Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
A Technical Reference
Prepared by the
System Protection and Controls Task Force
of the
NERC Planning Committee
Protection System Maintenance A NERC Technical Reference Table of Contents
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Summary ...............................................................................................................................1
2.1 Existing NERC Standards for Protection System Maintenance and Testing................................................1
2.2 Applicability of New Protection System Maintenance Standards ................................................................2
4. Definitions............................................................................................................................................................4
15. References..........................................................................................................................................................18
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APPENDICES
Appendix C Extended Maintenance Interval Assessment for Microprocessor Relays Based on Markov
Modeling.....................................................................................................................................................................29
Figure D-1 Pilot or Unit Transmission Line Protection System Using Power Line Carrier Blocking Channel..30
Figure D-2 Zones of Verification for the Line Protection System of Figure B-1 .................................................31
This report was approved by the Planning Committee on September 13, 2007, for forwarding to
the Standards Committee.
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1 The Planning Committee approved these documents in March 2007 and June 2007.
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Purpose: To ensure all transmission and generation Protection Systems affecting the reliability
of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are maintained and tested.
PRC-005 is not specific on where the boundaries of the Protection Systems lie. However, the
definition of Protection System in the NERC Glossary of Terms indicates what must be included
as a minimum.
Definition of Protection System (excerpted from the NERC Standards Glossary of Terms):
Protective relays, associated communication systems, voltage and current sensing devices, station
batteries and DC control circuitry.
Applicability: Owners of generation, transmission, and transmission Protection Systems.
Requirements: The owner shall have a documented maintenance program, with procedures, and
with test intervals supported by some basis. The owner must keep records showing that the
maintenance and testing was actually performed per procedures at the specified intervals, for at
least three years.
For proposed new maintenance requirements defined below, the term Bulk Electric System (BES) is
replaced by a specification of Protection Systems for which the requirements apply as given in Section
2.2 below.
The purpose and applicability of PRC-005 and the other maintenance standards will remain valid for the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, it will still be required to have a documented maintenance program, with
procedures and records. The present document looks at setting maximum allowable time intervals and
allowing continuation of existing programs conducted on a technically sound basis, while opening new
options for how this maintenance program can take advantage of features of new relays. The newest
relays have self-monitoring capabilities that open new options for verifying relay performance with
reduced on-site testing.
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nameplate rating). The following generator protection functions and system interface protection
functions are included:
a. Fault protective functions, including distance functions, voltage-restrained overcurrent
functions, or voltage-controlled overcurrent functions
b. Loss-of-field relays
c. Volts-per-hertz relays
d. Negative sequence overcurrent relays
e. Overvoltage and undervoltage protection relays
f. Stator ground relays
g. Communications-based protection systems such as transfer-trip systems
h. Generator differential relays
i. Reverse power relays
j. Frequency relays
k. Out-of-step relays
l. Inadvertent energization protection
m. Breaker failure protection
8. The protection systems, including all applicable protection systems from item 7 above, for the
system interface facilities for installations such as wind farms which are aggregated through a
single connection point to the system, greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating).
9. Protection Systems for underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) and undervoltage load shedding
(UVLS), and special protection schemes (SPS) which are subject to the various NERC Standards,
even if connected to the power system at voltages lower than those stated in (1) and (2) above.
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3. Ability to meter currents and voltages, as well as status of connected circuit breakers,
continuously during non-fault times. The relays can compute values such as MW and MVAR
line flows that are sometimes used for operational purposes such as SCADA.
4. Data communications via ports that provide remote access to all of the results of protection
system monitoring, recording, and measurement.
5. Ability to trip or close circuit breakers and switches through the protection system outputs, on
command from remote data communications messages or from relay front panel button requests.
6. Construction from electronic components some of which have shorter technical life or service life
than electromechanical components of prior protection system generations.
4. Definitions
We explain how five key words are defined for use in the following:
Maintenance An ongoing program by which Protection System function is proved, and restored
if needed. A maintenance program comprises verification of individual protection systems,
which in turn is achieved by of a combination of monitoring, testing, and calibration.
Verification A means of determining that the Protection System or component is functioning
correctly and is fit for service.
Monitoring Observation of the correctness of routine in-service operation of the Protection
System or component.
Testing Application of signals to a Protection System or component removed from service, to
observe functional performance or output behavior.
Calibration Adjustment of the operating threshold or measurement accuracy of a Protection
System measuring element to meet manufacturers specifications or an application accuracy
requirement.
Thus, this document will discuss requirements for a maintenance program. Repairs and adjustments are
carried out when required. PRC-005-1 language of maintenance and testing is no longer used.
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A key feature of condition-based monitoring is that it effectively reduces the time delay between the
moment of a protection failure and time the protection system owner knows about it, for the monitored
segments of the protection system. In some cases, the verification is practically continuous the time
interval between verifications is minutes or seconds. Thus, technically sound condition-based verification
as specified in Table 1 of Section 8 below meets the time-based verification requirements of the FERC
order even more effectively than time-based tests of the same system elements.
The result is that:
Future NERC standards should permit utilities to use a technically sound approach to testing
relays and components by on-site technicians with test sets. This periodic testing should be
conducted within maximum time intervals specified in Table 1 below.
TOs or GOs that wish to take advantage of remote monitoring, data analysis, and control
capabilities of modern protection systems can reduce periodic site visits and invasive testing as a
maintenance approach. The focus in this case is on defining and documenting a technically
complete program according to recommendations made in this document.
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verification intervals. Trip voltage and trip coil continuity is also monitored in partially-
monitored protection systems.
Thoroughly Monitored Applies to microprocessor relays and associated protection system
components that meet partial monitoring requirements of Note 1, plus additional monitoring of
alarms and performance measurement values as specified in Note 2. With these additional
monitoring actions, the bulk of the protection system elements that are likely to fail are monitored
continuously or frequently, so that maximum allowable verification intervals may be significantly
extended. However, even these additional monitoring steps do not assure that every possible
failure is detected, so infrequent periodic verification is still required.
Fully Monitored Applies to microprocessor relays and associated protection system
components in which every element or function required for correct operation of the protection
system is monitored continuously or verified, including verification of the means by which failure
alarms or indicators are transmitted to a central location for immediate action. Full monitoring
includes all elements of thorough monitoring. For fully-monitored systems or segments,
documentation is required that shows how every possible failure, including a failure in the
verification or monitoring system or alarming channel, is detected.
Section 9 describes a performance-based maintenance program which can be used to justify maintenance
intervals other than those described in Table 1.
Section 10 describes segments of the protection system, and overlapping considerations for full
verification of the protection system by segments. Segments refer to pieces of the protection system,
which can range from a single device to a panel to an entire substation.
Section 11 describes how relay operating records can serve as a basis for verification, reducing the
frequency of manual testing.
Section 13 describes how a cooperative effort of relay manufacturers and protection system users can
improve the coverage of self-monitoring functions, leading to full monitoring of for the bulk of the
protection system, and eventual elimination of manual verification or testing.
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Notes on Table 1
1. Partial monitoring comprises:
a. Monitoring of the internal self-monitoring alarm contact of a microprocessor relay as detailed in Note 1 (f) below. A
microprocessor relay is defined in Note 6. The alarm must assert in real-time for dc supply or power supply failures.
b. Monitoring of trip coil continuity and trip voltage by periodic checking of a monitoring light or by an automatic continuity-
monitoring means such as the trip coil monitor of the microprocessor relay.
c. Monitoring and alarming of the functioning of a protection telecommunications system, if used, as detailed in Note 1 (f) below, by
periodic checkback test, guard signal, or channel messaging functional indication.
d. Monitoring of the station battery voltage with associated alarms as detailed in Note 1 (f) below.
e. Documented confirmation of the correctness of the settings file immediately after any maintenance event that could possibly
influence settings:
i. One or more settings are changed for any reason.
ii. A relay fails and is repaired or replaced with another unit.
iii. A relay is upgraded with a new firmware version.
f. Alarms are supplied to an operations center or a maintenance monitoring center in real time for appropriate action.
2. Thorough monitoring comprises partial monitoring elements of Note 1, plus the following monitoring processes:
a. Verification of the ac analog values measured by the microprocessor relay, by comparing against other measurements using other
instrument transformers. This checking may use relay front panel value displays, or values gathered via data communications.
Groupings of other measurements (such as vector summation of bus feeder currents) can be used for comparison if calibration
requirements of Note 7 are met.
b. Monitoring of the continuity of breaker trip circuits, along with the presence of tripping voltage supply all the way from relay
terminals (or from inside the relay) though the trip coil, along with each required tripping voltage. If a trip circuit comprises
multiple paths that operate in a sequence, each of the paths must be monitored in this way. This includes monitoring of both the
operating coil circuit and the tripping circuits of auxiliary tripping relays and lockout relays.
c. Monitoring of the channel quality for a protection telecommunications system, if used, by monitoring or alarming the signal level,
signal to noise ratio, or error rate.
d. Alarms are supplied in real time to an operations center or a maintenance monitoring center for appropriate action. Specified
monitoring or measurement values are either supplied to the operations center or maintenance monitoring center either in real
time, or gathered for checking and appropriate action within the unmonitored maximum time interval.
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3. Full monitoring of a specific segment requires that every element or function required for correct operation of the protection system is
monitored continuously or verified, including verification of the means by which failure alarms and indicators are transmitted to a central
location for immediate action. Full monitoring includes all elements of thorough monitoring. Documentation is required that shows how
every possible failure, including a failure in the verification or monitoring system or alarming channel, is detected.
4. Every component of the protection system that can impact tripping, including components not named in Table 1, must be verified within
the required time interval for Category 3 components.
5. The prescriptive establishment of maximum allowable intervals must include allowance for extensions due to difficulties in obtaining
outages to do the necessary testing. This allowance must be carefully developed to assure that it does not, in essence, extend the
maximum allowable intervals themselves in the long term. For example, a six-month grace period could be permitted for the protection
system owner to accomplish the scheduled program without being found non-compliant; further extensions would require regional
approval before the end of the grace period. Another alternative could be to craft an allowance to permit a 1-year extension with the
caveat that the average actual testing interval over multiple testing cycles must be no longer than the prescribed interval.
6. Microprocessor relays are defined as those with input voltage or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and
conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics that are also performing self
diagnosis. In particular, note that relays combining comparator-based analog measurement circuits with microprocessors for system logic
or timing are classified as analog solid state (or static) relays that are not capable of self-monitoring.
7. Microprocessor relays typically are specified by manufacturers as not requiring calibration, but acceptable measurement of power system
input values must be verified within the Table intervals. For other relays, adjustment is required only to bring measurement accuracy
within the tolerance stated by the relay manufacturer. Alternatively, the asset owner may document the technical basis for a larger
permissible calibration tolerance based on the specific application of the relay.
8. Any Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) function whose output is used in a protection system or SPS (as opposed to a monitoring task) must
be verified as a component in a protection system.
9. Maximum intervals should be substantially reduced, or effective remedial action taken, for problem populations of equipment whose
abnormal levels of failures are found by testing or misoperation experience.
10. It is acceptable to use a single test procedure that covers multiple categories of equipment in a protection system. Fault or operating data
may be used to achieve some of the verification goals, as explained in Section 11 below.
11. A PRC standard does not require testing of circuit breakers. However, utilities have found that breakers often show problems during relay
tests. It is recommended that protection system verification include periodic testing of the actual tripping of connected circuit breakers.
12. In addition to verifying the circuitry that supplies dc to the protection system, the owner must maintain station batteries in accordance with
industry standards, or use a performance-based process as Section 9 describes. Battery systems used for UFLS or UVLS systems (but not
for any other protection systems addressed within this paper) need be checked only when the associated protection systems are verified.
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A performance-based maintenance program requires auditing processes like those included in widely used
industrial quality systems (such as ISO 9001-2000, Quality management systems Requirements; or
applicable parts of the NIST Baldridge National Quality Program). The audits periodically evaluate:
The completeness of the documented maintenance process
Organizational knowledge of and adherence to the process
Performance metrics and documentation of results
Remediation of issues
Demonstration of continuous improvement.
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Fault data analysis comprises a legitimate CBM program that is capable of reducing the need for a manual
time-interval based check on protection systems whose operations are analyzed. Even electromechanical
protection systems instrumented with DFR channels may achieve some CBM benefit. The completeness
of the verification then depends on the number and variety of faults in the vicinity of the relay that
produce relay response records, and the specific data captured.
A typical fault record will verify particular parts of certain protection systems in the vicinity of the fault.
For a given protection system installation, it may or may not be possible to gather within a reasonable
amount of time an ensemble of internal and external fault records that completely verify the protection
system.
For example, fault records may verify that the particular relays that tripped are able to trip via the control
circuit path that was specifically used to clear that fault. A relay or DFR record may indicate correct
operation of the protection communications channel. Furthermore, other nearby protection systems may
verify that they restrain from tripping for a fault just outside their respective zones of protection. The
ensemble of internal fault and nearby external fault event data can verify major portions of the protection
system, and reset the time clock for the Table 1 testing intervals for the verified components only.
What can be shown from the records of one operation is very specific and limited. In a panel with
multiple relays, only the specific relay(s) whose operation can be observed without ambiguity in the
record and the associated wiring paths are verified. Be careful about using fault response data to verify
that settings or calibration are correct. Unless records have been captured for multiple faults close to
either side of a setting boundary, setting or calibration could still be incorrect.
If fault record data is used to show that portions or all of a protection system have been verified to meet
Table 1 requirements, the owner must retain the fault records used, and the maintenance related
conclusions drawn from this data and used to defer Table 1 tests, for at least the retention time interval
given in Section 8.2.
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15. References
1. Predicating The Optimum Routine test Interval For Protection Relays, by J. J. Kumm, M.S.
Weber, D. Hou, and E. O. Schweitzer, III, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 10, No. 2,
April 1995.
2. Transmission Relay System Performance Comparison For 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, Working Group I17 of Power System Relaying Committee of IEEE Power Engineering
Society, May 2006.
3. A Survey of Relaying Test Practices, Special Report by WG I11 of Power System Relaying
Committee of IEEE Power Engineering Society, September 16, 1999.
4. Transmission Protective Relay System Performance Measuring Methodology, Working Group
I3 of Power System Relaying Committee of IEEE Power Engineering Society, January 2002.
5. Processes, Issues, Trends and Quality Control of Relay Settings, Working Group C3 of Power
System Relaying Committee of IEEE Power Engineering Society, December 2006.
6. Proposed Statistical Performance Measures for Microprocessor-Based Transmission-Line
Protective Relays, Part I - Explanation of the Statistics, and Part II - Collection and Uses of
Data, Working Group D5 of Power System Relaying Committee of IEEE Power Engineering
Society, May 1995; Papers 96WM 016-6 PWRD and 96WM 127-1 PWRD, 1996 IEEE Power
Engineering Society Winter Meeting.
7. Analysis And Guidelines For Testing Numerical Protection Schemes, Final Report of CIGRE
WG 34.10, August 2000.
8. Use of Preventative Maintenance and System Performance Data to Optimize Scheduled
Maintenance Intervals, H. Anderson, R. Loughlin, and J. Zipp, Georgia Tech Protective Relay
Conference, May 1996.
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Introduction
When the original scope for the System Protection and Control Task Force was developed, one of the
assigned items was to review all of the existing PRC-series Reliability Standards, to advise the Planning
Committee of our assessment, and to develop Standards Authorization Requests, as appropriate, to
address any perceived deficiencies.
This report presents the SPCTFs assessment of PRC-005-1 Transmission and Generation Protection
System Maintenance and Testing. The report includes the SPCTFs understanding of the intent of this
standard and contains specific observations relative to the existing standard.
The SPCTF sees the parallel intent for each of the PRC-005, PRC-008, PRC-011, and PRC-017 as being
maintenance and testing standards for different protective systems. In fact, PRC-005 & PRC-008, and
PRC-011 & PRC-017 have very similar format respectively. Since all protective relay systems require
some means of maintenance and testing, it would seem that all protective system maintenance and testing
could be included in one standard regardless of scheme type. The SPCTF recommends that these four
standards be reduced to one standard covering the issues detailed for PRC-005 on maintenance and
testing.
These four standards were developed primarily by translating the requirements of an earlier Phase I
Planning Standard; thus they have not been previously subjected to a critical review of the Requirements.
Executive Summary
Reliability standards PRC-005, 008, 011, and 017 are intended to assure that Transmission & Generation
Protection Systems are maintained and tested so as to provide reliable performance when responding to
abnormal system conditions. It is the responsibility of the Transmission Owner, Generation Owner, and
Distribution Provider to ensure the Transmission & Generation Protection Systems are maintained and
tested in such a manner that the protective systems operate to fulfill their function.
Only PRC-005 will be commented on in detail although the other three standards have the same concerns.
SPCTF concluded that:
Applicable to all four standards The listed requirements do not provide clear and sufficient
guidance concerning the maintenance and testing of the Protection Systems to achieve the
commonly stated purpose which is To ensure all transmission and generation Protection Systems
affecting the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are maintained and tested.
Applicable to PRC-017 Part of the stated purpose in PRC-017 states: To ensure that
maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
The phrase and misoperations are analyzed and corrected is not clearly appropriate in a
maintenance and testing standard. That is, the purpose is more appropriate in PRC-003 and PRC-
004, which relate to the analysis and mitigation of protection system misoperations. Analysis of
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Assessment of PRC-005-1
Purpose
R1. To ensure all transmission and generation Protection Systems affecting the reliability of the
Bulk Electric System (BES) are maintained and tested.
A review of PRC-005 indicates that this standard is intended to assure that all affected entities have
adequate maintenance and testing programs for their Protection Systems to ensure reliability. SPCTF
agrees with the Purpose statement of PRC-005-1.
General Comments
The SPCTF offers the following general comments:
None of the requirements within PRC-005-1 specifically indicate what minimum attributes
should be included in protective system maintenance and testing procedures.
For interval-based procedures, no allowable maximum interval is prescribed.
None of the requirements in the existing PRC-005-1 reflect condition-based or performance-
based maintenance and testing criteria.
Standard PRC-005 should clarify that two goals are being covered:
The maintenance portion should have requirements that keep the protection system equipment
operating within manufacturers design specification throughout the service life.
The testing portion should have requirements that verify that the functional performance of the
protection systems is consistent with the design intent throughout the service life.
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Applicability
Applicability 4.3 suggests that the definition of a Protection System in the Glossary of Terms should
4.1. Transmission Owners
4.2. Generation Owners
4.3. Distribution Providers that owns a transmission Protection System
clarify how a Distribution Provider may be the owner of a transmission Protection System.
Requirements
R1
R1. Each Transmission Owner and any Distribution Provider that owns a transmission Protection
System and each Generator Owner that owns a generation Protection System shall have a
Protection System maintenance and testing program for Protection Systems that affect the
reliability of the BES. The program shall include:
R1.1. Maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
R1.2. Summary of maintenance and testing procedures.
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R2
R2. Each Transmission Owner and any Distribution Provider that owns a transmission
Protection System and each Generator Owner that owns a generation Protection System shall
provide documentation of its Protection System maintenance and testing program and the
implementation of that program to its Regional Reliability Organization on request (within 30
calendar days). The documentation of the program implementation shall include:
R2.1. Evidence Protection System devices were maintained and tested within the defined
intervals.
R2.2. Date each Protection System device was last tested/maintained
PRC-005-1
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PRC-008-0
The Commission notes that the commenters generally share staffs concern that the proposed
Reliability Standard does not specify the criteria to determine the appropriate maintenance intervals,
nor does it specify maximum allowable maintenance intervals for the protection systems. The
Commission agrees and proposes to require NERC to modify the proposed Reliability Standard to
include a requirement that maintenance and testing of UFLS programs must be carried out within a
maximum allowable interval that is appropriate to the type of relay used and the impact on the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Accordingly, the Commission proposes to approve Reliability Standard PRC-008-0 as mandatory and
enforceable. In addition, the Commission proposes to direct that NERC submit a modification to PRC-
008-0 that includes a requirement that maintenance and testing of UFLS programs must be carried out
within a maximum allowable interval appropriate to the relay type and the potential impact on the
Bulk-Power System.
PRC-011-0
PRC-011-0 does not specify the criteria to determine the appropriate maintenance intervals, nor does it
specify maximum allowable maintenance intervals for the protections systems. The Commission
proposes that NERC include a Requirement that maintenance and testing of these UFLS programs
must be carried out within a maximum allowable interval that is appropriate to the type of the relay
used and the impact of these UFLS on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
The Commission believes that Reliability Standard PRC-011-0 serves an important purpose in
requiring transmission owners and distribution providers to implement their UVLS equipment
maintenance and testing programs. Further, the proposed Requirements are sufficiently clear and
objective to provide guidance for compliance.
Accordingly, giving due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO and with the expectation that the
Reliability Standard will accomplish the purpose represented to the Commission by the ERO and that
it will improve the reliability of the nations Bulk-Power System, the Commission proposes to approve
Reliability Standard PRC-011-0 as mandatory and enforceable. In addition, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA and 39.5(f) of our regulations, the Commission proposes to direct that NERC
submit a modification to PRC-011-0 that includes a requirement that maintenance and testing of
UVLS programs must be carried out within a maximum allowable interval appropriate to the
applicable relay and the impact on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
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PRC-017-0
PRC-017-0 does not specify the criteria to determine the appropriate maintenance intervals, nor does it
specify maximum allowable maintenance intervals for the protections systems. The Commission
proposes to require NERC to include a requirement that maintenance and testing of these special
protection system programs must be carried out within a maximum allowable interval that is
appropriate to the type of relaying used and the impact of these special protection system programs on
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Accordingly, giving due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO and with the expectation that the
Reliability Standard will accomplish the purpose represented to the Commission by the ERO and that
it will improve the reliability of the nations Bulk-Power System, the Commission proposes to approve
Reliability Standard PRC-017-0 as mandatory and enforceable. In addition, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA and 39.5(f) of our regulations, the Commission proposes to direct that NERC
submit a modification to PRC-017-0 that: (1) includes a requirement that maintenance and testing of
these special protection system programs must be carried out within a maximum allowable interval
that is appropriate to the type of relaying used; and (2) identifies the impact of these special protection
system programs on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
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Commission Determination
The following is the determination portion of FERC Order 693 regarding PRC-005-1.
1475 For the reasons stated in the NOPR, the Commission approves Reliability Standard PRC0051 as
mandatory and enforceable.
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1476 In addition, for the reasons discussed in the NOPR, the Commission directs the ERO to develop a
modification to PRC0051 through the Reliability Standards development process that includes a
requirement that maintenance and testing of a protection system must be carried out within a maximum
allowable interval that is appropriate to the type of the protection system and its impact on the reliability
of the Bulk-Power System. We further direct the ERO to consider FirstEnergys and ISONEs
suggestion to combine PRC0051, PRC0080, PRC0110, and PRC0170 into a single Reliability
Standard through the Reliability Standards development process.
Commission Determination
The following is the determination portion of FERC Order 693 regarding PRC-008-0.
1491. FirstEnergy and Entergy agree with the Commissions proposed directive, whereas APPA
suggests that the need for the proposal should be established first via the Reliability Standards
development process.
1492. We disagree with ISO/RTO Council and others that approval or enforcement of PRC0080 is
linked to approval of PRC0060. PRC0080 requires that a transmission provider or distribution
provider with a UFLS program (as required by its Regional Reliability Organization) shall have a UFLS
equipment and maintenance testing program in place. PRC0060 requires each regional reliability
organization to develop, coordinate and document a UFLS program that includes specified elements.
Again, we proposed to neither approve nor remand PRC0060 because it applies to a regional reliability
organization and the Commission was not persuaded that a regional reliability organizations compliance
with a Reliability Standard can be enforced as proposed by NERC. That is not the case with PRC0080,
which applies to transmission owners and distribution providers. Since PRC0080 is an existing
Reliability Standard that has been followed on a voluntary basis, transmission owners and distribution
providers are aware whether they are required to have a UFLS program in place. We approve PRC008
0 as mandatory and enforceable because it requires entities to have equipment maintenance and testing of
their UFLS programs. As stated in the Common Issues section, a reference to an unapproved Reliability
Standard may be considered in an enforcement action, but is not a reason to delay approving and
enforcing this Reliability Standard. The Commission expects that the program results will be sent to the
Regional Entities (instead of the regional reliability organizations) after they are approved.
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1493. The Commission approves Reliability Standard PRC0080 as mandatory and enforceable. In
addition, the Commission directs the ERO to develop a modification to PRC0080 through the
Reliability Standards development process that includes a requirement that maintenance and testing of a
protection system must be carried out within a maximum allowable interval that is appropriate to the type
of the protection system and its impact on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Commission Determination
The following is the determination portion of FERC Order 693 regarding PRC-011-0.
1515. The Commission approves Reliability Standard PRC0110 as mandatory and enforceable. In
addition, we direct the ERO to develop modifications to the Reliability Standard through the Reliability
Standards development process as discussed below.
1516. The Commission disagrees with APPA that the decision whether a modification is needed should
be established first by the ERO in its Reliability Standards development process. Our direction identifies
an appropriate goal necessary to assure the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The details
should be developed through the Reliability Standards development process.
1517. The Commission believes that the proposal is presently part of the process. The Commission
approves Reliability Standard PRC0110 as mandatory and enforceable. In addition, the Commission
directs the ERO to submit a modification to PRC0110 through the Reliability Standards development
process that includes a requirement that maintenance and testing of a protection system must be carried
out within a maximum allowable interval that is appropriate to the type of the protection system and its
impact on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
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VT VT
Trip Trip
Checkback Checkback
test Also verify wiring test
and test switches
Figure D-1 Pilot or Unit Transmission Line Protection System Using Power Line Carrier
Blocking Channel
The following illustrates the concept of overlapping verifications and tests as summarized in Section 10
of the paper. As an example, Figure D-1 shows protection for a critical transmission line by carrier
blocking directional comparison pilot relaying. The goal is to verify the ability of the entire two-terminal
pilot protection scheme to protect for line faults, and to avoid over-tripping for faults external to the
transmission line zone of protection bounded by the current transformer locations.
In this example, verification takes advantage of the self-monitoring features of microprocessor
multifunction line relays at each end of the line. For each of the line relays themselves, the example
assumes that the user has the following arrangements in place:
1. The relay has a data communications port that can be accessed from remote locations.
2. The relay has internal self-monitoring programs and functions that report failures of internal
electronics, via communications messages or alarm contacts to SCADA.
3. The relays report loss of dc power, and the relays themselves or external monitors report the
state of the dc battery supply.
4. The CT and PT inputs to the relays are used for continuous calculation of metered values of
volts, amperes, plus Watts and VARs on the line. These metered values are reported by data
communications. For maintenance, the user elects to compare these readings to those of
other relays, meters, or DFRs. The other readings may be from redundant relaying or
measurement systems or they may be derived from values in other protection zones.
Comparison with other such readings to within required relaying accuracy verifies instrument
transformers, wiring, and analog signal input processing of the relays. One effective way to
do this is to utilize the relay metered values directly in SCADA, where they can be compared
with other references or state estimator values.
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Protection System Maintenance A NERC Technical Reference Appendix D
5. Breaker status indication from auxiliary contacts is verified in the same way as in (2). Status
indications must be consistent with the flow or absence of current.
6. Continuity of the breaker trip circuit from dc bus through the trip coil is monitored by the
relay and reported via communications.
7. Correct operation of the on-off carrier channel is also critical to security of the protection
system, so each carrier set has a connected or integrated automatic checkback test unit. The
automatic checkback test runs several times a day. Newer carrier sets with integrated
checkback testing check for received signal level and report abnormal channel attenuation or
noise, even if the problem is not severe enough to completely disable the channel.
These monitoring activities plus the checkback test comprise automatic verification of all the protection
system elements that experience tells us are the most prone to fail. But, does this comprise a complete
verification?
CT CT
VT VT
Unverified
Trip Trip
portions of
P line relay line protection
P line relay
system
Data Data
Communications Communications
Figure D-2 Zones of Verification for the Line Protection System of Figure D-1
The dotted boxes of Figure D-2 show the segments of verification defined by the monitoring and
verification practices just listed. These segments are not completely overlapping, and the shaded regions
show elements that are not verified:
1. The continuity of trip coils is verified, but no means is provided for validating the ability of
the circuit breaker to trip if the trip coil should be energized.
2. Within each line relay, all the microprocessors that participate in the trip decision have been
verified by internal monitoring. However, the trip circuit is actually energized by the
contacts of a small telephone-type ice cube relay within the line protective relay. The
microprocessor energizes the coil of this ice cube relay through its output data port and a
transistor driver circuit. There is no monitoring of the output port, driver circuit, ice cube
relay, or contacts of that relay. These components are critical for tripping the circuit breaker
for a fault.
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Protection System Maintenance A NERC Technical Reference Appendix D
3. The checkback test of the carrier channel does not verify the connections between the
relaying microprocessor internal decision programs and the carrier transmitter keying circuit
or the carrier receiver output state. These connections include microprocessor I/O ports,
electronic driver circuits, wiring, and sometimes telephone-type auxiliary relays.
4. The correct states of breaker and disconnect switch auxiliary contacts are monitored, but this
does not confirm that the state change indication is correct when the breaker or switch opens.
A practical solution for (1) and (2) is to observe actual breaker tripping, with a specified maximum time
interval between trip tests. Clearing of naturally-occurring faults are demonstrations of operation that
reset the time interval clock for testing of each breaker tripped in this way. If faults do not occur, manual
tripping of the breaker through the relay trip output via data communications to the relay microprocessor
meets the requirement for periodic testing.
PRC-005 does not address breaker maintenance, and its protection system test requirements can be met by
energizing the trip circuit in a test mode (breaker disconnected) through the relay microprocessor. This
can be done via a front-panel button command to the relay logic, or application of a simulated fault with a
relay test set. However, utilities have found that breakers often show problems during protection system
tests. It is recommended that protection system verification include periodic testing of the actual tripping
of connected circuit breakers.
Testing of the relay-carrier set interface in (3) requires that each relay key its transmitter, and that the
other relay demonstrate reception of that blocking carrier. This can be observed from relay or DFR
records during naturally occurring faults, or by a manual test. If the checkback test sequence were
incorporated in the relay logic, the carrier sets and carrier channel are then included in the overlapping
segments monitored by the two relays, and the monitoring gap is completely eliminated.
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Protection System Maintenance A NERC Technical Reference Appendix E
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