
POEA and DOLE Orders dated 4 February 1991, 5 July 1991
Even in criminal cases (People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, 26 process enunciated in Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial
and 9 October 1991, finding private respondents not guilty of
February 1991, 194 SCRA 432; People v. Catubig, G.R. No. Relations (69 Phil. 635, G.R. No. 46496, 27 February 1940),
illegal exaction, are themselves supported by substantial
71626, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 505; People v. Base, G.R. otherwise, what would prevent an agency from demanding
evidence, and are therefore not subject to judicial inquiry."
No. 92124, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 688; People v. Santiago, proof beyond reasonable doubt or require at least two or
We disagree. According to POEA itself, in its original Order of G.R. No. 46132, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 556; People v. more witnesses to support an administrative finding of fact.
7 May 1990 Aquino, G.R. No. 83214, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 578; People Then, an agency may even create its own degree of proof
v. Lazo, G.R. No. 75367, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 274; People like requiring five witnesses, or an evidence be totally
After a careful evaluation of the facts and
v. Sampaga, G.R. No. 91539, 30 September 1991, 202 SCRA uncontested, to prove a claim all in the spirit of the relative
the evidence presented, We are more
157; People v. Babac, G.R. No. 97932, 23 December 1991, independence of administrative bodies from technical rules.
inclined to give weight to complainants'
204 SCRA 968), which require proof beyond reasonable
(petitioner spouses herein) posture. The Court is charged with having unjustifiably invaded the
doubt, a credible, convincing and positive testimony of a lone
Complainants' version of the case turf of public respondents. We need only stress that the
witness is sufficient to sustain conviction. The original Order
spontaneously presented in their judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and all lower
regarded and characterized the subject testimonies as
pleadings specifically during the courts necessarily includes the authority to "determine
"convincing" and "inspired belief".
clarificatory questioning is, to our mind, whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
more convincing than respondent's (sic) The subsequent categorization of petitioners' testimonies as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
stand. Moreover, the manner by which "[m]ere allegation of complainant" (p. 2, POEA Resolution of branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Art. VIII, Sec.
complainants narrated the whole incident 4 February 1991; See also p. 2, respondent Undersecretary's 1, Constitution). Clearly then, even presidential prerogatives
inspired belief in the allegation that Order of 5 July 1991) is startling, coming as it does from the are not beyond judicial review when, as in this case before
respondent CAREER is indeed guilty of same body which found CPSI guilty of illegal exaction "[a]fter Us, there is grave abuse of discretion or an utter disregard of
illegal exaction (emphasis supplied). a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented." the law.
The same may also be said of a later pronouncement that
Nothing could be clearer than these categorical statements. In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v.
there was "no concrete evidence or proof to support the
We are surprised why, on the basis of the very same findings, Factoran, Jr. (G.R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA
POEA Administrator's initial findings" (p. 2, respondent

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 63 of 98

49, 57), We reiterated the rule that judicial review of WHEREFORE, finding no substantial argument to warrant that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista
administrative findings of fact may be made modification of Our Decision of 19 November 1992, much less sign the same.6
a reversal, and for lack of merit, We Resolve to DENY WITH
. . . when there has been a denial of due After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring
FINALITY the motions for reconsideration respectively filed
process, or mistake of law or fraud, the Deed of Sale dated April 5, 1982 executed between the
by public and private respondents.
collusion or arbitrary action in the late Cesar Morelos in favor of Laura Bautista valid, and
administrative proceeding (L-21588 SO ORDERED. dismissed for insufficient evidence the claims and
Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. counterclaims for damages of the parties.7
v. Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [sic]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
[1987]), where the procedure which led to G.R. No. 158015 August 11, 2004
reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court. The
factual findings is irregular; when palpable
LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
errors are committed; or when a grave
COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
MORELOS, respondents.
capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo de decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In
Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 lieu thereof, another one is entered declaring AS
[1986]; International Hardwood and NULL AND VOID the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, April 5, 1982, executed between the late Cesar G.
117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club D E C I S I O N Morelos and defendant-appellee Laura R. Bautista.
Corporation v. National Labor Relations The Register of Deeds of Manila is DIRECTED to
Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. cause the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA Title No. 154043 in the name of defendant-appellee
61; and Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: LAURA R. BAUTISTA and to issue another one in the
Balarin, 16 SCRA 569). On appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 name of the ESTATE OF CESAR G. MORELOS.
Defendants-appellees are also directed to
Respondents assert that FILMAN, as the deploying agency of of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure is1a Decision of the Court
surrender possession of the disputed property to
petitioners, was legally entitled to charge P10,000 for both of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45549, reversing and setting
plaintiff-appellant.
petitioners, hence, its acceptance of a check for the same aside the judgment of the Regional2 Trial Court of Manila,
amount was not an overcharge. Here, public respondents Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83-17900 and entering a new one SO ORDERED.8
appear confused. Their orders and resolutions prove declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale between the
late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null and void. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
otherwise.
It is undisputed that the Fernandez spouses demanded and The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the
received the check for P10,000.00, but the subject orders and (formerly Washington) Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing following issues:
resolutions of public respondents did not particularly indicate an area of approximately 105 square meters. This parcel of
I.
whether the check was received by the Fernandezes in their land was previously owned and registered in the name of the
capacity as officers of CPSI or of FILMAN. Nevertheless, late Cesar Morelos under Transfer Certificate of Title No. WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF EXPERT
since the check was delivered to the Fernandezes in the 27604. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos WITNESSES ARE CONCLUSIVE TO BE A STRONG
office of CPSI and in the absence of proof that at that time the Bautista, being the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos.3 BASIS TO NULLIFY A DULY EXECUTED AND
latter represented themselves as officers of FILMAN, there is NOTARIZED DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any
no conclusion other than that the Fernandezes indeed acted children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest II.
as officers of CPSI. Moreover, the same amount represented on April 15, 1982. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and
by the check was the object of CPSI's prayer for recovery of WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in favor of
placement fees in its answer with counterclaim and position (ANNEX "3") IS VALID.
petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed
paper filed before respondent POEA (Annexes "C" and "D", of Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. III.
Petition; Rollo, pp. 75-79 and 115-117). If, as alleged, the Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 254843 was
Fernandezes did receive the check as officers of FILMAN, WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
issued in the name of petitioner Laura Bautista.4
then CPSI and the Fernandez couple (and the other THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SEEK THE
respondents as well) have to do a lot of explaining as to why Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.9
CPSI prayed for an award of placement fees. child of Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a
Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with
Significantly, the original order of POEA deducting from the and invoke the testimony of Carmelita Marcelino, the
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-17900, before the
amount to be reimbursed the sum of P3,000.00 as instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII. At the trial, he
appropriate placement fees of both petitioners is a clear confirmed that it was the decedent Cesar Morelos who affixed
presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that
manifestation that a private recruitment entity (CPSI) and not his signature to the document.
the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale
a private employment agency (FILMAN) was entitled to those and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedent's
fees. were not his.5 signature on the Deed was forged. He presented the
As regards the remaining issue on procedure, the same is testimony of Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
deemed waived as it is brought to Us only for the first time in INP Crime Laboratory Service, that the signature of decedent
valid. The witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified
this motion for reconsideration. on the questioned instrument, when compared to other
documents bearing the authentic signature of Cesar Morelos,

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 64 of 98

did not match and appeared to have been authored by a
different person. Cruz, Jr. declared that the latest document
bearing the genuine signature of the decedent is dated March
31, 1982, while the alleged forged signature was made on
April 5, 1982, or a mere lapse of five days. According to him,
it is not possible to have significant variation between the two
signatures, considering the proximity of time when the
signatures where affixed.10
Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief of the
Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP, testified that the
thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing on the residence
certificate indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, when
compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates
issued to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the
thumbmark of another person.
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following
manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.
It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys
the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a
public instrument.11 To overturn this legal presumption,
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave
rise to a spurious contract.
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of
Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that due to
the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination
of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned
document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to
questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while
probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.
Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony
may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment
on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny;
he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting
expert.13
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue
in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute
matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a
handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than
an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the
issue.14 clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its
favor the presumption of regularity.19 The authenticity and
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity
due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be
prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against
upheld.
direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who
was physically present at the signing of the contract and who As to the alleged insufficient consideration of the sale of the
had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert property, the mere inadequacy of the price does not affect its
witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at validity when both parties are in a position to form an
best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of independent judgment concerning the transaction,20 unless
Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of a defect in
due execution thereof.15 Having been physically present to consent is present.21 A contract may consequently be
see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura annulled on the ground of vitiated consent and not due to the
Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar, however, no
evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of vitiated consent was presented other than the
Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that
respondent's self-serving allegations.
the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of
Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks, CV No. 45549 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch VII in Civil Case No.
and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily 83-17900, declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between
escape detection by an ordinary lay person.16 petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista and Cesar Morelos over the
subject parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
When the trial court and the appellate court arrived at
No. 2760 as valid is REINSTATED. No costs.
divergent factual assessments in their respective decisions
and the bases therefor refer to documents made available to SO ORDERED.
the scrutiny of both courts, the well-settled rule that factual
findings of trial courts deserve respect and even finality will
not apply.17 In the case at bar, the varying factual G.R. No. 128230 October 13, 2000
assessments pertained to the authenticity of the signature of
ROCKWELL PERFECTO GOHU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
the late Cesar Morelos on the questioned Deed of Absolute
ALBERTO GOHU and ADELAIDA GOHU, respondents.
Sale conveying the 105-square meter property in favor of his
niece, Laura Bautista. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and This is a petition for review of the February 14, 1997 Decision
Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the United of the Court of Appeals1 dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 40631
States of America,18 we held that the authenticity of a which, in turn, assailed the refusal of Judge Francisco Donato
questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its Villanueva of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145,
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the to inhibit himself from hearing Civil Case No. 89-5919.
genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity,
rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of Civil Case No. 89-5919 was a Complaint for Specific
stops, shades, that may be found between the questioned Performance filed by petitioner against respondents to
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the compel them to accept the P500,000.00 balance of the
question of the former's authenticity. The result of purchase price of P600,000.00 for a parcel of land allegedly
examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the sold to him by the latter via an Option to Buy, and to execute
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, a corresponding Deed of Sale thereafter. The case was
inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into originally heard before Branch 142 of the Makati Regional
consideration, such as the position of the writer, the Trial Court with Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. presiding.
condition of the surface on which the paper where the In their Answer to the Complaint, respondents denied
questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings petitioner's claim, alleging that their signatures on the
and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play purported Option to Buy, as well as those of the supposed
an important role on the general appearance of the signature. witnesses thereto, were forged.
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, Upon referral by the court, acting through Judge De Guzman,
or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) examined the
evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much sample signatures of respondent Alberto Gohu and those
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or appearing on the subject Option to Buy. The NBI found that
dissimilarities, between a questioned handwriting and an the questioned and sample signatures were not written by
authentic one. one and the same person. Thereafter, respondents moved to
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 65 of 98
dismiss the case. Meanwhile, upon petitioner's motion, the On March 26, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Nonetheless, in the light of the evidence on record,
signatures were referred by the trial court to the PC Crime Reconsideration of Judge Villanueva's Resolution denying his an examination of the signature of the wife of
Laboratory for further examination. Again, it was found that Motion for Inhibition and his Order considering the case Alberto Gohu and the other instrumental witnesses
the sample and questioned signatures were written by two submitted for resolution without evidence. allegedly appearing on the document designated
different persons. Accordingly, invoking such findings, "Option to Buy" would be premature at this time in
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Judge
respondent filed a Motion to Resolve Motion to Dismiss. the absence of any showing that such document
Villanueva in an Order dated April 22, 1996. Likewise,
was in fact duly executed and that they signed the
Before this incident could be resolved, petitioner filed a petitioner's Motion for Cancellation of the scheduled trial date
document.
Motion for Inhibition, on the ground that respondent's thereafter was denied.
designated attorney-in-fact was a relative of Judge De The plaintiff is directed to establish such
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
Guzman. This was denied by Judge De Guzman who clarified precondition to the favorable consideration of the
certiorari. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
that said attorney-in-fact was not a close relative of his. order sought when plaintiff presents evidence in
Decision on February 14, 1997, dismissing the petition for
support of its counter-claim on 08 and 10 April 1997
On June 28, 1991, Judge De Guzman granted the Motion to certiorari.
as scheduled.5
Dismiss but on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the dismissal
Hence, the instant petition for review anchored upon the
order was reversed and the case ordered reinstated.2 What is more, as expressed Judge Villanueva, such
following grounds
examination was not ordered because it was not the function
Upon remand to the trial court, the case was repeatedly set
I of the court to do so. Indeed, if petitioner thought the same
for pre-trial conference.
crucial to his case, then it was his prerogative, if not duty, to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
On June 29, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Disqualification have such examination done. He cannot and should not pass
NOT ORDERING THE INHIBITION OF JUDGE
of Judge Francisco Donato Villanueva, who had replaced on such task to the court. Petitioner can very well undertake
VILLANUEVA.
Judge Salvador as presiding judge of Branch 142, on the to submit such signatures to an expert witness on his own
ground that a partner in the law office representing II and, thereafter, call such expert witness to testify thereon.
respondents, Gregorio Narvasa II, was the son-in-law of Atty. We note that an original copy of the subject Option to Buy was
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN given to petitioner's counsel by Judge Villanueva for that
Eduardo C. Tutaan who, in turn, acted as counsel for Judge
HOLDING THAT ALL OF THE ORDERS OF THE purpose.
Villanueva in an administrative case filed against the latter.
TRIAL COURT WERE ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE
On August 1, 1995, Judge Villanueva denied the said Motion WITH LAW.3 Petitioner also argues that Judge Villanueva was practically
and set the case for pre-trial conference on August 28, 1995. dictating to his counsel how to present evidence; insisting
In a string of cases decided by this Court, we said that while that petitioner be presented as first witness instead of their
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner requested that he
bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have intended handwriting experts. On this score, we find good
be allowed to have the signatures of respondent Adelaida
been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition ground for Judge Villanueva's insistence that petitioner be
Gohu as well as those of the two witnesses of the Option to
of the judge under Rule 137, Section 1(2), of the Rules of presented as witness, simply because to wait for the expert
Buy examined by expert witnesses as well. This was denied
Court, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion that a witness would delay the progress of the case. Far from
by Judge Villanueva for being premature.
judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and showing bias or prejudice, Judge Villanueva was merely
Following the continued resetting of the pre-trial, Judge convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
complying with his sworn duty as a judge to administer justice
Villanueva ordered the pre-trial terminated and for trial to partiality. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will
without delay. In other words, Judge Villanueva was not
commence. He then gave the parties five (5) days from not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed
directing petitioner on how to conduct his case but was
receipt of the pre-trial order within which to file motions for especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation
merely fending off what was obviously petitioner's attempt to
correction thereof, if any, and set the first trial date of the under his oath of office to administer justice without respect
further delay the case. After all, an independent and fair
case on February 16, 1996. to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.4 judge should not allow the parties to practically control the
On the scheduled trial date, counsel for petitioner manifested In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that proceedings in his court through obvious dilatory tactics.6
that he had not yet received a copy of the pre-trial order. petitioner failed to convincingly show Judge Villanueva's bias Petitioner next faults Judge Villanueva for insisting that his
Judge Villanueva thus gave him an unsigned copy and or prejudice. Indeed, we are in accord with the Court of counsel make a manifestation as to any corrections he
directed him to read the same and manifest any correction he Appeals that such actuations did not engender suspicion and wished made on the pre-trial order on the very day an
may wish to make so that trial could proceed as scheduled. doubt as to the fairness and ability to decide the case with the unsigned copy of the same was furnished him. However, it
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. appears that petitioner was given a five-day period anew
On March 4, 1996, at the scheduled trial for reception of
petitioner's evidence, petitioner instead filed a Second Petitioner complains that Judge Villanueva refused to order within which to make any such corrections, resulting in the
Motion for Inhibition based on Judge Villanueva's alleged the examination of the signatures of respondent Adelaida cancellation of the scheduled trial dates for the presentation
actuations that "grossly exhibited his bias for private Gohu and those of the two alleged witnesses of the Option to of his evidence on February 16 and 19, 1996. Instead,
respondents and/or prejudice against the petitioner." The Buy. However, as admitted by petitioner himself, the Order of petitioner chose to file his second Motion for Inhibition.
Motion was denied. On the same date, Judge Villanueva Judge Villanueva merely declared such examination as Petitioner likewise claims that his second Motion for Inhibition
issued an Order ,stating that petitioner's case is deemed premature. Certainly, petitioner was not barred from having was cursorily denied by Judge Villanueva on the same date it'
submitted for resolution without evidence in its support. such examination done on the said signatures at a later time, was filed. However, as explained by Judge Villanueva, it was
more properly during trial proper. In fact, the same Order petitioner himself who had asked for such immediate
Meanwhile, the case was transferred to Branch 145 following
specifically gives petitioner a chance to obtain an order for resolution in his Motion. We see no reason why immediate
the appointment of Judge Villanueva as presiding Judge of
the examination of the signatures, to wit action on the Motion could not be taken inasmuch as no new
that Branch.
grounds were raised therein. The one-page Motion simply

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 66 of 98

called the attention of Judge Villanueva to his denial of the
first Motion for Disqualification/Voluntary Inhibition. Again,
swift action on the same should be commended rather than
frowned upon, given the delay attendant to the case and the
lack of genuine or new issue raised therein.
Neither do we see anything wrong in the transfer of the case
from Branch 142 to Branch 145 following Judge Villanueva's
appointment to the latter Branch. Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 3-94 dictates that "every trial
judge who has started hearing a case shall continue to hear
and decide the case" and that "the case shall be transferred
to the branch to which he is assigned." The record shows that
at the time the case was transferred, respondents had
already presented two (2) witnesses before Branch 142
where Judge Villanueva used to preside, albeit during the
pre- trial stage, whose testimonies respondents had adopted
as part of the evidence in the main case. For all intents and
purposes, then, Judge Villanueva already started to hear the
case and should, therefore, continue to hear and decide the
same.
Petitioner argues, and it is not disputed, that at the time of the
transfer of the case to Branch 145, trial on the case had not
yet commenced. Such argument, however, loses sight of the
basic difference between the terms "hear" and "try" or
"hearing" and "trial". As defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
the term "trial" means a "judicial examination and
determination of issues between parties to an action".7 On
the other hand, the term "hearing" is "frequently used in a
broader and more popular significance to describe whatever
takes place before magistrates clothed with judicial
functions," "at any stage of the proceedings subsequent to its
inception".8
Finally, petitioner questions Judge Villanueva's order which
considers him to have waived his right to present evidence.
Again, far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, such
order upholds the court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the
part of one party. As may be gleaned from the Order of the
trial court, when the case was called for presentation of
evidence by petitioner, neither he nor his counsel responded.
It is noted that this was already the third scheduled trial date
for the presentation of petitioner's evidence. Also worth
noting is the fact that close to seven (7) years had elapsed
since the time of filing of the Complaint in 1989, until the time
such Order considering petitioner to have waived his right to
present his evidence was issued in 1996. To our mind, Judge
Villanueva acted with judicious wisdom when he issued the
questioned Order.
At any rate, it is too late in the day for petitioner to question
this matter as he had actively participated in proceedings
held subsequent to said Order.
In the light of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review
must necessarily fail. In order to disqualify a judge on the
ground of bias and prejudice, petitioner must prove the same
by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to
discharge this burden. This Court has to be shown acts or request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which,
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
being biased and partial.9
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, the instant an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
petition for review is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
to costs.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court
SO ORDERED. of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 validity of the Order of Arrest.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition
JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
DECISION praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision
granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent,
Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by was opposed by petitioner.
the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
The facts are:
from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail,
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special thus:
Administrative Region.
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting subject to the following conditions:
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
will appear and answer the issues raised in these
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong of the government;
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
Court;
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 67 of 98
 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold proceedings because extradition courts do not render United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
departure order before this Court even in judgments of conviction or acquittal. Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty
extradition proceeding; and and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
4. Accused is required to report to the government presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
upon the members of the international community. Thus,
to the nearest office, at any time and day of the he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA
a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
the condition that if the accused flees from his to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the innocence is not at issue.
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the
government and that the corresponding
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ liberty, and due process.
SO ORDERED. of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of
vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art.
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
nature.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private authorities are under obligation to make available to every
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged following trends in international law: (1) the growing fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
deprivation of ones liberty. importance of the individual person in public international law to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however,
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses of countries to observe these universal human rights in and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court in Purganan is in order.
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental First, we note that the exercise of the States power
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
Excessive bail shall not be required. as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been
of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this person may properly be a subject of international law is now detained.
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a international law are limited only to states was dramatically be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
prospective extraditee may be granted bail. eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one,
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings
G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity detention during the pendency of administrative
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus: of the Philippines under international conventions to
show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
uphold human rights.
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the international law.
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as On a more positive note, also after World War II, both The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case,
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a international organizations and states gave recognition and a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
person has been arrested and detained for violation of necessary certificate of registration was granted bail

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 68 of 98

pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To
refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed
the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission
of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may
be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence Records show that private respondent was arrested on
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection The applicable standard of due process, however, should not
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
9
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is
not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence
10
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
"the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice."
We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state
"in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-
arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention
is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In
fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution.
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out,
it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in
favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance
of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on
the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not
a flight risk and should be granted bail.
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant
is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129254 July 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RICARDO JANAIRO y BACOMO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When self-defense is invoked, the accused must establish

wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
11 clearly and convincingly all of the following: 1) unlawful
not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential that the Philippines honor its obligations under the aggression on the part of the victim, 2) reasonable necessity
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special for the means employed to prevent or repel it, and 3) no
merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant. Having
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats admitted responsibility for the killing, the accused has the
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily burden of proving the foregoing elements. Self-defense
purpose of trial or punishment.14 mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the collapses upon failure to discharge this burden.
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to The Case
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 69 of 98

Ricardo Janairo appeals the December 12, 1996 Decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 49) of Puerto Princesa City,
which convicted him of homicide and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua.
On November 13, 1992, an Information 2 was filed charging
appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of October,
1992, in the afternoon, at the Palawan
State College [PSC] Compound, Barangay
Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with treachery and evident premeditation,
with intent to kill and while armed with a
deadly, weapon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab one
Bencibeis 3 Aguilar, thereby inflicting
upon the latter [a stab] wound on the
chest, which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death. 4
Upon his arraignment on November 27, 1992, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Thereafter, Counsel de
Parte Perfecto de los Reyes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 6 praying for reinvestigation, insisting that
the charge should be changed to homicide. During the pre-
trial on January 11, 1992, the lower court denied this Motion.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to
On the other hand, the Appellant's Brief 14 narrates the facts whether or not the stabbing was intentional." In convicting
downgrade the crime charged from murder to homicide.
in the following manner:
Noting the conformity of the wife of the deceased, the court a
quo issued an Order amending the Information by crossing
out the phrase "with treachery and evident premeditation."
Arraigned again on April 13, 1993, appellant pleaded "not
8
guilty." Trial ensued. Thereafter, the lower court
promulgated its assailed Decision, 9 the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds that the [p]rosecution has
proven Ricardo Janairo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
[h]omicide and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all
its accessory penalties and to pay the
heirs of Bencibeis Aguilar actual damages
in the amount of P39,789.26 and
P50,000.00 as compensation for the death
of Bencibeis Aguilar. 10
Hence, this appeal. 11
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the prosecution presents its version of the facts
12
of the case in this wise:
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of
October 24, 1992[,] Bencebeis "Pakay"
Aguilar was walking towards his house
inside the PSC Compound, Puerto
Princesa City. Ricardo Janairo was
walking towards Aguilar. When the two
met at a certain point near Aguilar's house,
Janairo suddenly stabbed Aguilar with a
blade and immediately ran
away.1wphi1.nt
Aguilar managed to walk to his house
where he fell in front of the stairs. He was
brought to the hospital in San Pedro but he
[eventually] died of the mortal wounds he
sustained. The blade entered through the
anterior left chest penetrating the heart.
Previous to said incident, the two men had
figured in an altercation. Janairo had
asked permission from Aguilar, who was
the guard on duty at the PSC gate, if he
could bring a tricycle inside the
compound. The request was denied by the
latter. An exchange of words followed and
ended with Janairo making a threat:
"Babalikan ka namin." 13 (citations
omitted).
Ruling of the Trial Court
Version of the Defense
The lower court pointed out that the "more crucial issue is
appellant, the trial court ratiocinated as follows:
The case arose out of an incident which
transpired on October 24, 1992 while
accused was on his way out of the PSC
Compound, where the accused met
Bencebeis Aguilar. Bencebeis Aguilar
berated Ricardo Janairo by calling the
latter "son of a bitch, you are a brat".
Mr. Aguilar, by his words and facial
expression, was drunk[.] This triggered an
altercation between the two. For as
testified by witness Erma Denalo, at 15
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
October 24, 1992, while she and Dina
Mediodia were passing by [the] PSC
compound, they saw two persons having
an altercation as their action and tone of
their voice [showed]. Elma Denalo came to
know that the bigger one was Pakay
Aguilar and the small one Ricardo Janairo.
They were having an altercation facing
each other. When Elma Denalo and
companion were more or less 1 1/2 meters
near the two persons having an
altercation, she saw the two grapple for
the possession of the knife.
Ricardo Janairo testified that Bencebeis
Aguilar likewise stabbed him with a knife,
but he was able to parry the same.
Thereafter, they both grappled for the
possession of the knife. Ricardo Janairo
was holding the hand of Bencebeis Aguilar
and the latter likewise. Thereafter,
Ricardo Janairo fell on top of Mr.
Bencebeis Aguilar. After [that], the former
stood up as did the latter[.]
It was when the two of them fell that
Bencebeis Aguilar was wounded. And
afterwards, Ricardo Janairo stood up.
Bencebeis Aguilar did likewise[,] after
which, the latter again stabbed the former.
Fortunately, Ricardo Janairo was not hit[.]
Bencebeis Aguilar was drunk, as per his
acts, voice and physical appearance[.]
Had Ricardo Janairo wanted to kill
Bencebeis Aguilar, he could have done it
while the latter was down on the ground.
Ricardo Janairo ran away after the second
stab because he was afraid to be wounded
and, because he had no intention to kill
Bencebeis Aguilar[.] 16 (citations omitted)
Examining the evidence for both parties,
the Court finds [the p]rosecution evidence
to be the more credible. The occurrence of
the fight is [actually] not inconsistent with
[p]rosecution's version of the event,
because it [was] not improbable that
before Janairo was actually able to stab
Aguilar, they had grappled for possession
of the knife. At any rate, Aguilar must have
put up some resistance, which constituted
the fight witnessed by [d]efense
witnesses. The more plausible flow of
events then, was that, upon encountering
each other along the path, both accused
and victim had an exchange of words
which led [the] accused to draw a knife
and stab the victim after the scuffle. The
testimony of the accused is evasive and
inconsistent. At first, he testified that after
he and Aguilar had fallen to the ground,
Aguilar got up and tried to stab him again,
prompting him to run away. He claimed
that at the time he ran away, he did not
know that Aguilar had been wounded. Yet,
he later testified that when arrested by
authorities, he protested because he "had
Page 70 of 98
 no intention to kill" Aguilar which could by a lawyer who was an information or complaint must be raised at the time the
only [im]ply that he knew that Aguilar had American citizen; amendment is made[;] otherwise [appellant's] silence would
been wounded. In fact, he knew enough to be deemed consent on his part to the amendment. 24
4. In imposing the
recall that when he fell on top of Aguilar,
penalty of reclusion Right to Counsel
the blade of the knife was facing towards
perpetua upon the
Aguilar. Appellant contends that he was deprived of his right to
accused. 18
counsel, arguing that he was represented by Atty. de los
The testimony of Elma Denaco, the only
The main issue is whether or not he proved the elements of Reyes, who was an American citizen with no authority from
witness who claims to have seen Aguilar
self-defense. the Supreme Court to practice law. He was in fact prohibited
produce the knife which eventually killed
by the court a quo from appearing before it. 25
him, ha[d] its share of improbabilities. By The Court's Ruling
her own account, when she and her We disagree. It should be noted that the appellant was
The appeal is partially granted. The trial court correctly
companion saw accused and Aguilar present when the lower court issued its Order prohibiting
convicted appellant of homicide, but erred in sentencing him
grappling for the knife, they ran away Atty. de los Reyes from appearing before the court.
to reclusion perpetua.
through the PSC gate. Apparently, they did Appellant, however, insisted on being represented by the
not bother to report the violent incident to Preliminary Issues: said counsel. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
the police, or even to the security guard General, appellant "took full advantage of the one year gap
[at] the PSC gate where they passed going Validity of Court Proceedings between the hearing held on May 19, 1995 and the last
home. Then, when she learned that The Information hearing held on March 1, 1994, banking on the short memory
Janairo was accused of killing Aguilar, she of the court and the fact that: 1) at the time this case was
immediately went to have her statement After the arraignment on November 27, 1992, the Information heard on May 19, 1995, a new judge had been assigned to
taken by Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes. She was amended. The charge was "down grad[ed]" from RTC Branch 49, Judge Panfilo Salva and, 2) Atty. Vigonte of
19

was told to return in December to have her murder to homicide, and the phrase "with treachery and the PAO was no longer the counsel assigned to this case." 26
statement taken. The witness provides no evident premeditation" was crossed out from the Information:
More important, appellant was not prejudiced in any way by
explanation for her apparent reluctance to Without questioning the amendment, appellant entered a plea
his own disregard of the court Order. In all stages of this case,
report the incident to the police of not guilty. Under Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, however,
he was represented by counsel either de parte or de oficio.
authorities, which would have been the only formal amendments are allowed after the arraignment of
the accused. When he was arraigned again under the Amended
more natural course of action, considering
Information, he was assisted by Counsel de Oficio Atty.
the violent and serious nature of the Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or Reynado Vigonte. During the trial that followed the said
incident. complaint may be amended, in substance lawyer continued defending him. In any event, all the pieces
Given the evasiveness and improbability or form, without leave of court, at any time of evidence presented by the defense were considered by the
contained in defense witness testimonies: before the accused pleads; and thereafter lower court.
[the p]rosecution has presented the and during the trial as to all matters of
clearer and more credible case; Between form, by leave and at the discretion of the Because the appellant was neither prejudiced nor deprived
the [p]rosecution eye-witnesses who court, when the same can be done without of his right to counsel, there is no basis to invalidate the
prejudice to the rights of the accused. proceedings below.
[were] disinterested and [did] not stand to
gain or lose by Janairo's conviction, and xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied). Main Issue:
the accused himself, it [was] the former
who would probably give the more By implication, amendments as to substance are precluded Self-Defense
the after the accused has entered a plea. The amendment
20
accurate version of Invoking self-defense is admitting authorship of the killing.
incident. 17(citations omitted) made here was undoubtedly a matter of substance, for the
Hence, the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who must
nature of the crime was altered from murder to homicide.
The Issues establish with clear convincing evidence all of these elements
Nonetheless, the Court sustains the validity of the
of the justifying circumstance: 27 (1) unlawful aggression on
Appellant raises the following issues: proceedings.
the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
The lower court erred: Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, does not bar employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
substantial amendments that are beneficial to the accused. provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
1. In holding that the Consistent with the constitutionally enshrined rights to be defense. 28
accused stabbed the informed of the nature of charges and to be accorded due
Herein appellant, however, failed to demonstrate the
victim intentionally; process, the rule aims to protect the accused from prejudicial
foregoing elements clearly and convincingly. 29 As the lower
2. In not holding that the machinations that change the game midstream. 21 In this
court observed, the testimonies of the defense witnesses
accused stabbed the case, the amendment benefited 22 the appellant. The
were improbable, inconsistent and unworthy of belief.
victim in self-defense; amendment did not prejudice him or deprive him of defenses
available before the amendment. 23 Appellant presented Defense Witnesses Dina Mediodia and
3. In upholding the Elena Denaco to establish unlawful aggression on the part of
validity of the Moreover, appellant not merely consented to the amendment;
Bencebeis Aguilar. 30 Elena testified that she was with her
proceedings, when at in fact, he sought it. Indeed, the defense counsel had filed a
first cousin Dina when she saw the appellant and the victim
one point in time, the Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that the charge of murder
"grappling" for the knife that the victim had allegedly drawn
accused was assisted be changed to homicide. "Objection to the amendment of an
after a heated discussion. 31 But this was contradicted by

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 71 of 98

Dina, who clearly stated that after they, saw the deceased was recovered from the crime scene. Likewise, the hand of the victim[.)]
draw a knife, both of them immediately ran away without testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Johanna dela Cruz, And after parrying then
knowing what transpired afterwards. 32 Ricardo dela Cruz, Estrella Aguilar and Crisostomo Arenio all he stabbed me
clearly showed that the victim did not have a gun. [appellant] and after
Assuming arguendo that these witnesses indeed saw the
stabbing me I parried
victim pull out a knife, this fact alone did not establish When the appellant was asked to demonstrate how he
the stab by holding his
unlawful aggression, since the victim was not shown to have managed to parry and twist the knife towards the victim
hand and twist[ing] [it.]
used the deadly weapon to attack the appellant. 33Unlawful without injuring himself, his reenactment and subsequent
[I]n twisting the hand [,]
aggression refers to an attack or material aggression, an testimony showed that the wound was in the stomach area;
the point of the knife
offensive act positively showing the intent of the aggressor to that is, the lower abdomen. 47 He testified thus:
was pointed to the
cause injury. 34 It presupposes an actual, sudden and
ATTY. DE LOS REYES: victim then [I] pushed
unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, not
him and we fell down on
merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude. 35 These, the Q You stated a while
the ground.
two witnesses failed to demonstrate. ago that you were
blocked by the victim ATTY DE LOS REYES:
Moreover, the testimonies of these defense witnesses were
and that he tried to stab
far from convincing. They claimed that, after the incident, (to witness)
you and you parr[i]ed it
they executed a statement before Atty. de los Reyes because
and you grappled for Q When you fell down to
they wanted to help the appellant. Elena admitted, however,
the possession of the the ground, how about
that despite their knowledge that a case had been filed before
weapon[.] [W]ill you the knife[,] did it strike
the fiscal, neither she nor Dina submitted any affidavit to help
please demonstrate by the victim or not?
the appellant during the preliminary investigation. This was
36
going down the witness
improbable, because Elena and appellant's family were A Yes sir.
stand.
neighbors at the time, and the latter's mother was a friend. 37
COURT
COURT:
Even the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Percival Lesias
(to witness)
and Sylvio Bacaser did not help establish unlawful All right, for this
aggression. Lesias merely stated that he saw two individuals purpose we will make Q That knife wounded
quarreling. Bacaser, on the other hand testified that he saw the court Interpreter . . the victim?
two individuals who seemed to be "embracing each other," . ac[t] as the victim.
after which both fell down. Thereupon, the one with a smaller A Yes your Honor.
(WITNESS going down
build stood up and ran away, while the one with a bigger build ATTY DE LOS REYES
the witness stand)
remained on the ground. 38Neither testified that he had seen
Bencebeis Aguilar attack appellant with a knife. (to witness)
COURT INTERPRETER:
The only point clearly established by these four defense Q Then you f[e]ll down
[(]At this juncture, the
witnesses was that there was a scuffle. But our conclusion already and you were at
witness [went] down
remains unaffected. As clarified by the court a quo, "Aguilar the top as you said?
and showed to the
must have put up some resistance, which constituted the Court how he was A Yes sir.
fight witness by the defense witnesses." 39 blocked, stabbed by
the victim and [how] he Q What did you do next?
Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, was characterized
parr[i]ed and grappled A I stood up, sir.
by the trial court as "evasive and inconsistent." 40During
for the possession of
cross-examination, he testified that he did not drink during Q What did you do after
the knife and the Court
the christening of his nephew on that fateful day, October 24, standing up?
Interpreter acted as the
1992. 41 Later on, he retracted and admitted that he did drink
victim as the witness A Bencebeis Aguilar
during the celebration. 42 He also stated that after he fell on
demonstrated . . . how stood up and also
top of the victim while struggling for the knife, both of them
he was blocked and stabbed me.
stood up and Aguilar tried to stab him again. 43On cross-
how he parried the stab
examination, he contradicted himself by testifying that the Q Were you hit?
and how he
victim was still lying on the ground when the latter tried to
gr[a]ppled[,] [the] A No, sir.
stab him again. 44 His assertion that after he fell on top of
witness about side by
the deceased; both of them stood up and Aguilar tried to stab Q What did you do when
side [with] the victim on
him again was also belied by the testimony of Defense you were not hit?
the right side of the
Witness Sylvio Bacaser who stated that the victim remained
victim[.] He was held by A I ran away, sir.
lying down. 45
the victim by his left
Moreover, his testimony was contrary to the evidence in this hand and [i]n that COURT:
case. He tried in vain to show that he was threatened with a position the witness I just want this clarified.
gun by the allegedly drunk Aguilar. 46 But his testimony was parr[i]ed with his right
not corroborated by any witness; equally important, no gun hand[,] parrying the left (to witness)

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 72 of 98

 Q [W]hat part of the injury. 56 None of these was supported by the evidence on Q You made mention of
stomach of the victim record. As has been noted by the Court, "the failure of the this Ricardo Janairo. If
was hit by the knife? accused to prove self-defense belies his claim that he was this person is inside the
performing a lawful act" one of the essential elements of courtroom, will you be
A I am not certain in
the exempting circumstance of accident. 57 able to point [to] him?
what part of the
stomach of the victim[,] Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence A Yes, Ma'am.
the mere fact that when
We agree with the lower court that the evidence for the Q Kindly look inside the
both of us fell down to
prosecution establishes the culpability of the appellant. Two courtroom and point to
the ground. [sic] knife?
disinterested eyewitnesses, Ricardo de la Cruz and Johanna the person whom you
Q But you are sure that de la Cruz, testified that when the appellant met Aguilar near know as Ricardo
the [wound] was the PSC gate while the latter was headed towards his house, Janairo?
somewhere within the the former stabbed Aguilar then ran away towards Barangay
INTERPRETER:
stomach [area,] but you Sandiwa.
were not sure where it The man pointed to by
Ricardo dela Cruz testified: 58
hit? the witness when asked
Q While this Bencibeis his name identified
A Yes your Honor.
Aguilar was going himself as Ricardo
(emphasis supplied)
home on that afternoon Janairo.
The foregoing testimony is belied by the physical evidence of October 24, 1992,
PROSECUTOR:
showing that the wound was located in the upper part of the kindly tell the
chest area as clearly shown by the testimony of Dr. Manuel R. Honorable Court if xxx xxx xxx
Bilog, who conducted the autopsy on Aguilar.48 It was also there was any unusual
Q When this Ricardo
unlikely that appellant, without sustaining any injury, incident happened that
Janairo met
managed to parry several knife attacks, and subsequently to particular time and
B(e)ncibeis Aguilar do
wrest and twist the same towards the victim. 49 date?
you know what
Appellant's claim is further negated by his flight from the A There was Ma'am. happened, if any?
scene of the crime. 50 In fact, he admitted that he had not even
Q Will you kindly tell the A When this Ricardo
considered surrendering to the police. 51 If his claim of self-
Honorable Court what Janairo and Bencibeis
defense were true, he should have immediately reported the
was that? Aguilar met with each
incident to the proper authorities 52 instead of running around
other, this Ricardo
for an hour and then staying inside his parents' house while A He met this Ricardo
Janairo immediately
the authorities were already looking for him. Our Janairo.
stabbed this Bencibeis
jurisprudence has repeatedly taught that flight is an
Q Will you kindly tell the Aguilar and after
indication of guilt. 53 The inevitable conclusion from all the
Honorable Court . . . stabbing he ran away.
foregoing is that appellant stabbed the victim with the
where this Ricardo
intention of killing him. xxx xxx xxx
Janairo ca[m]e from
Indeed, "[a] plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably before he met this Q Can you tell the
appreciated, where it is not only uncorroborated by Bencibeis Aguilar as Honorable Court how
independent and competent evidence, but also extremely you said? many thrust[s were]
doubtful by itself." 54 The doubt engendered by the assertions made by Ricardo
A Yes, Ma'am.
of the appellant is amplified by his claim that he did not Janairo to Bencibeis
"intentionally" stab Aguilar. This vacillation invariably shows Q Where then [did] this Aguilar?
the weakness of his defense. 55 All in all, appellant failed to Ricardo Janairo c[o]me
establish with clear and convincing evidence the existence of A Only one, Ma'am.
from?
the unlawful aggression. Without unlawful aggression, there Q Do you know if
can be no self-defense. A [From] the house of
Bencibeis Aguilar [was]
his father.
Accident hit?
Q You mean to impress
The appellant also maintained before the lower court that the A Yes, Ma'am.
[sic] that the father of
stabbing of the victim was merely an accident; that is, it was Ricardo Janairo was Q And do you know
not intentional. It must be stressed that the accused has the also residing at the PSC what happened to
burden of proving the elements of this exempting Compound at Puerto Bencibeis Aguilar after
circumstance. He must show the following with clear and Princesa City? he was hit by the one
convincing evidence: 1) he was performing a lawful act with thrust made by Ricardo
due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) A Yes, Ma'am.
(J)anairo?
he had no fault or intention of causing the

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 73 of 98

 A Yes, Ma'am. Q This Aguilar, do you Janairo to stab Mr.
know him by any . . . Aguilar?
Q What happened?
name other than Mr.
A He immediately
A [He was s]till walking Pakay?
stabbed Mr. Aguilar.
towards home but he
A That is the only name
fell down just in front of Q What happened after
by which I know him.
their stairs. Ricardo Janairo
Q You mentioned that stabbed Mr. Aguilar?
Q And you were at the
person . . . Ricardo
time near the stairs of A He ran away.
Janairo, as the one who
your house?
stabbed Mr. Aguilar[;] Q Who ran away, Mr.
A Yes, Ma'am. do you know this Witness?
Ricardo Janairo?
Q And do you know [to] A Ricardo Janairo.
what direction this A Yes sir.
Appellant failed to show ill motive or any other reason why the
Ricardo Janairo ran
Q If you were ask[ed] to Court should disbelieve the testimonies of the prosecution
away?
point him out, would eyewitnesses. 60 Clearly, there is proof beyond reasonable
A I do not know what you be able to identify doubt that appellant, without any justification, did stab the
direction but he ran him? victim.
towards PSC.
A Yes sir. Penalty
Q And when this
INTERPRETER: Art. 249 61 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes homicide
Bencibeis Aguilar as
with reclusion temporal. Though it correctly found appellant
you said fell down near The man pointed to by
guilty of this crime, the lower court erroneously
the front of the house, the witness when asked
imposed reclusion perpetua on him. Interestingly, both
what if any did you do? his name identified
appellant and appellee agree that the penalty must be
himself as Ricardo
A I went to the wife and modified. Since no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
Janairo.
informed her that her was proven, the proper penalty shall be imposed in its
husband fell down in Q You said that Ricardo medium period. Additionally, appellant is entitled to the
front of their stairs. Janairo stabbed Mr. benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Aguilar, when for the
Johanna dela Cruz corroborated the foregoing. Pertinent Damages
first time you saw
portions of her testimony are reproduced hereunder: 59
Ricardo Janairo? One last point. To establish the civil liability of appellant, the
Q And where is your prosecution duly proved the following:
xxx xxx xxx
home located?
1. One thousand, one
Q Now, Madam
A Inside the PSC hundred thirty-nine
Witness, you said
Compound. pesos and twenty-six
Ricardo Janairo
centavos (P1,139.26)
Q On October 24, 1992, stabbed Mr. Aguilar[;]
as medical expenses
do you remember of in relation to where you
paid to the Palawan
any unusual incident [are] sitting now, where
Adventist Hospital.
that happened? [was] the position of
Ricardo Janairo at the 2. Twelve thousand
A Yes sir.
time of the stabbing? pesos (P12,000.00)
Q And what was that paid to the Sampaton
xxx xxx xxx
unusual incident, Funeral Parlor.
Madam Witness? A He was approaching
3. Ten thousand, three
Mr. Pakay.
A He immediately hundred and sixty
stabbed Mr. Pakay Q Could you tell us if the pesos (P10,360) for the
Aguilar. accused was running expenses during the
or walking towards Mr. wake.
Q When you said "he",
Aguilar?
who stabbed Mr. 4. Sixteen thousand
Aguilar? xxx xxx xxx pesos (P16,000) paid to
the Puerto Princesa
A Ricardo Janairo. A Just walking.
Memorial Park.
Q How many seconds
did it take for Ricardo

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 74 of 98

 5. Five pesos (5) paid to That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury.
the city government of Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified
Puerto Princesa. with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were
already been charged for the same offense before the going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez
Thus, the total amount of actual damages is thirty-nine
Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93- answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil
thousand, five hundred four pesos and twenty-six centavos
129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there ka na."
(P39,504.26), not thirty-nine thousand, seven hundred eighty-
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack,
nine pesos and twenty-six centavos (P39,789.26) as Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an
assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO
computed by the trial court. altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from
QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice
Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing
We also grant the amount of fifty thousand pesos with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back,
Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to
(P50,000.00) by way of indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were
free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and
victim. 62 Because the wife of the deceased testified that she the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela
suffered sadness, anxiety and sleepless night due to the
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but
sudden demise of her husband, 63 we also allow thirty
failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of
thousand pesos (P30,000) as moral damages.1wphi1.nt Criminal Case No. 94-135056
San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision finding appellant The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already
GUILTY of homicide is partially AFFIRMED, with the following EVANGELISTA of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, wounded!"
MODIFICATIONS: (a) he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) committed as follows:
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to a
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) he is ordered to
with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to
pay thirty-nine thousand, five hundred four pesos and twenty-
already been charged for the same offense before the report the incident. However, there was nobody in the
six centavos (P39,504.26) as actual damages, fifty thousand
Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93- precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD
pesos (P50,000) as indemnity ex delicto, and thirty thousand
129892 and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did General Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD
pesos (P30,000) as moral damages. No costs.
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the
SO ORDERED. the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic
acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-
PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated
G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006 him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all wound on his left forearm.
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime
COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner, vs. About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad")
of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. was at the WPD Homicide Division, his station received a call
than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury
from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of
DECISION inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only
Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST
slight and not fatal.
CARPIO, J.: Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong.
The Case Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula,
Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide
cases were tried jointly.
2000 Decision2 and the 7 November 2001 Resolution3 of the and frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of The Version of the Prosecution the inquest prosecutor.
Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station.
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at
Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong") and their friends
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD
were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta.
Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty Homicide Division.
Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the
beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
birthday of Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong
homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal
decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie and
consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the post-mortem
The Charge Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and Quejong. They
examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported
proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of that Quejong sustained two stab wounds and suffered from
homicide and attempted homicide in two Informations,5 as Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the
follows: house, Alberto Almojuela also known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp
a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also
Criminal Case No. 94-135055 likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuelas house. As the reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions
The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela on the right upper body, the wrist and on the lower
EVANGELISTA of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as and his companions blocked their path. extremities.
follows: Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" The Version of the Defense
Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 75 of 98

Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his
residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30
p.m., Almojuelas wife informed him that the group of Paz was
challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a
barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuelas house.
Almojuelas house was about twenty meters away from
Abarquezs house. When he arrived at Almojuelas house,
Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by
Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuelas waist and boxing him
at the stomach. Masula was near Almojuelas head holding a
piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez
shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed
Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still,
the group did not heed Abarquez who then fired a second
warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the
group of Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went
inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way
home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two
kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego") advised him to
report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to
Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk
officer. The desk officer told them that a person had been
stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw
policemen and media men with their barangay chairman. He
informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon
the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police
station to shed light on the incident.
Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his
daughter informed him that there was marijuana smoke
coming to their window. He went outside to look for the
source of the smoke and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula
smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move away
as there were children inside the house. He was on his way
back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later,
Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez
shouting, "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran
away.
Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was
resting in front of his house when he heard a commotion. He
noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista
saw Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the
fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was forced to
fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion
ran away.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court
found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to
prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the
killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted
as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial
court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz,
prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed
Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads: Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as
"those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
finds the accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond
simultaneous acts."17
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as
accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that
correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal
Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted. design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the
performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous
With costs de oficio.
acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
SO ORDERED.12 crime.18 Mere commission of an act, which aids the
perpetrator, is not enough.19 Thus:
Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court
of Appeals. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous
In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is
affirmed the trial courts Decision. The Court of Appeals
therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that
sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the
the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the
principal by direct participation.20
prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided
Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence
rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was merely at the of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to
crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties. mean that he committed the crime charged.21
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of
denied Abarquezs motion for reconsideration. Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified
that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus
Hence, the petition before this Court.
preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with
The Issues Almojuela. Paz testified:
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be q. And what happened in the exchange of words or
summarized as follows: altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo Quejong?
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the a. They grappled with each other, sir.
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals you do, if any?
erred in giving more credence to the testimony of
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale,
the prosecution witnesses.
sir.
Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not
q. And how this Dale hold you?
satisfy the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
that there was a misapprehension of facts and that the trial
PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion
based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by
Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against the accused holding both shoulders, your Honor.
him.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your
The Ruling of This Court shoulders, what happened next, if any?
The petition is meritorious. a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
determine the value and weight of the testimony of a witness.
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what
The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain
happened in the course of grappling, if any?
facts of substance and value, which if considered, might
affect the result of the case.16 This case is an exception to the You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other,
rule. what happened in the course of grappling? (sic)
Concurrence in Criminal Design a. They fell to the ground, sir.
q. After that what happened next, if any?
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 76 of 98
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his
from the hold of Dale and I approach the two. I saw Ricky and told you Joey tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to
blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic) would be the reason? the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not
necessarily show concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act.
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic) a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.
When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir. COURT: wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of
the extent of Quejongs injury and he expected Paz to look
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to
after his own companion.
Ricky or Ricardo? (sic) Bitoy when the accused tried to hold you and prevent you?
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 a. Yes, sir.
should be resolved in his favor. Thus:
inches including the handle).
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent
q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while not pacifying you but to stop you from helping the victim?
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
you were trying to free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez,
a. Yes, sir. presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle
"Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez
of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution
reprimanded you? (sic) xxx xxx xxx has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt.
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22 q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be
uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na, is it not? removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no
xxx xxx xxx reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The
q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?
Joey tumigil ka na. 24
defense need not even speak at all. The presumption of
a. Yes, sir.
Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with innocence is more than sufficient.27
q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Almojuelas criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence
Quejong, is it not?23 Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side
not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
a. They were just arguing, sir.
to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been proof loses.28 Hence:
[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because
shoulders by the accused [C]overdale Abarquez? Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an attempt to prevent inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
a. Yes, sir.
him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not? the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
a. Yes, sir on my side. Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the
from further quarrelling you, is it not? from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was accused of the crime charged is found lacking.29
trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir. trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to June 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001 Resolution of the
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the Almojuela. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the
shoulder by Abarquez? In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained: 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
ATTY. GASCON: Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No
as the witness while the witness act as the accused words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in pronouncement as to costs.
demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter preventing conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus,
the witness and saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na. it is essential that both were united in their criminal design. SO ORDERED.

COURT: xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of
the (principals) criminal design did not automatically make G.R. No. 157221 March 30, 2007
q. How many times? him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show
a. Twice, Your Honor. his concurrence in the principals criminal intent. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CESAR
GALVEZ, Appellant.
ATTY. GASCON: Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop
Almojuela. However, Paz testified that Abarquezs son D E C I S I O N
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na Bardie, who was one of Pazs companions, was the one trying
because you were trying to attack Bitoy, is it not? AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
to pacify Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was For review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of
1

(sic) holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela. 26 Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001,
which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Isabela, Basilan finding the accused-appellant Cesar Galvez

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 77 of 98

(Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the penalty of the Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds the
RTC from a sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) the crime were not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10 accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a member of the Philippine
months and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27,
maximum" to reclusion perpetua. in committing the crime of Murder as alleged in the
1995 with the following findings:
Information and which crime is defined and penalized under
The facts are as follows:
From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, but considering his good
At around 11 oclock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo case, this Court finds the following facts to be undisputable, military records after the commission of the crime, hereby
Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo Francisco and to wit: sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17)
Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio
leftover dinner inside the copra kiln in the farm of Perez in TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum, which is the minimum
Enojarda, while making copra in the coconut land of
Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from period of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to death.
Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was
the circle where they were eating to drink water, shots rang And to indemnify the heirs of the late Rosalio Enojarda, the
shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How many
out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting "Dan ya tupa amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the Court
gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his
comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory
body was hit by the gunfire, the evidence is found
crawling to different directions. After the attack, Rellios penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.
wanting.
reported the incident to the barangay captain and they
And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military
brought Enojardas dead body to his family. 3
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of
ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed Forces of the
the incident which was July 27, 1991, the accused
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Philippines.
Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.
Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine National Police
And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall
(PNP) for Murder, which reads: xxx
immediately be committed to the Provincial Jail where the
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the 3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite Provincial Warden is directed to immediately transfer him to
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at Matarling, rifleallegedly found by Barangay Captain the National Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal Colony at
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, Inocente Manicap from the scene of the crime and Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.
the above named accused, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso, the Police
And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional
with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to Investigator of this case, did not come from the M16
liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and its pertinent papers
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460, the gun issued
returned, upon receipt to the bondsman.16
assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda with the said to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11
M16 armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot wound on the Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the
body of the latter which caused his death.4 No. 18255, which rendered its Decision on March 30, 2001
prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were credible and
affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be imposed,
The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure themselves;
thus:
Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover and Rellios that the testimony of defense witness SPO2 Ramillano was
while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters away full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR
holding an armalite rifle and firing at their direction; Rellios was insufficient to disprove the presence of the accused at GALVEZ is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the
also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize the scene of the crime.12 decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
them as well as the firearms they carried because they were respects.17
The RTC concluded:
approximately nine meters away;5 Perez, also crawled and
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally
hid in the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16
liable based on conspiracy when such fact was not alleged in
stopped, one of the attackers passed by about two meters armalite rifle on that night of July 27, 1991, and those five (5)
the Information. However, it still found Galvez guilty of
from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx the
Murder.18 The CA reasoned that: the negative results of the
bright, he recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a bullet that hit and instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on that
paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that
fatigue uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez came
Galvez used another gun in shooting the victim; the
that Galvez had three armed companions but did not from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons
eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified Galvez as the
recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because who were the companions of the accused, Cesar Galvez at
perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of the crime; alibi,
they were about nine meters from Galvez.6 the night of the incident xxx. (emphasis supplied)
13
which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege and cannot prevail over positive identification; the offer of
that he was staying at his father-in-laws house on July 27, conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity Galvez to the wife of the victim to have the case settled is also
1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez of murder a strong indication of Galvezs culpability; and treachery was
He went home and slept with his wife soon after. 7 To based on conspiracy since Galvez was seen by two witnesses adequately established as the attack was sudden,
corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his unexpected and did not accord the victim an opportunity to
Ramillano, a visitor at his father-in-laws house and unidentified armed companions.14 The trial court also held defend himself.19 The CA further held that since there was no
Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also that the offer of Galvez to have the case settled out of court is mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty should
presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and an indication of his guilt.15 be reclusion perpetua.20
Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Region 9,
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA
Zamboanga City, who testified that the paraffin test The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:
denied in its Resolution dated August 21, 2001, stating that it
conducted on both his hands showed that there was no WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters
nitrate present; and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic surrounding the commission of the crime, being carefully and
9

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 78 of 98

was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed in the [THE] RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the
decision.22 OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. incident; in this case, the paraffin test was conducted on
Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was
The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court IV.
also positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO of four armed men who attacked them during the incident;
Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a
ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE Perez clarified that while he was in a crawling position, he
Resolution23 accepting the case; committing the accused to
CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION. was looking upward, thus, he was able to identify Galvez;
the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused
between Galvezs alibi and the positive declarations of
and the Solicitor General that they may file additional briefs V.
witnesses whose testimonies have not been assailed nor
with this Court.24
NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED- discredited by improper motive, the latter deserves greater
In his Appellants Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court APPELLANT. credence; the trial court correctly convicted Galvez of
erred: murder as there was treachery since the victim was not in a
VI. position to defend himself from the attack of the accused; the
I
TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248
IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS PRESUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE of the Revised Penal Code as there was no mitigating
LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF ROSALIO WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS circumstance;31 Galvez is also liable for temperate damages
ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS PRESUMED.26 of P25,000.00 since pecuniary loss has been suffered
FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT FIRE although its exact amount could not be determined, and
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellants exemplary damages of P25,000.00 due to the presence of the
HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET
Brief adding that: qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount
THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE
BEEN FIRED FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES VII of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to
BELONGING TO ANY OF THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED the heirs of the victim together with the P50,000.00 awarded
PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR INDICTED THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED by the trial court for moral damages.32
TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN THE SAME CRIMINAL IN DISREGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND
INFORMATION IN QUESTION. BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED- After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court
APPELLANT SHOT THE DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE resolves to acquit Galvez.
II OTHER THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO HIM.27 Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an
IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal accused may be held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In
RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE CHESTS cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt because an accused the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information,
WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER is always presumed to be innocent unless proven an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by
CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD SEEN THE otherwise;28 when circumstances yield two or more him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption not collective.33
IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of As explained in People v. Tampis,34
PEREZ [sic] POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS guilt, the court must side with that which will acquit the
IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED accused; in this case, the RTC found undisputed the fact that The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely
WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27, 1991 and inferred, in the information. Absence of a particular
MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE NARRATED BY HIM.25 the firearm that was used in killing the victim was owned and statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
possessed by another man, as shown by the negative results concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy
In his Supplemental Appellants Brief, Galvez further claims
of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the statement of Danilo renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable
that it was seriously erroneous:
Perez that he saw the accused on the night of July 27, 1991 is for the individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of them
I. not credible since Perez was in a crawling position with his would be held accountable only for their respective
chest almost touching the ground at the time he allegedly saw participation in the commission of the offense.35
TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY
the accused; Judge Memoracion, who penned the decision The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v.
BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER
could not have assessed the demeanor of the prosecution Quitlong, the Court explained:
MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
witnesses while testifying as it was another judge who heard
II. and received their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses, Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the
who corroborated his (Galvezs) alibi are unbiased and trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an
TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal
unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it is the
INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION, MORE SO THE THEORY consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has
only defense if it is the truth and it assumes importance where
OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE been apprised when the charge is made conformably with
the prosecution evidence is weak; the statement of the trial
BEING NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED IN THE PRESENT prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article
court that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-
CASE. III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
judicially settled is a tacit admission of guilt is also
III. unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that shows mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a
that the accused made an offer to settle the case out of criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of
court.30
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right
INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in
the paraffin test and the ballistic examination are not procedural rules. x x x

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 79 of 98

xxx
x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact
which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the
nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with
the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all
the others. Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not
only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as
well.36
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this
case, it is imperative that the prosecution prove Galvezs
direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the
prosecution failed to do.
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Rellios and Perez
that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on
the night in question. The positive identification of these
witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the negative
results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.37
We disagree.
The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot
the victim. While this Court does not ordinarily interfere with
the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of
witnesses, when there appears on the records, however,
facts and circumstances of real weight which might have
been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk
from its duty to render the law and apply justice.38
During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:
Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00
oclock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what happened?
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine
where it came from and one of our companion was hit.
Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was
hit?
A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.
xxx
Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion
Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?
A: I dropped and crawled, sir.
xxx
Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among
the grasses?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were COURT: (To the witness)
already hiding among the grasses?
In other words you were only presuming that it was him.
A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I
A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.
was hiding about two meters from me.
ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)
Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by
where you were hiding, who was that culprit? Did you understand the question when you were asked by the
Court. Since you did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at the
A: Cesar Galvez, sir.
victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes
xxx thereafter, you only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr.
Enojarda?
COURT:
A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed
by? Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances
appear to have been established: (1) at around 11 p.m.,
xxx
Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two companions were
Q: Was it 30 minutes after? eating merienda near the copra kiln when they were sprayed
with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the
xxx
ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked
A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes. and crawled to seek cover; (4) about five minutes after the
first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle,
Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and their two companions as
by together with his companions around 20 to 25 minutes well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to
after you heard the shots, is that what you want to impress 25 minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again
this Court? seen clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle
A: Yes, Your Honor. along with three armed companions, after which, their group
left the scene of the crime.
xxx
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish
Q: Did you see him really shoot? the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied) It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be
During his cross-examination, Perez further testified: observed in assaying the probative value of circumstantial
evidence:
Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different
directions, was not true? x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the
essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt
what we did was to drop and crawl. of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with
COURT: (To the witness) certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense.
You did not see the one firing? The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of
Yes, your Honor, because I crawled. events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the
Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1)
accused and companions pass by? particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which
A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to
has about 20 to 25 minutes.40 the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.43
xxx as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt every
Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused; 44 and that
Enojarda? every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the
A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied). accused must be duly taken into account.45
Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are
following: mainly based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals,
Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda? however, other circumstances that should be appreciated in
A: No sir. favor of Galvez, to wit:
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 80 of 98
 (a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw
Galvez with three other armed companions minutes
after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that
they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting of
Enojarda.46
(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot
at Enojarda and that he merely assumed that Galvez
was the one who shot the victim when the latter
passed by him.48 Rellios testified that he only
presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda.49
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding
with Galvez50 and that he does not know any motive
why Enojarda was killed.51
In considering both favorable and "incriminating"
circumstances for or against Galvez, the following must
always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez
as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder; that the three
other armed men were not included as John Does; and that
there was no allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that Galvez was the sole author of the shot that killed
Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not point to
Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The presence of
the three armed men raises the probability that any one of
those men inflicted the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the
prosecution witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez
who shot Enojarda.
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after
Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish that Galvez
was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that
Galvez was seen or was together with the three other armed
men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that
precludes the Court from concluding that it was Galvez who
shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said therefore that there was
positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial
evidence.
In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others as the guilty person.54 (Emphasis
supplied)
And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:
To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is
reasonable doubt, which simply means that the prosecutions
evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the
accused-petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty that another person shot Enojarda. There were three other
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the armed men, any one of whom could be the culprit.
conscience of those who are to act upon it. It is such proof to
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to
the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption
prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond
of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis
reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the
except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based
commission of the crime is established.62Indeed, the State,
on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds
aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on
of correctly identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts
the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the
weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and
strength of its evidence and without solace from the
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
weakness of the defense.64
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support this Court that it was erroneous for the CA to have affirmed
a conviction, and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused the RTC ruling that Galvezs offer to the victims wife to settle
should be considered.56 (Emphasis supplied). the case is a tacit admission of guilt.65
And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of
purely circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is vital. As held compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57 an implied admission of guilt,66 such principle is not
applicable in this case.
Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an
element of the crime. However, motive becomes important The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on
when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely offer of compromise,67 is the March 3, 1993 Order of the RTC
circumstantial or inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this which reads as follows:
case.58
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty.
In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court together with
not know of any motive on the part of Galvez to kill Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that
Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in there is a possibility of understanding and settlement
favor of Galvez. between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset
for new assignment.68
In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to
wit: Galvezs supposed offer of compromise was not formally
offered and admitted as evidence during the trial. The
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given
victims widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on
effect to the constitutional presumption of innocence which
any offer of compromise made by Galvez. We have held that
can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable
when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is
doubt one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that
amorphous, the same shall not benefit the prosecution in its
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
case against the accused.69
who are to act upon it. As we have so stated in the past
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
an offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of
synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the
guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a
and documentary, independently of whatever defense is legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever
had been committed precisely by the person on trial under may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance permitted to show that the offer was not made under a
favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify
suspicion must not be permitted to sway a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not
judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied) in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by
therefrom.71 (Emphasis supplied).
the circumstantial evidence, failed to exclude the possibility
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 81 of 98
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in
court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer
under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the
opportunity to explain that it was given for some other reason
that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt
or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences.
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails
over the alleged implied admission of guilt. In Godoy, the
Court, in acquitting the accused, explained that:
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more
presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused
and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to
examine the basis for each presumption and determine what
logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then
determine which should be regarded as the more important
and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating
his guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with
all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
proving the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until the defendants guilt is shown in this manner, the
presumption of innocence continues.72
xxx
The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first
principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial
part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or
conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the
crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its
purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be
an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against
the People and all the resources at their command. Its
inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence
of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set
free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a
doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in
evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence
rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.73
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of
Galvez, there could not be a moral certainty as to the guilt of
Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.
It may be pointed out that the following circumstances
support the conviction of Galvez as charged:
(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic
tests do not prove that Galvez did not fire a gun;
(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have
justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is
inherently weak;
(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law Galvezs guilt. Although an accused must satisfactorily prove
as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the
their house on the night in question; and prosecution to prove the accuseds guilt. The prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the
the investigating police officer.
prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the innocence of an accused by competent and credible
discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez beyond evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
reasonable doubt. presumption remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.79
conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as held by this
Court in People v. Pagal and People v. Teehankee which That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the
74 75
were cited by the CA in its Decision, since it is possible for a investigating police officer is a prerogative given to the
person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or accused and should not be given evidentiary value to
gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or establish his guilt. In People v. Saavedra,80 the Court held that
washed afterwards.76 Such principle, however, has no an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence
bearing in the present case. In should not be construed as an admission of guilt.
the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is
negative finding does not prove that the accused therein had
inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to
not fired a gun because the accused were positively identified
discharge the onus of his identity and
by witnesses as having shot their victims, unlike in the case
culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the strength of the
at hand where Galvez is not positively identified by direct or
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the
circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle
obligation is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove
should be given any weight at all, it should be in favor of
the guilt of the accused and not the accused to prove his
Galvez, that is, considering that he is not positively identified,
innocence.82 The prosecutions job is to prove that the
then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster his claim
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.83 Thus, when the
that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around.
evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved and
examination does not prove that Galvez did not fire a gun released at once.84
during the incident as it was possible that he used another
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal
gun, should also be struck down. It is the prosecution which
of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people to jail
has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other
but to render justice.85 Under our criminal justice system, the
than the one issued to him and that such firearm, which
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It is not for
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility adverted to by
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86
the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the
innocence. Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in this case for the
untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would also not
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin
be served with the conviction of the herein accused. It is well
and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove that Galvez did
to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:
not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be
used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to prove that In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime
he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand.
precepts of criminal law which presumes the innocence of Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators
the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accuseds of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her
innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is
him must survive the test of reason, and the strongest bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77 of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion
whether privileged or less privileged to be invoked without
That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his
fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an
presence at the scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, yet
acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the
he put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez
prosecution has not proved.87(Emphasis supplied)
did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to
corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden
in question, pertain to the weakness of Galvezs alibi which of proving Galvezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court
may cast doubt on his innocence. However, these has no choice but to acquit him.
circumstances do not prove beyond reasonable doubt
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 82 of 98
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, personal belongings of all and on the occasion of "AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO KUNG AYAW
Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 1816 dated said robbery in order to instill more fear among MONG MAMATAY" with additional warning to
February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in passengers, said accused in pursuit of their maintain the same speed as the vehicles preceding
CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001 conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully them. Thence accused Pineda instructed his
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant and feloniously with intent to kill shot in different companions to close all the windows and bus
Cesar Galvez is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his parts of his body one SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA Y curtains and commanded the passengers to bow
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Director INCINARES, PNP, who as a consequence of the down their heads. Irked by Ferrers act of stepping
of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the wounds died shortly thereafter to the damage and on the brake too often accused Pineda pressed the
immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being lawfully prejudice of all passengers, bus driver, conductor gun on his nape telling him "PUTANG INA MO KUNG
held for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly and the family of deceased SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida y GUSTO MONG MABUHAY AYUSIN MO ANG
within ten (10) days from notice. Incinares. PAGMAMANEHO MO" and then followed by another
instruction to his cohorts: "SAMSAMIN NINYO
SO ORDERED. CONTRARY TO LAW.4
LAHAT ANG MASASAMSAM NINYO DIYAN" or
The police arrested appellant on 5 September 1998 and words of similar import. At this juncture, Ramos,
detained him on 8 September 1998 in the Caloocan City Jail who was at a distance of one-half (1/2) meter from
G.R. No. 141644 May 27, 2004
for other criminal cases. The police arrested appellant for accused Pineda was ordered by the latter to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLANDO Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 546515 before Branch 131 of surrender to him his collections which out of fear he
PINEDA y MANALO, CELSO SISON y LLOREN (at large), the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.6 readily obeyed by handing over to Pineda the days
VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET alias "VICTOR earnings of P5,700. It was at that point while Ramos
Arraignment and Plea
COLET" (acquitted), TOTIE JACOB alias "TOTIE" (at large), was giving the money to Pineda when he took a
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE (at large), accused, ROLANDO Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment on 24 May glance at the left side of Pinedas face. Thence while
PINEDA y MANALO, appellant. 1999. After appellant had rested his case, the police arrested his cohorts were divesting the passengers of their
Colet. Colet pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on 27 cash and valuables accused Pineda was
DECISION continuously poking his gun at Ferrers neck and
September 1999. When the trial court rendered its decision,
CARPIO, J.: the other accused remained at large. would press it harder whenever he stepped on the
brake. Thence after Ferrer was divested by the
The Case The Trial robbers of his wallet containing his drivers license
On automatic review is the Decision1 dated 21 January 2000 The Version of the Prosecution and cash in the amount of P1,000 which incidentally
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, he borrowed earlier from a loan shark in EDSA and
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) the victims wife while the bus was somewhere in Malaria, Caloocan
National Capital Judicial Region ("trial court") in Criminal
Amalia Fuensalida; (2) bus driver Camilo Ferrer ("Ferrer"); (3) City, a commotion ensued inside the bus when one
Case No. C-53860 (98). The trial court found appellant
conductor Jimmy Ramos ("Ramos"); (4) PO3 Napoleon passenger later identified as Victim SPO1 Arnel
Rolando Pineda ("appellant") guilty of robbery with homicide,
Andaya; (5) PO3 Celerino Susano; and (6) Philippine National Fuensalida grappled with one of the hold-uppers for
attended by the aggravating circumstance of commission by
Police ("PNP") Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra. the possession of his clutch bag containing his
a band. The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the death
penalty and to pay the legal heirs of the victim SPO1 Arnel The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence thus: service firearm. In the course thereof the
Fuensalida ("Fuensalida") civil indemnity and damages. concerned malefactor shouted: "BOSS INAGAW
At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while bus ANG BARIL KO" prompting accused Pineda to shout
The Charge driver Camilo Ferrer (Ferrer for short) was driving back "TIRAHIN NA, PATAYIN NA, PAG LUMABAN,
his assigned passenger bus, the "Dreamline Aircon PATAYIN NA." Immediately thereafter and while the
The Information2 charged appellant, along with Celso Sison y
Bus" bearing Plate No. PWZ-208 with around fifty bus was in Pangarap Village, Caloocan City, six (6)
Lloren3 ("Sison"), Victor Emmanuel Colet ("Colet"), Totie
(50) passengers on board and heading for Tungko, shots rang out. Apparently fearing that the gunfire
Jacob ("Jacob"), John Doe and Peter Doe, with the crime of
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused Rolando would catch the attention of the highway patrol,
Highway Robbery resulting in Homicide, as follows:
Pineda (Accused Pineda for short) and his five (5) accused Pineda commanded his cohorts to check
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997, in companions boarded the bus along Quirino through the window if any patrol car was following
Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the above-named Highway near Lagro. Thence after the bus them and uttered: "HUWAG KAYONG
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping conductor Jimmy Ramos (Ramos for short) had MAGPAPAPUTOK." Not long afterwards accused
each other, with intent to gain and posing as collected the passengers individual fares, he Pineda remarked: "MALAPIT NA TAYO" and again
passengers of an AIRCONDITIONED BUS posted himself at the front door of the bus when ordered Ferrer: "DIRETSO MO LANG." As directed,
"DREAMLINE AIRCON BUS" then cruising along suddenly accused Pineda who was seated behind Ferrer kept on driving until accused Pineda ordered
Quirino Highway, Malaria, Caloocan City with more Ramos rose from his seat, prompting Ramos to turn him to stop the bus upon reaching Sampaguita
or less sixty (60) passengers, said accused by his head and look at Pineda. Forthwith the latter Street, Caloocan City where all the malefactors
means of violence and intimidation upon all held driver Ferrer by the neck while poking a gun at alighted with their loot including victim Fuensalidas
passengers as well as the bus driver and conductor, his nape and shouted to his companion: "TOTIE, service firearm i.e. a caliber .38 Smith and Wesson
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and IKUHA MO AKO NG SAPATOS DIYAN PARA revolver bearing Serial No. 47840. Thereafter the
feloniously stage a HOLD-UP by pulling out their MAUMPISAHAN NA ANG LARO," and then passengers started crying and some even lost
respective firearms and poke the same against announced a hold-up. While Ferrer was looking at consciousness. As suggested by one passenger,
everybody especially against the bus driver and accused Pineda through the rear-view mirror in they all alighted at the Tungko Police Station, San
conductor and they started to take and rob cash and front of the drivers seat, Pineda warned the former, Jose del Monte, Bulacan where a lady passenger

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 83 of 98

screamed: "PATAY NA, PATAY NA," referring to the
victim whose body was lying face down on the bus
flooring. However for lack of jurisdiction the police
officers thereat referred Ferrer, Ramos and the
crying lady to Malaria Police Station, Caloocan City.
The police officers after looking at the victims
cadaver and conducting an initial investigation
referred them to the Urduja Police Station. At the
Urduja Police Station, police investigators PO3
Celerino Susano and SPO1 Ernesto Mandanas of the
Investigation Section were dispatched to Malaria,
Caloocan City where subject bus bearing Plate No.
PWZ-208 and body no. 2657 was found parked in
front of the Kababayan Center. An ocular inspection
of the bus disclosed the lifeless body of victim lying
facedown on the flooring. Recovered inside the bus
were two (2) slugs (Exhs. "I" and "I-1") and two (2)
empty shells (Exhs. "J" and "J-1"). Thereafter the
body was brought to El Ruaro Funeral Parlor where
the same was subsequently identified by victims
widow Mrs. Amalia Fuensalida. Meanwhile the
police investigators took down on the same day the
sworn statements of Ferrer (Exh. "E") and Ramos
("Exh. "H" with submarkings "H-1" and "H-2") as
well as that of the private complainant Amalia
Fuensalida (Private Complainant for short) (Exh. "B"
with submarking "B-1").
It came to pass that P/Supt. Benjamin Cabiltes,
Chief of Urduja Police Sub-Station 4, Camarin Road,
Caloocan City assigned the team of SPO1 Carlito
Alas, PO3 Napoleon Andaya, Sgt. De Guzman and
other operatives of the Special Operations Group to
conduct follow-up investigation of the case. Initially
the team repaired to the police station in San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan where the bus was first brought
and based from [sic] information furnished by an
unidentified bus passenger to the effect that the
robber called for one "Totie" in the course of the
robbery, an inquiry was accordingly made as to
whether they know persons by that name to which
the San Jose del Monte police identified the man as
Totie Jacob, a member of the gang of accused
Rolando Pineda who with another companion
named Celso Sison was said to be detained at the
Municipal Jail of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan for
another case of robbery. Proceeding to the said
place the team found out that the duo were already
out on bail. Thence, after the pictures of accused
Pineda (Exh. "B") and Sison (Exh. "C") from the file
of said Municipal Jail were shown by the Team to
Ferrer, the latter positively identified the duo as two
of the six (6) malefactors involved in the robbery
with homicide in question (Karagdagang Salaysay
dated 6 Nov. 1997 Exh. "E-1").
With the above findings together with the sworn
statements of witnesses and the Joint Affidavits of
SPO1 Carlito Alas and PO3 Napoleon Andaya (Exh.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
"D" with submarkings "D-1" and "D-2"), as well as
Affidavit of PO3 Celerino Susano (Exh. "F" with
submarkings "F-1" and "F-2"), and other pertinent
documents such as the Death Certificate of victim
(Exh. "P" with submarkings "P-1" and "P-2"), the
case against accused Rolando Pineda, Celso Sison,
Victor Colet, Totie Jacob, and two "Does," "John"
and "Peter," were referred to the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Caloocan City for appropriate action by
P/Supt. Cabiltes per referral slip dated 10
November 1997 (Exh. "G" with submarking "G-1")
which resulted in the filing of instant charge against
the aforenamed accused after a preliminary
investigation conducted by Asst. City Prosecutor
Sancho G. Lomadilla.
Per the record, the cadaver of the victim was
autopsied on 16 October 1997 by Medico Legal
Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Services, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, per Request for Laboratory Examination of the
Caloocan City Police Station (Exh. "K") and the
Certification of Identification and Consent for
Autopsy (Exh. "L") signed by the Private
Complainant. Dr. Freyras findings was [sic]
embodied in her Medico Legal Report No. M-1509-
97 (Exh. "M" with submarkings "M-1," "M-2" and "M-
3") with its annexes, i.e. sketches of Human Head
and Body (Exh. "N" with submarkings "N-1" to "N-4"
and Exh. "O" with submarkings "O-1" and "O-2,"
respectively), which disclosed the following
findings and conclusion:
"FINDINGS:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, male cadaver in
rigor mortis with post mortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. The conjunctiva are
pale. The lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.
"HEAD, TRUNK, EXTREMITY:
(1) Gunshot wound, left parietal region,
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm just left of the
midsagittal line, 167.5 cm from the heel,
with an abraded collar measuring 0.1 cm
uniformly, directed posteriorwards,
downwards and medialwards, fracturing
the left parietal and left sphenoid bone,
lacerating both left cerebral hemisphere,
with subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrhages. A deformed slug recovered
embedded at the left sphenoid bone.
(2) Gunshot wound, left post auricular
region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 11 cm from
the posterior midline, 156.5 cm from the
heel, with an abraded collar measuring 0.1
cm uniformly, directed anteriorwards,
downwards and medialwards, fracturing
left temporal and left sphenoid bone,
lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere,
with subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrhages. A deformed slug recovered
embedded at the left sphenoid bone.
(3) Contusion, left supraorbital region,
measuring 4 x 3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior
midline.
(4) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 8 x 3
cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline.
(5) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of
entry, right submanibular region
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 7 cm from the
anterior midline, 146 cm from the heel,
with an abraded collar, measuring 0.1 cm
uniformly, an area of smudging measuring
4.5 x 2, 2.5 cm, 146 cm from the heel,
directed posteriorwards, upwards and to
the left fracturing the left mandible,
lacerating the larynx, making a point of exit
at the left preauricular region, measuring
1.5 x 1 cm, 14 cm from the anterior midline,
154 cm from the heel.
(6) Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of
entry, epigastric region, measuring 0.8 x
0.7 cm, 2 cm left of the anterior midline,
115 cm from the heel with an abraded
collar, measuring 0.1 cm uniformly,
directed posteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards, passing thru the 4th left
intercostal space, lacerating the left dome
of the diaphragm, stomach and the spleen,
making a point of exit at the left posterior
costal region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 10
cm from the posterior midline, 109 cm
from the heel.
(7) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of
entry, vertebral region, measuring 0.8 x
0.7 cm, just left of the posterior midline,
122 cm from the heel, with an abraded
collar, measuring 0.2 cm inferiorly, 0.1 cm
superiorly, medially and laterally, directed
anteriorwards, upwards and lateralwards,
fracturing the 9th left thoracic rib,
lacerating both lobes of the left lung,
making a point of exit at the left anterior
axillary region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 14
cm from the anterior midline, 126 cm from
the heel.
(8) Gunshot wound, right shoulder,
measuring 0.9 x 0.7 cm, 4 cm from the
posterior midline, 144 cm from the heel,
with an abraded collar, measuring 0.5 cm
laterally, 0.2 cm superiorly, 0.1 cm
inferiorly and medially, directed
anteriorwards, downwards and
Page 84 of 98
 lateralwards. A deformed slug recovered
embedded thereat.
There is about 800 cc of blood in the abdominal
cavity.
The stomach is full of partially digested food
particles, negative for alcoholic odor.
The rest of the visceral organs are grossly
unremarkable.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage secondary to multiple
gunshot wounds, head and trunk."
Elucidating on her medical findings, Dr. Freyra
testified that she found six (6) gunshot wounds in the
victims body, one abrasion and one contusion.
Gunshot wounds designated in the Medico Legal
report as Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were fatal; that judging
from the nature of the wounds, wherein the six (6)
gunshots had the same points of entries all
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, the fatal weapon was
possibly a .38 cal. revolver; however, she could not
form any opinion as to the number of assailant[s];
that the contusion on the left eye was brought about
by the blood in the head owing to several fractures
in the skull while the abrasion could have been
brought about by the rubbing of the affected area
with a rough surface. On the relative position of the
victim with the assailant/s it is possible that when
gunshot wounds nos. 1, 2 and 6 were inflicted, the
assailant was somewhere at the extreme left of the
victim who could be in a lying or sitting position or at
a lower level than the assailant with the muzzle of
the gun pointed downward. Gunshot wound no. 5
was inflicted at close range. Gunshot wound no. 7
which was located at victims back could have been
sustained while victim was in any of the three
aforecited positions as nos. 1, 2 and 6 while the
trajectory of gunshot wound no. 8 was also going
downward toward the lateral side of the body.
Dr. Freyra went on to add that some of the gunshot
wounds had points of entries and exits while others
did not have any exit wound thus this explains her
extraction of the deformed slugs (Exhs. "Q-1," "Q-2"
and "Q-3") from the victims body and the recovery
of police of slugs at the crime scene.
On the hearing of 16 July 1999 the Defense Counsel
agreed to stipulate that the private complainant
incurred the total amount of P60,000 representing
the funeral and other related expenses for the
deceased.
Testifying on the civil aspect of the case the private
complainant alleged that as Senior Police Officer I,
victim was receiving the monthly salary
of P9,277.50; that as a result of the death of her
husband she suffered mental block, wounded the Courts file; that he was again framed-up by the
feelings and sleepless nights and was very sad police on 15 November 1999 when he was arrested
thinking of what would be in store for their three by elements of the Caloocan City Police Station,
small children.7 Sub-Station 6, Bagong Silang for allegedly
concealing a deadly weapon and assault which was
The Version of the Defense
referred for inquest by Sub-Station Commander
The defense presented four witnesses: (1) appellant; (2) his Capt. VALDEZ to Inquest Prosecutor ACUA who
contractor Lillian Tan ("Tan"); (3) his acquaintance Efren however ordered his release as no evidence was
Quiton ("Quiton"); and (4) his co-accused Colet. The trial confiscated from his person, thus, he was released
court summarized appellants bid for an acquittal in this wise: from detention on 18 November 1997; that his
alleged involvement in the instant case which
On that day of 15 October 1997 from 8:00 a.m. to
occurred on 15 October 1997 was not even brought
5:00 p.m., accused was in the house of one VICTOR
up by the Sub-Station 6 operatives during his
"INTING" VILLENA in Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala,
custodial investigation before Prosecutor ACUA;
Caloocan City where he installed the electrical
that in furtherance of the police efforts to file trump-
wiring per contract with contractor LILLIAN TAN.
up [sic] charge against him the Caloocan City Police
He never left his said place of work on that
Station, Sub-Station 6, Bagong Silang implicated
particular day and as a matter of fact LILLIAN TAN
him for alleged Violation of P.D. 1866 and Robbery
even served him lunch and snacks in the morning
which allegedly happened on 5 September 1997
and afternoon. After finishing his work he was
despite the fact that he was detained as early as 5
paid P500 by his contractor and at 5:00 p.m. he went
August 1998 [sic] at the Caloocan City Jail and
home which is only one hundred meters away or a
ironically this resulted in the filing of two
five minutes [sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENAS
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and
house. Upon arriving home he rested for 5 minutes
54651, respectively, against him now pending
then took a bath and at around 6:00 p.m. he went to
before RTC Branch 131, this City (Exhs. "2" and "3"
the nearby house of his contractor LILLIAN TAN
with submarkings "2-A" and "3-A", respectively);
where he talked with her and drunk [sic] some beer
that while in jail he met fellow inmate EFREN
until 9:00 p.m. when he went home and ate dinner
QUITON from Bulacan who expressed surprise on
then retired to bed at around 10:00 p.m.; that he
why he was implicated in the instant case as he
does not know anything about the shooting incident
claimed to know what really happened and the
in question; that his house in Gumamela St., Malaria,
persons really involved in this case and volunteered
Tala, Caloocan City is about 30 to 45 minutes ride to
to testify for him in Court.
or from Lagro, Quezon City and a distance of around
On 1 September 1999, the Defense Counsel recalled
4 to 5 kilometers to Quirino Highway, Malaria, this
Accused PINEDA (TSN 1 September 1999) to the
City where according to prosecution witnesses
witness stand who testified that he remembered an
CAMILO FERRER and JIMMY RAMOS the shooting
event which occurred on 15 August 1997 when he
incident in question occurred; that he had no
figured in a rumble and the unnamed male person
previous encounter or quarrel with these FERRER
who was seriously wounded as a result of his
and RAMOS and did not know them prior to the
punches turned out to be the nephew of police
incident; and that he saw for the first time police
officer TITO ALAS who was the one who arrested
investigator PO3 CELERINO SUSANO in court; that
him in connection with instant case and whose
[the] instant charge against him was fabricated as
he was just implicated by his co-accused VICTOR house was a distance of around 300 meters away
COLET, who is a brother of a policeman, and CELSO from his house; that subsequently his sister
SISON @ BOYET TARTARO, an asset of the police informed him that after he stepped out of the house,
which arose from the rivalry over a woman he had police officer TITO ALAS came looking for him and
with CELSO SISON who is a good friend of VICTOR had he found him then he could have been killed.
COLET; that the duo who managed to elude arrest,
The defense presented Miss LILLIAN TAN who
were heard to say that he would rot in jail; that
corroborated the alibi defense of the Accused,
CELSO SISON was also instrumental for [sic] his
further professing lack of knowledge about the
arrest by SPO2 ABRAHAM FERNANDEZ and SPO1
incident in question and maintained that except that
LEOPOLDO DAVID for alleged violation of P.D. 1866
of a contractor-worker relationship, no other
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del
relation exist [sic] between her and Accused
Monte, Bulacan which was however subsequently
PINEDA.
dismissed after he posted the required bailbond on
5 August 1999 (Exh. "1"); that his picture shown by The other defense witness EFREN QUITON
the Caloocan City Police to the witnesses in the corroborated the testimony of the Accused relative
instant case must have been secured by them from to his getting acquainted with him at the City Jail and
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 85 of 98
his knowledge about the offense for which he
(accused) was being implicated. He testified in this
wise:
He (EFREN QUITON) was a resident of Grotto, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan prior to his detention and
is detained at the Caloocan City Jail on charge of
illegal possession of shabu during pot session
which occurred on 10 June 1999; that while thus
under detention he came to know his fellow inmate
ROLANDO PINEDA and on "10 June 1996" (p. 3, TSN
of 31 August 1999 QUITON) the latter intimated to
him about his (Accuseds) case to which he
expressed surprise considering that sometime on
16 October 1997, SPO4 MARIO LARENAS
approached him inquiring on whether he saw
BOYET TARTARO, VICTOR COLET and one TITO
who were said to be the suspects in the bus hold-up
incident wherein one policeman was killed and that
the name of the Accused PINEDA was never
mentioned as among those he suspected; that he
knows very well this BOYET TARTARO, a police
aide, who used to handle the traffic at the crossroad
of Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte and a
certain COLET because both were often seen
together. While SPO4 LARENAS had mentioned to
him that the incident for which the aforenamed trio
were the suspects [in the robbery with homicide
case that] happened in Caloocan City, however, no
mention was made to him with reference to its date
of occurrence.
As records have it, after the defense was deemed to
have rested its case following the admission of its
formal offer of evidence, a "Motion To Reopen Trial"
was filed on 17 September 1999 by Defense
Counsel, for the purpose of admitting newly
discovered evidence brought about by the arrest of
accused VICTOR EMMANUEL COLET who was
committed to the BJMP Caloocan City on 10
September 1999 in connection with another case
involving Violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425.
Aforecited Motion was given due course by this
Court in its Order of 24 September 1999 and the
case was thus set anew for the reception of
Accused PINEDAs additional evidence which
consists solely of the testimony of co-accused
COLET to corroborate his (Accused PINEDAs)
defense of alibi. In the course of Accused COLETs
testimony he gave his true name as VICTOR
EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET hence upon motion
of the Trial Prosecutor, the Information was
accordingly amended to reflect his alleged true
name.
As synthesized by the Court the following were
Accused COLETs declarations:
He, Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES
COLET, aka "PINOCCHIO" x x x is a resident of 686
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
Quirino Highway, Bankers Village II, this City which
is one-half to one kilometer away from accused
PINEDAs place at Barracks II, Bukid Area, District
I, this City. The first time he saw Accused Pineda
was in 1996 in Bukid Area and subsequently he used
to see him passed-by [sic] the house of the woman
he (Accused COLET) was courting in Barracks II.
On that fateful day at about 7:15 p.m. of 15 October
1997, Accused COLET boarded subject air-
conditioned bus in Lagro, Quezon City purposely to
go home and had himself seated at the bus right
side, third seat from the last. At that juncture he
noted the presence of CELSO SISON, SPENCER and
TOTIE JACOB inside the bus. When the bus was
approaching Grotto, Guandanoville Subdivision,
between Amparo and Pangarap Village, this City
Accused TOTIE JACOB, a neighbor of his in
Bankers Village II, who was armed with a handgun
then seated on the first seat, right side of the bus,
suddenly stood up and declared a hold-up shouting:
"WALANG KIKILOS, HOLDAP ITO, HOLDAP ITO,
PARE UMPISAHAN NA NATIN." Simultaneously,
TOTIEs companion who was holding a grenade,
stood up and ordered the passengers to bow down
by saying: "YUMUKO KAYONG LAHAT." And while
the passengers bowed down their heads, TOTIEs
four (4) other companions who were all armed,
started divesting the passengers of their cash and
valuables which the passengers dropped in a black
duffel bag upon instruction of the hold-uppers.
Accused COLET claimed that his co-accused
PINEDA was neither a passenger of the bus, nor one
of the six hold-uppers and that he did not see
PINEDA at anytime on that evening of 15 October
1997.
On cross-examination, COLET explained that while
stooping down, he managed to peep surreptitiously
and saw ROBERTO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO @
CELSO SISON shooting the policeman victim who
was then in seating position with his .38 caliber
handgun; that it was SPENCER then sporting a
barbers cut at the sides with curly and wavy hair on
top, who was pointing his gun at the driver; that the
hold-uppers were armed as follows: CELSO SISON
@ BOYET TARTARO aka ROBERTO SISON, a .38
gun; "BAROK," a knife; EDISON PALMARIO, a hand
grenade; SPENCER, a .38 caliber handgun; TOTIE
JACOB, a .45 caliber handgun; and the sixth
unidentified robber, a knife. Accused COLET is
familiar with TOTIE JACOB since he used to hear the
latters name in 1994, it was this TOTIE JACOB
whom he (Accused COLET) saw divesting the bus
conductor of his money; that he used to see EDISON
PALMARIO at Phase I, Pangarap Village, this City,
whenever he went around their place on board his
scooter. In 1976, he used to see alias BAROK, a
jeepney "barker," while he was yet a student at the
Novaliches Elementary School. Prior to his arrest,
he was jobless since he was the one taking care of
his father who suffered a stroke. In 1997, he was a
volunteer confidential agent of the San Jose del
Monte Police. He received no salary therefor except
certain personal doleout from Major TINIO. He was
arrested in 8 September 1999 for illegal possession
of shabu and he learned that he was implicated in
this case three days after his detention at the City
Jail and on the following day he learned that PINEDA
is one of his co-accused.
Accused COLET further stated that although he was
one of the passengers of the bus, nothing was taken
from him as not all passengers were victims of
robbery; that soon after he alighted at Pleasant Hill
he immediately contacted and reported the incident
to SPO1 TITO ALAS of Sub-Station 4, Bukid Area,
this City telling him that they could still catch up with
the hold-uppers since they just alighted at
Sampaguita St., Malaria Caloocan City and SPO1
ALAS gave words [sic] that he would take care of
the matter. The latter also asked him if he knew
PINEDA who was once detained at the San Jose del
Monte Jail to which he answered in the affirmative.
He assured SPO1 ALAS that he will testify in this
case once the suspects are apprehended.8
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that contrary to the offense designated
in the information, the proper charge against appellant is
robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code9 and not highway robbery resulting in homicide under
P.D. No. 532. The trial court declared that the situation
covered by P.D. No. 532 contemplates acts of brigandage
against any prospective victim anywhere on the
highway.10 The trial court found the testimonies of Ferrer and
Ramos "positive, spontaneous and forthright" and observed
that they "remained steadfast and convincing despite the
rigid cross-examination by defense counsel and the
clarificatory questions"11 of the trial court judge. After
evaluating the evidence, the trial court convicted appellant
and acquitted Colet, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the
prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of Accused ROLANDO PINEDA Y
MANALO of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Art. 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and
considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of, by a band, sans any mitigating
circumstance to offset it, which per Art. 63 of the
Revised Penal Code called for the imposition of the
greater penalty, this Court hereby sentences said
Accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to
indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased, SPO1
ARNEL FUENSALIDA, the civil indemnity
Page 86 of 98
 of P50,000; and to pay the private complainant Colet that appellant was not one of those who held- S: Upang alamin ko kung aking makikilala ang
AMALIA FUENSALIDA the following: up the bus and killed the victim. taong nangholdap sa pampasaherong Bus na
aking minamaneho.
a. stipulated actual damages of P60,000; 4. Ruling out the defense of alibi appellant
interposed.13 5. T: Paano mo makikilala ang mga holdaper?
b. moral damages of P40,000;
The Courts Ruling S: Nabalitaan ko lang po na may litrato dito sa
c. exemplary damages of P60,000;
presinto na pinaghihinalaan na nangholdap sa
The appeal is meritorious. In overturning the ruling of the trial
d. compensatory damages of P167,872.50 bus.
court, we follow the rule that an appeal in a criminal case
as well as to return the loot in the amount of P1,000 opens the entire case for review on any question, including 6. T: Natatandaan mo pa ba ang mukha ng holdaper?
and P5,700 to driver FERRER and conductor one not raised by the parties.14
S: Kung sakali ko pong makita ang litrato.
RAMOS, respectively; to restore thru this Court, for
The findings of a trial court, given its vantage point to assess
its proper disposition, the service firearm of victim 7. T: May ipakikita akong mga litrato, tingnan mong
the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to full faith and credit.
SPO1 FUENSALIDA described as .38 cal. revolver mabuti kung mayroon tao na kasama sa mga
On appeal, reviewing courts do not disturb such findings of
Smith & Wesson with serial no. 47840; and to pay the nangholdap sa pampasaherong bus?
the trial court. However, the reviewing court may overturn the
costs.
trial courts findings when there is a showing that the trial S: Iyan po sir ang isa at isa pa po ito sir na
Accordingly, pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or nangholdap sa Bus na aking minamaneho. (When
Revised Rules of Court, let the entire records hereof circumstance of weight and substance, which, if considered, the Investigator on case presented couples of
including the complete set of the transcript of could materially affect the result of the case.15 This Court has picture [sic] to the affiant he positively identified
stenographic notes be forwarded to the Honorable consistently held that the rule on the trial courts appreciation two pictures who were responsible in a Bus Hold-
Supreme Court for automatic review within 30 days of evidence must bow to the superior rule that the up who were identified as (Number 1) Rolando
but not earlier than 15 days after promulgation of prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond Pineda y Manalo @ Lando, 36 years old, married,
the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, jobless, native of Valenzuela and with last known
new trial or reconsideration. and this presumption must prevail unless overturned by address at Phase 3, Bgy. San Rafael IV, San Jose
competent and credible proof. 16
del Monte, Bulacan, and/or Gumamela St.,
With respect to Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL
Malaria, Caloocan City and (Number 2) Celso
GONZALES COLET, the prosecution having failed to A conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and
Sison y Lloren @ Boyet @ Boyet Tartaro with last
overcome with the required quantum of proof his convincing testimony establishes the identity of the accused
known address at Gumamela St., Malaria,
constitutional presumption of innocense his motion as the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution
Caloocan City.19 (Emphasis supplied)
to dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence, is proves beyond reasonable doubt that all elements of the
granted. Correspondingly a judgment of crime are attributable to the accused. The trial courts Like Ferrer, Ramos also gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of
17

ACQUITTAL is hereby entered in his favor.
Accused COLETs release from detention is in order Identity of the Perpetrator
unless he is being detained further for other lawful
cause/s.
Let an alias order of arrest issue forthwith against perpetrators of the crime.
Accused CELSO SISON Y LLOREN @ BOYET
TARTARO and TOTIE JACOB @ TOTIE and
thereafter let the case as against them be archived
without prejudice to its revival once they be
arrested later on.
SO ORDERED. 12
Errors Assigned
Appellant states that the trial court gravely erred to the point
of abusing its discretion in the following matters:
1. Holding that the prosecution witnesses have
positively identified appellant.
2. Giving probative weight and value to the
testimonies of Camilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos
despite being inconsistent on material and relevant
points and being untruthful to the court.
3. Not giving probative weight and credibility to the
testimony of accused Victor Emmanuel Gonzales
conviction of appellant fails in both bases.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the
prosecution witnesses positively identified him as one of the
Ferrer gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of the Caloocan City
Police Station on the night of the incident. In his statement
dated 15 October 1997, Ferrer describes appellant thus:
12. T: Sa anim na kataong nangholdap may
natatandaan ka ba sa Kanila?
S: Ang natatandaan ko ay ang taong tumutok sa
akin ng baril na .45 sa ulo at ang kanyang itsura
ay balinkinitan ang katawan, 25-30 taong
gulang, may hati sa gitna ang buhok, walang
bigote, kayumanggi, nakasuot ng polo shirt [na
kulay] berde, nakamaong na kupas, salitang
tagalog.18
On 6 November 1998, the police invited Ferrer to identify the In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of
perpetrators of the crime from photographs the police suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
showed to him. Ferrer gave a subsequent statement on the test where they consider the following factors: (1) the
identity of the perpetrators as follows:
4. T: Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto sa tanggapan
na ito at nagbibigay ng isang salaysay?
the Caloocan City Police Station on 15 October 1997, the
night of the incident. However, unlike Ferrer, Ramos candidly
admitted that he could not identify any of the perpetrators.
9. T: Sinabi mo kanina na anim yong hold-uppers na
pawang armado ano ba mga dala nilang baril at
may mamumukhaan ka ba sa kanilang sakaling
muli mo silang makita?
S: Armado po sila ng kalibre .45 at .38
revolver. Hindi ko sila mamumukhaan dahil agad
po ako nilang pinayuko.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The police later arrested appellant based on an out-of-court
identification by Ferrer. Ferrer first identified appellant and
Sison through mug shots the police presented to them.
Although he testified against Colet, SPO1 Carlito Alas ("SPO1
Alas"), the investigating police officer, admitted that there
were only two photographs presented to Ferrer. The police
showed Ferrer only the photographs of appellant and his co-
accused Sison.21
witness opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime; (2)
the witness degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty shown by the witness of his identification; (5) the

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 87 of 98

length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.22
Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the
established methods of identifying criminals,23 the procedure
used in this case is unacceptable. The first rule in proper
photographic identification procedure is that a series of
photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the
suspect.24 The second rule directs that when a witness is
shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains
to the suspect.25 Thus:
[W] here a photograph has been identified as that of
the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal
identification of that person may be based not upon
the witnesss recollection of the features of the
guilty party, but upon his recollection of the
photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked
to attempt a corporeal identification of a person
whose photograph he previously identified may say,
"Thats the man that did it," what he may actually
mean is, "Thats the man whose photograph I
identified."
xxx
A recognition of this psychological phenomenon
leads logically to the conclusion that where a
witness has made a photographic identification of a
person, his subsequent corporeal identification of
that same person is somewhat impaired in value,
and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of the
fact that he first saw a photograph.26 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion
because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison,
focusing attention on the two accused.27 The police obviously
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only
appellant and Sisons photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.
The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their
identification of appellant fails the totality of circumstances
test. The out-of-court identification of appellant casts doubt
on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
In its decision, the trial court relied on the testimonies of
Ferrer and Ramos to prove that appellant is one of the
perpetrators. On closer examination, however, we see that
Ferrer and Ramos failed to establish that what they saw of the
perpetrators is sufficient to produce an accurate memory of
the incident. During direct examination, Ferrer testified that
one of the perpetrators, who poked a gun at his nape, did not
allow him to turn back his head. There was limited opportunity
for Ferrer, while driving the bus, to see the perpetrators.
Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Did you hear that utterance made, "Umpisahan na
ang laro"?
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
A Yes, sir.
Q When you heard that, was your bus in motion?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A Someone held me at my neck while poking a gun
at my nape, sir.
xxx
Q What other utterance was made?
A I saw one of the bus passengers grappling of [sic]
one of the hold uppers who was trying to retrieve
from [sic] his clutch bag, sir.
Q Did you see that person with the clutch bag and
the other person who was trying to grapple the
clutch bag?
A No, I was not allowed to turn my head back, sir.
xxx
Q After you heard the shots what happened?
A The one who poked a gun at me said "deretso mo
lang."
Q He never leave you at [sic] your place?
A "Hindi po."
Q How many shots did you hear?
A Six (6) shots, sir.
Q After those six (6) shots what happened?
A I could not turn my head to see whether the
person who was shot was dead, sir.28
xxx
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q After the words which someone uttered, you felt
somebody held you by the nape and poked a gun at
your head, is that correct?
A Yes, he jumped from one of the front seats, sir. the voice of the perpetrator at his back, it is not clear if he saw
xxx
Q Is this two seater seat where the person who
poked a gun at your nape seated located
somewhere to your right?
A Yes, sir.
Q This seat and the drivers seat, are they parallel
line or side by side or abreast with the drivers seat?
A Slightly slanted from the drivers seat, sir.
Q In other words, this seat is situated somewhere to
your back side?
A "Parang tagiliran po."
Q How far from your shoulder?
A (Witness pointing more than a meter.)
Q In other words, you would not see the person
sitting on that particular seat not unless you turn
over your head to the right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that time you were concentrated in driving, is it
not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a driver, its not your business to look around
and check on the passengers, its the duty of the
conductor, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so sensing that no untoward incident that
might happen, you just continued driving peacefully
until that very moment when somebody shouted
"umpisahan na ang laro," correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then immediately after that, someone
approached you from your behind and poked you
something at your nape which you later felt to be a
gun, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you to concentrate in your driving, if
you want to live, correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q For fear that something might happen to you if you
disobey the instruction of that person at your back,
you just concentrated in your driving not even trying
to turn your head to look around, correct?
A Yes, sir.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Ferrer insisted that he saw what was happening through the
rearview mirror. Although Ferrer felt the presence and heard
the perpetrators face or only his back.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q At the time you heard the gunshots, the person at
your back was still there pointing a gun at your
nape?
A Yes, he never left, sir.
Q So you could not turn your head to check what
was going on at the back of the bus for fear that the
man at your back will shoot you?
Page 88 of 98
 A "Hindi po ako lumilingon pero nakikita ko sa
salamin dahil mayroon po akong rear [view] mirror
sa harap."
COURT: (butts in)
Q How big is that mirror?
A (Witness demonstrating with hands for about a
foot long and 8 inches in width.)
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Where is that mirror installed or positioned?
A In front of the driver, sir.
Q When you looked in the mirror you could see the the perpetrator, an examination of Ramos testimony shows
back portion of the bus?
A Yes, sir.30 (Emphasis supplied)
During cross-examination, Ramos remembered that he saw
part of the perpetrators face.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q And you were apprehensive even lifting your head
to try to take a look at the suspect because it could
be very noticeable [and] you might be shot?
A Yes sir.
Q That is why when that suspect demanded money
from you your head [was] vowed [sic] down?
A Yes sir. But when I handed the money I took a look
at his face particularly the left portion.31(Emphasis
supplied)
The relative positions of Ferrer, Ramos, and the perpetrator
who poked a gun at Ferrers nape, is as follows: Ferrer on the
left (drivers) side of the bus and facing the windshield,
Ramos on the second step of the running board at the right
side of the bus and facing the road,32 and the perpetrator
somewhere in between them, on a level higher than
Ramos.33 Based on Ramos testimony, Ferrer could not have
seen the perpetrators face by looking at the rearview mirror.
Ramos testified that he saw the left side of the perpetrators
face. This meant that the perpetrator was facing the
passengers and not the windshield. Thus, if Ferrer while
driving could see the perpetrator who was situated at his
back, the most he could see through the rearview mirror was
the back of the perpetrator who was facing the passengers.
Ferrer, however, is certain that he took a fleeting glance of
the perpetrators face, even as he concentrated on his
driving. Obviously, this view of the perpetrators face did not
come from glancing at the rearview mirror. Ferrer claimed to
have seen the perpetrators face before the robbery started,
thus:
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Were you able to [lift your head to look at the rear
view mirror] despite the fact that the person who
was at your back was poking the gun at your nape A Medyo maigsi po.35 (Emphasis supplied)
and telling you not to make any wrong move
A well-known authority36 in eyewitness identification made a
because he will shoot you?
list of 12 danger signals that exist independently of the
A "Bago po nag-umpisa, nakita ko na iyong mukha identification procedures investigators use. These signals
niya dahil napalingon ako noong nag-umpisa ang give warning that the identification may be erroneous even
laro."34 (Emphasis supplied) though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive.
The facts of a particular case may contain a warning not in
Ferrers identification of the perpetrator is inconsistent on
the list. The list is as follows:
how he saw the perpetrator, through the rearview mirror or
by looking back at him. (1) the witness originally stated that he could not
identify anyone;
Ramos testified that he saw how appellant and his
companions robbed the passengers and killed Fuensalida. (2) the identifying witness knew the accused before
However, even if during trial Ramos pointed to appellant as the crime, but made no accusation against him
when questioned by the police;
that he did not actually see, much less remember, the faces
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the
of the perpetrators. Thus:
identifying witness original description and the
PROSECUTOR SISON: actual description of the accused;
Q Those persons whom you saw who sat near the (4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the
driver if you can see him will you be able to identify witness erroneously identified some other person;
him?
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the
A I cannot point to him because when he said those accused;
words we were made to vow [sic] our head [sic]
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but
down and whenever I made a moved [sic] I was
fails to identify him;
kicked.
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness
xxx
had limited opportunity to see the accused;
Q You said you cannot identify the persons who sat
(8) the witness and the person identified are of
by the driver of the bus. How about the five other
different racial groups;
companions [of] that person if you see them again
will you be able to identify them? (9) during his original observation of the perpetrator
of the crime, the witness was unaware that a crime
A Hindi po.
was involved;
Q Were you able to see the face x x x of that person
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the
who sat near the driver [at any instance]?
witness view of the criminal and his identification of
A I only see [sic] the back of the head because when the accused;
he turned sidewards I was only able to see the back
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
of his head.
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial
Q How about the side view of his face. Were you able
identification.
to see?
Three of these danger signals apply to the prosecution
A Opo.
witnesses identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the
Q Now, look around the courtroom and point to crime. Ramos originally stated that he could not identify any
anyone and look at their [sic] side view of these of the perpetrators. Ferrer had a limited opportunity to see
persons one by one and tell us if any of them the perpetrators before the robbery started. When he first
resembles that person whom you saw? saw appellant, Ferrer had no inkling that appellant would rob
them.
A (Witness pointing to the person who identified his
name as Rolando Pineda). The more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the
identity of the perpetrator and not to establish the existence
COURT:
of the crime. For even if the commission of the crime is
Q How were you able to identify? established, without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
identity of the perpetrator, the trial court cannot convict any
A Iyong haba ng konti ng buhok, side view.
one.37 Ferrer and Ramos mental conception of the incident,
Q Was he sporting the same kind of hair? the resulting inaccuracy in their narration, and the
suggestiveness of the pictures presented to them for
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 89 of 98
identification cast doubt on their testimonies that appellant is
one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Denial and Alibi as a Defense
The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive
identification of the accused. Courts look with disfavor on the
defense of alibi. However, we explained in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals:38
Judges seem disposed more readily to credit the
veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any
amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the
accused, whether by way of alibi, insufficient
identification, or other testimony. They are
unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance
of the eyewitness is disturbed by her experience
that her powers of perception become distorted and
her identification frequently most untrustworthy.
Into the identification, enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused
personally the desire to requite a crime, to find a
scapegoat, or to support, consciously or
unconsciously, an identification already made by
another.
The defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence
for the prosecution is weak and there is no positive
identification of the accused,39 as in this case. The rule that
the accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases.
Otherwise, we will have the absurdity of the accused being
put to a greater burden if the prosecutions evidence is weak
than if it were strong.40
While it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at
the scene of the crime, corroboration of his alibi comes from
three separate sources: Tan, Quiton, and Colet. Tan
corroborated appellants testimony on his whereabouts at
the time of the crime. Quiton testified that a day after the
crime, he was asked by SPO4 Mario Larenas ("SPO4
Larenas") of the San Jose del Monte, Bulacan police force if
he had knowledge of the whereabouts of "Boyet Tartaro, Kulit
and Tito." SPO4 Larenas approached Quiton because he
knew that Quiton was acquainted with the three. SPO4
Larenas did not mention appellants name as one of the
suspects.41
Colet, on the other hand, claimed to have knowledge of the
crime and the perpetrators as he was a bus passenger at the
time of the crime. Thus:
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q When you boarded that bus where did you take
your seat?
A Right side of the bus, third seat from the last seat.
xxx
Q When Totie Jacob declared a hold-up as you say,
what did he say?
A While standing Totie Jacob declared a hold-up Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda is inside
and said "Walang kikilos. Holdap ito, holdap ito. this courtroom now?
Pare, umpasahan [sic] na natin" and his
A Yes, sir.
companions stood up and said "Yumuko kayong
lahat" and then his companion who stood up holding Q Will you kindly point to us the person of Rolando
a grenade and told them to vow [sic] down. Pineda?
xxx A (Witness correctly pointing to accused Rolando
Pineda.)
Q How about the passengers? What did they do
when they [were] ordered to bowed-down [sic]? xxx
A They all bowed down. PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q How about you? What did you do? Q What was the position of the policeman who [was]
shot at the bus at the time accused Celso Sison shot
A I also bowed my head down but I was peeping
him?
clandestinely at them because I did not expect that
I would be in that situation and looking at what they A The person who shot the policeman was at the
are doing. policemans back.
xxx xxx
Q What did the hold-uppers do when all the Q When you saw Celso Sison shot [sic] the victim
passengers were no longer looking at them because inside the bus were you standing then?
their heads were bowed down?
A I was still stooping down and at the same time
A The other hold-uppers nearest to the passengers peeping.43
ordered the passengers to put their things down in
Colet knows the names and faces of the perpetrators of the
a black duffel bag ("parang supot ni Hudas").42
crime, as they all live near each other. Colet asserted that he
Colet testified that appellant was not a perpetrator in the was an eyewitness and that he remembers the perpetrators
crime and absolved him from liability. and even the weapons used.
ATTY. BAUTISTA: PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q You said that there were six hold-uppers all in all? Q You said you saw the person who shot [the
policeman]? Who was that person who shot [the
A Yes, sir.
policeman] inside the bus?
Q And you said you have taken a good look at these
A Roberto Sison alyas Boyet Tartaro.
hold-uppers?
xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q And who was that hold-upper who was near the
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda was one of
driver of the bus?
those six hold-uppers that you have seen?
A Ang nasa likod po ng driver ay si Spencer.
A Wala po, hindi po.
Q Who is Spencer?
Q Will you kindly tell us also if Rolando Pineda was
one of the passengers of the bus, if you know? A Iyon lang po ang pagkakakilala sa taong iyon.
Malapit din po sila sa amin nakatira.
A Hindi rin po, wala rin po.
xxx
Q Will you kindly tell us or if you likewise see [sic]
Rolando Pineda at any time of the night of October Q You also saw Totie Jacob, right?
15, 1997?
A In front of the door.
A Wala rin po.
xxx
Q You said that you know Rolando Pineda having
Q x x x Do you know the three others?
met you and seen him for several times. If you will
see Rolando Pineda again will you be able to A Maam iyong dalawa, iyong isa hindi ko po kilala.
recognized [sic] him?
Q Who were the other two?
A Yes, sir.
A Edison Palmario, the one holding the hand
grenade, and alias Barok.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 90 of 98
 xxx Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, married to a certain Evelyn Tagle. On the other hand, at the
that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime time of the incident, Roberto was cohabiting with a certain
Q x x x [W]hich came first, the shooting of the police
independent from the offense for which he is on trial. A man Mary Grace Pineda.
officer or the taking of personal belongings of the
may be a notorious criminal, and may have committed many
passengers? On that very day, accused-appellant was invited by their
crimes, and still be innocent of the crime charged on trial.48
barangay captain to shed light on the incident and was
A Sabay po.
Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution subsequently detained, as a complaint against him had been
Q And the hold-upper also took away the collection provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall filed.
of the bus conductor. Did you see that? be presumed innocent until
On June 28, 1987, accused-appellant was formally charged
A I saw Totie Jacob commander the bus conductor. the contrary is proved." An accused is entitled to acquittal in an information, reading as follows:
unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
xxx That on or about October 28, 1986, in the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof. We
Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Q Tell us again what were those weapons used by hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
Laguna, Republic of the Philippines and
them?
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
A Celso Sison alias Tartaro .38 gun, Barok a knife, trial court is REVERSED. Appellant Rolando Pineda y Manalo Court, the accused ARISTON A. ABAD,
Palmario a hand grenade, Spencer a .38 gun, Totie is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. His immediate release is with intent to kill, with evident
Jacob a .45 gun and the 6th one a knife.44 ordered, unless there are other valid causes for his continued premeditation, abuse of superior strength
detention. and treachery, being then conveniently
The prosecution asks this Court to ignore Colets testimony armed with a deadly bladed weapon, did
that appellant was not at the crime scene and did not The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to then and there willfully, unlawfully and
participate in the criminal act. The prosecution considers implement this Decision and report to this Court immediately feloniously attack, assault and stab
Colets testimony as polluted, coming from a co-accused. The the action taken not later than five days from receipt of this therewith one ROBERTO PINEDA Y
flaw in this argument is that Colet is not a discharged co- Decision.
PAULIN, who as a result thereof, sustained
accused. The trial court acquitted Colet when it granted his
45
stab wounds on vital parts of his body
SO ORDERED.
Demurrer to Evidence, which the prosecution did not even which directly caused his death, to the
oppose. The defense presented Colet who testified that
46
damage and prejudice of his surviving
neither he nor appellant participated in the crime. Colets heirs.
G.R. No. 119739 June 18, 1998
testimony corroborates those of Ferrer and Ramos on the
number of perpetrators and the manner of commission of the ARISTON A. ABAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and That the crime was committed with the
crime. Colet gave his testimony in an unhesitating and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. generic aggravating circumstance of
straightforward manner. evident premeditation and the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior and
Appellant even believed that Colet falsely implicated him in treachery.
ROMERO, J.:
the crime at the beginning. Appellant and Colet had a
previous rivalry over a woman and Colet is known in their Death struck like the proverbial thief in the night, but was the CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
area as someone with influence, being a police informer. accused-appellant the perpetrator thereof?
The case was assigned to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial
Unless he simply wanted to tell the truth, Colet was unlikely
In the early morning of October 28, 1986, Ana Paulin was in Court of San Pedro, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on
to testify on appellants innocence when he himself is
bed at her house in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, when September 8, 1987, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not
charged with the same crime and was present at the crime
she was suddenly awakened by the cries of "Inay, inay, inay." guilty." At the trial, the prosecution presented three
scene. Appellant also attributes the motive of revenge to
Startled, she bolted up, looked out of the window and saw a witnesses, namely, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., Mary Grace Pineda,
SPO1 Alas, as appellant previously beat up SPO1 Alas
man alighting form the jeep parked in front of her house. She and Ana Paulin; the defense presented the accused-appellant
nephew during a brawl. The prosecution did not present
47
yelled at the man who looked up at her then ran away. When and Evelyn Tagle.
evidence to rebut this statement.
she opened the front door downstairs, she found her son, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who autopsied
In its attempt to pin the crime on appellant, the prosecution Roberto Pineda, sprawled on the doorstep. He had been
the body of the victim, testified that the deceased suffered
dug up other criminal cases filed against appellant. Appellant repeatedly stabbed in the chest and back.
fifteen stab wounds and seven multiple wounds,
was previously charged with robbery and illegal possession
With the help of neighbors, she rushed Roberto to the consequently dying of shock due to severe intra-thoracic
of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly weapon, and
Midtown General Hospital in San Pedro but was refused hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds at the chest
assault, for which he was released after posting bond.
admittance due to the lack of medical facilities therein. Her and back.
Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this
son expired on the way to another hospital. At about 3:30 Mary Grace Pineda testified that three days before the
point:
a.m., she reported the incident to the San Pedro police. It was incident, accused-appellant had an altercation with Roberto
SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that only before noon of that same day, however, when she
over the child of the latter with Susan Paulin. The victim
one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is submitted a "Salaysay" identifying accused-appellant Ariston
allegedly wanted to recover his child from Susan, which
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the A. Abad as the man she had seen running away from her
accused-appellant opposed. The two even came to blows
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be house moment before she discovered her son's bloody
over the matter, with mutual threats to kill each other.
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, condition. She further stated that accused-appellant and
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or Roberto had been enemies ever since her daughter-in-law, On the other hand, accused-appellant denied the truth of Ana
usage, and the like. Susan, left the latter for accused-appellant, who was then Paulin's narrative, saying that on the evening of October 27,

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 91 of 98

1986, after selling sampaguita flowers at Pasay City, he went by the prosecution do not show beyond reasonable doubt that Q. Did you see anything
home to San Pedro at around 12:00 midnight, and that, he was the accused perpetrated the crime for which he stands unusual when you
already sleeping at the time the alleged stabbing incident charged. look(ed) out the
occurred. His alibi was corroborated by his wife, Evelyn. window?
From a careful perusal of the records, it becomes clear that
In its judgment rendered on November 27, 1991, the San the court a quo affirmed accused-appellant's conviction on A. Yes, sir.
Pedro RTC found accused-appellant guilty of homicide. The the basis of the following pieces of circumstantial evidence:
Q. Will you please tell
dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
First. Accused-appellant was seen at the scene of the crime the Court what is that
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused from which he later hastily fled. unusual thing that you
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the saw?
Second. Accused-appellant had a motive to kill victim, having
crime of HOMICIDE as defined and
had an altercation with the latter three days before. A. I saw a person
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
alighted (sic) from the
Penal Code and taking into consideration The above circumstances, in the absence of other
jeep, sir.
the provisions of the Indeterminate corroborative evidence, do not point with moral certainty to
Sentence law, there being no aggravating the guilt of accused-appellant. Q. But where is that
or mitigating circumstance to offset each jeep that you have just
We have consistently held that the mere presence of
other, he is hereby sentenced to suffer mentioned?
accused-appellant at the locus criminis cannot be solely
imprisonment of 8 years 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months interpreted to mean that he committed the killing. The mere A. In front of our
4

presence of accused-appellant at the crime scene, without window, sir.

and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that, indeed,
maximum, together with all the accessory Q. And when you said
he committed the crime. In fact, the only certain conclusion
penalties provided by law, and to you saw a person came
that can be drawn from the testimony of prosecution witness
indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pineda in down the jeep, what did
Ana Paulin is the fact that accused-appellant alighted from a
the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. No you do next?
parked jeep in front of her house and not that he killed the
costs.
victim. This is clear from her testimony: A. I shouted at him, sir.
SO ORDERED. 2
Q. Now, after you hear Q. What did you should
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the the word "Inay" about at him?
lower court, hence the present recourse. three times, what did
A. I said "Hoy" and
you do next if any?
Accused-appellant assails his conviction by the lower court, asked "Ano yan," sir.
maintaining that he could not be considered guilty beyond A. I stood up
reasonable doubt and that the testimonial evidence of the Q. When you said that,
"bumalikwas," sir.
prosecution lacked proof and facts to sustain his conviction. what did that man do?
Q. Why did you stand
We find accused-appellant's arguments worthy of merit. A. Look(ed) at me and
up, why did you
run (sic) away, sir.
"bumalikwas"?
The most glaring feature of the present case is the lack of an
eyewitness to the actual killing. No one saw accused- xxx xxx xxx
A. I was surprised,
appellant stab the victim, nor was the murder weapon ever startled, sir. Q. Now, you said after
found. The only thing that links accused-appellant to the looking up to you and
Q. After standing up
crime is his presence at the scene of the incident, thus, the suddenly he run away,
what did you do next?
reliance of the trial court on circumstantial evidence to what did you do next?
convict accused-appellant. A. I look(ed) out
A. I go (sic) downstairs,
through the window,
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a sir.
sir.
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time Q. Where downstairs
Q. What windows is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with did you go, what
that?
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 3 Thus, for portion?
circumstantial evidence to suffice for conviction, the A. The window in front
A. Outside our door, sir.
following requisites must concur: (i) there must be more than of our house, sir.
one circumstance to convict; (ii) facts on which the inference Q. After going outside
Q. Why did you look out
of guilt is based must be proved; and (iii) the combination of your door, what did you
through that window in
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction see, if any?
front of your house?
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances established A. I saw my son lying
must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and A. Because I heard the
(sic) prostrate outside
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty shout came from that
our door, sir. 5
person, to the exclusion of all others. In the present case, the direction, sir.
Court is of the view that the circumstantial evidence proffered On cross-examination, Ana Paulin's testimony reveals:
xxx xxx xxx

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 92 of 98

 Q. Mrs. Witness, you As to accused-appellant's motive, it is true that the latter did Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish
did not actually saw have a motive to kill Roberto Pineda. Yet, in order to support both the commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.
(sic) the stabbing? a conviction, motive must be coupled with evidence from
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for
which it may be reasonably deduced that the accused-
A. No, sir. 6 rape with homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
appellant was the malefactor. 8 Given the paucity of evidence
128, in Caloocan City based on circumstantial evidence. The
Furthermore, Ana Paulin's testimony fails to state whether the in the instant case, to conclude that the killing arose from the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction with
man she saw was carrying a weapon , or whether he was previous altercation between accused-appellant and the
modification on February 22, 2007.1
bloodied or not. Indeed, there is an absence of positive proof victim would be more speculative than factual. The court
that accused-appellant assaulted the victim. cannot rely on mere presumptions and conjectures to convict The victim was Marita,2 a girl who was born on October 29,
the accused-appellant. While his alibi is rather weak, this is 1994 based on her certificate of live birth.3 When her very
Likewise, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who
no reason for us to sustain his conviction, as the burden of young life was snuffed out by strangulation on July 2, 1999,
performed the autopsy, testified:
proof still lies the prosecution to establish that accused- she was only four years and eight months old.4She had been
Q. Doctor, you said that appellant killed the victim. Thus, this Court, in Peo playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang,
the wounds found on vs. Manansala 9 held that: Caloocan City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her
the body of the victim mother, first noticed her missing from home.5 By noontime,
Trial court must keep in mind that the
Roberto Pineda are because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband
prosecution must be able to overcome the
(sic) cause(d) by a Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told him about
constitutional presumption of innocence
sharp bladed Marita being missing.6Manito rushed home and arrived there
beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the
instrument? at about 2 pm,7 and immediately he and Julia went in search
conviction of the accused. The
of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house
A. Yes, sir. prosecution must stand or fall on its own
in the vicinity. They did not find her.8 At 6 am of the next day,
evidence; it cannot draw strength from the
Q. But it is also possible Manito reported to the police that Marita was missing.9 In her
weakness of the evidence for the defense.
that the wounds could desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant (manghuhula) in
have been caused by In the instant case, the totality of evidence adduced by the an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might
more than one sharp prosecution cannot be considered as constituting an be found only five houses away from their own. Following the
bladed instrument? unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body
that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. The covered with a blue and yellow sack10 inside the comfort
A. Yes, sir. circumstances proffered by the prosecution only or so far as room of an abandoned house about five structures away from
Q. So, it is also possible to create a suspicion that the accused probably perpetrated their own house.11 Her face was black and blue, and
that there were (sic) the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the bloody.12 She had been tortured and strangled till death.
more than one required quantum of evidence being proof beyond The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin
assailant? reasonable doubt. We quote, with emphasis, the saying that
Bautista and Jovy Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores
"The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that
Atty. Paler. embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 10 might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita.13 The
Incompetent, your police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999
honor. In sum, if a life is taken, justice demands that the wrong be just as he was alighting from a vehicle.14
redressed, but this justice that calls for retribution cannot be
Court. The doctor said the same one that would convict accused-appellant at bar On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in
that it could be possible whose guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 11 the RTC the information charging Villaflores with rape with
that the wounds could homicide committed as follows:15
have been also caused WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City,
by more than one decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12565 dated Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
instrument. March 31, 1995, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by
appellant Ariston A. Abad is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of
Atty. Agosila. Yes, your reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the accused be means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the
Honor, and my next immediately released from his place of confinement unless person of one Marita, a minor of five (5) years old, did then
question is whether it is there is reason to detain him further for any other legal or and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have
also possible that there valid cause. No pronouncement as to cost. sexual intercourse with said Marita, against the latters will
were (sic) more than and without her consent, and thereafter with deliberate intent
one assailant? SO ORDERED. to kill beat the minor and choked her with nylon cord which
caused the latters death.
Court. Witness may
answer. CONTRARY TO LAW.
G.R. No. 184926 April 11, 2012
A. Yes, sir. 7 Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
guilty to the crime charged.16
This admission raises serious doubts as to the credibility of EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant.
the prosecution's theory that accused-appellant was the D E C I S I O N The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision,
victim's sole assailant. viz:
BERSAMIN, J.:

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 93 of 98

After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the and on different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, They were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light
prosecution presenting witnesses namely, Aldrin Bautista, Phase 9 arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of on the incident. Blanco and the other police officers returned
Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, SPO2 July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the child at the back to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept
Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3 Rodelio Ortiz, portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with
PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase. pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the SPO1 Antonio Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the
yellow sack inside the comfort room. The child appeared house of Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of
black and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha"). He place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio nearby to avoid detection and
July 3, 1999, the lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita
saw blood stains on her lips and when he removed the sack asked a child to look out for Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep
(hereinafter Marita) born on October 21, 1994, (see
covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina. The from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued as people
Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was discovered
yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the
by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl
had already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no said jeep. The officers took him in custody and brought him to
at an unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their
longer in the same condition when recovered, saying, when Sub-station 6 and SPO3 Nacis instructed them to fetch his
residence in Phase 9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day
asked by the Court: "medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira- wife. He was with police officer Antonio Chan and they waited
before at about noon time his wife called him up at his work
sira." There was another sack, colored blue, which was used for the arrival of the wife of Villaflores from the market. When
place informing him that their daughter was missing,
to cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the she arrived, it was already night time. They informed her that
prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He
back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when SOCO her husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the
went around possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no
Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the killing of a child. There was no reaction on her part. She was
one could provide any lead until the following morning when
body to the funeral parlor. He had already interviewed some with her 3 minor children in the house. She went with them to
his wife in desperation, consulted a "manghuhula" at a
person when the SOCO Team arrived composed of Inspector the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if she
nearby barangay. According to the "manghuhula" his
Abraham Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other members. He knew anything about what happened on the night of July 2,
daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that
was the one who took the statement of the wife of Edmundo initially, she denied but in the course of the questioning she
was how he tracked down his daughter in exact location. She
Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of evidence to broke down and cried and said that she saw her husband
was covered with a blue sack with her face bloodied and her
Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark place some sacks under their house. He remembered the
body soaked to the skin. He found a yellow sack under her
the items. When the SOCO Team arrived, a separate wife saying, "noong gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may sako
head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a half feet
investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin. sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos
long and the diameter, about the size of his middle finger.
niya yong sako at nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko,
There were onlookers around when the NBI and policemen PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City
tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala
from Sub-station 6 arrived at the scene. The SOCO Team took Police Station, as a police investigator, took the sworn
yon, wala yon." The wife was crying and she said that her
pictures of Marita. Jessie was investigated and his statement of Aldrin Bautista upon instruction of his chief,
husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their
statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to read his statement after
children. She said that she was willing to give a statement
funeral expenses in the total amount of P52,000.00 marked as which he signed the document then gave it to investigator,
against her husband. Their house is a "kubo" the floor is made
Exhibit L and sub-markings. (See other expenses marked as SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused
of wood and there is space of about 2 feet between the floor
Exhibit M and sub-markings). the confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo
and the ground. She saw the sack filled with something but
Villaflores. Aldrin went closer to the detention cell from where
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She
he identified and pointed to Villaflores as the one who
forward and narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the related that before she went outside, she again took a look at
abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known the sack and she saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. She
in the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a neighbor of the SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the went inside the house and went out again to check the sack
[victims family], leading Marita by the hand ("umakay sa preparation of the documents to be submitted for inquest to and saw the child. It was Sgt. Nacis who typed the statement
bata"). At about noon time they were at Batmans house the fiscal. He asked the investigator to prepare the affidavit of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed. He identified the
where they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are of the victims father and the statement of the two witnesses sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings.
drug users. Aldrin sports a "sputnik" tattoo mark on his body and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral slip
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime
while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G. ("through crusher and other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered
Laboratory, SOCO, Caloocan City Police Station also went to
gangster"). While in Batmans place, although he did not see the evidence custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the
the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at about 2:50 in the afternoon
Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at physical evidence recovered from the scene of the crime
with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin, at the vacant lot of Block
the back of the house. Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of July 3, the suspect,
57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned the area and
the afternoon of the same day, he heard cries of a child as he Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco,
saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She
passed by the house of Batman ("Narinig ko pong umiiyak ang SPO1 Antonio Alfredo, NUP Antonio Chan and the members
was covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around
batang babae at umuungol"). At about 7:00 oclock in the of Bantay Bayan in Bagong Silang.
her neck. There was another yellow sack at the back of her
evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, head. He identified the nylon cord (Exhibit N) and the yellow
towards a vacant house. He thought that the child must have
Caloocan City, as follow-up operative, was in the office at sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew
been in the sack because it appeared heavy. It was the sack
about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, together that it was in the possession of the officer on case. The blue
that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police Officer Martin Interia, sack appears in the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R,
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a team for and was marked Exhibits T-3-A, S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter
a child was found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, them to go to the scene of the crime. They immediately they marked the initial report as Exhibit U and sub-markings.
investigator at Sub-station 6 Bagong Silang, Caloocan City proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector Corpuz entered the They also prepared a rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with
who was dispatched by Police Chief Inspector Alfredo premises while he stayed with his companions and guarded SOCO report 047-99 marked as
Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO Team the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating the case.

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 94 of 98

Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO posterior fourchette was likewise lacerated and markedly
report 047-99 marked as Exhibit W. congested, too. It could have been caused by an insertion of
blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP
asphyxia by strangulation, in laymans term, "sinakal sa
Crime Laboratory with office at Caloocan City Police Station
pamamagitan ng tali." The external injuries could have been
conducted the autopsy on the body of Marita upon request of
caused by contact with a blunt object like a piece of wood.
Chief Inspector Corpus. The certificate of identification and
The abrasion could have also been caused by a hard and
consent for autopsy executed by the father of the victim was
rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-
marked as Exhibit G. He opined that the victim was already
250-99 of the victim, Marita _____ marked as Exhibit H and
dead for 24 hours when he conducted the examination on July
sub-markings. He issued the death certificate marked as
3, 1999 at about 8 oclock in the evening. The postmortem
Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch representing the body of the
examination disclosed the following:
victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The sketch
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: of the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on
the head could have been caused by hard and blunt object
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in
while other injuries were caused by coming in contact with a
secondary stage of flaccidity with postmortem lividity at the
hard or rough surface. There were also punctured wounds
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips
which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or
and nailbeds are cyanotic.
anything pointed. The ligature mark was congested and
HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK depressed.
1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 On cross-examination, among others, he explained the
x 3.5 cm; 3.5 cm from the anterior midline. stages of flaccidity which is the softening of the body of a
dead person. The first 3 hours after death is the primary stage
2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic of flaccidity and after the third hour, the body will be in rigor
region, measuring 4 x 2.2 cm, from the anterior mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The
midline.
victim could have been dead at least 9 oclock in the morning
3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 on July 2. As regards the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it
cm from the anterior midline. is possible that two or more persons could have caused it.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as
4 x 1 cm, bisected by the anterior midline. follows:
5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the
cm left of the anterior midline. charge of raping and killing the child saying he did not see the
child at anytime on July 2, 1999. At around 10:00 oclock in
6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, the morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the market place at
measuring 9.2 x 0.1 cm, 11.5 cm from the anterior Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt
midline.
called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5
7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His
bisected by the anterior midline. Aunt was residing at Phase 10 which is about a kilometer from
his place. His residence is some 5 houses away from the
8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he
0.4 cm, 6 cm from the Posterior midline.
was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their electrical
9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x connection. He corrected himself by saying he does not know
0.8 cm, 6.5 cm from the posterior midline. Marita but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack
and throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested on July 3,
There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged.
vestibule is abraded and markedly congested, while the He has witnesses like Maring, Sherwin, Pareng Bong and
posterior fourchette is likewise lacerated and marked Frankie to prove that he had no participation in the killing.
congested.
On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being
The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are called "Batman" in their place and that Aldrin and Jovie are
markedly congested with scattered petecchial hemorrhages. his friends. They go to his house at Package 5, Phase 9, Lot
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly 32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are his close friends
rice. being his neighbors and they usually went to his house where
they used shabu ("gumagamit ng bato"). At 42, he is older
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation." than Aldrin and Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the him to his house to fix electrical wiring. He also knew his wife, 1999 he left the house at about 11:00 oclock in the morning
vestibule was abraded and markedly congested while the but does not know their children. On the night of July 2, Aldrin
and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence
street near the precinct while walking with his wife. They
came from Bayan. His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant.
Two of his children were in Phase 3, the other two were in his
house and two more were left with his siblings. When he was
arrested, he was carrying some food items which they
brought in Bayan. They did not tell him why he was being
arrested. He saw his wife once at Police Station 1 before he
was brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie harbored ill
feelings against him because the last time they went to his
house he did not allow them to use shabu. He admitted using
shabu everytime his friends went to his house. He is not
legally married to his wife. She visited him for the last time on
July 19, 1999. He denied that the door of his house had a sack
covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not
talked with the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his
wife for help. He just waited for his mother and she told him,
they will fight it out in court, "ilalaban sa husgado."
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and
out of his house. His bathroom is in front of his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor
of Edmundo Villaflores told the court that the charges against
Villaflores were not true, the truth being, that on the night of
July 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the back of his house
holding a sack containing something which he did not know.
They were talking to Batman and offering a dog contained in
the sack and then they left the sack near the comfort room
outside the door of the house of Batman. They came back and
took the yellow sack. He followed them up to the other
pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he
learned that Villaflores was being charged with the killing of
Marita. At first, he just kept quiet because he thought
Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a drug user, but
later when he had a drinking spree with his father and uncle,
he told them what he knew because he could not trust any
policeman in their place. He told them what really happened
and they advised him to report the matter to the barangay. So
he went to the purok and made a statement in an affidavit
form. He executed the "Salaysay" in the presence of their
Purok secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok
secretary who gave him the form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie
about midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also another
person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who is the eldest in the
group and considered their "Amo-amo". In his affidavit, he
said: "Ako ay lumabas ng bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita
ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata. Tapos po ay may
narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay
papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa in Batman." He
said he was sure that the sack contained the child because
he saw the head of the child, it seemed like she was staring at
him and asking his help. He executed the statement after the
arrest of the accused. He did not go to the police station to
narrate his story. He made his statement not in the barangay
hall but only at their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2,
to go to school in PMI at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not see
Page 95 of 98
Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of July 2. He
arrived home at about 8:00 oclock in the evening because he
passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his mother
who was a vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30,
then they bought some food stuffs to bring home. He was not
sure of the date when Batman was arrested. He admitted that
Batman is his uncle being the brother of his mother. His uncle
is a known drug addict in the area. He usually saw him using
shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife, Aldrin and
Jovie. After he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he
did not do anything because he was busy reviewing for his
exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After he made his
statement, he showed it to their Purok Leader, Melencio
Yambao and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his
statement and recorded it in the logbook. It was not
notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin and Jovie.
Jose Pitallana is no longer residing in their place. He did not
even know that Aldrin and Jovie testified against his uncle. He
never went to the police to tell the truth about the incident.
As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted
Villaflores of rape with homicide, holding that the
circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that
his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt.17 The RTC
decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing "Marita"
and hereby sentences him to the Supreme penalty of death,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to pay the
cost if this suit, to be paid to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified
bring the accused to the National Penitentiary upon receipt combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound
hereof after the promulgation of the decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the
conviction, disposing:
18
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch
128 finding the accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide is committed
affirmed with modification in the sense that (a) the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion
perpetua and the judgment on the civil liability is modified by
ordering the appellant to pay the amount of P100,000.00 civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages and P52,000.00 as
actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden
to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and xxx
circumstance constituting the crime charged.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established
xxx
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
Ruling
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
We sustain Villaflores conviction. reclusion perpetua to death.
I Nature of rape with homicide as a composite crime, When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
explained committed, the penalty shall be death.
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A xxx
composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the
composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a
composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape
single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of
with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is
a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or
noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death,
which states:
and the latter with death.
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
rape are crucial in determining whether the crime is a
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion
to be applied in its maximum period.
that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also
hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and
supra, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of
composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the
compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on
one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers
of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed,
during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act
crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs
that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light immediately before or after, or during the commission itself
felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of
compound crime may be the subject of a separate the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim
information. herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape, became
evident, viz:
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently
provides: Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the
meaning of the phrase appearing in line 24, "or on the
occasion"?
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances: When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is
committed by reason of the rape, I would understand that. But
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
what is the meaning of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"?
How far in time must the commission of the homicide be
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; considered a homicide "on the occasion" of the rape? Will it
be, if the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
drunk and they killed somebody along the way, would there
abuse of authority; and
be a link between that homicide and the rape? Will it be "on
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) the occasion" of the rape?
years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstance mentioned above be present.
Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 96 of 98
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack
itself, and the homicide is committed with a very short time issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned
lapse. reason from circumstantial evidence.22 To be clear, then, house where the childs lifeless body was later
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on found.32 Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified the
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr.
direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.23 yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of
President: If the rapist enters a house, kills a maid, and rapes
his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered
somebody inside the house, I would probably consider that as The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct
her body;33 Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered
a rape "on the occasion of". Or if the rapists finished evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which
her body.34 Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the
committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater
abandoned house where Maritas body was found and
somebody, let us say, a potential witness inside the house and degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that
kills him, that is probably clear. But suppose the man happens circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier
enabled access to the abandoned house without having to
to kill somebody, will there be a link between these? What is of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
pass any other houses.35 This indicated Villaflores familiarity
the intent of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"? x x x guilt of the accused.24 Nor has the quantity of circumstances
and access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several
sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced
xxx pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like
into some definite standard to be followed in every instance.
the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack,
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto:25
were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope
course, is rape, and homicide is a result of the circumstances
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of tied to the door of his house,36 and the yellow sack was a wall-
surrounding the rape.
circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following covering for his toilet.37 Eighthly, the medico-legal findings
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator passage from People vs. Ludday:26 "No general rule can be showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by
from Cagayan where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the
place or is apprehended by the police and he commits in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including
homicide, I think would be examples where the phrase "on the consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds.
occasion thereof" would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal
President, is rape.19 with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The
rational hypothesis except that of guilt." vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested
II The State discharged its burden of proving the rape with positive for spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body of Marita
homicide beyond reasonable doubt Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when
was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-
burden of proving all the elements of Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity
rape and homicidebeyond reasonable doubt in order to Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or
warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape with at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
homicide charged in the information.20 The State must thus These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose
prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived totality has brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of
Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he are proven; and Villaflores for rape with homicide. As to the rape, Marita was
consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape. lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when doubt. (5) legal officer who had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver
the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years on July 3, 1999, attributed to the insertion of a blunt object
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA like a human penis. The fact that the vaginal and periurethral
of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because
considered several circumstances, which when smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa
a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to
"appreciated together and not piece by piece," according to confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As
the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth
the CA,27 were seen as "strands which create a pattern when to the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by
(Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994,
interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain that led to the strangulation with a rope, and the time of death as
indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at
reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with
the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As
others, was guilty of rape with homicide. the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going
such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute
statutory rape. We concur with the RTC and the CA. towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999
carrying the yellow sack that was later on found to cover
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the The duly established circumstances we have considered are Maritas head. Anent the identification of Villaflores as the
commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the following. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to
the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around Villaflores as the person they had seen holding Marita by the
and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,28 leading the child through the alley hand going towards the abandoned house before the victim
because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying
victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always from the victims house.29Secondly, Marita went missing after of a child from within Villaflores house, and the tracing to
hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope found at the
circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the body on the following day.30 Thirdly, Solidum passed by crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.
crime as well as the identity of the culprit. 21 Direct evidence Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard
proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating
inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum testimony of Borcillo. They justifiably did so.1wphi1 For one,

Evidence CASES: iii. weight and sufficiency of evidence Page 97 of 98

after he stated during direct examination that Villaflores was recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary
only his neighbor,39 it soon came to be revealed during his damages as a way of correction for the public good. For the
cross-examination that he was really a son of Villaflores own purpose,
sister.40 Borcillo might have concealed their close blood
P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary
relationship to bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring
damages,44 for a lesser amount would not serve genuine
his uncle, but we cannot tolerate his blatant attempt to
exemplarity.
mislead the courts about a fact relevant to the correct
adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo deserved no WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
credence as a witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum by the Court of Appeals on February 22, 2007 finding and
and Bautista in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of
justly met with skepticism. Had Borcillos incrimination of rape with homicide, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS,
Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could namely: (a) that he shall suffer reclusion perpetua without
have easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for an eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
aunt about a kilometer away from the place of the crime on Sentence Law), as amended; (b) that he shall pay to the heirs
that morning of July 2, 1999. Yet, the alibi could not stand, of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
both because the alleged aunt did not even come forward to addition to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals;
substantiate the alibi, and because the Defense did not and (c) that all the awards for damages shall bear interest of
demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision.
the place where the crime was committed at the time it was
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
committed.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC
to reclusion perpetua in consideration of the intervening
enactment on June 24,
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.41 Nonetheless, we have also
to specify in the judgment that Villaflores shall not be eligible
for parole, considering that Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 expressly holds persons "whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" not
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law), as amended.
The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper.
However, we add exemplary damages to take into account
the fact that Marita was below seven years of age at the time
of the commission of the rape with homicide. Article 266-B,
Revised Penal Code has expressly declared such tender age
of the victim as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties. xxx.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
xxx
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability "when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."42 The Civil Code permits such award "by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."43 Granting exemplary damages is not dependent
on whether the aggravating circumstance is actually
appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such, the Court

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