A.C. No. 3919 January 28, 1998SOCORRO T. CO,vs.
wasnotconsummatedasrespondentlatersoldthesamecarto
ATTY.GODOFREDON.BERNARDINO,
FACTS:
Socorro T. Co alleged that in asshe was following up the
documentsforhershipmentattheBureauofCustoms,shewas
approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N.Bernardino,
introducinghimselfassomeoneholdingvariouspositionsinthe
Bureau ofCustoms. Respondent offered to help complainant
andpromisedtogivehersomebusinessattheBureau.Inno
time, theybecame friends and a month after,respondent
succeeded inborrowing from complainant P120,000.00 with
the promiseto paythe amount infull thefollowing month,
broadlyhinting that he could use hisinfluence at the Bureau
ofCustoms to assist her.To ensure payment, respondent
issuedtocomplainantseveralpostdatedchecks.However,the
checkscoveringweredishonoredforinsufficiencyoffunds
andclosureofaccount.Respondenttoldcomplainantthathe
wouldbeabletopayherifshewouldlendhimanadditional
amountofP75,000.00tobepaidamonthaftertobesecuredby
achattelmortgageonhisDatsuncar.
Ascomplainantagreedrespondenthandedherthree(3)copies
ofadeedofchattelmortgageandsix(6)copiesofthedeedof
sale of hiscar with the assurance that hewould turn over
itsregistration certificate and official receipt. The agreement
another. Despite several chances given him to settle
hisobligation respondent chose to evadecomplainant so
thatshe was constrained to write him afinal demand letter
precedingthefilingofseveralcriminalcomplaintsagainsthim
for violation ofBP Blg.22.Complainant alsofiled a letter
complaintwiththeOfficeoftheOmbudsman.
Bywayofdefense,respondentaverredthathegavethechecks
tocomplainantCobywayofrediscountingandthatthesewere
fullypaidwhenhedeliveredfivecellularphonestoher.
ISSUE:
Whetheralawyermaybesanctionedformisconductinhis
privatecapacity
RULING
:Whileitistruethattherewasnoattorneyclientrelationship
between complainant and respondent as the transaction
betweenthemdidnotrequiretheprofessionallegalservices
ofrespondent,neverthelessrespondent'sobjectconductmerits
condemnation from thisCourt. As a generalrule, a court
willnotassumejurisdictiontodisciplineoneofitsofficersfor
misconduct committed inhis private capacity. But this is a
generalrulewithmanyexceptions...Thenatureoftheoffice,
thetrustrelationwhichexistsbetweenattorneyandclient,as
wellas between court and attorney, andthe statutory rules
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require
thatanattorneyshallbeapersonofgoodmoralcharacter.So
itshield that an attorney will beremoved not only for
malpracticeanddishonestyinhisprofession,butalsoforgross
misconductnotconnectedwithhisprofessionalduties,which
shows him to beunfit for the officeand unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, which
requiresthat"alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,
immoralordeceitfulconduct.""Conduct,"asusedinthisRule,
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1)
YEARfromthepracticeoflawwithwarningthatrepetitionof
thesameorsimilaractswillmeritamoreseverepenalty.
is not limited toconduct exhibited in connection with the
performance of professional duties. In the case at bar,it is
glaringlyclearthattheprocurementofpersonalloansthrough
insinuationsofhispowerasaninfluencepeddlerintheBureau
of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and
thetaking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid
governmentofficeconstituteconductingrossviolationofRule
1.01ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility
NAPOLEON ANTAZO,petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON.
COURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.
ALAMPAY,J.:
This is a petition for certiorari directed against the decision
dated October 21, 1976 rendered by the Court of Appeals,
affirmingtheconvictionofthepetitionerhereinforthecrime
ofestafabytheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,inCriminal
Case No. 326M. Petitioner prays that the judgment of the
courts below which he assails be set aside, and that his
acquittalbedecreedbythisCourt.
The antecedent facts of this case disclose that petitioner
NapoleonAntazo,aresidentofBinagonan,Rizal,alawyer
andaretiredmunicipaljudge,wastheownerofaparcelof
landknownwithanareaof1,452squaremetersknownasLot
No.2ofPsd9594,situatedatBarrioCalumpang,Binangonan,
RizalandcoveredbyTCTNo.147525.
InMay,1965,MarianoMedinaexpressedhisinteresttobuya
portionofsaidlotfromNapoleonAntazo.AntazoandMedina
proceededtothesiteofthelotandthelatterdecidedtobuya property.
portionofsaidproperty,moreparticularlydescribedasLotNo.
2A2whichhasanareaof295squaremeters.
Subsequently,AntazoandMedinaenteredintoacontractof
Purchase and Sale on June 18, 1965. Under this contract,
NapoleonAntazoinconsiderationoftheamountofP4,277.00
tobepaidtohimininstallmentbythespousesMedina,bound
himselftoselltheaforementionedLot2A2;NapoleonAntazo
likewiseobligedhimselftodelivertothesaidSpousesMedina
the title to this portion of land "free from all liens and
encumbrances"uponfullpaymentbythesaidvendeesofthe
purchaseprice.Intheirsaidcontractofpurchaseandsale,it
was, however, expressly stipulated therein that before the
completion of the installment payments by the vendees, the
ownership of the property would remain with Napoleon
Antazo.
OnAugust19,1965,thevendor,NapoleonAntazo,withoutthe
knowledgeorconsentofMarianoMedina,mortgagedtothe
Binagonan Rural Bank for the amount of THREE
THOUSAND(P3,000.00)PESOS,theentireLotNo.2A,thus
includingLot2A2whichearlier,wasagreedtobesoldtothe
Medinas. This mortgage to the Binagonan Rural Bank
significantlywasdischargedonlyonAugust14,1971.
OnJuly16,1966theMedinascompletedtheirpaymentofthe
installments on Lot 2A2. Thereupon they demanded from
NapoleonAntazo,thedeliveryofthetitleforLot2A2andthe
executionofthecorrespondingabsoluteDeedofSaleforsaid
On August 12, 1966 Napoleon Antazo executed a deed of
absolute sale forthe lot in question with a statement in his
DeedofConveyancethatthesubjectlandsoldis"freefromall
liens and encumbrances". At that point of time, there was,
however, still an existing mortgage thereon in favor of the
BinagonanRuralBank.
DespiteseveraldemandsbythevendeesMedinasonvendor
Antazo,saidvendorfailedtodelivertothemaseparatetitle
coveringLot2A2.Sometimein1970,theMedinaswentto
theRegisterofDeedsofRizaltoinvestigatethetitleoftheland
soldtothembyAntazoanditwasthenthattheydiscovered
that there was a mortgage lien onsaid land in favor ofthe
BinagonanRuralBankandthatasidefromthisencumbrance,
there was also a levy on execution upon the same land by
virtueofthedecisionoftheCityCourtofManila,inCivilCase
No. 134430, entitled Philippine National Bank, versus
NapoleonAntazo,inscribedonSeptember27,1967onthetitle
oftheland.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered its
decisiononAugust14,1971,thedispositiveportionofwhich
ishereunderquoted:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Napoleon Antazo guilty beyond reasonable
doubtasprincipalofthecrimeofestafa,defined
andpenalizedunderparagraph2,Article316,
Revised Penal Code and there being no
mitigatingoraggravatingcircumstance,hereby
sentencedhimtosufferanimprisonmentoftwo
(2)monthsandone(1)dayofarrestomayorand
topayafineofP4,277.00representingtheprice
ofthepurchasedlotpaidbyMarianoMedinato
thedefendantwithsubsidiaryimprisonmentin
caseofinsolvencyattherateofP2.50aday,but
shallnotexceed1/3oftheprincipalpenalty,nor
shallitbemorethanone(1)yearandtopaythe
costs.

TheMedinasthroughtheirlawyer,wrotealetteronFebruary
2,1970,toNapoleonAntazodemandingthedeliverytothem
ofacleartitletoLotNo.2A2.NoreplywasmadebyAntazo
tosaidletterdemandnotwithstandinghisreceiptthereof.Thus,
on May 4, 1971, predicated on the facts aboverecited,
NapoleonAntazowaschargedwiththecrimeofestafabefore
theCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,BranchVI,Makati.Said
criminalcasewasdocketedasCriminalCaseNo.326M.
xxxxxxxxx
Thepetitionerhereinappealedtheaforestateddecisiontothe
CourtofAppeals.OnOctober21,1976,theFifthDivisionof
saidAppellateCourtaffirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourt
withmodificationbutonlyastothesubsidiaryimprisonment
of the accusedappellant in case of his failure to pay the
imposedfineduetohisinsolvency,whichtheCourtofAppeals
fixedattherateofEIGHT(P8.00)PESOSforeverydayhe
should serve, but not to exceed onethird of the principal
penalty,whichshallnotalsoexceedoneyear.
The facts of this case do not appear to be disputed. The
principalissuethatshouldberesolvediswhetheronthefacts
foundbythecourtsbelow,thepetitioner,NapoleonAntazo,
shouldbeadjudgedguiltyofmisrepresentation,fraudordeceit.
TheCourtofAppealsinitsdecisionstatedthefollowing:
Wefullyagreewiththeobservationofthetrial
court that "as a lawyer and an exmunicipal
judge at that, who is conversant with the
intricaciesofthelaw,itislikelythattheaccused
inserted the aforementioned phrase to fully
convincethecomplainantofthesupposednon
existence of any liability on the disputed
property."
In his fourth assignment of error, defendant
appellantNapoleonAntazovainlytriedtoraise
anissuebypointingoutthatthetrialcourterred
in not applying the ruling of the Court of
AppealsdecidedcaseofPeoplevs.Pedrasa(62
O.G.5571).Butwehavescrutinizedthefacts
involvedinbothcasesinthatandintheinstant
caseand We cannot but fully agree with the
argumentoftheSolicitorGeneralthattheruling
of this Court inPeople vs. Pedrasacannot be
made to apply in the present case. Even
assuming 'that the case ofPeople vs.
Guanio(CA 67 O.G. 4231) did not expressly
supersedethePedrasacase,still,thefactsofthis
caseandthePedrasacasediffersubstantially.In
the latter case the appellant (Pedrasa) was no
longertheownerofthelandatthetimehesold
it to the complainant (Vera). Neither was the
mortgageonthesamelandvalid.....(Decision
of the Court ofAppeals; CAG.R.No.15653
CR,Rollo,pp.3435).
We are in complete accord with the observation and
pronouncementsmadebythecourtbelowinitsdecision.
Petitioner, however, has raised as before this Court the
followingquestionswhichhesubmitstobealegalissue.
WastherefraudanddeceitconstitutiveofEstafa
under Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
committedbyPetitionerwhenheenteredintoa
ContractofPurchaseandSaleonJune18,1965,
oninstallmentbasis,andthereafterexecutinga
DeedofAbsoluteSaleonAugust12,1966upon
completion of the installment payments but
prior to the redemption of the mortgage
constitutedontheentiretyofthesubdivisionlot
ofwhichthepropertyinquestionwasincluded?
(MemorandumforPetitioner,Rollo,p.119).
Thesubmissionofthepetitionerhereinisthattheinstantcase
estafahasnotbeencommitted.Petitionercontendsthatduring
theexecutionoftheDeedofAbsoluteSale,nopaymentwas
made either coetaneously or subsequently by the private
complainant as full payment had already been made in
accordancewiththeContractofPurchaseandSaleofJune18,
1965.AlthoughPetitioneracknowledgeshisfailuretocomply
withhisobligationtodeliverthetitleofthepurchasedlotfree
from all liens andencumbrances, he argues that he is NOT
guiltyofthefraudordeceitforwhichhecouldbeindictedfor
estafa because a mere promise to perform a thing is not a
representationwhichconstitutesadeceitandfailuretoperform
such promise does not change its character. Petitioner
maintainsthattheintentiontodefraudmustexistcoetaneous
withtheallegeddeceitfulact,citingthepronouncementsinthis
regardmadeinthecaseofPeoplevs.Villarin,CAG.R.No.
10598R,October31,1953,50O.G.262).
WefindthesecontentionsofPetitioneruntenable.Weuphold
rathertheargumentofthepublicrespondentPeoplethatthere
aretwostagesinthesalestransactioninvolvedinthiscase,
namely: the first stage was when Medina entered into a
contract of Purchase and Sale on June 18, 1965, with the
Appellantherein,forthepurchaseofthelotinquestionfor
P4,277.00,ofwhichP1,500.00wastobepaidinadvanceby
Medina;thatthisContractofPurchaseandSaleis,merelya
contracttosellforitisexpresslystatedthereinthatownership
ofthepropertywouldberetainedbyVendorNapoleonAntazo,
until the full payment of the price has been made by the
Medinas.Untilthefullpriceispaid,theobligationoftheseller
totransferownershipanddeliveracleartitletotheproperty
wouldnotyetarise.Itisourviewhoweverthattherealready
attaches even at that time the inherent commitment of the
vendorthatthecorrespondingclearandvalidtitlewouldbe
transferredbyhimtohisvendeeuponaccomplishmentbythe
latterofthestipulatedconditionsagreeduponbythem.
ThesecondstagewouldbeonAugust19,1965whenappellant
mortgaged the property to the Binagonan Rural Bank,
presumably with the intention of redeeming it prior to the
completionoftheinstallmentpaymentsbycomplainant.When
complainantMedinapaidthelastinstallmentonthepurchase
priceonJuly16,1966,andthendemandedtheexecutionofan
absolutedeedofsalecoveringthepurchasedpropertyandthe
deliveryofthetitleofsaidlandtohim,PetitionerNapoleon
Antazo prepared and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exhibit B) containing the express warranty that the lot in
questionisfreefromallliensandencumbranceswhenitwas
notinfactsoatthattime.Itwasthenstillmortgagedinfavor
oftheBinangonanRuralBankandtherewasalsoalevyon
executiononthesamelandonaccountofthedecisionofthe
City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 134430, entitled
"PhilippineNationalBankvs.NapoleonAntazo"(ExhibitC2),
dulyinscribedonthetitleofsaidpropertyonSeptember27,
1967, It cannot be said that there was no money or
consideration paid for when the deed of Absolute Sale was
executed on August 12, 1966. Such document of sale or
conveyancewasexecutedbypetitionerbecausefullpayment
hadalreadybeeneffectedpreviouslybycomplainantMedina,
whotherefore,demandedthatthecorrespondingdeedofsale
bemade.
Itwouldbeatthissecondstageofthetransactionwhendeceit
wasexercisedbyAppellantAntazo,aformerMunicipalJudge
ofAngono,Rizal.HeplacedanexpresswarrantyintheDeed
ofAbsoluteSalethatthelotinquestionisfreefromallliens
andencumbrances,whenitwasnotsoinfact.
Asfraudinvolvesactsorspokenorwrittenwordsbyapartyto
misleadanotherintobelievingafacttobetruewhenitisnotin
fact that express warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale
coveringthelotinquestion(ExhibitB)thatsaidlandis"free
from all liens and encumbrances" constitutes the false
representationordeceitandoneoftheelementsgivingriseto
thecrimeofestafa.(Peoplevs.Galsim107Phil.303).
PetitionerAntazocannotrightfullyclaimthatnodamageson
ComplainantMedinawasbroughtaboutbythefalsewarranty
madeintheDeedofAbsoluteSale.MarianoMedina'sdamage
inherentlyconsistsinhisinabilitytoreceiveapropertyfree
fromencumbrances.Astherightfulvendee,hewouldacquire
titletothepropertybutsubjecttotherestrictionsoftheexisting
liens. When Mariano Medina entered into a contract of
purchaseandsaleonJune18,1965hedidnotexpectthatthe
petitioner herein would later impose encumbrances on the
property.Itcanbelogicallyassumedthathereinvendeeswould
have refrained from buying the land or declined to pay the
installments agreed upon if they had any inkling that
encumbranceswouldlaterbeimposedonthepropertybytheir
vendees. For this Court to condone the conduct of the
petitionerappellant would encourage mischievous practices,
conduciveofmuchharmtoprospectiverealestatebuyers.
Theotherargumentofthepetitioneristhatthecomplainant
MarianoMedinamustbeconsideredtobefullyawareofthe
encumbrancesoftitleofthepropertyinquestionassuchfacts
arerecordedintheRegisterofPropertyofRizalatthetimeof
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on August 12,
1966.Onthepremisethattheregistrationofthemortgagein
favoroftheBinangonanRuralBankintheRegisterofDeedsis
anoticetothewholeworldofitsexistence,petitionertherefore
submits that complainant must be presumed in law to have
alreadyknowledgeofsaidencumbrancebeforehecompleted
hispaymentsfortheland,negatinganyinferenceofdeceitfor
whichhecouldbeheldcriminallyliablefor.
This contention of petitioner is devoid of merit. For said
offensetobecommitted,itisonlyenoughtoconsiderhisfalse
pretenses or misrepresentations in the deed of sale that the
subject Lot No. 2A2 is unencumbered when in fact a
mortgagelienstillexistsinfavoroftheruralbank.Thatsuch
encumbrance is recorded assumes no significance. What is
pertinentandrelevantisthefactthatsuchfalserepresentations
ofpetitionernolessservedastheingredientsofdeceitfoisted
onthecomplainantvendee.Ourlawsdonotcompelavendee
to make an inquiry or to undertake an investigation in the
OfficeoftheRegisterofDeeds,toascertainthestatusofthe
propertyinvolved.Thevendeecanrelyonthemanifestations
made to him by his vendor whom he can presume to be
trustworthy.Whatisimportantisthatthevendeemustbedealt
with in good faith by his vendor and the conduct of the
petitionerhereininconnectionwiththesaleofthesubjectlot
manifestlydisclosethecontrary.Thesuppressionofmaterial
informationandthefalserepresentationsbypetitionerthatthe
property which complainant paid for is free from liens and
encumbrancesisclearlyadeceptiontoputofforforestallthe
petitioner's appellants' concommittant obligation to deliver a A.C.No.554January3,1969
cleartitletothelandsold.
BRIGIDO TOQUIB,complainant,
WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariinthiscaseishereby vs.
dismissedforlackofmerit. ATTY.VALERIANOTOMOL,JR.,respondent.

SANCHEZ,J.:

Theproblembeforeusiswhetherornotrespondenthaslived
up to his lawyer's oath that he would conduct himself as a
lawyer,inthewordsofSection3,Rule138oftheRulesof
Court,"tothebestofmyknowledgeanddiscretion."

Thefactsthatgaverisetothiscasearethefollowing:

Respondentattorney,ValerianoTomol,Jr.,wascounselfor
complainant's father, octogenarian Hermogenes Toquib,
defendant in Civil Case No. R958 of the Court of First
InstanceofSouthernLeyte,entitled"TeodulodePaz,etal.,
Plaintiffs,versusHermogenesToquib,Defendant"forrecovery
ofpossessionofaparcelofland.
X
byTurboMac
After plaintiffs closed their evidence in the court below,
respondent moved that the deposition of defendant
HermogenesToquibbetakeninviewofhisadvancedageand
inability to attend the hearing at Maasin. The lower court
grantedhismotion.Butat2:00o'clockp.m.ofDecember22,
1960,thescheduleddateofthetakingofthedepositionbefore
theJusticeofthePeaceofHinunangan,defendantToquibdid
notappear.Whenat3:00o'clockintheafternoonthewouldbe
deponent was still not available, respondent moved for
postponement. The judge denied his motion, informed the
partiesthenpresentthathewouldsubmitareporttotheCourt
ofFirstInstance,whichhedid.
OnMay19,1961,theCourtofFirstInstanceissuedanorder ask him for a copy of the decision. Respondent gave
considering the case submitted for decision in view of
defendant'sfailuretoattendthescheduleddeposition.
OnMay25,1961,thesamecourtrenderedjudgmentinfavor
ofplaintiffsdeclaringthemthetrueandrealownersofthereal
propertyindispute,orderingdefendanttovacatethesame,and
topaydamagesfortheoccupationthereof.
Between June and August, 1961, complainant, on several
occasions,wenttoseerespondentinquiringaboutthestatusof
thecaseandaskingwhenhisfather'sturntopresentevidence
wouldcome.Respondent,however,consistentlyadvisedhimto
waitforthenoticeofhearing.
SometimeinJune,1962,complainantsfatherreceivedawrit
of execution served upon him by the provincial sheriff.
Complainantpromptlywenttoseerespondent,askedhimthe
reason therefor, since his father had not even presented his
evidence.Respondentadvisedcomplainanttotellhisfatherto
acceptthewrit.1awphil.t
Because respondent did not take any action in the case,
complainantengagedtheservicesofAtty.RomeoGomezwho
filedanoticeofappeal.Complainantcheckedtherecordofthis
case,foundthatrespondent,asearlyasJune7,1961,received
copy of the decision through Manuel Labrador whom he
authorizedtoreceivemailmattersinhisbehalf.
Atty.Gomezadvisedcomplainanttogobacktorespondentto
complainantfordeliverytoAtty.GomezaletterdatedJuly1,
1962.Inthatletter,respondentstatedthathehadnotreceived
copyofthedecisionbutsuggestedthatAtty.Gomez"studythe
possibility of filing an action for annulment of the decision
inasmuch as the reglementary period for filing a motion to
vacatethejudgmentunderthesameproceedingshasalready
lapsed".
X
byTurboMac
 Came the administrative complaint before this Court. We
gave due course. By resolution of December 3, 1962, we
required respondent toanswer in 10days fromnotice. That
resolutionwas receivedbyrespondentonJanuary14,1963.
Respondentsimplyfiledapetitionprayingthatcomplainantbe
orderedtofurnishhimcopiesofcertaindocuments.Buteven
afterhisrequestwasgranted,respondentdidnotasmuchas
bother to file his answer to the administrative complaint as
requiredinouraforesaidresolutionofDecember3,1962.
Following the investigation, the Solicitor General filed his
reportrecommendingthatrespondentbesuspendedfromhis
officeaslawyerforaperiodofsix(6)months.Havingonfile
the Solicitor General's complaint and the answer thereto
pursuanttoSection5,Rule139oftheRulesofCourt,aswell
asthememorandaoftheparties,thecaseisnowbeforeusfor
decision.
Fortworeasons,respondentmustbesuspended.
First.Thefailureofdefendant'sdepositionofDecember22,
1960shouldhavebroughthometorespondenttheprecarious
situationinwhichhisclientwasthenfound.Heknewthatthe
onlyevidenceonrecordinthecivilcaseisthatpresentedby
plaintiffs. It should have dawned upon him then that as a
lawyerwhocontrolledmattersoflegalprocedureforhisclient,
itwasproperlyhisdutytomakerepresentationstothecourtto
withholdactiononthecaseandtoaskforanotherdateforthe
takingofdefendant'sdeposition.Hefailedtodoso.Hisexcuse
that"hehadnotyetconferredandagreedwithcomplainantas
tothedateoftheavailabilityofhisfather'spresence",ispoor,
indeed.Heshouldhavethoughtthatthecasecouldnotremain
in the calendar indefinitely; and that the judge could have
declared the case submitted for decision for lack of proper
representationsonhispartforthepresentationofdefendant's
evidence.HedidnothingbetweenDecember22,1960toMay
19,1961.Ineffect,thecourt,onMay19,1961,declaredthe
casesubmittedfordecision.Intheordinarycourseofbusiness,
he must have received a copy of this order. Again, he did
nothing.
BetweenJuneandAugust,1961,complainantinquiredfrom
respondent about the status of this case, asked him when
defendant'sturntopresentevidencewouldtakeplace.Andyet,
respondentconsistentlyadvisedhimtowaitforthenoticeof
hearing.
The Solicitor General in his report stated: "Respondent's
inactionevincesneglectonhisparttoprotecttheinterestsof
hisclient."
Second.CopyofthedecisionofMay25,1961wasserved
uponrespondentthroughManuelLabrador,onJune7,1961.
Respondentwouldwanttoshakeofftheilleffectsofthisfact
bysayingthatLabradorhadnoauthorityfromhimtoreceive
registeredmails.Itwaswrongforhimtosayso.
At that time, respondent was Mayor of Silago. Manuel
LabradorwasanemployeeoftheSilagopostoffice.Labrador
testified that there was an arrangement between him and
respondentthatLabradorwouldgivetorespondent'ssecretary
all mail matters addressed to respondent. Labrador admitted
thathereceivedinbehalfofrespondentthemailcoveringthe
decisionofthecaseaddressedtorespondentanddelivereditto
thelatter'ssecretary.Heaverredthathedeliveredmailmatters
forrespondentinidenticalmannercountlessoftimes.Notthat
Labrador is not telling the truth. For, respondent himself
corroborated Labrador. Respondent declared that whatever
mails were addressed to him were to be delivered to his
secretarybyManuelLabrador.
Respondenttooknostepstoprotecttheinterestsofhisclient
onthefaceofthatadversedecision.Whichhecouldhavevery
welldone.Because,respondentstayedatSilagosincehewas
electedMayorthereofin1959.Silagoisonly17kilometers
fromHinunangan,residenceofcomplainantandhisfather.He
didnotasmuchasnotifyhisclientthereof.Hehadallowedthe
statutoryperiodforappealtolapse.Hedidnotevenprocure
fromthecourtrelieffromsuchjudgment.
Canon15oftheCanons ofProfessionalEthics warnsthat
"(t)helawyerowes"entiredevotiontotheinterestoftheclient,
warmzealinthemaintenanceanddefenseofhisrightsandthe
exertion of his utmost learning and ability', to the end that
nothingbetakenorbewithheldfromhim,savebytherulesof
law,legallyapplied."Hefailedinhisdevotiontotheinterestof
hisclient.1Worse,hisconductwhich,inthelanguageofthis
CourtinBlanzavs.Arcangel,Adm.Case492,September5,
1967,shouldbeuptothelevelof"parexcellence",is,onthe
contrary,evenreprehensible.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered suspending
AttorneyValerianoTomol,Jr.fromthepracticeoflawforone
(1)yearfromthedatethisjudgmentbecomesfinal.

Thisisnotacaseofsimplelaxitynorofmerefailuretoserve
a client's interests. It goes farther. It is the attorney's
insensibilitytothemisfortuneofhisclientbroughtaboutbyan
adverse decision occasioned by the attorney's own gross
negligence.Surelyenough,suchindifferenceisnotchesbelow
thestandardrequiredofhisofficeasalawyer.

EUGENIO MAGO,Complainant, v. ATTY. ELISEO
BOTE,Respondent
The respondent was charged with gross negligence for not
having paid proper attention to the prosecution of the
complainantsactionfordamages,resultinginitsdismissaland
thelatterslossofalegitimateclaimforP34,000.00againstthe
defendant.
It was alleged that the respondent was retained by the
complainanttoprosecutethisclaimandenteredhisappearance
on behalf of the plaintiff on January 4, 1960. After the
complainanthadrestedhiscase,thedefensepresenteditsmain
witness,thedefendantherself,buttherespondentwasnotthen
able to crossexamine her for lack of time. That was on
September 19, 1960, and that was also the last time the
respondent appeared in this case. 2
OnNovember6,1962,thelateJudgeFranciscoO.Geronimo
issued an order, reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Itappearingthatthiscasehasbeenpendingsince1959,and
that since the last order dated September 19, 1960, neither
partyhastakenanysteptoprosecutefurtherthiscase,andit
appearing furthermore that the counsel for the plaintiff has
movedtoanunknownaddresswithoutinformingthiscourt,it
isorderedthatthiscasebeasitisherebydismissed,without
prejudicetotherightofeitherpartytoassertinanewaction
theirrespectiveclaims,shouldtheydesiretolitigatefurther.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED." 3
ThecomplainantlearnedofthisorderonlyonApril12,1974,
ortwelveyearslater,whenheinquiredaboutthestatusofhis
casefromcourtpersonnel.Earlier,accordingtohim,hehad
1 periodicallyaskedaboutthesamematterfromtherespondent,
who had assured him he would be informed about it. The
respondent later changed his address without notifying the
complainant or the court. 4
This complaint was referred for investigation, report and
recommendationtotheSolicitorGeneral,5who,afterhearing
theparties,filedhisownadministrativecomplaintagainstthe
respondent based on the earlier complaint and on his own
findings. 6
Inrefutationofthecharges,therespondentsimplydeniesthat
he received any notice from the court but does notstate or
provethatheinformeditofhis changeofaddress.Healso
claimsthatheandthecomplainanthadaquarrelsometimein
1961,beforethecasewasdismissed,andthatasaresulthehad
terminatedtheirlawyerclientrelationship.7Thereisnothing
intherecordthathehadformallywithdrawnascounselforthe
complainant. On the contrary, he was still the attorney of
record for the plaintiff when Civil Case No. 39004 was towardhisclientandactedinamannerunbecomingamember
dismissed on November 6, 1962. of the Bar.

Itappearsthatsince1960therespondenthadnotliftedafinger WHEREFORE,therespondentissuspendedfromthepractice
to further press the private complainants claim or even to oflawforaperiodofoneyear,effectiveimmediately.Itisso
verifyitsstatus.Thereisalsoevidencethataftertheprivate ordered.
complainantbroughtthismattertothisCourt,therespondent
andhiswifetwiceofferedhimapieceoflandinconsideration
of the withdrawal of his complaint. 8

Theargumentraisedbytherespondentthatthecomplainants
casewasweakanywaydoesnotdeserveseriousconsideration.
In the first place, he himself recommended against the
defendants offer of amicable settlement, insisting that the
complainantscasewasstrong.9Inthesecondplace,hewould
nothaveacceptedthecaseifhethoughtithadnoprospects,
especiallysincehewouldbepaidonlyonacontingentbasis.

Inanyevent,thisdefenseisnojustificationforabandoningthe
case.complainantguiltyoflaches.Therecordshowsthatthe
complainant filed his complaint on December 24, 1974, 11
afterlearningofthedismissalofhiscaseonlyonApril12,
1974.Itisnottruethatthecomplainantsleptonhisrightfor
twelveyearsforhewasinformedoftheorderofdismissalonly
eight months before he filed his complaint.

TheCourtisconvincedthattherespondentgrosslyneglected
the complainants case, to the latters prejudice. In so
comporting himself, the respondent violated his ethical duty

ArrietavsIlosa
FACTS:AdisbarmentcasewasfiledagainstAtty.Llosaby
Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute
sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to its
execution.Inanswer,respondentadmittedhavingnotarizedthe
DeedofAbsoluteSale.Butbeforeaffixinghisnotarialseal,he
first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified
theidentitiesof the signatories, and determined the
voluntarinessofitsexecution.
However,inalaterdate,therespondentsoughttodismissthe
disbarmentcaseadmittingtothefacttheinstantcaseisonlya
product of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some
facts andis now convinced that everything is inorder.The
designated Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
recommendedthedismissaloftheinstantcase.TheBoardof
GovernorsoftheIBPadoptedtheaboverecommendationand
resolvedtodismisstheinstantcaseafterfindingnocompelling
reasontocontinuewiththedisbarmentproceedings.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or
suspendedfrompracticeoflaw.
HELD:YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six
months from practice of law with a warning that
anotherinfractionwill be dealt with more severely. Citing
Section1ofPublicActNo.2103alsoknownastheNotarial
law, the SupremeCourtexplained
theimportanceofadherenceto said law as part of the
responsibility of a duly deputized authority to conduct such
notarial process. Duediligenceis to be observed, this being
part of alawyersprofessional responsibility and procedural
lapseisnotanexcusetocatertotheconvenienceofclients.
Anyviolationistantamounttomisconduct.Suchmisconductis
agroundfordisbarmentasstatedbytheSection27ofRule138
oftheRulesofCourt.Furthermore,theSupremeCourtstressed
theprimaryresponsibilityoflawyersasstatedinCanonIofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibilitythatalawyershalluphold
theConstitution,obeythelawsofthelandandpromoterespect
forlawandlegalprocesses.Alawyermustalsorefrainfrom
engaginginunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
andcounsellor,whichincludestatutorygroundsenumeratedin
Section27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourt,allofthesebeing
broadenoughtocoverpracticallyanymisconductofalawyer
in his professional or private capacity may be disbarred or
suspended.
A.C.No.215December29,1962 sincerely" her "own wish" and had been "prompted by ill
MERCEDES H. SOBERANO,complainant,
vs.
EUGENIOV.VILLANUEVA,respondent.
CONCEPCION,J.:
OnMarch12,1955,complainantMercedesH.Soberanofiled
withthisCourtapetitionallegingthat,afterinducingherto
take part, in December 1951, in a fake wedding under the
belief, on her part, that it was a genuine and valid one,
respondentEugenioV.Villanuevacohabitedwithherandlater
livedwithherashusbandandwife,asaconsequenceofwhich
she bore him two (2) children, and that, subsequently, he
abandonedherandtheirchildren,andpraying,therefore,that
hebedisbarred.Soonthereafter,shefiledacommunication,
datedMarch21,askingthatherpetitionbe"shelved";thatno
actionbetakenthereon"untilafterhermotherhavearrivedand
decidedonthe,matter";andthatmeanwhile"noperson",not
even respondent, be informed of said petition. This
communication was followed by another, dated March 22,
1955,statingthatcomplainant'smotherhadjustarrivedand
thatshe(themother)had"decidedthatthecasemustgoon".
OnMarch29,1955,and,also,thenextday,thisCourtreceived
identifyhandwrittenmotionsofthecomplainant,datedMarch
28, 1955, stating that the filing of said petition was "not
adviceundulyinfluencing"her,and"finallywithdrawing"her
complaintagainstrespondentVillanueva.However,onApril2,
1955,complaintfiledanother"manifestation"prayingthatsaid
motionforwithdrawalofherpetitionbedenied,respondent
having secured the motion "by means of threats and
intimidation".
Inhisanswerrespondentdeniedthemainallegations ofthe
petition,particularlythosereferringtotheallegedlysimulated
marriageandtohishavinglivedwithcomplainantashusband
andwife,althoughheadmittedhavingbeenintimatewithher.
Uponinvestigation,theSolicitorGeneral,towhomthematter
wasreferred,filedthecorrespondingcomplaintfordisbarment,
which is asubstantial reproductionofcomplainant's petition
for disbarment. In his answer to this complaint, respondent
reiteratedthedenialsandallegationscontainedinhisanswerto
said petition, and, in addition thereto, he set up "special
defenses" as well as expressed the wish to present further
evidence, which he was authorized to introduce and did
introducebeforeanofficerofthisCourt.Afterduehearingand
the submission of memoranda, the matter was deemed
submittedfordecision.
Thefirstquestionfordeterminationiswhetherornottherehas
beenasimulatedmarriagebetweenthepartiesherein.Theonly
evidence thereon is complainant's testimony. Although she
introduced, by way of corroboration, the testimony of one
BeatrizJuada,thelattermerelyclaimedtohaveseenaprinted
formofmarriagecontract,withthenamesofthecomplainant
and therespondenttypewrittenatthe bottom thereof. Beatriz
didnotevennoticewhetherornotthereweresignaturesatthe
bottomofsaidinstrument.
Upontheotherhand,complainant'sbehaviorbeliesherclaim
totheeffectthat,believing,inviewoftheallegedmarriage
ceremonyinDecember1951,thatrespondentwasherhusband,
sheconsentedtocohabitwithhim,andlaterlivedwithhimas
hislawfulweddedwife.Indeed,inherletter(Exhibit16)to
respondent, dated January 23, 1955 or over three (3)
yearsaftertheaforementionedceremonysheremindedhim
ofhisunfulfilledpromisetomarryherafterhepassedthebar
examinationin1954,thusleavingnoroomfordoubtthatshe
didnotconsiderhimasherhusbandandthattherehadfake
weddingin1951.Again,herletterstohim,Exhibits1,26,2,3,
6and7,dated,respectively,July19,andSeptember6,10and
12,1950,andFebruary24,1951madereferencetotheirtryst
inhotels,toherdelayedmenstruation,tothepossibilityofher
beinginthefamilywayandtotheneedofseeingaphysician
inconnectiontherewith,and,accordingly,revealclearlythatin
relationshadexistedbetweenthemevenpriortoDecember,
1951.Whatismore,herlettertohim,Exhibit9,datedOctober
1, 1951, contains expressions of such a highly sensual,
tantalizingandvulgarnatureastorenderthemunquotableand
to impart the firm conviction they must have had sexual
intercourse so often that she felt no restraint whatsoever in
writinghimwithimpudicity.
Inshort,havingpossessedheratpleasure,withoutbenefitof
clergy, it is most incredible that respondent would
subsequently resorttoa simulatedweddingorder tocohabit
with her. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that in
September, 1953, she went to the National Bureau of
Investigation and expressed the wish a complaint against
respondent he having refused knowledge his offspring and
failedtosupporther.WhentheAssistantDirectorofsaidoffice
inquiredwhetherrespondentandsheweremarried,heranswer
wasinthenegative.Itisclear,therefore,thattheallegedfake
marriagewaspurelyafigmentofherimagination,withoutany
factualbasiswhatever.lawphil.net
The next question is whether the extramarital relations
betweentheparties,beforerespondent'sadministrationtothe
Bar,warrantdisciplinaryactionagainsthim.Theruleonthis
pointissetforthintheAmericanJurisprudence(Vol.5,p.416)
fromwhichwequote:
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for
misconductcommittedbeforehisadmissiontotheBar,
andthisnotwithstandingthathiscertificatetopractice
wasissuedafteraBoardofLawExaminers,asrequired
bylawpasseditsjudgmentuponhismoralcharacter
andstanding.Inorder,however,tojustifydisbarment
forbreachofgoodfaithcommittedbeforeadmission,
thetransactionoractmustbesocorruptandfalseasto
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensibletoahighdegree.
Intimacybetweenamanandawomanwhoarenotmarried,
especiallyinthelightofthecircumstancesattendingthiscase,
is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action
againstthemanasamemberoftheBar.Thisisparticularly
true in the case under consideration, for no less than the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental,whererespondentpracticeshisprofession,aswell
asDeanJeremiasMontemayoroftheCollegeofLawofthe
AteneodeManila,andtheHon.GuillermoSantos,formerly
Chairman of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission, then
PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofAgrarianRelationsandJudge
oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,havevouchedforthe
good moral character of said respondent as a worthy and
distinguishedmemberoftheBar,attestedbyhissubsequent
electionaspresidentoftheNegrosOccidentalBarAssociation.
Neithermustweoverlookthecircumstancethat,inviewofthe
factsadvertedtoaboveandothersrevealedbytherecord
which, for obvious reasons, need not be set forth in this
decision it was rather difficult for respondent to marry
complainantherein.
Oneotherpointshouldbedisposedof.Itistheallegationin
complainant's"manifestation"ofApril2,1955,totheeffect
thathermotion,datedMarch281955finallywithdrawing
herpetitionfordisbarmentofrespondenthereinbecausesaid
petition did "not sincerely" reflect her "own wish" and had
been"promptedbyilladviceundulyinfluencingher"had
beensecuredbyrespondentthrough"threatandintimidation",
andpraying,therefore,thatsaidmotionbedenied.Sufficeitto
saythattheonlyproofinsupportofsaid"manifestation"is
complainant'suncorroboratedtestimony,whichiscontradicted
byrespondent'stestimonyanddeservesnocredencenotonly
forthereasonspointedoutabovealso,becausesaidmotion
wastwicehandwrittenentiretybycomplainantherein,andher
penmanship thereon is as good and firm as that of her
aforementioned letters, admittedly made without any
semblanceofduress,thusshowingthattherewasno"threat
andintimidation"whenshepreparedsaidmotion.

Inthelightofthepeculiarconditionsobtaininginthiscase,the
complaintagainstrespondenthereinisaccordinglydismissed.
Itissoordered.