FORM A

FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT

ECJ NO :
034/2004

PARTIES:

THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF Applicant

PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
and
ROYDON ROY RUDMAN First Defendant
ADRIAN HENDRICKUS BOTHA Second Defendant
ELRIKA MATTEE First Respondent
SANETTE BOTHA (DE VRIES) Second
Respondent
EXTRA DIMENSIONS 1072 C.C. Third Respondent
BLAIZEPOINT TRADING 348 C.C. Fourth Respondent

RERENCE NUMBERS -
Registrar: 15/2004

DATE HEARD: 25 MARCH 2004

DATE DELIVERED: 22 JULY 2004

JUDGE(S): NEPGEN J

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES -
Appearances:
for the State/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): MJ DE JAGER & NC NDZENGU
for the accused/respondent(s): HJ VAN DER LINDE SC
Instructing attorneys:
Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): DULLABH & CO.
Respondent(s): NETTELTONS

CASE INFORMATION -
Nature of proceedings : RETURN DAY OF PROVISIONAL ORDER

Topic: RESTRAINT ORDER IN TERMS OF PREVENTION OF

ORGANISED CRIME ACT
 2

INTHEHIGHCOURTOFSOUTHAFRICA

(EASTERNCAPEDIVISION)

CaseNo.:15/2004

Datedelivered:

Inthematterbetween:

THENATIONALDIRECTOROF Applicant

PUBLICPROSECUTIONS

and

ROYDONROYRUDMAN FirstDefendant

ADRIANHENDRICKUSBOTHA SecondDefendant

ELRIKAMATTEE FirstRespondent

SANETTEBOTHA(DEVRIES) SecondRespondent

EXTRADIMENSIONS1072C.C. ThirdRespondent

BLAIZEPOINTTRADING348C.C. FourthRespondent

________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________

NEPGEN,J:

[1]TheapplicantistheNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions.On8January
 3

2004Sandi,Jgrantedtheapplicantaprovisionalrestraintorderintermsofthe

provisionsofsection26(3)(a)ofthePreventionofOrganisedCrimeAct,No.121

of1998(TheAct). Atthesametimea rulenisi wasgrantedcallinguponthe

defendantsandtherespondents(towhomIshallreferinmoredetailhereunder)

toshowcauseon26February2004whytheprovisionalrestraintordershould

notbeconfirmedandwhytheyshouldnotbeorderedtopaythecostsofthe

application in the event of them opposing the relief sought. The application

beforeSandi,Jwasbroughtexparteandwasheardincamera. Byagreement

thereturndaywasextendeduntil25March2004whenthemattercamebefore

me.

[2] The defendants cited in the application are Roydon Roy Rudman (first

defendant)andAdrianHendrickusBotha(seconddefendant). Thereasonwhy

theseindividualshavebeencitedasdefendantsisbecausetheyarebothgoing

tobechargedwith27chargesoffraud,alternativelytheft,andthusfallwithinthe

definition of defendant in section 12 of the Act. First respondent is Elrika

Mattee,whoismarriedtofirstdefendant.SecondrespondentisSanetteBotha,

thewifeofseconddefendant.ThirdrespondentisExtraDimensions1072C.C.,

a close corporation which carrieson business asMakana Financial Services.

First defendant established third respondent and he alone holds beneficial

interestsinthisclosecorporation.FourthrespondentisBlaizepointTrading348

C.C. Thisclosecorporationwasestablishedbyseconddefendantandheand

firstdefendanteachholda50%interesttherein.
 4

[3] The application is opposed by only second defendant and second

respondent.Althoughfirstdefendantgavenoticeofhisintentiontoopposethe

application,hewithdrewhisnoticeofopposition.Forthesakeofcompletenessit

can be mentioned that second defendant and second respondent applied for

condonationforthelatedeliveryoftheiropposingaffidavits,whichapplication

wasnotopposedbytheapplicant.Suchcondonationwasaccordinglygranted.

[4]Annexedtothefoundingaffidavitisadraftchargesheet.Fromthisitappears

that there are four persons who were allegedly defrauded, alternatively from

whommoneywasstolen,byfirstdefendantandseconddefendant.Thesefour

personshavebeenreferredtointhepapersascomplainantsandIshalldo

likewiseinthisjudgment.

[5] Under the heading THE FACTS IN BROAD OUTLINE the following

avermentsaremadeinthefoundingaffidavit:

23.1 AssetoutinthedraftchargesheetannexedheretoandmarkedJGR1
and also in the supporting affidavit herewith, the complainants were
defraudedofR2.697millionintotalarisingfromvariousinstancesfora
purportedinvestmentschemewhichhoweverdidnotexist.

23.2 TheDefendantsrequestedthecomplainantstomakefundsavailableto
theDefendantswhowereinturntousethesaidfundstoprovidebridging
financetoSANDFemployeeswhowereonpensionbutstillawaitingtheir
pension money. The SANDF employees were to repay the amounts
advanced to them plus 30 % interest and the complainants were to
receivetheircapitalanda10%interest.

23.3 Noneofthecomplainantsreceivedanycapitalorinterestaspromisedon
theirinvestmentsandonoraboutthe12thofApril2002bothDefendants
allegedtothecomplainantsthattheirinvestedamountshavebeenlost.
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(Thesupportingaffidavitreferredtoinparagraph23.1ofthefoundingaffidavitis

theaffidavitdeposedtobyoneBrianClaassen,theinvestigatingofficerinthe

caseagainstfirstandseconddefendants.)

[6]Theallegationsmadeinthefoundingaffidavitinsupportofthereliefsought

againsttherespondentsarethatfirstdefendantestablishedthirdrespondentand

thatthreeofthecomplainantsdepositedmoneyintoitsbankaccount(paragraph

8ofthefoundingaffidavit);thatfourthrespondentwasestablishedbysecond

defendant and may have received some affected gifts (paragraph 9 of the

founding affidavit); that the respondents are cited as persons who probably

receivedaffectedgiftsfromtheDefendant(sic),whomightbeholdingproperty

onbehalfoftheDefendantsorbyoperationoflaw(paragraph10ofthefounding

affidavit);andthatanyaffectedgiftreceivedbyanyoftherespondentswouldbe

subjecttorestraintintermsoftheordersoughtandthattherespondentsshould

thereforebeorderedtodisclose,bywayofaffidavit,thetheexistenceandall

relevant details of any affected gifts they have received, either directly or

indirectly,fromDefendants(paragraph33ofthefoundingaffidavit).

[7] The alleged criminal conduct on the part of first defendant and second

defendantisreferredtoinmoredetailintheaffidavitofClaassen. Healleges

that first defendant and second defendant worked together in Grahamstown

during 2001 and thereafter. Second defendant was well known to the four

complainants. Duringtherelevantperiodthecomplainantswererequestedby
 6

bothdefendantstomakefundsavailabletothem,whichfundstheywoulduseto

providebridgingfinancetoSANDFemployeeswhowereonpensionbutwere

stillawaitingpaymentoftheirpensionmoney. Allamountsadvancedtosuch

SANDFemployeeswouldberepaidbytheseemployeestogetherwithintereston

suchamountsattherateof30%. Thecomplainantswereinformedthatthey

would be repaid the capital advanced together with 10 % interest thereon.

Claassen avers that the defendants convinced the complainants that the

aforesaidschemewasfreeofrisk,secureandlegal;thatfirstdefendanthada

contactpersonatthe6th SouthAfricanInfantryCorps(6SAI)inGrahamstown

whoprovidedhimwithdetailsofSANDFemployeeswhoweretoberetrenched

or who were to receive severance packages; that first defendant had legal

access(Iassumethisisintendedtomeanthathewasentitledto)toapproach

such employees and offer them bridging finance while they were awaiting

paymentofthe amountsdue tothem;thatall the documentation wasabove

boardandclearedbyABSAbankandthatthisgavefirstdefendanttherightto

deduct electronically from each SANDF employees account the amount

advancedtohimtogetherwiththeinterestreferredtoaboveoncepaymentofthe

amount due had been received; and that both defendants had a list of 200

namesreflectingwhotheSANDFemployeesinquestionwere,aswellastheir

lastdatesintheSANDFandtheamountofthepackagestheyweretoreceive.

ItcanbementionedatthisstagethatthelistannexedtoClaassensaffidavit

containsonlynamesandidentificationnumbers. Claassenfurtherreferstoan

affidavitbyoneParkins,whichaffidavithecontendsconfirmsthatthenamesand

details appearing on the list are fictitious. The two affidavits deposed to by
 7

ParkinsandwhichareannexedtoClaassensaffidavitdonotgosofarasto

confirmthat the namesand detailsappearing on the listare fictitious. What

theseaffidavitsdoindicate,however,isthatduringtherelevantperiodonly6

SANDFemployees,whowerebasedat6SAIinGrahamstown,terminatedtheir

servicecontractsandthatnoneoftheirnamesappearontheaforesaidlist.

[8] Claassensaffidavittakesthecaseagainsttherespondentsnofurther. In

fact,inhisaffidavitheonlyreferstofirstrespondent,statingthatsheismarriedto

first defendant; and to fourth respondent, stating that it was established by

seconddefendantandthateachdefendantholdsa50%interesttherein.

[9] The answering affidavit of second defendant and second respondent was

deposedtobyseconddefendant.Aconfirmatoryaffidavitbysecondrespondent

is attached. However, in certain instances the deponent of the answering

affidavitwouldappeartobesecondrespondent.Bethatasitmay,itisclearthat

seconddefendantdenieshavingcommittedanyoffence.Hehaschosennotto

setouthisversionindetailintheansweringaffidavit,buthasreferredtowhathe

statedwhenhemadeastatementtothepoliceon18April2002andintwo

affidavitsmadebyhiminoppositiontosummaryjudgmentapplicationsbrought

by two of the complainants, namely Michau (in case no. 1519/2002) and Du

Plessis(incaseno.1020/2002).Itisclearthatseconddefendantadmitsthathe

wasinvolvedwithfirstdefendantinaventurewherebymoneywasobtainedfrom

thecomplainantsonthebasisthatitwouldbeusedtoprovidebridgingfinance
 8

for SANDF employees in the circumstances referred to above, and that the

complainants were told that they would receive repayment of their capital

together with interest at 10 % once the pension benefits of the SANDF

employeeswerepaidintothebankaccountsofsuchemployees.Itisalsoclear

thatseconddefendantdoesnotdisputethatsuchventurewasnotagenuine

one. In fact, he refers to it in his answering affidavit as a scam. Second

defendantallegesthatfirstdefendantwastheinstigatorofthisschemeandthatit

washe(firstdefendant)whoprovidedseconddefendantwiththedetailsofhow

theschemewouldoperate.Accordingtoseconddefendanthehadnoreasonto

mistrustfirstdefendantandhonestlybelievedthattheventurewasalegitimate

one.Itisnotdisputedthatheapproachedthecomplainantsandinformedthem

oftheschemeandtherebyinducedthemtomakewhattheyconsideredtobe

investments.ItwasonlytowardstheendofMarch2002thatseconddefendant

realisedthatsomethingmightbeamiss. Insummary,thus,seconddefendant

doesnotdisputehisinvolvementinwhatwasundoubtedlyanillegalventurebut

contendsthathedidsowithoutanyguiltyknowledgeandbecauseheaccepted

whathehadbeentoldbyfirstdefendant.Heaccordinglydeniesthathehadany

intenttodefraudthecomplainantsortostealmoneyfromthem.

[10]Thegroundsuponwhichthegrantingofarestraintorderisopposedarethe

following:

1. The applicant, as an ex parte applicant, failed to make a full

disclosureoffactswhichitwashisdutytodisclose.
 9

2. Theapplicationshouldnothavebeenbroughtonanexpartebasis

without notice to second defendant and second respondent as

therewasnourgencynoranydangerofassetsbeingdissipated.

3. Therearenoreasonablegroundsforbelievingthataconfiscation

ordermaybemadeagainstseconddefendant.

[11]Thefactswhichitisallegedtheapplicantshouldhavedisclosedwerethat

second defendant had, on 18 April 2002, made a detailed statement to one

Townsend, a captain in the Commercial Branch of the South African Police

ServicesinHumewood,inwhichhesetoutfullyhisversionoftherelationship

betweenhimandfirstdefendant.ThisisthepolicestatementtowhichIreferred

above. Inaddition,referenceismadetothefactthatseconddefendantmade

the two affidavits, which have also been referred to above, in opposition to

summaryjudgmentapplicationsandinwhichhisdefencewasagainsetout,the

contentionbeingthattheinvestigatingofficermusthavebeenaware,priortothe

applicationbeinglaunched,ofthefactthatcivilproceedingshadbeeninstituted

against second defendant and that he had made these affidavits. It was

submittedthatseconddefendantsversionissuchanintegralpartofthecase

againsthimthatitshouldhavebeendisclosed.

[12] The applicant contends that the fact that second defendant made the
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statementsconcerned,andthecontentsthereof,arenotmaterialandcouldnot

have influenced Sandi, J in any way in deciding whether or not to grant the

provisionalrestraintorder.

[13]InPhillipsvNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions,2003(6)SA447(SCA)

(forconveniencehereinafterreferredtoasPhillips(SCA))at455B[29],Howie,P

pointedoutthatitistritethatanexparteapplicantmustdiscloseallmaterialfacts

thatmight influence the courtindecidingthe application. (See also National

DirectorofPublicProsecutionsvBasson,2002(1)SA419(SCA)at428I[21].)

InthepassagereferredtothelearnedPresidentoftheSupremeCourtofAppeal

dealtwiththesituationthatarisesiftherehasbeenamaterialnondisclosurein

thefollowingterms:

Iftheapplicantfailsinthisregardandtheapplicationisneverthelessgrantedin
provisionalform,theCourthearingthematteronthereturndayhasadiscretion,
when given the full facts, to set aside the provisional order or confirm it. In
exercisingthatdiscretionthelaterCourtwillhaveregardtotheextentofthenon
disclosure;thequestionwhetherthefirstCourtmighthavebeeninfluencedby
proper disclosure; the reasons for nondisclosure and the consequences of
settingtheprovisionalorderaside.

[14] The first question that must be decided is whether the fact that second

defendant made the statements referred to, and the contents of those

statements,shouldhavebeendisclosed.Inthisregardwhatmustbedecidedis

whether those facts might (not would) have influenced Sandi, J in deciding

whetherornottograntaprovisionalrestraintorder.

[15]Itisnotcleartomeinwhatwaytheaforementionedfacts,whichwerenot
 11

disclosed,mighthaveinfluencedthedecisionofSandi,Jinthismatter.Itisclear

thathemusthavebeensatisfiedthatthejurisdictionalfactsreferredtoinsection

25(1)(b),namelythathehadtobesatisfiedthatseconddefendantwastobe

chargedwithanoffenceandthatitappearedthattherewerereasonablegrounds

forbelievingthataconfiscationordermaybemadeagainstseconddefendant,

hadbeenestablished.Theinformationreferredtowouldonlyhaveindicatedthat

seconddefendanthasconsistentlydeniedhavingbeeninvolvedinanycriminal

activityandwouldhaveprovideddetailsofhisdefence.This,accordingly,would

have given rise to a dispute of fact. It is not appropriate for a court, when

consideringwhetherornottograntaprovisionalrestraintorder,orforthatmatter

afinalrestraintorder,toattempttoresolvedisputedfactsinrelationtotheguiltor

otherwiseofadefendant.Thiswillbedonebythetrialcourt.Furthermore,the

usualruleinmotionproceedingsassetoutin PlasconEvansPaintsLimitedv

VanRiebeekPaints(Pty_Limited,1984(3)SA623(AD),doesnotapplywhenit

comestodeterminingwhetherornotreasonablegroundsexistforbelievingthat

aconfiscationordermaybemade(seeNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutionsv

Kyriacou,2003(2)SACR524(SCA)at529fh[10]). Thepositionmayhave

beendifferenthadtheapplicantbeenawareoffactswhichindicatedthatthere

wasatleastastrongprobabilitythatseconddefendantwouldnotbeconvicted

andhadfailedtodisclosesuchfacts.That,however,isnotthepositioninthis

matter.Inthecircumstancesitismyviewthatthereisnomeritinthispointtaken

onbehalfofseconddefendant.
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[16] Inanyevent,evenifmyconclusionshouldhavebeenthattheaforesaid

factsshouldhavebeendisclosed,thisdoesnotinitselfmeanthatafinalrestraint

ordershouldnotbegranted.Istillhaveadiscretion,whichistobeexercisedin

themannerreferredtoin Phillips(SCA). Insofarastheextentofthealleged

nondisclosureisconcerned,Ihavealreadypointedoutthatitrelatesmerelyto

seconddefendantsexculpatoryversionoftherelationshipbetweenhimselfand

firstdefendant. Iamunabletoconcludethatafailuretosetoutadefendants

denialofguiltisinitselfamatterwhichshouldhavetheresultthattheapplication

shouldbedismissed.Afterall,everyoneispresumedtobeinnocentuntilacourt

finds that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. I have

alreadystatedthatitismyviewthatSandi,Jwouldnothavebeeninfluencedin

makingtheorderwhichhedidmakehadhebeenawareofthefactswhichitis

contendedshouldhavebeenreferredtointhefoundingpapers. Byreasonof

the applicants denial that there was any material nondisclosure no specific

reasonfornotannexingtheaforementionedstatementstothefoundingaffidavits

has been advanced, although the applicant, in reply, annexed a copy of the

wholeofthepolicedocket,statingthatthisamountedtoanoverburdeningof

thesepapersbothbywayofnaturethereofandvolume.Inthelightofmyviews

onthesematters,whichinmyjudgmentarenotsufficientformetoexercisemy

discretioninfavourofseconddefendantandsetasidetheprovisionalrestraint

order,itisnotnecessarytoconsidertheconsequencesofdoingso.

[17] Iturnnowtoconsiderthesubmissionthattheapplicationshouldnothave
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beengrantedbecauseofthefailuretohavegivennoticetothedefendantsand

therespondents,whichwasbasedonthefurthersubmissionofanallegedlack

ofurgencyaswellasalackofanydangerthatanyoftheassetsrestrained

wouldbedissipated.

[18] Section26(1)oftheActempowerstheapplicanttoapply exparte fora

restraintorder.Itswordingisalmostidenticaltothatofsection38(1)oftheAct,

whichempowerstheapplicanttoapply exparte forapreservationofproperty

order. In NationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions&AnothervMohamedNo&

Others, 2003 (4) SA 1 (CC) Ackermann, J, when dealing with the proper

constructionofsection38oftheAct,saidthefollowingat15DF[33]:

Iwouldattheoutsetpointoutthatitisnotthe exparte natureoftheinitial

applicationunders38thattheHighCourtfoundtobeobjectionable,butthefact
thatonitsconstructionofthesection,aHighCourtisprecludedfromissuinga
rulenisi.Thephraseins38(t)heNationalDirectormaybywayofanexparte
applicationapplymeansnomorethanthat,iftheNationalDirectorisdesirousof
obtaininganorderunders38,sheorhemayuseanexparteapplication,inthe
sensedefinedinpara[27]above.Itsanctionsaparticularinitiatingprocedureto
beemployedwhenreliefofaparticularnatureisbeingsought. Animportant
consequenceofthisisthatanapplicationbytheNationalDirectorunders38can
neverbedismissedsolelyonthegroundthatithasbeenbroughtexparte.

Theseremarksmustapplyequallytosection26oftheAct.Thisdisposesofthe

argumentadvancedonbehalfofseconddefendantandsecondrespondentin

thisregard.Iwouldpointout,inanyevent,thaturgencyisnotaprerequisitefor

thebringingofanapplicationundersection26(1)oftheAct.Similarly,itisnot

essential that a case be made out that there is a threat that assets will be

disposedof(see NationalDirectorofPublicProsecutionsvPhillips&Others,

2002(4)SA60(W)(hereinafterreferredtoasPhillips(WLD))at76H77E).
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[19]Ashasbeenmentioned,thethirdgroundrelieduponforthesubmissionthat

a final restraint order should not be granted is that there are no reasonable

grounds for believing that a confiscation order may be made against second

defendant. As such an order can only be granted if second defendant is

convicted,whatmustbeconsidered,therefore,iswhetherreasonablegrounds

existforbelievingthatseconddefendant may,notwill,beconvictedandthata

confiscation order will thereafter be made. Counsel for second defendant

accepted that the approach to be adopted, insofar as the degree of proof is

concerned,tobeadoptedwascorrectlysetoutinPhillips(WLD)at81DH.The

followingwasstatedinthepassagereferredto:

In my view an application for a restraint order is analogous (although not

identical)toanapplicationforaninteriminterdictandattachmentpendentelite.
Insofarassuchreliefcontainselementsoffinality,theLegislaturecouldnever
haveintendedthatitshouldbedefeatedbyreasonofconflictsoffactperse.Nor
would a reference to evidence be appropriate: that might well anticipate the
enquiryatthecriminaltrialandimpingeontherightofsilence.Theprimafacie
caseisproofofareasonableprospectofobtainingbothaconvictioninrespectof
thechargeslevelledagainsttherespondentandasubsequentconfiscationorder
under s 18 (1). It is appropriate in determining whether the onus has been
discharged to apply the long accepted test of taking the facts set out by the
applicanttogetherwithanyfactssetoutbytherespondentwhichtheapplicant
cannotdisputeandtoconsiderwhether,havingregardtotheinnateprobabilities,
theapplicantshouldonthosefactsobtainfinalreliefatatrial(forthispurpose,
theconfiscationhearing). Thefactssetupincontradictionbytherespondent
shouldthenbeconsideredand,ifseriousdoubtisthrownupontheapplicants
case,hecannotsucceed.

Ofcourse,attheendoftheday,allthatisrequiredisevidencethatsatisfiesa

courtthattherearereasonablegroundsforbelievingthataconfiscationorderwill

be made by the court convicting the defendant concerned (Kyriacous case,

supra,at529h).
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[20]Ihavealreadyreferredtotheconductonthepartofseconddefendantwhich

theapplicantallegesconstitutesfraud,alternativelytheft. Seconddefendants

participationintheschemeisnotdisputed.Infact,itisclearthatheplayedan

activepartandthathewasthepersonwhoapproachedthecomplainantsand

furnishedthemwithdetailsofthescheme.Itseemsclearthatitwasasaresult

of the information furnished by second defendant that the complainants were

inducedtoadvancemoneytofirstdefendant.Theillegalityofthewholeventure

isalsonotdisputed.IngeneralIagreewiththesubmissionmadebyapplicants

counsel that the papers establish all the elements of fraud or theft, with the

exceptionofknowledgeofwrongfulnessonthepartofseconddefendantand

thuscriminalintent.Whetherornottherewassuchknowledgeofunlawfulness

andcriminalintentissomethingthatthecourthearingthecriminaltrialwillhave

todecide. Whatrequiresconsiderationatthisstageiswhetherthereareany

facts or circumstances which, if accepted by the trial court, could establish

knowledgeofunlawfulnessandcriminalintent.Inthisregardapplicantscounsel

referredmetoastatement,whichiscontainedinthepolicedocket,madebyfirst

defendantandfromwhichitappearsthatitishisversionthatseconddefendant

approachedhimandsuggestedthattheyenterintoajointventurewhichwould

involvetheprovisionofbridgingfinance. Accordingtofirstdefendantaninitial

amountofR160000,00wasprovidedbyseconddefendantinordertosetupthis

business. Applicantscounselfurtherreferredmetoastatementinthepolice

docketmadebyPaulinaDaSilva,oneofthecomplainants.Inthisstatementshe
 16

avers, interalia,thatseconddefendantcontactedherontwooccasionsduring

March2002andpersuadedhertoinvesttwoamountsofR55000,00.Onthe

first of these occasions second defendant allegedly told her that he had an

amountofR2millioninthebusinessandthathewouldnothaveapproachedher

ifhethoughttherewouldbeanyproblems.Althoughseconddefendanthasnot

dealtwithwhatisallegedbyDaSilvainherpolicestatement,itcanbeaccepted

thatherallegationthathehadtoldherthathehadR2millioninthebusinessis

inconsistentwithhisversion. AsIhavepointedout,seconddefendantalleges

thatfirstdefendantwastheinstigatororarchitectofthewholescheme,andwhat

firstdefendantstatedinhisstatementisthereforealsoinconsistentwithsecond

defendantsversion.Itwouldbeinappropriatetoattempttoresolvetheaforesaid

disputes,somethingwhichcaninanyeventnotbedoneonthepapersbefore

me. Allthatneedbesaidaboutthesedisputesisthatiftheversionsoffirst

defendantandDaSilva,ortheversionofoneofthem,isacceptedthismayhave

theresultofpersuadingthetrialcourtthatseconddefendanthadtherequisite

knowledge of unlawfulness and the necessary criminal intent to justify his

conviction.Iamthereforeunabletoagreewiththesubmissionmadeonbehalf

ofseconddefendantthatthedefencesetoutbyhim,asdiscussedmorefully

above,cannotbedisputedbytheapplicantandthatifoneappliesthetestsetout

bytheHighCourtinPhillips(WLD)afinalrestraintordershouldnotbemade.It

is accordingly my view that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

second defendant may be convicted of the offences referred to and that a

confiscationordermaybemadeagainsthim.
 17

[21] Iturnnowtoconsiderthepositionofsecondrespondent. Ihavealready

referredtotheallegationsmadeinthefoundingaffidavitinsupportoftherelief

soughtagainsttherespondents. Dealingspecificallywithsecondrespondent,

theonlyallegationwhichisrelevanttoheristhatinparagraph10ofthefounding

affidavit,namelythatsheisapersonwhoprobablyreceivedaffectedgifts,or

whomightbeholdingpropertyonbehalfofseconddefendant(ontheassumption

thatthatwaswhatwasintendedtobealleged).Inthescheduleofassets,which

is annexed to the provisional restraint order, the only reference to second

respondentistobefoundinparagraph3(b)(iv),(whichdealswiththedefendants

INTERESTINENTITIES)wherethereisreferencetoseconddefendanthaving

a 50 % interest in Corpclo 822 CC and second respondent having a 50 %

interest therein. In the founding affidavit nothing is said about this close

corporation.However,whenthematterwasarguedapplicantscounselreliedon

thefactthatsecondrespondenthada50%interestinthatclosecorporation,

statingthatitwasclearfromtheallegationsmadeintheansweringaffidavitof

seconddefendantthatsecondrespondenthadreceivedanaffectedgift.Inthis

regard it appears from such affidavit that second defendant allegedly lent an

amountinexcessofR160000,00totheclosecorporation,whichamounthad

beenobtainedfromatotalamountofR250000,00thatseconddefendanthad

receivedfromthescam.

[22]Anaffectedgiftisdefinedinsection12(1)oftheActasmeaning

anygift
a) madebythedefendantconcernednotmorethansevenyearsbeforethe
fixeddate;or
 18

b) madebythedefendantconcernedatanytime,ifitwasagift
i) of property received by that defendant in connection with an
offencecommittedbyhimorheroranyotherperson;or
ii) of property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly
representedinthatdefendantshandspropertyreceivedbyhimor
herinthatconnection,
whetheranysuchgiftwasmadebeforeorafterthecommencementof
thisAct.

Itremains,however,agift,subjecttotheprovisionsofsection16oftheAct,

whichprovidethatforthepurposesofchapter5oftheAct

a defendant shall be deemed to have made a gift if he or she has

transferred any property to any other person directly or indirectly for a
consideration the value of which is significantly less than the value of the
considerationsuppliedbythedefendant.

[23]Itisclearfromtheallegationsmadebyseconddefendantintheanswering

affidavit,whicharetheallegationsrelieduponbyapplicantscounselinargument

beforeme,thattheaforesaidmoneywasnotpaidtosecondrespondentbutto

theclosecorporation.Itwasalsonottransferredtotheclosecorporationfora

consideration having a value significantly less than the amount ofthe money

advanced.Onthebasisofwhatisallegedinthepapersbeforemethemoney

wasloanedtotheclosecorporationandwasutilisedbytheclosecorporationto

pay deposits in respect of the purchase of immovable properties and also

transfer costs in connection therewith. There is thus no way that these

transactionscanbebroughtwithintheextendeddefinitionofagiftascontained

insection16oftheAct,andevenlessreasonforholdingthatthismeansthatthe

moneywasindirectlytransferredtosecondrespondentforaconsiderationsuch

asthatreferredto. Thereisnoevidencetosuggestthatsecondrespondent

acceptedanyofthismoneyinherpersonalcapacity,noristhefactthatsheand
 19

seconddefendantaremarriedtoeachotherandthateachhold50%interestin

theclosecorporationindicativethatshedidso. Inmyjudgmentthepositionis

thatthesomewhatspeculativecase,toputitatitshighest,madeoutagainst

second respondentinthe foundingaffidavitisinno waystrengthened bythe

allegations made by second defendant (and second respondent) in the

answeringaffidavit.Inmyjudgmentnocasehasbeenmadeoutforthegrantof

anyreliefagainstsecondrespondent.

[24] Itwasnotsuggestedbyeithercounselthattheprovisionalrestraintorder

shouldinanywaybevariedintheeventoftherulenisibeingconfirmed.Forthe

reasonssetoutaboveIamoftheviewthatafinalrestraintordershouldbe

grantedagainstseconddefendant.Insofarassecondrespondentisconcerned,

itismyviewthattherulenisishouldbedischarged.

[25]Theonlyremainingissuerelatestocosts.Applicantscounselrequestedme

toawardcoststotheapplicantintheeventofitbeingsuccessfulinobtaininga

finalrestraintorder.Inmyviewitwouldbeinappropriatetodosoatthisstage,

andIproposetomakeanordersimilartothatmadein Phillips(WLD), namely

thatthecostsofthisapplicationarereservedfordeterminationbythiscourtafter

finalisation of the criminal trial and, in the event of both or either of the

defendantsbeingconvicted,theoutcomeofanyapplicationforaconfiscation

order.Astheapplicanthasbeenunsuccessfulinsofarassecondrespondentis

concerned,itismyviewthatheshouldbeorderedtopayhercosts.
 20

Thefollowingorderismade:

1. The rule nisi is confirmed against first defendant; second

defendant; first respondent; third respondent and fourth

respondent.

2. The costs of this application, insofar as they relate to the

defendants and respondents referred to in paragraph 1, are

reserved for determination by this Court after finalisation of the

criminaltrialand,intheeventofaconvictionoffirstdefendantand/

orseconddefendant,theoutcomeofanysubsequentapplication

foraconfiscationorder.

3. Theruleisdischargedagainstsecondrespondent,withcosts.

_________________________
J.J.NEPGEN
JUDGEOFTHEHIGHCOURT