1.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project
is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these
funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art.
VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP
was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings
only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse
all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot
be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.

3. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court.
 RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These

Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA),
which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:
1w phi1

Valuation under
Valuation under COA
Difference
Name of Justice Items Purchased CFAG Memorandum
(in pesos)
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
(in pesos)

Artemio Panganiban Toyota Camry, 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90

(Chief Justice) 2003 model

Toyota Grandia, 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00

2002 model

Toyota Camry, 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

2001 model

Ruben T. Reyes Toyota Camry, 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50

(Associate Justice) 2005 model

Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00

2003 model

Angelina S. Gutierrez Toyota Grandia, 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00

(Associate Justice) 2002 model

Adolfo S. Azcuna Toyota Camry, 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00

(Associate Justice) 2005 model

Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00

2002 model

Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10

Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise
the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the
Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a
matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government
property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its
budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciarys resources,
based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or
required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Courts policy in the disposal of its property would be
tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

OUR RULING

We find Atty. Candelarias recommendation to be well-taken.

The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial
independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11

Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve
justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the
other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts:
decisional independence and institutional independence."13 Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political or
popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law."14 On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the
judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government."15 Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of
the judiciary as a body."16

In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21,
2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of judicial independence in the following manner:

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy
within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it
seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses
on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity
of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an
independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository of
judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,18 no
less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution,
or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary. 19 The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy,20 and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence21 has characterized
administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.22

The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office,23 and
ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."24 With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer
justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of
their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. 25

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Courts powers, but also by
providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Courts affairs.

Fiscal Autonomy

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from
discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws
removing all jurisdiction from courts,26 the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial
functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the
Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to
perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative
autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under
Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for
the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them
in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and
sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards
the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity
and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now
agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquinos veto of particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciarys
constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from
the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is
withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It
knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed.30

The Courts declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations;31 real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and
properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.

Application to the Present Case

The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of
administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01
reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and
the appellate courts:

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the
Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";

WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement
government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and

WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she
officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated
properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the
Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement
benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the
Court has the power to administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and
entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.33

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary
authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges
and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of
Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of
property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the local government
units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries conformably to their respective
corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and
dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate
to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However, whether
exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for
interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of
the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23,
1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit
be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.
4. LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel,
CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA,
VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ
ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES,
EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA,
Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of
the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206
or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the
above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators
and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select
and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than
malfeasance.

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2)
whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is
sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,
LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II. The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity
accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a
clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were
direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
 common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for
rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be
funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with
the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to
execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the
actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the
budgetary process remain intact.
_______________

NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

5. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011
RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with
MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operatives facts that occurred in the interim
and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain
to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their
choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumb marks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?
III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, andUNANIMOUSLY directed land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

 [The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on
this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were
also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at
the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since
SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of
the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and
not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR,
under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were
allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads,
irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the
area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded
per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per
qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to
industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well
as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court
however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be
distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since
this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of
the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin
to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of
coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court
majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant
case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon
the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs
should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be
transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the
FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory,
since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs
will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the
HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI
share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire
control over HLI.]

6. David et al vs Arroyo

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12
of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act
of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words
of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based
on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state of national emergency and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
 (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

7. CHREA vs.CHR G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the
CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in
the Commission. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the
DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees
of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied
the same. CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld
the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within
the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD:
the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National
Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering
that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer
means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to
manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well.
In the recent case of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA
officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and
position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless,
subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the
latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as
possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758. )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior
to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the
DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of
a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional
plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as
evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the
nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission,
and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional
commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be
tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions
shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast,
Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on
Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the
Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express
mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from
time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA,
the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso
facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not
specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational
structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded
fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal
autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of
the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.26

NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record
in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to
show that its president has the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank
and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in
the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently
meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits
of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs
request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was
a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due
process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR
heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key
positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no
law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal
to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive
without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond
cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

7. Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals
fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC
denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of
the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a
revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply
with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed

8. KilosBayan vs. Teofisto Guingona

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a national network system that
will in turn expand PCSOs source of income.
Bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that: PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it
is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from
holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity; The network system
sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the
Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such; PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No.
7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems. PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but
merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the
nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though.

On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a
collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by
the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate,
and manage the network system including its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is
to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.

9. Sanidad vs COMELEC

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD
No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in
nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power
of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly
during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power
to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people
in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only
of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the
people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

10. Defensor- Santiago vs COMELEC

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that
system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con
stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable
such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated,
that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

11. SALONGA vs PAO G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

Facts:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no
prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno
Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case
has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge
sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor
any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is
the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information
against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no
rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues:

1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating
for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara vs Enage
(41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that: The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents legislative powers
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino
culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the
Reports.

12. TANADA vs ANGARA

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners
question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and
as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty
and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not
a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of
commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing
the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a
member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not
economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.