It Runs in the Blood:

An Essay on Enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty Law

Presented to
ATTY. JOAN DYMPHNA SANIEL-AMIT
School of Law and Governance
University of San Carlos
Cebu City, Philippines

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the course
LLB 136N: Legal Writing

By
Rabindranath Saludsod Polito
EH 301

March 28, 2017

 It Runs in the Blood:
An Essay on Enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty Law

Introduction

Pagkagawad sa baranggay ba. This was the reaction of my friend who is currently
a member of the barangay council in a small village in Mindanao when he learned I am
studying Law. He invited me to run under his administration as he will run again this
elections but this time as the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Elections in the
Philippines will be held on October 23, 2017. The election shall elect the Punong
Barangay, more commonly known as barangay captains, and members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, or barangay council, in more than 40,000 barangays (villages)
throughout the country whose terms will start in November 2017.1

Mu-daog lagi ka, sila bahala nimo. He said this after I refused to run because I
know I will not win. It is because very few know me in our village. When he said sila,
he was referring to his family with their influence who will assure me of the victory
because his father was the Captain for a long time, his mother is still serving as a
kagawad for quite sometime now, and his brother is the SK chairperson, all in the same
barangay. This conversation led me to recall a section on political dynasty in the present
Constitution.

The Constitution provides: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.2 It is hoped
that with such provision the citizens are given political opportunities with equal
conditions to hold public offices.

The late Senator Defensor-Santiago explained that the term prohibit is not to be
understood as prohibitory but regulatory.3 The prohibition is against political dynasty to

1
Commission on Elections, Resolution No. 10168, November 2016.
2
1987 Phil Const Art II, 26.
3
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Constitutional Law Annotated (Manila: Rex Bookstore, 2015).
avoid circumvention of the provision limiting reelection of public officers to give chance
to others in a position for public office.4 For example, a governor is allowed two
reelections. After being reelected twice, he is barred from running for the same position
by operation of law. However, he can ask his son, wife, brother or relatives to run for the
same position without violating any law. If the son wins, the province continues to be
governed by the same family. The election of a family member of that politician negates
the purpose of prohibiting reelection. That is a political dynasty.

Constitutionalist Bernas said that the establishment of political dynasties is an

effective way of monopolizing and perpetuating power.5 Hence, the state is commanded
to prohibit political dynasties. Commissioner Sarmiento explained the rationale of the
provision as widening opportunities of competent, young and promising poor candidates
to occupy important positions in the government.6

The phrase as may be defined by law makes the provision non-self-executing. In

other words, it requires a law to be passed and enacted by the Congress. However, thirty
(30) years since the ratification of the Philippine Constitution on February 2, 1987,
despite few attempts, no bill has been enacted or signed into law defining and prohibiting
political dynasties in the Philippines.

Recently, it is to be noted that the Congress is in the process of passing a bill on the
restoration of death penalty. In this view, this essay aims to prove that it is also incumbent
upon the Philippine Congress under the present administration to also enact a law
defining and prohibiting or regulating political dynasties to give effect to a constitutional
provision and to address certain issues on poverty and poor governance.

This essay will answer pertinent questions to the enactment of the anti-dynasty law:
(a) Why should the Congress enact a law that prohibits political dynasty? (b) How should
political dynasty be defined in the Philippines? (c) Who are the candidates that should be
prohibited? and (d) How should political dynasty be prohibited?
4
Ibid.
5
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (Manila: Rex Book Store, 2009).
6
Ibid.
 Since the focus is to highlight the importance on enacting the anti-dynasty law by the
Congress, this essay is limited to: (a) studies by Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza on the
definition of political dynasty, (b) the situation of the Philippines without the enactment
of the anti-political dynasty law, (c) comments by known constitutionalists in the
Philippines such as Bernas and Santiago, and (d) the features of the proposed and rejected
bill authored by the late Senator Defensor-Santiago.

This essay is divided into three main sections. First, I will give an overview on the
definitions of political dynasty as presented in the studies of Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza.
The section analyzes and compares the varied definitions of political dynasty to have a
better comprehension on the matter. Second, I will enumerate reasons for enacting a law
against political dynasty. The section lays down the effects of the non-enactment of an
anti-political dynasty law which leads to a number of societal and governmental problems
of the country. These problems should compel the Congress to enact said law. Finally, I
will analyze the bill on Anti-Dynasty authored by Senator Defensor-Santiago by
comparing it with existing studies as to the (a) the definition of political dynasty and (b)
the prohibited candidates. The last section also provides the role of the COMELEC in
prohibiting candidates from political dynasties.

Overview on Political Dynasty

Dal Bo defines a political dynasty as a family that has successfully retained political
power through maintaining control over at least one elective position over successive
generations.7 Also, Albert presents two main patterns that typically emerge in a political
dynasty.8 First, relatives that occupy the same elective position over time or an individual
succeeding to an elective position previously occupied by a relative. Second, relatives
that occupy multiple elective positions simultaneously. Thus, there is an existence of
political dynasty when a family retains at least one elective position over successive
7
Ernesto Dal Bo et al., Political dynasties, The Review of Economic Studies (April 2009): 115-142.
8
Jose Ramon G. Albert et al., Regulating political dynasties toward a more inclusive society, Policy Notes. Philippine Institute
for Development Studies (August 2015): 2-3.
election cycles and/or when a family expands its number of family members in elective
office. This definition is similar to Mendoza, defining political dynasty as members of the
same family occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or
simultaneously across different positions.9

Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza all cover the elements of succession and expansion of
political dynasties. However, Dal Bo only considers one elective position held by a family.
It is good to note that Albert and Mendoza include multiple positions or across different
positions held by a family to show that political dynasties do not only monopolize
political power through succession but also through expansion.

Regulating Political Dynasty

Political dynasty should be regulated because it exemplifies a particular form of elite

persistence in which a single or few family groups monopolize political power.10 The
most obvious and valid reason for the Congress to enact a law prohibiting political
dynasty in the Philippines is found in Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution. The
Philippines, in the spirit of democracy, allows fair play and guarantees equal access to
opportunities for public service which can be realized when the State is able to prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. For three (3) decades or thirty (30) years
after the enactment of the Constitution, there has been no bill on Anti-Dynasty that has
been signed into law. Aside from the Constitution, there are a few and compelling reasons
for the Congress to regulate political dynasties in the Philippines.

First, political dynasties are pervasive in the ten (10) poorest provinces that are
afflicted by low levels of human development, bad governance, violence, and poor
business climates.11 These provinces are Lanao del Sur, Eastern Samar, Apayao,

9
Ronald U. Mendoza et al., Political Dynasties and Poverty: Evidence from the Philippines, Asian Institute of Management
(AIM) Policy Center (October 2013): 1.
10
Pablo Querubin, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines, Harvard
Academy for International and Area Studies (October 2011): 2-3.
11
Albert, supra.
Maguindanao, Zamboanga del Norte, Sarangani, North Cotabato, Negros Oriental,
Northern Samar and Western Samar. In these provinces, either poverty results in the
creation of political dynasties or political dynasties aggravate bad governance failing to
reduce, if not actually worsen, poverty conditions.

Second, poverty contributes to the expansion of the largest and strongest political
dynasties.12 Given that the poor are most vulnerable to political patronage and
manipulation as well as practical to sell their votes, a worsening, if not unchanging,
poverty would be beneficial to political dynasties. Since the largest political dynasties
would, in most situations, be the families that have cultivated the most extensive
networks of patronage, accumulated the most political and financial capital, and have the
access to the largest political machineries, they would also be in the best position to take
advantage of vulnerable economically disadvantaged voters.

Third, political dynasties employ education to cultivate patronage relationships

through scholarship grants and infrastructure expenditure support.13 The dominant
political dynasty can thus channel resources into education projects and programs that
identify their members as politicians with only the interest of the locals in their hearts.
Given strong norms for reciprocity and personal indebtedness, the increased investments
in the local public education system would help strengthen further the dominant political
dynasties. Indeed, this view contradicts the position that improved education among the
electorate would lead to more informed choices and less political dynasties elected into
office.

Fourth, political dynasties, particularly the fat kind where there are many family
members simultaneously occupying elective positions, weaken the checks-and-balances
in government.14 Familial ties within the context of public finance breed conflicts of
interest and weaken accountability and auditing mechanisms that are supposed to police
the behavior of public officials, particularly in the way they manage public resources. In

12
Mendoza, supra.
13
Ibid.
14
Albert, supra.
situations where the provincial governor, district representative, and several municipal
mayors are related, for example, flows of internal revenue allotments, national budget
insertions and appropriations, and locally generated revenues will be strongly influenced
or, at worst, controlled by a single family.

Finally, political dynasties accrue political capital over time and benefit from
incumbency advantages during elections.15 Dynasties weaken the competition in the
political system, resulting in less access for alternative leaders and youth leaders to be
part of the political system. In many jurisdictions, political dynasties run uncontested or
contested only by other dynasties. Any monopoly of political power is harmful to society
and may cause violence.

Anti-Dynasty Bills Passed and Rejected

As presented above, political dynasties have been linked to poverty, monopoly,

violence, bad governance, among others. In this view, at least two bills have been passed
in the Congress. During the First Regular Session of the Fifteenth Congress of the
Philippines, a bill entitled An Act to Prohibit the Establishment of Political Dynasties
(2011) was introduced by the late Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Then, during the
First Regular Session of the Sixteenth Congress of the Philippines, Senator Joseph Victor
G. Ejercito introduced a similar bill entitled An Act Prohibiting the Establishment of
Political Dynasties (2013). For some reasons, both bills were rejected by the Congress.

The following discussions focus only on the analysis of the bill passed and authored
by Senator Defensor Santiago.

Defining Political Dynasty

In the bill passed by Defensor-Santiago in 2011, an explanatory note was provided, as

follows:
15
Ibid.
 To give force and effect to this [Art. 2, Sec 26] provision, the playing field of the
political arena should be levelled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to
aspire on even terms with those from ruling politically dominant families.
Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system of
extended families. However, this extended family system, an otherwise beneficial
concept when applied to the social aspects of human behavior, finds its pernicious
effects in the political arena where public office becomes the exclusive domain of
influencial families and clans that are well-entrenched in Philippine politics. The
monopoly of political power and public resources by such families affects the citizenry
at the local and national levels.
The socio-economic and political inequities prevalent in the Philippine society
limit public office to members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for
convenience and out of cultural mindset, look up to these ruling families as dispensers
of favors, and thus elect relatives of these politically dominant families.

From the explanatory note, political dynasty implies that having an extended family
may be beneficial to the social aspects of Filipinos but it has adverse effects to Philippine
politics. This should be enough to motivate the Congress to eventually define political
dynasty. Senator Defensor-Santiago defined political dynasty in Section 3, paragraph (a)
of said bill which reads:

Political Dynasty shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent
elective official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with
the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the same office
immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official. It shall be
deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within
the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simustaneously for elective
public office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent
elective official.

The definition is complete in the sense that it includes: (a) the degree of relationship;
(b) the position; (c) the location; and (d) the stage in the political arena.

First, this definition of Santiago specifies the degree of relationship or the extent of
connection between the official and the candidate or other official. Dal Bo, Albert and
Mendoza, in their definition, only used terms such as family members and relatives
which failed to qualify to what extent is the offical related or connected to the candidate
or other official. The problem with their definition is its vagueness. Should ones cousin,
nephew, grandson or in-laws be included in the definition of family or relatives
remains unanswered by their definitions. However, Santiago qualified the terms family
members and relatives by within the second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. Thus, a governor succeeded by his son or brother-in-law constitutes political
dynasty, but when succeeded by his cousin or uncle does not constitute political dynasty.
Santiago successfully qualified political dynasty to relationships within the second civil
degree by consanguinity or affinity. Considering such qualification, one may suggest to
extend from second civil degree to fourth civil degree. In a study by Dal Bo, the
Philippines has 75% total legislators coming from political dynasties, which ranked first
followed by Thailand with 42% and Mexico with 40%.16 Defining political dynasty with
second civil degree by consanguinity or affinity may not solve power monopolization.
The relationship must be extended to fourth civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

Second, Santiagos definition included what position is sought or held to constitute

political dynasty: An incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office
simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies
the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official. Dal
Bo, Albert and Mendoza also included this in their definition. Dal Bos one elective
position over successive generations, Alberts same elective position over time or an
individual succeeding to an elective position previously occupied by a relative and
multiple elective positions simultaneously, and Mendozas elected positions either in
sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different positions all agree with
the definition of Santiago. There are two types of positions described in the above
definitions: (a) offices within the same province and (b) same office occupied by a
relative successor. The inclusion of position finds meaning in a study conducted by Albert
showing that in the local government positions in the Philippines, Vice-Mayor (50.29%),
Mayor (66.33%), Representative (74.26%), Vice-Governor (75%) and Governor (85%)
are shared by political dynasties.17 In these positions, either incumbent officials within

16
Dal Bo, supra at 118.
17
Albert, supra at 5.
the same province hold office with relatives or incumbent officials succeeded the
positions occupied by their relatives.

Third, Santiagos definition qualified the location where political dynasties rule in the
country: within the same province. Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza are silent about the
location in their definition. Santiagos inclusion of the location is significant since the
presence of political dynasties in the provinces in the Philippines is linked with poverty
incidence. Albert found that the incidence of political dynasties is prevalent in ten (10)
poorest provinces of the country in 2012.18 For example, Lanao del Sur with 67.31%
Povery Incidence (PI) was ruled by 59.47% of political dynasties, Eastern Samar with
55.43% PI by 54.17 political dynasties, Apayao with 54.69% PI by 55.56% political
dynasties and Maguindanao with 54.51% PI by 64.45% political dynasties. Mendoza also
had a similar finding with Albert as he explained that political dynasties contribute to the
expansion of the largest and strongest political dynasties.19 Given that the poor are most
vulnerable to political patronage and manipulation as well as practical to sell their votes,
a worsening, if not unchanging, poverty would be beneficial to political dynasties. Since
the largest political dynasties would, in most situations, be the families that have
cultivated the most extensive networks of patronage, accumulated the most political and
financial capital, and have the access to the largest political machineries, they would also
be in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable economically disadvantaged
voters.

Fourth, Santiagos definition added a stage in the political arena when political
dynasty is deemed existing: where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are
related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simustaneously for
elective public office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an
incumbent elective official. This provision means that political dynasty already exists
when family members run simultaneously for an elective public office within the same
province even if they are not related to the incumbent official. There are four essential
18
Ibid.
19
Mendoza, supra.
elements in this provision: (a) two or more persons related, (b) running simutaneously for
elective public office, (c) within the same province, and (d) even if not related to the
incumbent official. This implies that as early as the stage of candidacy, political dynasty
is already deemed to have existed. Thus, winning or not is immaterial pursuant to this
provision. Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza are also silent about stage.

Candidates Prohibited

Section 4, paragraph 1 of Santiagos proposed bill provides for Persons Covered or

Prohibited Candidates, as follows:

No spouse, or person related within the second degree of consanguinity or

affinity whether legitimate or illegitimate, to an incumbent elective official seeking
reelection shall be allowed to hold or run for any elective office in the same province in
the same election. In case the constituency of the incumbent elective official is national
in character, the above relatives shall be disqualified from running within the same
province where the former is a registered voter.

The first type of a prohibited candidate is one who is related to an incumbent official
who seeks reelection. Thus, a spouse, or person, related within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity whether legitimate or illegitimate, to an incumbent elective
official seeking reelection should not be allowed to hold or run for any elective office in
the same province in the same election. The above provision is sufficient to identify the
candidates who should be prohibited on the ground of political dynasty. The prohibition
in Section 4, paragraph 1 of Santiagos bill is based on the definition of political dynasty
in Section 3, paragraph (a), as discussed earlier in this essay. Faithful to the definition, the
prohibition includes: (a) the degree of relationship; (b) the position; (c) the location; and
(d) the stage in the political arena. The degree of relationship is within second civil
degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is forwarded in this essay that such degree should
be extended from second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to address the growing population of political dynasty in the
country as shown in the studies by Mendoza in 2013 and Albert in 2015. Albert showed
that candidates from political dynasties usually win in the elections. In said study, a data
from the winning candidates in the 2013 Gubernatorial Elections showed that 9% were
from uncontested dynasties, 19% from dynasties winning over non-dynasties, and 40%
from dynasties beating other dynasties. From the data, it is shown that a total of 68%
Gubernatorial winners were from political dynasties.20

The second type of a prohibited candidate is one who is related to an incumbent

official who holds a national office. A significant prohibition in the above prohibition is
where an incumbent official is national in character, his relatives shall be disqualified
from running within the same province where the incumbent official is a registered voter.
The purpose of the provision, most likely, is to diminish the national officials undue
influence over the province where he is a registered voter.

Section 4, paragraph 2 of the Prohibited Candidates states:

In case where none of the candidates is related to an incumbent elective official

within the second degree or consanguinity or affinity, but are related to one another
within the said prohited degree, they, including their spouses, shall be disqualified from
holding or running for any local elective office within the same province in the same
election.

The third type of a prohibited candidate is one who, although not related to any
incumbent official, runs simultaneously with another candidate related within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity in the same province. The provision above finds its
meaning in the last part of the definition on the stage of political arena. There are four
elements here: (1) candidates are not related to an incumbent official, (2) they are running
for any elective office, (3) within the same province, and (4) in the same election. The
effect of the above provision can eliminate the growth of developing or budding political
dynasties that as early as the stage of candidacy, candidates are disqualified, even if they
are not related to any incumbent official, as long as they are seeking any elective office
within the same province in the same election. According to Albert, during the 2013
elections, 80% of the running candidates in election parties were from political

20
Albert, supra.
dynasties.21 Bernas said the state is commanded to prohibit political dynasties to
guarantee equal access to public service.22 With the presence of 80% members of
political dynasties in election parties, only very few new, promising and poor candidates
are given that equal opportunity.

Section 4, paragraph 3 of the Prohibited Candidates provides:

In all cases, no person within the prohibited civil degree of relationship to the
incumbent shall immediately succeed to the position of the latter; Provided, however,
this section shall not apply to Punong Barangays or members of the Sangguniang
Barangay.

The fourth type of a prohibited candidate is one who seeks to succeed to the position
of an incumbent official related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
above provision is consistent with the definition of Santiago in Section 3, paragpraph (a)
as included in the definitions of Dal Bo, Albert and Mendoza. Section 1, Article 2 of the
1987 Constitution on Declaration of Principles and Stare Policies could not be any clearer
that The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As such, public officials are
not supposed to be succeeded by their relatives. Sovereignty resides in the people not in
political dynasties. In 1991, Huntington found that there are a number of anti-dynasty
legal statutes across democratic countries with presidents, vice-presidents and
congressional seats: Handuras in 1982, El Salvador in 1983, Guatemala in 1985,
Nicaragua in 1987, Brazil in 1990, Colombia in 1991, and Paraguay in 1992.23 Feinstein
found that regulations on dynasties and anti-dynasty statutes suggest that there is
growing evidence of improvements in the democratic process of countries that introduced
these types of reforms.24 Thirty (30) years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
the Philippines as a democratic country remains to be a country without regulations or
statutes prohibiting political dynasties.

21
Ibid.
22
Bernas, supra.
23
S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Norman,OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1991).
24
B. Feinstein, The dynasty advantage: Family ties in congressional elections, Legislative Studies Quarterly (November 2011):
571598.
Prohibiting Political Dynasty

This essay does not argue to criminalize but to prohibit political dynasty as provided
in Section 26, Art. II of the present Constitution. One way to prohibit political dynasty is
for the COMELEC to disqualify candidates from running and holding elective offices.
Section 5 of Santiagos bill on the Effect of Violation of Prohibition states:

The COMELEC shall motu proprio or upon verified petition of any interested
party deny due course to any certificate of candidacy filed in violation of this act.

Under Article IX, C, Section 2, paragraph 1 states that the COMELEC shall have the
function to Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Further, pursuant to Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC may moto proprio or upon verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Hence, these provisions validate Santiagos means of prohibiting political dynasties
through COMELECs refusal to give due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy.

In Munder vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, a candidate may be disqualified if he commits any of the
election offenses or prohibited acts specified therein. In Aguam vs. COMELEC, the
Court ruled that the COMELEC can even oust the candidate proclaimed not withstanding
that he has already assumed office. Further, in the cases of Salcedo II vs. COMELEC and
Justimbaste vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC can refuse to give due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy and can even disqualify candidates.

Section 6 on the Period for Filing Petition for Disqualification of Santiagos bill
provides:

Any citizen of voting age, candidate or duly-registered political party,

organization, or coalition of political parties may file with the COMELEC, after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy and before proclamation, a petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided for under Section 4 of this Act.
 The above provision is consistent with Section 28 of the Omnibus Election Code that
a petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the
certificates of candidacy but not later than the candidates proclamation should he win the
elections.

In De la Cruz vs COMELEC, the Court ruled that a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate but the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate
at all. In Cayat vs. COMELEC, it was ruled that if a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, all votes for that candidates are
stray votes. In Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, if the certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes should also be stray votes because
the certificate is void from the beginning.

With the above provisions and Supreme Court decisions, when the Anti-Dynasty Bill
is enacted, the COMELEC can deny the certificate of candidacy or disqualify a candidate
should it find that said candidate has violated said law. Political dynasties will then be
gradually eliminated from the political arena.

Conclusion

This essay presents that it is incumbent upon the Congress to enact an anti-political
dynasty law to prohibit political dynasty in the country as provided in the present
Constitution and as suggested in studies showing low levels of human development, bad
governance, abuse of power, violence, poor business climates, and poverty, all linked to
political dynasty.

Also, it shows that the Congress should define political dynasty including the degree
of relationship, the position, the location, and the stage in the political arena as proposed
by the late Senator Defensor-Santiago. It is argued in this essay that the degree of
relationship be extended from second civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to fourth
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to address the link between poverty and political
dynasty.

Further, persons prohibited should include those who are related to incumbent
officials, those who are related to incumbent officials who hold a national office, those
who succeed the positions occupied by their relatives, and those who, even not related to
incumbent officials, are seeking any elective positions with their relatives within the same
province in the same election.

Finally, the prohibition process includes disqualification and denial of a certificate of

candidacy which shall be under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to Article IX,
C of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

After thirty (30) years from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Section 26 of
Article II remains a provision that requires legislation for its implemention. By far, two
Anti-Dynasty Bills by Santiago in 2011 and Ejercito in 2013 have been rejected by the
Congress. The rejection renders the provision in the Constitution nugatory.

My friends family has been in politics serving our barangay for a period of time
already. Holding positions in the barangay level may not constitute political dynasty as
argued in this essay. However, abuse is apparent in his confident remarks Mu-daog lagi
ka, sila bahala nimo. Such utterance paints a picture of an election won not because of
the people but because of power and influence. It is a picture painted by political
dynasties. It is a picture in violation of the Constitution. If the Congress continues to
reject Anti-Dynasty Bills, more and more pictures of this kind will be painted. This has to
stop.