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AbstractAdditive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is years. According to the Wohlers report [1], in 2015 the AM
an emerging manufacturing technology that is expected to industry accounted for $5.165 billion of revenue, with 32.5%
have far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental, and geopo- of all AM-generated objects used as functional parts.
litical implications. As use of this technology increases, it will Due to the computerization involved in AM, several
become more common to produce functional parts, including researchers have raised concerns regarding its security, in-
components for safety-critical systems. AMs dependence on cluding intellectual property violation [2], [3], [4], [5], [6],
computerization raises the concern that the manufactured [7], [8] and sabotage of manufactured objects quality [9],
parts quality can be compromised by sabotage. [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. In this paper, we focus on
This paper demonstrates the validity of this concern, as the latter a threat to public safety and national security
we present the very first full chain of attack involving AM, when functional parts of safety-critical systems or of critical
beginning with a cyber attack aimed at compromising a benign infrastructure are sabotaged. While prior work addresses
AM component, continuing with malicious modification of a various selected aspects of this issue, to the best of our
manufactured objects blueprint, leading to the sabotage of the knowledge, no one has provided a holistic view and pre-
manufactured functional part, and resulting in the physical sented a proof that this type of indirect, multistage, cyber-
destruction of a cyber-physical system that employs this part. physical attack is actually possible. This paper provides
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We propose
such a proof. This paper presents the complete chain of
a systematic approach to identify opportunities for an attack
attack involving AM, beginning with a cyber attack aimed
at compromising a component in the AM environment,
involving AM that enables an adversary to achieve his/her
continuing with malicious modification of a design file,
goals. Then we propose a methodology to assess the level of
leading to the manufacture of a sabotaged functional part,
difficulty of an attack, thus enabling differentiation between
and resulting in the physical destruction of a cyber-physical
possible attack chains. Finally, to demonstrate the experimental
system that employs this part. In order to accomplish this,
proof for the entire attack chain, we sabotage the 3D printed
we propose a systematic approach to identify possible attack
propeller of a quadcopter UAV, causing the quadcopter to chains that will allow an adversary to achieve his/her goals.
literally fall from the sky. For the selection of the attack to be performed, we propose
a methodology to assess the level of difficulty of an attack.
1. Introduction The assessment is based on the skills, tools, and network
access available to an adversary.
Additive Manufacturing (AM), often called 3D printing, Lastly, for the experimental evaluation of both our ap-
refers to the creation of 3D objects by adding thin lay- proach and the concern raised, we demonstrate an attack
ers, one layer at a time, to build up an object from two on a benign desktop 3D printer owner who prints a re-
dimensions to three in order to create the desired form. placement propeller for his quadcopter UAV. Our remote
Compared to the traditional subtractive manufacturing sabotage attack causes the propeller to break during flight,
technologies, which use various cutting tools to reduce a and this is quite literally followed by the quadcopter falling
solid block of source material to the desired shape and from the sky. The remainder of the paper is structured as
size, AM has numerous socioeconomic, environmental, and follows: In Section 2, we discuss the previous work in
technical advantages. These include, but are not limited to, this area. Section 3 contains an overview of the Additive
shorter design-to-product time, just-in-time and on-demand Manufacturing workflow which will be the basis of the rest
production, production in the proximity to assembly lines, of the study. Section 4 maps the attack chain what will lead
reduction of source material waste, and especially, the ability to sabotage of a system by compromising a 3D printed func-
to produce functional parts with complex internal structure tional part. We discuss the flow of the attack, tracing back
and application area-optimized physical properties. These from adversary goals, to various forms of manipulations,
advantages have played a significant role in the increased to possible compromised elements and attack vectors. In
adoption of this transformative technology in the recent Section 5, we rank the difficulty level and impact of each
attack vector by methodically deconstructing and assessing of these techniques to withstand shape perturbations, e.g.,
the factors involved in carrying out the attacks. Then, in the intentional alterations or unintentional noise commonly
Sections 6 and 7 we demonstrate an end-to-end cyber attack introduced during reverse engineering. This property is
utilizing the methodology that weve presented and the real- necessary to trace the origin of the IP violation. In [17],
life implications of this attack. Finally, we summarize our the authors propose a signing methodology that aims to
findings and discuss future work in Section 8. transition the metadata associated with the digital 3D object
to the physical 3D printed object. The authors also suggest
2. Related Work a variety of approaches to maintain provenance, including
steganography, digital watermarking, content streaming and
To the best of our knowledge, the very first proof of the RFID hardware. Among others, the authors discuss the
concept that a desktop 3D printer could be compromised benefits of printing RFID tags inside the 3D objects as a
was presented in 2013 at the XCon2013 conference by way to track the objects.
Xiao Zi Hang (Claud Xiao). According to his keynote However, as discussed in [3], in the context of AM, IP
presentation [15], an attack can modify printing results, is not limited to the specification of the 3D object geometry;
including the size of the model, position of components, it can also include the specification of required properties
integrability of components, etc. (that correspond to operational parameters of a functional
Several publications analyze the possibility of compro- part), and manufacturing process parameters (which ensure
mising 3D printers. In [12], the authors analyzed the man- that functional parts will satisfy requirements). We are not
ufacturing process chain and found several attack vectors aware of any further publications addressing the latter two
that can be easily exploited. They focused primary on the categories of IP in AM.
aspects related to networks and communication. They have A recent article [13] generalizes the ability to sabotage
examined the lack of integrity checks, particularly at the AM as the weaponization of 3D printing. The authors
stage of receiving the design (common mechanisms that propose a framework for the analysis of attacks involving
are not secure include email and USB drives), the lack of AM and then then discuss how certain categories of attacks
physical security on machining tools, the exposure to com- can generate effects comparable with those produced by
mon network attacks and the difficulty of relying on existing weapons (e.g., kinetic damage). Further, the authors argue
quality control processes. A recent publication [16] analyzes that the targets of such an attack can be 3D manufactured
open source software that is commonly used with desktop objects, AM equipment, or environment.
3D printers: Marlin firmware, and three GUI applications In [11], based on an extensive survey of AM-related
that run on PCs and communicate with the 3D printer via material science literature, the authors identified manufac-
G-code, Cura 3D, ReplicatorG, and Repetier-Host. In each turing parameters that can have a negative impact on a
of these programs, static analysis of the source code and manufactured parts quality. The discussion focuses on AM
dynamic analysis of the communication between the 3D with metals and alloys and covers a variety of AM processes,
printer and the computer reveal numerous vulnerabilities that including powder bed fusion, direct energy deposition, and
can be exploited. sheet lamination. The identified parameters include but are
Other publications dealing with this topic can be grouped not limited to build direction, scanning strategy, heat source
based on the two main security threat categories associated energy, etc.
with AM: intellectual property (IP) violation and sabotage For plastics 3D printers, several publications provide an
of AM. experimental proof that various manipulations can reduce
Several authors [2], [4], [8] analyze legal aspects of IP the parts quality. In [9], the authors developed malware
protection in AM and report numerous deficits. For instance, to alter the STL file defining the 3D object geometry by
a 3D scan of a manufactured object is not considered an introducing voids (i.e., internal cavities) into the design. A
original technical drawing (blueprint) [8]; thus it can be used similar approach is presented in a recent article [14]; here,
to legally avoid copyright protection of a blueprint. the authors investigated the impact on the tensile strength
In [6] the authors present the first published side-channel of two types of manufacturing modifications: insertion of
attack on a 3D printer. The authors analyze the acoustic sub-millimeter scale defects in the interior of 3D printed
emanations of a desktop 3D printer, and show that various parts, and modification of the orientation of the part during
sound properties can be used to distinguish between four printing. As opposed to [9], in [14] defects are introduced
stepper motors, three of which are used to move the printer by replacing the main material with a contaminant.
nozzle along the X/Y/Z axes, while the other is used to ex-
trude the filament while printing. The authors show that this 3. Additive Manufacturing Workflow
information is sufficient to reconstruct object topology. The
experimental results show an average rate of accuracy for Figure 1 represents a high abstraction level workflow
axis prediction of 78.35% and an average length prediction that is common in AM. This workflow represents an increas-
error of 17.82%. ingly common scenario when AM is offered as a service1 .
Several authors have addressed various aspects of IP 1. As of May 2016, 3D Printing Businesses web site
protection of 3D object design. In [5], the authors survey 3D (http://3dprintingbusiness.directory/) lists 851 companies offering 3D
digital watermarking techniques and evaluate the potential printing service.
Software/Firmware
AM Equipment Updates Effects
Manufacturer Attack Compromised
AM Vectors Manipulations
Element(s)
STL/AMF Service Provider Targets
3D Object Specification
Designers Controller PC Materials & Adversarial Goals
Manufactured
Application Areas
3D Object
The End Product
Customers/Users
Electricity Figure 2. Attack on/with 3D printer (based on [13])
Power
Provider
4.2.2. Influenced Elements. the change (we will discuss the latter in Section 4.3). We
AM Files: AM files are the input to the manufacturing propose the following categorization:
process. STL/AMF files contain objects specification Indiscriminate/Selective: Manipulations such as change of
and any modification to these files will directly influ- the objects orientation are rather indiscriminate and af-
ence the resulting object. Printer instructions, that are fect the entire object. Similarly, configuration variables
generated from these design files, are compiled into that determine the slicing tools properties will lead to
a toolpath file that can be changed on the Controller rather indiscriminate changes that affect the processing
PC, during transit or even on the 3D printer. The of the entire design file. Other manipulations can be
printers instructions in the toolpath (commonly G-code selective, depending on both the subject of manipula-
commands) represent objects specification as well as tion and the compromised element that exercises this
manufacturing properties that are related to the printing manipulation. For example, layer thickness can either
process. be modified in the slicing software configuration and
Configuration: Minor changes in configurations can im- indiscriminately impact all the layers of the printed
pact the resulting object. Crucial properties of objects object or modified by changing a subset of G-code
specification can be manipulated by minor changes in commands, impacting only selected layers during the
configuration settings in the slicing software. Properties manufacturing process.
like layer thickness, fill density, shell thickness, etc. Static/Dynamic: Another characteristics is whether manip-
Additionally, modification of printer configuration, like ulations are statically present or dynamically intro-
print bed temperature, nozzle travel speed, etc, can duced. For instance, modifications of STL/AMF files
impact the manufacturing process. are generally static in nature, and they will be repli-
Code: Controlling the software enables a fine-grain control cated every time the file is used to manufacture the
over the outcome. By influencing the software that runs described object. Compromise of software or firmware
on the Controller PC or on the 3D printer, the adversary involved into AM processes will enable dynamic ma-
can achieve both manipulation categories. nipulations. Modifications to the toolpath or G-code
Traffic: Controlling the traffic can cause interference with commands10 can then be performed dynamically on
the times or content of the sent data. Some printers the fly and triggered by a combination of various
receive the printing instructions over the network and events. As demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack [28]
any disturbance or modification to this data impacts the has illustrated, dynamic attacks can be significantly
resulting object. In [26], the authors show that even harder to identify as an attack; therefore, such attacks
slight printing delays between each printed layer can can continue being active for a longer period of time
affect the compressive strength, toughness and tangent undetected.
modulus of samples printed. Direct/Indirect: In object specification manipulations (e.g.,
in the STL/AMF file), the configuration values of the
4.2.3. Characteristics of Manipulations. Orthogonal to the
presented categories of manipulations are characteristics of 10. Both toolpath and G-code commends can contain/specify information
these manipulations. These depend on the subject of manip- about the manufactured object as well as instructions for the 3D printer
ulation and also on the compromised element that exercises configuration; the latter will affect manufacturing process.
AM tools and 3D printers, instructions sent to the Network: In the AM workflow, network communication is
3D printer (e.g., as individual G-code commands), and present for transferring files from an external designer
status information sent back directly affect the manu- of a 3D object to the Controller PC (external network
factured object (and its quality) directly. In addition, communication) and also between the Controller PC
as discussed in [26], [29], also the timing of particular and the 3D printer (internal network communication).
commands and status information, as well as the power Both can be compromised, enabling changes of the
supply of the 3D printer, can have a significant impact transmitted data.
on the manufactured process, and therefore on the We distinguish between the following network ele-
manufacturing parts quality. Various classical network ments that can be compromised:
attacks (DoS, etc). can cause indirect manipulations, Network Equipment: Both the hardware and soft-
e.g., by causing G-code commands to arrive too late ware of network equipment such as routers, switches,
or out of order. It should be noted that while the hubs, etc. can be compromised.
impact of direct manipulations on a parts quality can Network Services: Network communication is sup-
be predicted with a high level of certainty (and/or tested ported by various services including DNS, Active
in a laboratory environment), the impact of indirect Directory, Mail servers, etc. Compromise of such
manipulations is rather stochastic. elements can control the flow and the access on the
network.
4.3. Compromised Elements Unrelated assets: Other computers, network-enabled
devices such as printers, and mobile devices that
The above mentioned manipulations are only possible if have access to the network can be compromised,
at least one of the following elements of the AM workflow is thus enabling malicious interference into other com-
compromised. Note that not all compromised elements can ponents involved in the 3D printing process.
exercise all manipulations, and that manipulations available
Depending on whether the external or internal network
to different compromised elements might be comprised of
connection is compromised, a variety of manipulations
different characteristics.
can occur, however they cannot exceed the scope of
External Designer: In the considered AM workflow, the manipulations available to the external 3D Object De-
STL/AMF blueprint files are provided to the AM Ser- signer or Controller PC, respectively. These manipula-
vice Provider either by external designers or down- tions can be further restricted, depending on which the
loaded from the Internet. In both cases, the files are network element that is compromised.
received via an external (Internet) connection and serve 3D Printer: The 3D printer is the heart of the manufactur-
as the basis for the entire manufacturing process. The ing process. Control over the printer can compromise
designer is likely located outside the trusted environ- the integrity of the printed objects design and manu-
ment; and can therefore be compromised either by a facturing process. The attacker needs to control either
cyber attack or impersonation of a malicious actor. the 3D printers firmware or the hardware to achieve
In this case, the STL/AMF files originating outside his/her goals. If the 3D Printer is compromised, the
the trusted environment may contain an altered object whole spectrum of manipulations is possible without
design, and both the introduction of defects and change any restrictions11 .
of the orientation are possible. This represents a direct,
static manipulation; whether it can be selective or not
depends on the file format used.
4.4. Attack Vectors
Controller PC: The Controller PC operates on the
An attack vector is a path or means by which an attacker
STL/AMF design files, converts the design to G-code
can compromise and thus gain control over an element in
command and issues corresponding those commands
the AM workflow. In this paper, we only consider cyber
to the 3D printer. If the Controller PC is not dedicated
attack vectors that can be used to compromise one or more
solely to the AM process and is also used for unrelated
of the elements described above. We distinguish between
activities such as web browsing, etc. (as is commonly
the following attack vectors:
the case of private PCs connected to a desktop 3D
printers, and cannot be completely excluded in an
4.4.1. Software Attacks. The Software that is used on the
industrial environment either), it can be compromised.
Controller PC or the 3D printer can be compromised and
Exploitation of the Controller PC can target software
execute additional unintended functions.
that is either directly related to the AM process, e.g.,
It has been well demonstrated that programs are full of
tools that are supporting the AM process, or unrelated
vulnerabilities and are vulnerable to arbitrary code execu-
software components that are executed on the Con-
tion. According to [30], the defect per KLOC stands at 6.1
troller PC. If malicious code is running on the PC, it
for examined mission-critical software systems that were
has direct access to, and therefore can manipulate, the
examined. Also, the Time-to-Fix can take days to months.
design files, the generated tool path files, individual
G-code commands, the 3D printer configuration, and 11. Here, logical restrictions are meant; all manipulations are within the
ultimately also firmware updates for 3D printer. boundaries of physically possible.
3D printing softwares are no exception. Since there is a Software updates are a potential threat, not only be-
variety of software that is directly or indirectly involved in cause of the addition of new code which might con-
the 3D printing process, there is a wide range of potential tain bugs, but also because the addition of new code
software vulnerabilities that can be exploited. introduces another attack vector to the environment.
Software updates can be hijacked and manipulated
Code Injection into AM Files: We consider the AM de- if not implemented correctly. One famous example
sign files the most vulnerable components, because they is the Flame malware that spoofed the request for
generally originate outside the controlled environment Windows Updates on the local network and delivered
and are generated by tools that are frequently provided malicious code instead [32].
by third parties. The attacker can change the original Open Source Backdoor: An attacker can gain access
design files at several steps of the AM process, starting to the network by integrating a backdoor into open
with the external designers site and the files delivery source software. This is not a targeted attack since it
to the Controller PC, up to its representation in the 3D is hard to influence the open-source software that
printer itself. is used. Moreover, the backdoor must escape the
If an attacker can find a vulnerability in the software in- checks and the reviews of the codes owners of the
volved in the manufacturing process, a specially crafted code. Nevertheless, since in 3D printing, there is a
file can be provided as a source for this software, thus variety of open-source malwares used, this attack
eventually executing an arbitrary code. There are two vector has a high likelihood of occurring.
types of AM files: the design files and the toolpath
files. Compromising of the design files (commonly 4.4.2. Hardware/Firmware Attacks. The focal point of the
of the STL/AMF type), can be done either from the AM process is the 3D printer. By controlling the printer,
external designer side, the Controller PC itself (by the adversary can impact the outcome of the manufactur-
a malicious software already running on the PC or ing. Thus the adversary needs to gain control over the
other compromised network components), or during firmware/hardware of the 3D printer in order to fully control
the files network transmission. A well-known example the printing process. Most of the printers are not directly
of a malicious code embedded in a CAD file is the connected to the Internet, thus the adversary needs to gain a
MEDRE.A worm [31]. Eventually it is also possible to foothold inside the network and leverage it for a secondary
compromise the 3D printer itself, e.g., by a specially attack of the 3D equipment.
crafted toolpath file. Firmware/Hardware Vulnerabilities: Similarly to soft-
General Infiltration Methods: Software attacks aim to ware, the existence of bugs or oversights in the
compromise software running on one of the compro- firmware/hardware components is inevitable. They are
mised elements. These attacks frequently exploit soft- less common than software vulnerabilities since the
ware vulnerabilities, i.e., weaknesses in the system that functionality of the 3D equipment is limited and find-
commonly originate from software bugs, specifically ing/testing the vulnerabilities requires the hardware
errors, mistakes, or oversights that can result in unex- itself or an emulator (which are still not common).
pected and typically undesired behavior. Compromise Hardware trojans: Hardware attacks, in the form of mali-
of a single device in the AM network can lead to cious modifications of electronic hardware at different
compromise of other crucial components via lateral stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns
movement. An adversary will search for the easiest and in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount
least protected point of entry by leveraging common such an attack by introducing a hardware Trojan into
infiltration methods such as: spear phishing via emails the system, that can manipulate the AM process-related
or fraudulent websites, malicious attachments, external data it has access to.
devices, brute force hacking, stolen credential, etc. Firmware Updates: A malicious firmware update is one
Software Supply Chain: Software vulnerabilities can be of the ways in which an adversary can compromise a
accidentally or intentionally inserted into the software 3D printer or network elements.
at any point in its development, distribution or use pro-
cess. Software end-users have limited ways of finding 4.4.3. Network Attacks. Since the AM equipment can
and correcting these defects to avoid exploitation. reside on the same network as the Controller PC, tradi-
Compromised Software: Software that is used on the tional network attacks can impact the 3D printing process.
Controller PC or 3D printer can be compromised Although most printers use propriety protocols, they are
and execute additional unintended functions. Such vulnerable to the same attacks as any other network devices.
functions can compromise either AM-related files or General Network attacks: Some of the network attacks
the communication between AM components. The lead to full control over the communication. The at-
attacker can replace the software with its own mali- tacker can secretly relay and possibly alter the com-
cious version or compromise specific libraries. munication between two parties. Attacks in which com-
Software Updates: Software updates are used to fix munication is fully controlled are called man-in-the-
bugs that cause operational/security problems or middle attacks, and this type of attack can include
to add new features/functionality into the program. sniffing, spoofing and session hijacking. Moreover, an
attacker can cause damages and delays in the manufac- Technological Difficulty
turing process by triggering a denial-of-service attack
(1 Easy, 2 Moderate, 3
(1 Highly available
2 Needed, 3 Specific
3 HW depended)
2 SW dependent
Hacking Skill Level
Availability of tools
in the network. Such attacks can halt production and
Access to the AM
Calculated Score
(1 Not Needed
Hard)
Network
Needed)
Needed
suspend the legitimate communications on the network.
Any interference in the timing of the printing process
can have significant effects on the quality of the result-
Attack Vectors
ing object [29]. Code Injection 2" 1" 2" 1.7"
General Infiltration Methods 2" 1" 2" 1.7"
Protocol vulnerabilities: There may be logic bugs in the Software Compromised
2" 3" 2" 2.3"
Software
Software
Supply
protocols themselves. An attacker can hijack a commu-
Chain
Software Updates 2" 3" 2" 2.3"
nication by using logical mistakes in the protocol, as Open Source Backdoor
Hardware Trojans
1"
3"
1"
3"
1"
3"
1"
3"
Hardware/
well as implementation mistakes in the software. These Firmware Firmware Updates 2" 3" 3" 2.65"
Engineering Needed
Manufacturing
Specification
Modification
Modification
Knowledge of
Knowledge in
Specific AM
Properties
Calculated
Difficulty
Process
Object
Attack Vectors
Specification
2" 3" 2.5" Code Injection
Attack Vectors
Modification
General Infiltration Methods
Manufacturing
Properties 3" 3" 3" Compromised Software
Software
Software
Supply
Chain
Modification Software Updates
6.1.2. Experimental Environment. We have implemented 6.2.1. Attack Target. In this scenario, the goal is for the
the scenario outlined above using equipment that is some- propeller to break when the drone ascends very quickly or
what typical for a private household (see summary in Ta- after a comparatively short operational time. This means that
ble 1). The DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ is a 4 kg (8.8 pounds) the sabotage of the propeller should either cause a reduction
quadcopter UAV that can stay in the air for up to 25 minutes. in the propellers tensile strength in the direction of the lift
It has a HD video camera installed and can stream live video. force, or cause the rapid development of material fatigue in
The drone can be purchased for about $500, a price that is the propeller.
affordable for the majority of private users. For a 3D printer
we have selected the LulzBot Taz 5 with single extruder 6.2.2. Manipulations. Out of the options described in Sec-
and V2C connector. LuLzbot TAZ is a plug-and-play device tions 4, the manipulation of the manufacturing process re-
that comes with a numerous of features that can make it quires a higher degree of the AM proficiency. As for our
Figure 8. Case study attack chain
scenario it is not the case, this option is eliminated. Both the element that is both used for AM and surfing the Internet,
possible influences on object specification are feasible with is the valid choice.
the skills and tools our adversary has. This manipulation is
preferable in the examined scenario since it is both selective 6.2.4. Attack Vectors. Personal computers are a frequent
and direct. However, a change to the orientation of the object targets of attacks. Numerous tools and relevant information
can eventually have the following drawbacks. First of all, if can be found on the web. For choosing the attack vector,
the victim has already printed a propeller in the past (which we have focused on most common tools and behaviors of
is our assumption) and monitors the printing process, change individual users. We chose a phishing attack because it is
of the printed objects orientation can easily be recognized. one of the most common attack vectors for individuals and
Furthermore, it is also possible that the object with changed IT professionals. We had a choice of several file format or
orientation will not fit in the 3D printer platform, thus flash exploits that are widely available on the Internet. We
eventually preventing the propeller from being printed at all. chose a ZIP file format vulnerability in the popular WinRAR
The remaining option of defect introduction is both feasible software.
and eventually can remain undetected.
While the selection of the manipulation category is 6.3. Defining Manipulation
comparatively straight forward, the exact definition of the
modification is not. Questions such as what type of defect, Regardless of adversarys AM proficiency, some impe-
the shape of a defect, and its location in the printed 3D rial experiments are required to verify that the manipulation
object should be defined. leads to the sabotage of the propeller. We assume that the ad-
Even though the adversary has moderate AM profi- versary has enough resources to perform some experiments,
ciency; it is extremely difficult to calculate impact of of using equipment either identical or close to identical to the
defects geometry on the stress concentration or similar victims one. In particular, we assume that the adversary has
factors intensively studied and well understood in the the same 3D printer and drone. By gaining access to victims
material science. Therefore, the adversary has to experiment Controller PC, the adversary possesses the original design
with various defects and find which are working within file of the propeller and the knowledge of which slicing soft-
defined conditions. ware is used. Figure 9 shows the original propeller design. It
Each defect can be introduced via multiple influenced was modeled using the SolidWorks software. While playing
elements. The choice of the influenced elements depends the role of an adversary who is modifying the design, we
on the compromised element that is selected. use the SolidWorks software as well.
6.2.3. Compromised Element. The object description 6.3.1. Location of Defect. Propellers convert engines
changes its representation as it traversal over different el- torque force into thrust force. The original propeller design
ements of workflow. It is represented as a STL/AMF file by is engineered to withstand the thrust force that acts on it
the 3D object designer and during transfer to the Controller when the motors are spinning at the maximum supported
PC. Once at the Controller PC it is translated to either revolution per minute (RPM). The lift force causes the pro-
G-code individual commands or a toolpath file that are peller to bent upwards during flight, thus placing a certain
transmitted to the 3D printer. Also, in the 3D printer itself, amount of stress onto the propeller.
the design can have a different internal representation. It is The calculation of thrust force and stress distribution are
clear that any element along this path, if compromised, can rather complex topics12 that, as we assume, exceed by far
modify the object specification.
12. The thrust produced by a propeller depends on factors like its shape
In our considered scenario we aim to compromise the and diameter, on the motors RPM, and on the density of the air. Stress
AM environment from the Internet, thus the Controller PC, distribution depends on the objects geometry and material properties.
Figure 9. Original Propeller Designed using SolidWorks
Figure 12. Two printed caps site-by-site. Cap A is sabotaged and Cap B
is benign
Figure 10. Red circles highlight location selected for the defect
Figure 15. The drone with three normal propellers and one damaged
printed propellers, one of the original and another one of a
maliciously altered design.
In order to create a controlled, reproducible testing en- 7.1.1. Compromising Controller PC. In order to infiltrate
vironment and to measure effects of our manipulations, we the system, we used a patched WinRAR vulnerability [35]
have used an enclosed room and attached drone to the table that spoofs the file name and extension of the archived
with a duct tape. We have rapidly increased thrust/RPM to document. We have created a malicious EXE file using
capture the breaking point. Doing this, we have measured the Metasploit framework that triggers an exploit. Using
two factors: the breakage time of the propeller and the RPM the WinRAR vulnerability, we have changed the name and
count when the failure happens. extension of the executable file to look like an innocent PDF
During our tests we could verify that the propeller file.
printed using the original design could operate at more than The victim received an email enticing him to download
15000 RPM for an extended period of time (over 5 minutes). a .Zip file from Dropbox and double-click on the PDF file
However, propellers printed with various defects introduced inside. Once the victim clicks on the file, a reverse shell is
in the design could not sustain this operational conditions. opened in the background and the attacker can take control
Figure 14 captures the second a sabotaged propeller breaks. over the system.
The breakage point occurred at 10457 RPM after 10
seconds. 7.1.2. Manipulating Design File. The next step is to find
During our lab tests we have witnessed a side effect of potential design files that the attacker can manipulate. The
the targeted damage that we aimed to create. Besides com- attacker searches for .STL files and downloads them for
promising the drone itself, in some cases the breakage of the further investigation. Once the files are in the attackers
propeller have damaged one of the other fully functioning possession he/she can modify the design in a way that would
propellers. cause damage. In our experiment, we have modified the
design using the SolidWork software, tested the effect of
7. Case Study, Part II: Attack Execution the manipulation experimentally (Section 6.3), and lastly,
replaced the original file with the maliciously altered one.
After the modified file is used to produce a replacement
After all the above described preparatory steps have been propeller, the sabotage attack enters a new phase, when the
accomplished, we were ready to perform the actual attack. entire CPS can become a victim of a part failure.
We execute the sabotage attack in three steps. First, we The first step of the field trials was to test whether the
have compromised the victims Controller PC. Second, we printed propellers will be able to withstand actual flight. We
have downloaded the original design file and developed a attached four propeller that were all printed from the regular
sabotaged design (as described in Section 6.3). Third, we design. The drone was able to take off and fly normally
have changed the design file on the victims PC according during a long periods of time (more than 5 minutes of
to the developed manipulation. regular flight).
Figure 18. The broken sabotaged propeller
8. Conclusion