CIVIL LAW REVIEW ..

not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this
of general application, which have not been published,
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
shall have no force and effect.
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
question said petitioners are without the requisite legal
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
65 of the Rules of Court.

In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
RULING:
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
following the completion of their publication in
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
effect immediately.
provided, ...

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to

In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
presidential issuances which are of general application,
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
the date of publication is material for determining its date of
and effect.
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.

Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue

at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does

1
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
NACHURA, J.:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci"
tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her
favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senates internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senates website,
satisfies the due process requirement of law.
RULING:
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to
the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision . The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the
website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available
at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory
to comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is
all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in
the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While
we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does
not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by
the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could
not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of
the Constitution.
2
 EN BANC Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal arrangement between the
DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the
rule in the case of People vs. Que Po Lay , 94 Phil. 640 (1954)
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,
that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for
vs.
its violation should be published before becoming effective, this,
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
on the general principle and theory that before the public is
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law,
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F.
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or
MARCELO, respondents.
reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain
any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: under pain or penalty.

Senator Gringo Honasan was charged with the crime of coup What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453
detat before DOJ. (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:

Petitioner filed a motion for clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case asserting that since the imputed acts
were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of
the Ombudsman and not the DOJ that has the jurisdiction to
conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should
the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the
regular courts that can take cognizance of the case considering
that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade
31.
He is directed to file a counter-affidavit but instead Senator
Gregorio Honasan filed the herein petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members, CIDG-PNP Director, and Ombudsman, attributing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing
the aforequoted Order on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
DOJ's contention: DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation pursuant to the Revised Administrative
Code and coup d'etat is not directly related to his office as a
Senator. The jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is
not derived from provisions of the JOINT CIRCULAR.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular
between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining
authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and
of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT
regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.

Ombudsman's contention: DOJ has the jurisdiction because

coup d'etat falls under the Sandiganbayan only if it is committed
in relation to office. The JOINT CIRCULAR need not be published
because it is merely an internal agreement between DOJ and
Ombudsman at it neither regulated nor penalizes conduct of
persons.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is

ineffective on the ground that it was not published.

RULING:

Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is

ineffective on the ground that it was not published is not
plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's
dissertation on the matter, to wit:

Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on

a proper reading and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ

3
 FIRST DIVISION Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt
under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition
G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999
under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners

vs.
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
PARDO, J.
On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino
child, Michael Magno Madayag, under the provision of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The
natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable
consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval
of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as
well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objective of the law.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective,

prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for

adoption by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child

despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on
August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July
29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which allowed aliens to adopt.

RULING:

This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under

the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at
the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested
right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective

August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are
aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall
be governed by the law then in force. "A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny." 8 "Vested rights include not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and

substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time
it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it
fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court
is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be
ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance.

4
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
A complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City against Eduardo
P. Manuel.
On April 22, 1996, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a
second marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in
RTC of Baguio City. It so appeared in the marriage contract that
Manuel was single.
Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus
Gana without the said marriage having been legally dissolved
before the second marriage.
Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first
marriage of the respondent to Rubylus Gana.
Their relationship turned sour and Eduardo left. Thereafter, Tina
learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he
believed in good faith that his marriage was invalid. He said he
did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of
his first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he
had not heard from her for more than 20 years.
On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC.
Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that
conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there must be malice for
one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the RTC
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification. Contrary to the contention
of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it
ruled that petitioners first wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article
41 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent
for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of
judicial declaration. However, Article 41 of the Family Code,
which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of
instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for
the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on
Criminal Law.
5
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that
for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second
marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided
in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
Judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for
purposes of remarriage. The present spouse must institute a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory
examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as
presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
In some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which
could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of
his estate. Before such declaration, it was held that the
remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 112024 January 28, 1999
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner reported a net loss in 1986 and thus declared no tax
payable. On 1987, petitioner requested the respondent, among
others, for a tax credit representing the overpayment of taxes in
the first and second quarters of 1985.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes
withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 and in
1986. Pending investigation, petitioner instituted a Petition for
Review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
CTA denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit
for 1985 on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided for by law. The petitioners claim
for refund in 1986 was likewise denied on the assumption that it
was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax payment in
the succeeding year. MR was denied.
CA affirmed the decision in toto hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a
position contrary to its declared circular if it would result to
injustice to taxpayers. Citing ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation
vs. Court of Tax Appeals (1981) , petitioner claims that rulings or
circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
have no retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to taxpayers.
Respondent argues that the two-year prescriptive period for
filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of
Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final
Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15
following the close of the calendar year. Further, respondent
Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case
before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed
beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to
petitioners cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea
for tax refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription,
despite petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years.
RULING:
After a careful study of the records and applicable jurisprudence
on the matter, we find that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is
not warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period
set by law.
6
Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation."
The primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to
finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common
weal. Due process of law under the Constitution does not
require judicial proceedings in tax cases. This must necessarily
be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly
relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of
utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the
collection of taxes levied should be summary and interfered with
as little as possible.
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit
should be exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR
being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its
functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by
incidental matters.
The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or
credit with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2)
years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is
commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should
be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and
final payment of the tax for the year.
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC
7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years
on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular
created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of
1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law;
rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by
Congress.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue who denied petitioner's claim
of refund or tax credit. Rather, it was the Court of Tax Appeals
who denied (albeit correctly) the claim and in effect, ruled that
the RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is out of
harmony with or contrary to the express provision of a statute
(specifically Sec. 230, NIRC), hence, cannot be given weight for
to do so would in effect amend the statute.
Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial decisions,
applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal
system of the country. But administrative decisions do
not enjoy that level of recognition. A memorandum-
circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a
taxpayer with shield against judicial action. For there are
no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative officials
and such wrong interpretation could not place the
Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.
Moreover, the non-retroactivity of rulings by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue is not applicable in this case because the
nullity of RMC No. 7-85 was declared by respondent courts and
not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Lastly, it must
be noted that, as repeatedly held by this Court, a claim
for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and
should be construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are

considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific
and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued
from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is
widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by
the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to
great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is
not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be
erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative
issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.

Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in

estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As
pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC
No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue
is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with
Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC for being contrary to the express
provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be
given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.

It is likewise argued that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

after promulgating RMC No. 7-85, is estopped by the principle of
non-retroactively of BIR rulings. Again We do not agree. The
Memorandum Circular, stating that a taxpayer may recover the
excess income tax paid within 10 years from date of payment
because this is an obligation created by law, was issued by the
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On the other hand,
the decision, stating that the taxpayer should still file a claim for
a refund or tax credit and corresponding petition for review
within the two-year prescription period, and that the lengthening
of the period of limitation on refund from two to ten years would
be adverse to public policy and run counter to the positive
mandate of Sec. 230, NIRC, - was the ruling and judicial
interpretation of the Court of Tax Appeals. Estoppel has no
application in the case at bar because it was not the

7
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo
Pesca, a seaman got married March 1975 after a whirlwind
courtship. Their union begot 4 children.
However, in 1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was
emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became
violent. On March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was convicted by the
MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11
days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological
incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided in favour of the
petitioner.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner
had failed to establish that:
(1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would
cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant as
provided in Article 68 of the Family Code;
(2) that incapacity is grave;
(3) preceded the marriage;
(4) is incurable;
(5) that such incapacity is psychological;
(6) that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically;
(7) that it has been proven by an expert;
(8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14
January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption
that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner
argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should
warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guidelines for psychological incapacity
enunciated in the Santos and Molina should be applied in this
case.
RULING:
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated
in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical
Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36
of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado
legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon
law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until
the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept
has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for
the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that
followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations
in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
8
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA
COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and
ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint that on
May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter
Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA),
obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second
mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604
and a Promissory Note payable within six months or up to
November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998,
Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan,
executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided).
ISSUE:
Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a
future heir while the parents are still living valid?
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner
entered into a contract involving the formers future inheritance
as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioners favor.
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals, we invalidated the contract of
sale between Lazaro Taedo and therein private respondents
since the subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of whatever
share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey
of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of
the Register of Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of
Taedos future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be
the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between
the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this
case that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor
of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of
any right or create any obligation between them for being
violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it
is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the
claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to
the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to
registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property
flows from Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon
petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his
adverse claim. Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without
any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and
ineffective and perforce be cancelled.

RULING:

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil

Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance
to be considered "future", the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified
as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites
concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been

opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part

of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to

the object, an expectancy of a right which is
purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of

Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her
parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them
are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are
likewise present considering that the property subject matter of
Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of the properties
that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and,
such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is
undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.

9
 THIRD DIVISION RTC had taken, Lucilas waiver was absolute and contained no
precondition. The pertinent portion of the affidavit of waiver
reads:
G.R. No. 192383 December 4, 2013

That to put everything in proper order, I hereby

ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
LUCILA C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) claimed that in 1975 he
and his sister, respondent Lucila C. Dela Cruz and (Lucila) and
Cornelia C. Dela Cruz (Cornelia), bought on installment a 240-
square meter land in Las Pias from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. On
the following year, Isabelo constructed a residential house on
the subject lot.
Because of Lucias plea for the siblings to help their cousin,
Corazon L. Victoriano (Corazon), who was in financial distress,
Isabelo agreed to have the lot they bought used as collateral for
the loan that Corazon planned to secure from the Philippine
Veterans Bank. To make this posible, Lucila paid the P8,000.00
that they still owed Gatchalian Realty, Inc. On January 18, 1979
the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
S-80735 in Lucilas name and this was mortgaged for Corazons
benefit. But, since Corazon failed to pay her loan, the bank
foreclosed on the property on March 1, 1989 for P286,000.00.
Lucila redeemed it on March 27, 1992.
On October 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver
relinquishing all her share, interest, and participation to half of
the lot to Isabelo and the other half to her niece, Emelinda C.
Dela Cruz (Emelinda). On even date, Isabelo and Emelinda
executed a Kasunduan acknowledging their respective rights in
the property. Claiming ownership of half of the subject property
by virtue of Lucilas affidavit of waiver, on August 22, 2005
Isabelo filed an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City in SCA 05-0008, seeking the
segregation of his portion of the land and the issuance of the
corresponding title in his name. But Lucila countered that the
property, including the house built on it, belonged to her since
she paid for the same out of her income as pawnshop general
manager and from selling jewelry.
waive all my share, interest and participation in
so far as it refer to the one half portion (120 SQ.
M.) of the above-parcel of land, with and in
favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, of
legal age, married, Filipino and residing at Las
Pinas City, and the other half portion (120 SQ.
M.) in favor of my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA
CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and
residing at Sto. Rosario Hagonoy, Bulacan; x x x
Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put
everything in proper order, I hereby waive" if her intent was to
set a precondition to her waiver covering the property, half to
Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her intention, she
could have stated, "subject to the condition that everything is
put in proper order, I hereby waive..." or something to that
effect. When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper
order, I hereby waive my share, interest and participation" in the
two halves of the subject property in favor of Isabelo and
Emelinda, Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in ceding
the property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper
order, thus she was driven to make the waiver in their favor.
Lucila did not say, "to put everything in proper order, I promise
to waive my right" to the property, which is a future
undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything is put
in proper order. But she instead said, "to put everything in
proper order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase "hereby waive"
means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already
waiving her right to the property, irreversibly divesting herself of
her existing right to the same. After he and his co-owner
Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of
half of the subject property having the right to demand its
partition.
PARTITION IS PROPER ONLY WHEN WAIVER WAS
UNEQUIVOCAL AND IRREVERSIBLE.

She claimed that her affidavit of waiver did not cede ownership
of half of the property to Isabelo since the affidavit made clear
that her waiver would take effect only if the problems that beset
their family were resolved. Since this condition had not been
met, she had every right to revoke that waiver as in fact she did
so on September 24, 2004 in the Kasulatan ng Pagpawalang Bisa
ng "Affidavit Waiver."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucilas affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo half

of the subject property conveys to him a right of ownership over
that half?

RULING:

The CA agreed with the RTC that Lucilas affidavit of waiver did
not vest any property right to Isabelo since the condition she set
in that affidavit had not been fulfilled. This then gave Lucila the
right in the meantime to rescind the waiver, something that she
eventually did. But, contrary to the position that the CA and the

10
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138463 October 30, 2006
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES: RICARDO REYES,
DAYLINDA REYES, BEATRIZ REYES, JULIAN CUECO,
ESPERANSA REYES, VICTORINO REYES, AND JOVITO
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALUMPANG, GEOFFREY CALUMPANG, AGAPITO
AGALA, LORENZO MANABAN, RESTITUTO MANABAN,
OLYMPIA MANABAN, PELAGIA MANABAN AND FELIPE
CUECO, respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Isidro Reyes is the owner of the subject property in this case. He
has three children. Victoriana, Telesfora and Leonardo. Some of
the heirs of Leonardo were able to obtain certificate of title over
the subject land, depriving the heirs of Telesfora and Victoriana
(respondents in this case) of their rights over the property.
Subsequently, three out of the registered co-owners of the said
land executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the respondents.
The rest of the registered co-owners filed a complaint,
contending that the Deed of Quitclaim is invalid. It is in a form of
donation which requires formal acceptance on the part of
donees, who are the respondents in this case.
RULING:
The indefeasible rights of a holder of a Torrens Title may
be waived in favor of another whose equitable rights
may have been barred by laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by the
exercise of due diligence could or should have been
done earlier.
On the issue of the rights of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes being barred by the indefeasibility of petitioners Torrens
Title over subject lot, we qualify. White it is true that the
indefeasibility of petitioners title on the ground of laches bars
the rights or interests of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes over the disputed lot, still, the indefeasible rights of a
holder of a Torrens Title may be waived in favor of another
whose equitable rights may have been barred by laches.
In Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Villalba, laches is defined
as:
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by the exercise of due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
Under this time-honored doctrine, relief has been denied
to litigants who, by sleeping on their rights for an
unreasonable length of time either by negligence, folly
or inattention have allowed their claims to become
stale. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt . The
laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial
remedies. However, the equitable rights barred by laches still
subsist and are not otherwise extinguished. Thus, parties guilty
of laches retains equitable rights albeit in an empty manner as
they cannot assert their rights judicially. However, such
equitable rights may be revived or activated by the waiver of
those whose right has ripened due to laches, and can be
exercised to the extent of the right waived.
The standard of a valid waiver requires that it "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.
The waiver is clear. The recent case of Valderama v. Macalde reiterated
the three (3) essential elements of a valid waiver, thus:
(a) existence of a right;
(b) athe knowledge of the existence thereof; and
(c) an intention to relinquish such right.
These elements are all present in the case at bar. The three (3)
executors, who were co-owners and titleholders of the said lot since
1954, were aware of their rights, and executed the Deed of Quitclaim
in clear and unambiguous language to waive and relinquish their rights
over Lot No. 3880 in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes. Thus, the existence of a valid waiver has been positively
demonstrated. Moreover, in People v. Bodoso, cited in Valderama, it
was held that the standard of a valid waiver requires that it "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." In the instant case, petitioners utterly failed to adduce
any evidence showing that the assailed quitclaim was done absent
such standard. Indeed, we note with approval the CAs apt application
of the presumption "that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns
and that private transactions have been fair and regular."
A quitclaim is not a donation where those who executed the same
merely acknowledged the ownership of and better right over the lot f
other persons.
In this factual setting, respondents could have filed an action for
reconveyance to recover their shares in Lot No. 3880. However,
instead of instituting such a suit, respondents were able to convince
Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, to execute a Deed of
Quitclaim restoring to them their shares. Therefore, it is clear that the
quitclaim is not a donation for the three (3) ReyesesVictorino, Luis,
and Jovitowho merely acknowledged the ownership of and the
better right over the said lot by the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes. Having acquired title over the property in 1954 to the exclusion
of respondents Agalas and Manabans, through the Deed of Quitclaim
executed in 1972, the three (3) Reyeses merely acknowledged the legal
rights of respondents over their shares in the said lot. In fine, the Deed
of Quitclaim, not being a donation, no formal acceptance is needed
from the Agalas and Manabans.
11
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedents heirs.
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the
owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property)
in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was
survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property
belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No.
5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregorias heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo,
Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo (Gregoria's heirs) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have
become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo
Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon,
and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession
of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the
taxes on the property; that Leonardos claim is barred by
estoppel and laches.
The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an
unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943. Enriquez in turn
allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943
via another private sale document.
Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than
30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630.
On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of
Ownership of Land claiming sole ownership of the property
which he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No.
16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 20102 in Leons name.
The trial court ruled that There was no prescription. Prescription
began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo
Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979,
which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the
property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article
494 of the Civil Code, which provides that [n]o prescription shall
run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership
only on February 9, 1979.
RULING:
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and
Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana
and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.
In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein
became entitled to the property upon the sisters passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject
property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in
common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights. They have the full
ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even
substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of
one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done
by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial
court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which
Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962.
Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against
the other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces
the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other
co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property
only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration
exclusively in his name, and informed the latter before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of the property.
These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by
12
Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in
his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held
that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979
or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to
him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has
claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just
under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts notice,

however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr.
performed acts that may be characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being
married to Antipolos daughter Teodora. Under the
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis
for succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the

property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For
this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo,
and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been
lost.

Likewise, petitioners argument that Leonardos admission and

acknowledgment in his pleadings that Lucimo Sr. was in
possession of the property since 1943 should be taken against
him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of
the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to
Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens
system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leons name. Leons
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the
property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of

the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the
property at any time.

13