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Northeastern Political Science Association

Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue


Author(s): Mark J. Lutz
Source: Polity, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Summer, 1997), pp. 565-592
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue
Mark J. Lutz
Universityof Notre Dame

Many contemporaryobserversbelieve that liberalstates need to


encouragethe virtuesof citizenshipas a correctiveto calculative
individualism.Yet othersfear that any such effort willjeopardize
autonomyand diversity.A fuller understandingof Plato's account of
the character,importance,and deficienciesof civic virtueprovides the
best startingpoint for our own reflectionson civic virtue.A dramatic
readingof The RepublicelucidatesPlato's account of the differences
betweencivic and philosophic virtueby focusing on whatprevents
Glauconfrom understandingand acceptingSocrates'teachingabout
justice. Because Glauconregardsjustice as altogetherselfless while
also insistingthat it is the means to his own completehappiness,his
virtueis sub-philosophic.Not only are his opinionsshaped by the
standardsof his political communitybut he also lacks the steadfast-
ness of soul needed to understandhow justice can lead to his own
happinessor recognizehow it does so in Socrates.At the same time,
this dramaticreadingrevealsthat Socratesdoes not simply dismiss
civic accountsof virtuesince it is only by recognizingtheirpower that
he can affirm the nobility,justness, and goodness of the philosophic
life.

Mark Joseph Lutz is an AssistantProfessor of Political Scienceat the


Universityof Notre Dame. He is currentlywritinga book on classical
republicanismand liberalism.

The philosophers who founded liberalism believed that its success


dependedon transformingthe popularunderstandingof virtue.Relying
on the authorityof modem natural science, thinkerssuch as Hobbes,
Locke, Montesquieu,and Hume conveyeda powerfulcritiqueof tradi-
tional virtuesto theirnon-philosophicfellow citizens.'Accordingto that

1. Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1994), Vol. II, pp. 30-91.

Polity
Polity Volume
Volume XXIX, Number 44 1997
Summer
XXIX, Number Summer 1997

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566 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

critique, qualities such as courage and generosityare rooted not in a


powerfullove of what is noble or "good in itself," but in a desire for
preferenceand praise.2Moreover, what we esteem is so variableand
ineffable, so much a matterof whim or caprice,that its pursuitis often
uncertainand contentious.3
Some of thesephilosophersextendedthis critiqueof traditionalvirtues
to the virtue of the citizen. Montesquieuregardedcivic virtueas a pas-
sionate love of the fatherlandthat is possible only in small, classical
republics.He furtherarguedthat classicalrepublicsinspiredthis passion
chieflyby deprivingcitizensof all "ordinary"objectsof love and dedica-
tion. Unable to love wealth, art, or even the private family, citizens
inevitablydirectedtheir love toward the republic.4But their hungerto
honor the fatherlandtendedto be fanaticaland frequentlyled to warsof
conquest.5In light of the capriciousnessof noble virtueand the narrow
belligerenceof civic virtue, the liberalphilosophersemphasizedinstead
more reasonable,morereliable,milderqualitieslike prudence,industry,
keeping one's word, civility, and temperance.6In promotingsuch vir-
tues, liberalphilosophersencouragedus to pursuethose goods that we
can acquireon our own ratherthan those we might obtain in common.'
Today, many worrythat liberalismhas beentoo successfulin promot-
ing the virtues of calculativeindividualismand suggest that we should
now turn our attention to the virtues of "disinterested"citizenship.
Some arguethat a revivalof civic virtuewould not only alleviatesocial
and politicalproblems,but also addressthe profoundhumanlongingfor

2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin, 1969), ch.
6; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Fraser (New
York: Dover, 1959), Book II, ch. 28; David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human
Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. P. H. Nidditch (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 276; Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The
Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Book IV, ch. 2.
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 6, 10, 11, 13, 15; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws,
Book III, chs. 7 and 8; Book IV, ch. 2; Book V, ch. 19.
4. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book IV, ch. 6; Book V, ch. 2.
5. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book IV, chs. 6, 8; Book V, ch. 6; Book VIII,
ch. 16; also Publius, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961),
No. 6.
6. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 6, 15; John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education,
ed. Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), sec. 41-62; Mon-
tesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book V, ch. 6; Publius, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 1, 3, 11,
37, 43, 78, 85.
7. Gordon Wood, "Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution," Chicago-
Kent Law Review, 56 (1990): 23.

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Mark J. Lutz 567

civic association and action.8 Yet others fear that public efforts to culti-
vate citizenship will jeopardize the autonomy and diversity that we
cherish. Consequently, many proponents of civic virtue look not to
public bodies and laws but to sub-political "civic associations" such as
the family, schools, the work-place, and religious bodies to cultivate the
virtues of citizenship. But it is difficult to understand how we can assure
that these associations will promote the virtues of citizenship without
some form of direct political oversight or action.9
To understand how best to promote the virtue of citizenship, it is
imperative to know precisely what it is. We need to know its aims, its
roots, its limits, and what is required to sustain it. Plato's account of
civic virtue is a good place to begin our inquiries, because no one has
reflected more deeply on the character, importance, and deficiencies of
civic virtue than has Plato. Plato's "spokesmen" repeatedly exhort their
listeners to use political means to educate citizens to virtue (Apology 41e-
42a; Gorgias 521; Republic 403a, 500e ff.; also Laws 643d-e, 650b) and
lay out in the Republic and Laws programs for such an education. But
Plato's Socrates also says that no city can educate all its citizens to virtue
in the strictest sense. The civic virtue available to the multitude is merely
a "popular" virtue that is less noble (Republic 401e ff., 430c5-6, 473c-e,
497a, 500d) and even less genuine than the true virtue of the philosopher
(Republic 518d-519a6, 520c, 544a, 619c6-dl). It is because philosophers
are more virtuous than non-philosophers that the former must rule over
the latter as kings.
It is not, however, clear exactly what distinguishes the virtue of the
philosophers from the civic virtue of non-philosophers or how philo-
sophic virtue surpasses civic virtue or even in what sense philosophic
virtue ceases to be "civic." Nor is Socrates especially explicit about what
obstacle or obstacles prevents the civic virtue of the non-philosopher
from being transformed into the nobler and truer virtue of the philoso-
pher. Plato even introduces doubts into his account. If the virtue of the
philosopher is so manifestly superior to that of the non-philosopher, why
does Socrates speak to his interlocutors not in a didactic but in a dia-
logical, inclusive, even "democratic" manner?'? We can begin to appre-
ciate the full complexity of Plato's thought through a careful, dramatic

8. E.g., Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley:


University of California
Press, 1984); Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community (London: Routledge, 1990);
Wood, "Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution."
9. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen," Ethics, 104
(1994):
364-69.
10. Arlene Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992),
p. 144.

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568 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

readingof the Republic.Sucha readingrevealsa powerfulargumentfor


the superiorityof philosophicto civic virtue in a mannerthat remains
respectfulof citizenshipand the civic understandingof virtue.

I. Civic Courageand Civic Education

Thoughone of the mainthemesof Plato'sRepublicis an elaborationand


examinationof civic virtue, Socratesavoids using the specific term. At
one point, however,he speaksof one particularvirtue,courage,as being
"political" or "civic" (430c3).11It seems that what makes this form of
this particularvirtueespecially"political" is not that it is manifestedon
behalf of the city, but more preciselythat it derivesfrom whatone learns
from the city. Accordingto Socrates, it consists in acceptingand pre-
servingthe "correctopinions" about what is and is not terriblethat are
given to us by the laws in the face of pains, pleasures,desires,and fears.
Yet Socratesindicatesthat this form of courageis not the noblest sort
and promises a better treatment of that virtue later in the dialogue
(430c5-6).Althoughhe does not say specificallyin this passagewhatpre-
vents civic courage from being the noblest kind, he points to its chief
defect when he subsequentlydescribesthe courageof a good individual.
The key difference is that those with civic courage stand by correct
opinionsthat they have absorbedfrom laws, whilethose with the nobler
couragestand by what is proclaimedby reasonedspeeches(429c2, 7-8,
430al-3, 442c2). To have civic courageis to rememberand act on correct
opinions that one acceptsas true on the authorityof law, while to have
the noblersort is to rememberand act on what one knowsto be true for
oneself. This virtueis civic, in otherwords,becauseit is instilledin us by
legal, civic means ratherthan by reason alone. Thus, the citizen who
believesthat it is terribleto abandonone's post or woundedcomradesin
battle withoutthinkingthroughfor oneself why this is terriblehas civic
courage.For those who lack the rationalcapacityto know for themselves
whatis and what is not terrible,civic courageseemsto be the best attain-
able kind of courageas well as a crucialingredientof the best attainable
form of rationality.12 And to the extent that civic virtue ultimatelyre-
quires strict adherenceto the law, civic courage would seem to offer
powerful support to civic virtue as a whole (424e5-425al, 380c, 383c,
417b, 425e, 461b-5b, 605b; Laws 653b, 659d, 643e-4a,645b-c).

11. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references are to the Republic in Platonis
Opera, Tomus IV, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902).
12. C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),
p. 239.

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MarkJ. Lutz 569

In saying that civic courage means steadfast adherenceto "correct


opinions" given to us by the laws, Socratesindicatesthat one has civic
couragein the strictestsense only when the opinions one absorbsfrom
the laws are in fact "correct." In Books VI and VII, however,Socrates
raisesseriousquestionsabout the educativepowerof law, aboutthe reli-
abilityof the opinionsit teaches,and henceabout civiccourageand civic
virtue, as such. These emerge as Socrates explains that philosophers
often seemvicious becausemost potentialphilosophersare corruptedby
the many non-philosopherswho dominateeach city, leaving only im-
postersto claim the mantle of philosophy(492c ff.). Cities are in effect
schools led by sophistswho define what is noble (kalon), good, and just
accordingto whateverpleases the multitudeof non-philosopherswho
alwaysgovern. In orderto explainwhy the domineeringmultitudenever
know the things that they claim to teach, Socratesalludesfor a second
time to their inabilityto acceptthat the many noble (or beautiful)par-
ticularsthat they perceiveand love "are not." They regardthese many
differentparticularsas beautifulwhiledenyingthat thereis anythingthat
is "beautifulitself," whilephilosophersenvisionand love the altogether
separateand transcendentidea of the beautiful (476c ff., 493e-4a). To
the extent that every actual city is ruled by those who cannot philoso-
phize, it seemsthat everyactualexampleof civic courageis in fact stead-
fast devotion to incorrectopinions about what is and is not terrible.
Yet the Republic raises the possibility of a city able to educate its
citizens in light of genuine knowledgeof the virtues. This city would
appearto be as rationalas possible,insofaras it is shapedby reasonwith
a view to reasonableends.13It wouldminimizethe greatdefectof the rule
of law which follows from laying down the same, universalrules for
everyonewithout discriminatingaccordingto the particularvirtuesand
vices, capacitiesand needs, of each individual(Statesman294a10-295a8;
Laws627el-628a5,666e, 713c-e,756e-757e).14Whilethe city describedin
the Republiccannot providethe personalattentionrequiredfor perfect
governance(Laws 713c-e; Statesman271e4-272al), its rulers monitor
eachcitizen'scharacterand talentsin orderto placeeachone in his or her
naturalclass. Its laws and institutionsare offered as modelsto be modi-
fied as circumstancesdictate (412c-414a).5s

13. Christopher Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," Review of Politics, 56 (1994):


267.
14. Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," pp. 278-79; George Klosko, The Develop-
ment of Plato's Political Theory (New York: Methuen, 1986), p. 190.
15. Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981), pp. 105-06.

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570 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

Despite the optimismabout the rationalityof laws that is implicitin


these reforms, Socrates' continuing account of the city and its laws
deepenshis criticismof the educationwe receivefrom cities and from
law. Accordingto the accountof the cave at the startof Book VII, we are
raisedas prisonersto a false perspectiveon the world, ableto see only the
shadows of artifactsas they are cast upon a wall ratherthan things as
they reallyare. We are burdenedwith many chainsthat preventus from
recognizingthe artificialityof the worldas we are givento understandit.
One of the most importantaspects of this artificialitycomes to sight as
Socratesmentionsthat the shadowsincludeimagesof humanbeingsand
of justice (514c, 516a, 517d, 520c; Laws 663c).16These shadows are
imagesof what it meansto be a just or noble or good humanbeingpro-
jected by the laws. From the specificcommandsof legal codes to works
of poetry, the laws presentus with models of how we should live, with
images of virtue, againstwhich we are to measureourselvesand others
(602d). By referringto these images as shadows of artifacts, Socrates
indicates that every model of a just and noble and good human being
that we absorb from the law is somehow unnatural,exaggerated,dis-
torted. In this context, Socratesgoes on to say that a true, liberaleduca-
tion consists in turningentirely away from what we learn in the cave
(518b-d)and in using "dialectics"to recognizethe inadequacyof what
the law-giverteachesabout the just, the noble, and the good (538d6ff.).
What is especiallystrikingin the account of the cave is that Socrates
makes these criticismsnot merely of all actual cities, but even of the
rational city ruled by philosophers.17 He says that philosophersregard
even this apparentlyphilosophiccity as a cave whichthey are unwilling
to rule or even to enter (514a-515c, 516d-e, 517d-e, 519c-d, 520b-c,
521bl-3, 540a). Even though its citizensare to be schooledin "correct"
opinions, these opinions remainessentially"ugly" and "blind," rooted
in somethingother than knowledgeor intelligence(377b, 412e-3a,429c,
478a-c, 506c). Thusgrounded,civic virtuesare not virtuesin the strictest
sense. Socratessays that prudence(phronesis)is the only true virtueof
the soul while the other so-called virtues, presumablyincluding civic
courageand the rest of the law-inducedcivic virtues,are closerto virtues
of the body that are instilledby habitsand exercises(518d9-519a6;619c6-
dl). It is becausethe city's virtuesare rooted in dubious beliefs that its

16. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 256; Klosko, The Development of


Plato's Political Theory, p. 92.
17. T. H. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 221.

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MarkJ. Lutz 571

teachings are threatened by exposure to Socratic dialectic (497d-8c,


537-8).18
On the whole, the cave imagesuggeststhat the citizen, as such, is never
educatedto genuinevirtue and that civic courage and civic virtue as a
whole consist in preservingdistortedimagesof what is terribleand what
is not terribleno matterwhat. It also suggeststhat even the rationalcity
describedin the Republicis merelya caveand that its "correctopinions"
areno betterthan the distortionsthat prevailin othercities. YetSocrates'
willingnessto deviselaws and imagesof virtuefor the city in the Republic
(380c, 383c, 421a, 456b-c, 461a ff.), as well as the Athenian Stranger's
willingnessto do so in the Laws, indicatesthat the difficultyis not simply
that philosophersare unwillingto suggestbetterlaws. Perhapsthe city in
the Republicis a cave in the sense that its foundersmust win the alle-
giance of the guardians,or at least of the auxiliaries,by telling them
"noble" lies about theology, the autochthonousbeginningsof the city,
divine sanctions for naturalclasses, and the marriagelottery (377 ff.,
414-5, 459c). But it is not enoughfor someoneto recognizethat these are
lies in orderto be liberatedfrom the cave, for otherwiseindividualssuch
as Glauconand Adeimantuswould have alreadybeen "turnedaround,"
led from the artificialityof the cave to the sight of the good itself, and
becomephilosophers.Perhapsthereis somethingabout law as suchthat
makes even the best laws unreliableguides to learningthe truth about
humannature.Perhapsthere is somethingin the soul that makesus un-
willing to accept or prone to distortthe truth about virtue even as it is
conveyedby the best laws.

II. Glaucon'sCivic Virtue


One of the least arbitraryand most revealingways of approachingthese
questionsis by examiningthe drama of the dialogue, for even though
Socratesis not a law-giver(but Gorgias521), his conversationswith par-
ticularindividualsenableus to see preciselywhathe can and whathe can-
not convey about virtue to non-philosophers.Socrates'most conspicu-
ous interlocutorin the Republicis Glaucon,a youngmanwho wantspas-
sionatelyto know the goodness of justice and trustsin Socrates'probity
and insight. In the course of teachingGlaucon about justice, Socrates
attempts to lead him to understandthe virtue of the philosopher.
Glauconis unableto absorbthis teachingin the courseof this particular

18. Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," p. 263, n. 3; Martha Nussbaum, The Fragil-
ity of Goodness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 88; Reeve, Philosopher-
Kings, p. 109.

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572 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

conversation.Rather, an education in philosophicvirtue requiresthe


"turning"of one's soul and cannotbe accomplishedin one conversation
(518c, 533a). The dramahelps us see the obstaclesthat hinderGlaucon
from understandingSocrates'teachingabout virtueduringtheirconver-
sation about justice. There are, moreover, suggestions from other
dialogues that Glaucon is incapableof absorbinga Socraticeducation
and of becominga philosopher.'9
At the opening of the Symposium, Socrates' disciple Apollodoros
berates"Glaucon" for failing to follow Socratesand to devote himself
to philosophy(Symposium172a-173b).Whilesome scholarstake this to
be the Glauconof the Republic,Burydisagrees,presumablybecauseit is
difficult to believe that he could have fallen away so completelyfrom
Socrates.20But even if he is not the same Glaucon, MarthaNussbaum
observes that by naming the characterin the Symposium"Glaucon"
Plato expects readersto think of the Glaucon of the Republic.2'By
remindingus of the Republic'sGlauconin this context,Plato wantsus to
considerwhetherhe is able to follow throughon what Socratestries to
teach him in the Republic.As one consultsother dialogues,one finds no
suggestionthat Glauconpursuedphilosophyfurther.ChristopherBruell
notes that "the only interlocutorof Socratesin the Republicof whom
Plato informs us that he turned later to philosophy is Polemarchus"
(Phaedrus257b3-4).22In the Parmenides,Cephalusasks Glaucon and
Adeimantusto take him, not them, to their half-brotherAntiphon to
learn from him what transpiredduringSocrates'first conversationwith
the philosophers Parmenidesand Zeno (Parmenides 126b-c). In the
Apology, Socrates notes how the relatives of his companionsdo not
accuse him of corruptingthem. He specificallynotes that Adeimantus
does not blamehim for his influenceon Plato, but says nothingto sug-
gest that he had any significanteffect on Glaucon(Apology 34a). Hints
suchas these do not, of course, provethat Glauconlacksthe capacityto
become a philosopher,but they at least alert us to the possibilitythat
what hindershis educationto philosophicvirtue is significantand con-
fines the sharingin philosophicvirtue to a very few. By examiningthe
concerns,beliefs, and deficienciesthat impedeGlaucon'sprogressin the
Republic,we may cometo understandthe kindsof obstaclesthat must be
overcome in order to philosophize and thus better discern what dis-
tinguishes the non-philosopherfrom the philosopher and civic from
philosophicvirtue.
19. Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," p. 268.
20. R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: Heffer, 1932), p. 3.
21. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 170.
22. Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," p. 268.

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MarkJ. Lutz 573

At the beginningof Book II, Glauconprefaceshis long speechabout


justice by listing three categoriesof good things and asking Socratesto
say into whichof these categoriesjustice falls. The firstcategoryconsists
of those thingsthat aregood "in themselves"ratherthanthose whichwe
choose for "what comes from them" (357b4-8).This categorywould
includeany good in whichwe "delightfor its own sake" suchas "enjoy-
ment" and "harmlesspleasuresthat have no after-effectsotherthan the
enjoymentin having them." A second categoryof good things consists
of those that are "good in themselves"as well as good for what comes
from them. Glaucon cites as examples thinking, seeing, and health,
things that are not only enjoyable or beneficial immediatelybut also
useful for other good things that come from them (357c1-3).The third
categoryconsistsonly of goods such as exercise,medicine,and laborthat
are not enjoyable by themselvesbut which are useful insofar as they
bringabout othergoods whichproduceenjoyment(357c5-d2).The most
obvious differenceamongthese categoriesseemsto be that the goods in
the first and secondcategoriesare enjoyableimmediately,whilethose in
the third categoryare enjoyed only for what they subsequentlycause.
SocratesanswersGlauconby sayingthat he considersjustice to be in
the "noblest" or most beautiful category (en toi kallistoi), which he
identifiesas the categoryof thingsthat we enjoy both for themselvesand
as meansto othergood things(358al-3). Accordingto Socrates,justiceis
unlike drudgerybecauseit is enjoyableall by itself and unlikeharmless
pleasuresin that it is desirablenot only itself but also for the othergood
or enjoyablethingsthat it bringsabout, like thinking,seeing, and health.
Glaucon,however,asks Socratesto provethatjusticeis "good in itself,"
by which he seems to mean that it be praisedwithout regardto further
consequences(358b6-7).Glaucongoes on to make his celebratedspeech
blamingjustice in order to provoke from Socratesits proper defense.
The speechpresentsjustice as being legal ratherthan natural,as a con-
trivance made by the cowardly majority in order to seduce strong,
courageous"real men" into believingthat it is good to follow the law
and care for the well-beingof otherswhen by naturewe all care mostly
about our own happiness(359b2, 359c1-6).Any real man who willingly
submitsto the law and bears the burdensof citizenshipis a dupe. By
asking Socratesto refute this thesis, Glaucon revealshis hope that his
own sense of justice is the productof genuinecourageand rationality.
But in wantingSocrates'help, Glaucon shows that he suspectsthat his
sense of justiceis no more than the productof weaknessand social con-
ditioning.Socratesis to put these doubtsto restby convincinghim that a
"realman" would choose to remainjust in the face of the greatesthard-
shipsand that justice is compatiblewith the greatestcourageand ration-

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574 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

ality. At the conclusionof his speech,Glauconinventsan imageof a man


who is perfectlyjust but who suffers enormouslybecauseof his justice;
in askingSocratesto defendjustice, Glauconasks him to show that such
a man would willinglyendureeven a terribledeath for justice's sake.
The primarydifficultyin identifyingwhatjustice would have to be to
live up to Glaucon'sexpectationsis that his implicitaccountof the good-
ness of justice does not quite resemble any of the examples of good
things in the three categories. It is unlike enjoyment and harmless
pleasures,as well as unlikethinking,seeing,and health, for justicecould
cost a real man everything,even life itself. It is also unlikeexercisingor
taking medicineor laboringinsofar as these things are painful experi-
ences that we must endure because they produce other things that we
enjoy having. In fact, justiceentailsa measureof pain, if only becauseit
meansobeyinglaws that requireus to treatothers "as equals"(359c5-6)
or as if theirhappinesswereas importantas our own. This meansthat we
would sometimeshave to disregardour own needs to care for those of
others. But if the pain of justiceis not a pricewe pay for some separate,
subsequentgood, what is the relationbetweenthe pain one enduresfor
justice and the goodness of justice? It is only by conceivingof a coura-
geous man who is willingto die miserablybecauseall he caresabout is
justicethat we are able to recognizesomethingessentialto justice:that it
is somethingmore importantthan our own individualwell-beingor hap-
piness. It is not like a bittermedicinethat we take to gain glowinghealth,
but like a bitter drink that we swallow because it is good to take it,
regardlessof its consequencesfor us. It wouldbe good to take it evenif it
killed us.
Yet Glaucongoes further,by askingSocratesto show that those who
have nothingbut justiceare happierthan those who have everythingbut
justice (361d3). He wants Socratesto argue, in other words, that being
just is a sufficient cause of more happinessthan one can have without
justice and that being just is a necessaryconditionof perfecthappiness.
This request seems to fly in the face of the rest of Glaucon's implicit
accountof justice-for if he thinksjusticeis the meansto greaterhappi-
ness than is availablethroughinjustice,it is difficult to understandnot
only how it could be said to be good regardlessof its consequences,but
also why it would requireany more "manliness"or couragethan our
willingnessto take a bitter medicinethat we know will give us glowing
health(Laches192e).PerhapsGlauconwantsto be shownthat it is possi-
ble for justiceor citizenshipto be good "for its own sake" in two discrete
senses:It is good both becauseit is an object of dedicationworth more
than our happinessand also becausebeingdedicatedto justice makesus
happierthan we could otherwisebe. A "real man" disregardshis desire

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MarkJ. Lutz 575

for happinessto pursuejustice, but nonethelessfinds that he is happiest


for having done so.
To satisfy Glaucon, Socratesmust affirm that we can separatein our
heartsand mindsour willingnessto be just "for its own sake" from our
belief that justice is the core of our happiness.He would have to show
that our fundamentalexperienceof justice is that it is so importantthat
we would choose it even if it were at the cost of our happinessand, in
addition to this, that those who care only for justice are happierthan
those who do not carefor it at all. He mustshow that we can understand
the goodnessof justicewithoutany essentialconnectionto our own good
and that it just so happensthat the just become happy.
After listening to Glaucon's requests (supplementedand comple-
mented by Adeimantus), Socrates expressesamazementthat the boys
remain attractedto justice even though they offer such powerfulcri-
tiquesof justice.Socratessaysthat he fearsthat he does not knowhow to
satisfy them, even though he had said to Glaucon that he thought he
knewin whatway it is good. Socratesgoes on to explorewhatjusticeis in
the soul by first clarifyingits place in a city. While elaboratingthe good
city in Books II throughIV, Socratesindicatesthat we cannotsimplyrely
on what he has said to that point about the virtuesto learn about the
goodness of justice, but must contrastwhat comes to sight in the good
city with what comes to sight in a good individualin the hope that the
truth about justice will emerge, in the same way that flame bursts out
from rubbingtogethertwo sticks (434d-435a);SeventhLetter 341c5-d2,
344b3-cl).23We must look, in other words, for friction, for differences
and tensions,betweenjustice in the good city and in the good individual
in orderto understandwhat justice is and how it is good.
Accordingto the argumentlaid out by Socrates,the city is wise insofar
as its guardianshave good counsel about what is best for the whole city
(428d).Its courage,as we have seen, lies in its warriors'capacityto retain
the opinions instilledby law about what is and what is not terrible.Its
moderationconsistsin each partagreeingto the hierarchyof partsof the
city; its justice, in the willingnessof each part to performonly its own,
proper,specializedfunction(431d-e,433d). By statingthat the particular
citizen who possesses these virtues is willing to subordinatehis or her
own inclinations,desires,and ambitionsto the good of the city, firm in
the conviction(dogmatos)that the happinessof the city is more impor-
tant than that of any of its parts(412d-e,420b-c, 428d, 433, 434c, 519e,

23. Bruell,"Plato's PoliticalPhilosophy,"pp. 271-72;Irwin,Plato's MoralTheory,p.


332n32.3.5.

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576 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

544d-e),Socratesapparentlyaffirmsthe fundamentaltenetof Glaucon's


accountof the goodness of justice. He impliesthat the core of virtueor
of "goodness" lies in subordinatingone's happinessto that of the city.
In light of this, virtueis "civic" not only insofar as one adheresto the
correctopinionsabout the good, the noble, and the just that are givento
us by the law, but also insofaras one caresfor the city or for justicemore
than for one's own happiness.
Yet as Socratesdescribesthe soul of a good individual,a somewhat
different image of human virtue comes into view. The wisdom of the
good individualis said to consist not in knowing what is good for the
whole city but in what is good for the whole soul (441e4-5).Its courage
lies in rememberingnot whatthe law proclaimsbut whatreasonedspeech
proclaimsto be terribleand not terrible.Its moderationconsistsin each
part of the soul agreeingto the hierarchyof parts;and its justice, in the
willingnessof each part to do only its own, specializedjob (442c-443d).
The chief differencebetweenthe accountsof virtuein the city and in the
individualis that whilethe virtuouscitizencaresprimarilyabout the city,
the virtuousindividualis concernedabove all with his or her own, indi-
vidual, psychicharmonyor health.24Such an individualcalls "just" the
good order of the parts of the soul as well as whateverproducesthat
good order (443c, 444d-e).
In identifyingjustice with whatevermakes the soul more harmonious
or healthy, Socratessays explicitlythat justice need not involveactingin
relationto others. He says that if a good individualacts, in politicsor in
some other way, it is alwayswith an eye to the harmonyof his or her soul
(443e). Throughthis comparison,Socratesreaffirmshis initialanswerto
Glaucon'squestionabout which categoryof good things would contain
justice. He quietly denies that justice is good in the "purely" self-
transcendent,self-denying,and heroicsenseto whichGlauconalludesin
his speech. It may be good or desirableon its own, but it must also be a
part of, a meansto, and anothername for the healthof the soul, a good
that is both immediatelygratifyingand useful for other things (444d-e,
591b). It is not merelylike health(357c1-3),but is in fact the healthof the
soul. Only psychicjustice is justice itself or justice "in truth" (443c9).
Socratessays that he has discussedthe good city and its justice solely
becausethese thingsprovidean "image" of the justiceof the good indi-

24. Annas, Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 132; Bruell, "Plato's Political Philoso-
phy," p. 271; Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p. 210; Mary Nichols, Socrates and the Polit-
ical Community (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 95; David Sachs,
"A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?" in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1971), p. 46.

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MarkJ. Lutz 577

vidual(443c4-5)and later adds that it does not matterwhetherthe good


city and its justice come into being at all as long as one has justice in
one's own soul (443c, 472c-d, 591d-e, 592a7, 592b3-4;cf. 361d4-6).
Socratesadvancesthis alternativeaccount of justice becausehe finds
supportfor it from those who arepassionatelydevotedto virtue,such as
Glaucon himself. More of Glaucon's account of justice emerges in
responseto Socrates'furtherpresentationof virtuein Books V through
VII, especiallywhere he describesthe characterand motivationsof the
philosopher(484d ff., 501d, 544a). The first thing that Socrates says
about philosophersis that they are moved by an eros of knowledgeof
"the whole truth." To explainhow philosophersdiffer from lovers of
merespectacles,Socratessays that they are like lovers of boys and wine
who find every sort of wisdom beautifuland also like lovers of honor
who preferthe most beautifuland highestsort of wisdom. In particular,
they love the idea of the kalon, the formor look of that whichis "beauti-
ful" or "noble" (474c-475e, 479a, 499b-c, 501d). In addition to
their single-mindedlove of the ideas, they have a couragethat shows
itself in not looking upon death as somethingterrible(486bl, 487a5).
This courageappearsto be a reflectionof a steadinessof soul that some-
how does not interferewith but rather sustains their fiery passion to
know (503c-d). Because of this great passion and their imperturbable
psychic strength, they are otherwise moderate and never tempted to
injure nor to steal.
Having apparently completed his account of the philosophers'
"beautifuland good" soul (503d),Socratesadds that they are especially
eager to know the idea of the good, which he identifiesas the greatest
and most fitting study and somethingwhich one must know in orderto
make sense of the beautifuland the just (504d, 505a, 506a). Although
most considerthe good to be either pleasureor prudence,it is in fact
somethinglike the sun, somethingthat illuminatesthe beings,that causes
truthand knowledge,and that is "beyond" these thingsin beauty. It is,
moreover,the causeof "existence"and of "being" and exceedsthem in
venerabilityand power. Glaucon seems to be greatly impressedby this
description,as he exclaims"by Apollo, what diamonictranscendence"
(509c1-2).In seekingthe good, philosophersmay seem to devote them-
selvesto somethingutterlybeyondthemselves.But they are not like the
heroic "real men" whom Glaucon hopes devote themselvesto justice
ratherthan to happiness,for even thoughhe says that theirinitiallibera-
tion may be painful, he also says that it may be accompaniedby great
pleasures(538d, 581d ff.; Apology 33c). In fact, these lovers neither
undergogreat tormentsnor sacrificeanythingthey otherwisedesire in
their pursuit of the good (485d6-el); those who finally encounterthe

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578 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

good are said to dwell while still alive in the Isles of the Blessedand to
achievethe greatesthappiness(519c, 526e).
Immediatelyafter alludingto their bliss, however, Socratessuggests
that the foundersof the good city must compeltheseloversof wisdomto
surrendertheir perfect happiness in order to rule the city. Glaucon
challengesthis, askingwhetherthose who communewith the ideasare to
be done an injusticeby being deprivedof their happiness(519d). This
dissenttells us that he believesthat thereis a "beautyand goodness" of
the soul, a glowing, inner health that consists in a fiery, magnificent,
steady passion to know what is beautifuland good (503c-d),that those
who possessthis achievecompletehappiness,and that they have no fur-
ther need of nor obligation to care for anythingelse beyond it. Even
though Glauconclaimsto be uncertainabout the goodnessof justice, as
a just man he knows in his heart that whateverjustice is, it cannot be
somethingthat destroyshappiness(cf. 334b, 335a, 335d, 347e). Contrary
to what he earlieraskedSocratesto show him, even he cannotfully sepa-
rate his belief that justiceis of the greatestimportancefrom his expecta-
tion that it is a part of completebliss.
Thus Glaucon's most fundamentalbelief is not that justice is good
regardlessof its consequences,but that no matter how unhappy one
makes oneself for justice's sake, in the end it is unthinkablefor happi-
ness and justice to remainat odds. His devotionto justice is neverfully
sunderedfrom, and thus dependsupon, his belief that beingjust is fully
compatiblewith his own happiness.He thus seemsto devote himself to
justicein the expectation,hiddeneven fromhimself, that the best way to
achieveperfecthappinessis to put that goal out of his mindwhilestriving
to care for somethingelse. In fact, his willingnessto forgo his happiness
preciselyfor the sake of the city or justiceratherthan for other potential
objectsof devotionpointsto his expectationthat devotionto thesethings
will resultin perfecthappiness,for even thoughthey presentthemselves
as moreimportantthan any one person'sgood, they also are understood
to be commongoods, goods throughwhichthe individualsecuresa hap-
pinessunavailableon one's own (420b, 421c, 465a; Laws 875a-d,903c).
In light of this, "civic" virtue means not simply adherence to correct
opinionsgiven to us by law, nor even caringfor the city or justiceabove
all else, but more preciselycaring for the city or justice while striving
neitherto notice that we expectthis caringfor the city or justiceto make
us happynor to thinkaboutthe meansby whichthe city or justicewill do
so.
This is not to say that Glauconis incapableof envisioninghow virtue
and perfect happinessmight be reconciled, for he points to one such
means in swearingby Apollo when Socratesdescribesthe good itself.

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MarkJ. Lutz 579

Never having heardof the "doctrineof the ideas," Glauconapparently


understandsthe good to be somethinglike the god Apollo, a providential
god associated with the sun, who might admit "beautiful and good"
lovers of the good to the Isles of the Blessed(cf. Symposium180b3-5).
And near the end of the conversation, Glaucon readily agrees to
Socrates'suggestionthat the just are not neglectedby the gods but are
rewardedif not in this life, then in the next (612c, 613a-b).Yet Glaucon
never seems to see how deeply and completelyhe expectsjustice to cul-
minate in happiness. Socrates, however, recognizeshow deeply those
who love justice expectit to resultin individualpsychichealth and even
bliss, so he does not classify it as a noble sacrifice but as one of the
noblestgood things,i.e., as one of those beautifulor splendidthingsthat
are enjoyableand useful for other things (334c-d, 358al-3).
BecauseGlauconnever fully recognizeshow confidenthe is that jus-
tice is good for him, he unknowinglyexaggeratesthe self-transcendence
of his own dedication to justice and thus never draws upon all the
strengthor couragethat such transcendencewould seem to call forth.
Ratherthan force Glauconto confront the problemat the heart of his
understandingof justice, Socratesseems to test whether Glaucon will
recognize that problem and its implications. For immediately after
Glauconcomplainsthat it would be unjustto force lovers of the idea of
the good to rule the city, Socratesremindshim that they are concerned
with the happinessof the city ratherthan of its parts and thereforethe
lovers of the idea of the good must come back to rule the city (519e;cf.
with 420b-c, 464e). One might expect Glauconto restateand elaborate
his objection that justice cannot requirethe virtuousto surrendertheir
perfect happinesseven for the sake of the good city. Indeed, Socrates
quietly agreeswith this objectiona few lines later when he remarksthat
philosopherswho grow up outsidethe good city, i.e. all actual philoso-
phers, are underno obligationto rule (520al-b4).
Instead of pressinghis objection, Glaucon simply accepts Socrates'
reminderthat the happinessof the city is moreimportantthan that of its
parts. Throughoutthe rest of the dialogue, Glaucon speaks about the
measuresneededto bringabout the good city. In placingsuch emphasis
on establishingthe good city, Glauconcontinuesto speakas if the happi-
ness of the city were more importantthan that of its parts-thus appar-
entlyforgettingthatthe good cityis only an "image"to be usedfor recog-
nizingthe importanceof establishingharmonyin one's own soul, which
is justice "in truth" (443c-e,472c-d, 592b). By continuingto speakas if
it wereimportantto bringthe good city into being, Glauconstill seemsto
believethat the happinessof the city is more importantthan that of its
partsand hencethat civicjusticeis identicalto justicein the truestsense.

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580 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

After drawingGlaucon'sattentionback to his concernwith the com-


ing into being of the good city, Socrates describeswhat its guardians
must studyto becomeboth warriorsand philosophers.But in layingout
theircourseof study, Socratesgraduallyplacesless emphasison the mar-
tial educationthan on the philosophic.25After Socratesrecommendsthe
study of mathematicsto disciplinethe mind, he asks if geometryshould
also be studied.When Glauconsuggeststhat it is useful in war, Socrates
replies that it has virtuallyno practicaluse but must be encouragedas
much as possible for the sake of knowing "what is always" (527b).
Similarly,when Socratesasks if astronomyshould be studied, Glaucon
remarksthat it is useful for farming,navigation,and the art of generals;
yet Socratesreprimandshim for even consideringastronomy'spractical
application(527d, 528e). After describinghow studentswill studydialec-
tics to discernthe good itself, Socratesasks Glaucon "will you let your
young people rule withoutthis and without establishinga law that they
must study it." Without noticing how Socratesdistanceshimself from
the political applicationof this education,Glauconreplies"I agreeand
join you in establishingthis law" (534e).A few pageslater, Socratessays
to Glauconthat afterthe educationis complete,the studentswill haveto
descendinto the "cave" again "for you" (539e3-6).
Despite these repeated suggestions, Glaucon never notices that
Socratespresentsthe good city as Glaucon'sratherthanhis own andthus
distanceshimself from the civic understandingof justice. At the end of
Book VII, Socratesadds that in order for that city to come into being,
everyoneoverthe age of ten wouldhaveto leaveit. In response,Glaucon
says that they have discernedthe quickestand easiestwaythat sucha city
could come into being, if it can come into being (541a-b).In sayingthis,
Glauconseems much less insistentthat the good city be provenpossible
than he had in Book V (cf. 541a-bwith 471e). Yet it is strikingthat he
does not note the apparentimpossibilityof such an exodusand even sug-
gests that the city might come into being by other means.
By the end of Book IX, however, Glaucon finally seems to have
absorbedSocrates'lesson and says explicitlythat the good individualwill
not mind politicalthingsbut will attendonly to "the city in speech"that
does not exist anywhereon earth(592a-b).But after Glauconaccedesto
this, Socratesbegins Book X by reconsideringthe actual city's institu-
tions (595a, 605b, 607a, 607c), speakingonce again as if they werecon-
cernedwith bringingan actualcity into being. And once again, Glaucon

25. Allan Bloom, "InterpretiveEssay" in Plato's Republic(New York: Basic Books,


1968),p. 408; Nichols, Socratesand the Political Community,p. 217n30.

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MarkJ. Lutz 581

joins in, speakingas if establishingthe good city were crucialto being


just in the truestsense. In the courseof this discussion,Glauconrefersto
the unjustnot as those whosesouls are disorderlyand unphilosophic,but
as murderers(610el). Apparentlygoing along with Glaucon, Socrates
adopts a similarlycivic understandingof justice when he describesthe
rewardsof justice and penaltiesof injustice,for he refersto the just not
as philosophers, who always disdain ruling and who are customarily
reviled, but as those who sometimes choose to rule and always win
honors (cf. 613d-e with 487d, 495c, 521b, 539c). Yet in the concluding
myth of Er, Socratesrevertsto a philosophicunderstandingof justice
and says that the just arethose who "alwaysphilosophize,"who choose
a privateratherthanpubliclife, and who "practicejusticewith prudence
in every way" (619d, 620c, 621c).
On the whole, Socratesdoes not confront Glauconwith the implica-
tions of his beliefs aboutjusticebut insteadshowsus how Glauconread-
ily acceptsinvitationsto look away from what he has impliedabout the
characterof justice and of his love of justice. Leo Straussobservesthat
Socratesnever abandonsthe "fiction" that the good city is possible.26
Socratesmay avoid sayingexplicitlythat the good city cannot come into
being because he wants us to observe how Glaucon remainseager to
believethat it can and thus to observehow resolutelyhe adheresto a civic
understandingof justice. Socratesdoes not, however,allow Glauconto
returnto a merelycivic understandingof justice that fails to admirethe
"private"philosopheras a just humanbeing. For an importantpart of
Socrates'purposein the Republicis to provideGlauconand otherswith
a betterimage of philosophicvirtue.
Glaucon's failure to understandfully the differencebetweenmerely
civic and philosophicvirtue duringthe exchangesof the dialogue does
not prove that he is incapableof going furtheron his own. He may, in
fact, reflecton his statementsand actionsand recognizehis own dissatis-
factionwith the propositionthat the happinessof the city is more impor-
tant than that of its parts. He may recognizethat he exaggeratesthe self-
lessness of his own concernwith justice and denies himself the oppor-
tunity to discern exactly how justice might be a means to his psychic
healthand happiness.Yet the literaryhints from other dialoguesgive us
little reasonto believethat he went backto and reflectedon this or other
Socraticconversations.The questionof Glaucon'sfuturecompelsus to
ask more preciselywhat is it that hindershuman beings like him from
thinkingthroughtheir understandingof justice.

26. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of


Chicago Press, 1964),
p. 129.

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582 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

III. Eros and Courage


To understandthe obstaclesthat preventnon-philosophersfrom sharing
in philosophicvirtue, we need to considerwhy morallyseriouscitizens
like Glauconwould be inclinedto regardthe goodness of justiceand the
happinessof the city as somethingseparatefrom their own happiness.
We need to ask why citizenslike Glauconwould want to remainin the
cave, resistingwhat a Socratesmight teach them about the goodnessof
justice. Furthermore,we need to understandhow and why lovers of
wisdom are able to transcendthe cave to the extent this is possible.
BecauseSocrates'account of the cave is admittedlyonly an image, one
must look to other partsof the dialogue, and not least to the drama,to
understandthe "chains" that are said to bind young men such as
Glauconin the cave. In the Republic,SocratescharacterizesGlauconas
being both courageousand erotic (357a, 474d-475a).Glaucon'scourage
comes to sight when he challengesSocrates' account of justice at the
opening of Book II, even though Socrateshas just finished humbling
Thrasymachus,the celebratedrhetorician.In his speech,Glauconreveals
his erotic characterwhendescribingthe perfectfreedomof the man who
wore the "ringof Gyges'sancestor,"for the very first thinghe imagines
that man doing is having sexual intercoursewith the queen (357a).
Similarly,in Book V, he delightsat the prospectthat the most valiant
guardians will be permitted to kiss whomever they wish (468b-c).
Socrates offers furtherevidence of Glaucon's eroticismby twice men-
tioning that Glaucon has lovers (362, 402e). According to Socrates'
speechin the Symposium,erotic desireis not simplya sexualdesire,but
is a needy longing for that which is beautiful or noble (kalon) (Sym-
posium 203b). Socratesdistinguisheseros of the good from eros of the
beautifulon the groundsthat we love good thingsin the expectationthat
they will make us happywhile we love beautifulthingsin the expectation
that they will make us immortal(Symposium203b, 204c6-205a7,206bl-
207a4). Insofaras we desireonly what we believewe needand lack (Sym-
posium 200al-e9), eros for the kalon reflects an awarenessthat we are
mortaland an aspirationthat beautyor nobilitymight somehowenable
us to overcomeor make up for our deaths.
In that speech, heroes are singled out as examplesof erotic human
beings. They are said to be moved by eros to manifest a beautiful or
noble courageby dyingbravely,in partbecausethis act endowstheirlives
with something intrinsicallysplendid or "good in itself" and in part
because it provides them with immortal glory that will survive their
deaths(Symposium208). Nearthe end of his speech,Socratesdescribesa
furtherlink betweenerotic love of the kalon and immortality:He sug-

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MarkJ. Lutz 583

gests that those lovers who devote themselvesto "the beautifulitself"


seek to manifesttherebya "truevirtue"that mightwin themthe immor-
tality they seek from loving gods (Symposium212a2-7).27
Bearingthis psychology of eros in mind, Glaucon's love of justice
comes more clearlyinto focus. Even though his eroticlove for beautiful
things tempts him to live beyond the law, he is at the same time deeply
enamoredby the beautyof justice. He is especiallymovedby the thought
of a "real man" who overcomesdeep and powerfulneedsfor the sakeof
justicebecausethis self-overcomingseemsto call forth a prodigiousand
splendidinner strength,the very existenceof which would providesuch
menwith greatsolace for mortality.Glaucon'sadmirationand desirefor
nobilityis even more explicitwhen Socratesgoes on to describea com-
munitythat comes into beingthroughmutual,economicself-interestand
that is characterizedby its practicality,gentility,and easeof life. As soon
as Socratesmentions how its inhabitantswill live and die in comfort,
passingtheir tranquillives on to succeedinggenerations,Glaucon calls
such people "pigs" (372d). They appearto him to be less than human
becausethey have only the "necessities"of life (369c, 372a, 373b). They
exist without the opportunityfor the noble self-sacrificeand self-over-
coming that moves him so deeply. Thereis nothing "noble" (gennaias)
in the first city except its loaves of bread (372b).
Recognizingthat Glaucon longs for somethingbeyond the mundane
pleasuresof "mere life," Socratesdescribesa second, "feverish" city
that is moreto his liking, a city filled withthingsthat are beautifulrather
than necessary(373a5). But Glaucon is far more pleased with the city
that is "purged" of luxuriesin Books II and III (399e) than with the
feverishone becauseof the former'ssplendidpublic art and becauseof
the noble, self-transcendentvirtue that it requires of its citizens.
Adeimantus,ratherthan Glaucon, objects to the sacrificesasked of the
guardians(419a-b;also 401e-403c, 416d-417b,468e, 503a). Glaucon is
attractedto the thoughtthat by denyinghimselfwhatis good for him, he
will display the greatest, most shining, most noble strength of soul.
Glauconwould find the moderate,practicalvirtuespromotedby Locke
and Montesquieuinadequateto satisfy his longing for the kalon.
By fallingin love with the beautyof justice, Glaucondevotes himself
to somethingthat is not as radicallyand ultimatelyseparatefrom his own
well-beingas he believes. He is not only convincedthat justice cannot
undermineperfecthappiness,but also very pleasedby Socrates'sugges-

27. Michael J. O'Brien, " 'Becoming Immortal' in Plato's Symposium," Greek


Poetry
and Philosophy, ed. D. Gerber (Chico, CA: Scholar's Press, 1984), pp. 198-99.

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584 Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue

tion that by encountering the most beautiful of all beings one is able to
live in the Isles of the Blessed when still alive and perhaps by the thought
that one can thereby avoid death altogether. Moreover, in Book X
Glaucon readily accepts Socrates' assertion that the gods do not neglect
the just but reward them, if not in this life, then in the next (612c-613a).
In fact, the last thing that Glaucon says in the dialogue is that there are
few things more pleasant to hear than how the just are rewarded in the
afterlife (614b). If Glaucon's love of justice is animated by the hope that
it will ultimately provide him with perfect, lasting happiness, this in itself
does not render him less noble. For it is disputable whether human beings
will regard it as "noble" or virtuous to do things that fundamentally
harm oneself (335c-d; Laches 192d). Socrates, at least, does not think
that the noble things are utterly separate from those that are good for us,
but includes them among things that are beneficial (358al-3, 505a, 506a,
517c).
While both Glaucon and Socrates desire to be just and noble and
good, only the philosopher pursues these ends successfully. Socrates'
superiority to Glaucon is due not simply to his manifest intelligence, but
also to his philosophic "courage," to his great steadiness of soul or
endurance (503-4, 535a; Symposium 203d5, 219d2 ff.; Laches 194a).28
According to Socrates' account of dialectics in the Republic, dialectics
consists above all in thinking critically about what is just and noble and
good and about the opposites of these things. Yet he suggests that such
critical thought is so difficult that it requires great courage. The opening
of the drama of the Republic offers us a concrete example of the impor-
tance of courage for dialectics and for transcending the merely civic
understanding of justice and of virtue. Cephalus is a wealthy old man
who loves to talk, especially now that his sexual longings have subsided.
In the course of a few lines, the old man whose character has been shaped
by eroticism reveals to Socrates that he is very afraid and hopeful about
what will happen to him after he dies and now strives to be just to win a
happy afterlife from the gods (330d-33 lb). But as soon as Socrates' ques-
tions lead Cephalus to see that he does not know precisely what it takes
to be just, the old man flees the conversation, never to return. As impor-
tant as knowing justice is to Cephalus, he is too fearful to endure exam-
will
ining it, too frightened of the possibility that he will discover that he
never learn how to be truly just in the eyes of the gods.
Even if we do not consciously hope to use justice to win literal, indi-

28. Aristide Tessitore, "Courage and Comedy in Plato's Laches," Journal of Politics,
56 (1994): 131.

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MarkJ. Lutz 585

vidual immortalityin the way that Cephalus does, our anxieties and
wishes about death presentobstacles to thinkingclearly about what is
just and noble and good. BecauseGlauconhopes that the nobilityof his
concernwith justice will console him for death or perhapseven provide
him with immortality,he resistsquestioningthe perfect selflessnessand
perfectnobilityof his concernwith justice. In describinga good educa-
tion, Socratesrecommendsone that makes studentstougheror hardier,
especiallyregardingdeath and the death of loved ones (387c-e). But
Socrates and Glaucon ultimately agree that it is too much to expect
everyoneto put entirelyaside their grief at death (603e ff.) and that this
anguishmakes it especiallydifficult to think clearlyabout what is good
and bad (604b9-cl). In orderto deliberatesuccessfullyin the face of our
tribulations,we need a "medicine"or "education"that consistsin both
reasonand habituation(604cl-d2, 606a8). In fact, even those with philo-
sophic naturesseem to find it difficult to overcomeentirelytheir fears
about death. Even a good individualneeds a certaincourageor steadi-
ness of soul to recallwhatone otherwiseknowsis terribleand whatis not
terriblein the face of pleasure,pains, fears, and desires(430c5-6,442c2,
535a). If death is not the terribleexistencethat Homer'sAchillessays it
is, it nonethelesscasts so importanta shadow over one's life that one
cannotphilosophizewithoutthinkingabout it and it bringson so greata
loss that one needs to be stout of heartto think in light of it (386a-388c,
517cl; Phaedo 64a).
Becauseour anxietiesaboutdeathlead us to exaggeratethe selflessness
of our concernwithjusticeand to obscurethe meansby whichwe expect
justiceto makeus happy,they are amongthe strongestroots of civicvir-
tue. This helps us to understandwhy civic courageis singledout as the
only virtuespecificallycalled"civic," for it is preciselythe lackof steadi-
ness in the soul that leads us to understandvirtuein a "civic" manner,
i.e., to be importantwithout any regardto our own, individualwell-
being. Civic courage turns out to differ from the nobler courage not
becausethe formeris groundedin thoughtlessperseveranceor habitua-
tion, but becauseit reflectsa lack of endurancethat succumbsto pains,
pleasures,fears, and hopes about justice and the whole of virtue. To
havephilosophiccourageis to havesufficientenduranceto resistthe very
foundationsof civic courageand to think throughwhat the noble and
good and just actuallymean to us.
As an Athenian,Glauconhas not, of course,beensubjectedto the sort
of civic educationoutlined in the Republic. But his eros for beauty or
nobility causes him to admirethe courageand rationalityof the citizen
who denies himself and submits to the law for the sake of justice
(358e-359c).It seems that laws are able to promotecivic virtuenot only

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586 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

by habituation(e.g., Laws 653a-c),but also by appealingto this natural


erotic longing to be noble. One of the most significant natural dif-
ferencesbetween Glaucon and Socratesappearsto be that the former
lacks the steadinessof soul to scrutinizehow his exclamationat 519d
(thatit is unjustto destroythe perfecthappinessof the loversof the idea
of the good) calls into question his conviction that justice consists in
devotingoneselfto the city and its law. Glauconis willingto questionthe
goodness of justice, but cannot, at least in the course of the dialogue,
bringhimselfto considerthe answerimpliedby his own beliefs. Socrates,
on the otherhand, is able to risk the thoughtthat his own concernwith
justice is not as selfless and courageousas Glaucon wants to believe.
Bearingthe importanceof steadinessof soul in mind, we may be able to
explainwhy Polemarchusratherthan Glauconis said to be attractedto
philosophy in the Phaedrus. Like Glaucon, Polemarchusis bold, even
contentious(327b-c, 331d4-5);and like Glaucon, Polemarchusbelieves
that justice must be beneficial(333al, 334b7, 335d13).But Polemarchus
is the only interlocutorwho raisesthe questionof whetherthe good city
is possible (449bl-450a2).29Polemarchus'swillingnessto question the
possibility of what he fervently believes should come into being may
reflect a toughnessthat Glaucon does not share. In light of Socrates'
criticismof civic virtue, it seems that the best education,civic or other-
wise, wouldhelp those with sufficientlygood naturesto masterthe fears
that preventus from recognizingwhat is problematicabout our merely
civic understandingof virtue.
Having gained some clarity about the differencesbetween civic and
philosophiccourage, we are in a better position to interpretSocrates'
"formal" account of why non-philosophersare unable to understand
auto to kalon nearthe end of Book V. Glaucon'scentraldifficultyis not
so much that he mistakenlybelievesthat particularbeautifulbeingsare
beautiful without believing in the existence of "the beautiful itself"
(476c) as that he mistakenlyacceptsan image or phantomof beautyor
nobility for that which is genuinelybeautifulor noble (479bl1-dl). His
belief that justice is good in two, utterlyseparatesensesis only an image
of justice, for even he will not maintainthat justicecan be good "for its
own sake" unless it is also good for us. Moreover,as long as he stead-
fastly ignores potential frictions between the two aspects of justice's
goodness, he will not begin to see how they might be reconciled.He will
continueto admirethe law-abiding,devotedcitizenwho neverconsiders
how civicjusticecontributesto his or her own happinessand psychichar-

29. Strauss,The City and Man, pp. 122-23.

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Mark J. Lutz 587

mony. He now admires the philosopher as a just human being, but will
not recognize that only those who always consider the good order of their
souls, who practice "justice with prudence in every way," are truly just
(621c). More concretely, Glaucon will not see how Socrates' steadfast
pursuit of knowledge of the just and noble and good provides him with a
harmony or health of soul that Glaucon himself would otherwise recog-
nize as just and noble and good. Glaucon's "civic" understanding of
justice remains incomplete and, to that extent, a mere image or phantom
of justice (476c4-8).30
Mary Nichols offers an especially rich and thought-provoking inter-
pretation of the Republic as a critique of the longing for perfect justice.
According to Nichols, the dialogue demonstrates how our political
aspirations urge us to impose a single, universal vision on the city that
inevitably obscures essential differences.31 In particular, she points to
Glaucon as an example of those who are moved by this spirit. She
attributes his demand to hear justice praised without regard to its conse-
quences as a demand that justice be understood as something "pure or
simple" and "unmixed with the complexity of relationships that charac-
terize human life." At the heart of his desire for simplicity lurks a desire
to find a world in which the just do not suffer but enjoy only "perfect
goodness." According to Nichols, Glaucon is "ready to reject the world
because he cannot find what is simply good there."32 She says that
in response to Glaucon's demand for a simpler, more perfect world,
Socrates describes the easy, bucolic goodness of the "healthy city" early
in Book II. But Glaucon rejects this city because he knows "the world is
not as harmonious as Socrates describes it, that the interests of men do
not coincide, and that conflict among citizens and among cities necessi-
tates rule." Glaucon desires harmony and simplicity, but senses that
"they cannot be found in the easy way Socrates prescribes."33 Socrates
goes on to describe the good city at great length in order to expose how
Glaucon's vision becomes manifestly inhumane and impossible.
Despite the persuasiveness of Nichols's general thesis, it seems that she
overlooks some important aspects of Glaucon's character. For even
though Glaucon wants Socrates to show that the just ultimately find
perfect happiness, he also wants him to show that justice is a test and sign
of manly courage. Glaucon is less ready to reject the world because it is

30. Darrel Dobbs, "Choosing Justice: Socrates' Model City and the Practice of Dialec-
tic," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994): 270.
31. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 36-37, 95-96.
32. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 60, 64-65, 69.
33. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, p. 68.

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588 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

complexand imperfectthan to rejectjustice becausehe suspectsthat we


care about it out of weaknessor simple-mindedness.By admiringjustice
for the noble courageit calls forth, Glauconexpectsit to entailsacrifices
that are, in some respect,imperfections.He wantsto know that justiceis
not only advantageous,but also noble. In keepingwith her presentation
of Glaucon as desiring perfect goodness and deploringthat the just
suffer, Nichols arguesthat he "obviously dislikes tragedy" because it
"revealsmen's weakness,their inabilityto control their situation, and
their vulnerabilty."34 But in Book X, when Socratessays that even the
best of us enjoy and give ourselvesto tragic poets who make us com-
miseratewith mourningheroes, Glaucon reples "Of course I know it"
(605d; see also 607d). Glaucon joins Socrates in criticizingtragedy
becauseit makes him enjoy public lamentationswhen, in fact, he takes
pridein sufferingquietlyin accordancewith the law (604a-b).Glaucon's
admirationfor the noble beautyof those who endurehardshipis at the
heart of his respectfor the just.
Furthermore,Glaucon'sdemandfor such beautyor nobilitygives rise
to his objectionto the healthycity in Book II. Glaucondoes not directly
questionthe possibilitythat the healthycity could come into being, but
insteaddenigratesits way of life, callingit a "city of pigs."35As Nichols
observes, Glaucon perceives a fundamental difference between
"stronger" and "weaker" human beings.36At the root of Glaucon's
inchoate complaint about the city of pigs is his conviction that "real
men" who lived in that practical,healthycity would encounternothing
that is "useless but beautiful" and would never manifest nobility
through struggle and sacrifice. Nichols makes a persuasivecase that
"politicalmen" long to impose a partialand distortedvision on the city.
But in at least one respect,the problemwith Glaucon'svision is not that
it simplifiescomplexitiesbut that it mistakenlyseesjusticein two discrete
ways:as somethingthat is good for its own sakeand also as the meansto
our happiness.He has, in this sense, a falselybifurcatedand falselycom-
plex understandingof virtue. Plato's Socrates,on the otherhand, seems
to believethat genuinevirtuehas but one form (518el-2; Phaedo 69b; cf.
Laws 965d).

34. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 60, 68, 111.
35. Strauss,The City and Man, p. 122.
36. Nichols, Socratesand the Political Community,p. 68.

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Mark J. Lutz 589

IV. Conclusion

Despite Socrates' many criticisms of civic virtue, the disdain for civic
virtue reflected by his image of the cave is not Plato's last word. For
Socrates is apparently grateful for the physical protection and atmo-
sphere of moral seriousness provided by the laws of Athens (e.g.,
Apology 41e-42a; Crito passim). Moreover, the Republic suggests how
the moral education provided by laws might lend crucial support to
philosophic investigation. In Book VII, Socrates acknowledges that
spirited, young dialecticians often enjoy "tearing apart" what the law
teaches about nobility and justice but fail to discern what is genuinely
just and noble and good. In order to prevent dialectics from sinking into
superficial skepticism, Socrates recommends that no one be allowed to
engage in dialectics until they are moderated by age (537d, 539c); but this
solution is problematic, since Socrates notes that the greatest and most
numerous labors must be undertaken by the young (536d). In order to
moderate the young dialecticians' fiery quickness so that they remain
alert to evidence of what is genuinely just and noble and good, laws
might be formulated that bolster their steadiness of soul and powers of
self-command.
Socrates' conduct in the dialogue reflects an even deeper level of
respect for civic virtue. Socrates' philosophic predecessors tended to dis-
miss the non-philosophers' beliefs about justice as mere convention
unworthy of serious examination.37Socrates, however, discovers that his
lack of "divine wisdom" or definitive knowledge of the necessities that
govern the whole compels him to reconsider whether philosophers have
given adequate attention to what non-philosophers experience and say
about justice and the gods who uphold justice (Apology 20e ff.; Phaedo
99d-100c; Republic 506e, 509c). Unable to trust entirely his own subjec-
tive thinking, he determines to test and deepen his account of virtue
against non-philosophic accounts. Throughout the dialogues, we find
Socrates examining whether the words and actions of politicians, poets,
sophists, priestesses, and others undermine or support his account of
virtue. Thus, even as Socrates argues that most denizens of the cave can
never be liberated from their shadowy understandings of virtue, in prac-
tice he relies on his fellow citizens' experiences and understandings of
virtue to affirm his own.38
In the Republic, the understanding of virtue that Socrates encounters

37. Plato, Laws 889e3-890a2; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b14-17, 1141a20-b8;


Aristophanes, Clouds 94-104, 223-6, 367 ff., 901-2, 1201-3, 1399-1400, 1421-2, 1428-9.
38. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p. 38.

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590 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue

in men such as Cephalus,Polemarchus,Glaucon,and Adeimantusis the


matrixout of whichhe demonstrateshis own virtue.Fromamongthese,
Socrates focuses in particular on Glaucon's civic understandingof
justice, treatingit as the bar before which he must justify philosophic
virtue. In the course of the dialogue,Glaucondoes not fully graspwhat
is impliedby his objectionto the thoughtthatjusticecan ruinthe perfect
happinessof those who love the good itself. But his words and actions
signalhis deeperrecognitionthat justice cannotbe moreimportantthan
the harmonyand happinessof one's own soul. Glauconimplicitlyagrees
with Socrates that only those who "practicejustice with prudencein
every way" are truly just human beings. Moreover, he agrees with
Socratesthat the noblestthings are not those that we seek for their own
sake, but ratherthose that are both good in themselvesand also useful
for otherthings(358al-3). Thus, by Glaucon'slights, the individualwho
caresprimarilyfor the well-beingof his soul by philosophizingpossesses
a more just, a nobler, a more completeversionof civic virtue.
Glaucon's inability to recognize the philosopher's virtue helps us
understandmore preciselythe relation between civic and philosophic
virtue. On the one hand, philosophicvirtueseemsto be the completion
of civic virtueand thus to differ from civic virtueas a matterof degree.
Yet this conclusionis at odds with Socrates'statementsthat the philoso-
pher's nature differs decisivelyfrom that of the non-philosopher,that
the soul of the philosopheris turnedin a differentdirectionfrom that of
the non-philosopher,and that philosophersalone have prudence,which
is the only genuine virtue of the soul. Perhaps this difficulty can be
resolvedby consideringmore carefully Socrates'account of the philo-
sophicnature.Accordingto Socrates,one of the most importantaspects
of the philosophicnatureis steadinessof soul. One needsthis steadiness
to turn away from the civic understandingof virtue and to scrutinize,
clarify, and follow the implicationsof one's own beliefs. As we see in
Glaucon,it is difficult to considerthe relationshipbetweencivic justice
and our own happinessin partbecausewe long to understandour devo-
tion to civic justice as utterlyselfless and thus a displayof perfectnobil-
ity; for we cherishour nobilityas a consolationfor deathand possiblyas
a means to immortality.Throughoutthe Republic, Glauconresists the
thought that justice cannot be perfectlyselfless and perfectlynoble but
requiresus to be prudentor carefulin seekinghappinessand psychichar-
mony. By continuingto resist this thought, by trying to be perfectly
noble ratherthan both noble and prudent,he foreclosesthe possibility
that he will be just in the truestsense. Thus, Glaucon'swordsand actions
point in the directionof a virtuethat he does not possess.
Socrates' examinationof Glaucon is an impressivevindication of

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Mark J. Lutz 591

philosophic virtue. Yet Socrates' endeavor to examine how others experi-


ence and understand virtue is never complete. As we see in the Euthy-
phro, Socrates continues to conduct these investigations even at the end
of his life. It seems that Socratic rationalism vindicates itself only to the
extent that it remains open to the widest range of philosophic and non-
philosophic experiences and understandings of virtue. For a Socratic
philosopher to cease examining and thus respecting those with alternative
notions of virtue would be to undermine the very foundations of philo-
sophic virtue. For Socrates would lose the only solid basis of his respect
for philosophy were he to disdain the civic understanding altogether.
Because Socrates never fully refutes every alternative account of
virtue, he must continue to grant them the deepest possible respect and
must not sweep them recklessly aside. Abstracting for the moment
Socrates' desire to reform his fellow citizens, Socrates' philosophic need
to confront his fellow citizens' deepest and most thoughtful accounts of
virtue leads him to exhort them to take their experiences and beliefs
about virtue seriously and to defend them as best they can (e.g., Apology
28b-d, 41e2-42a2; Symposium 218d-9a). On the other hand, Socrates is
sufficiently confident in the legitimacy of philosophy to defend it against
its critics and to persuade his fellow Athenians that philosophers exem-
plify virtue. He displays a courage and self-command that citizens would
readily find exemplary (e.g., Symposium 219e-221c). Moreover, he
expects his manifest seriousness about virtue to merit not only tolerance
of but even respect for philosophy among those who are most aware of
the importance of virtue to themselves.
While many contemporary thinkers advocate cultivating the virtues of
citizenship, most remain wary of undertaking strong measures to foster
it.39 Like early liberals, some warn that civic virtue may require severe
intrusions on our pursuit of personal ends and even forms of indoctrina-
tion.40 The Republic, however, endeavors to show that some aspire to
civic virtue not solely under the force of law, but also from longings
within their own soul. Glaucon is moved by the virtue of the citizen out
of a natural, erotic desire to share in what is noble and admirable. The
Republic suggests that it is possible to promote civic virtue by drawing
attention to how citizenship aims at satisfying this profound human
longing. Plato's subtle drama is especially valuable insofar as it enables
readers to enter into the thinking and experiences of interlocutors such as
Glaucon so that we may come to feel the power and beauty of civic

39. Kymlickaand Norman,"Returnof the Citizen,"pp. 368-69.


40. E.g., Donald Herzog, "Questionsfor Republicans,"Political Theory, 14 (1986):
486.

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592 Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue

virtue. In fact, one of the main purposes of the dialogue may be to


awaken skeptical readers to that power and beauty. After Glaucon and
Adeimantus finish their long speeches at the start of Book II, Socrates
claims that he is amazed that they are still attracted to justice despite
having absorbed such powerful critiques of it (368a-b). But Socrates'
professed amazement is puzzling, since he is already aware that Glaucon
at least remains attached to justice despite having been exposed to criti-
cisms of justice by Thrasymachus and many others (347e, 358c). Those
who are likely to be genuinely amazed at Glaucon's persistent attachment
to justice are those students of rhetoric, sophistry, and pre-Socratic
philosophy who believe that our concern with justice is based on conven-
tion, on force and indoctrination, and who believe that it can readily be
debunked and overcome. One possible purpose of the dialogue may be to
teach such thinkers that they are as ignorant of the strength and complex-
ity of justice as was the Socrates ridiculed in Aristophanes' Clouds.
Along with helping us to deepen our respect for civic virtue, the dia-
logue also offers us serious warnings. It teaches us that the lover of civic
virtue resists considering precisely how civic virtue contributes to our
happiness and harmony of soul. It demonstrates how devotion to civic
virtue can place inhumane demands on citizens, especially on those indi-
viduals whose primary concern is the happiness and health of their souls.
On the whole, the Republic neither simply praises nor condemns civic
virtue, but offers us a rare and important opportunity to see its power
and dignity while keeping its deficiencies squarely before our eyes. It is
difficult to imagine how Platonic political philosophy could directly
affect efforts to foster civic virtue. But by challenging the modern
account of citizenship, by helping theorists raise new questions and sug-
gest new lines of inquiry about the origins, uses, and limits of civic
virtue, it can at once broaden and deepen our discussion about how cul-
tivating the virtues of the citizen could leaven liberal political culture.

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