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Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue
Mark J. Lutz
Universityof Notre Dame
1. Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1994), Vol. II, pp. 30-91.
Polity
Polity Volume
Volume XXIX, Number 44 1997
Summer
XXIX, Number Summer 1997
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566 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin, 1969), ch.
6; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Fraser (New
York: Dover, 1959), Book II, ch. 28; David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human
Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. P. H. Nidditch (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 276; Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The
Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Book IV, ch. 2.
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 6, 10, 11, 13, 15; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws,
Book III, chs. 7 and 8; Book IV, ch. 2; Book V, ch. 19.
4. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book IV, ch. 6; Book V, ch. 2.
5. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book IV, chs. 6, 8; Book V, ch. 6; Book VIII,
ch. 16; also Publius, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961),
No. 6.
6. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 6, 15; John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education,
ed. Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), sec. 41-62; Mon-
tesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book V, ch. 6; Publius, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 1, 3, 11,
37, 43, 78, 85.
7. Gordon Wood, "Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution," Chicago-
Kent Law Review, 56 (1990): 23.
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Mark J. Lutz 567
civic association and action.8 Yet others fear that public efforts to culti-
vate citizenship will jeopardize the autonomy and diversity that we
cherish. Consequently, many proponents of civic virtue look not to
public bodies and laws but to sub-political "civic associations" such as
the family, schools, the work-place, and religious bodies to cultivate the
virtues of citizenship. But it is difficult to understand how we can assure
that these associations will promote the virtues of citizenship without
some form of direct political oversight or action.9
To understand how best to promote the virtue of citizenship, it is
imperative to know precisely what it is. We need to know its aims, its
roots, its limits, and what is required to sustain it. Plato's account of
civic virtue is a good place to begin our inquiries, because no one has
reflected more deeply on the character, importance, and deficiencies of
civic virtue than has Plato. Plato's "spokesmen" repeatedly exhort their
listeners to use political means to educate citizens to virtue (Apology 41e-
42a; Gorgias 521; Republic 403a, 500e ff.; also Laws 643d-e, 650b) and
lay out in the Republic and Laws programs for such an education. But
Plato's Socrates also says that no city can educate all its citizens to virtue
in the strictest sense. The civic virtue available to the multitude is merely
a "popular" virtue that is less noble (Republic 401e ff., 430c5-6, 473c-e,
497a, 500d) and even less genuine than the true virtue of the philosopher
(Republic 518d-519a6, 520c, 544a, 619c6-dl). It is because philosophers
are more virtuous than non-philosophers that the former must rule over
the latter as kings.
It is not, however, clear exactly what distinguishes the virtue of the
philosophers from the civic virtue of non-philosophers or how philo-
sophic virtue surpasses civic virtue or even in what sense philosophic
virtue ceases to be "civic." Nor is Socrates especially explicit about what
obstacle or obstacles prevents the civic virtue of the non-philosopher
from being transformed into the nobler and truer virtue of the philoso-
pher. Plato even introduces doubts into his account. If the virtue of the
philosopher is so manifestly superior to that of the non-philosopher, why
does Socrates speak to his interlocutors not in a didactic but in a dia-
logical, inclusive, even "democratic" manner?'? We can begin to appre-
ciate the full complexity of Plato's thought through a careful, dramatic
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568 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
11. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references are to the Republic in Platonis
Opera, Tomus IV, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902).
12. C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),
p. 239.
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MarkJ. Lutz 569
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570 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
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18. Bruell, "Plato's Political Philosophy," p. 263, n. 3; Martha Nussbaum, The Fragil-
ity of Goodness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 88; Reeve, Philosopher-
Kings, p. 109.
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572 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
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576 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
24. Annas, Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 132; Bruell, "Plato's Political Philoso-
phy," p. 271; Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p. 210; Mary Nichols, Socrates and the Polit-
ical Community (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 95; David Sachs,
"A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?" in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1971), p. 46.
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MarkJ. Lutz 577
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578 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
good are said to dwell while still alive in the Isles of the Blessedand to
achievethe greatesthappiness(519c, 526e).
Immediatelyafter alludingto their bliss, however, Socratessuggests
that the foundersof the good city must compeltheseloversof wisdomto
surrendertheir perfect happiness in order to rule the city. Glaucon
challengesthis, askingwhetherthose who communewith the ideasare to
be done an injusticeby being deprivedof their happiness(519d). This
dissenttells us that he believesthat thereis a "beautyand goodness" of
the soul, a glowing, inner health that consists in a fiery, magnificent,
steady passion to know what is beautifuland good (503c-d),that those
who possessthis achievecompletehappiness,and that they have no fur-
ther need of nor obligation to care for anythingelse beyond it. Even
though Glauconclaimsto be uncertainabout the goodnessof justice, as
a just man he knows in his heart that whateverjustice is, it cannot be
somethingthat destroyshappiness(cf. 334b, 335a, 335d, 347e). Contrary
to what he earlieraskedSocratesto show him, even he cannotfully sepa-
rate his belief that justiceis of the greatestimportancefrom his expecta-
tion that it is a part of completebliss.
Thus Glaucon's most fundamentalbelief is not that justice is good
regardlessof its consequences,but that no matter how unhappy one
makes oneself for justice's sake, in the end it is unthinkablefor happi-
ness and justice to remainat odds. His devotionto justice is neverfully
sunderedfrom, and thus dependsupon, his belief that beingjust is fully
compatiblewith his own happiness.He thus seemsto devote himself to
justicein the expectation,hiddeneven fromhimself, that the best way to
achieveperfecthappinessis to put that goal out of his mindwhilestriving
to care for somethingelse. In fact, his willingnessto forgo his happiness
preciselyfor the sake of the city or justiceratherthan for other potential
objectsof devotionpointsto his expectationthat devotionto thesethings
will resultin perfecthappiness,for even thoughthey presentthemselves
as moreimportantthan any one person'sgood, they also are understood
to be commongoods, goods throughwhichthe individualsecuresa hap-
pinessunavailableon one's own (420b, 421c, 465a; Laws 875a-d,903c).
In light of this, "civic" virtue means not simply adherence to correct
opinionsgiven to us by law, nor even caringfor the city or justiceabove
all else, but more preciselycaring for the city or justice while striving
neitherto notice that we expectthis caringfor the city or justiceto make
us happynor to thinkaboutthe meansby whichthe city or justicewill do
so.
This is not to say that Glauconis incapableof envisioninghow virtue
and perfect happinessmight be reconciled, for he points to one such
means in swearingby Apollo when Socratesdescribesthe good itself.
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MarkJ. Lutz 579
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584 Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue
tion that by encountering the most beautiful of all beings one is able to
live in the Isles of the Blessed when still alive and perhaps by the thought
that one can thereby avoid death altogether. Moreover, in Book X
Glaucon readily accepts Socrates' assertion that the gods do not neglect
the just but reward them, if not in this life, then in the next (612c-613a).
In fact, the last thing that Glaucon says in the dialogue is that there are
few things more pleasant to hear than how the just are rewarded in the
afterlife (614b). If Glaucon's love of justice is animated by the hope that
it will ultimately provide him with perfect, lasting happiness, this in itself
does not render him less noble. For it is disputable whether human beings
will regard it as "noble" or virtuous to do things that fundamentally
harm oneself (335c-d; Laches 192d). Socrates, at least, does not think
that the noble things are utterly separate from those that are good for us,
but includes them among things that are beneficial (358al-3, 505a, 506a,
517c).
While both Glaucon and Socrates desire to be just and noble and
good, only the philosopher pursues these ends successfully. Socrates'
superiority to Glaucon is due not simply to his manifest intelligence, but
also to his philosophic "courage," to his great steadiness of soul or
endurance (503-4, 535a; Symposium 203d5, 219d2 ff.; Laches 194a).28
According to Socrates' account of dialectics in the Republic, dialectics
consists above all in thinking critically about what is just and noble and
good and about the opposites of these things. Yet he suggests that such
critical thought is so difficult that it requires great courage. The opening
of the drama of the Republic offers us a concrete example of the impor-
tance of courage for dialectics and for transcending the merely civic
understanding of justice and of virtue. Cephalus is a wealthy old man
who loves to talk, especially now that his sexual longings have subsided.
In the course of a few lines, the old man whose character has been shaped
by eroticism reveals to Socrates that he is very afraid and hopeful about
what will happen to him after he dies and now strives to be just to win a
happy afterlife from the gods (330d-33 lb). But as soon as Socrates' ques-
tions lead Cephalus to see that he does not know precisely what it takes
to be just, the old man flees the conversation, never to return. As impor-
tant as knowing justice is to Cephalus, he is too fearful to endure exam-
will
ining it, too frightened of the possibility that he will discover that he
never learn how to be truly just in the eyes of the gods.
Even if we do not consciously hope to use justice to win literal, indi-
28. Aristide Tessitore, "Courage and Comedy in Plato's Laches," Journal of Politics,
56 (1994): 131.
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MarkJ. Lutz 585
vidual immortalityin the way that Cephalus does, our anxieties and
wishes about death presentobstacles to thinkingclearly about what is
just and noble and good. BecauseGlauconhopes that the nobilityof his
concernwith justice will console him for death or perhapseven provide
him with immortality,he resistsquestioningthe perfect selflessnessand
perfectnobilityof his concernwith justice. In describinga good educa-
tion, Socratesrecommendsone that makes studentstougheror hardier,
especiallyregardingdeath and the death of loved ones (387c-e). But
Socrates and Glaucon ultimately agree that it is too much to expect
everyoneto put entirelyaside their grief at death (603e ff.) and that this
anguishmakes it especiallydifficult to think clearlyabout what is good
and bad (604b9-cl). In orderto deliberatesuccessfullyin the face of our
tribulations,we need a "medicine"or "education"that consistsin both
reasonand habituation(604cl-d2, 606a8). In fact, even those with philo-
sophic naturesseem to find it difficult to overcomeentirelytheir fears
about death. Even a good individualneeds a certaincourageor steadi-
ness of soul to recallwhatone otherwiseknowsis terribleand whatis not
terriblein the face of pleasure,pains, fears, and desires(430c5-6,442c2,
535a). If death is not the terribleexistencethat Homer'sAchillessays it
is, it nonethelesscasts so importanta shadow over one's life that one
cannotphilosophizewithoutthinkingabout it and it bringson so greata
loss that one needs to be stout of heartto think in light of it (386a-388c,
517cl; Phaedo 64a).
Becauseour anxietiesaboutdeathlead us to exaggeratethe selflessness
of our concernwithjusticeand to obscurethe meansby whichwe expect
justiceto makeus happy,they are amongthe strongestroots of civicvir-
tue. This helps us to understandwhy civic courageis singledout as the
only virtuespecificallycalled"civic," for it is preciselythe lackof steadi-
ness in the soul that leads us to understandvirtuein a "civic" manner,
i.e., to be importantwithout any regardto our own, individualwell-
being. Civic courage turns out to differ from the nobler courage not
becausethe formeris groundedin thoughtlessperseveranceor habitua-
tion, but becauseit reflectsa lack of endurancethat succumbsto pains,
pleasures,fears, and hopes about justice and the whole of virtue. To
havephilosophiccourageis to havesufficientenduranceto resistthe very
foundationsof civic courageand to think throughwhat the noble and
good and just actuallymean to us.
As an Athenian,Glauconhas not, of course,beensubjectedto the sort
of civic educationoutlined in the Republic. But his eros for beauty or
nobility causes him to admirethe courageand rationalityof the citizen
who denies himself and submits to the law for the sake of justice
(358e-359c).It seems that laws are able to promotecivic virtuenot only
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586 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
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Mark J. Lutz 587
mony. He now admires the philosopher as a just human being, but will
not recognize that only those who always consider the good order of their
souls, who practice "justice with prudence in every way," are truly just
(621c). More concretely, Glaucon will not see how Socrates' steadfast
pursuit of knowledge of the just and noble and good provides him with a
harmony or health of soul that Glaucon himself would otherwise recog-
nize as just and noble and good. Glaucon's "civic" understanding of
justice remains incomplete and, to that extent, a mere image or phantom
of justice (476c4-8).30
Mary Nichols offers an especially rich and thought-provoking inter-
pretation of the Republic as a critique of the longing for perfect justice.
According to Nichols, the dialogue demonstrates how our political
aspirations urge us to impose a single, universal vision on the city that
inevitably obscures essential differences.31 In particular, she points to
Glaucon as an example of those who are moved by this spirit. She
attributes his demand to hear justice praised without regard to its conse-
quences as a demand that justice be understood as something "pure or
simple" and "unmixed with the complexity of relationships that charac-
terize human life." At the heart of his desire for simplicity lurks a desire
to find a world in which the just do not suffer but enjoy only "perfect
goodness." According to Nichols, Glaucon is "ready to reject the world
because he cannot find what is simply good there."32 She says that
in response to Glaucon's demand for a simpler, more perfect world,
Socrates describes the easy, bucolic goodness of the "healthy city" early
in Book II. But Glaucon rejects this city because he knows "the world is
not as harmonious as Socrates describes it, that the interests of men do
not coincide, and that conflict among citizens and among cities necessi-
tates rule." Glaucon desires harmony and simplicity, but senses that
"they cannot be found in the easy way Socrates prescribes."33 Socrates
goes on to describe the good city at great length in order to expose how
Glaucon's vision becomes manifestly inhumane and impossible.
Despite the persuasiveness of Nichols's general thesis, it seems that she
overlooks some important aspects of Glaucon's character. For even
though Glaucon wants Socrates to show that the just ultimately find
perfect happiness, he also wants him to show that justice is a test and sign
of manly courage. Glaucon is less ready to reject the world because it is
30. Darrel Dobbs, "Choosing Justice: Socrates' Model City and the Practice of Dialec-
tic," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994): 270.
31. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 36-37, 95-96.
32. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 60, 64-65, 69.
33. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, p. 68.
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588 CivicVirtueand SocraticVirtue
34. Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, pp. 60, 68, 111.
35. Strauss,The City and Man, p. 122.
36. Nichols, Socratesand the Political Community,p. 68.
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Mark J. Lutz 589
IV. Conclusion
Despite Socrates' many criticisms of civic virtue, the disdain for civic
virtue reflected by his image of the cave is not Plato's last word. For
Socrates is apparently grateful for the physical protection and atmo-
sphere of moral seriousness provided by the laws of Athens (e.g.,
Apology 41e-42a; Crito passim). Moreover, the Republic suggests how
the moral education provided by laws might lend crucial support to
philosophic investigation. In Book VII, Socrates acknowledges that
spirited, young dialecticians often enjoy "tearing apart" what the law
teaches about nobility and justice but fail to discern what is genuinely
just and noble and good. In order to prevent dialectics from sinking into
superficial skepticism, Socrates recommends that no one be allowed to
engage in dialectics until they are moderated by age (537d, 539c); but this
solution is problematic, since Socrates notes that the greatest and most
numerous labors must be undertaken by the young (536d). In order to
moderate the young dialecticians' fiery quickness so that they remain
alert to evidence of what is genuinely just and noble and good, laws
might be formulated that bolster their steadiness of soul and powers of
self-command.
Socrates' conduct in the dialogue reflects an even deeper level of
respect for civic virtue. Socrates' philosophic predecessors tended to dis-
miss the non-philosophers' beliefs about justice as mere convention
unworthy of serious examination.37Socrates, however, discovers that his
lack of "divine wisdom" or definitive knowledge of the necessities that
govern the whole compels him to reconsider whether philosophers have
given adequate attention to what non-philosophers experience and say
about justice and the gods who uphold justice (Apology 20e ff.; Phaedo
99d-100c; Republic 506e, 509c). Unable to trust entirely his own subjec-
tive thinking, he determines to test and deepen his account of virtue
against non-philosophic accounts. Throughout the dialogues, we find
Socrates examining whether the words and actions of politicians, poets,
sophists, priestesses, and others undermine or support his account of
virtue. Thus, even as Socrates argues that most denizens of the cave can
never be liberated from their shadowy understandings of virtue, in prac-
tice he relies on his fellow citizens' experiences and understandings of
virtue to affirm his own.38
In the Republic, the understanding of virtue that Socrates encounters
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592 Civic Virtue and Socratic Virtue
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