African Governance

NEWSLETTER JANUARY - jUNE 2017

Volume 4 #1

africas
DEMOCRATIC
DIVIDENDS AND
DEFICITS
Commemorating the
10th Anniversary of ACDEG
 In This Issue JANUARY - jUNE 2017

Volume 4 #1
04 Commissioners Foreword
05 Word from the Editor
06 The Directors Take: Drafting of the Charter
10 Feature Articles
11 Towards Universal Ratification of ACDEG for Africas Democratization
16 Victory for ACDEG: The Gambias Post-Election Crisis and Lessons for Africa
19 The State Reporting Mechanism under ACDEG
22 ACDEG: New Opportunities for Advancing Womens Political Empowerment
24 ACDEG & Youth Participation in Democratic Governance Processes

27 The Peoples Perspectives

28 Reason for Hope, Impetus for Action: Citizens Perceptions on ACDEG Priorities
34 Business and Corruption in Africa: the Relevance of ACDEG
37 Democratic Accountability in State-Society Relations: The Role of ACDEG
39 Women centred initiatives to promoting transitional justice in Africa
41 The Organisation of American States, the African Union and ACDEG: A Luta Continua
43 Addressing Illicit Financial Flows through ACDEG

45 Africa Talks DG Trends One on One

Samson Itodo - Not Too Young To Run

49 For the Records

50 2017 Election Calendar
51 ACDEG Watch
54 Understanding AGA
Publication of African Governance Architecture (AGA) 55 DPA at a Glance
Department of Political Affairs,
African Union Commission EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Roosevelt Street, W21, K19
PO Box 3243 Editor-in-Chief
Addis Ababa Khabele Matlosa
Ethiopia
Members
AUC, June 2017 Olabisi Dare
Calixte Mbari
www. aga-platform.org Salah Hammad
www.au.int/pa Rizzan Nassuna
#DGTrends Sharon Ndlovu
Sam Atoubi

Design: Laughing Gas Illustration Coordinating Editor

Printing: Lotus Printing Nebila Abdulmelik
Commissioners Foreword
Let us dedicate
ourselves to fight
together for lasting
peace and justice on
earth
The clarion call by the
AU anthem reminds
us of the raison dtre
of the Organization of
African Unity and its
successor the African
Union. We must never
lose sight of the vision
of our forbearers for
unity, solidarity and
a better life for all
peoples of Africa. The
reinvigoration of the
Pan African dream
through Agenda 2063
calls on each one of
us to reflect on our
history, take stock of
challenges as well as
achievements and seize
the opportunities that
Africa presents.
It is this deliberate and conscious effort that
will lead us to realize the aspirations laid out in
Agenda 2063. We pledged, in our formulation
of this blueprint for our continent, to build
effective, capable and inclusive states; exercise
accountable leadership and encourage active
citizenry. It is incredibly gratifying to note that
aspiration 3 and 4 of Agenda 2063 envision an
Africa of good governance, respect for human
rights, justice and the rule of law; and [which is]
04 African Governance Newsletter
peaceful and secure.
These aspirations are mirrored in the Global
Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda
2030) which call for peaceful and inclusive
societies for sustainable developmentaccess
to justice for all andeffective, accountable
and inclusive institutions at all levels (Goal
16). Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 reaffirm
the inextricable link between democratic
governance and peace and security. They
explicitly acknowledge the imperative of
ensuring synergy, coherence and coordination
between our governance and peace
architectures, namely the African Governance
Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA) respectively.
We must do more than pay lip-service to the
synergy between the two.
Ten years ago, the visions now reflected in
both Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 had
been articulated in what we know as ACDEG
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance. ACDEG is inspired by the
objectives and principles enshrined in the
Constitutive Act of the AU, particularly Articles
3 (g and h) and 4 (m), which emphasize the
significance of democratic governance, popular
participation, the rule of law and human
rights. It sets out norms, values and standards
agreed upon by AU Member States including
universal values of democracy and respect
for human rights; rule of law premised on
supremacy of the constitution; the holding of
regular, free and fair elections conducted by
competent, independent and impartial national
electoral bodies; prohibition and rejection of
unconstitutional changes of government; and
promotion and protection of the independence
of the judiciary; among others.
ACDEG is today hailed as the yardstick for
various policy and institutional initiatives
on democratic governance at continental,
regional and national levels. It has become
the overarching normative framework upon
which Member States democratic governance
progress is to be measured. The establishment
and subsequent operationalisation of AGA
and its Platform is anchored on the promotion
of AU Shared Values instruments, including
ACDEG. ACDEG also guides the work of the
African Union Commission Department of
Political Affairs.
More than ever before, the resources human,
financial, technical and intellectual are within
our grasp to fulfil the promises we have
made to present and future generations. The
contributions in this issue provide insights,
lessons and policy proposals for us to take
forward. It would behove us to take heed to the
advice provided by both young and old if the
Africa that we want and need is ever to
be realized.
HE Minata Samat Cessouma
Commissioner, Political Affairs
African Union Commission
Word from the Editor
We are honoured to
bring you the January
June 2017 Edition of
the African Governance
Newsletter. This issue
is unique for a number
of reasons. It is our
first issue in five years
and is the culmination
of our efforts to revive
this periodic newsletter
and contribute to the
body of knowledge on
democratic governance
on the continent. As the
ten year anniversary
since the adoption of
the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections
and Governance
(ACDEG), 2017 is an
opportune time to
reflect on Africas
democratic dividends
and deficits, which is
why we have chosen
this as the focus of this
issue of the African
Governance Newsletter.
The Directors Take gives us the backstory of
the drafting of the Charter and the individuals
who were involved in the early stages. Feature
Articles in this issue showcase ACDEGs
state reporting process, womens political
empowerment, youth participation and lessons
for Africa from the Gambia. Think pieces,
dubbed the Peoples Perspectives deal with a
range of themes relevant to ACDEG including
citizens perceptions of democracy, transitional
justice, addressing corruption in business,
state-society relations, stemming illicit financial
flows through effective tax regimes and Latin
Americas impact on ACDEG. I sat down with
Samson Itodo, the driving force behind Not too
Young to Run, for our one-on-one interview,
Africa Talks DG Trends to discuss young people,
politics and mobilization for a more equitable
political landscape. Emphasizing the need for
greater accountability, the Newsletter includes
ACDEG Watch providing the most updated
Nebila Abdulmelik
information on the status of ratification of the
Editor, African Governance Newsletter
Charter our focus for this edition.
Considering the AU theme of 2017,
Harnessing the Demographic Dividend
through Investments in Youth, this edition
has purposefully ensured that the majority of
articles are written by young people. In fact, out
of eleven articles, seven have been authored
by young people a first for the Newsletter.
Furthermore, the one-on-one interview which
has been a tradition of this Newsletter since
its inception is also focused on youth. This is
part of both DPA and AGAs deliberate efforts
to create space for young people to articulate
their views and perspectives as well as
showcase their contributions to a peaceful and
democratically governed Africa.
We hope that these pieces inspire further
deliberation and thinking amongst citizens,
practitioners and policy makers, point to
potential areas of research and provide mpetus
for greater practice as well as highlight the
utility of ACDEG to advancing democracy on
our continent. We welcome your reflections
and thoughts on this issue. Happy reading!
January - June 2017 05
 debated and refined various drafts of the Council of the African Union. Without peace accede to APRM, it also forms a key part
Charter between 2004 and 2006. and security, democracy is likely to be of the standards and codes used in the
compromised. Without peace and democracy, self-assessment and peer review itself.

The Directors Take:

The main meetings were held as follows: (a) inclusive socio-economic development cannot Therefore, there is a symbiotic and inextricable
governmental experts meeting in May 2004 be realized on a sustainable basis. relationship between the Charter and APRM.
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; (b) preliminary

The Drafting of ACDEG consultative meetings between the lead author

Khabele Matlosa
Dr. Khabele Matlosa was the lead author in the drafting of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). He is currently the Director of Political Affairs at the
African Union Commission. Connect with him at khabelem@africa-union.org and/or @MatlosaK.
Evolution ACDEG was developed by African experts
to address Africas peculiar governance
challenges. As the lead author, I was
The African Charter on
Democracy, Elections commissioned by the Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) of the African Union Commission
and Governance
(AUC), through the then Director, Ambassador
(henceforth referred Emile Ognimba to provide technical assistance
to as ACDEG or the in the development of the Charter. Amb.
Charter) was adopted Ognimba played an important role in the
by the African Union development of the Charter, providing the
(AU) during the 8th necessary logistical support, working hand-in-
glove with his team.
Ordinary Session of
the Assembly of the
I was responsible for drafting the Charter
Heads of State and
alongside a group of eminent African
Government held on governance experts; Africas best and brightest
30th January 2007 in minds on the subject matter. We worked on
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. ACDEG for three years between 2004 and
This was a historic 2006. One of the key experts who played a
development that pivotal role in the development of the Charter
cemented Africas was Dr. Abdallah Hamdok, the current Deputy
Executive Secretary of the United Nations
irreversible commitment
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); a
to democratic renowned political economist and committed
and participatory
Pan-Africanist. At that time, Dr. Hamdok was
governance. the Regional Director for the Africa Office of
the Stockholm-based International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Africa has made considerable progress on (IDEA). Dr. Hamdok chaired all the meetings of
its democratization path: one-party rule and independent experts from all Member States
military regimes have become a taboo on of the African Union convened to validate the
the continent. Multi-partyism and regular various drafts.
elections have taken center stage in African
politics. In short, ballots have replaced bullets We also received solid legal expertise and
advice on various drafts by the then Legal
as fundamental instruments for competition
over state power. The Charter is a central part Counsel of the African Union, Justice Ben
Kioko, one of the sharpest legal minds on the
of this story of democracy-promotion in Africa
today as we celebrate the 10th anniversary of continent. Justice Kioko is currently the Vice
President of the African Court on Human and
its adoption.
Peoples Rights based in Arusha, Tanzania.
Above all, we were enthused and energized
by the political support behind the Charter
from various African leaders. Within the
AUC we received political support from
the then Commissioner for Political Affairs,
H.E. Madam Dolly Joiner Nying and the
Chairperson at the time, H.E. Alpha Oumar
Konar. As we developed the Charter, we
were inspired by experiences of other regional
intergovernmental organisations around
the world, more particularly the Democratic
Charter of the Organisation of American States
(OAS). Interestingly, in the end, the Charter is
more expansive than any other democracy
charter in the world. So far, it remains the most
comprehensive democracy treaty globally,
surpassing even the OAS Charter which
and the Department of Political Affairs in May
2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; (b) Independent
The process towards the development of the
draft Charter was triggered by the Inaugural
AU Summit of Heads of State and Government
A key factor in the development of ACDEG
was the continental conference co-hosted by
the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
Experts Meeting in November 2005 in Addis held in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. of South Africa, the African Association of
Ababa; (c) Meeting of the Government Experts During that Summit, two declarations relating Electoral Authorities (AAEA) and the African
in March 2006 in Addis Ababa; (d) Meeting to democratic governance were adopted: Union Commission (AUC) in Pretoria, South
of Independent Legal Experts in April 2006 the OAU Declaration on Principles Governing Africa from 7-10 April 2003 under theme
in Addis Ababa; (e) Government Experts Democratic Elections and the NEPAD Elections, Democracy and Governance:
and Ministerial Meetings back-to-back in Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic Strengthening African Initiatives. The
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo in June and Corporate Governance. Conference involved various key stakeholders
2006; (f) Council of Ministers Meeting and the such as the electoral management bodies,
AU Summit in July 2006 in Banjul, The Gambia politicians, academics, AUC, government
and (g) finally the adoption of the Charter The NEPAD Declaration was followed a year officials and other development partners.
during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in later by the establishment of the African Peer Participants to the Pretoria Conference agreed
January 2007. What is the value of the Charter? Review Mechanism (APRM) which introduced to the following principles of democratic
Africas own self-assessment and peer review governance:
Essence on the state of governance covering four main
thematic areas namely (a) Democracy and Entrenchment of democratic values and
The Charter draws from Africas commitment Political Governance, (b) Economic Governance institutions to promote and strengthen
to democratic and participatory governance
and Management, (c) Corporate Governance constitutionalism and good governance;
enunciated in the founding treaty of the and (d) Socio-Economic Development. While
African Union, the 2000 Constitutive Act. the Charter implores all AU Member States to
It commits the 55 AU Member States to
democratic, participatory, representative and
responsive governance under conditions
of peace, security and stability. It calls for
governance that ensures inclusive and
equitable socio-economic development.
Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act
articulate the key objectives and principles
of the AU respectively. The principal plank
of these two Articles is the unequivocal
embrace of popularly and legitimately elected
governments and an outright rejection and
condemnation of unconstitutional changes
of government in line with the 2000 Lom
Declaration. Within the framework defined in
these two Articles, the AU upholds the basic
democratic principle that elections are a
legitimate method of transfer of power and the
only democratic manner of expressing popular
sovereignty in representative democracies.
The Constitutive Act also recognizes that
sustainable democratic governance in Africa
requires political stability, peace and security in
conformity with the 2002 Protocol Relating to
the Establishment of the Peace and Security Nebila Abdulmelik

06 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 07

 Promotion and protection of all basic
human rights, freedoms and obligations
as enshrined in relevant United Nations
Human Rights Instruments and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights;
Constitutions and legal frameworks
should determine the tenure and
number of terms that a head of state and
government can stand for elections;
Political pluralism and freedom of
association, assembly, political tolerance
and promotion of free political activity;
Establishment of independent electoral
management bodies (EMBs) and other
autonomous public institutions that
support and entrench democratic
governance such as national human
rights commissions, anti-corruption
commissions, public prosecutors and
independent judiciaries;
Institutionalisation of certainty and
predictability of election rules and
procedures and uncertainty of electoral
outcomes; and
Entrenchment of a culture of
accountability of elected representatives.
The final statement adopted by conference
participants exhorted African states to
expand the frontiers of democratization. It
was this statement that formed the basis for
the development of the Draft Declaration on
Elections, Democracy and Governance - the
precursor to the Charter. A year after this
conference, the 2003 Summit of the AU Heads
of State and Government held in Maputo,
Mozambique considered the draft Declaration
on Elections, Democracy and Governance
and mandated the AUC to transform this
declaration into a Charter.
The AU convened a meeting of Government
Experts in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 15 to
17 May 2004 to discuss the Draft Declaration
on Democracy, Elections and Governance that
emanated from the Pretoria Conference and
was considered by the AU Summit in Maputo.
08 African Governance Newsletter
Specifically, the meeting recommended that:
The draft declaration contain a series of
commitments already made by Member
States in the areas of democracy and
governance, which the Commission would
like to convert into a legally binding text,
such as a Charter.
The document deals with issues of the
relationship between democracy and the
AU system; democracy and human rights;
democracy, sustainable development
and poverty alleviation; illiteracy and
conflicts; strengthening and protection of
democratic institutions; democracy and
free and fair elections, and promotion of
democratic culture.
In view of the legal nature of such a
document and the required procedures
of a Charter, the Commission should be
mandated to convene a meeting of legal
and other experts to examine the draft
and put it in appropriate legal language
before submitting it to the Policy Organs
of the Union for adoption.
Thus, the Charter espouses Africas firm
commitment to democracy. It was
adopted in 2007. It came into force in 2012, a
year declared by the AU Policy Organs as the
Year of Shared Values. The Charter is, indeed,
one of the key shared values of the African
Union. The fifteenth country to ratify the
Charter facilitating its coming into force was
Cameroon. What is the future trajectory of the
Charter?
Future Trajectory
Although a progressive step forward, the
adoption of the Charter, in and of itself, may
not be enough for the transformation of the
governance architecture in Africa. The 55
Member States of the AU now need to sign,
ratify, domesticate and implement the Charter.
Evidence suggests that the AU has developed
numerous progressive normative frameworks
to date. However, many of these norms have
not been translated into policy practice by
way of law reform, reform of governance
institutions, transformation of political culture
and socio-economic policy reviews and
adaptation. AU Member States are implored to
ratify, domesticate and implement ACDEG and
regularly report on implementation progress.
It is worth reiterating that the Charter was
prompted by the desire on the part of African
States to reverse the cancerous culture of
unconstitutional changes of government. The
Charter has a specific section that deals with
this problem in detail and suggests strategies
that need to be adopted in order to eradicate
this culture. Despite this commitment on the
part of AU Member States, which also draws
from the 2000 Lom Declaration, military
coups have taken place with the earliest
after the adoption of the Charter being in
Mauritania. Ironically, Mauritania was the very
first country to ratify the Charter and the very
first to breach it due to a military coup in 2008.
The Charter has also expanded the definition
of unconstitutional changes of government
through inclusion of Article 23 sub-section
5 which provides that unconstitutional
manipulation of tenure of office of government
amounts to unconstitutional change of
government. Despite this provision, the
phenomenon of manipulation of constitutions
aimed at prolonging terms of office of
incumbents is still with us. This trend led to
the AU Peace and Security Council mandating
DPA to develop guidelines on constitutional
amendments to ensure AU Member States
amend their constitutions in line with Article
10 of ACDEG and avoid the possibility of
breaching the Charter as per Article 23.
Ideally, elections are supposed to ensure
democratic governance and facilitate peace
and political stability. Democracy cannot
prevail and become sustainable if peace and
political stability are non-existent. By the same
token, under conditions of protracted violent
conflict, war and political instability, socio-
economic development is impossible. Africas
diverse societies are often conflict-prone
and such conflicts threaten nation-building
and social harmony. Whereas these conflicts
occur periodically, they tend to be exacerbated
during elections. This is so, given that elections
entail political contestation over the control of
the state and in such contestation, stakes tend
to be very high.
The electoral contestation becomes so fierce
that elections at times are considered war
by other means. In some instances, ballots
are disregarded as contestants quickly resort
to bullets to capture state power. As bullets
replace ballots, the main victims are often
ordinary citizens who get caught in the
cross-fires of power struggles. As the English
adage goes, when two elephants fight, it is the
grass that suffers most. In the process, politics
becomes militarised and the military becomes
politicised all in the name of contestation
for state power and in the process, elections
become meaningless. It is imperative that
elections are transformed to become conflict
management instruments rather than triggers
for violent conflict, war and political instability.
Effective conflict management structures,
including national infrastructures for peace,
should be strengthened and/or established
to ensure that electoral disputes are handled
amicably and dealt with early enough before
they escalate into violent conflict. Africa needs
to invest much more in structural prevention of
conflicts if the noble goal of the AU to silence
Nebila Abdulmelik
guns and end all wars on the continent by
the year 2020 is to be realised. The Charter
provides a perfect platform for structural marginalised groups mainly women, youth,
prevention of crisis. people with disabilities, minorities etc. With
these conditions in place, Africa is ripe for a
Furthermore, given the socio-economic, transformative and sustained democratic
religious, ethnic and gender cleavages that governance landscape that is responsive to the
mark diversity of African societies, power- needs of its people.
sharing arrangements (at both national and
sub-national levels) should be institutionalised
so as to transform politics from a zero-
sum game into a positive-sum game. By
encouraging constitutional order, ACDEG has
a huge potential to advance constitutionalism
and rule of law in Africa as well as to ensure
the holding of democratic, credible and
peaceful elections. The Charter provides
avenues for constructive management of
diversity in Africa, including the setting up of
national infrastructures for peace. Three main
conditions are necessary to realize the promise
of ACDEG: (a) transformative and visionary
leadership, (b) effective, efficient and resilient
institutions and (c) citizen participation and
engagement taking due regard to inclusion of
January - June 2017 09
 Towards
Universal Ratification of ACDEG
for Africas Democratisation
Prof Andr Mbata Mangu
Andr Mbata Mangu is a Research Professor at the College of Law, University of South Africa, and Editor-in-Chief of the African Journal of Democracy and Governance
(https://journals.co.za/content/journal/ajdg). Connect with him at amangu@idgpa.org.

Objectives and Principles of ACDEG

The African Charter on
The adoption of ACDEG was an important moment in the history of a continent which was
Democracy, Elections
infamously known for its unconstitutional changes of government, bad governance and human
and Governance
rights abuses. The objectives and principles of ACDEG are the following:
(ACDEG) was adopted
at the eighth Ordinary
Session of the
Conference of Heads of

FEATURE
State and Government
of the African Union
(AU) in Addis Ababa,

ARTICLES
Promotion of universal values and Promotion of the rule of law based Promotion of the regular holding of
Ethiopia, on principles of democracy and respect on respect and supremacy of the transparent, free and fair elections
for human rights Constitution in order to institutionalise legitimate
30 January 2007. governments and democratic
changes of governments

On 16 January 2012, Cameroon became

Towards Universal Ratification of ACDEG for Africas Democratization
Victory for ACDEG: The Gambias Post-Election Crisis and Lessons for Africa
The State Reporting Mechanism under ACDEG
ACDEG: New Opportunities for Advancing Womens Political Empowerment
ACDEG & Youth Participation in Democratic Governance Processes
the 15th AU Member State to deposit its
instrument of ratification with the Chairperson
of the AU Commission (AUC). In line with
its Article 48, ACDEG came into force on 15
February 2012, which was the thirtieth day Interdiction, rejection and Promotion and protection of Promotion of political pluralism,
condemnations of unconstitutional the separation of powers and including the role, rights and duties of
after the deposit of the fifteenth instrument changes of governments independence of the judiciary the opposition
of ratification. The year 2017 therefore marks
the tenth anniversary of the adoption of
ACDEG and the fifth of its entry into force. This
article reflects on the importance of universal
ratification of ACDEG and its meaning for
democratization in Africa.

Instauration, reinforcement and
consolidation of good governance
through promotion of democratic
practice and culture
Promotion of the prevention and
fight against acts of corruption and
impunity
Promotion of effective and equitable
participation of citizens, including
women, in the democratic and
development processes and in
the governance of public
affairs. (Articles 2 3)

010 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 11

 Ratification Status of ACDEG by AU Member States

Signed, ratified and Still to ratify and Never Ratified and deposited
deposited their deposit their signed or their instruments but
instruments instruments ratified never signed

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
ACDEG embodies the following elements Cote dIvoire
that can help define a democratic state Democratic Republic of Congo
in Africa: Djibouti
Respect for the rule of law and human rights, Egypt
Nebila Abdulmelik
including the right of women to participate in Equatorial Guinea
government on the same footing as men;
Eritrea
Regular, free, fair and credible elections;
Ratification of ACDEG It shall assist State Parties and coordinate
Ethiopia
evaluation on implementation of the Charter Separation of powers;
The Chairperson of the AUC plays an with other key AU organs including the Pan- Fight against acts of corruption and impunity; Gabon
important role in the ratification, accession, African Parliament, the Peace and Security Rejection and condemnation of Gambia
implementation and reporting on ACDEG. He Council (PSC), the Human Rights Commission, unconstitutional changes of government; and
Ghana
or she is the depository of ACDEG and shall the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Political pluralism.
inform all AU Member States of the signing, the Economic Social and Cultural Council, the Guinea
ratification, accession, and coming into force, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Guinea-Bissau
reservations and requests for amendments appropriate national-level structures (Article Kenya
of ACDEG. The Chairperson shall also register 45). synthesized report on the implementation of
ACDEG with the General Secretariat of the ACDEG (Article 49). On 17 March 2017, Togo Lesotho
United Nations (UN) in line with Article 102 of State Parties are bound to report every two became the first AU Member State to report Liberia
the UN Charter and according to Article 51 of years to the AUC on their implementation of to AUC. As of 31 March 2017, out of the 55 AU Libya
ACDEG. ACDEG. Reports are copied to the relevant Member States, 45 had signed ACDEG but only
AU organs for appropriate action within their 30 had ratified it. Ten never signed and 26 have
As for the AUC, it is the central coordinating respective mandates. Through the Executive not ratified it and deposited their instruments
structure for the implementation of ACDEG. Council, AUC should prepare and submit to the of ratification.1
Assembly, for appropriate measures, a

12 African Governance Newsletter 1

https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-sl-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf (accessed on 15 March 2017) January - June 2017 13
 ACDEG and Democratisation
in Africa
ACDEG aims to advance Africas
Signed, ratified and Still to ratify and Never Ratified and deposited democratisation by, inter alia:
deposited their deposit their signed or their instruments but
instruments instruments ratified never signed Promoting African governance standards,
which include universal values and
principles such as respect for human
rights, supremacy of the Constitution and
Madagascar the rule of law, regular, transparent, free
Malawi and fair elections, interdiction, rejection
and condemnation of unconstitutional
Mali
changes of governments, independence
Mauritania of the judiciary, separation of powers,
Mauritius democratic culture and practice, good
Morocco governance, fight against corruption and
impunity, political pluralism, sustainable
Mozambique development, peace and security (Articles
Namibia 2-22, 27, 36-43);
Nigeria
Defining unconstitutional changes of
Niger
governments and empowering the AU
Rwanda PSC and Assembly to impose sanctions
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic on the perpetrators of unconstitutional
changes of governments or Member
Sao Tome & Principe
States that would have supported or
Senegal encouraged them (Articles 23 26, 46);
Seychelles
Sierra Leone Stressing the nexus between democracy,
governance, sustainable development, Nebila Abdulmelik
Somalia peace and human security (Articles 2, 3,
South Africa 11-13, 36-43);
South Sudan Conclusion: Call for Action It would mean that African States, their leaders,
Encouraging cooperation between the CSOs, and citizens are committed and serious
Sudan The celebration of the 10th anniversary of the about the promotion of democratic principles
AUC and RECs on the implementation
Swaziland of ACDEG and massive participation of adoption of ACDEG and the fifth anniversary and institutions, popular participation, human
stakeholders, particularly civil society of its entry into force provides an opportunity rights, the rule of law, good governance,
Tanzania
organisations (Articles 43-45). for AU Member States to renew their condemnation and unconstitutional changes
Togo commitments under Articles 3 and 4 of the AU of governments, sustainable development,
Tunisia Universal ratification of ACDEG will contribute Constitutive and achieve universal ratification peace and security as enshrined in the AU
of ACDEG. The remaining 25 Member States Constitutive Act and ACDEG.
Uganda to deepening democratic governance, which is
critical for sustainable development, peace, and should follow suit by ratifying ACDEG. All 55 AU
Zambia Member States are required to sign and ratify
security. All stakeholders at the continental,
Zimbabwe regional and national levels should therefore ACDEG. Signing is not enough when consent
be encouraged to urgently ratify the Charter. to be bound is to be expressed by ratification.
Universal ratification and compliance with
ACDEG should be encouraged by AUC and
RECs.

14 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 15

Victory for ACDEG:
The Gambias Post-Election Crisis and
Lessons for Africa
Sait Matty Jaw
Sait Matty Jaw is a social justice and political activist from Gambia. He is currently studying for his Masters of Public Administration at the University of Bergen. His research interests
include: regime change in Sub-Saharan Africa, political parties and elections, social movements and local government politics. Connect with him @saitjaw and/or saitjaw@gmail.com.
In a stunning defeat,
Yahya Jammeh lost the
Gambian Presidency
in December 2016 to
the relatively unknown
Adama Barrow.
Jammehs defeat at
the polls ended his
22 year iron-grip on
the tiny West African
nation with a population
of approximately two
million people.
His unexpected initial acceptance of the
election results on December 2nd by and
large brought The Gambia back to her
democratization goal. However, a week
later, Jammeh made a melodramatic U-turn,
characteristic of his eccentric nature, thus
culminating into a two month political impasse
that forced tens of thousands to flee into
Senegal while a greater number was internally
displaced. Jammehs refusal to leave power,
followed by a series of diplomatic talks, led
to a military intervention from ECOWAS.
Subsequently, Jammeh was sent peacefully
into exile in Equatorial Guinea without any
actual military action.
This piece first briefly explores why Jammeh
lost the election. While it contends that there
are many possible explanations, one
16 African Governance Newsletter
What was different in 2016 was not the fact
that his repressive tactics subsided, rather they
escalated4. It was the fact that young people
decided to use their demographic numbers
that brought about change5. In the previous
elections, young people that make up about
65% of The Gambias population were apolitical
and had less interest in the countrys political
process. However, the death of Solo Sandeng6
at the hands of Jammehs secret agents
ignited a sense of patriotism within the youth
population. Instead of taking to the streets,
young people decided to get their voters card
cannot negate the role of social media. en masse. This new found interest in Gambian
Secondly, it briefly discusses the important politics among young Gambians both at home
role played by regional organizations, and in the diaspora started taking effect,
particularly ECOWAS and the AU as well as primarily within the opposition ranks. Young
the UN in line with the notion of preventive people demanded the opposition to unite, a
diplomacy. Finally, the Gambian experience is call the leaders could not resist. Another reason
situated within the general framework of the for greater youth interest had to do with the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and dire economic situation of the country and
Governance (ACDEG). This piece particularly the growing unemployment rate7 that forced
questions how we can assess The Gambias many youth to embark on perilous journeys to
democratic prospects in light of ACDEG. While Europe.
there are many lessons to learn from the
Gambian case, the idea of collective security for Although the economy was important, the
democratic governance must be promoted on December 2016 elections to many young
the continent. Gambians was not about what job the coalition
government could provide, but rather about
Why Jammeh Lost ending decades of dictatorship and giving
Gambia another chance. It was about a respect
Jammeh, who seized power in a military coup
for human rights, freedom and democracy.
in 1994, was poised to win his fifth term. The
Above all, it was protecting The Gambias
previous four elections he won in 1996, 2001,
peaceful coexistence and unity among its
2006 and 2011, were speculated not to have
various ethnic and religious groups, which
been credible and transparent by international
Jammeh threatened by firstly declaring the
observers. ECOWAS boycotted the elections
Gambia an Islamic state and secondly by
twice. First in 2011 and again in 2016 when
insulting the Mandinka8 ethnic group.
the regional body cited an unacceptable
level of control of the electronic media by the
During the campaign period, an unprecedented
party in power and opposition and electorate
number of young people joined the
cowed by repression and intimidation2. In his
oppositions political rallies, using social media
22 year presidency, Jammeh whittled state
to canvas for support. At the end of the three-
institutions and reified a personality cult. He
horse race, about 60% of Gambian electorates
enacted laws that stifled human rights, press
rejected Jammeh and the IEC chairman
freedom, unfavorable electoral laws and forced
declared Barrow as the duly elected President
Gambians to live in a perpetual state of fear.3
of The Gambia after winning 43.34% of the
votes.9
2
https://gambia.smbcgo.com/2016/11/28/ecowas-boycotts-gambias-polls-second-time/
3
There have been reports of forced disappearance, murder, torture, detention without trial etc.
Social media was particularly instrumental
in many respects to the ousting of Jammeh.
This was the case as public media was not
accessible and amenable to the opposition
and divergent views, coupled with the
severe suppression of independent media.
Consequently, social media became the only
space for citizens to access and exchange
ideas and information. With scores of Gambian
journalists forced to flee, a host of them set
up online newspapers and radio stations
abroad that had better access to news inside
the country than those at home. Hence these
online radio and newspapers became the
major source of news about the regime. For
example, it was observed that many public
servants would first log-on to these online
media outlets when they get to their offices
in the morning to access the latest news
about the country. A similar trend could
also be noticed across The Gambia, even in
villages. This served to severely damage the
reputation of Jammehs regime as Gambians
began to receive horrible stories of crimes
and corruption. What this also meant was that
disgruntled civil servants or security personnel
and indeed common citizens realized that they
could secretly send information to these online
media outlets for public consumption.
Melenama
This had a damaging effect on the regime,
while also generating huge public discontent
hence the resulting voting pattern.
This also meant that various WhatsApp groups
began to spring up, as parties and youth
groups as well as ordinary Gambians began
to create chat groups to communicate and
disseminate information. These WhatsApp
groups became influential platforms where
targeted voice messages were sent and shared
across platforms. With voice messages, the
illiteracy challenge was overcome, as one
would see old men and women in the villages
listening to these messages. This helped to
energize electorates and encourage them to
vote. In addition to WhatsApp forums, similar
groups were created on Viber and Facebook.
The use of the Internet through social media
and online media outlets became the single
most powerful tool that mobilized and
organized the people at all levels to stand up
to Jammeh.
With social media, the Gambian diaspora was
also able to generate funds for the opposition
given that in 2015, Jammeh made changes to
the electoral laws by raising fees for contesting
for political position to an exorbitantly high
rate. It is estimated that funds generated
by the diaspora amounted to over 120,000
Euros, which was channeled to the opposition
coalition to fund their campaign. Without
sufficient financial resources, Jammeh would
have had a greater advantage.
See Human Rights Watch report on Gambia https://
4
www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/17/gambia-two-decades-
fear-and-repression
5
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/
nov/30/young-gambians-ready-to-vote-out-dictatorial-
yahya-jammeh-regime
6
On 14th April 2016, National Youth of UDP led a youth
protest demanding for electoral reforms ahead of the
2016 presidential elections. In 2015 Jammeh change
the electoral act increasing deposits for Presidential
candidates. Also the age limit (30-65 years) for presidency
in the constitution barred many politicians including the
UDP party leader from contesting the elections.
7
The youth unemployment rate in the Gambia was around
40%.
8
The Mandinkas are the largest ethnic group in Gambia
with about 40% of the population.
9
Gambias electoral system is First past the post system.
Jammeh introduced this system in 2001 to avoid going
into second round of voting.
January - June 2017 17
The Political Impasse
On December 9th, in a late night televised
broadcast, Yahya Jammeh rejected the
December 1st election results that ended
his 22 year rule citing the Independent
Electoral Commissions dishonesty and the
unprecedented level of foreign interference
in the election. He called for a fresh election
to be officiated by a God fearing IEC and
at such a time that Gambia has money
to organize a fresh election. Jammehs
broadcast immediately generated widespread
condemnation at home and across the globe
led by The Gambias only neighbor, Senegal.
Jammehs refusal to accept the wishes of the
electorates created a refugee situation and
at the same time ushered a second phase
of the resistance. Although he deployed the
military in the streets, Gambians and young
people in particular were ready to defend
their votes in a non-violent manner. The
Gambia Bar Association issued a bold and
damning condemnation on December 13 in
which it described the actions of Jammeh as
treasonable. From that moment, scores of
Gambian CSOs were emboldened to follow
suit and issue tough statements calling on
Jammeh to step down. Several CSOs and
communities dispatched delegations to
meet the president-elect at his residence in
solidarity. Soon after, a movement started
by young people, #GambiaHasDecided
emerged gaining momentum through social
media, t-shirts and billboards and additional
mediums to denounce Jammehs antics. The
movement became so popular that Jammeh
dispatched soldiers to pull down billboards
and arrest scores of youths wearing t-shirts
that had messages supporting Adama
Barrows presidency. While Gambians were
defending their democracy, ECOWAS, AU and
UN engaged in sustained shuttle diplomacy
with a view to finding a peaceful solution to
the political crisis. The regional bodies were
at the same time also heavily engaged on the
diplomatic front to secure a concession from
Jammeh to hand over power at the end of his
18 African Governance Newsletter
term. wThus, as preventive diplomacy by these
inter-governmental bodies reached a cul-de-
sac, due to Jammehs intransigence, an armed
intervention force by ECOWAS to defend the
will of the Gambian people became the last
resort. This option would later ensure that the
new president was inaugurated on January
19. Following a series of failed talks, ECOWAS
deployed a military contingent led by Senegal
to forcefully oust Jammeh. Days after Adama
Barrows inauguration in Senegal, Jammeh
went into into exile to Equatorial Guinea under
the threat of the intervention force.
# Gambia has
decided
The Gambia and ACDEG
The political impasse in Gambia was a clear
test to West Africa in particular and Africa at
large. It tested Member States commitment
to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance as well as the ECOWAS
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
However, the seriousness of this commitment
was seen in the Gambian case. Article 9 of
the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and
Good Governance and Article 23 (4) of ACDEG
clearly stipulated that losers of elections must
concede defeat to the winning party. Refusal
to do so is in contravention to both the AU
Charter and the ECOWAS Protocol which State
Parties are expected to uphold and abide by.
The AUs commitment to ACDEG did not start
during the impasse, but rather started
as far back as April 2016 following a brutal
crackdown on peaceful protesters in Banjul.
A high level delegation led by the then
Commissioner for Political Affairs, HE Aisha L.
Abdullahi, visited the Gambia to assess both
the state of readiness as well as to encourage
a free and fair election. AUs proactive
approach was indispensably instrumental
to the peaceful election and to resolving the
impasse. Its commitment to also defend the
outcome of the election was very visible. Hence
the stance and posture taken by the AU could
be considered as a model for future resolution
of electoral conflicts in region. However, this
must be backed by the sub-regional bodies
proactive stance as well. Therefore SADC, EAC
and other sub-regional blocs must take heed
from ECOWAS.
Conclusion
As the AU celebrates 10th Anniversary of
ACDEG, it is important to note that ACDEG is
being defended by the citizens of Africa on a
daily basis. It is also important to note that the
Youth Engagement strategy of AGA was well
utilized by and guided the youth of Gambia
even though many of the leaders were in exile.
If the Gambian case has taught us anything,
it is that the promotion and protection of
democracy and good governance is the
responsibility of all. If a small nation such as
The Gambia can defeat an entrenched dictator
through the ballot, the rest of the continent, if
not the world, can do the same.
The State Reporting Mechanism
under ACDEG
Rizzan Nassuna
Rizzan Nassuna is the Democracy and Governance Expert at the AGA Secretariat. She leads on the state reporting process for ACDEG. She is passionate about tracking democratic gover-
nance trends on the continent. Connect with her at nrizzan@gmail.com and/or @nrizzan.
Since its inauguration
in 2002, the African
Union (AU) has adopted
progressive normative
frameworks towards
the advancement
of the democratic
governance agenda on
the continent. Unlike
the Organisation of the
African Unity (OAU),
which was established
to among other things
defend the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and
Nebila Abdulmelik
independence of African
countries as well as
and instruments adopted by the AU, including Commission (AUC) to put in place measures
eradicate all forms of
Agenda 2063 and the African Charter on and modalities to support AU Member
colonialism from Africa, Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). States to establish the required capacities
the AU was partly Central to the AU democratic governance and processes for monitoring and reviewing
established to deal with agenda, is the promotion of the ratification, domestication efforts. In an effort to give
continental challenges domestication and implementation of the AU effect to this, among other Declarations
in a new manner that Shared Values Instruments , including ACDEG. and Decisions of the Assembly, the AUC has
would address their This agenda is premised on a Declaration over the years established frameworks and
structural root causes. on the Theme of the 2011 Summit: Towards mechanisms, including the African
Greater Unity and Integration Through Shared Governance Architecture (AGA).
Values (Assembly/AU/Decl.1 (XVI)), in which
the AU Heads of State and Government
One of the objectives of the AU is to promote
noted the challenges in promoting, ratifying
democratic principles and institutions, popular
and domesticating instruments of Shared 10
Discussion Paper: Towards Greater Unity and
participation and democratic governance Integration through Shared Values. 23 November 2010.
Values and reaffirmed their commitment to Although Shared Values has never been formally defined
as buttressed by Article 3(g and h) and speed up the ratification and domestication within the AU, it is generally conceived as those norms,
Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act of AU. of the instruments of Shared Values. In the principles and practices that have been developed and
acquired, which provide the basis for collective actions
These ideals are further reinforced by norms, same Declaration, the AU Heads of State and and solutions in addressing the political, economic and
pronouncements, decisions, policy frameworks Government urged the African Union social challenges that impede Africas integration
and development.
January - June 2017 19
AGA and ACDEG
AGA is inspired by the Constitutive Act of
the AU that expresses the determination of
the Union to promote and protect human
and peoples rights, consolidate democratic
institutions and culture, and ensure good
governance and the rule of law. AGA was
formally launched by the AUC in June 2011, in
response to a Decision of the 15th Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of AU Heads of State
and Government (AU/Dec.304 (XV) held in
July 2010, which called for among other things
putting in place a Pan-African Architecture on
Governance. As such, AGA was established as
a platform for dialogue between the various
stakeholders who are mandated to promote
participatory governance and strengthen
democracy in Africa, in addition to translating
the objectives of the legal and policy
pronouncements in the AU Shared Values .
AGAs establishment is further grounded in
the AU norms, pronouncements, decisions
and instruments, particularly ACDEG. Adopted
on 30 January 2007 and having come into
force on 16 February 2012, ACDEG has 30
State Parties out of 55 AU Member States. It
provides a continental normative framework
for the promotion and consolidation of
democratic governance, rule of law and human
rights. It consolidates commitments in line with
past OAU and AU decisions and declarations
related to democratic governance. The
Charter is composed of eleven (11) Chapters,
which set out principles and commitments
for AU Member States to nurture a culture of
democracy, rule of law, human rights and peace
through the condemnation of unconstitutional
changes of government.
State Reporting Under ACDEG
By ratifying ACDEG, State Parties commit to
submit every two years, from the date the
Charter comes into force for that particular
country, a report to the AUC on the legislative
or other relevant measures taken to give
effect to the principles and commitments of
the Charter. In line with this provision, 23 of 30
States Parties to ACDEG are due to submit
20 African Governance Newsletter
ACDEG obliges State Parties to:
Take legislative, executive and
administrative actions to ensure that
national laws and regulations are in
line with the principles and
commitments of the Charter
Promote political will as a necessary
condition for the attainment of the
goals of the Charter
Ensure wider dissemination of the
Charter and all relevant legislations
among the citizens and
other stakeholders
Submit a report every two years from
the date the Charter comes into force
for that particular State, on measures
taken to implement the Charter
their state report. Thus far, only one State Party
Republic of Togo has submitted its initial
report on the implementation of the Charter.
Critical to the workings of AGA is its
institutional framework the African
Governance Platform which was launched
in June 2012 as a basis for facilitating
harmonisation of instruments and coordination
of democratic governance initiatives in
Africa. The Platform is composed of AU
Organs, Institutions and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs), with a formal mandate for
the promotion and sustenance of participatory
governance, democracy and human rights in
Africa. Specifically, Rule 4 (a) of the Rules of
Procedure of the African Governance Platform
mandates the Platform, under the coordination
of AUC, to serve as the evaluation mechanism
for the implementation of ACDEG as envisaged
under Articles 44, 45 and 49 of the Charter
and as elaborated in the Guidelines for State
Parties Reporting.
Adopted by the Executive Council during the
January 2016 Summit held in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, the Guidelines for State Parties
Reporting are intended to provide a framework
for preparation and submission of state reports
on the legislative, or other relevant measures
taken with a view to giving effect to the
principles and commitments of the Charter.
The State reporting process under
ACDEG provides an opportunity for
State Parties to:
Reaffirm their commitments to
uphold the provisions of the Charter
Report on efforts undertaken to fulfil
their obligations under the Charter
Measure progress towards the
implementation of the Charter and
assess the effectiveness of national
mechanisms involved in the process
Identify obstacles and establish
successful collaborative relationships
with other State Parties, AU Organs,
Institutions and RECs, and national
stakeholders
Identify challenges encountered in
the fulfilment of their commitments
to the Charter and develop
home-grown solutions
According to the Guidelines, State Parties The review processes of the State Parties
are expected to submit two types of State reports will be coordinated by the AGA
reports an initial report and a periodic report. Secretariat based at the Department of
The initial report is expected to provide the Political Affairs of the AUC.
baseline conditions for a reporting State, which
will inform compliance evaluation for that Call for Action
given State. On the other hand, the periodic
report will be used to track improvements and The ultimate purpose of the State reporting
achievements in the democratic governance process under ACDEG is to ensure effective
situation of a reporting State, focusing on new implementation of and compliance to the
developments, achievements and challenges. principles and commitments of the Charter by
The submission of State Parties reports is State Parties. This speaks directly to Aspiration
expected to be made to the Chairperson 3 of Agenda 2063, which envisages an Africa
of AUC by a national authority that will be of participatory governance, democracy,
empowered by the concerned State Party to respect for human rights, justice and the rule
do so. of law. As Africa strives to build a culture of
good governance, democratic values, gender
In order to ensure diversity, effective equality, respect for human rights, justice
participation and inclusivity of all concerned and rule of law, it is critical for AU Member
in the ACDEG State reporting processes, States to universally ratify and implement the
State Parties are required to establish a principles and commitments in the Shared
multi-stakeholder national institutional Values instruments, including ACDEG. As
framework. This will be composed of line Africa celebrates the 10th anniversary of the
ministries, agencies/institutions and non-state adoption of ACDEG, there is no better time for
actors, including civil society organisations. State Parties to submit their initial reports on
The framework shall be responsible for the implementation of the Charter, in order to
the coordination, monitoring and reporting take stock of the achievements and challenges
in the democratisation trajectory of Africa.
activities on the implementation of ACDEG.
On receipt of the reports, the AUC Chairperson
is obliged to send a copy of the report to the
relevant organs of the AU (that constitute
the African Governance Platform) for review
within their respective mandates. This process
is envisaged to take a maximum of three
(3) months. The review process of the State
Reports will take the shape of constructive
dialogues between Members of the African
Governance Platform and reporting State
Parties, including non-state actors. The
dialogues shall provide an inclusive forum for
an interactive review and discussion of a given
State Partys report, including identification
of challenges faced in the implementation of
ACDEG and practical solutions to the same.
The observations and recommendations from
the State reports review processes will be
compiled in a synthesis report. This will be
submitted to the AU Assembly through the
Executive Council by the AUC Chairperson as
per Article 49 (3) of ACDEG.
January - June 2017 21
ACDEG:
Specifically, Article 29 of the Charter recognizes the legislative branch12. In addition, the last leadership and participation in political processes.
the crucial role of women in development and few years have also witnessed a regression in The AU must call on all Member States to
strengthening democracy. It places an obligation some of the countries that were hitherto on intensify efforts towards the implementation

New Opportunities for Advancing

on State Parties to create the necessary the rise particularly on womens participation in of Article 29 of ACDEG to further enhance
conditions for full and active participation of parliament. For instance, between 2012 and 2017 womens access to power and their meaningful

Womens Political Empowerment

women in decision-making and also in electoral
processes5. In this regard, ACDEG places
additional obligations on AU Member States to
broaden the democratic space to enable women
Tsion Belay Alene
Tsion Belay Alene is a human rights advocate who is passionate about gender equality and womens empowerment. She is currently working as a Governance and Democracy Analyst at the to play their rightful roles in political and
African Governance Architecture (AGA) Secretariat based at the African Union Commissions Department of Political Affairs. Connect with her at: tsionalene@gmail.com and/or @tsionbelay. decision-making processes.
All of these initiatives have created a favorable
environment for the advancement of womens
political empowerment agenda. In the last two
Beyond comprising
decades, significant improvements have been
the majority in terms
recorded with women increasingly taking up
of population, women
key political positions such as presidents/prime
are a cornerstone of ministers, vice-presidents, house speakers, chief
the percentage of women parliamentarians has participation, representation and leadership at
shown a decline in Seychelles (from 43.8% to all levels of decision making structures in the
21.2%), Nigeria (from 6.8% to 5.6%), Malawi (from quest for the attainment of continental and global
22.3 to 16.7), and Mauritius (from 18.8 to 11.6)13. gender parity targets.
This is a clear indication that progress is not given
and it requires relentless efforts to sustain the
gains made so far.
Conclusion
The importance of womens political
empowerment cannot be over-emphasized.
Meaningful engagement of women in politics
enhances democracies through achieving 5
ACDEG, Article 29

economic development justices, and cabinet ministers. Several women justice, promoting gender-sensitive policy issues, 6
Osei-Afful, Rhoda. Beyond the Numbers: Womens Inclusion
and making use of womens resources for the in Political Processes in Africa. Africa Up Close, May 2014.
and play a crucial role now head powerful ministerial portfolios like Available at: https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/beyond-
in building a peaceful Finance in Nigeria and Defense in South Africa, betterment of society14. A democracy without the the-numbers-womens-inclusion-in-political-processes-in-
full and meaningful participation of half of the africa/
and prosperous Africa1. among others6. Enhanced womens political
population remains forever inadequate.
Nonetheless, despite participation is demonstrated by the increase in According to the 2017 data from the Inter- Parliamentary
7

Union, women now occupy 23.8% of parliamentary seats in

their contribution, the number of women in national parliaments Sub-Saharan Africa, which is slightly higher than the world
with Rwanda - 63.8%, Senegal - 42.7% and South Even though the achievement recorded in average of 23.4%: Inter- Parliamentary Union, 2017
available data indicates
Africa - 41.5% among others7. Most of these increasing womens participation in national
that African women parliaments is laudable, the overall picture of
8
Report by the African Union Commission Chairperson on
gains are evident in countries that have instituted the Implementation of the Women, peace and security Agenda
have largely been womens political participation is still below in Africa, July 2016. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/africa/
special quotas for women8. osaa/pdf/pubs/2016womenpeacesecurity-auc.pdf
on the peripheries of Nebila Abdulmelik
the threshold, with only a few women holding
political processes2. The positions in cabinet positions, political party 9
Beyond Head Counts: How to measure African Womens
Despite these pockets of progress facilitated by political Influence. October, 2016. Available at: https://www.
low number of womens Progressive normative trends towards more More importantly, the African Charter on the plethora of progressive norms on gender leadership, and local government positions15. newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/articles/2016/10/26/beyond-
representation, equitable political participation of women Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) equality and womens participation in political Therefore, it is imperative that we give due head-counts-measure-african-womens-political-influence

participation and coupled with womens improved economic highlights specific provisions for the effective life, many countries are still slow to meet the attention to other structures of government - 10
Kandawasvika-Nhundu, Rumbidzai. Political Parties in
including the judiciary, executive, and also local Africa through a Gender Lens: International Institute for
leadership in decision- status have also played a crucial role in participation of women in political spaces. global target on improving womens political Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2013
making structures is an pushing the womens agenda forward. empowerment9. Several challenges remain in levels of governance - in order to realize the
full political empowerment of women. It is also 11
Womens Political Empowerment, Representation and
injustice that must be the realization of womens rights pursuant to Influence in Africa: A Pilot Study of Womens Leadership in
The AU has demonstrated its commitment to political participation. These include socio-cultural equally important to understand the persistent Political Decision-Making. International Republican Institute
remedied. Women provide approximately 70 per cent of (IRI), 2016.
gender equality by adopting several important
1

decisions such as the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa, the Solemn
Over the last two decades, Africa has made
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa,
significant strides in advancing womens
the AU Gender Policy, the African Womens
political empowerment. This is the result
Decade, and the Fund for African Women.
of a complex interplay of factors such as
The recently adopted Agenda 2063 also
the increasing consolidation of democracy,
recognizes the imperative of gender equality
agricultural labour and produce about 90 per cent
of all food & Women in Africa. Women in Africa:
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/
dev/poverty/womeninafrica.htm
2
See Concept Note, 8th African Union Gender Pre-
Summit on 2016 African Year of Human Rights, with
Particular Focus on the Rights of Women 17 - 21
January 2016. Available at: http://www.au.int/en/
newsevents/19536/8th-african-union-gender-pre-
summit-2016-african-year-human-rights
barriers, information and capacity gaps, political
violence, limited political will to address womens
issues and ineffective implementation of laws.
There are numerous countries in Africa that have
low number of women in parliaments, cabinets,
and as heads of state and government10. For
instance, the percentage of women members of
the single/lower house of the national legislative
challenges hindering women from playing
meaningful roles in the political processes. Efforts
must be put in place to address these challenges
through systemic political and economic
transformation for women.
As the AU commemorates the 10th Anniversary
of the adoption of ACDEG and 5th Anniversary of
its entry into force, it is important to take stock of
12
The country with the highest percentage of female ministers
is South Africa with 44.7 percent, and the country with the
lowest is Sudan with no executive women ministers and Sierra
Leone with 6.5 percent. Womens Political Empowerment,
Representation and Influence in Africa: A Pilot Study
of Womens Leadership in Political Decision-Making.
International Republican Institute (IRI), 2016.
13
Inter- Parliamentary Union report, 2012 and 2017
Phillips, Anne. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon,
14

proliferation of womens movement groups, 1995. Print

and underscores the importance of meaningful
the shift towards multiparty systems and
participation and representation of women in
3
Ndlovu, Sibonokuhle & Mutale, Sani Boniface. Emerging body ranges from a notable 61.3% in Rwanda (the the modest gains made so far in broadening the
Trends in Womens Participation in Politics in Africa. Osei-Afful, Rhoda. Beyond the Numbers: Womens Inclusion
highest) to a mere 5.6% in Nigeria (the lowest)11. space for womens political participation. This is 15

the growing drive by civil society actors in American International Journal of Contemporary in Political Processes in Africa. Africa Up Close, May 2014.
decision-making structures as a major driver Research, Vol. 3 No. 11; November 2013 Africas leadership of women in the executive also an opportunity to shine the spotlight on the Available at: https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/beyond-
fostering womens participation in leadership3 . the-numbers-womens-inclusion-in-political-processes-in-
and enabler for the achievement of its goals4 . branch is also much lower than that in the barriers in the way of realizing womens equal
4
AU Agenda 2063, Aspiration 6 africa/

22 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 23

ACDEG and
these normative instruments. These include youth participation in structural prevention Kigali Forum. Organisations such as YouthLab
the low levels of ratification of norms; limited of conflicts, peacebuilding and post conflict - South Africa, Sohoutou Initiative Benin,
capacity of national, regional and continental reconstruction and development as well as African Youth Commission, Gender Centre for

Youth Participation
institutions to implement norms; and, the often achievement of transparent and accountable Empowering Development (GenCED) Ghana,
overlooked policy & institutional attitude governance in Africa. African Youth Movement amongst others

in Democratic Governance Process

towards youth participation. have also adapted various programmes and
Through the AGA-YES, several programmes initiatives to align with continental norms and
Nonetheless, as clearly articulated in Agenda have been initiated to enhance the capacities standards. This exemplifies the value accruable
Ibraheem B. Sanusi 2063, ensuring greater access for young of AGA Platform Members to engage young from strategic and structured engagement of
Ibraheem Sanusi is a Governance expert and the Citizens Engagement Lead at the African Governance Architecture Secretariat. He is passionate about Africa and the meaningful engage- people to effectively engage and participate people in their programmes and initiatives. young people in formal processes. Through
ment of youth in Africas development. Connect with him at ibsanusi@gmail.com and/or @ibsanusi. in local governments, legislatures, judiciary These include the very successful Youth Pre- their programmes, these young people
and political parties are critical enablers for Forums to the Annual High Level Dialogue on continue to contribute to the implementation
the attainment of the continental goals and Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in of ACDEG through advocacy for the ratification
aspirations. It is therefore imperative that the Africa (DG Trends). The Forum provides a safe of ACDEG and the AYC, enhancing youth
The African continent opportunity provided by the 10th Anniversary space for intra and intergenerational dialogue participation in electoral processes and
is currently witnessing of ACDEG and the dedication of the year with the aim of ensuring youth perspectives demanding accountable and transparent
a youth bulge with 2017 by the AU to youth empowerment, is on continental democratic governance policies governance. Despite the success stories of the
leveraged to re-ignite and re-energise various are taken onboard in policy and programmatic AGA-YES, concerted efforts are still needed
huge ramifications
ongoing efforts at enhancing meaningful youth interventions. to ensure its scale up and sustainability of
for democratisation
participation, leadership and representation in initiatives launched therefrom. Such efforts
prospects of the political and governance processes at all levels. In addition, capacity building and exchange must include improved institutional, technical
continent. According programmes have been organised for and financial support to the initiatives.
to the African Union, AGA-YES: Translating Norms to youth organisations and networks to foster
about 60% of the total Action compliance and implementation of youth Conclusion
population of Africa participation norms at national, regional
is below the age of 24 Established in 2011 by the AU, the African and continental levels. Other programmes Africa has the potential to reap
Governance Architecture (AGA) is the overall and initiatives include the AU Youth in democratisation dividends leveraging the
years, and over 35% are
political and institutional framework for the Peacebuilding Initiative (AU-YPI), Africa youth bulge. However, taking advantage of
between the ages of 15
promotion and sustenance of democracy, Talks DGTrends as well as its social media this opportunity lies significantly on how
and 35 years, making governance, human rights and humanitarian AU Member States prioritise meaningful
Africa the youngest engagement initiatives. Through these
assistance on the continent. The principle programmes, several inter-regional linkages participation of young people through
continent in the world. objective of AGA is guided by the Declaration enabling policy directives, incentivization as
and partnerships have been fostered amongst
of the 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly African youth. well as inter-generational interactions and
of the Union to create a framework for engagement. Developing a continent-wide
dialogue among stakeholders with an ultimate Through the implementation of the AGA-YES, agenda for enhancing youth participation in
Despite this sheer demographic strength, Normative Context put in place measures that promote active
aim of harmonisation of AU Shared Values democratic governance processes, such as
very few young people are able to access the youth participation. Specifically, Article 11(2) youth networks and organisations have also
instruments and coordination of initiatives been able to improve their programming theAGA-YES, is a critical first step in harnessing
mainstream formal political and governance Article 31(1) and (2) of ACDEG enjoins State of the Youth Charter calls for the guarantee of
towards promoting participatory governance and foster strategic linkages between their the youth bulge for development and growth
processes. Several others are forced to take Parties to promote participation of social participation of youth in parliament and other
and consolidating democracy on the continent. programmes with regional and continental of Africa. Such a continent-wide strategy must
informal routes including through protests, groups with special needs, including the youth decision-making bodies by prescribed laws. It
aspirations and goals. For instance, the widely ensure an enabling space for youth energies,
civil disobedience etc. Yet, youth participation and people with disabilities, in governance further calls for the creation or strengthening
To ensure popular participation and citizen acclaimed #NotTooYoungToRun Campaign creativity and passion to be channeled to
in formal decision making processes process. It also enjoins systematic and of platforms for youth participation in decision-
engagement in the attainment of democracy, which seeks to advocate for constitutional, coordinated efforts aimed at deepening
could accelerate and catalyse the rapid comprehensive civic education to encourage making at local, national and continental levels
governance, and respect for human and legislative and electoral reforms that promote democratisation on the continent. AU Member
transformation envisaged by the continent full participation of social groups of governance while ensuring equal access
peoples rights on the continent, AGA increased representation of youth in political States must also put in place similar structures
in its Agenda 2063. Where then lies the with special needs in democracy and to young men and women to participate in
developed a Youth Engagement Strategy and governance institutions as well as that allow for meaningful participation of
challenge and how can the 10th Anniversary of development processes. decision-making and in fulfilling civic duties.
under its citizen engagement objectives. The processes is an offshoot of the 2014 DG Trends young people in its democratic governance
the ACDEG as well as the AU 2017 Theme on
AGA Youth Engagement Strategy (AGA- Youth Pre-Forum on Youth Equal Participation institutions. To achieve this, efforts must be
Harnessing Demographic Dividend through While it can be argued that this reference Despite these normative aspirations, the
YES) provides a framework for effective in Political Process held in Kigali, Rwanda. The made to address institutional, legal, policy
investments in Youth spur broad-based to young people in ACDEG can be at best reality is starkly different. Meaningful youth
engagement of Africas young women and campaign is coordinated by Youth Initiative for and capacity gaps as well as socio-cultural
renewed commitment to meaningful youth described as perfunctory, the African Youth participation has been hindered by several
men in democratic governance processes. This Advocacy, Growth & Advancement (YIAGA), attitudes that hinder youth participation.
engagement in political and Charter on the other hand corroborates the factors that limit the full implementation and
is intended to strengthen efforts towards Nigeria; an organisation that participated in the Furthermore, strategic and deliberate
governance process? spirit of ACDEG by enjoining State Parties to attainment of the aims and objectives of

24 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 25


investments must be made to support and
scale up impactful youth initiatives and
programmes at the national, regional and
continental levels. Africas youth have a huge
role to play in the democratisation agenda
of the continent. The large number of young
people on the continent has the potential
26 African Governance Newsletter
to either be an asset or a liability for Africas
governance and development. To avoid the
latter, AU Member States, Regional Economic
Communities, and other stakeholders must
ensure an enabling environment for their
meaningful participation and engagement in
political and governance processes.
the PEOPLES
PERSPECTIVES
Reason for Hope, Impetus for Action: Citizens Perceptions on ACDEG Priorities
Business and Corruption in Africa: the Relevance of ACDEG
Democratic Accountability in State-Society Relations: The Role of ACDEG
Women centred initiatives to promoting transitional justice in Africa
The Organisation of American States, the African Union and ACDEG: A Luta Continua
Addressing Illicit Financial Flows through ACDEG
Reason for Hope,
Do Africans want democracy? Average trends | 16 countries | 2002-2015

Impetus for Action:

100%

90%
84% 82%

Citizens Perceptions on ACDEG Priorities

80% 79%
76% 79%
76% 77% 77% 77%
77% 72% 75% 75%
70% 74%
70% 71%
67%
63% 68%
60% 63%

50%
Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi Support Democracy
47% 47%
51%
46%
Reject one-party rule 40%
Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi is the Executive Director of Afrobarometer. One of the co-founders of Afrobarometer, Professor Gyimah-Boadi is also the Executive Director of the Ghana Center
36%
for Democratic Development. He is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon, and holds a PhD from the University of California, Davis. Reject military rule 30%
He is the co-author of the book Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Prof. Gyimah-Boadi is chair of the National Council of Per- Reject one-man rule 20%
sons with Disability and a member of the Advisory Council of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. 2002/2003 2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015
Demand for democracy

Democracy African countries with high-quality Elections

Among the many ways elections are more likely to register
Despite warning signs of a democratic Many Africans are skeptical of the
to measure progress increases in popular demand for
recession, public support for democracy management and quality of elections in
towards a vision as democracy than countries with low-
is stronger than a decade ago, and most their countries.
quality elections.
rich and ambitious as
Africans say they want more democracy
the African Charter on Just half say they trust their electoral
than theyre actually getting. In a positive sign for the future of
Democracy, Elections democracy, popular demand for
commission somewhat (25%) or a lot
and Governance Large majorities of Africans support democracy still exceeds citizen
(25%).
(ACDEG), the democracy (67%) and reject authoritarian perceptions of the available supply of
perceptions of average regimes such as dictatorship (78%), Two-thirds rate their most recent election
democracy in 26 out of 36 surveyed
citizens must be military rule (73%), and one-party as completely free and fair (41%) or free
countries.
and fair, but with minor problems (24%).
counted as one of the government (78%). Smaller proportions
most important. (43%) are committed democrats who
simultaneously prefer democracy More than four in ten say that voters
and reject all three non-democratic are at least sometimes threatened
alternatives, an index we call demand for with violence at the polls (44%); that
Afrobarometer, a pan-African, non- democracy. opposition candidates are at least
partisan research network, has been sometimes prevented from running
conducting public attitude surveys on Countries vary widely in their demand (43%); that the news media never or
democracy and governance, elections, rights, for democracy. For example, while only sometimes provides fair coverage
economic conditions, and related issues since three in four Mauritians are consistent, of all candidates (43%); and that voters
1999. Its sixth round of surveys (2014/2015), in committed democrats, fewer than one are often or always bribed (43%).
36 countries in all regions of Africa, represents in 10 Mozambicans merit the same
more than three-fourths of the continents description. Women are significantly less Only one-third (34%) think that votes are
population. likely to demand democracy than men always counted fairly. Several countries
(39% vs 49%). with a history of election-related violence
On most indicators relevant to the ACDEGs express low levels of confidence in
first decade, citizens describe advances in Across 16 countries surveyed since 2002, the vote count, including Kenya (26%),
some countries and stagnation or backsliding a steady, decade-long upward trend in Zimbabwe (22%), and Nigeria (6%).
in others. Together, these voices provide both demand for democracy has ended with a
reason for hope and impetus for action. Here downward turn since 2012. Half of Africans say that elections do not
12
Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the
are a few highlights. language of the respondents choice with nationally rep-
work well as mechanisms to 1) ensure
resentative samples that yield country-level results with a that peoples views are represented
margin of sampling error of +/-2% (for a sample of 2,400)
or +/-3% (for a sample of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.
(50%) and 2) ensure that voters are able
For more on methods, survey questions, and results, as to remove non-performing leaders from
well as free access to all data and an online data analysis
tool, see www.afrobarometer.org.
office (51%).

28 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 29

Youth Engagement Corruption Few bribe-payers (14%) report the Access to justice
incidents to authorities. Among those
Political and civic engagement by African Based on Afrobarometer data, who do, most (68%) say authorities take Weak public trust, high perceptions of
youth is declining and is particularly weak Transparency International estimates that no action, and many (29%) say they corruption, and difficulties encountered
among young women. nearly 75 million Africans paid a bribe in the suffered negative consequences. when engaging with the courts make access 80%
past year some to escape punishment by to justice a challenge in many 70%
Political engagement is generally lower the police or courts, but many to get access Almost two-thirds (63%) say their African countries.
60%
among African youth than among their to basic services. government is performing badly at
elders, particularly in terms of voting (65% fighting corruption. But a narrow majority A slim majority (53%) of Africans trust the 50%
21%
of 18-35 year-olds vs. 79% of citizens A majority (55%) of Africans say (54%) says ordinary citizens can make a courts at least somewhat. One in three 40% 10%
9%
above age 35 in the last national election). corruption has increased over the difference in the fight against corruption. believes that most or all judges and 30%
7%
9%
15%
13%
previous year. magistrates are corrupt. 9%
9%
10%
20%
Young women are less interested in
24% 24%
public affairs than young men (48% vs. African publics are nonetheless convinced 10% 22% 20% 23%

60%) and less likely to discuss politics

Who is corrupt? | 36 countries | 2014/2015 of the legitimacy of judicial rulings: 0%
(61% vs. 74%). 72% say courts have the right to make Too expensive Judge did not listen No advise Too complex Long delays
decisions that people must abide by.
African youth are less likely than their Police 45% 39% 9%
Once or twice A few times Often
elders to attend community meetings Among those who had contact with the
Bussiness Leaders 41% 37% 10%
(47% vs. 57%) and to join others to raise courts, 54% say obtaining the needed
an issue (40% vs. 47%). Young womens Government ofcials 38% 44% 9% assistance was difficult, and 30% report
participation lags behind that of their paying bribes to court officials.
Tax ofcials 36% 41% 10%
male peers (by 9 percentage points, on
average). Judges and magistrates 34% 43% 13% Common problems in dealing with the
courts include long delays, difficulty
Young women are less likely than young Local government councillors 34% 45% 11%
understanding legal procedures, lack of
men to contact political or community counsel, judges who do not listen, and
Parliament 33% 44% 11%
leaders to discuss an important issue high costs.
(43% vs. 53%) or to attend a protest (8% Presidency 31% 42% 15%

vs. 13%). Poor, uneducated, and rural citizens are

Traditional leaders 21% 43% 26%
most likely to encounter problems in the
In 16 countries tracked since 2002/2003, Religious leaders 15% 40% 36% courts.
youth engagement has declined, 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
particularly interest in public affairs and Most/All are corrupt Some are corrupt None are corrupt Democracies and stable countries are
measures of civic activism. doing a markedly better job of providing
access to justice for their citizens than
autocracies and post-conflict countries.
Declining youth civic engagement | 18-35-year-olds | 16 countries | 2002-2015

70% Freedom of Association In six of 20 countries tracked since Despite high perceptions of freedom of
2008/2009, the perception of complete association, one-third (32%) of Africans
60%
Eight in 10 Africans feel at least somewhat freedom declined significantly between agree that governments should be able
50% free to join any political organisation they 2008 and 2015, led by drops of 23 to ban any organisation that goes against
want. percentage points in Benin and 21 points its policies.
40%
in Burkina Faso.
30% A majority (58%) feel completely free to
20%
associate as they wish, while one in six
(17%) feel not very or not at all free.
10% Ofcial leader / Active member of religious group
Women are somewhat less likely to feel
Ofcial leader / Active member of voluntary assosiation
0% Attended a community meeting
completely free than men, 55% vs. 60%.
2002/2003 2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015
Joined others to raise an issuse
Ofcial leader / Active member of religious group Attended a community meeting
Ofcial leader / Active member of voluntary assosiation Joined others to raise an issuse
30 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 31
Regional Integration - Freedom of Only one-third (34%) agree that Media Freedom Tolerance
Movement governments should help guarantee
free elections and human rights in Amid growing concerns about Contrary to common portrayals, Africans
Many citizens are not yet convinced of the neighbouring countries, while 58% restrictions on media freedom, Africans express high degrees of tolerance for
benefits of integration. instead emphasize the need to respect overwhelmingly support an independent people from different ethnic groups
national sovereignty. media that holds government accountable. (91%), people of different religions (87%),
A majority (56%) say they should be immigrants (81%), and people living with
able to move freely across international About six of 10 citizens say the African A majority (54%) say the news media HIV/AIDS (68%).
borders in order to trade or work in Union (58%) and regional economic should have the right to publish any views
other countries. But in 15 of 36 surveyed organisations (61%) help their country at and ideas without government control, Tolerance levels are particularly high in
countries, fewer than half of citizens least a little bit. About three in 10 say while 42% say government should have regions and countries that are ethnically
support free cross-border movement. they dont know enough about these the right to prevent publications that it and religiously diverse. Similarly,
organisations to assess their helpfulness. considers harmful to society. tolerance for people living with HIV/AIDS
Only one in four citizens (26%) says it is is highest in countries with high HIV/
easy to cross international borders. Two-thirds (69%) say the news media AIDS prevalence further evidence that
should constantly investigate and report intolerance and stigmatisation can be
on government mistakes and corruption, unlearned through personal encounters.
and 59% say it is in fact somewhat or
80%
very effective in this role. More than three-fourths (78%) say they
70% would somewhat dislike or strongly
66% 64%
60% However, more than one-third (36%) dislike having a homosexual neighbour.
51% 49%
and in some countries more than two- But not all of Africa is homophobic:
50%
42%
44% 43% thirds say the media often or always Majorities in four countries (Cape Verde,
40% 38%
abuses its freedom by publishing things it South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia),
30% 29% knows are not true. and more than four in 10 citizens in three
26%
20% other countries, would like or not mind
10%
having homosexual neighbours.

0%

West Africa East Africa Southern Africa Central Africa North Africa Conclusion
If weakening demand for democracy, low
Support free movemnet across borders
Favour limiting cross-border movements of people and goods trust in electoral commissions, declining youth
engagement, and perceptions of increasing
corruption are cause for concern, they are
also calls to action, fired by hopeful findings:
Africans do want more democracy than they
are getting. Most want high-quality elections
and a free news media. Most want a strong
fight against corruption, and think they can do
their part.

Giving voice to ordinary citizens, public-opinion

survey findings can point us toward problems
and opportunities. Highlights that scratch the
surface push us to dig deeper into millions of
data points illuminating differences and trends
by country and region, gender, age group, and
other factors all ready to be mined by those
working for a more democratic, equitable, and
inclusive Africa.

32 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 33

Business and
Corruption in Africa:
the Relevance of ACDEG
Dr. Romola Adeola
Romola Adeola is an international law expert, policy analyst and social justice activist. She is a Steinberg Fellow in International Migration Law and Policy at McGill University in Canada.
She served as the AU Consultant in the development of the regional policy on Business and Human Rights. Connect with her aderomola@gmail.com and/or @aderommie.

Africa derives from the $75 billion counterfeit first port of call when speaking of corruption, it
Corruption is a global drug industry which has significant health is pertinent to emphasise the role of national
rights impacts.17 Counterfeit drugs account
challenge. As much
for 50% of drug sale in sub-Saharan Africa.18
as $2 trillion is lost
Yearly, it is estimated that more than 120,000
globally solely from people die in Africa solely from counterfeit 13
IMF Staff Discussion Note Corruption: costs and miti-
bribery in the public anti-malarial drugs.19 With statistical gating strategies (SDN/16/05, May 2016); D Lawder IMF:
sector.13 With the reality indications that about 800,000 deaths Global corruption costs trillions in bribes, lost growth
Reuters 11 May 2016.
of corporate complicity mostly from Africa result from these drugs,20
in corruption, not least,
14
Illicit financial flows: report of the High Level Panel on
the need for a response to business-related Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, commissioned by the
through illicit financial corruption is a major policy imperative AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning
and Economic Development (2015).
flows and secret for Africa.
deals in the extractive 15
Global Financial Integrity Hiding in plain sight: trade

industries, the global Can the AU Respond Effectively? misinvoicing and the impact of revenue loss in Ghana,
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda: 2002-2011
(2014).
estimate of $2 trillion It is within this context that the normative
does not vividly capture response of the African Charter on Democracy,
16
Congos secret sales Global Witness 13 May 2014.

the grave nature Election and Governance (ACDEG) resonates.21 17

of the problem.
The Magnitude of Corruption
In Africa alone, 65% of the $50 billion loss
from IFFs derives from corporate commercial
activities through tax evasion and avoidance,
concealments and circumvention of local levies
and custom duties.14 In Tanzania, for instance,
Article 33(3) of ACDEG provides that State
Parties should combat corruption in fostering
corporate governance. What this implies is that
State Parties must ensure that measures to
combat business-related corruption are part
of corporate governance structures, systems
and processes. As such, anti-corruption
mechanisms must not only check public
sector corruption but also focus on private
sector activities. Article 11 of the African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combatting
S Beard Fake pharmaceuticals are a $75 billion global
industry Marketplace 26 September 2013. Nebila Abdulmelik
18
S Webb A bitter pill to swallow: the problem of, and
solutions to, Sub-Saharan Africas counterfeit pharmaceu-
tical trade (2014) The Journal of Global Health <http:// human rights mechanisms in view of the strong business human rights due diligence The first set relates to the AU Organs with
www.ghjournal.org/a-bitter-pill-to-swallow-the-problem- link between corruption and the enjoyment of also recognised in the AUBHR Policy as a mandates on human and peoples rights.
of-and-solutions-to-sub-saharan-africas-counterfeit-
pharmaceutical-trade/> human rights. As national income lost through framework for ensuring that businesses Within this system, the African Commission
corruption affects the progressive realisation address the adverse human rights impacts of on Human and Peoples Rights, the African
19
M Wall Counterfeit drugs: People are dying every day
BBC News 27 September 2016. of economic, social, political and cultural their commercial activities. Court of Human and Peoples Rights and the
rights, national human rights institutions are African Committee of Experts on the Rights
20
S Elzas Fake drugs impact Africa, more profitable than
illicit drug market RFI 14 September 2015. important in the narrative on institutional However, given the real risk of collusion and Welfare of the Child are relevant. These
protection. The link between business-related between business and national officials in institutions have the mandate to protect
African Charter on Democracy, Election and Gover-
21

$18.73 billion was lost between 2002 and
2011 due to misinvoicing.15 From secret deals
in the extractives between businesses and
some government officials between 2010
and 2012, the Democratic Republic of Congo
lost at least $1.36 billion twice its national
budget for health and education.16 Another key
Corruption (AUCPCC) lends credence to
this assertion in mandating States to adopt
legislative and other measures to prevent and
combat acts of corruption and related offences
committed in and by agents of the private
sector.22
nance (2007/in force 2012).
22
African Union Convention on Prevention and Combat-
ting Corruption (2003/in force 2005). In article 1 of
the AU Anti-Corruption Convention, private sector is
defined as the sector of a national economy under private
ownership in which the allocation of productive resources
is controlled by market forces, rather than public au-
thorities and other sectors of the economy not under the
public sector or government. Article 22(5)(e) mandates
the Advisory Board on Corruption within the African
corruption and human rights reverberates in
the current draft of the African Union Policy
on Business and Human Rights (AUBHR
Policy).23 The AUBHR Policy recognises that
the complicity of some businesses in corrupt
activities in Africa has made the realisation of
the socio-economic welfare and human rights
of the African peoples a pertinent challenge
the furtherance of corruption, there is a need human rights.24
for regulatory measures beyond the state
linking business-related corruption to the 23
The AU Policy on Business and Human Rights seeks
to serve as a regional roadmap and provide guidance
institutionalisation of corporate governance,
to states, regional economic communities and regional
criminal justice, democracy and human rights institutions in addressing issues of business and human
rights in the implementation of the UN Guiding
within the framework of ACDEG. Three sets
Principles on Business and Human Rights.
of African Union Organs and Institutions are
See African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
particularly relevant in promoting human rights 24

manifestation of business-related corruption in While anti-corruption agencies are often the Union is mandated to: collect information and analyze (1981/in force 1986), art 45; Protocol to the African
the conduct and behaviour of multi-national corporations on the continent. National human rights while at the same time eradicating corruption. Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the
operating in Africa and disseminate such information to institutions can foster compliance with Establishment of an African Court on Human and
national authorities. Peoples Rights (1998/in force 2004), art 3(1).

34 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 35

 Democratic Accountability in
Through this competence, they can advance
guidance to Member States on measures to
ensure corporate accountability, uprooting

State-Society Relations:
corruption and fostering compliance of States
with the establishment of these measures by

The Role of ACDEG

linking business ventures to the realisation of
their human rights obligations. However, it is
pertinent to emphasise that the jurisdictional
competence of these institutions can only be Ikubaje John G.
invoked through communications from local Ikubaje John is a Governance and Development Expert currently working on Human Rights and Transitional Justice at the Department of Political Affairs at the African Union Commission
populations and civil society advancing these in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Connect with him at Gbodij@africa-union.org and/or jikubaje@gmail.com and/or @JIkubaje.

linkages.

The second set relates to the continental
criminal justice system which is an important
regulatory institution beyond the State. In
2014, the African Union Assembly adopted
a Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights (the Malabo Protocol).25
Article 46(c) of the Malabo Protocol grants the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights
jurisdiction over corporate crimes including
corruption.26 Through this institution, business-
related corruption may be addressed and
redressed. However, much of the success of
this institution will depend not merely on its
establishment, but precisely on the technical
and political support it would enjoy from AU
Member States in fighting impunity
on the continent.
The third set relates directly to the AU Advisory
Board on Corruption (AUABC) which has a
pertinent role to play in combatting all forms
of corruption on the continent. Established
under the AU Anti-Corruption Convention,
AUABC, among other things, is mandated to
promote the development of anti-corruption
regulations; collate information on the
nature of corruption in Africa and advise
governments.27 While it cannot entertain and
adjudicate cases on issues of corruption, it can
serve as a regulatory measure by providing the
necessary data on business-related corruption
and its impacts on issues of human rights,
embolden the AUABC to intensify its fight
against corruption in the spirit of both ACDEG
and the AU Convention against Corruption.
Conclusion
Beyond the above-mentioned institutions, it
is pertinent for African States to engage with
home states of businesses through multilateral
anti-corruption agreements. This duty is
emphasised in the draft AU Policy on Business
and Human Rights which requires States to
ensure that businesses are held accountable
for corrupt practices with human rights
impacts.28 As part of the State duty to protect
human rights, host states are mandated to
conclude agreements with home states of
25
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2014).
businesses. Such agreements will create
conducive legal spaces for local populations
26
and civil society to demand accountability
27
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute
As above, arts 28(I) & 46(c)
AU Anti-Corruption Convention (n 10 above), art
defined set of values and practices all
Pan-Africanism of which may take different forms and
inspired the expressions among different cultures and
establishment of the societies around the world. Democratic
OAU in 1963. During this principles include, among others, accountability,
period, democracy and transparency, equality, regular credible and
participatory governance transparent elections, majority rule, respect for
minority rights, free private and public press,
unfortunately occupied
and popular participation of citizens in policy
the back seat of Africas
processes, respect for rule of law and human
development agenda. rights etc. It is also important to indicate that
In 2002, the OAU was in the majority of governance literatures,
transformed into the accountability is usually identified to be one of
African Union (AU). This the core elements of democratic governance.
new development made On the other hand, the success of the above
democratic governance democratic principles is dependent on strong
a major continental democratic and public sector institutions.
project.
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance (ACDEG) is the most
important AU Shared Values instrument
The normative foundation of the AUs in the areas of democracy, elections and
commitment to democratic governance lies governance in Africa. Its adoption is a
in Article 3 of the African Union Constitutive demonstration of commitment on the part
Act. The provision deals with respect for of the AU and its Member States to embrace
democratic principles and institutions, and promote democratic principles and
popular participation of citizens in democratic participatory governance. In order to have
processes and participatory governance. In an appreciative understanding of the role
the same vein, sub-section (m) of Article 4 of ACDEG on democratic accountability
stipulates that all AU Member States and therefore, it is important we briefly define
the Union shall have respect for democratic the term(s) accountability and democratic
principles, human rights, rule of law and accountability.
participatory governance. It also condemns
In practice, accountability can take a number
of different forms, depending on the
institution in question. In general, relationships
of accountability have two important
components; answerability (the right to get a
response and the obligation to provide one)
and enforceability (the capacity to ensure an
action is taken, and access to mechanisms for
redress when accountability fails).
According to the literature, there are different
kinds of accountability arrangements in place.
Some of these include social, administrative,
bureaucratic and political. This piece narrows
its analysis to democratic accountability, which
in turn forms part of political accountability.
Democratic accountability takes place when
elected leaders and public officials have to
answer to the citizens regarding their actions,
decisions or indecisions during the time
they are or were occupants of public office.
Those found to be performing to the required
standards are usually rewarded by their
continued stay in office while those found to
be lacking in one way or another are punished.
Broadly speaking, accountability is one of the
hallmarks of representative democracies the
world over.
ACDEG has enormous provisions on virtually
all the principles of democratic governance,
accountability inclusive. For example, article 2
(10) provided that parties to the Charter shall

where state machineries are unable or 22(5). and rejects unconstitutional changes of There is no universally acceptable definition establish all the necessary conditions to foster
democracy and governance. It may further
unwilling to do so. The AU Policy on Business and Human Rights seeks
government in Member States. of the two terms. Accountability refers to the citizen participation, transparency, access
serve as a platform for facilitating dialogue
28

to serve as a regional roadmap and provide guidance

on addressing business-related corruption in to states, regional economic communities and regional
processes, norms and structures that require to information, freedom of the press and
institutions in addressing issues of business and human
Democracy is more than just a set of specific powerful actors (governors) to answer for their accountability in the management of
Africa. The declaration of the year 2018 as the
rights in the implementation of the UN Guiding government institutions; it rests upon a well- actions to another actor (the governed). public affairs.
Africa Year for Combatting Corruption should Principles on Business and Human Rights.

36 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 37


Specific provisions on accountability can
also be found in article 32(1); which specifies
that State Parties to the Charter shall strive
to institutionalize good political governance
through accountable, efficient and effective
public administration. Other accountability
provisions are enshrined in different sections
of the Charter. Some of them include
article three (3) sub-sections (1-11) dealing
with democratic principles; article 27 on
horizontal accountability measures; which
encourages strengthening of the Legislative
and Judiciary for oversight functions and
democratic efficiency in AU Member States. In
addition to the above, articles 31 and 32 have
ample provisions on citizens participation
and government accountability vertical
accountability measures. In a nutshell, the
Charter has ample provisions on vertical
and horizontal accountability measures to
strengthen democratic accountability on the
continent.
ACDEG therefore has all the necessary
ingredients to accomplish democratic
accountability. However, certain conditions
38 African Governance Newsletter
are to be met for this to be accomplished.
As recommended below, State Parties must
be committed to the provisions of ACDEG.
Political and public sector institutions must be
strengthened to deliver democratic dividends
and be accountable to the citizens. Also,
the elected government officials and public
servants must see accountability of their
services to the citizens as an obligation on
one hand, and democratic rights on the part
of the citizens on the other. The political and
public sector institutions must be responsive
to the needs and aspirations of the citizens.
For this to happen, civil society must have the
capability to compel accountability from the
elected and appointed government officials.
Conclusion
Despite the above provisions on accountability
in State-Society Relations in the Charter,
it remains a critical challenge in Africas
democracies. If the accountability provisions
of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance are implemented by the State
Parties to the Instrument as expected,
democratic accountability would have
long been a household name in African
democracies. For effective implementation and
realization of ACDEGs objectives - democratic
accountability inclusive, all democracy and
participatory governance stakeholders -
national, regional, continental and international
- must pool the necessary resources
together and promote universal ratification,
domestication and implementation of ACDEG.
Nebila Abdulmelik
Women Centred Initiatives
to Promoting Transitional Justice
in Africa
Semiha Abdulmelik
Semiha Abdulmelik has over seven years experience in country-specific governance, humanitarian, and conflict programming and policy analysis-with field experience in Sudan and South
Sudan- as well as on Pan-African policy issues and regional institutions. She has worked for local and international NGOs, as well as various UN agencies, and the AUC. She holds an MA in
Human Rights Practice (Distinction) and tweets at @SAbdulmelik. She is an alumnus of the African Leadership Centre. Connect with her at semabdul@gmail.com.
When we fought our
war for independence,
we won and celebrated,
but we were not vigilant
and we did not ask
for accountability
from our leaders and
ourselves, we did not
take time to settle our
own differences and
reconcile, we did not Ibraheem Sanusi
ask for any justice not
even reparation... And
here we are again. This
Transitional justice represents an important Transitional Justice takes
time it should not be
mechanism in addressing violations Centre-Stage in African
business as usual.
and injustices, combating impunity, and Peace-Building Processes
promoting reconciliation in countries
There is a serious emerging from political crises and violent In the past decade, a clear shift in the leadership
need to transform armed conflicts. When seen through the of mediation efforts in Africa from global actors
the institutions and lens of democratization, transitional justice (be they multilateral or bilateral) to continental
we women want to processes necessitate accountability and and regional ones (regional hegemons or
be there and fully responsiveness, transparency, and a level of regional organizations) has been witnessed.
represented, our voices citizen participation, which works towards the This is significant as peace agreements and
should be heard. Not re-establishment of democratic institutions. political settlements represent one of the key
as victims only, not as As such, these processes need to be seen sites for addressing transitional justice. Setting
as complementary to AU shared values the framework for, if not the precise details for
perpetrators only, but
instruments such as the African Charter on transitional justice, has become increasingly
as agents for change.
Democracy, Elections and Governance. While standard in mediation processes. However,
We should not leave it to what extent have regional organizations
the Charter does not explicitly talk about
to the instigators of the reconciliation or similar transitional justice consolidated their thinking and discourse on
conflict to bring peace, processes, it sets the broad framework for transitional justice? In the case of the African
the people must them in its general principles on participation Union (AU), a draft Transitional Justice Policy
be involved and representation (Article 3); provisions is pending adoption by decision makers. Once
on a culture of peace (Article 11, 12); and adopted, the policy will be critical in guiding the
-Women in South Sudan maintenance of political and social organizations approach to transitional justice in
dialogue (Article 13). AU-led mediation processes.
January - June 2017 39

Gender Equality in Transitional
Justice
Given the AUs normative commitments to
gender equality and the broader women,
peace, and security agenda, it is equally
important to ensure that transitional justice
efforts are at minimum gender sensitive and
gender responsive. The rationale for women,
or a broader gender focus, is three-fold. Firstly,
there is the rights-based argument. Womens
rights are human rights, and violations of
womens rights in conflict situations need
to be addressed as any other human rights
violation. The second is a pragmatic argument.
That is, womens experiences during conflict
are barometers of the nature and extent of
conflict-related human rights abuses. They
then provide crucial testimonies and data
points about the scope of what should be
covered under the transitional justice process
and selected mechanism. The third is the
long term, durable or sustainable peace
argument. As a large constituency, womens
experiences during conflict (and pre-conflict)
provide critical perspectives for the design and
implementation of peacebuilding.
But what would women-centred transitional
justice look like? There are, at minimum, three
notions of women centredness. The first is the
idea of gender sensitive or gender responsive
transitional justice. That is, transitional justice
which promotes truth, justice and accountability
for gender-based human rights violations. This
is a transitional justice that works for women.
The AU Gender Policy (2009) is the most explicit
AU articulation of this, aiming for Truth and
Reconciliation Structures with a view to bringing
to the fore, violations against women and young
girls during conflict periods, and accelerating
the admission of violation of human rights and
find lasting solutions, including the provision of
psychological support. Mandates, and the type/
scope of violations considered under a given
transitional justice mechanism are key in this
regard. Building on this, the second notion is of
inclusive transitional justice. It goes beyond the
first notion in that it also focuses on institutional
representation of and meaningful participation
of women in the transitional justice mechanism.
40 African Governance Newsletter
Issues of design, composition, and outreach
then come into play at this level. The August
2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudans
Chapter on Transitional Justice, Accountability,
Reconciliation, and Healing is instructive in this
manner. The Agreement sets that a minimum
of three (3) Commissioners must be women,
of the total seven (7), including parity among
the four (4) South Sudanese Commissioners
in the Commission to be established
(representation element). In addition to this,
the Agreement also mandates a process of
outreach and consultations among women
and girls, and recording of their experiences
(the participation element). The third and final
dimension is transitional justice as influenced
by womens discourse and practice. Women
have historically and in more contemporary
times engaged in various reconciliation
processes. These are to a large extent local,
informal/traditional, at times beyond the
national, and often highlight the importance
of economic tools and services. Such practices
do, and should influence the shape that a
transitional justice mechanism takes in the
post-conflict period to ensure that they
are contextualized and locally relevant and
appropriate, while learning from on-ground
practice.
Beyond this however, is a larger significance,
if we are to move from a minimalist to a
more transformative approach to transitional
justice. Women are gendered citizens, and are
therefore a good indicator of state-society, and
society-society relations. State building has
for too long been seen as a technical process
and one primarily driven and supported
by externals. There is however increasing
acknowledgement that it is, and should be,
if not exclusively, but primarily, a political
endeavor. This political endeavor is inherently
about re-negotiating state-society relations.
Moreover, the state building enterprise has
also suffered from a lack of a gendered lens. If
then we see peacebuilding and state building
as two non-discrete, linked projects, we then
are challenged to give greater attention and
space to women in renegotiating power and
the nature of state-society relations, which
they experience differently as gendered
citizens. A focus on women can also lead to
the question of who else is being excluded
from these conversations. Transitional justice
then becomes a state-society and society-
society ongoing dialogue/conversation
which uses the resolution of conflict to
conceptualize/reimagine what it means to
live well and long, cumulating individual
security and development ideals to arrive
at collective dignity and humanity. This is a
transformative approach which is deeper than
just gender justice or addressing crimes, and
works towards comprehensively dismantling
structural inequalities for all, and moving
towards commonly agreed visions of new
social structures.
Conclusion
From a policy perspective, therefore, these
reflections lead to a number of considerations.
Firstly, what range of transitional justice tools
do we have collectively that are fit for purpose?
Do they address the new nature of conflicts on
the continent? Do they balance top down and
bottom up approaches? What degree and type
of external intervention is necessary? What can
we learn from state building and peacebuilding
practice? Can we move from a fetishization of
the formal, towards a more hybrid model which
may be more effective in certain contexts?
Secondly, how do we refocus on the economics
of transitional justice? Thirdly, and finally how
do we ensure a long-term horizon, which sees
transitional justice as an ongoing iterative
exercise? It is hoped that the foregoing
illustrates how ensuring a transformative,
gender-sensitive approach to transitional
justice can go a long way in realizing some of
the key principles and goals of ACDEG.
necessary for the establishment of deep
The Organisation of American States,
the African Union and ACDEG:
A Luta Continua
Dr. Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge
Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, PhD. is based in Addis Ababa as the Peace and Development Advisor for Ethiopia. In the past he has worked on peace and security issues in Ethiopia, Nigeria,
South Africa, the Sudans, Tchad; as well as Syria, Nicaragua, the Guianas and the Caribbean Sea Region. His areas of expertise are governance, natural resource management and conflict
prevention. Connect with him at k.sansculotte@gmail.com and/or @KSansculotte
disparate. These Acts did however go a long
It is often said that while way to reaffirming the interconnectedness
Lusophone Africans of democratic governance, economic
rebelled to secure development, and sustainability. However
their freedom, their there was no single document or normative
rebellions ultimately framework that addressed all these
liberated Portugal. multifarious issues in one single text. The
Thus, the political push for what would become ACDEG gained
movements in one substantial momentum in 2003, after an
innovative gathering in Coral Gables under the
part of the world may
auspices of the Community of Democracies
have reverberations
Seoul Plan of Action.29
on the other side
of the globe. Latin ACDEG was Inspired by the OAS
America and Africa are Democracy Charter
joined in a way that
The conference, the first in a series of dialogues
few other continents
between the Organization of American States
are. While the cultural
(OAS) and the AU, included representatives
links between the two
from the AU and the OAS, representatives from
are well known, the
specific African and American states, including
economic and political Cape Verde, Mali, Botswana, Senegal, Kenya,
ties are more of an Ghana, Mozambique, Jamaica, Brazil, Chile,
untold story. Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru and the Dominican
Republic, and a few civil society organizations.
The meeting focused on the role the OAS had
The African Charter on Democracy Elections taken in promoting democracy through the
and Governance (ACDEG), Africas first Inter-American Democratic Charter, and the
binding regional instrument that attempts to AUs experience with their own normative
comprehensively address all of the elements reforms as they related to democratization.
A key area of focus was how best to promote
democracy, is also a tale of this interwoven democratic institutions and practices within
history. While by 2003, the AU had developed regional frameworks, with a specific focus on
a relatively comprehensive set of linked how regional organizations and coordinated
Declarations, Charters, and Acts regarding the efforts can strengthen democracy, and
protection and consolidation of democracy - overcome obstacles.30
the moves and documents were
January - June 2017 41

Nebila Abdulmelik
The idea of an experience sharing forum was
apt because both regional organizations had
struggled with supporting post-Cold War calls
for strong adherence to democratic principles
despite strong institutional dedication to
promoting and, more importantly, protecting
democratic norms. The 2003 Dialogue,
coupled with the impetus created by the
Pretoria Conference on Elections, Democracy
and Governance, held in April 2003 in South
Africa, led to the push to create a single African
framework document on democracy, drawing
on some of the lessons and more importantly
failures in Latin America and the Caribbean.
ACDEG was adopted four years later in 2007, at
the Ninth Summit of the African Union in Addis
Ababa.
Why ACDEG?
In adopting the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance, the African Union
sought to consolidate all past commitments
made within the ambit of the declarations and
decisions relating to democracy and
42 African Governance Newsletter
governance. Via the ACDEG and the African
Governance Architecture (AGA), the AU has
underscored the fact that democracy must
be understood as more than just a set of
specific government institutions.31 Democracy
rests upon a well understood group of values,
attitudes, and practices all of which may
take different forms and expressions among
different cultures and societies around the
world. Democratic principles include among
others, accountability, transparency, equality,
regular, credible and transparent elections,
majority rule, respect for minority rights, free
private and public press, effective and popular
participation of citizens in policy processes,
including marginalized social groups including
women, youth, people with disabilities,
minorities etc.
Conclusion
Despite advances in democratic take up
since the end of the Cold War, the degree of
democracy among African states continues to
vary considerably, with authoritarian regimes
at one extreme, functional multiparty systems
at the other, and many forms of imperfect
democracy in the middle.32 The same can be
said about Latin America. The two regions,
bound by history, now share commitments
to entrenching democracy and must ensure
that the voices of youth and women are
incorporated into governance mechanisms.
The OAS can learn much from the AU as it
deals with States, which are bent on curbing
the democratic rights of its citizens. Through
the adoption of ACDEG, the AU reaffirmed its
commitment to citizen focused democracy.
It is an acknowledgement, similar to that of
the OAS, of the fact that what drives a states
internal growth and progression is democratic
and responsive institutions. In no area is this
more apparent than with the repeated calls
and push for increased democratization.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/21663.htm
29
30
U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, Fact
Sheet, Dialogue on Democracy (June 3, 2003), available
online at http://statelists.state.gov/script/wa.exe?A2=ind0
306aandL=dosfactsandD=1and P=205.
31
The Role of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance on Democratic Accountability
in State-Society Relations in Africa: Ikubaje John https://
www.academia.edu/8885379/The_Role_of_the_African_
Charter_on_Democracy_Elections_and_Governance_
on_Democratic_Accountability_in_State-Society_
Relations_in_Africa
on corporate tax collection.
32
E. Y. Omorogbe, A Club of Incumbents? The African
Union and Coups dEtat (2011) 44(1) Vander- bilt
Journal of Transnational Law 123154 at 124 (2011).
Addressing Illicit Financial Flows
through ACDEG
Alexander Ezenagu
Alexander Ezenagu is a Nigerian lawyer. He is currently completing a doctorate in International Tax Law at McGill University, Canada, and holds a Master of Law degree (LLM) from the
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Alexander writes on international tax law and policy issues, focusing on the African continent. Connect with him at paulezenagu@gmail.com
and/or @ezenagu.
However, MNEs, by the nature of their cross- To resolve the issues, countries, apart from
The UNECA Report border economic activities, are exposed to granting unilateral reliefs in their domestic
asserts that the African tax liabilities in more than one jurisdiction: laws, enter into tax treaties. Tax treaties have
continent lost in excess the home state and the host state, and become the globally-accepted framework by
of $1 trillion in illicit possibly in a third state where it has some which countries cooperate to avoid double
financial flows (IFFs)33 form of presence or has obtained economic taxation and remove barriers to international
over the last 50 years. value. The conflicting tax claims by States business; but they have also become tools
It further stresses that leads to a double taxation problem. Beyond used by multinationals to avoid or evade
the continent loses an the jurisdiction to tax the profit of the MNE, taxation on a global scale.
determining the quantum of profit to be
estimated $50 billion
allocated to each of the conflicting States The current resolution mechanism is largely
annually in IFFs.
poses a second conflict. based on the OECD Model Tax Treaty relied on
One means of IFFs is through transfer
mispricing of goods and services transferred
among related entities of a multinational
enterprise. This is significant, as a good
number of African economies are dominated,
in terms of value of trade, by multinational
entities (MNEs), who export capital into Africa
in anticipation of repatriating profits to their
home countries. To ensure that governments
provide the necessary infrastructure for
business, these companies are taxed for the
use of the infrastructure in the countries,
both physical and invisible. A major aspect of
this taxation is corporate taxation, that is, the
taxation of the MNE on its profit. Many African
economies rely heavily on corporate taxation
due largely to the prevalence of the informal
sector with minimal record-keeping taking The African Capacity
place, hampering the effective collection of Building Foundation
taxes from the informal sector. This effectively
narrows the tax base, thereby putting pressure
Illicit Financial Flow Report of the High Level Panel
33
on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (The Mbeki Report),
commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of
Finance, Planning and Economic Development.
January - June 2017 43
by countries entering bilateral agreements
for the prevention of double taxation. This
treaty adopts the separate entity and arms
length approach (SE-AL), which essentially
treats subsidiaries of an MNE as separate
entities for accounting and tax purposes.
These companies are further expected to act
at arms length, behaving as independent
entities would. This treatment is provided for in
Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model Tax Treaty
and the UN Model Treaty. Critics have accused
the existing approach of income allocation,
of brokering double non-taxation, in its bid
to avert double taxation. It has equally been
accused of not being fit for purpose and as
such should be revised or replaced with a new
system of cross-border taxation. Considering
the perceived failure of the existing system
of income allocation, the G20 and the OECD
in 2013 commissioned the Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, with the aim to
address some of the challenges of the SE-AL
approach to income allocation. However, the
BEPS Project has been accused of not being
inclusive, shying away from the real issue - the
right of countries to tax - and paying little or
no heed to the demands of African countries.
Equally, developing countries have accused
the OECD of inviting them to the table after
the menu had been decided, leading to famous
saying, if you are not on the table, you are on
the menu. It should also be noted that the
negotiations for the international tax system
occurred when African countries were colonies
of imperial masters and as such, had no
representation or say in the devolution of tax
rights and powers.
The existing Model Tax Treaties - foundations
of bilateral tax agreements entered by African
countries - are not suitable for the African
continent. It is high time the African continent
played a leading role in the discussions on
taxation of its resources. This is part of the
mandate of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Article 2(7)
of ACDEG states as one of its objectives, the
encouragement of effective coordination and
harmonization of governance policies amongst
State Parties with the aim of promoting
regional and continental integration.
44 African Governance Newsletter
It further seeks to enhance cooperation The anomaly of aid in reverse from African
between the African Union, Regional Economic countries to the Global North38 must urgently
Communities and the International Community be addressed by the AU. ACDEG provides the
on democracy, elections and governance.34 legal framework to address this.
To achieve these objectives, countries shall
institutionalize: equitable allocation of the
nations wealth and natural resources35;
development of tax policies that encourage
investment36; and an efficient and effective
tax system premised upon transparency
and accountability37. What is missing from
the Charter is the protection of tax bases
of African countries and the prevention of
profit shifting. However, one could argue
that Art. 33(10) of ACDEG incorporates this
in its mandate to develop tax policies that
encourage investment. The present rush
by African countries to attract investment,
through tax entry into tax treaties, tax holidays
and incentives, must be balanced by the need
to obtain the returns from such investment in
AFRICA TALKS
the form of tax revenue. Tax policies must not
only attract investment, but also must lead to
the development of the state.
DG TRENDS -
Faced with an evolving world, continuous
globalization and internationalization of
activities, aided further by technological
ONE ON ONE
advancements, the African continent must
own and hone its tax philosophy. A study on
the appropriate allocation formula for African
countries must be carried out at the level of
the AU, by African jurists and tax experts, in
line with what the International Chamber of
Commerce and the League of Nations did in
the 1920s. If Africa must stop the erosion of
its tax bases and shifting of its profit to tax
havens, it must harmonize its tax laws and
arrive at a consensus on its tax policies and
philosophies, in line with the European Unions
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (EU
CCCTB). Africa must speak to the world with a
united voice that advances its own agenda and
will lead to the realization of its aspirations as Article 2 (12) of the Charter.
34
laid out in ACDEG and the 50 year blueprint, Article 33 (6) of the Charter
35
Agenda 2063. The time is now and an
Article 33 (10) of the Charter
36
important first step is to commission a meeting
of tax experts to identify the loopholes in both Article 33 (13) of the Charter.
37
the domestic and international tax laws and 38
Charles R. Irish (1974). International Double
policies of African countries. Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source:.
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23,
pp 292- 316.

Samson Itodo, YIAGA
Not too Young to Run
Nebila Abdulmelik,
Knowledge
Management Expert at
the AGA Secretariat and
Editor of the African
Governance Newsletter,
sat down with Samson
Itodo, Executive
Director of YIAGA and
the brain behind the
Not too Young to Run
Campaign to discuss
young people, politics
and aspirations.
Who is Samson Itodo? What
NA drives you? What makes you
passionate about democratic
governance in Africa?
SI: Franz Fanon in his book Wretched
of the Earth opined that Each
generation must, out of relative
obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill
it, or betray it. I am one citizen that
believes that inclusive democracy
is a must and as we strive to make
democracy deliver development, no
single person, man, woman, persons
living with disability nor youth must
NA
be left behind. This Mission is one I
have invested in, in the last decade
and half. It is a life struggle and I
have no intention of relenting until
we build an Africa predicated on the
values of justice, equality, equity and
accountability. I aspire for an Africa
46 African Governance Newsletter
where the riches of all must cease
to be concentrated in the hands
of a few. Gerontocracy must no
longer be the order of the day, in a
continent where over sixty percent
of its population is young people.
Business can no longer be as usual
with the prevailing average age of
a ruling president as 65 years. We
have to do more, it is this desire to
create change that drives me and
makes me Samson Itodo.
What led to the formation of
YIAGA? Tell us more about what
YIAGA is and what it seeks
to achieve.
SI: YIAGA started as a student group
in the University of Jos, Nigeria
in 2007. We were just a bunch of
students tired of poor governance.
NA
We were fed up on one hand with
the manner in which the school
authority treated the Student
Union Government and where any
dissenting voice was intimidated,
threatened or led to the expulsion
of students. We found this situation
unacceptable. On the other hand,
there was the larger challenge
of governance itself. Nigeria at
that moment was a transitioning
democracy, with the attendant
teething problems. Aside from core
governance deficits, what again
spurred our action was the flawed
2007 general elections. It defined
one of our core agendas, which
was the need for credible and
transparent elections and since then
the organization has transformed
from a student based organization
to one promoting youth political
participation, legislative
engagements, elections and
accountability to mention a few of
our interventions. And to the glory
of God, in ten years we have made
significant inroads and are charting
new courses.
What inspired Not too Young to
Run?
SI: Not too Young to Run did not
start today, it has been a core
agenda YIAGA has pushed since
the 2009 constitutional and
electoral amendment process. As
an organization, we facilitated the
formation of the Youth Alliance
on Constitution and Electoral
Reform, a coalition of over 80
youth organizations, whose core
demands during the constitutional
review was the reduction of the
eligibility age. We pursued this
through various avenues until the
2015 general elections. It was
during one of our post-election
reviews based on the prevailing
socio-political realities, that we
decided to utilize the power of the
hashtag #NotTooYoungToRun. We
didnt know it then, but this was
the start of movement building
and partnerships that gave rise
to what today has become a
global campaign and a global
call for action. We changed our
narrative to show the country why
the idea was ripe. A cursory look
at Nigerias electoral history in
the recent past shows over 800
people were killed during the 2011
post-election violence in Northern
Nigeria, with the ravaging Boko
Haram insurgency killing over
20,000 people so far. Yet all the
protagonists in these acts and
several other insecurities in Nigeria
are mostly youth. Our engagements,
buttressed by evidence-based
research, have shown exclusion as
one of the reasons they adduce
for engaging in criminal acts. In the
Nigerian political system, franchise
is from age 18 but while you can
vote, you cant be voted for as a
result of the huge gap between
voting age and eligibility age. In
reality, this means that, from age
18 where you can vote, you can
only contest for the position of
presidency 22 years after, Senate
and Governorship 17 years later
and the House of Representatives
and State Assemblies in another
12 years.
Since the return to democracy,
there has been no governor aged
35 years or younger in the whole
of Nigeria let alone a President
aged 40 or younger. In fact, in the
whole of Nigerias 469 member
National Assembly, there are only
3 legislators below the age of 35.
When benchmarked by 35 years,
which is the National Youth Policy
definition of youth, there are only
3 legislators within the youth age
bracket in the lower house.
What is your vision for the
NA
campaign? What do you hope it
will change?
SI: Our hope for the campaign is
to have the age of qualification
lowered so that more young
people can effectively participate
in the political process. We want
more young people with capacity,
competence and integrity to hold
political leadership positions. This
will in the long run redress the
problem of exclusion and bolster
youth participation. For now, we
are happy that the campaign is no
longer a national campaign but has
gone global. The campaign was
first launched at the global level
in November 2016 during the UN
forum in Geneva, Switzerland.
In January 2017, it was again
launched at the UN during the
ECOSOC Youth Forum in New York,
USA. It has been debated on the
floor of the House of Commons in
the UK. Our hope is that the ideals
that it embodies become not just
norms but entrenched practices
across the world. No democracy is
good enough until it is inclusive.
What successes has the campaign
NA registered so far?
SI: First and foremost, I will
like to state that the campaign
though initiated by YIAGA was
conceptualized to be a movement
never an organization or individual
led initiative. With the power of
movement in mind, the campaign
has been transformed to a global
movement. Taking Nigeria as
an example, young people have
galvanized for action. For instance,
youth trooped out to support the
campaign. The most astonishing
experience was in the most affected
state in the Boko Haram insurgency,
Bornu State, where over 5000 young
people came out to march in support
of the campaign. The campaign is
also in the Gambia, where it was
the galvanizing point for the just
concluded 2017 parliamentary
elections calling on youth to contest
the elections. As earlier mentioned,
the campaign has now gone global.
On the continental level, the African
Union will also be launching the
campaign in June 2017. This has
been made possible by the relentless
efforts of community organizers at
local, state, national and international
level. Beyond elevating the discourse
at the national and international
level, the Nigerian parliament is
taking bold steps to amend the
Constitution. This is unprecedented
and the 8th National Assembly
should be commended.
January - June 2017 47
 What challenges have you faced
NA with the campaign and shifting of
mindsets on youth capabilities?
SI: To be sincere, we are so happy
that we have not faced as much
challenges as we envisaged on the
campaign and this is predicated on
the approach we adopted, that is
movement building and a campaign
owned by the people. In Nigeria,
several individuals, organizations
even politicians and political parties
are doing one thing or the other in
support of the campaign. The African
Union has publicly supported the
campaign and is initiating moves
to engage Member States on the
campaign. Our reality has made
it a must so it is an idea being
championed at the right time.
What do you say to those who
NA argue that young people are
not yet ready to lead? To the
unconverted, what would you
mention as some of the benefits
of allowing young people to lead?
SI: It is a farce, which is no longer
tenable that young people are
incapable of leading. On the political
front, we have seen how the political
impasse of over 22 years in The
Gambia was decided by the youth
through #GambiaHasDecided.
Today the President of Inter-
parliamentary Union (IPU) Forum of
Young Parliamentarians is a 26 year
old Ugandan MP Mourine Osoru.
In businesses, social enterprises,
think tanks, government, we are
witnessing youth effectively taking
charge and demonstrating capacity
to engender social transformation
and democratic development.
Together with youth and older
generations, we must infuse new
ideas and ways of doing things to
lead Africa to greater heights.
48 African Governance Newsletter
What advice would you have for
NA young people, who often feel
discouraged, to stay the course?
SI: Young people must know that
political inclusion is a right. We are
on a continent with over 60 percent
of its people below the age of 35
years. This huge demography must
be tapped into. Thuggery, the cost
of politics, the ugly nature of politics,
political violence and all other
challenges that scare people from
participating in politics must and
can be overcome. If we, as young
people become a critical mass of
those who become part of the
political make up of our countries,
we can change these perceptions
and realities of politics. We must
as a generation of young people,
discover our mission and fulfil it so
as not to betray it.
What message do you have
NA for the leaders of Africa in this
regard?
SI: It is time for African leaders to
realize that politics is service to
the people. They must approach
governance from this prism. It is
important they jettison primordial
sentiments in the running of
government. They must realize that
power is transient and power held
is held on behalf of the people, so
promoting sustainable development
and looking out for future
generations must be a priority.
Transport yourself to the future
NA - more specifically 46 years later
in 2063 - What do you think you
will be sure to witness, celebrate
about this continent? What do
you envision for the future?
SI: I envision an Africa, where
human rights are protected, where
women, youth, people living with
disabilities are considered as assets.
An Africa where women are not
treated as second class citizens,
when men and women are equal.
An Africa where our votes count,
an Africa where ethnicities, religion
no longer defines us as a people.
An Africa where solutions to our
problems are locally designed and
adapted. A borderless Africa, an
Africa where irrespective of country,
for the
language and colour, you can live
in any of its countries without fear.
An Africa where politics becomes
a service to the people. An Africa
records:
where the riches of the continent
are equitably distributed amongst
its people. An Africa where equity
prevails. That is Africa of my dream,
the Africa our Agenda 2063 evokes
in me and I am so confident that this
shall come to pass.
2017 Election Calendar
ACDEG Watch
Understanding AGA
DPA at a Glance
January - June 2017 49
 Countries that have Ratified
1. Algeria
2. Benin
3. Burkina Faso
4. Cameroon
5. Chad

2017 ELECTION CALENDAR ACDEG Watch

6. Comoros
7. Cte dIvoire
8. Djibouti
9. Ethiopia
10. Ghana
11. Guinea
12. Guinea Bissau
Ratification Status of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 13. Lesotho
14. Liberia
15. Madagascar
16. Malawi
17. Mali
18. Mauritania
19. Namibia
20. Niger
21. Nigeria
22. Rwanda
ALGERIA 23. Sahrawi Republic
04 May Libya 24. Seychelles
TBC
25. Sierra Leone
26. South Africa
27. South Sudan
28 Sudan
SENEGAL
30 July 29. Togo
30. Zambia
GAMBIA
06 April Cape Verde

Countries that have Signed

LIBERA 1. Angola
10 October
2. Burundi
3. Central African Republic
Kenya 4. Cape Verde
GABON 08 August 5. Congo
29 July
6. Democratic Rep. of Congo
CONGO 7. Equatorial Guinea
RWANDA Sao Tome &
8. Gabon
6 July 03-04 August Principe Seychelles
9. Gambia
10. Kenya
ANGOLA 11. Mozambique
23 August 12. Mauritius
13. Senegal
14. Somalia
Comoros
15. Sao Tome & Principe
16. Swaziland
17. Tunisia
18. Uganda
Presidential
Mauritius
Parliamentary LESOTHO Ratified
03 June Countries that have
not Signed/Ratified
General Signed
1. Botswana
2. Egypt
Not Signed/Ratified 3. Eritrea
4. Libya
5. Morroco
6. Tanzania
7. Zimbabwe

50 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 51

List of countries which have signeD, ratified/acceded to
the African charter on democracy, election and governance

DATE OF DATE OF DATE OF DATE OF

COUNTRY SIGNATURE RATIFICATION DATE DEPOSITED COUNTRY SIGNATURE RATIFICATION DATE DEPOSITED

Algeria 14/07/2012 20/11/2016 10/01/2017

14/07/2012 Madagascar 31/01/2014 23/02/2017 13/04/2017
14/07/2012
Angola 27/01/2012 - - Malawi - 11/10/2012 24/10/2012
Benin 16/07/2007 28/06/2012 11/07/2012 Mali 29/06/2007 13/08/2013 02/09/2013
Botswana - - - Mauritania 29/01/2008 07/07/2008 28/07/2008
Burkina Faso 02/08/2007 26/05/2010 06/07/2010 Mauritius 14/12/2007 - -
Burundi 20/06/2007 - - Morocco - - -
Cameroon - 24/08/2011 16/01/2012 Mozambique 27/05/2010 - -
Cape Verde 27/01/2012 - - Namibia 10/05/2007 23/08/2016 30/08/2016
Central African Republic 28/06/2008 - - Nigeria 02/07/2007 01/12/2011 09/01/2012
Chad 22/01/2009 11/07/2011 13/10/2011 Niger 17/06/2008 04/10/2011 08/11/2011
Comoros 02/02/2010 30/11/2016 06/01/2017 Rwanda 29/06/2007 09/07/2010 14/07/2010
Congo 18/06/2007 - - Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 25/07/2010 27/11/2013 27/01/2014
Cote dIvoire 11/06/2009 16/10/2013 28/11/2013 Sao Tome & Principe 01/02/2010 - -
Democratic Republic of Congo 29/06/2008 - - Senegal 15/12/2008 - -
Djibouti 15/06/2007 02/12/2012 22/01/2013 Seychelles - 12/08/2016 28/09/2016
Egypt - - - Sierra Leone 17/06/2008 17/02/2009 08/12/2009
Equatorial Guinea 30/01/2011 - - Somalia 28/01/2013 - -
Eritrea - - - South Africa 01/02/2010 24/12/2010 24/01/2011
Ethiopia 28/12/2007 05/12/2008 06/01/2009 South Sudan 24/01/2013 26/01/2014 13/04/2015
Gabon 02/02/2010 - - Sudan 30/06/2008 19/06/2013 16/09/2013
Gambia 29/01/2008 - - Swaziland 29/01/2008 - -
Ghana 15/01/2008 06/09/2010 19/10/2010 Tanzania - - -
Guinea 09/05/2007 17/06/2011 11/07/2011 Togo 30/10/2007 24/01/2012 20/03/2012
Guinea-Bissau 17/06/2008 23/12/2011 04/01/2012 Tunisia 27/01/2013 - -
Kenya 28/06/2008 - - Uganda 16/12/2008 - -
Lesotho 17/03/2010 30/06/2010 09/07/2010 Zambia 31/01/2010 31/05/2011 08/07/2011
Liberia 18/06/2008 23/02/2014 07/03/2017 Zimbabwe - - -
Libya - - - Total countries : 55 of signature : 45 of ratification : 30 of deposit : 30
Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 30 January 2007.
This Charter shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of fifteen (15) instruments of ratification.

52 African Governance Newsletter January - June 2017 53

Understanding AGA
The African Governance
Architecture (AGA) is a
framework for dialogue
aimed at facilitating
the harmonization of
AU Shared Values
Instruments and
coordination of
initiatives towards
the promotion and
consolidation of
democratic governance
on the continent.
AGA is inspired by the Constitutive Act of AU
that expresses the Unions determination to
promote and protect human and peoples
rights, consolidate democratic institutions and
culture and ensure good governance and the
rule of law. This determination is buttressed
by related objectives and principles contained
in Article 3(g and h) and Article 4(m) of the
Act on the promotion, protection and respect
for human rights, democratic principles and
institutions, and good governance. These
ideals are further reinforced by norms,
pronouncements, decisions and instruments
adopted by the AU in particular the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance (ACDEG). The mandate of AGA
stems from the Decision of the 15th Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of AU Heads of State
and Government (AU/Dec.304 (XV) held in July
2010.
In order to give effect to the Assembly decision
on the Establishment of the Pan-African
Governance Architecture, the AUC
54 African Governance Newsletter
established AGA as a platform for dialogue
between the various stakeholders who
are mandated to promote and strengthen
democratic governance in Africa, in addition
to translating the objectives of the legal and
policy pronouncements in the AU Shared
Values.
AGA is operationalised through its institutional
mechanism the African Governance Platform
that brings together all AU Organs and
institutions as well as Regional Economic
Communities with a mandate to promote
democracy, governance and human rights. The
initiatives of the African Governance Platform
are coordinated through five clusters
and a Secretariat.
The five clusters are:
Human rights and Constitutionalism and
transitional justice rule of law
Democracy Governance
Humanitarian affairs
The AGA Secretariat, based at the DPA serves
as the coordinating arm or catalyst for the
achievement of the goals of AGA through the
provision of a framework for interaction, active
engagement, synthesis and convergence
among the Members of the African
Governance Platform.
Some of AGAs flagship programmes
include citizens engagement in democratic
governance processes, realized through the
development and implementation of AGA
Youth, Women and Civil Society Engagement
Strategies. Other initiatives include knowledge
management and Annual High Level Dialogues
on democratic governance trends, challenges
and prospects; operationalisation of the state
reporting mechanism under ACDEG; and
enhancing AGA-APSA synergy.
AGA Youth, Women and Civil Society
Engagement Strategies
Annual High Level Dialogues on
democratic governance trends,
challenges and prospects
Operationalisation of the state
reporting mechanism under ACDEG
Enhancing
AGA-APSA synergy
DPA at a Glance
The Department
Divisions of the Department of The Resource Centre for
Political Affairs Democracy, Governance and Human
of Political Affairs
Rights
(DPA) of the African To realize its objectives, DPA is structured
Union Commission thematically into two main Divisions the The Resource Centre is a facility that offers
is responsible for Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and technical support to the various programmes
promoting, facilitating, Elections Division (DGHRE); and Humanitarian and activities of DPA. The Center provide the
coordinating and Affairs, Refugees and Internally Displaced Staff of the AU, members of the Diplomatic
encouraging democratic Persons Division (HARDP). Corps, including AU Member States
Representatives in Addis, academia and
principles and the
Democracy, Governance, Human researchers as well as the general public with
rule of law, respect
Rights and Elections Division a variety of up-to-date publications, books,
for human rights, the (DGHRE) journals and other reference materials on
participation of the democracy, governance and human rights
civil society in the DGHRE seeks to enhance democratic among other thematic areas. In addition, the
development process governance among AU Member States and Centre offers internet and printing services
of the Continent and the the effective realization of human and peoples for users.
achievement of durable rights on the Continent. Through various
specialized units and programmes, the Division
solutions for
coordinates initiatives on governance and
addressing
democracy assessments, electoral support and
humanitarian crises. observations, improvement of public service
delivery, local governance, anti-corruption
and promotion and protection of human and
DPA is mandated to promote AU Shared peoples rights.
Values, coordinate AU election observation and
monitoring missions, provide technical support Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees
to electoral bodies and implement sustainable and Internally Displaced Persons
solutions to humanitarian and political crises, Division (HARDP)
including through preventive diplomacy.
HARDP seeks to provide continental direction
Considering its mandate, the Department
to the achievement of durable solutions for
also serves as the Secretariat for the African
addressing humanitarian crises. This includes
Governance Architecture.
pursuing actions to alleviate the plight of
DPA envisions an integrated, peaceful and
refugees, returnees and internally displaced
democratically governed Africa driven by its
persons (IDPs), including meeting their
citizens and playing a pivotal role in global
immediate protection and assistance needs as
political and humanitarian diplomacy.
a result of man-made and natural disasters.
DPA is intended as an efficient and effective
vehicle for the AUC in the promotion of pan- HARDP also coordinates the work of the AU
on the Special Emergency Assistance Fund for
African unity, political integration and durable
Drought and Famine in Africa (SEAF).
solutions to humanitarian crises through AU
Shared Values.
January - June 2017 55
African Governance
NEWSLETTER JANUARY - jUNE 2017
Volume 4 #1