Republic of The Philippines Manila: Petitioners

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN BANC
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,
GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, and TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR.,
Petitioners,
-versus- G.R. No. 231658
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON.
DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR;
and GEN. EDUARDO AO, CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL
LAW IMPLEMENTOR,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT,

VIRGILIO T. LINCUNA, ATELIANA
U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO,
CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM
BALANGHIG, RENATO REYES, JR.,
CRISTINA E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS
H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS
REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L.
TINIO, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY
REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D.
BROSAS, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I.
ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA
KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE
ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM,
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, and

JOVITA MONTES,
Petitioners,
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF-OF-STAFF LT. GENERAL
EDUARDO AO, and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE

NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD,
NORAISAH S. SANI, and ZAHRIA P.
MUTI-MAPANDI,
Petitioners,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR

C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND)
SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY
(OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) CATALINO
S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF
STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP) DIRECTOR GENERAL
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, and
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
2
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM
Respondents1 Executive Secretary Salvador C.

Medialdea, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines General Eduardo
Ao, Philippine National Police Director General Ronald M.
Dela Rosa, National Security Adviser Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., and Secretary of Interior and Local
Government (Officer-in-Charge) Catalino S. Cuy, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, in compliance with this
Honorable Courts Order dated June 10, 2017, respectfully
state:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS
1. There is a rebellion in Marawi City and in other

parts of Mindanao, as evidenced by armed public uprisings
and atrocities committed therein. As of June 17, 2017,
twenty-six (26) civilians and fifty-nine (59) government
forces have been killed and at least fifty-nine thousand
(59,000) families have been displaced from their homes.2
Considering the magnitude and scope, as well as the
presence of rebel groups in Mindanao, public safety is
endangered, requiring the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
2. For a full appreciation of the magnitude and scope

of the rebellion in Mindanao, it is necessary to trace the
origin of and the cause behind the Islamic State movement.
A brief history of the

Islamic State or caliphate
1
While impleaded as respondent in G.R. No. 231771, the OSG omitted President Rodrigo Roa Duterte as
named respondent in view of his presidential immunity (cf. Hon. Aguinaldo, et al. v. President Aquino, et
al., G.R No. 224302, November 29, 2016). The arguments in support of this position will be discussed
further below.
2
See Affidavit of Delfin Lorenzana dated June 17, 2017, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex 1
and made an integral part hereof.
3
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
3. ISIS was formed sometime in 2014 by the

members of the Al Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq.3 In the
ongoing Syrian conflict, Al Qaeda in Iraq moved to Syria and
broke away from Al Qaeda to form ISIS, also known as
DAESH.4
4. Leading the ISIS is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who

now claims to be the caliph, or head of ISIS. He has
successfully and rapidly established the Islamic State or
Khalifa in Syria and Iraq. To be part of the Khalifa or
caliphate, mujahideen or Muslims who proclaim themselves
as warriors for the faith, pledge their bayah or allegiance to
the caliph al-Baghdadi.5 Through their bayah to the caliph,
they oblige themselves to unify under the banner of one
caliphate.6
5. ISIS has propagated its plan to impose its will and

influence worldwide. To do so, it captures and administers
territories. These conquered territories are collectively
referred to as a caliphate. The caliphate is divided into
different wilayah or provinces led by a wali. Each wali has a
complete bureaucracy in place to exercise control over areas
they occupy. A wali is provided a specific amount of financial
support from the ISIS core to enable the wilayah to operate.
6. The success of ISIS in conquering territories

means, too, that it has the capacity to acquire fighters and
modern weaponry. The United Nations (UN) has labeled
ISIS as the worlds wealthiest organization.7 ISIS derives
its income from operating seized oil fields, obtaining
protection money from businesses, and profits from black
market transactions. The UN estimated that ISIS received
3
Thomas Samuel, Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, available at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/Radicalisation_SEA_2016.pd
f (last accessed June 11, 2017).
4
Ibid.
5
Dabiq: Remaining and Expanding (Muharram 1436 or November 2014), a copy of which is attached as
Annex 1 of Respondents Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017.
6
Ibid.
7
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Daesh) to
international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in
countering the threat, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/92 (January 29, 2016) (last accessed on
June 11, 2017).
4
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
an income of four hundred million ($400M) to five hundred

million US Dollars ($500M) in 2015 alone.8
7. The wealth and power of ISIS not only enabled

the rapid expansion of its caliphate, but also inspired other
radical Islamic groups worldwide. These groups commit
atrocities in the name of the Islamic State in order to seek
recognition and supportfinancial or otherwisefrom ISIS.
The Philippines as the

extension of the ISIS
caliphate
8. The notoriety of the ISIS in the Middle East has

attracted the attention of extremist groups in the
Philippines. The AFP has obtained ISIS propaganda
material, Dabiq,9 which reports that as early as November
2014, a number of local rebel groups in the Philippines had
already pledged their allegiance to the ISIS caliphate.
9. There are four ISIS-linked local rebel groups that

operate in different parts of Mindanao.10 These groups have
formed an alliance for the purpose of establishing a wilayah,
or Islamic province, in Mindanao. The four (4) groups, which
find their roots in different parts of Mindanao, are as follows:
a. The Abu-Sayyaf Group from Basilan (ASG-

Basilan), led by Isnilon Hapilon (Hapilon);
b. Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), also known
as the Maguid Group, from Saranggani and Sultan
Kudarat. The group is led by Mohammad Jaafar
Maguid;
c. The Maute Group from Lanao del Sur led by Omar
Maute; and
d. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF),
based in the Liguasan Marsh, Maguindanao.
8
Ibid.
9
See Dabiq, attached as Annex 1 of Respondents Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017.
10
See Affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, par. 25; attached hereto as Annex 2 and forms an
integral part hereof. N.B. Due to national security reasons, Petitioners copy of the affidavit will not contain
Operations Directive 02-2017, attached thereto as Annex 3, and Rules of Engagement for Operations
Directive 02-2017, attached thereto as Annex 4.
5
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
10. These groups are notorious for committing

numerous bombings, assassinations, and extortion activities
in the country, especially in Mindanao.11 In the past, these
groups had been operating separately and independently.
Due to their uniform pledge of allegiance to ISIS and their
support for the establishment of a wilayah, an alliance has
been formed between and among these groups (for brevity,
these groups are collectively referred to herein as ISIS-
linked local rebel groups).
11. In addition to these ISIS-linked local rebel groups,

there are also ISIS cell groups that operate all over
Mindanao. These cell groups conduct coordinated attacks
with the aforesaid rebel groups. These cell groups are as
follows:
a. Ansar Dawiah Fi Filibbin

b. Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
c. Al Harakatul Islamiyah Battalion
d. Jamaat Ansar Khilafa
e. Ansharul Khilafah Philippines Battalion
f. Bangsamoro Justice Movement
g. Khilafah Islamiya Mindanao
h. Abu Sayyaf Group (Sulu faction)
i. Syuful Khilafa Fi Luzon
j. Marakah Al-Ansar Battalion
k. Dawla Islamiyyah Cotabato
l. Dawlat Al Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik
m. Ansar Al-Shariyah Battalion
n. Jamaah al-Tawhid wal Jihad Philippines
o. Abu Dujanah Battalion
p. Abu Khubayn Battalion
q. Jundallah Battalion
r. Abu Sadr Battalion
s. Jamaah Al Muhajirin wal Anshor
t. Balik-Islam Group
12. These ISIS-linked local rebel groups and ISIS cell

groups have conducted violent activities, particularly in the
areas of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga and Davao,
11
Ibid.
6
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
not merely to sow terror amongst the populace, but to

dismember the country. They have the capability of
conducting bomb attacks in any areas of Mindanao. For this
year alone, there had been forty-three (43) violent attacks
by these groups that occurred consisting mostly of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), harassments, and
kidnappings.
13. On April 2016, the ISIS weekly online newsletter,

Al Naba, announced the appointment of ASG-Basilan leader,
Hapilon, as the emir or leader of all ISIS forces in the
Philippines. The appointment of Hapilon as its Philippine emir
was further confirmed in a June 21, 2016 online video by
ISIS entitled The Solid Structure.12 The video hailed
Hapilon as the mujahid13 authorized to lead the soldiers of
the Islamic State in the Philippines.
14. The appointment by the ISIS of an emir in the

Philippines furthered the unification of the local rebel groups.
Sometime in June 2016, members of the different ISIS-
linked local rebel groups consolidated in Basilan where its
new emir operates his rebel group.14
15. On December 31, 2016, Hapilon and about thirty

(30) of his followers, including eight (8) foreign terrorists,
were surveilled in Lanao del Sur. According to military
intelligence,15 Hapilon performed a symbolic hijra16 or
pilgrimage to unite with the ISIS-linked groups in mainland
Mindanao. This was geared towards realizing the five (5)-
step process of establishing a wilayah, which are: first, the
pledging of allegiance to the Islamic State; second, the
unification of all terrorist groups who have given bay'ah or
their pledge of allegiance; third, the holding of consultations
to nominate a wali or a governor of a province; fourth, the
achievement of consolidation for the caliphate through the
conduct of widespread atrocities and uprisings all across
12
See video footage entitled, The Solid Structure, attached as Annex 2-A of Respondents
Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017.
13
Singular form of mujahideen.
14
See Affidavit of Eduardo Ao, Annex 2.
15
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled Marawi City as a Staging Ground for Attacks, a copy of which is
attached as Annex 8 to the affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, attached hereto as Annex 2.
16
Hijra marks the beginning of Islam as a religion, when Muhammad and his followers migrated from
Mecca to Medina in 622 in order to preserve their community. See
http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Hijra-before-ISIS.php, last accessed on June 11, 2017.
7
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Mindanao; and finally, the presentation of all of these to the

ISIS leadership for approval or recognition.
16. On the first week of January 2017, a meeting

among these ISIS-linked rebel groups was supposed to take
place in Butig, Lanao del Sur for the purpose of declaring
their unified pledge of allegiance to ISIS and re-naming
themselves as the Dawahtul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq
(DIWM). This was, however, preempted by the death of
Mohammad Jaafar Maguid (a.k.a. Tokboy), then leader of
the AKP, coupled with the conduct of a series of military
operations in the area.17
17. The appointment by ISIS of an emir in the

Philippines is already the third step in the establishment of a
wilayah in Mindanao. Moreover, these groups now have the
unified mission of wresting control of Mindanaoan territory
from the government for the purpose of establishing a
wilayah.
The Davao bombing and

other violent activities of
pro-ISIS groups leading up
to the siege of Marawi on
May 23, 2017
18. After ISIS appointment of Hapilon as emir, he and

the ISIS-linked local rebel groups committed multiple
atrocities resulting in the wounding and killing of military
and civilian personalities. These atrocities came in the wake
of the consolidation of forces of around one hundred five
(105) rebel members of the combined groups of the Abu
Sayyaf, the Maute Group, the BIFF, and foreign terrorists.18
19. The government has noted the increased

occurrences of military encounters with these ISIS-linked
local rebel groups. One of these battles occurred on August
29, 2016 when members of the ASG ambushed and killed
17
18
See Powerpoint Presentation entitled, Military Operation on Updates in Marawi and Implementation of
Martial Law, dated June 7, 2017 and AFP Briefing Manuscript, copies of which are attached as Annexes
10 and 11 in the Affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, attached hereto as Annex 2.
8
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
fifteen (15) army soldiers in Patikul, Sulu. Moreover, there

was a notable increase in terror attacks against the civilian
population.19 On the night of September 2, 2016, Davao City
was rocked with a fatal bombing incident in a populous night
market. Fifteen (15) civilians were killed and sixty-seven
(67) others were injured.20
20. Due to the then increasing concerted attacks

against the military and the populace, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte (President Duterte) issued Proclamation No. 55
entitled, Declaring a State of National Emergency on
Account of Lawless Violence in Mindanao on September 4,
2016. He acted pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution which authorized him to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
21. Notwithstanding the issuance of Proclamation No.

55, the ISIS-linked local rebel groups continued to wreak
havoc in Mindanao, committing numerous bombings,
assassinations, and extortion activities in the country. These
violent activities are widespread and were duly recorded in
areas such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga, Davao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and Maguindanao.
22. The following incidents are confirmed by the

military to have been perpetrated by these rebel groups
prior to the May 23, 2017 Marawi siege:21
a. There had been six (6) kidnappings from January

2017 up to the present, translating to sixteen (16)
victims. Notably, three (3) of the victims were
beheaded, five (5) were released, and nine (9)
others were rescued, with twenty-seven (27)
victims still being held in captivity;
b. Attack at a 51st Infantry Battalion, PA, based in
Brgy. Bayabao, Butig, Lanao del Sur on February
20, 2016;
19
See Proclamation No. 55, a copy of which is attached as Annex 4 of Respondents Consolidated
Comment dated June 12, 2017.
20
Ibid.
21
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled Significant Atrocities in Mindanao Prior to the Marawi City
Incident, a copy of which is attached as Annex 9 to the affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017,
attached hereto as Annex 2; See Affidavit of Eduardo Ao , Annex 2.
9
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
c. Kidnapping of six (6) sawmill workers and the

beheading of two (2) of the victims on April 4 and
11, 2016, respectively;
d. Attack at the Lanao del Sur Provincial Jail in
Marawi City on August 27, 2016 in order to free
detained rebels;
e. Improvised explosive device (IED) attack at a
night market in Roxas Avenue, Davao City on
September 2, 2016, leading to the death of fifteen
(15) people and the injury of more than sixty (60)
others;
f. On November 5, 2016, the ASG abducted a
German national, Juergen Kantner, and killed his
wife, Sabine Merz;
g. Siege in Butig, Lanao del Sur from November 26
to December 1, 2016, which resulted in skirmishes
with government troops and the eventual
withdrawal of the group amid several fatalities;
h. On December 28, 2016, the members of BIFF
lobbed two (2) grenades at the provincial office of
Shariff Maguindanao;
i. On January 13, 2017, an IED exploded in
Barangay Campo Uno, Basilan thereby killing one
(1) civilian and injuring another;
j. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three
(3) Indonesian crew members near Bakungan
Island, Tawi-Tawi;
k. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED
in Barangay Danapah, Basilan resulting in the
death of two (2) children and the wounding of
three (3) others;
l. Ambush of military elements in Marawi City on
February 16, 2017, to include MAJ JERICO P
MANGALUS PA and one (1) enlisted personnel;
m. Carnapping in Iligan City on February 24, 2017
which led to government pursuit operations killing
two (2) members identified as Azam Taher
AMPATUA and @WOWIE and the apprehension of
Eyemen Canulo ALONTO in Tagoloan, Lanao del
Norte on the same day;
n. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its
German kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner, in Sulu;
10
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
o. On March 5, 2017, Mrs. Omera Lotao MADID was

kidnapped in Saguiaran, LDS by suspected Maute
Group elements;
p. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabanga,
Bohol leading to firefights between the rebels and
government troops;
q. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino
kidnap victim, Noel Besconde;
r. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni
Siraji and beheaded him three (3) days later; and,
s. From February to May 2017, there were eleven
(11) separate instances of IED explosions by the
BIFF in Mindanao. This resulted in the death and
wounding of several military and civilian persons.
23. AFP intelligence reports also disclose that as early

as April 18, 2017, Abdullah Maute had dispatched his
followers to the cities of Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro
to conduct bombing operations, carnapping, and
liquidation of AFP and PNP personnel in the said areas. 22
24. Due to the continuous spate of crimes in pursuit of

rebellion by these ISIS-linked local rebel groups, the
Secretary of Defense, Delfin Lorenzana, and the National
Security Adviser, General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.,
expressed to President Duterte sometime during the first
quarter of 2017 the advisability of declaring martial law in
Mindanao.23 In support thereof, Secretary Lorenzana had
been submitting thick briefers to the President about these
rebel groups outlining therein their political motives and list
of armed attacks against the government.
25. On March 9, 2017, and before the Davao local

government officers and members of the media, President
Duterte already cited the intelligence on these ISIS-linked
rebel groups, and declared his intention to proclaim martial
law if the situation in the Mindanao region worsens.24
22
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled, Timeline of ASG and Maute Collaboration, a copy of which is
attached as Annex 7 to the affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, attached hereto as Annex 2.
23
See Affidavit of Delfin Lorenzana, Annex 1.
24
Ibid.
11
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
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The siege of Marawi City

on May 23, 2017
26. On April 22 to 25, 2017, Hapilons rebel group

engaged in armed offensives against the military in Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur.25 The government offensives, which involved
a combination of ground assaults and airstrikes, forced the
rebel group to flee to Marawi City.26
27. On May 23, 2017, there were intelligence reports

that Hapilon was hiding at a safe house of the ISIS-linked
local rebel groups in Barangay Basak Malutlut, Marawi City.27
Around 1 oclock in the afternoon, a joint military and police
team commenced its operation to capture Hapilon and other
Maute Group operational leaders in the person of Abdullah
and Omarkhayam Maute, through the enforcement of
pending judicial warrants for their arrests.28
28. At around 2 oclock in the afternoon, the military

and police officers arrived in Barangay Basak Malutlut,
Marawi City, pursuing the high-value targets.29 This was
followed by a series of encounters throughout the day in
different parts of Marawi City.
29. At 2:18pm, the government troops from the 51st

Infantry Battalion were faced with heavy assault from the
rebel groups in the vicinity of the Amai Pakpak Medical
Center. Four (4) government troopers were wounded in the
encounter.
30. The ISIS-linked local rebel groups launched an

overwhelming and unexpectedly strong offensive against
government troops. Multitudes, about five hundred (500)
armed men, rampaged along the main streets of Marawi and
swiftly occupied strategic positions throughout the city.
Snipers positioned themselves atop buildings and began
25
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled, Marawi City as a Staging Ground for Attacks, Annex 9 of
Affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, Annex 2.
26
Ibid.
27
See AFP Briefing Manuscript, a copy of which is attached as Annex 11 to the affidavit of Eduardo Ao
dated June 17, 2017, attached hereto as Annex 2.
28
29
Ibid.
12
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
shooting at government troops. The ISIS-linked local rebel

groups were also equipped with rocket-propelled grenades
(RPG) and seemingly limitless ammunition for high-
powered assault rifles.30
31. The rebel groups occupied and burned several

buildings. At around 8:00pm, the rebels have burned the
Marawi City Jail, a Land Bank of the Philippines branch,
Dansalan College, and Our Lady of Help Cathedral.31 In the
process, they mercilessly killed nine (9) innocent civilians
and kidnapped Father Chito Suganob.
32. By 10:00pm, the local rebel groups have set up

road blockage and checkpoints in Naga Street, Bangolo
Street, Mapandi Street, and Camp Kaithly Street. They also
controlled at least three (3) of the main bridges in Marawi
City namely, the Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiran bridges. They
also occupied the Philhealth Office and Salam Hospital in
Barangay Lilod.
33. At or around 10:00pm, government troops

composed of members from the 49th Infantry Battalion
encountered rebels in Barangay Mapandi. The ensuing clash
caused the death of a soldier and wounding of three (3)
others.
34. In their rampage, the rebel groups brandished the

black ISIS flag and hoisted it in the locations that they
occupied.32 An ISIS flag was recovered by the 51st Infantry
Battalion in the vicinity of the Amai Pakpak Medical Center,
where the troops had an armed encounter with the rebels.33
Another ISIS flag was captured by the 103rd Infantry Brigade
in Barangay Basak, which was under the control of the rebel
groups.34
35. Even this Honorable Court has ordered judges and

court personnel in Marawi City to conduct court matters in
30
Ibid.
31
See Affidavit of Delfin Lorenzana dated June 17, 2017, Annex 1.
32
Ibid.
33
See Affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, Annex 2.
34
13
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
nearby Iligan City and other safe areas. The aforesaid

attacks resulted in the shutdown of stations of local courts.35
36. To date, there have been fifty-nine (59) casualties

on government troops and twenty-six (26) civilian deaths.36
Over 380 of our soldiers and police officers have been
wounded. Civilians numbering more than 1,600 have been
rescued by government troops. On the part of the ISIS-
linked rebel groups, there have been two hundred twenty-
eight (228) casualties.
37. The incident also caused displacement of persons

and families from their homes in Marawi City as they were
forced to evacuate and escape the firefight between the
government and the rebels. As of 14 June 2017, over 59
thousand (59,000) families or over 260 thousand people
have been affected by the armed conflict.37
38. On May 24, 2017, the government troops in

Marawi obtained planning documents and a video tape in a
safe house occupied by the ISIS-linked local rebel groups
located in Barangay Basak, Malutlut, Marawi City. The video
footage shows Hapilon and the members of the two (2) ISIS
rebel groups, the ASG Basilan and the Maute Group,
planning the attack and occupation of Marawi, thereby
confirming and validating their intention of establishing the
besieged city as their territory. The video also reveals that
the Marawi siege is a prelude for another attack outside of
the said city and in other parts of Mindanao. This video was
shared to the Associated Press and already made public.38
39. According to intelligence reports, the ISIS-linked

local rebel groups had intended to burn down the entire city
of Marawi on the day of Ramadan, or on May 26, 2017. The
said attack would have served as the precursor for other
rebel groups to stage their own uprisings across Mindanao in
a bid to simultaneously establish a wilayah in the region.
35
Office of the Court Administrator Memorandum dated May 31, 2017, a copy of which is attached as
Annex 9 of Respondents Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017.
36
37
38
See video entitled, Marawi Siege Planning, attached as Annex 2-B of Respondents Consolidated
14
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
40. Marawi is a strategic location due to its favorable

terrain and accessibility to Northern and Central Mindanao.
Military intelligence point to Hapilons tactical intent of using
Maguindanao and Cotabao as escape routes, supply line, and
backdoor passage for reinforcements from other ISIS-linked
rebel groups.39 These would have aided them in gaining
control over and consolidating not just Marawi City, but a
larger part of the Mindanao region. Moreover, the rebel
groups have established contacts inside the city who are
providing them with logistical and financial support.40
41. However, the planned attack by the rebels was

foiled when government troops attempted to serve the
warrant on 23 May 2017. This forced the ISIS-linked local
rebel groups to prematurely execute their planned siege of
Marawi.41
President Dutertes
Proclamation No. 216
declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
42. During the siege of Marawi City, President Duterte

was in Moscow, Russia on a business trip. Nonetheless,
President Duterte was constantly updated by his officials on
the situation in Marawi City.
43. Upon being informed of the crisis in Marawi,

President Duterte, around 10:00 p.m. of May 23, 2017
(Philippine time), issued Proclamation No. 216,42 entitled
Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao, pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
39
40
Ibid.
41
Id.
42
See Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017, attached as Annex 10 of Respondents Consolidated
15
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
44. Before President Duterte issued Proclamation No.

216, he was informed of numerous armed and violent
attacks on public and private facilities on the ground. As the
Respondent General Ao narrates:
35. That prior to the formal declaration by the President

of martial law in the area on May 23, 2017, the Maute
group had commenced numerous armed and violent
attacks on various public and private facilities in Marawi,
such as but not limited to the following:
a. Assault of the Marawi City Jail;

b. Assault of its on-duty personnel;
c. Carting away of personnel-issued firearms and
vehicles;
d. Ambuscade and burning of the Marawi Police Station
and taking away of a police prowl car;
e. Killing of an element of the Provincial Drug
Enforcement Unit;
f. Freeing of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the
Marawi City Jail;
g. Taking control of at least three (3) bridges, namely:
Lilod, Bangulo and Sauiaran bridges, all of Marawi
City;
h. Putting-up of road blockades and checkpoints in the
area, namely at Naga St., Bangolo St., Mapandi St.,
and Camp Keithly St., all of Marawi City, which were
occupied by the rebels until around 10 oclock in the
evening;
i. Burning down of schools and churches, and taking
hostages with them;
j. Attacking the Amai Pakpak Hospital, hoisting the
ISIS flag thereat, and taking hostages in the medical
facility;
k. Burning down of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship
Hospital; and
l. Ransacking of the Land Bank of the Philippines and
commandeering its armored car, among other
atrocities that had been committed.43
45. In compliance with the reportorial requirement

under the Constitution, President Duterte submitted his
written report on the declaration of martial law in
43
16
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Mindanao44 to Congress on May 25, 2017 at 9:55 p.m. The

report outlined the factual basis for the Presidents issuance
of Proclamation No. 216.
46. Four weeks after Proclamation No. 216 was

issued, government troops have yet to fully secure Marawi
City. Up to now, the government has not yet taken full
control over the entire city, and the attacks of the ISIS-
linked local rebel groups still impede the delivery of basic
services.
47. On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C.

Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A.
Billones, Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., Raul Daza, and Edgar
R. Erice filed a Petition dated June 3, 2017 (hereinafter
Lagman Petition) asking this Honorable Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216, and
to nullify the proclamation.
48. In its Resolution dated June 6, 2017, the

Honorable Court required Respondents to file their Comment
on the Lagman Petition not later than June 12, 2017 at 12
oclock in the afternoon. The Petition was likewise set for
Oral Arguments on June 13 to 15, 2017. Representatives
Daza and Erice were dropped as Respondents.
49. On June 9, 2017, Eufemia Campos Cullamat,

Virgilio T. Lincuna, Ateliana U. Hijos, Roland A. Cobrado, Carl
Anthony D. Olalo, Roy Jim Balanghig, Renato Reyes, Jr.,
Cristina E. Palabay, Amaryllis H. Enriquez, ACT Teachers
Representative Antonio L. Tinio, Gabriela Womens
Representative Arlene D. Brosas, Kabataan Party-List
Representative Sarah Jane I. Elago, Mae Paner, Gabriela
Krista Dalena, Anna Isabelle Estein, Mark Vincent D. Lim,
Vencer Mari Crisostomo, Jovita Montes filed a Petition on
even date (hereinafter Cullamat Petition) asking this
Honorable Court, to declare as void, in whole or in part,
Proclamation No. 216, and to enjoin its continued
implementation.
44
See Presidents Report to Congress dated May 25, 2017, attached as Annex 11 of Respondents
17
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
50. On even date, Norkaya S. Mohamad, Sittie Nur

Dyhanna S. Mohamad, Noraisah S. Sani, and Zahria P. Muti-
Mapandi filed a Petition dated June 8, 2017 (hereinafter
Mohamad Petition) asking this Honorable Court to compel
Respondents to present proof on the factual basis for
Proclamation No. 216, and to declare it null and void for
being unconstitutional.
51. In view of the filing of the two other Petitions, this

Honorable Court issued two Orders dated June 10, 2017
requiring Respondents to file a Consolidated Comment on
the Lagman, Cullamat, and Mohamad Petitions.
52. On June 12, 2017, Respondents filed their

Consolidated Comment of even date on the three Petitions.
53. In an En Banc Advisory dated June 12, 2017, this

Honorable Court limited the issues of the consolidated
petitions to the following:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos.

231658, 231771, and 231774 are the appropriate
proceeding covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required of this Court when a declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and

suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
a. Is required to be factually correct or only not
arbitrary in his appreciation of the facts;
b. Is required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon of the Secretary of
National Defense;
c. Is required to take into account only the
situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have
not been accurately reported;
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that
have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
18
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual and legal

bases for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by

this Court involves the calibration of the graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely:
calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 21 of 23 May 2017 may

be considered vague and thus null and void:
a. With its inclusion of other rebel groups; or
b. Since it has no guidelines specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region;
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities in Marawi City are

sufficient basis:
a. For the existence of actual rebellion
b. For a declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism

are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of
public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May

2017 will:
a. Have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55
s. 2016; or
b. Also nullify the acts of the President in calling
out the Armed Forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region;
10. Whether or not an order issued by the martial law

administrator is cognizable outside of the area covered by
martial law.
54. On June 13, 2017, this Honorable Court amended

the En Banc Advisory on the matter of the limitations of the
issues in the consolidated petitions. The Court removed the
tenth (10th) issue, and modified the seventh (7th) issue as
follows:
19
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities in Proclamation No.

216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are
sufficient basis:
a. For the existence of actual rebellion
b. For a declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus in the entire Mindanao region; xxxx
55. Oral Arguments for the consolidated petitions took

place from June 13 to 15, 2017.
56. On the last day of the Oral Arguments, the Court

held an executive session on the ground that the facts to be
discussed are confidential. In attendance were Respondents
Secretary Lorenzana and AFP Chief of Staff Ao, among
others.
57. The Honorable Court, through its Resolution dated

June 6, 2017, ordered the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda not later than June 19, 2017 at 2 oclock in the
afternoon.
58. Hence, this Memorandum.
ARGUMENTS
I.
PRESIDENT DUTERTE ENJOYS IMMUNITY FROM SUIT,
AND SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE DROPPED AS A
RESPONDENT IN THE CULLAMAT PETITION.
II.
PETITIONERS FAILED TO ALLEGE AND ESTABLISH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
PRESIDENT DUTERTE IN DECLARING MARTIAL LAW
AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
A. THE PRESENT PETITIONS DO NOT SATISFY THE

APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING REFERRED TO
20
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
UNDER ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, AND MUST ACCORDINGLY BE
DENIED DUE COURSE BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
1) This Honorable Court may deny due course to

petitions which fail to satisfy the appropriate
proceeding referred to under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
2) The appropriate proceeding referred to under

Article VII, Section 18 is a petition for
certiorari.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURTS POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 18 IS
ONLY LIMITED IN SCOPE.
1) This Honorable Court cannot declare

Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional on
the basis of the void for vagueness rule.
2) The sufficiency of the factual basis for the

proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ should
not be made to depend on what is written on
the face of Proclamation No. 216.
3) The constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216

should not be made to depend on or be
affected by the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders,
special orders, arrest orders or other orders
issued subsequent thereto.
4) This Honorable Court can only review the

sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ. The Presidents
choice of which Commander-in-Chief power
should be exercised is beyond the ambit of
judicial review.
21
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
5) Proclamation No. 216, like any other

governmental act, enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality which may be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
6) The standard for examining sufficiency of

factual basis for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ is arbitrariness, not correctness.
C. PETITIONERS FAILED TO DISCHARGE THEIR

BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PRESIDENT
DUTERTES PROCLAMATION NO. 216 IS BEREFT
OF FACTUAL BASIS.
1) The contents of news reports are

inadmissible. Even assuming that they are
admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value.
2) The unreliability of these news reports to

establish facts in a judicial proceeding
becomes even more evident when the
element of psychological warfare is taken
into consideration.
3) The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus

does not apply to the information found in
Proclamation No. 216.
D. THE LACK OF RECOMMENDATION FROM THE

DEFENSE SECRETARY, OR ANY OTHER PERSON,
DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE PROCLAMATION; NEITHER DOES IT
AUTOMATICALLY NEGATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS PROCLAMATION.
III.
THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO. 216.
22
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
A. THERE IS ACTUAL REBELLION IN MINDANAO

PERPETRATED BY ISIS-LINKED REBEL GROUPS
THAT HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT. THESE GROUPS ARE RESOLUTE IN
ACHIEVING THEIR UNIFIED GOAL OF
ESTABLISHING A WILAYAH IN THE MINDANAO
REGION.
1) There are armed public uprisings against the

government in different places across
Mindanao. These are perpetrated by local
rebel groups that have pledged their
allegiance to ISIS and to the goal of carving
out their own territory called a wilayah.
2) Due to their overt acts of rebellion, the ISIS-

linked rebel groups effectively deprived
President Duterte of his powers and
prerogatives.
3) The factual circumstances after the issuance

of Proclamation No. 216 further validate the
existence of rebellion in Mindanao and the
need to secure public safety in the entire
region.
B. IN THE PURSUIT OF THEIR GOAL OF

ESTABLISHING A WILAYAH IN MINDANAO, THE
ISIS-LINKED REBEL GROUPS HAVE NO
MISGIVINGS IN ATTACKING NOT ONLY
GOVERNMENT FORCES, BUT ALSO THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION IN MINDANAO. HENCE, THE
MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY DEMANDS THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
1) The rebellion by the ISIS-linked local rebel

groups have been endangering public safety
in the entirety of Mindanao even prior to the
Marawi siege.
2) Due to the unified goal of the ISIS-linked

local rebel groups to establish a wilayah in
Mindanao, the danger to public safety is not
23
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
isolated only in Marawi Cityconformably

with the nature of rebellion as a crime
without borders.
3) Ensuring the safety of the public requires

the use of the powers inherent in the
proclamation of martial law.
DISCUSSION
I.
PRESIDENT DUTERTE ENJOYS IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT, AND SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE
DROPPED AS A RESPONDENT IN THE
CULLAMAT PETITION.
59. Respondents cannot overemphasize the need to

drop President Duterte as a party in this case. He enjoys
immunity from suit during his incumbency.
60. Presidential immunity is one of the basic tenets of

our legal system. While an explicit guaranty of immunity for
the President is not found in the text of the 1987
Constitution, presidential immunity during tenure remains as
part of the law. The reason for this is simple. Immunity from
suit assures the exercise of presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also
demands undivided attention.45
61. Conformably with the principle of presidential

immunity, Petitioners Cullamat, et al., committed a patent
error when they impleaded President Duterte as respondent
in this case. As Chief Executive of the Republic and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
President Duterte enjoys immunity from suit during his ...
tenure of office or actual incumbency.46
45
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988.
46
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012.
24
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
62. This Honorable Court has affirmed time and again

the existence and enforcement of Presidential immunity. In
Randolf David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,47 this Honorable
Court made no distinction as to the nature of the action for
which the President is being sued. This Court stressed that
the President may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law.48 Thus, this Court, in David, held that it was improper
to implead former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in a
petition for certiorari which sought to question her acts done
in the exercise of her ordinance power under the
Administrative Code of 1987. This Honorable Court warned
that [it would] degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such.49
63. Based on David, President Duterte should not be

impleaded as a respondent in the present case. Petitioners
cannot be permitted to disregard the doctrine of presidential
immunity. Without any waiver of his immunity from suit,
President Duterte should be dropped as a party-respondent.
II.
PETITIONERS FAILED TO ALLEGE AND ESTABLISH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
PRESIDENT DUTERTE IN DECLARING MARTIAL LAW
AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
A. THE PRESENT PETITIONS DO NOT SATISFY THE

APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING REFERRED TO
UNDER ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND MUST ACCORDINGLY BE
DENIED DUE COURSE BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
1) This Honorable Court may

deny due course to
petitions which fail to
satisfy the appropriate
47
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
25
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
proceeding referred to
under Article VII, Section
18 of the 1987
Constitution.
64. There is no doubt that this Honorable Court has

the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
Proclamation No. 216. This much has been vested in it by
the express terms of the third paragraph of Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.50
65. Petitioners argue that this provision imposes an

obligation on this Honorable Court, upon the filing of a case
before it, to require from the Government proof that
Proclamation No. 216 is founded on sufficient factual basis.
Contrary to Petitioners claims in their petitions and
statements in the oral arguments, however, the review of
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not a mandatory duty of this Honorable
Court.
66. In the first place, as already pointed out by

Respondents in their Consolidated Comment,51 the use of
the word may under Article VII, Section 18 means that
this Honorable Court has no obligation to entertain any and
all kinds of petitions filed before it for the review of the
habeas corpus.
67. A contrary interpretation would lead to absurdity.

Construing the provision as a mandatory obligation on the
part of this Honorable Court to accept any petition as
50
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
51
See Respondents Consolidated Comment dated June 12, 2017, p. 21.
26
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
automatically sufficient in form and substance would open

the floodgates for unscrupulous individuals to clog the high
courts dockets with patently unmeritorious petitions. This is
because Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
allows any citizen, despite having suffered no direct injury,
to ask this Honorable Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the Presidents exercise of his martial law
and suspension powers.
68. Too, the constitutionally mandated thirty-day

limitation for this High Court to promulgate its decision may
prove taxing not only for this Honorable Court, but also to
the Secretary of National Defense, the AFP Chief of Staff,
and other officials of the AFP. Instead of devoting their
scarce time and resources to quelling real danger to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, these officials
are dragged to court to justify the Presidents imposition of
martial law despite the petitions containing nothing more
than bare allegations.
69. Surely, the framers of the 1987 Constitution could

not have intended such absurd results. Instead,
Respondents submit that the 1986 Constitutional
Commission merely stated in categorical terms that the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ may be
reviewed if only to quell any doubt on the power of the
Supreme Court to do so. The provision should not be taken
to mean as allowing just about any kind of petition to be
filed before this Honorable Court to trigger the review
mechanism under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
70. In fact, this Honorable Court is not without

experience in denying due course to petitions seeking the
judicial review of a martial law proclamation. In Fortun v.
Arroyo,52 for instance, it dismissed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition assailing former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyos proclamation of martial law over Maguindanao. This
Honorable Court held that the petitions in Fortun [did] not
52
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012.
27
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of

judicial review.
71. This lends credence to the view that, indeed, the

review mechanism under Article VII, Section 18 imposes no
compulsory obligation on the part of this Honorable Court;
otherwise, this Honorable Court would have entertained the
petition in Fortun despite the martial law proclamation
having been lifted, and the issue becoming moot.
72. Respondents submit that this Honorable Court

may likewise deny due course to petitions filed before it
especially when, as in this case, Petitioners failed to institute
the appropriate proceeding for this Honorable Court to
exercise its power of review under Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution.
2) The appropriate
proceeding referred to
under Article VII, Section
18 is a petition for
certiorari.
73. Petitioners claimed during the oral arguments that

the appropriate proceeding referred to under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution refers to either a sui
generis or a special proceeding or one by which, as defined
under Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. From this definition, Petitioners argue that,
by instituting the present Petitions before this Honorable
Court, Respondents may be required to establish the
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ.53
74. Petitioners are mistaken. An application of the

different rules of constitutional construction all lead to the
conclusion that the appropriate proceeding referred to
under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is a
53
Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court, dated June 13, 2017.
28
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
petition for certiorari, and not a special proceeding or a sui

generis proceeding as claimed by Petitioners.
75. The first rule of constitutional construction,

according to this Honorable Court in Francisco, Jr. v. House
of Representatives, is that wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.54
76. Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution

uses the term appropriate proceeding, and not special
proceeding, a technical term which is defined under Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. As such, the term
appropriate proceeding should be interpreted in its generic
sense, i.e., a legal proceeding, which is defined as any
proceeding authorized by law and instituted in a court or a
tribunal to acquire a right or to enforce a remedy.55
77. It bears emphasis, too, that even under the 1964

Rules of Civil Procedure, which was in effect at the time the
1986 Constitutional Commission was drafting the
Constitution, the term special proceeding already had the
same meaning as the one found in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Aware that the same is a technical term, our
constitutional framers could have used the technical term
special proceeding in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, but they did not.
78. The second rule of constitutional construction is

that where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.56
79. By expressly providing that this Honorable Court

may review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the 1987 Constitution merely clarified
that the Presidents proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ do fall within the
54
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
55
Blacks Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, p. 1398.
56
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
29
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
ambit of judicial review, consistent with the Honorable

Courts expanded power of judicial review under Article VIII,
Section 1. The power of review, however, extends only to
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation
and/or suspension.
80. With all due respect, the provision should not be

taken to mean as an absolute grant of authority for the
Honorable Court to require the government machinery to
establish, by way of a special proceeding, the facts upon
which the President proclaimed martial law or suspended the
privilege of the writ.
81. The proclamation of martial law and the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
after all, are legitimate tools in the arsenal of powers that
the President possesses. His exercise thereof, much like any
other governmental act, must be accorded the strong
presumption of constitutionality that may be overcome only
by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction
of the Constitution.57
82. This Honorable Court in Francisco, Jr. instructs us

that if the first and second rules of constitutional
construction fail to clarify the ambiguity, the constitution
must be interpreted as a whole.58 Ut magis valeat quam
pereat.
83. While Article VII, Section 18, does not specify the
remedy through which the appropriate proceeding found
therein may be resorted to, the Constitutions provisions on
judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1, as well as the
Honorable Courts original jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
same article, all point to certiorari as the logical, natural and
only recourse.
84. There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the

precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law.59 Considering
57
Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994.
58
59
Magno v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011 citing Machado v. Gatdula, G.R.
No. 156287, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 546, 559, citing Spouses Vargas v. Spouses Caminas, G.R.
30
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
that the present Petitions were filed invoking this Honorable

Courts original jurisdiction to declare Proclamation No. 216
as unconstitutional, one needs only to look at what
proceedings fall under the original jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court.
85. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution furnishes

the answer. The said provision limits the original jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court to petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Of these
proceedings, it makes most sense that a petition for
certiorari is the appropriate proceeding referred to in
Article VII, Section 18 to ask the Honorable Court to nullify
any proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The nullification of an
act, after all, is the office of a writ of certiorari.
86. Too, this Honorable Court has declared that a

petition for certiorari is an appropriate remedy to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials60 in the exercise of its
expanded judicial power found under the second paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
87. Further, the institution of a petition for certiorari

as the appropriate proceeding under Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution correctly places the burden on the
Petitioners assailing the constitutionality of a martial law
proclamation to prove the existence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the President.
88. All told, the term appropriate proceeding under

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is not a
special proceeding, much less a sui generis proceeding, by
which this Honorable Court can declare Proclamation No.
216 unconstitutional. All tools of constitutional construction
lead to no other conclusion than that a petition for certiorari
Nos. 137839-40, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 305, 317; Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, G.R. No.
154295, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 320, 335; and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229 Phil.
234, 242 (1986).
60
See Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, citing Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board,
G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 470, 494. See also Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015.
31
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
is the proper and only way by which to invoke this

Honorable Courts review power under Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURTS POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 18 IS
ONLY LIMITED IN SCOPE.
1) This Honorable Court

cannot declare
Proclamation No. 216 as
unconstitutional on the
basis of the void for
vagueness rule.
89. The Cullamat Petition questions the use of the

phrase, other rebel groups,61 and argues that the
proclamation fails to specify or identify which rebel groups
are included in the term, leaving the proclamation open to
misinterpretation, and confusion. On this ground, Cullamat,
et al. claim that Proclamation No. 216 is void for vagueness.
90. At the outset, Petitioners must be reminded that

the void-for-vagueness rule is not even applicable in the
case at bar. The void-for-vagueness rule states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.62 A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
61
Cullamat Petition, p. 23.
62
Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560,
November 19, 2001, citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926), in
turn cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967)).
32
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government

muscle.63
91. The void-for-vagueness rule is an analytical tool

developed for testing on its face statutes in free speech
cases.64 Thus, as a ground for a facial challenge of a law,65
the vagueness doctrine has special application only to free-
speech cases, not to executive acts such as Proclamation
No. 216.66
92. Besides, the term other rebel groups is not at all

vague when viewed in the context of the words that
accompany it. Based on the maxim noscitur a sociis, the
correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of
various meanings may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or
with which it is associated. According to this Honorable
Court in Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council:67
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where

a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. This is because a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be
modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In
short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase
must be ascertained from the context of the body of the
statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.68
63
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010, citing People v. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143, August 31, 1988.
64
Ibid.
65
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. (Id.)
66
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004.
67
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
68
Citations omitted.
33
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
93. Following the maxim noscitur a sociis, the term

other rebel groups refers to groups, such as the ASG, AKP,
BIFF, as well as other groups that adhere to, and act in
furtherance of, the political motives of the Maute Group.
94. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to

other rebel groups found in Proclamation No. 55, which it
cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
95. If, of course, other rebel groups which have

different political motives take advantage of the ongoing
situation to commit crimes, escalate the situation, or
contribute to the threat to national security and peace and
order in Mindanao and elsewhere in the country, there is
nothing objectionable about the Government enforcing the
rule of law, keeping the peace, and prosecuting these rebel
groups. Rebellion, after all, remains to be a crime punishable
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, with or without
a prior declaration of martial law.
2) The sufficiency of the

factual basis for the
proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ
should not be made to
depend on what is written
on the face of
96. The Lagman and Mohamad Petitions claim that

Proclamation No. 261 is broad and replete with conclusions
of fact and law. For this reason, Petitioners ask that this
Honorable Court declare Proclamation No. 216
unconstitutional. Stated otherwise, the Lagman and
Mohamad Petitions, similar to the Cullamat Petition, seek a
facial invalidation of Proclamation No. 216. For the same
reasons above, the void-for-vagueness rule finds no
application in the case at bar.
34
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
97. More importantly, Article VII, Section 18 of the

1987 Constitution only requires for the constitutionality of
the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ that it be grounded on factual basis that
rebellion does exist and the public safety requires such
proclamation or suspension. The 1987 Constitution is bereft
of any guideline as to what form the proclamation or
suspension should be in, or standards as to the specific
details that should be mentioned in the document wherein
such proclamation or suspension is made.
98. Thus, the review power of the court should not be

limited to the four corners of the document in which the
proclamation or suspension appears, but rather, on the
pleadings filed by the parties,69 the evidence presented by
Petitioners to show that the facts upon which the
proclamation or suspension was made are insufficient, and
only when the burden of evidence has shifted, the
Governments countervailing evidence.70 This, of course,
assumes that Petitioners, in the first place, were even able
to overcome the heavy burden of proving insufficiency of
factual basis for the Presidents proclamation; otherwise,
this Honorable Court need not even conduct its own
independent investigation outside the pleadings.71
99. It bears pointing out that martial law is an

inherent power of the Commander-in-Chief to swiftly and
decisively stamp out invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it. During martial law, the President has the
powers of a commanding general in a theatre of
war.72 Because of this, the framers of our 1987 Constitution
saw it fit not to unduly hamper with technicalities the
President's authority to declare a state of martial
law. Hence, the absence of any guideline or standard as to
the form and details of its proclamation.
100. Common sense dictates that the degree of

specificity required of, for example, allegations made in
69
See David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
70
In Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, this Honorable Court conducted an
executive session to receive evidence from the parties.
71
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.
72
See Records of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates Vol. II, July 29, 1986, p. 398.
35
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
pleadings73 or in criminal Information filed in court,74 or of

decisions rendered by judicial bodies,75 cannot be expected
of the President, not only because it would be impracticable
considering the exigencies, but also because, in the first
place, the President is not even seeking judicial authority to
exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers, nor is he
rendering a judicial decision or resolution subject of review
by this Honorable Court.
101. Instead, through Proclamation No. 216, President

Duterte exercised his ordinance powers as an implement of
his Commander-in-Chief powers recognized under Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The power to issue
proclamations is an ordinance power under Chapter 2, Book
III of the Administrative Code of 1987. The relevant
provision states that:
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing

a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.
102. By these standards, Proclamation No. 216 is not

vague as Petitioners claim it to be. President Dutertes
Proclamation No. 216 contains sufficient details so as to
fairly apprise the public of the state of martial law in
Mindanao founded on the existence of rebellion therein, and
the resulting danger to the public safety that call for the
exercise of Commander-in-Chief powers.
103. For one, the Whereas clauses in Proclamation No.

216 encapsulated and summarized the factual circumstances
for the declaration of martial law by the President showing
the existence of actual rebellion in various areas of
Mindanao, and that public safety required the proclamation,
to wit:
73
See Rules of Court, Rule 7 on Parts of a Pleading, and Rule 8 on Manner of Making Allegations in
Pleadings.
74
Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that, A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
75
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that, No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
36
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of

Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts
committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack
on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February
2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass
jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their
arrested comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today, May 23, 2017, the same Maute terrorist

group within the City, burned down certain government
and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of
Government forces, and started flying the flag of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas,
thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance
to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives
to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of
rebellion; xxxx76
104. Too, further details were included in the Report

submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017 in accordance with
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. In his
Report,77 the President said that he acted based on relevant
information or data in his possession as would guide him in
his assessment that public safety requires the imposition of
habeas corpus.
105. All things considered, President Dutertes

Proclamation No. 216 and his Report sufficiently described
the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality
of the rebels weaponry, and the purposes of their lawless
activities, giving fair notice to the public of the state of
martial law in Mindanao. By the express terms of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the sole purpose of a
presidential proclamation is to apprise the public of a status
or condition of public moment of interest Proclamation No.
216 does precisely that.
3) The constitutionality of
76
Office of the President, Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao, Proclamation No. 216, May 23, 2017.
77
See Presidents Report to Congress dated May 25, 2017, attached as Annex 11 of Respondents
37
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
should not be made to

depend on or be affected
by the implementing
and/or operational
guidelines, general orders,
special orders, arrest
orders or other orders
issued subsequent thereto.
106. In the Advisory issued by this Honorable Court on

June 12, 2017, as well as during the oral arguments, the
parties were asked to explain whether Proclamation No. 216
may be considered vague, and thus, null and void, because
it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational
parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
107. With all due respect to this Honorable Court, any

implementing or operational guidelines, general orders,
special orders, or other orders issued subsequent to
Proclamation No. 216 should not be included in the review
subject of the present case. No less than the Constitution
has limited the scope this Honorable Courts inquiry to the
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.78 The implementing and
operational guidelines, general or special orders, and arrest
orders deal with how martial law is to be implemented, and
has absolutely nothing to do with why it was declared by the
President. Reviewing the operational guidelines would, thus,
go beyond scope of review that the sovereign has granted to
this Honorable Court under the 1987 Constitution.
108. Another reason that militates against the review of

the constitutionality or validity of the implementing or
operational guidelines for Proclamation No. 216 is that this is
not the lis mota of the case, a requirement for the exercise
of judicial review.79
109. Lis mota literally means the cause of the suit or

action. This requisite is rooted in the principle of separation
78
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
79
38
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
of powers. It is simply an offshoot of the presumption of

validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-
equal branches of the government.80
110. Given the presumed validity of an executive act,

the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless
the constitutional question he raised is determined by
the Court.81 Thus, if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground, this Honorable Court is enjoined from
passing upon a constitutional question.82
111. Considering that this case may be disposed of for

reasons other than the constitutionality of the implementing
and operational guidelines of Proclamation No. 216, there is
no necessity for this Honorable Court to pass upon these
guidelines in the instant case.
4) This Honorable Court can

only review the sufficiency
of the factual basis for the
law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ. The
Presidents choice of which
Commander-in-Chief
power should be exercised
is beyond the ambit of
judicial review.
112. Petitioners Mohamad, et. al., assert that martial

law must be an instrument of last resort. According to
them, [i]f there is a remedy less severe than martial law,
such less severe remedy must be resorted to. Only when
there is a showing that the situation cannot be contained
unless martial law is declared, can the use of such
extraordinary power of the President be justifiable.83 The
Mohamad Petition proceeds to argue that the grounds of
invasion and rebellion are common grounds for the exercise
80
Luis General v. Alejandro Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011.
81
Ibid., citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
82
Ibid., citing Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516 (1946).
83
See Mohamad Petition, p. 9.
39
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
of the three extraordinary powers under Article VII, Section

18. The choice of which power to use is not discretionary in
the hands of the President, but must be dictated by the
exigencies of the situation.84 On the strength of these
arguments, Petitioners seek that the Honorable Court review
the factual basis behind the declaration of martial law, and
nullify Proclamation No. 216.
113. Petitioners Cullamat, et. al., on the other hand,

point out that if claims to lawless violence can be met by
the lesser calling out power, the more reason that mere
claims of the same cannot be used in the imposition of that
greater power of martial law or suspension of the writ.85
114. In effect, these petitions seek the nullification of

Proclamation No. 216 because a lesser power could have
been exercised by the President given the circumstances.
Being a purely political question, however, the Presidents
choice of which Commander-in-Chief power to exercise,
especially in case of concurrence, is beyond the province of
judicial review.
115. It is true that the 1987 Constitution, by the

express provision of Article VIII, Section 1, has expanded
the concept of judicial review to include as well the
examination of what traditionally were recognized as political
questions. In Marcos v. Manglapus,86 this Honorable Court,
held that [t]he present Constitution limits resort to the
political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.
116. This notwithstanding, it is not entirely accurate to

say that the 1987 Constitution has totally dispensed with the
political question doctrine.
84
85
See Cullamat Petition, p. 15.
86
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.
40
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
117. Prior to the 1987 Constitution, this Honorable

Court held in Taada v. Cuenco87 that political questions
refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
118. With the evolution the concept of judicial power,

this Honorable Court held in the 2003 case of Francisco, Jr.
v. House of Representatives that, the determination of a
truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts
are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits.88
119. Moreover, it is true that the 1987 Constitution

specifically allows the Supreme Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof. The matter of sufficiency of factual
basis, therefore, is a justiciable question, i.e., the Court can
review whether there are sufficient facts for the existence of
rebellion, and that the public safety requires the
proclamation or suspension.
120. It is likewise true that all three Commander-in-

Chief powers found under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution provide for the existence of rebellion as basis
for their exercise.
121. However, Respondents submit that, in case of the

concurrent availability to the President of these three
powers, there are no standards in the Constitution by which
this Honorable Court can review the choice of which
87
G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957.
88
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003; See also The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
205728, January 21, 2015.
41
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Commander-in-Chief power the President decides to

exercise. Nothing in the text of the 1987 Constitution
suggests that the powers, as claimed by Petitioners, must be
exercised only in a sequential manner or graduated
approach. Stated otherwise, the use of calling-out powers is
not a condition precedent to the proclamation of martial law;
neither is the latter a condition precedent to the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
122. Indeed, Petitioners are correct in pointing out that

Fr. Joaquin Bernas, member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, described the three Commander-in-Chief
powers under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution in a graduated sequence.89 However, it must be
recalled that the opinion of one of the drafters of the
Constitution bears little weight when compared to the text of
the constitutional provision itself, as it is the text that has
been read and assented to by the sovereign Filipino people
in ratifying the Constitution.90
123. Here, were it truly the intention of the

constitutional framers to require the President to calibrate
his Commander-in-Chief powers, they could have easily
provided so. Yet, the 1987 Constitution, as it was ratified by
the sovereign Filipino people, is silent as to the need to
apply the Commander-in-Chief powers in a graduated
sequence.
124. The unmistakable intent of the 1987 Constitution,

therefore, is to give full discretion to the President in his
choice of which Commander-in-Chief power to exercisea
choice which cannot, because there are no constitutionally
imposed limitations, be the subject of review by this
Honorable Court.
125. The rationale behind granting the President full

discretion in the choice of Commander-in-Chief power to
exercise in case of their concurrence is not difficult to
understand.
89
II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp.
409, 412 (1986).
90
Taada v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957.
42
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
126. Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution

provides that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines. As Commander-in-
Chief, the President is not just a titular or ceremonial head
of the armed forces, but is its actual superior in both military
command and administrative matters. The President
possesses absolute authority over the persons and actions
of the members of the armed forces.91 As the Commander-
in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and
to employ them in the manner he may deem most
effectual.92
127. As Commander-in-Chief and chief executive, in

whom is committed the heavy burden of preserving the very
survival of the State, the President is empowered, nay,
obliged, to preserve the State against both domestic and
foreign attacks. Needless to state, all military intelligence is
reported to and concentrated in the President to enable him
to make an informed choice of which power to exercise as
Commander-in-Chief. Also, in the discharge of his duties, he
must necessarily be accorded a very broad authority and
discretion in ascertaining the nature and extent of the
danger that confronts the nation and in selecting the means
or measures necessary for the preservation of the safety of
the Republic.93
128. The foregoing considered, Respondents implore

this Honorable Court not to go beyond the scope of review
allowed it by the 1987 Constitution. The clear and
unmistakable language of the 1987 Constitution allows this
Honorable Court to go no farther than reviewing only the
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
129. In any case, the issue of whether or not President

Duterte should have applied a graduated sequence to the
91
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006.
92
See Kulayan, et. al. v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
93
See Concurring Opinion of Justice Antonio in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, September 17,
1974.
43
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Commander-in-Chief powers vested in him by the 1987

Constitution is a purely academic exercise.
130. To recall, President Duterte had already used his

calling out power prior to Proclamation No. 216 when, on 4
September 2016, he issued Proclamation No. 55 entitled,
Declaring a State of National Emergency on Account of
Lawless Violence in Mindanao due to the then increasing
concerted attacks against the military and the populace.
131. Proclamation No. 216 cites, as part of its basis,

the events that led to Proclamation No. 55. Thus, even
assuming without conceding that the President must first
exercise his calling out power prior to his martial law power,
President Duterte had, in fact, fully complied with this
graduated sequence erroneously put forth by Petitioners.
5) Proclamation No. 216, like

any other governmental
act, enjoys the
presumption of
constitutionality which
may be overcome only by
the clearest showing that
there was indeed an
infraction of the
Constitution.
132. Mohamad, et al. ask this Honorable Court to

compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis
for declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, and after
inquiring into the factual basis of such declaration and
suspension, declare Proclamation No. 216 null and void for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL, for lack of sufficient factual
basis.94 Petitioners, in effect, attempt to shift the burden of
proof to Respondents. This is untenable.
94
44
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
133. It is axiomatic that he who alleges must prove.95

Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat.96 The
requirement of onus probandi finds even stricter application
in constitutional litigation, where acts of the government are
presumed constitutional. Petitioners, in asserting that the
government had not been compliant with the Constitution,
possess the burden of proving it.97
134. Like any governmental act, Proclamation No. 216

enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, Petitioners
have the burden of establishing that Proclamation No. 216
was totally bereft of factual basis.
135. To borrow the words of the Honorable Associate

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in Social Justice Society v.
Alfredo S. Lim98 petitioners must be able to prove beyond
any doubt how the challenged governmental act violates the
Constitution. Petitioners failed to overcome this burden.
6) The standard for

examining sufficiency of
factual basis for the
law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ is
arbitrariness, not
correctness.
136. As early as Lansang v. Garcia,99 a case decided

under the 1935 Constitution, this Honorable Court had
already provided the precedent for the standard applied in
determining the propriety of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpuswhether the act had not been arbitrary, and
not whether it had been correct. For the first time and in
categorical terms, the Supreme Court unanimously held in
Lansang that it had the authority to inquire into the
95
Spouses Ramos v. Obispo, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013.
96
The burden of the proof lies upon him who affirms, not him who denies.
97
See, for instance, Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013; Ermita Malate Hotel
v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, October 23, 1967.
98
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014.
99
G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971.
45
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
existence of said factual bases in order to determine the

constitutional sufficiency thereof.100
137. This Honorable Court cited and affirmed Lansang

in In re: Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,101 a case decided under the
1973 Constitution. There, this Court reasserted its power to
inquire into the existence of the factual bases [for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in
order to determine the sufficiency thereof.102
138. The test of arbitrariness and its application to the

limited judicial query over the sufficiency of factual basis
was affirmed in Aquino where the Honorable Court held:
The recognition of justiciability accorded to the

question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there
expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in
ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to
ascertaining "merely whether he (the President) has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the
President's decision is correct but whether, in
suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
139. At the time that the 1986 Constitutional

Commission was discussing the provision now referred to as
Article VII, Section 18, Lansang and Aquino already allowed,
albeit restricted, the judicial review of a Commander-in-
Chief power. Through the rule of contemporaneous
construction, members of the Constitutional Commission are
presumed to know the state of laws at the time they were
drafting the Constitution. Thus, when they pertained to
sufficiency of factual basis in the present Constitution, the
term carries with it the context by which it was used in
Lansang and Aquino, and the means by which this legal
conclusion was arrived at.
140. Stated otherwise, it is no coincidence that the

present Constitution, in framing the judicial review of the
proclamation of martial law under the terms of sufficiency
100
Emphases supplied.
101
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974.
102
Emphases supplied.
46
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
of factual basis mirrors the language of the Honorable Court

in Lansang and Aquino. The intent is clear that the standard
of arbitrariness in Lansang and Aquino must be applied even
under the 1987 Constitution.
141. Further, the Supreme Court has already

recognized the standard of arbitrariness in interpreting its
power to review the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under the 1987 Constitution.
142. The manner of review used by the Court in the

2000 case of IBP v. Zamora103 with regard to the Presidents
calling out power is couched in a language similar to
Lansang and Aquino, when the Court held that it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
143. Aside from the jurisprudential origins of the term

sufficient factual basis and the arbitrariness standard
applied by the Court in determining the same, it must also
be recalled that Proclamation No. 216 is an executive act
and should, thus, not be subjected to any threshold of
evidence available in the resolution of judicial and quasi-
judicial acts.
144. Mindful of the principle of separation of powers

and the limits of its own judicial authority, the Court in
Lansang v. Garcia104 noted that Commander-in-Chief
proclamations should not be reviewed in the manner that it
reviews decisions appealed to it from lower courts, thus:
To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the

validity of the contested proclamation is far from being
identical to, or even comparable with, its power over
ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by
ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the
appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.
103
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
104
G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971.
47
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
145. Neither can martial law proclamations be

examined in the manner that decisions of administrative
agencies are reviewed. The Honorable Court in Lansang
noted that the judicial authority to review decisions of
administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as
regards findings of fact made in said decisions,105 and that
this may be interfered with only if there is no evidence to
support these administrative findings, and that it is
arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. Even then,
the Court noted that it cannot apply this limited approach to
the judicial inquiry on Commander-in-Chief proclamations,
as administrative proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of
evidence.
146. The Honorable Court in Lansang, thus, resolved to

use the approach in determining the constitutionality of
legislative acts to test the validity of Commander-in-Chief
proclamations, as they are both acts of another co-equal
branch of government. The Court, citing the Solicitor
Generals argument with approval, held:
... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the

questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy
the Court not that the President's decision is correct and
that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending
the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.106
147. The arbitrariness standard recognizes that the

Presidents discretion in exercising his Commander-in-Chief
powers cannot be the subject of any of the approaches for
reviewing judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. This, in
effect, also recognizes that the threshold of evidence found
in these proceedings cannot be applied mutatis mutandi to
examine the sufficiency of the factual basis available to the
President at the time he used his Commander-in-Chief
powers. The Presidents act, after all, is purely executive in
nature, and is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act.
148. Consistent with this approach in Lansang, the

Honorable Court in IBP v. Zamora opted to frame the
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
48
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
determination of sufficiency of factual basis from the point

of view of not totally bereft of factual basis, and not from
any of the threshold of evidence applicable in judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus, the Court held:
In view of the constitutional intent to give the

President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis.107
149. In doing so, the Honorable Court in IBP v. Zamora

acknowledged the difficulty of determining the sufficiency of
factual basis based on ordinary judicial approaches:
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces

is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces
may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.108
150. Corollarily, President Duterte only needed to have

a reasonable belief of the existence of rebellion and that
public safety requires the issuance of Proclamation No. 216.
151. In constitutional law, reasonableness is the

anathema of arbitrarinessan act is arbitrary if it is
unreasonable. Viewed from this perspective, the President
needs only to have a reasonable belief of the existence of
rebellion that endangers public safety for him to be able to
wield his Commander-in-Chief powers.
152. Petitioners heavily rely on the Dissenting Opinion

of the learned Senior Associate Justice Antonito T. Carpio in
107
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.
108
Ibid.
49
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Fortun v. Arroyo,109 to the effect that there must be

probable cause that rebellion exists before the President
may proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
153. However, it must be noted that in Fortun, this

Honorable Court refused to examine the basis of factual
sufficiency of the proclamation declaring martial law,
because it felt no need to, the proclamation having been
withdrawn within a few days of its issuance. Hence, probable
cause as quantum of evidence, with all due respect, finds no
basis in existing jurisprudence.
154. Besides, applying probable cause as the quantum

of evidence may result in conflicting decisions between this
Honorable Court and lower courts.
155. To illustrate, in case this Honorable Court declares

that there is probable cause that rebellion exists in
Mindanao, lower court judges, with whom applications for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against suspected rebels
are pending, may be inclined to grant the same on the
strength of this Honorable Courts findings. In the
alternative, if this Honorable Court were to declare that
there is no probable cause for rebellion in Mindanao, lower
court judges may rely on such ruling to immediately dismiss
applications for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
those persons who are being indicted by prosecutors for
rebellion. Both scenarios are equally deplorable because trial
court judges are required by Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution to arrive at their own personal
determination that probable cause does or does not exist for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
156. Too, probable cause is arrived at through personal

knowledge, as referred to in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, or through affidavits, as in Rules 112 and 126 of
the same Rules. Such scenario will prove to be impracticable
for the President, who at presentand rightfullyrelies on
intelligence from the members of the armed forces and of
the police force, both of which are under his command.
109
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012.
50
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
157. In sum, Respondents submit that, in reviewing

whether there is sufficient factual basis for Proclamation No.
216, this Honorable Court can only determine whether or
not there existed reasonable belief for President Duterte to
issue Proclamation No. 216 based on the facts then available
to him, and must not go into the correctness of or the
wisdom behind his decision.
C. PETITIONERS FAILED TO DISCHARGE THEIR

BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PRESIDENT
DUTERTES PROCLAMATION NO. 216 IS BEREFT
OF FACTUAL BASIS.
1) The contents of news

reports are inadmissible.
Even assuming that they
are admissible in evidence,
they have no probative
value.
158. The present Petitions question the sufficiency of

the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law by
disputing the veracity and credibility of the facts found in
Proclamation No. 216, together with its legal conclusions.
Petitioners attempt to do this by citing news reports that
allegedly contradict the facts found in Proclamation No. 216,
as well as inviting a piecemeal evaluation of the violent
incidents that happened in Marawi.
159. News articles, however, amount to hearsay

evidence, twice removed, and are therefore not only
inadmissible, but are without any probative value at all
whether objected to or not. They are only admissible as
evidence of the existence of their publication, and the tenor
of the news therein stated.110
110
Feria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000.
51
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
160. In Bedol v. Comelec,111 the Honorable Court

concluded that because the authors had no personal
knowledge of their contents, newspaper articles are hearsay.
For even if the contents of the articles are admitted, the
authors' lack of personal knowledge regarding their contents
greatly diminish their probative value.
161. Even if the contents of these newspaper articles

are admitted, their authors lack of personal knowledge with
regard to these contents greatly diminish the probative
value of its contents.
162. Thus, absent other competent and credible

evidence to corroborate the same, newspaper articles can
never be used as proof of its contents,112 much less
overcome a legal presumption bestowed on governmental
acts. The credibility of secondhand sources is insufficient to
overturn the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by
2) The unreliability of these

news reports to establish
facts in a judicial
proceeding becomes even
more evident when the
element of psychological
warfare is taken into
consideration.
163. Petitioners Mohamad, et. al., dispute the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the President in declaring
martial law by pointing out conflicting statements of AFP
personnel to media outlets as regards the situation in
Marawi on May 23, 2017.113
164. The fact of the matter is that there is a rebellion

and there are ongoing operations to halt the same. As
111
People of the Philippines v. Carugal and Espinosa, Jr., G.R. No. 123299, September 29, 2000.
Emphasis supplied.
112
Bedol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009.
113
52
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
reflected on the AFP Statement and Updates on the Marawi

Operations dated May 23, 2017:114
The situation in Marawi has stabilized.
Security forces are in full control of the situation.
The armed men we are dealing with are not ISIS but
members of Local Terrorist Group.
The news being circulated by these terrorists and their

sympathizers are spurious and are meant to spread lies
and disinformation. It is propaganda to attract foreign
terrorists support and recognition.
The reported eyewitness account is untrue that Amai

Pakpak Hospital has been occupied and the people there
were held hostage.
The Marawi City Hall was not occupied as was earlier

reported merely quoting sources.
The sporadic firefights heard were harassment actions by

terrorist sympathizers that were conducted as diversionary
tactics to divide the attention of the reinforcing AFP
personnel.
But even these are already held in check.
Information from operating units states that at around 2PM

23 May 2017, Soldiers, acting on the information regarding
the presence of local terrorists and their cohorts,
proceeded to Brgy. Basak, Malutlut, Marawi City for a law
enforcement Operation.
The security forces were fired upon constraining them to

retaliate.
Follow-up operations are on-going. We cannot reveal other

details so as not to compromise operational security.
Follow on forces are underway as we speak to further

ensure that we will keep the grip of the situation.
Meanwhile, we fervently urge our people to refrain from

posting in social media information that would tend to
exacerbate the situation. Especially of photos and videos
on the movements of our troops and on terrorist
propaganda circulating through social media.
114
Published online at http://www.afp.mil.ph/index.php/8-afp-news/420-afp-statement-and-updates-on-the-
marawi-operations Retrieved 16 June 2017.
53
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
We will continue to provide updates as often as possible

with due regard to the security of our operating forces and
the conduct of the operations itself.
165. What Petitioners failed to consider is that while the

conflict is real, these statements were made as part of the
AFPs psychological operations.
166. The military and subversive groups are known to

engage in psychological warfare against their foes.
Psychological warfare is the use of propaganda, threats, and
other psychological techniques to mislead, intimidate,
demoralize, or otherwise influence the thinking or behavior
of an opponent.115
167. Non-military options have come to play a greater

role in achieving political and strategic goals and, in some
situations, are greatly superior to the power of weapons.
The new-generation war is dominated by information and
psychological warfare that will seek to achieve superiority in
troops and weapons control and depress the opponents
armed forces personnel and population morally and
psychologically.116
168. The role of psychological operations is to influence

the perceptions, attitudes and behavior of target audiences,
be it selected individuals or groups, with the goal of
achieving political or military objectives.117
169. Psychological operations are an integral part of

shattering the enemys overall cohesion and will to fight.
Coordinated and synchronized with other political and
military activities, it seeks to gain advantage over the
115
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/psychological-warfare.
116
Col. S.G. Chekinov (Res.), Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), The Nature and Content of a New-
Generation War (Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy), p. 13. Published
online at
http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf
Retrieved 16 June 2017
117
NATO MILITARY POLICY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS MC 0402/1 dated March 2003, p. 2.
Published online at https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PSYOPS-Policy-2003.pdf Retrieved 16
June 2017
54
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
enemy in the moral and intellectual, rather than the physical

arena.118
170. Verily, these highlighted statements by the AFP in

news reports are propaganda statements and are part of the
militarys strategy of engaging their enemies in
psychological warfare.
171. No less than General Ao, the AFPs Chief of Staff,

admitted that the AFP has been engaged in psychological
warfare as part of the AFPs strategy to combat ISIS-linked
rebel groups, viz:
14. That despite the actual threat of ISIS in the

Philippines, there had been a directive to all AFP
spokesperson and personnel to downplay any news or
information pertaining to this collective group. This is so as
not to give them recognition and fan the flames of
rebellion. Too, these statements were made to encourage
foreign investments and maintain confidence in the
Philippine economy.119
172. Thus, the unreliability of these news reports to

establish facts in a judicial proceeding becomes even more
evident in the face of psychological warfare.
3) The maxim falsus in uno,

falsus in omnibus does not
apply to the information
found in Proclamation No.
216.
173. Petitioners Lagman, et al., claim that falsus in

uno, falsus in omnibus applies to the Presidents Report to
Congress on his declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao as it contained false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic accounts.120
118
15 (United Kingdom) Psychological Operations Group Annual Report 2007/08, p. 4. Published online
at https://www.psywar.org/psywar/reproductions/15POG_Annual_Report_2008.pdf Retrieved 16 June
2017.
119
See Affidavit of Eduardo M. Ao, Annex 2
120
See Lagman Petition, pp. 21 22.
55
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
174. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is a

rule in evidence where, because a person tells a single lie,
he or she is deemed to be lying throughout his or her whole
testimony, or that there is strong possibility that he or she is
so lying. The reason for it is that once a person knowingly
and deliberately states a falsehood in one material aspect,
he must have done so as to the rest.121
175. The legal maxim, however, applies only to

testimonial evidence when found to be false in a material
point, which the witness must have a conscious and
deliberate intention to falsify.122 It finds no application to
official proclamations made by the President in the exercise
of his power and duty as Commander-in-Chief.123
176. Besides, it bears stressing that in our jurisdiction,

the rule invoked does not lay down a categorical test of
credibility as it should not be applied to portions of the
testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly
where the false portions could be innocent mistakes.124 It is
neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court,
which may accept or reject portions of the witness
testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the
corroborative evidence in the case.125 The rule is not an
inflexible one of universal application.
177. In other words, the principle is not controlling in

our jurisdiction. As early as 1953, this Court, characterizing
this rule as much invoked and abused, held that the rule is
not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible
one, which allows the jury or the court to draw the inference
or not to draw it as circumstances may best warrant.126
178. That there are supposed minor inaccuracies in

Proclamation No. 216, even if true, cannot serve as ground
for this Honorable Court to declare that no sufficient factual
basis exists for its issuance. Respondents invite this
121
People v. Dasig, et al., G.R. No. L-5275, August 25, 1953.
122
People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011.
123
Ibid.
124
Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007.
125
People v. Lucena, G.R. No. 137281, April 3, 2001.
126
People of the Philippines v. Dasig, et al., G.R. No. L-5275, August 25, 1953.
56
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Honorable Court to examine the information contained in the

Proclamation in their totality.
D. THE LACK OF RECOMMENDATION FROM THE

DEFENSE SECRETARY, OR ANY OTHER PERSON,
DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE PROCLAMATION; NEITHER DOES IT
AUTOMATICALLY NEGATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR ITS PROCLAMATION.
179. The lack of prior recommendation by Respondent

Defense Secretary Lorenzana does not militate against the
Presidents decision to proclaim martial law in Mindanao. The
Constitution bestows the full authority to proclaim martial
law upon the President and no one else, and without need
for the prior approval of any other public official, much less
his alter ego. Section 18, Article VII provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of

all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.127
180. The recommendation of the Secretary of National

Defense, or any member of the Executive Department for
that matter, is not a condition precedent to the Presidents
exercise of his power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the
127
Section 18, Article VII.
57
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
absence of such positive recommendation does not affect

the validity of Proclamation No. 216; neither does it impact
on the sufficiency of the factual basis for its proclamation.
181. Under our presidential system of government, the

Constitution vests the totality of executive power in one
person: The President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Thus, Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides that,
[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.
182. Justice Laurel, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,128

interpreted Article VII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution129
in this wise:
With reference to the Executive Department of the

government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not
plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principles that The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines. This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, should be of the President's bosom
confidence (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-
General, 453), are subject to the direction of the
President.130
183. Since members of the Cabinet are merely alter

egos of the President, they draw the force of their authority
from his office. In the language of Justice Laurel, the
personalities of the members of the Cabinet are mere
projections of the President.
128
G.R. No. L-46570, 21 April 1939.
129
Section 1, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides that, [t]he executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines.
130
Emphases supplied.
58
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
184. Logically, members of the Cabinet cannot impose

their will on the President. On the contrary, as mere alter
egos, they are under the Presidents control.131
185. This power of control is so expansive that the

President can, in the exercise of the executive power, even
ignore the recommendations of the members of the Cabinet.
In Bermudez v. Torres,132 the Honorable Supreme Court
ruled that the President, as the Head of the Executive
Department, possesses the ultimate discretion in the
exercise of executive powers, even when the law itself
requires a prior recommendation from cabinet secretaries:
It is the considered view of the Court, given the

above disquisition, that the phrase upon recommendation
of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III,
Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be
interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere
advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon
the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here
nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President,
being the head of the Executive Department, could very
well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of
discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said
as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
186. Given the non-binding nature of a cabinet

recommendationeven when the law itself requires itthe
lack of recommendation from Secretary Lorenzana does
nothing to the validity of Proclamation No. 216. President
Duterte may even ignore a recommendation if one is given.
187. Stated otherwise, whether the factual basis for the

issuance of Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient cannot be
made to depend on the recommendations, or lack of it, of
President Dutertes subordinates. Indeed, the only question
is whether the proclamation is founded on facts.
131
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that, [t]he President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
132
G.R. No. 131429, 4 August 1999.
59
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
188. At any rate, President Duterte actually received

positive recommendations from his high-ranking officials
prior to the May 23, 2017 proclamation of martial law.
189. In his Affidavit, Defense Secretary Lorenzana

narrated that he and National Security Adviser Esperon, Jr.
had already recommended the proclamation of martial law in
Mindanao during security briefings and cabinet meetings
held during the first quarter of 2017, viz:
3. Due to the heightened frequency of the armed

attacks in Mindanao, the advancement in the weapons
used by the armed groups, and the evident political
intention to dismember Philippine territory and deprive the
President of his powers in Mindanao, I and the National
Security Adviser, GENERAL HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,
AFP (Ret), during security briefings and cabinet meetings
during the first quarter of 2017, expressed to President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte the advisability of declaring Martial
Law.
190. On this point, this Honorable Court in IBP v.

Zamora has observed that the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state.133 Because the reports
are written in public documents, what they state are prima
facie evidence of the facts.134 The President, in exercising his
discretion to declare martial law, may thus rely on the
information found in these reports.
191. In this case, President Duterte had with him

intelligence reports that brief him of the security situation in
Mindanao prior to Proclamation No. 216. According to
Defense Secretary Lorenzana:
7. This declaration of Martial Law by the President

was prompted by the security briefings he received of the
situation in Marawi City from security officials of the
government, particularly, when he was informed of the
political motives and continued armed attacks against the
Government.
133
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
134
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec.44.
60
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
192. General Ao likewise attests to the Presidents

possession of validated intelligence reports prior to his
issuance of Proclamation No. 216:
9. There exists a sufficient factual basis for the

imposition of Martial Law in the whole of Mindanao by the
President and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. These facts had been principally anchored
on certain validated intelligence reports as mentioned by
the President in his formal Report to Congress dated May
25, 2017 (cited in the Petition in G.R. No. 231658 as its
Annex B);
10. With due deference to the wisdom of the

President in his decision to set the coverage of his
declaration specifically for the whole of Mindanao, the
undersigned affirms the sufficiency of his factual basis of
declaring martial law in the entire Mindanao island group
and not only in Marawi City where the atrocities are being
blatantly committed by the rebels. This consideration is
backed by established historical data and ensuing validated
intelligence reports gathered from operating units,
specifically anchored on the following material facts: xxxx
193. Also, as head of state and chief architect of foreign

affairs, the President is even expected to keep abreast of
international developments, especially those affecting the
countrys national security. President Duterte cannot close
his eyes to the spread of ISIS worldwide,135 and the spate of
attacks launched by its wide network of allied terrorist
groups, such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris, France.
194. All told, it is within the power of the President to

declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus even in the absence of a recommendation
from the Secretary of National Defense, high-ranking
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any
other person for that matter. Corollarily, there is nothing
arbitrary in this reliance, as the Presidentgiven his vast
responsibilities as head of state, chief representative in
foreign affairs, and Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine
armed forcescould not be reasonably expected to
personally determine the veracity of all these reports.
135
61
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
II.
THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO. 216.
A. THERE IS ACTUAL REBELLION IN MINDANAO

PERPETRATED BY ISIS-LINKED REBEL GROUPS
THAT HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT. THESE GROUPS ARE RESOLUTE IN
ACHIEVING THEIR UNIFIED GOAL OF
ESTABLISHING A WILAYAH IN THE MINDANAO
REGION.
195. Rebellion as understood under Article 134 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,
provides that:
Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection How

committed. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any
body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives.
196. Lagman, et al. judicially admit the existence of

armed public uprisings in Marawi City directed against the
Philippine Government.136 They, however, question the
motive behind these attacks, and assert that the attackers
have no intent to remove the allegiance of Marawi City or
any portion of Mindanao from the Philippine Government.
197. In addition, Lagman, et al. claim that the unfurling

and hoisting of the flag of the ISIS in several areas in
Marawi City is but cheap propaganda,137 and does not
reflect the intent to dismember the Philippine territory. They
likewise cite a news article claiming that the Maute group is
a private militia latching [onto] the IS brand theatrically to
inflate perceived capability.138 They claim that the armed
resistance by the Maute Group in Marawi City is for the
136
See Lagman Petition, pp. 14 18.
137
Ibid. at p. 15.
138
Ibid.
62
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
purpose of shielding Hapilon from capture, and not an act of

removing Marawi City from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government.139 It was likewise intimated during the oral
arguments that the attack in Marawi may have been an
ethno-cultural effort on the part of other Islamic tribes in
Mindanao to defend Hapilon and his group.
198. As will be discussed below, President Duterte had

sufficient factual basis to believe that rebellion exists in
Mindanao, and that it endangers public safety.
199. At the time President Duterte issued Proclamation

No. 216, all of the elements of rebellion have manifested
itself: first, the existence of armed public uprisings in
different areas in Mindanao, a fact which even Petitioners
admit, and second, both the alternative purposes of
rebellion found under Article 134 of the RPC are present: (1)
these uprisings have, for its objective, the removal of
Mindanao from its allegiance to the Philippine government
through the creation of an ISIS caliphate in the region, and,
(2) these uprisings have the aim of and actually deprived
President Duterte of his powers and prerogatives in
Mindanao.
200. The rebellion, in turn, endangers the entirety of

Mindanao. As will be discussed below, the geographical
importance of Marawi City, as well as the nature of the
rebellion of the ISIS-linked rebel groups and their resources
have caused, and threaten to spread, violence across the
entire region.
1) There are armed public

uprisings against the
government in different
places across Mindanao.
These are perpetrated by
local rebel groups that
have pledged their
allegiance to ISIS and to
the goal of carving out
139
Ibid. at p. 17.
63
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
their own territory called a

wilayah.
201. The Maute Group from Lanao del Sur has banded
with three other rebel organizations, namely the ASG from
Basilan headed by Hapilon, the AKP (formerly known as the
Maguid Group) from Saranggani and Sultan Kudarat, and
the BIFF from Maguindanao. These groups are also affiliated
with local cell groups located throughout the country.
202. Independently of one another, these groups are

notorious in their commission of numerous bombings,
assassinations, and extortion activities in the country,
especially in Mindanao. As early as November 2014,
however, the ISIS has reported that a number of Islamic
extremist groups in the Philippines had already pledged their
allegiance to the caliphate and the Khalifa al-Baghdadi.140
203. The pledge of a mujahid to the caliphate is to

hear and obey [him], in times of hardship and ease, and in
time of delight and dislike. The same pledge declares
support for the Khalifa, and obedience to Allah and
actualization of the unheeded obligation of the era.141
204. The pledge of the ASG, Maute Group, AKP, and

BIFF to the caliphate and the Khalifa al-Baghdadi was
confirmed in the ISIS newsletter called Al Naba with its issue
dated April 2016. The newsletter announced the
appointment of ASG leader Hapilon as the emir of all Islamic
State forces in the Philippines.
205. His appointment was later also made known to the

public in a June 21, 2016 video by ISIS entitled The Solid
Structure. The widely circulated video hailed Hapilon as
the mujahid authorized to lead the soldiers of the Islamic
State in the Philippines, thereby unifying the four groups
under the ISIS flag of the Islamic State.142
140
141
Ibid.
142
See The Solid Structure video, attached as Annex 2-A of Respondents Consolidated Comment
dated June 12, 2017.
64
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
206. On December 31, 2016, Hapilon and about thirty

(30) of his followers from Basilan, including eight (8) foreign
terrorists, were spotted in Lanao del Sur. Hapilon and his
cohorts performed a symbolic hijra,143 which is the holy
voyage of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca
to Medina. The purpose of this is to further the unification
goals for all rebel groups in Mindanao.
207. The ISIS-linked rebel groups have the common

mission of wresting control of Mindanaoan territory from the
government for the purpose of establishing the region as a
wilayah. The appointment by ISIS of an emir in the
Philippines is already the third step in the establishment of a
wilayah in Mindanao.
208. It bears noting that the four rebel groups find

their roots and have solidified their membership base in
different provinces and cities across Mindanao, and the
success of establishing a wilayah in Mindanao demands a
consolidation of their efforts; hence, the need to appoint one
head mujahid in the person of Hapilon as emir.
209. Too, Petitioners err in their claim that the sole

purpose of the ISIS-linked local rebel groups in laying siege
in Marawi City on May 23, 2017 is to prevent the arrest and
capture by the government of its leadersHapilon and the
Maute brothers.
210. Evident from the discussion above, the siege of

Marawi City cannot simply be characterized as the result of
counter-measures against the governments pursuit of
Hapilon, but was, in fact, a strategic and well-coordinated
attack to overthrow the present government and to establish
a wilayah in Mindanao.
211. While it may be true that the joint AFP-PNP team

in Marawi City ordered the conduct of a raid and the arrest
of Hapilon in his hideout on May 23, 2017, the joint PNP and
AFP forces were prevented from realizing their objective by a
143
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled Marawi City as a Staging Ground for Attacks, Annex 8 of the
Affidavit of Eduardo Ano dated June 17, 2017, attached as Annex 1.
65
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
strong and strategic offensive by the ISIS-linked rebel

groups.
212. Armed men marched along the streets and swiftly

occupied strategic positions throughout the city. Snipers
positioned themselves atop high rise buildings and began
shooting on government troops. The rebels were equipped
with large arsenal of military hardware, including RPGs that
can destroy tanks and inexhaustible amount of ammunition
for high-powered assault rifles.
213. Consistent with their planned rebellion, the rebels

occupied establishments in the city, like the Amai Pakpak
Medical Center. They also burned the Marawi City Jail and
released its prisoners. The rebels ransacked and burned
down the Dansalan College, the Our Lady of Help Cathedral,
and a Land Bank of the Philippines branch. They mercilessly
kidnapped and killed teachers and other innocent civilians.
214. It was also confirmed by military intelligence

sources that the grand plan of the rebels was to raze the
entire city of Marawi on the day of Ramadan, or on May 26,
2017. The Marawi attack would have served as a precursor
for other terrorist groups to stage their own uprising across
Mindanao in a bid to simultaneously establish a wilayah in
the region. The planned attack, however, was foiled when
the government troops conducted a raid in pursuit of Hapilon
in Barangay Basak Malutlut. This forced the rebels to
prematurely execute the Marawi siege.
215. Meanwhile, in the other cities and provinces in

Mindanao, the membership bases of the ISIS-linked local
rebel groups are still intact and battle-ready. As previously
discussed, the number of incidents perpetrated by these
groups across Mindanao are hard to ignore. These increased
attacks are precisely what urged President Duterte to issue
Proclamation No. 55, which unfortunately, was not enough
to quell the attacks.
66
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
216. The totality of these circumstances belies the

claim in the Lagman Petition144 that the Marawi siege was
but a mere counter-offensive to the governments attempt
to capture Hapilon. The Marawi siege on May 23, 2017 was
intended to be the climax of a clear and actual takeover of
Philippine territory by means of a violent uprising against the
government.
217. Too, these systematic, coordinated and still

continuing attacks by the rebel groups against government
troops indicate that the intention of these rebel groups is not
pintakasi or an ethno-cultural attempt to protect what is
perceived to be indigenous territory in Marawi City. Rather,
the clear intent is to actually remove the allegiance of
Mindanao from the Philippines and deprive the President of
his powers and prerogatives therein. Besides, were it really
a case of pintakasi on the part of local residents in Marawi,
this fact alone does not negate the existence of a rebellion
waged by Hapilon and other rebel groups who have the
unified purpose of creating a wilayah in Mindanao.
218. Petitioners, in their bid to question the political

motive behind the armed attacks in Marawi and across
Mindanao, likewise assert that ISIS has yet to actually
recognize Hapilon and local rebel groups as part of ISIS.
Petitioners Lagman, et al. postulate that the Maute Groups
use of the IS brand is merely to inflate its capabilities and
that there is little ISIS threat in the country.
219. Respondents submit that the official recognition of

ISIS is irrelevant to determine whether or not rebellion does
exist. The existence of rebellion does not depend on the
acquiescence of the country, territory or group to which the
rebel groups have pledged their allegiance to. The fact that
these local rebel groups believe and actually perform overt
acts to remove Mindanao from its allegiance to the Philippine
Government already constitutes rebellion. In other words,
even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is no
official recognition by ISIS bestowed upon local rebel
groups, this fact does not detract from the fact that there is
actual rebellion committed by these groups.
144
See Lagman Petition, p. 17 18.
67
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
2) Due to their overt acts of

rebellion, the ISIS-linked
rebel groups effectively
deprived President Duterte
of his powers and
prerogatives.
220. Rebellion likewise exists when an armed public

uprising aims to depriv[e] the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives,145 as in this case.
221. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of all

armed forces of the Philippines146 tasked to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national
territory.147 The 1987 Constitution likewise vests executive
power upon the President148 for the maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property.149 In
a number of recorded incidents, police stations in Marawi
have suffered from ambushes and robbery of service
firearms and vehicles. Local rebel groups have deprived
President Duterte of his powers by taking over the territory,
disrupting the peace, and occupying public and private
institutions in Marawi City, and pledging allegiance to ISIS.
222. In the same breath, the release of at least one

hundred and seven (107) inmates from the Marawi City Jail
resulted in a deprivation of President Dutertes power to
keep these prisoners in custody. Republic Act No. 6975
empowers the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP) to exercise supervision and control over all city and
municipal jails150 which exist for the custody and
safekeeping of city and municipal prisoners, among
others.151 The BJMP is an office under the Department of
145
Revised Penal Code, as amended, Article 134.
146
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 18.
147
1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 3.
148
149
1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 5.
150
R.A. No. 6975, Section 61.
151
Ibid. at Sec. 63.
68
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
Interior and Local Government152 over which the President

exercises control.153
223. It bears noting that it was upon this preceding

factual milieu that President Duterte proclaimed martial law
and suspended the privilege of the writ in the whole of
Mindanao. As attested to by both Secretary Lorenzana and
AFP Chief of Staff Ao, President Duterte has been kept up
to date by his civilian and military officials on the rebel
situation in Marawi City and elsewhere in Mindanao both
with regard and even prior to the Marawi Siege on May 23,
2017.
224. Specifically, as regards the situation in Marawi on

May 23, 2017, Respondent General Ao, who was with the
President on official travel, attests that the President was
made aware of vital intelligence prior to his issuance of
Proclamation No. 216, such as the rebels takeover of at
least three (3) bridges in the area, the freeing of dozens of
Marawi City Jail inmates, and the burning down of schools
and churches, among other horrific acts.
225. In addition to the foregoing violent accounts of

these ISIS-linked local rebel groups, the President also has
background information of these groups and is aware of
their aim to carve out their own territory by overthrowing
the duly constituted government. According to the Secretary
of National Defense, Delfin Lorenzana, he had submitted
thick briefers to the President about these rebel groups
outlining therein their political motives and list of armed
attacks against the government.
226. Based on the foregoing circumstances, the

Presidents issuance of Proclamation No. 216 cannot be said
to have been made in a whimsical or arbitrary manner.
Proclamation No. 216 was made on the basis of intelligence
reports then available to him.
152
Id. at Sec. 4.
153
69
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
227. Further, the facts contained in the intelligence

reports justify President Dutertes reasonable belief that a
rebellion does exist, and that the public safety of the entire
Mindanao required the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
3) The factual circumstances

after the issuance of
further validate the
existence of rebellion in
Mindanao and the need to
secure public safety in the
entire region.
228. The tragic aftermath of the May 23, 2017 attack

left behind casualties and destruction, with survivors losing
their homes and loved ones. As of June 25, 2017, there
have been fifty-nine (59) casualties on government troops
and twenty-six (26) civilian deaths. Over three hundred and
eighty (380) of our soldiers and police officers are wounded.
While government efforts have managed to rescue one
thousand six hundred (1,600) civilians, still, over fifty-nine
thousand (59,000) families were forced to evacuate for their
safety.
229. The monumental damage caused by the ISIS-

linked local rebel groups disprove any notion that the attack
was a mere counter-offensive to the governments service of
a warrant of arrest against Hapilon. The rebels were well-
equipped, well-manned, and well-prepared in urban warfare
against the government troops. As of June 16, 2017, there
have been more than two hundred (200) rebels killed by
military troops. It is estimated that there was a total of
around five hundred (500) rebels during the May 23, 2017
siege.
230. It is also worth noting that there were foreign

rebel fighters in the Marawi siege. The presence of these
foreigners fighting alongside the local rebels negate the
notion that the Marawi siege was brought about by a mere
pintakasi feud.
70
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
231. The political motive of Hapilon and other rebel

groups was likewise further confirmed in a video recording
retrieved by the AFP154 a day after the Marawi siege.
232. In said video obtained on May 24, 2017, Hapilon,

the Maute brothers, and other unidentified members of ISIS-
linked local rebel groups in Mindanao were documented
while planning the attack of Marawi City, as a prelude for
another attack outside of the said city and in other parts of
Mindanao.
233. Throughout the video, Abdullah Maute made it

known that the Marawi siege is but a preliminary step to
enable them to gain a foothold for their next plans. In the
early parts of the video, Abdullah Maute was recorded
saying, Kung halimbawa magsimula tayo papasukin natin
ang sa loob ng Madina, sa loob ng Madina. Kukuha tayo ng
halimbawa hmm mga paaralan diyan para
mag-gain na tayo ng premise155
234. More telling is Abdullah Mautes statement at

around 2:17 in the said video, where he said, O kaya,
unahin natin dito tapos suno-sunod na ito O kaya unahin
natin dito at separate natin dito isa (circled Marawi)
para may daanan tayo.156
235. Hoisting the ISIS flag in Marawi City, therefore, is

not as innocuous as Lagman, et al. paint it to be. Contrary
to their claim that it is cheap propaganda, the act of
planting the ISIS flag on Marawi soil is a manifestation of
the rebel groups firm resolve to dismember the Philippine
territory and remove Marawi, and ultimately, Mindanao,
from its allegiance to the Philippine government.
B. IN THE PURSUIT OF THEIR GOAL OF

ESTABLISHING A WILAYAH IN MINDANAO, THE
ISIS-LINKED REBEL GROUPS HAVE NO
154
See Marawi Siege Planning, Annex 2-B of Respondents Consolidated Comment dated June 12,
2017.
155
Ibid.
156
Id.
71
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
MISGIVINGS IN ATTACKING NOT ONLY

GOVERNMENT FORCES, BUT ALSO THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION IN MINDANAO. HENCE, THE
MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY DEMANDS THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
1) The rebellion by the ISIS-

linked local rebel groups
have been endangering
public safety in the
entirety of Mindanao even
prior to the Marawi siege.
236. It is worth reiterating that the atrocities

committed by the ISIS-linked local rebel groups have been
widespread across the Mindanao region. In determining
whether sufficient factual basis exist, this Honorable Court
should not limit itself to the tragic Marawi siege. The vicious
and destructive acts by these groups against the military
and the civilian populace are numerous and continuous, and
have been taken into account by President Duterte before
issuing Proclamation No. 216.
237. As early as November 2014, the local rebel groups

have pledged their allegiance to ISIS and in seeking its
recognition, have committed crimes in furtherance of
rebelling against the government and carving out a wilayah
in Mindanao.
238. The four ISIS-linked local rebel groups the ASG,

AKP, Maute Group, and BIFF, as well as numerous ISIS cell
groups, have committed numerous bombings,
assassinations, and extortion activities in the country,
especially in Mindanao. These violent activities are
widespread and were duly recorded in areas such as Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga, Davao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, and Maguindanao.
239. For emphasis, it is necessary to reiterate just

some of the atrocities committed by these groups in
furtherance of the rebellion in the entirety of Mindanao.
72
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
These cruel and inhumane acts prior to the May 23, 2017
Marawi siege show that even during those times, public
safety was being continuously endangered by these rebel
groups:
a. There had been six (6) kidnappings from January

2017 up to the present, resulting to sixteen (16)
victims. Notably, three (3) of the victims were
beheaded, five (5) were released and nine (9)
others were rescued with twenty-seven (27)
victims still being held in captivity;
b. IED attack at a night market in Roxas Avenue,
Davao City on September 2, 2016, leading to the
death of fifteen (15) people and the injury of more
than sixty (60) others;
c. On November 5, 2016, the ASG abducted a
German national, Juergen Kantner, and killed his
wife, Sabine Merz;
d. Siege in Butig, Lanao del Sur from November 26
to December 1, 2016, which resulted in skirmishes
with government troops and the eventual
withdrawal of the group amid several fatalities;
e. On December 28, 2016, the members of BIFF
lobbed two (2) grenades at the provincial office of
Shariff Maguindanao;
f. On January 12, 2017, an IED exploded in
Barangay Campo Uno, Basilan thereby killing one
(1) civilian and injuring another;
g. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three
(3) Indonesian crew members near Bakungan
Island, Tawi-Tawi;
h. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED
in Barangay Danapah, Basilan resulting in the
death of two (2) children and the wounding of
three (3) others;
i. Ambush of military elements in Marawi City on
February 16, 2017, to include MAJ JERICO P
MANGALUS PA and one (1) enlisted personnel;
j. Carnapping in Iligan City on February 24, 2017
which led to government pursuit operations killing
two (2) members identified as Azam Taher
AMPATUA and @WOWIE and the apprehension of
Eyemen Canulo ALONTO in Tagoloan, Lanao del
Norte on the same day;
73
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
k. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its

German kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu;
l. On March 5, 2017, Mrs Omera Lotao MADID was
kidnapped in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur by
suspected Maute Group elements;
m. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabanga,
Bohol leading to firefights between the rebels and
government troops;
n. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni
Siraji and beheaded him three (3) days later; and,
o. From February to May 2017, there were eleven
(11) separate instances of IED explosions by the
BIFF in Mindanao. This resulted in the death and
wounding of several military and civilian persons.
240. AFP intelligence reports also disclose that as early

as 18 April 2017, Abdullah Maute had dispatched his
followers to the cities of Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro
to conduct bombing operations, carnapping, and
liquidation of AFP and PNP personnel in the said areas. 157
241. The foregoing list reveals that even prior to the

Marawi siege on May 23, 2017, public safety in the entire
Mindanao region was already in grave danger inasmuch as
the ISIS-linked local rebel groups were already committing
widespread atrocities in other parts of Mindanao. Indeed,
even before the said Marawi incident, rebellion was already
existing in Mindanao. The ISIS-linked local rebel groups had
continuously ignited public uprisings and taken arms against
the government for the purpose of removing the whole of
Mindanao from its allegiance to the Philippine government
and depriving the President and/or Congress of any of their
powers and prerogatives. The Marawi siege was but the peak
of the groups objective of creating a wilayah in Mindanao
and eventually dismembering the entire Mindanao region
from the Philippine territory. Notably, the conduct of
widespread atrocities and uprising all across Mindanao for
the achievement of consolidation for the caliphate is the
fourth (4th) step in the five-step process of establishing an
ISIS wilayah.
157
See AFP Intelligence Report entitled, Timeline of ASG and Maute Collaboration, Annex 7 of the
Affidavit of Eduardo Ao dated June 17, 2017, attached as Annex 1.
74
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
242. The mission to conduct widespread atrocities is

further manifest by the damage and casualties caused by
the siege of Marawi City. As of June 25, 2017, there had
been fifty-nine (59) casualties on government troops and
twenty-six (26) civilian deaths. Over three hundred and
eighty (380) of our soldiers and police officers are wounded.
Civilians numbering more than one thousand and six
hundred (1,600) have been rescued by government troops
and over fifty-nine thousand (59,000) families were forced
to evacuate for their safety.
243. It cannot be gainsaid that the insidious goals of

the ISIS-linked local rebel groups are posing an
overwhelming threat to public safety in Mindanao. Worse,
due to the continuing and widespread nature of rebellion,
there is clear and actual danger of such violent activities to
increase in frequency and geography.
2) Due to the unified goal of

the ISIS-linked local rebel
groups to establish a
wilayah in Mindanao, the
danger to public safety is
not isolated only in Marawi
Cityconformably with the
nature of rebellion as a
crime without borders.
244. The validity of the declaration of martial law and

the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the entirety of Mindanao is furthermore buttressed by the
fact that rebellion, as a crime, has no predetermined
bounds. This Honorable Courts ruling in People v.
Lovedioro158 instructs us that:
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed

public uprising against the government. By its very nature,
rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One
aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that
other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law,
absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political
158
People v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995. Emphasis supplied.
75
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of

People v. Hernandez, thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed

against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a
crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as,
being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
245. As a crime without borders, the rebellion

perpetrated by the ISIS-linked rebel groups is not confined
to the acts they have committed in Marawi City. Hence, acts
or crimes done in furtherance of the purposes of the said
rebellion, in places outside of Marawi City, are part of the
crime of rebellion itself. It is important to stress that the
ISIS-linked rebel groups have the common mission of
wresting control of Mindanaoan territory from the
government for the purpose of establishing the region as a
wilayah. This unified mission of the said ISIS-linked rebel
groups, coupled by their rising of arms publicly against the
government, indubitably constitutes the crime of rebellion.
Thus, all acts done by them in pursuit of their unified
mission are absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
246. It bears reiterating that after the ISIS

appointment of Hapilon as emir, he and the ISIS-linked local
rebel groups committed multiple atrocities resulting in the
wounding and killing of military and civilian personalities
across the Mindanao region.
247. There is also evidence before this Honorable Court

to show that the rebel groups actually planned to take over
neighboring cities after their siege of Marawi City. This is
confirmed in a video recording retrieved by the AFP wherein
Hapilon, the Maute brothers, and other unidentified
members of ISIS-linked local rebel groups in Mindanao were
documented while planning the attack in Marawi, as a
prelude for another attack outside of the said city.
76
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
248. No less than the Chief of Staff of the AFP admits

that the ISIS-linked local rebel groups could have controlled
the entirety of Mindanao without the swift declaration of
martial law by the President, viz:
e. Marawi City is but part of a grand plan that includes the

whole of Mindanao if not contained decisively and swiftly
through instrumentation of the extraordinary measure
such as imposition of martial law in the whole region of
Mindanao.159
249. It becomes apparent, therefore, that the groups

conduct of rebellion encompasses territories outside of
Marawi City, thereby endangering the safety of the public
not only in Marawi, but elsewhere in Mindanao.
250. On this point, it must be emphasized that, while

the 1987 Constitution requires the existence of an actual
rebellion, the requirement of public safety, as discussed by
the Honorable Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. in
his dissenting opinion Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,160 allows
the President to consider future acts in determining whether
or not to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ. According to the eminent Justice Velasco, citing the
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., in Fortun:
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public

safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the
Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same
word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the
Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the
concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public
safety both in the present and in the future arising from
present and past acts. Such nuance, it is submitted, gives
to the President a degree of flexibility for determining
whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial
law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements
of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts. To
require that the President must first convince herself that
there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and
jurisprudence can severely restrict the Presidents capacity
to safeguard public safety for the present and the future
and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution.
159
160
Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
77
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
What all these point to are that the twin

requirements of actual rebellion or invasion and the
demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But
whether there exists a need to take action in favour of
public safety is a factual issue different in nature from
trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of
public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the
existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual
or tactile sense. Its existence can only be determined
through the application of prudential estimation of what
the consequences might be of existing armed movements.
Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or
wrongly in finding that public safety called for the
imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid asking
whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such decision involves the verification of
factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article
134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential
judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing martial
law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty
whether the Penal Code has been violated. This is the
reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant
to override the executives judgment.
251. In fact, even from a purely criminal law

perspective, rebellion, to be consummated under Article 6 of
the RPC, does not require that the allegiance of the territory
of the Philippines or a part thereof be actually removed from
the Government. Too, the law does not require that the Chief
Executive actually be deprived of his powers or prerogatives
before a person may be prosecuted for rebellion. Article 134
of the RPC only requires these as motives behind an armed
public uprising against the government. A contrary
interpretation would result in an absurd scenario wherein the
State has already been rendered powerless to prosecute
individuals for rebellion.
252. Considering that the Commander-in-Chief powers

are key to the survival of the State, the President should be
allowed to utilize these powers to the fullest extent in order
to maintain public safety, and prevent the State from falling
into the hands of the enemy.
3) Ensuring the safety of the

public requires the use of
the powers inherent in the
78
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
law.
253. During the oral arguments, much of the

interpellation revolved on the question of what additional
powers are granted by martial law to the President, which
are not present when he merely calls out the armed forces,
that necessitated President Dutertes exercise thereof
through Proclamation No. 216.
254. While Respondents maintain their position that the

choice of which Commander-in-Chief power the President
should exercise under the circumstances is a purely political
question, and thus, outside the ambit of judicial review, the
proclamation of martial law in the whole of Mindanao is
justified by the need for the armed forces to keep the peace
and enforce the laws therein.
255. To better understand the difference between the

calling out power and the power to proclaim martial law,
reference must be made to the dichotomy between civilian
authority and military authority, the former being supreme
over the latter at all times,161 with the President as the head
of both.
256. The duty to maintain general peace and order is

ordinarily lodged in civilian authorities, particularly the PNP
which, under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975, has the duty to
[e]nforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection
of lives and properties, and [maintain] peace and order
and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety.
257. On the other hand, Article II, Section 3 of the

1987 Constitution provides that the duty of the armed forces
is to secure the sovereignty of the State, and the integrity of
the national territory. Thus, when the President calls out the
armed forces in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion under Article VII, Section 18
of the Constitution, the President does exactly what is
expected of the armed forces, i.e., to engage in combat to
161
1987 Phil. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.
79
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its

national territory.
258. By comparison, when the President declares

martial law, he, in effect, asks the armed forces to assist
him in the execution of civilian functions, except of course,
the performance of legislative and judicial functions which
are beyond the pale of martial law by the express terms of
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
259. This interpretation finds support in the opinion of

former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile162 when he declared, citing American sources, that
[t]he right to call out the military forces to maintain order
and enforce the law is simply part of the police power. More
recently, the distinguished Justice Dante O. Tinga opined in
David v. Arroyo163 that martial law involves the substitution
of the military in the civilian functions of government.
260. This is not to suggest, however, that the

proclamation of martial law requires a priori the collapse of
civilian government. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,164 this
Honorable Court held that the fact that courts are open
cannot be accepted as proof that the rebellion and
insurrection, which compellingly called for the declaration of
martial law, no longer imperil the public safety.
261. More importantly, as already discussed above,

martial law is a tool precisely to ensure the survival of the
State. As such, while the proclamation of martial law under
the 1987 Constitution requires the existence of actual
rebellion, the validity for its exercise should not be made to
depend upon the actual dismemberment of the Philippine
territory or the actual deprivation of the President of his
powers and prerogatives; the exercise of martial law at that
point would already be too late.
262. Aside from keeping the peace, it is likewise

submitted that martial law enables the President to order
162
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974.
163
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
164
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974.
80
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
the AFP to perform other functions that the PNP, under

ordinary circumstances, should perform, for instance:165
a. Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest

of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution;
b. Exercise the general powers to make arrest,
search and seizure in accordance with the
Constitution and pertinent laws; and
c. Detain an arrested person for a period not beyond
what is prescribed by law, informing the person so
detained of all his rights under the Constitution.
263. Thus, under martial law, military officers are

considered as proper officers who may serve warrants of
arrest and may effect warrantless arrests under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
264. It bears emphasis that the crime of rebellion has

been held as a continuing crime.166 According to former
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, in her opinion in Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary,167 this doctrine should be applied to
its proper contexti.e., relating to subversive armed
organizations, such as the New People's Army, the avowed
purpose of which is the armed overthrow of the organized
and established government. Only in such instance should
rebellion be considered a continuing crime.
265. Following said disquisition, police officers may

arrest members of a rebel group on the ground that they are
committing a crime in their presence pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court.
266. Considering that, under martial law, members of

the armed forces perform the functions expected of the
police force, i.e., effecting arrests,168 the martial law
implementor may issue Arrest Orders the purpose of which
is to alert and inform the entire armed forces of the identity
165
See Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975.
166
See Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991
and Garcia v. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20,1983.
167
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004.
168
See Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975
81
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
of members of the rebel groups for which martial law was

proclaimed, and enable them to arrest these rebels on sight
for a continuing crime. This function, among others, cannot
be performed by the armed forces when the President has
only called them out to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
267. The issuance of such Arrest Orders does not

offend Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. After
all, the said provision only guards against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Reasonableness depends on the
circumstances. Allowing the warrantless arrest of individuals
identified as members of rebel groups minimizes their
possibility of escape and the propagation of their ideology,
and prevents the commission of more crimes in furtherance
of the rebellion. Therefore, such warrantless arrests based
on the Arrest Orders are not unreasonable as they are only
limited in purpose and may be effected only during the
period of martial law.
CLOSING STATEMENT
Rebellion is afoot in Mindanao. In the western, central

and eastern areas of the Mindanao region, there have been
armed attacks against the civilian population, and pillage of
public and private establishments.
While it is easy to brush aside the armed attacks in

Marawi City and elsewhere in Mindanao as common crimes
bereft of any political motive or color, these attacks are
atypical of previous terrorist activities in Mindanao.
As narrated above, the military had already received

reports as early as November 2014 of a brewing attempt to
remove Mindanao from the territory of the Philippines, and
eventually pledge its allegiance to a proto-state known
worldwide as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS.
This was later confirmed by military intelligence in 2016 with
the appointment of an emir or a governor of the Islamic
State in the Philippines, with Marawi City as the capital
thereof.
82
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
This Honorable Court can take judicial notice of the fact

that the occupation of Marawi by armed groups has been
ongoing for almost thirty days now. This alone is proof
enough that the goal of these lawless elements is not merely
to sow fear and panic to the populace, but to actually
establish a stronghold in the Mindanao region and deprive
duly-constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives
therein.
The discussion above further explained the events

leading up to the siege of Marawi on May 23, 2017 that
inevitably served as basis for the President to issue
Proclamation No. 216 for the whole of Mindanao. Too, the
Respondents have described the magnitude and scope of the
rebellion, and how it has endangered public safety in the
entire Mindanao region, validating the need for the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
To close, the Government recognizes the vital role

played by the Supreme Court in ensuring the supremacy of
the Constitution. The Government submits, however, that
under the premises obtaining in the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to
President Duterte. Far from it, there is more than sufficient
factual basis for proclaiming martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
Article II, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution declares in

no uncertain terms that the prime duty of the Government is
to protect the people. In faithful compliance with this duty,
President Duterte saw it fit to exercise arguably the most
awesome of his constitutional powers.
As the survival of the State hangs in the balance,

Respondents respectfully ask this Honorable Court to sustain
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216, and allow the
President to perform his constitutional mandate of protecting
the people.
83
MEMORANDUM
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774
x--------------------------------------------x
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Respondents

respectfully pray of this Honorable Court to:
1) DENY DUE COURSE to the Consolidated

Petitions, and
2) DISMISS the Consolidated Petitions for fatal

procedural defects and/or utter lack of merit.
Other just and equitable reliefs under the premises

are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Manila, 19 June 2017.
84

Republic of The Philippines Manila: Petitioners

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

-versus- G.R. No. 231658

HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT,

VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, and

-versus- G.R. No. 231771

PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE,

NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE

-versus- G.R. No. 231774

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR

Respondents1 Executive Secretary Salvador C.

1. There is a rebellion in Marawi City and in other

2. For a full appreciation of the magnitude and scope

A brief history of the

3. ISIS was formed sometime in 2014 by the

4. Leading the ISIS is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who

5. ISIS has propagated its plan to impose its will and

6. The success of ISIS in conquering territories

an income of four hundred million ($400M) to five hundred

7. The wealth and power of ISIS not only enabled

The Philippines as the

8. The notoriety of the ISIS in the Middle East has

9. There are four ISIS-linked local rebel groups that

a. The Abu-Sayyaf Group from Basilan (ASG-

10. These groups are notorious for committing

11. In addition to these ISIS-linked local rebel groups,

a. Ansar Dawiah Fi Filibbin

12. These ISIS-linked local rebel groups and ISIS cell

not merely to sow terror amongst the populace, but to

13. On April 2016, the ISIS weekly online newsletter,

14. The appointment by the ISIS of an emir in the

15. On December 31, 2016, Hapilon and about thirty

Mindanao; and finally, the presentation of all of these to the

16. On the first week of January 2017, a meeting

17. The appointment by ISIS of an emir in the

The Davao bombing and

18. After ISIS appointment of Hapilon as emir, he and

19. The government has noted the increased

fifteen (15) army soldiers in Patikul, Sulu. Moreover, there

20. Due to the then increasing concerted attacks

21. Notwithstanding the issuance of Proclamation No.

22. The following incidents are confirmed by the

a. There had been six (6) kidnappings from January

c. Kidnapping of six (6) sawmill workers and the

o. On March 5, 2017, Mrs. Omera Lotao MADID was

23. AFP intelligence reports also disclose that as early

24. Due to the continuous spate of crimes in pursuit of

25. On March 9, 2017, and before the Davao local

The siege of Marawi City

26. On April 22 to 25, 2017, Hapilons rebel group

27. On May 23, 2017, there were intelligence reports

28. At around 2 oclock in the afternoon, the military

29. At 2:18pm, the government troops from the 51st

30. The ISIS-linked local rebel groups launched an

shooting at government troops. The ISIS-linked local rebel

31. The rebel groups occupied and burned several

32. By 10:00pm, the local rebel groups have set up

33. At or around 10:00pm, government troops

34. In their rampage, the rebel groups brandished the

35. Even this Honorable Court has ordered judges and

nearby Iligan City and other safe areas. The aforesaid

36. To date, there have been fifty-nine (59) casualties